INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.722
To be read in continuation of the following articles of mine:
April 27,2011, titled " Real Masterminds of 26/11 Still at Large in Pakistan" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers45%5Cpaper4448.html
April 28,2011, titled " Incriminating Spotlight on ISI in the US" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers45%5Cpaper4454.html
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The detailed testimony of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in the case against Tahawuur Hussain Rana and some others being tried in absentia before a Chicago court has received considerable attention in India and Canada. However, the attention received in Pakistan is limited. The focus in Pakistan seems to be more on his credibility as a witness. Questions posed by the defence lawyer of Rana relating to Headley’s background as a narcotics smuggler and his alleged unreliability in money matters have received greater attention in Pakistan than in India. I do not know how the Danish press has been covering the trial.
2.There are two principal charges against Rana relating to his role in the criminal conspiracy to provide material support for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, which materialized, and a planned terrorist strike in Denmark, which did not materialize. The material support provided by Rana was in the form of purchase of air tickets for Headley, allowing Headley to pose as a member of the staff of Rana’s immigration consultancy firm during his travels to India and Denmark and allowing him to open an office of Rana’s firm in Mumbai to facilitate the collection of operational intelligence required by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the LET for the execution of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
3. Whatever evidence Headley has given in his testimony combined with other evidence such as telephone and E-Mail intercepts independently collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) having a bearing on the charges against Rana will definitely be taken into consideration by the court and the jury in deciding on the guilt or otherwise of Rana. This is a case against Rana and not against Headley. The case against Headley in which he has already made a plea bargain has not yet come up before a court. The FBI has apparently kept it for later to ensure that Headley would co-operate in getting Rana, his close friend, convicted. Headley has been co-operating till now.
4. Rana is only a co-conspirator in the case. The principal conspirators are Sajid Mir , Abu Qahafa, Mazhar Iqbal,Major Iqbal, Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha. While the principal conspirators, all based in Pakistan, have been cited by the FBI as co-accused, no action has been taken by the FBI to pressure the Government of Pakistan to arrest them and hand them over to the FBI so that they could be tried along with Rana and Headley. No explanation has been forthcoming so far as to why no action has been taken by the FBI to make Pakistan hand them over for trial in Chicago.
5. A careful study of the proceedings of the trial against Rana since it started on May 23 would indicate a two-pronged strategy by the FBI:
*Encouraging Headley to testify in detail regarding the role of the ISI and the LET without holding back any thing in order to satisfy India and convince it that there would be no attempt to cover up the role of the ISI.
*Not exercising pressure on Pakistan to arrest the persons named by Headley and to hand them over to the FBI in order to spare any embarrassment to the Government of Pakistan.
6. Will the second prong of the FBI’s strategy succeed by sparing the Government of Pakistan of any embarrassment because of the disclosures of Headley regarding the involvement of the ISI? This would depend upon the way the prosecution lawyer and the Judge sum up the proceedings for the benefit of the jury when all the testimonies are over. If they focus only on the evidence relevant to the charges against Rana, they might succeed. On the contrary, if they also focus on the charges against the absconding accused being tried in absentia, it might not.
7. What are the action options for India?
*Draw the attention of the Terrorism Monitoring Committee of the UN Security Council in terms of the UNSC Resolution No 1373 passed after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US and ask for action against the ISI for violation of the UNSC resolution. The UNSC Resolution has re-affirmed the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that “every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.”The testimony in the case against Rana has clearly shown a serious violation of this Resolution by the ISI which should be held accountable. Indian action may not succeed because of a possible Chinese veto in support of Pakistan, but that should not deter us from bringing the evidence to the notice of the UNSC Monitoring Committee.
*Insist that the US should treat the case relating to the involvement of the ISI in the Mumbai blasts on par with the involvement of the Libyan intelligence in an act of terrorism directed against a Pan Am aircraft (the famous Lockerbie case) in 1988, which resulted in the death of all the passengers and crew, many of them US nationals. The US insisted on the trial of the Libyan intelligence officers involved and the payment of compensation to the families of the victims by the Libyan Government. It succeeded on both counts. The Government of India should immediately set up a task force to study how the US handled the Lockerbie case and follow the same procedure in this case. The relatives of the victims---whether Indian or foreign nationals--- should be closely associated with the work of the Task Force. The Government of India should insist on the trial of the ISI officers involved before the Chicago court and the payment of compensation to the relatives of the victims by the Government of Pakistan.
*Re-energise our case for the declaration of Pakistan as a state-sponsor of international terrorism by the US State Department on the basis of the evidence adduced in the trial. The State Department will avoid doing it as it did after the Mumbai blasts of March 1993, but that should not deter us from taking up the case against Pakistan vigorously once again. ( 27-5-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
ATTACK ON NAVAL AIR ARM AT KARACHI---AN UPDATE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 721
B.RAMAN
There is still confusion about the total number of terrorists involved in the daring commando-style attack on PNS Mehran, the headquarters of the Pakistani Naval Air Arm, located inside the Faisal base of the Pakistan Air Force at Karachi on the night of May 22,2011. Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, had estimated the total number as six---of whom, according to him, two were killed in the fire-fight, two blew themselves up to escape capture and two managed to escape. However, in a report lodged with an adjoin8ing Police Station, the Navy has reportedly estimated the total number of terrorists involved as 10 to 12, of whom eight managed to escape.
2. Apart from the four terrorists, 10 others were also killed. These included one Naval Lieutenant, one naval rating, three members of a naval detachment of the Special Services Group (SSG), which is an inter-services group of specially-trained commandos, three members of the fire brigade and two from the Pakistani Rangers.
3. The terrorists entered the base from an adjoining residential area by climbing over the compound wall with ladders and cutting the barbed wire on top of it. They rushed to the hangars located about a KM from the wall without being detected by the search lights installed inside the base and blew up two of the three Orion P-3C aircraft and a helicopter parked there with the help of rocket-propelled grenades. About 15 members of a naval detachment of the SSG rushed to the spot and opened fire. The terrorists managed to reach a nearby tower and took shelter there. Thereafter, there was an intense fire-fight between the terrorists and the SSG detachment for nearly 17 hours before the SSG detachment managed to bring the situation under control with the help of reinforcements.
4. Considering that the entire operation lasted about 17 hours, the number of fatalities---particularly of naval personnel---was surprisingly low. The SSG and the Fire Brigade sustained more fatalities than the Navy. They were reportedly killed by gun fire from the terrorists as they were trying to put out the fire on the Orion planes.
5. The biggest damage suffered by the Navy was in respect of the two Orions. It had a holding of six, of which three are in the US for upgradation and are expected back only after November---one in December, one in June next year and one in December next year. Of the remaining three which were being used for maritime surveillance, two have been destroyed by the terrorists. Only one is available now. It is to be seen whether the US will rush to replace the two destroyed as the Pakistanis are hoping it would.
6. The destruction of the two Orions was targeted and not accidental. Even though the Orions, which are armed with Harpoon missiles, were acquired by the Pakistan Navy for use against India, they were currently being used to protect logistic shipments to the NATO forces in Afghanistan, which are unloaded at the Karachi port. Thus, the targeted destruction of the two Orions could have had the tactical objective of preventing their use for protecting the NATO logistic shipments .
7. The attempted attack on Chinese personnel accommodated inside the base, which was initially denied by the Chinese authorities, is since reported to have been admitted by them. Were the Chinese taken hostage by the terrorists? If so, how long were they in the custody of the terrorists? How were they ultimately got released? Answers to these questions are not available.
8. It has been reported that 11 Chinese were living inside the base. In addition, six Americans were working inside the base, but it is not known whether they were living inside the base or in hotels outside. From the fact that there were no reports of any of the Americans being taken hostage, one could infer that the Americans were probably living in a hotel and were not present in the base on the night of May 22 when the terrorists struck.
9. According to unconfirmed reports, the Americans were from the Lockheed Martin company, which has an on-going contract with the Pakistan Navy for the repair and maintenance of the Orion and the Chinese were from the Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard of Shanghai, which had supplied three F22P frigates to the Pakistan Navy and is presently helping the Navy in the construction of a fourth one in the Karachi dockyard. In January, well-informed Pakistani sources had reported the death of four Chinese personnel in a road accident near Karachi. It was not known whether they belonged to this company.
10. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for the attack. The TTP had in the past attacked Chinese personnel working in different parts of Pakistan and kidnapped some Chinese engineers working in the tribal areas. It has links with the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, an organization of Uighurs from the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province.
11. Was there also an Uighur angle to the Mehran attack? ( 25-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
There is still confusion about the total number of terrorists involved in the daring commando-style attack on PNS Mehran, the headquarters of the Pakistani Naval Air Arm, located inside the Faisal base of the Pakistan Air Force at Karachi on the night of May 22,2011. Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, had estimated the total number as six---of whom, according to him, two were killed in the fire-fight, two blew themselves up to escape capture and two managed to escape. However, in a report lodged with an adjoin8ing Police Station, the Navy has reportedly estimated the total number of terrorists involved as 10 to 12, of whom eight managed to escape.
2. Apart from the four terrorists, 10 others were also killed. These included one Naval Lieutenant, one naval rating, three members of a naval detachment of the Special Services Group (SSG), which is an inter-services group of specially-trained commandos, three members of the fire brigade and two from the Pakistani Rangers.
3. The terrorists entered the base from an adjoining residential area by climbing over the compound wall with ladders and cutting the barbed wire on top of it. They rushed to the hangars located about a KM from the wall without being detected by the search lights installed inside the base and blew up two of the three Orion P-3C aircraft and a helicopter parked there with the help of rocket-propelled grenades. About 15 members of a naval detachment of the SSG rushed to the spot and opened fire. The terrorists managed to reach a nearby tower and took shelter there. Thereafter, there was an intense fire-fight between the terrorists and the SSG detachment for nearly 17 hours before the SSG detachment managed to bring the situation under control with the help of reinforcements.
4. Considering that the entire operation lasted about 17 hours, the number of fatalities---particularly of naval personnel---was surprisingly low. The SSG and the Fire Brigade sustained more fatalities than the Navy. They were reportedly killed by gun fire from the terrorists as they were trying to put out the fire on the Orion planes.
5. The biggest damage suffered by the Navy was in respect of the two Orions. It had a holding of six, of which three are in the US for upgradation and are expected back only after November---one in December, one in June next year and one in December next year. Of the remaining three which were being used for maritime surveillance, two have been destroyed by the terrorists. Only one is available now. It is to be seen whether the US will rush to replace the two destroyed as the Pakistanis are hoping it would.
6. The destruction of the two Orions was targeted and not accidental. Even though the Orions, which are armed with Harpoon missiles, were acquired by the Pakistan Navy for use against India, they were currently being used to protect logistic shipments to the NATO forces in Afghanistan, which are unloaded at the Karachi port. Thus, the targeted destruction of the two Orions could have had the tactical objective of preventing their use for protecting the NATO logistic shipments .
7. The attempted attack on Chinese personnel accommodated inside the base, which was initially denied by the Chinese authorities, is since reported to have been admitted by them. Were the Chinese taken hostage by the terrorists? If so, how long were they in the custody of the terrorists? How were they ultimately got released? Answers to these questions are not available.
8. It has been reported that 11 Chinese were living inside the base. In addition, six Americans were working inside the base, but it is not known whether they were living inside the base or in hotels outside. From the fact that there were no reports of any of the Americans being taken hostage, one could infer that the Americans were probably living in a hotel and were not present in the base on the night of May 22 when the terrorists struck.
9. According to unconfirmed reports, the Americans were from the Lockheed Martin company, which has an on-going contract with the Pakistan Navy for the repair and maintenance of the Orion and the Chinese were from the Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard of Shanghai, which had supplied three F22P frigates to the Pakistan Navy and is presently helping the Navy in the construction of a fourth one in the Karachi dockyard. In January, well-informed Pakistani sources had reported the death of four Chinese personnel in a road accident near Karachi. It was not known whether they belonged to this company.
10. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for the attack. The TTP had in the past attacked Chinese personnel working in different parts of Pakistan and kidnapped some Chinese engineers working in the tribal areas. It has links with the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, an organization of Uighurs from the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province.
11. Was there also an Uighur angle to the Mehran attack? ( 25-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
THREATS TO PAK NUCLEAR ARSENAL
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/How-to-keep-Pakistan-nuclear-arsenal-safe/articleshow/8562322.cms )
B.RAMAN
The daring commando style raid into a Pakistani naval base at Karachi on May 22 by terrorists of the Pakistani Taliban has highlighted once again the poor state of physical security at sensitive infrastructure in Pakistan and the undetected infiltration by extremist elements into the Pakistani Armed Forces.
Since the Pakistani Taliban came into existence in July 2007 , it has organized a number of such raids into the establishments of the armed forces including into the General Headquarters, the sanctum sanctorum of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi. The success of these raids was made possible by the suspected help of insiders, who collaborated with the terrorists, and by the poor state of physical security.
The fact that such raids continue to take place and that the security forces and the intelligence agencies continue to be taken by surprise would add to the concerns of the international community regarding the state of physical security in Pakistan’s nuclear establishments and the dangers of the presence inside them of sympathisers who might collaborate with organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in facilitating an act of terrorism involving the use of nuclear material seized from such establishments.
There are three possible dangers needing attention. The first is terrorists and their sympathizers wittingly or unwittingly causing radioactive leakages by raiding such establishments and damaging the production process. The second is the terrorists getting hold of easy-to-use nuclear material such as dirty bombs from ill-guarded establishments. The third is the leakage of the technology to terrorists from sympathetic scientists.
To prevent such dangers one requires an effective process for the continuous identification and weeding out of suspicious elements from nuclear establishments, a capability for the collection of human and technical intelligence regarding planned raids into such establishments and a physical security system with multi-layer security that could prevent attacks effectively even in the absence of preventive intelligence.
Repeated physical security breaches in sensitive infrastructure in Pakistan are due not only to poor preventive intelligence, but also to a single-layer security which was not able to stand up to a determined attempt to breach the security.
The Pakistanis claim that such breaches are unlikely in the case of nuclear establishments where, according to them, there is a multi-layer security and there is a constant vetting of the personnel to detect attempts at infiltration. Moreover, according to them, their nuclear arsenal is not kept in a ready-to-use form in one place, but in dismantled parts in a number of places. Thus, to be able to get at a nuclear weapon, the terrorists should be able to raid successfully at more than one place simultaneously, which would be difficult.
The serious failures of intelligence and security at Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden had been living undetected for over five years underlined the dangers of totally depending on Pakistani verbal assurances with regard to security against any kind of terrorism. Unadmitted incompetence and complicity at different levels with terrorists reduce the value and dependability of such Pakistani assurances.
The rest of the world would be as much affected as Pakistan by any breach of the physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. It is, therefore, important that the international community should not remain satisfied with Pakistan’s oral assurances alone. There has to be a close and continuous interaction between the intelligence and security agencies of Pakistan and those of the US and other NATO countries for ensuring that the security of nuclear establishments in Pakistan cannot be breached.
This means the association of the agencies of these countries in the planning and implementation of security measures in the nuclear establishments. It is believed that US experts in nuclear security already play a discreet, but important role in this matter. Is their role adequate to ensure that what happened in the Karachi naval base cannot happen in a nuclear establishment?
Only the US, which is more knowledgeable than any other country in matters relating to nuclear security in Pakistan, will be in a position to answer this question. India, which has an adversarial relationship with Pakistan, cannot expect to play a role in this matter. But through close interaction with the US agencies, it should be able to reassure itself that whatever needs to be done is being done by the US with the co-operation of Pakistan.
India can play a useful role in helping the US in this matter by strengthening its capability for the collection of human and technical intelligence regarding likely threats to Pakistan’s nuclear establishments and arsenal and sharing it with the US.
There is little scope for a stand-alone Indian role with regard to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, but discreet co-operation between India and the US can add value to the efforts being made by the US.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
B.RAMAN
The daring commando style raid into a Pakistani naval base at Karachi on May 22 by terrorists of the Pakistani Taliban has highlighted once again the poor state of physical security at sensitive infrastructure in Pakistan and the undetected infiltration by extremist elements into the Pakistani Armed Forces.
Since the Pakistani Taliban came into existence in July 2007 , it has organized a number of such raids into the establishments of the armed forces including into the General Headquarters, the sanctum sanctorum of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi. The success of these raids was made possible by the suspected help of insiders, who collaborated with the terrorists, and by the poor state of physical security.
The fact that such raids continue to take place and that the security forces and the intelligence agencies continue to be taken by surprise would add to the concerns of the international community regarding the state of physical security in Pakistan’s nuclear establishments and the dangers of the presence inside them of sympathisers who might collaborate with organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in facilitating an act of terrorism involving the use of nuclear material seized from such establishments.
There are three possible dangers needing attention. The first is terrorists and their sympathizers wittingly or unwittingly causing radioactive leakages by raiding such establishments and damaging the production process. The second is the terrorists getting hold of easy-to-use nuclear material such as dirty bombs from ill-guarded establishments. The third is the leakage of the technology to terrorists from sympathetic scientists.
To prevent such dangers one requires an effective process for the continuous identification and weeding out of suspicious elements from nuclear establishments, a capability for the collection of human and technical intelligence regarding planned raids into such establishments and a physical security system with multi-layer security that could prevent attacks effectively even in the absence of preventive intelligence.
Repeated physical security breaches in sensitive infrastructure in Pakistan are due not only to poor preventive intelligence, but also to a single-layer security which was not able to stand up to a determined attempt to breach the security.
The Pakistanis claim that such breaches are unlikely in the case of nuclear establishments where, according to them, there is a multi-layer security and there is a constant vetting of the personnel to detect attempts at infiltration. Moreover, according to them, their nuclear arsenal is not kept in a ready-to-use form in one place, but in dismantled parts in a number of places. Thus, to be able to get at a nuclear weapon, the terrorists should be able to raid successfully at more than one place simultaneously, which would be difficult.
The serious failures of intelligence and security at Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden had been living undetected for over five years underlined the dangers of totally depending on Pakistani verbal assurances with regard to security against any kind of terrorism. Unadmitted incompetence and complicity at different levels with terrorists reduce the value and dependability of such Pakistani assurances.
The rest of the world would be as much affected as Pakistan by any breach of the physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. It is, therefore, important that the international community should not remain satisfied with Pakistan’s oral assurances alone. There has to be a close and continuous interaction between the intelligence and security agencies of Pakistan and those of the US and other NATO countries for ensuring that the security of nuclear establishments in Pakistan cannot be breached.
This means the association of the agencies of these countries in the planning and implementation of security measures in the nuclear establishments. It is believed that US experts in nuclear security already play a discreet, but important role in this matter. Is their role adequate to ensure that what happened in the Karachi naval base cannot happen in a nuclear establishment?
Only the US, which is more knowledgeable than any other country in matters relating to nuclear security in Pakistan, will be in a position to answer this question. India, which has an adversarial relationship with Pakistan, cannot expect to play a role in this matter. But through close interaction with the US agencies, it should be able to reassure itself that whatever needs to be done is being done by the US with the co-operation of Pakistan.
India can play a useful role in helping the US in this matter by strengthening its capability for the collection of human and technical intelligence regarding likely threats to Pakistan’s nuclear establishments and arsenal and sharing it with the US.
There is little scope for a stand-alone Indian role with regard to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, but discreet co-operation between India and the US can add value to the efforts being made by the US.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
Sunday, May 22, 2011
DARING TERRORIST ATTACK ON PAKISTAN'S NAVAL AIR ARM AT KARACHI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 720
The Faisal Base of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) located about 10 KMs from the Karachi internationl airport is what the PAF calls a Joint User airfield. It is used by the PAF and the air arms of the Pakistan Army and Navy as well as by the VVIP squadron. All air surveillance movements over the sea --- whether by the PAF or by the Army or by the PN--- are controlled from this base.
2. Since 1975, the operating base of the Naval Air Arm , called PNS Mehran, is located inside this airfield. All senior officers of the Naval Air Arm operate from PNS Mehran. The Naval Air Arm at PNS Mehran is headed by Commander Naval Aviation (COMNAV). Under him there are four Heads of Department (HOD) designated as Commander Air (Cdr Air), Commander Air Engineering Department (Cdr AED), Commanding Officer MEHRAN (CO MEH) and Officer Commanding Naval Aviation Training School (OC NATS).
3.The squadrons of the Naval Air Arm are stationed in PNS Mehran.These are the P3C Orion Squadron (28 Sqn), the Atlantic Squadron (29 Sqn), the Fokker Squadron (27 Sqn), the Seaking Squadron (111 Sqn) and the Alouette Squadron (333 Sqn).
4. While the Naval Air Arm was raised primarily to provide maritime surveillance capability against India, it has been playing, in addition, a counter-terrorism role since the US started its Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October,2001. This counter-terrorism role consists of air surveillance to prevent any sea-borne intrusions of Al Qaeda and to detect any terrorist plans for attacks on ships bringing supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The supplies are landed in the Karachi port and then moved by trucks to Afghanistan.
5.While the Pakistani Army and Air Force have no operational role to play in the US-led military operations in the Afghan territory against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban, the Pakistani Navy is a member of the US-led international naval force which patrols the seas to the west of Pakistan to prevent any hostile activity which could hamper the operations in Afghan territory. The Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, established at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, comprises naval forces from France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The task force conducts maritime security operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The leadership of the Task Force is rotated amongst the participating navies. A Pakistani naval officer has been commanding it off and on when the turn of the Pakistan Navy comes.
6.On November 16,2004,the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that it had accepted Pakistan’s request to buy seven P-3C Orion aircraft with T-56 turboprop engines, communications equipment, training devices, medical services, support and test equipment, engineering technical services, supply support, operation and maintenance training, documentation, spare/repair parts, publications, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements. The estimated cost would be $970 million.
7.The DSCA announcement added: "The command-and-control capabilities of these aircraft will improve Pakistan’s ability to restrict the littoral movement of terrorists along Pakistan’s southern border and ensure Pakistan’s overall ability to maintain integrity of their borders. Pakistan intends to use the proposed purchase to develop a long needed fleet of maritime and border surveillance aircraft. The addition of these aircraft will provide Pakistan with search, surveillance, and control capability in support of maritime interdiction operations and increase their ability to support the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom Operations; anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare capabilities; and a control capability over land against transnational terrorists and narcotics smugglers. The modernization will enhance the capabilities of the Pakistani Navy and support its regional influence and meet its legitimate self-defense needs. Pakistan is capable of absorbing and maintaining these additional aircraft in its inventory.”
8. The first two of these aircraft were delivered in April 2010 and officially inducted into the Naval Air Arm at a function held at PNS Mehran on June 2,2010. Some more of the remaining five have since been inducted, but their number is not known. These planes are generally kept in hangars belonging to the Naval Air Arm and operate from the joint user airfield.
9. The active role played by the Pakistani Navy in support of the NATO operations in Afghanistan has attracted the anger of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On March 4, 2008, two unidentified suicide bombers, operating in tandem, attacked the prestigious Naval War College located in a high security area of Lahore. They were both on motor-cycles. One of them rammed his motor-cycle against the security gate at the rear of the building breaking it open. The other drove through this opening into the parking area and blew himself up. Their target was the naval institution and not any particular individual or individuals inside. They wanted to demonstrate their ability to penetrate the campus and cause damage. Six persons were killed--- one of them a naval officer, three members of the security guards at the gate and the two suicide bombers.
10.On December 2,2009, an alert official of the Pakistani naval intelligence in plain clothes and a naval security guard in uniform deployed outside the building of the Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad prevented what could have been a major terrorist strike against the Naval Headquarters by an unidentified suicide bomber. Spotting a suspicious-looking individual outside the NHQ, they stopped him and searched him. He turned out to be a suicide bomber wearing a concealed suicide vest. However, they could not prevent him from activating the explosive device in the vest. One person was killed on the spot and another succumbed to his injuries later.
11.Two Pakistani naval personnel--- a commissioned officer of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant and a sailor--- were among four persons killed in two separate but coordinated explosions in Karachi on April 26, 2011. The explosions targeted two buses of the Pakistan Navy which were transporting naval personnel to their places of work. According to available indications, the improvised explosive devices, which struck the buses, had been planted along routes normally taken by the buses and activated through mobile telephones.
12. According to the " Daily Times" of Lahore ( April 27,2011), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, claimed the responsibility for the blasts, and threatened more attacks on security forces. The claim was made in a telephone call to a foreign news agency by a person who identified himself as Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesman of the Taliban. He reportedly said: "Security forces will be targeted in the future as well, because they are killing their own people in Waziristan and elsewhere at the behest of the United States.”
13. Since the raid by the Pakistani military commandos into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July,2007, there has been a number of retaliatory attacks by the TTP against the Army, the Air Force, the Special Services Group (SSG), the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the para-military forces and the police. It is, however, believed that the attacks on the Navy were connected to its role in providing maritime support to the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Navy had no role to play in the Lal Masjid raid. The Pakistani authorities have been apprehending a surge in these attacks on the security forces, including the Navy, in retaliation for the raid by US naval commandos into the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011, in which OBL was killed.
14. At around 10 PM on the night of May 22, an unidentified group of about 15 terrorists armed with explosives, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and assault weapons was reported to have managed to infiltrate into the PNS Mehran base through a side of the Faisal PAF base where a PAF museum is located and engaged in a fire fight with naval and other security personnel after destroying at least one----according to some other reports two---PC 3 aircraft kept in the hangars. The fire-fight was still going on at 3 AM on the morning of May 23 when last reports came in.
15. It has been reported that the survivors among the attackers have taken some hostages and taken shelter inside a building in the base. According to unconfirmed reports, among the hostages are one or more Chinese military personnel working in the base. It has been further reported that some Americans and Turks were also working in the base. It is not known whether any of them has been taken hostage. At least 11 naval personnel are reported to have died in the fire fight so far. No one has claimed responsibility till now.
16. The daring attack and the inability of the Navy to prevent it are likely to add to the feelings of humiliation in the Pakistani Armed Forces which have been prevalent since the Abbottabad raid. To deflect anger over the security failure at PNS Mehran, attempts could be made to divert suspicion against India. Extra vigilance and extra security would be required along our coast in general and in the Mumbai area in particular. Instructions should be issued to all concerned to avoid any statements and comments which could aggravate the paranoia of the Pakistani Armed Forces and to refrain from exhibiting any sense of glee over the discomfiture of the Pakistani Armed Forces.(23-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Faisal Base of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) located about 10 KMs from the Karachi internationl airport is what the PAF calls a Joint User airfield. It is used by the PAF and the air arms of the Pakistan Army and Navy as well as by the VVIP squadron. All air surveillance movements over the sea --- whether by the PAF or by the Army or by the PN--- are controlled from this base.
2. Since 1975, the operating base of the Naval Air Arm , called PNS Mehran, is located inside this airfield. All senior officers of the Naval Air Arm operate from PNS Mehran. The Naval Air Arm at PNS Mehran is headed by Commander Naval Aviation (COMNAV). Under him there are four Heads of Department (HOD) designated as Commander Air (Cdr Air), Commander Air Engineering Department (Cdr AED), Commanding Officer MEHRAN (CO MEH) and Officer Commanding Naval Aviation Training School (OC NATS).
3.The squadrons of the Naval Air Arm are stationed in PNS Mehran.These are the P3C Orion Squadron (28 Sqn), the Atlantic Squadron (29 Sqn), the Fokker Squadron (27 Sqn), the Seaking Squadron (111 Sqn) and the Alouette Squadron (333 Sqn).
4. While the Naval Air Arm was raised primarily to provide maritime surveillance capability against India, it has been playing, in addition, a counter-terrorism role since the US started its Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October,2001. This counter-terrorism role consists of air surveillance to prevent any sea-borne intrusions of Al Qaeda and to detect any terrorist plans for attacks on ships bringing supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The supplies are landed in the Karachi port and then moved by trucks to Afghanistan.
5.While the Pakistani Army and Air Force have no operational role to play in the US-led military operations in the Afghan territory against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban, the Pakistani Navy is a member of the US-led international naval force which patrols the seas to the west of Pakistan to prevent any hostile activity which could hamper the operations in Afghan territory. The Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, established at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, comprises naval forces from France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The task force conducts maritime security operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The leadership of the Task Force is rotated amongst the participating navies. A Pakistani naval officer has been commanding it off and on when the turn of the Pakistan Navy comes.
6.On November 16,2004,the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that it had accepted Pakistan’s request to buy seven P-3C Orion aircraft with T-56 turboprop engines, communications equipment, training devices, medical services, support and test equipment, engineering technical services, supply support, operation and maintenance training, documentation, spare/repair parts, publications, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements. The estimated cost would be $970 million.
7.The DSCA announcement added: "The command-and-control capabilities of these aircraft will improve Pakistan’s ability to restrict the littoral movement of terrorists along Pakistan’s southern border and ensure Pakistan’s overall ability to maintain integrity of their borders. Pakistan intends to use the proposed purchase to develop a long needed fleet of maritime and border surveillance aircraft. The addition of these aircraft will provide Pakistan with search, surveillance, and control capability in support of maritime interdiction operations and increase their ability to support the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom Operations; anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare capabilities; and a control capability over land against transnational terrorists and narcotics smugglers. The modernization will enhance the capabilities of the Pakistani Navy and support its regional influence and meet its legitimate self-defense needs. Pakistan is capable of absorbing and maintaining these additional aircraft in its inventory.”
8. The first two of these aircraft were delivered in April 2010 and officially inducted into the Naval Air Arm at a function held at PNS Mehran on June 2,2010. Some more of the remaining five have since been inducted, but their number is not known. These planes are generally kept in hangars belonging to the Naval Air Arm and operate from the joint user airfield.
9. The active role played by the Pakistani Navy in support of the NATO operations in Afghanistan has attracted the anger of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On March 4, 2008, two unidentified suicide bombers, operating in tandem, attacked the prestigious Naval War College located in a high security area of Lahore. They were both on motor-cycles. One of them rammed his motor-cycle against the security gate at the rear of the building breaking it open. The other drove through this opening into the parking area and blew himself up. Their target was the naval institution and not any particular individual or individuals inside. They wanted to demonstrate their ability to penetrate the campus and cause damage. Six persons were killed--- one of them a naval officer, three members of the security guards at the gate and the two suicide bombers.
10.On December 2,2009, an alert official of the Pakistani naval intelligence in plain clothes and a naval security guard in uniform deployed outside the building of the Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad prevented what could have been a major terrorist strike against the Naval Headquarters by an unidentified suicide bomber. Spotting a suspicious-looking individual outside the NHQ, they stopped him and searched him. He turned out to be a suicide bomber wearing a concealed suicide vest. However, they could not prevent him from activating the explosive device in the vest. One person was killed on the spot and another succumbed to his injuries later.
11.Two Pakistani naval personnel--- a commissioned officer of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant and a sailor--- were among four persons killed in two separate but coordinated explosions in Karachi on April 26, 2011. The explosions targeted two buses of the Pakistan Navy which were transporting naval personnel to their places of work. According to available indications, the improvised explosive devices, which struck the buses, had been planted along routes normally taken by the buses and activated through mobile telephones.
12. According to the " Daily Times" of Lahore ( April 27,2011), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, claimed the responsibility for the blasts, and threatened more attacks on security forces. The claim was made in a telephone call to a foreign news agency by a person who identified himself as Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesman of the Taliban. He reportedly said: "Security forces will be targeted in the future as well, because they are killing their own people in Waziristan and elsewhere at the behest of the United States.”
13. Since the raid by the Pakistani military commandos into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July,2007, there has been a number of retaliatory attacks by the TTP against the Army, the Air Force, the Special Services Group (SSG), the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the para-military forces and the police. It is, however, believed that the attacks on the Navy were connected to its role in providing maritime support to the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Navy had no role to play in the Lal Masjid raid. The Pakistani authorities have been apprehending a surge in these attacks on the security forces, including the Navy, in retaliation for the raid by US naval commandos into the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011, in which OBL was killed.
14. At around 10 PM on the night of May 22, an unidentified group of about 15 terrorists armed with explosives, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and assault weapons was reported to have managed to infiltrate into the PNS Mehran base through a side of the Faisal PAF base where a PAF museum is located and engaged in a fire fight with naval and other security personnel after destroying at least one----according to some other reports two---PC 3 aircraft kept in the hangars. The fire-fight was still going on at 3 AM on the morning of May 23 when last reports came in.
15. It has been reported that the survivors among the attackers have taken some hostages and taken shelter inside a building in the base. According to unconfirmed reports, among the hostages are one or more Chinese military personnel working in the base. It has been further reported that some Americans and Turks were also working in the base. It is not known whether any of them has been taken hostage. At least 11 naval personnel are reported to have died in the fire fight so far. No one has claimed responsibility till now.
16. The daring attack and the inability of the Navy to prevent it are likely to add to the feelings of humiliation in the Pakistani Armed Forces which have been prevalent since the Abbottabad raid. To deflect anger over the security failure at PNS Mehran, attempts could be made to divert suspicion against India. Extra vigilance and extra security would be required along our coast in general and in the Mumbai area in particular. Instructions should be issued to all concerned to avoid any statements and comments which could aggravate the paranoia of the Pakistani Armed Forces and to refrain from exhibiting any sense of glee over the discomfiture of the Pakistani Armed Forces.(23-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, May 21, 2011
HELLO SADNESS
Bonjour Tristesse ( "Hello Sadness") is the title of a novel written by Françoise Sagan in 1954 when she was barely 18. It became a best-seller in France and was shot into a movie in 1958. Francoise Sagan was inspired by a lovely poem written by Paul Éluard, which was titled "À peine défigurée". The poem in French and its free English translation by me are given below:---B.Raman
À peine défigurée - Hardly Disfigured
Adieu tristesse
Bonjour tristesse
Tu es inscrite dans les lignes du plafond
Tu es inscrite dans les yeux que j'aime
Tu n'es pas tout à fait la misère
Car les lèvres les plus pauvres te dénoncent
Par un sourire
Bonjour tristesse
Amour des corps aimables
Puissance de l'amour
Dont l'amabilité surgit
Comme un monstre sans corps
Tête désappointée
Tristesse beau visage.
Farewell Sadness
Hello Sadness
I see you on the ceiling
I see you in the eyes that I love
I see you in the smile that betrays you.
Hello Sadness
Power of love
From which kindness rises
Like a bodiless monster
Unattached head
Sadness has a beautiful face.
À peine défigurée - Hardly Disfigured
Adieu tristesse
Bonjour tristesse
Tu es inscrite dans les lignes du plafond
Tu es inscrite dans les yeux que j'aime
Tu n'es pas tout à fait la misère
Car les lèvres les plus pauvres te dénoncent
Par un sourire
Bonjour tristesse
Amour des corps aimables
Puissance de l'amour
Dont l'amabilité surgit
Comme un monstre sans corps
Tête désappointée
Tristesse beau visage.
Farewell Sadness
Hello Sadness
I see you on the ceiling
I see you in the eyes that I love
I see you in the smile that betrays you.
Hello Sadness
Power of love
From which kindness rises
Like a bodiless monster
Unattached head
Sadness has a beautiful face.
CHINA: ALL THE WAY WITH PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
China has gone all the way with Pakistan in the difficult situation being faced by Pakistan in the aftermath of the Abbottabad raid by some US naval commandos on May 2, which led to the death of Osama bin Laden.
2. This became apparent during the just concluded (May 20,2011) four-day visit of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to China during which he met, among others, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The visit had been fixed weeks before the Abbottabad raid to mark the high-profile observance of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but as it took place a few days after the raid, Pakistan’s much-doubted sincerity in fighting terrorism became the defining and dominating theme of the visit.
3. Even before Gilani’s departure for China, the Chinese authorities had made it clear in no uncertain terms on many occasions that they did not share the skepticism being expressed in the US regarding the sincerity of Pakistan in the so-called war against terrorism. The Chinese also refrained from subscribing to the view that to have been able to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad, OBL must have had some local support from official circles in Pakistan. They had no hesitation in endorsing the claims made by Pakistan that its security forces had made huge sacrifices in the war against terrorism.
4. These points were reiterated with even greater force by the Chinese during their interactions with Gilani after his arrival in China. It was apparent that the Chinese leaders have had no difficulty in accepting the claims of Pakistan that it was taken by surprise by OBL being found in Abbottabad. While refraining from any comments that could have been misinterpreted as criticism of the unilateral US raid to kill OBL, the Chinese underlined their own preference for joint operations with Pakistan in dealing with the Uighur dissidents operating on both sides of Pakistan’s border with the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. The Chinese also refrained from any remarks that could be interpreted as an attempt to capitalize on the post-Abbottabad anti-US sentiments in Pakistan to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the US. Chinese analysts stressed the importance of continuing Pakistani counter-terrorism co-operation with the US on the one side and with China on the other.
5. During his meeting with Gilani, Hu promised to increase cooperation with Pakistan on fighting terrorism and cross-border crimes in a bid to create a sound security environment for the economic and social development of both countries. Hu expressed his appreciation of Pakistan’s contribution in the fight against terrorism, and said China would promote security dialogue and coordination with Pakistan. He said China would join Pakistan in the fight against drug trafficking, cross-border crimes and the "three evil forces"--terrorism, extremism and splittism.
6. Pakistani journalists who had accompanied Gilani have claimed that during his meeting with Gilani, Wen said that Pakistan had made great sacrifices in the global war against terrorism and urged the international community to understand and support Pakistan' s efforts to maintain domestic stability and advance the economic and social development. They also quoted Wen as telling Gilani that "Pakistan' s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected," and as disclosing that China had asked the US to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty, understand its problems, address its concerns and acknowledge the sacrifices rendered by it in the war against terror. China was reported to have made this point to the US during a recent strategic dialogue between the two countries in Washington DC
7. The strong Chinese support for Pakistan on the counter-terrorism issue was also underlined in the joint statement ussued by the two countries at the end of the visit on May 20. The statement inter alia said: “China believes that Pakistan’s efforts for promoting peace and stability in South Asia need to be recognised and supported. The Chinese side recognised the tremendous efforts and great sacrifice that Pakistan has made in fighting terrorism and reiterated its respect and support for Pakistan’s efforts to advance its counter-terrorism strategy and safeguard its security.”
8. In a commentary on the visit carried on May 18, the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” said: “Due to special causes in various aspects, such as historical and tribal influences, the "three forces" headed by the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" have existed for a long time in the tribal areas at the Pakistani-Afghan border. However, China has always respected Pakistan's sovereignty when combating the "three forces" jointly with Pakistan and understands Pakistan's enormous sacrifices and significant contributions in the forefront of the international fight against terrorism. Pakistan has also always supported China's sovereignty and territorial integrity in major issues related to the Taiwan region, Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.”
9. In a commentary published on May 20 in the Government-controlled “China Daily”, Han Hua, associate professor at Peking University's School of International Studies, said : “Instead of creating a gulf in relations, the death of bin Laden has offered a chance to Pakistan, the US and China to work together to combat terrorism. After all, the three countries' anti-terrorism mission is still very much on.”
10. Thus, the following points relating to the Chinese position have come out loud and clear from the visit:
• China welcomes the death of OBL as a result of the US raid.
• Despite the success of the raid which was organized unilaterally by the US, it stresses the importance of respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty.
• Pakistan’s failure to detect the presence of OBL at Abbottabad does not detract from the sacrifices made by it in the war against terrorism. These sacrifices have to be recognized.
• China has no intention to capitalize on the US misgivings about Pakistan to wean Pakistan away from the US.
• Continuing counter-terrorism co-operation between Pakistan and the US would benefit the war against global terrorism which continues despite OBL’s death
11.Though India has not figured in any of the statements and reports emanating from China on Gilani’s visit, reading between the lines one could infer that Pakistan’s concerns over its ability to prevent any Indian air intrusions into Pakistan must have figured in the discussions. The reported Chinese agreement to expedite the supply of 50 JF-17 Thunder aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force during the next six months strengthens this inference.
12.The “Daily Times” of Lahore has commented on this as follows in its report: “According to official sources, these aircraft will be equipped with sophisticated avionics. Not only will the aircraft be handed over within weeks, China will also foot the bill initially. Although Pakistan and China have been jointly developing this multirole combat aircraft in the past, in the aftermath of the US operation in Abbottabad, serious questions have been raised about Pakistan’s defence capabilities. According to a strategic expert, the speedy delivery of 50 pieces of this aircraft, originally to be done over two years, is expected to allay apprehensions of not only the Pakistani public but will also send a message to the world that Pakistan’s defence is not weak. It might be remembered that not only has the Indian military chief speculated on the possibility of a US-style strike from the Indian side to take out jihadi outfits in Pakistan, there has been escalation on the Pakistan-India border near Sialkot recently. Also, observers believe that in a situation when the speculations are rife that Pakistan may not be able to resist another US attack inside its territory if it so decides, this agreement will send a clear message to the world on which side China stands.” ( 22-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
China has gone all the way with Pakistan in the difficult situation being faced by Pakistan in the aftermath of the Abbottabad raid by some US naval commandos on May 2, which led to the death of Osama bin Laden.
2. This became apparent during the just concluded (May 20,2011) four-day visit of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to China during which he met, among others, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The visit had been fixed weeks before the Abbottabad raid to mark the high-profile observance of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but as it took place a few days after the raid, Pakistan’s much-doubted sincerity in fighting terrorism became the defining and dominating theme of the visit.
3. Even before Gilani’s departure for China, the Chinese authorities had made it clear in no uncertain terms on many occasions that they did not share the skepticism being expressed in the US regarding the sincerity of Pakistan in the so-called war against terrorism. The Chinese also refrained from subscribing to the view that to have been able to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad, OBL must have had some local support from official circles in Pakistan. They had no hesitation in endorsing the claims made by Pakistan that its security forces had made huge sacrifices in the war against terrorism.
4. These points were reiterated with even greater force by the Chinese during their interactions with Gilani after his arrival in China. It was apparent that the Chinese leaders have had no difficulty in accepting the claims of Pakistan that it was taken by surprise by OBL being found in Abbottabad. While refraining from any comments that could have been misinterpreted as criticism of the unilateral US raid to kill OBL, the Chinese underlined their own preference for joint operations with Pakistan in dealing with the Uighur dissidents operating on both sides of Pakistan’s border with the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. The Chinese also refrained from any remarks that could be interpreted as an attempt to capitalize on the post-Abbottabad anti-US sentiments in Pakistan to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the US. Chinese analysts stressed the importance of continuing Pakistani counter-terrorism co-operation with the US on the one side and with China on the other.
5. During his meeting with Gilani, Hu promised to increase cooperation with Pakistan on fighting terrorism and cross-border crimes in a bid to create a sound security environment for the economic and social development of both countries. Hu expressed his appreciation of Pakistan’s contribution in the fight against terrorism, and said China would promote security dialogue and coordination with Pakistan. He said China would join Pakistan in the fight against drug trafficking, cross-border crimes and the "three evil forces"--terrorism, extremism and splittism.
6. Pakistani journalists who had accompanied Gilani have claimed that during his meeting with Gilani, Wen said that Pakistan had made great sacrifices in the global war against terrorism and urged the international community to understand and support Pakistan' s efforts to maintain domestic stability and advance the economic and social development. They also quoted Wen as telling Gilani that "Pakistan' s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected," and as disclosing that China had asked the US to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty, understand its problems, address its concerns and acknowledge the sacrifices rendered by it in the war against terror. China was reported to have made this point to the US during a recent strategic dialogue between the two countries in Washington DC
7. The strong Chinese support for Pakistan on the counter-terrorism issue was also underlined in the joint statement ussued by the two countries at the end of the visit on May 20. The statement inter alia said: “China believes that Pakistan’s efforts for promoting peace and stability in South Asia need to be recognised and supported. The Chinese side recognised the tremendous efforts and great sacrifice that Pakistan has made in fighting terrorism and reiterated its respect and support for Pakistan’s efforts to advance its counter-terrorism strategy and safeguard its security.”
8. In a commentary on the visit carried on May 18, the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” said: “Due to special causes in various aspects, such as historical and tribal influences, the "three forces" headed by the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" have existed for a long time in the tribal areas at the Pakistani-Afghan border. However, China has always respected Pakistan's sovereignty when combating the "three forces" jointly with Pakistan and understands Pakistan's enormous sacrifices and significant contributions in the forefront of the international fight against terrorism. Pakistan has also always supported China's sovereignty and territorial integrity in major issues related to the Taiwan region, Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.”
9. In a commentary published on May 20 in the Government-controlled “China Daily”, Han Hua, associate professor at Peking University's School of International Studies, said : “Instead of creating a gulf in relations, the death of bin Laden has offered a chance to Pakistan, the US and China to work together to combat terrorism. After all, the three countries' anti-terrorism mission is still very much on.”
10. Thus, the following points relating to the Chinese position have come out loud and clear from the visit:
• China welcomes the death of OBL as a result of the US raid.
• Despite the success of the raid which was organized unilaterally by the US, it stresses the importance of respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty.
• Pakistan’s failure to detect the presence of OBL at Abbottabad does not detract from the sacrifices made by it in the war against terrorism. These sacrifices have to be recognized.
• China has no intention to capitalize on the US misgivings about Pakistan to wean Pakistan away from the US.
• Continuing counter-terrorism co-operation between Pakistan and the US would benefit the war against global terrorism which continues despite OBL’s death
11.Though India has not figured in any of the statements and reports emanating from China on Gilani’s visit, reading between the lines one could infer that Pakistan’s concerns over its ability to prevent any Indian air intrusions into Pakistan must have figured in the discussions. The reported Chinese agreement to expedite the supply of 50 JF-17 Thunder aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force during the next six months strengthens this inference.
12.The “Daily Times” of Lahore has commented on this as follows in its report: “According to official sources, these aircraft will be equipped with sophisticated avionics. Not only will the aircraft be handed over within weeks, China will also foot the bill initially. Although Pakistan and China have been jointly developing this multirole combat aircraft in the past, in the aftermath of the US operation in Abbottabad, serious questions have been raised about Pakistan’s defence capabilities. According to a strategic expert, the speedy delivery of 50 pieces of this aircraft, originally to be done over two years, is expected to allay apprehensions of not only the Pakistani public but will also send a message to the world that Pakistan’s defence is not weak. It might be remembered that not only has the Indian military chief speculated on the possibility of a US-style strike from the Indian side to take out jihadi outfits in Pakistan, there has been escalation on the Pakistan-India border near Sialkot recently. Also, observers believe that in a situation when the speculations are rife that Pakistan may not be able to resist another US attack inside its territory if it so decides, this agreement will send a clear message to the world on which side China stands.” ( 22-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, May 20, 2011
LESSONS FROM TERROR LIST GOOF-UP
B.RAMAN
In March, our Ministry of Home Affairs had given to its Pakistani counterpart a list of 50 terrorists----Indian as well as Pakistani nationals--- who were suspected to have been involved in acts of terrorism in India. The Pakistani authorities were requested to have them arrested and handed over to India for trial.
India had been giving such lists to Pakistan ever since the Khalistani terrorists hijacked some aircraft of the Indian Airlines to Pakistan in the 1980s. Initially, the lists included mostly the names of Khalistani terrorists who were operating from Pakistan. Subsequently, the lists were expanded in the 1990s to include the names of some terrorists from Jammu & Kashmir and the absconding accused of the 1993 blasts in Mumbai, including Dawood Ibrahim and his associates.
Till about 2004, this list had a total of about 20 names. It has since expanded to 50 due to the search for the absconding accused in post-2004 jihadi acts of terrorism. Pakistan used to deny the presence of any Indian national in its territory. In respect of the Pakistani nationals figuring in the Indian lists, its response used to be that India had not been able to produce any evidence regarding their involvement in terrorism.
This exercise had been going on for nearly 30 years without Pakistan taking any action to trace those wanted by India and arresting and handing them over. Before handing them over to Pakistan, the lists used to be vetted by a joint committee consisting of officers of all agencies and the State Police. A senior officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) used to chair this committee. The representatives of the State Police were required to confirm that the lists were correct.
No errors in the preparation of these lists had occurred in the past due to the systematic vetting of the lists by all agencies sitting jointly for the purpose before handing them over to Pakistan.
This procedure does not appear to have been followed in the case of the latest list of 50 wanted terrorists. As a result, the names of at least two suspects, who had been arrested in India and hence were not absconding, found their way into the list which showed them as hiding in Pakistan.
The US naval commando raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 and his death during the raid have given rise to considerable criticism in the US regarding the alleged role of Pakistan in sheltering wanted terrorists. Presumably to capitalize on the growing public criticism of Pakistan for giving shelter to terrorists, the MHA apparently decided to make the latest list available to the media in order to highlight Pakistan’s non-cooperation in tracing and arresting terrorists wanted in India.
Journalists of the “Times of India” and NDTV, who scrutinized the list, found out that two of the terrorists shown in the list as hiding in Pakistan were actually in India.
This has created considerable embarrassment for the Govt. of India. Though there was no mala fide intention on the part of the MHA, its failure to detect these errors before the list was handed over to Pakistan indicated a certain casualness in the maintenance of records relating to absconding accused in the Govt. of India and in the preparation of the list. The usual process of vetting of the list by a joint committee of the officers of the agencies and the Police was apparently not followed.
There was an unwise haste in preparing the list, handing it over to Pakistan and releasing it to the media in order to capitalize on the growing suspicions in the international community about Pakistan’s non-cooperation in counter-terrorism.
The embarrassment faced by the Government of India cannot be easily undone. The professional and diplomatic faux pas is likely to damage the reliability of our professional standards regarding investigation and documentation. It is going to take us some time to have the damage to our credibility repaired.
The episode will also enable Pakistan to reinforce its argument that Indian allegations of Pakistani support to terrorism are motivated propaganda and hence cannot be relied upon.
Three corrective steps are required to avoid a repeat of this embarrassment. Firstly, to act against the officers who have contributed to this embarrassment by their sins of commission and omission. Secondly, to revamp the process for the preparation of such documents in future to rule out errors. Thirdly, to avoid undue haste in preparing such lists and going to the media with them, in the hope of thereby embarrassing Pakistan.
If the international community has to be convinced about the correctness of our allegations against Pakistan, it must develop confidence in the reliability of our documentation and in our due diligence process in preparing such dossiers. ( 20-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
In March, our Ministry of Home Affairs had given to its Pakistani counterpart a list of 50 terrorists----Indian as well as Pakistani nationals--- who were suspected to have been involved in acts of terrorism in India. The Pakistani authorities were requested to have them arrested and handed over to India for trial.
India had been giving such lists to Pakistan ever since the Khalistani terrorists hijacked some aircraft of the Indian Airlines to Pakistan in the 1980s. Initially, the lists included mostly the names of Khalistani terrorists who were operating from Pakistan. Subsequently, the lists were expanded in the 1990s to include the names of some terrorists from Jammu & Kashmir and the absconding accused of the 1993 blasts in Mumbai, including Dawood Ibrahim and his associates.
Till about 2004, this list had a total of about 20 names. It has since expanded to 50 due to the search for the absconding accused in post-2004 jihadi acts of terrorism. Pakistan used to deny the presence of any Indian national in its territory. In respect of the Pakistani nationals figuring in the Indian lists, its response used to be that India had not been able to produce any evidence regarding their involvement in terrorism.
This exercise had been going on for nearly 30 years without Pakistan taking any action to trace those wanted by India and arresting and handing them over. Before handing them over to Pakistan, the lists used to be vetted by a joint committee consisting of officers of all agencies and the State Police. A senior officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) used to chair this committee. The representatives of the State Police were required to confirm that the lists were correct.
No errors in the preparation of these lists had occurred in the past due to the systematic vetting of the lists by all agencies sitting jointly for the purpose before handing them over to Pakistan.
This procedure does not appear to have been followed in the case of the latest list of 50 wanted terrorists. As a result, the names of at least two suspects, who had been arrested in India and hence were not absconding, found their way into the list which showed them as hiding in Pakistan.
The US naval commando raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 and his death during the raid have given rise to considerable criticism in the US regarding the alleged role of Pakistan in sheltering wanted terrorists. Presumably to capitalize on the growing public criticism of Pakistan for giving shelter to terrorists, the MHA apparently decided to make the latest list available to the media in order to highlight Pakistan’s non-cooperation in tracing and arresting terrorists wanted in India.
Journalists of the “Times of India” and NDTV, who scrutinized the list, found out that two of the terrorists shown in the list as hiding in Pakistan were actually in India.
This has created considerable embarrassment for the Govt. of India. Though there was no mala fide intention on the part of the MHA, its failure to detect these errors before the list was handed over to Pakistan indicated a certain casualness in the maintenance of records relating to absconding accused in the Govt. of India and in the preparation of the list. The usual process of vetting of the list by a joint committee of the officers of the agencies and the Police was apparently not followed.
There was an unwise haste in preparing the list, handing it over to Pakistan and releasing it to the media in order to capitalize on the growing suspicions in the international community about Pakistan’s non-cooperation in counter-terrorism.
The embarrassment faced by the Government of India cannot be easily undone. The professional and diplomatic faux pas is likely to damage the reliability of our professional standards regarding investigation and documentation. It is going to take us some time to have the damage to our credibility repaired.
The episode will also enable Pakistan to reinforce its argument that Indian allegations of Pakistani support to terrorism are motivated propaganda and hence cannot be relied upon.
Three corrective steps are required to avoid a repeat of this embarrassment. Firstly, to act against the officers who have contributed to this embarrassment by their sins of commission and omission. Secondly, to revamp the process for the preparation of such documents in future to rule out errors. Thirdly, to avoid undue haste in preparing such lists and going to the media with them, in the hope of thereby embarrassing Pakistan.
If the international community has to be convinced about the correctness of our allegations against Pakistan, it must develop confidence in the reliability of our documentation and in our due diligence process in preparing such dossiers. ( 20-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
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