B.RAMAN
President Barack Obama is expected to announce on December 1,2009, a mid-course correction in his strategy to win the campaign against the Taliban in the Af-Pak region. One has been promised a comprehensive strategy which would focus equally on the military and non-military components of the fight with the objective of winning it in a foreseeable time-frame.
2. The campaign, launched in October,2001, by the previous Administration of George Bush under the code-name Operation Enduring Freedom, has already lasted eight years. No end is in sight. In the meanwhile, there are indications of a growing fatigue in public opinion over a campaign that seems to be leading nowhere.
3.Battle fatigue of the NATO forces is what the Taliban and Al Qaeda want. There are signs in plenty of such fatigue. The fatigue is presently confined to sections of the civil society. If it spreads to the security forces, the campaign will be unwinnable.
4. While Obama has promised a comprehensive strategy and is taking his time to formulate it without being hustled by critics and detractors, much of the discussion and speculation in the US is focussed on one aspect---- the likely surge in the troop strength.
5. If a surge alone can win the campaign, a decision ought to be easy.Unfortunately, neither surges nor body counts determine the course of a campaign and its ultimate outcome. Without better tactics and better understanding of the adversary's tactics, no war or military campaign can be won whatever be the number of troops at one's disposal.
6. The question of the appropriateness of the tactics currently followed by the US troops in the Af-Pak region has hardly figured in the various reports submitted by the US military commanders on the ground to the Pentagon and in the discussions preceding a decision by the President.
7. While the Taliban in Afghanistan has been following a variable modus operandi in respect of its terrorist attacks through suicide bombers, its MO in relation to its insurgent attacks has shown hardly any variation. The MO of its insurgent attacks can be described as follows: avoid a frontal confrontation with a superior enemy on the offensive, withdraw, bide your time, regroup and attack by surprise. Territorial control is an objective of only variable importance. Where territorial control could mean large casualties and a large commitment of insurgent forces to safeguard territorial control, there is no hesitation in abandoning it.
8. This a much tried and often successful MO of many insurgent organisations from the days of the Vietcong in Vietnam and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet troops. The US troops have been countering this MO in the same way as they did in Vietnam and the Soviet troops did in Afghanistan.
9. Is there an unconventional response to the conventional insurgent tactics of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan? How to create battle fatigue in the Taliban and Al Qaeda? How to deny them sanctuaries and opportunities for re-grouping? What will be more effective---a large number of troops with advantages of numbers and better equipment centrally commanded and controlled or a large number of small groups of special forces such as the Green Berets operating autonomously of each other and enjoying operational flexibility? How to modify the current centralised command and control to suit such operational autonomy and flexibility?
10. To win the campaign against the Taliban in its territory where the US forces are strangers, the surprise element is important. The frequent Drone strikes from the air provide one such surprise element which has been effective time and again, but there is hardly any surprise element on the ground because of the continuing emphasis on large forces fighting set-piece battles.
11. The Af-Pak region is not the place for set-piece, predictable battle tactics. What is required is battle tactics of growing unpredictability to the Taliban that will confuse it, impose on it a high rate of attrition and ultimately lead to battle fatigue in its ranks.
12. One cannot expect Obama and his advisers to discuss battle tactics in public, but greater attention needs to be paid to it than seems to be the case till now. (27-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, November 27, 2009
Thursday, November 26, 2009
COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE MORALE OF THE HUMAN ELEMENT
B.RAMAN
The citizens of this country have valid reasons to be concerned over indications of poor morale and a deteriorating esprit de corps in the Mumbai Police and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), our external intelligence agency.
2. One may have the best of technical capabilities and unlimited resources, but if the human element responsible for using them effectively is disgruntled and pulling in different directions, our counter-terrorism machinery runs the danger of failing once again as shockingly as it did on 26/11 of last year.
3. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Home Minister P.Chidambaram, National Security Adviser M.K.Narayanan and Congress (I) leader Sonia Gandhi show no signs of being the least concerned over the poor state of morale in the Mumbai Police and the R&AW.
4. One does not need to have access to inside information to realise that the staff morale is far from satisfactory in two segments of our counter-terrorism machinery that will have to play an important role in preventing another 26/11.We have had three acts of mass casualty terrorism committed in Mumbai by Pakistan-based terrorists.
5. To prevent another----either in Mumbai or elsewhere--- we need a revamped and rejuvenated police machinery in Mumbai which will act as a team in detecting and neutralising any new conspiracy. The role of the R&AW, which has the task of monitoring the plans and activities of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its terrorist creations, will be equally important. If the officers of the Mumbai Police and the R&AW are in a disspirited state of mind, the terrorists from Pakistan and their ISI creators will find the road open for a repeat of 26/11.
6. One has to only read carefully the reports appearing with disturbing frequency in the media to realise that the morale of the human element is in a poor shape. When morale and esprit de corps are poor, the human elements in the counter-terrorism machinery spend their time more in countering each other through the medium of an obliging media than in countering the terrorists.
7. The stories that some senior officers of the Mumbai Police are disseminating about each other and the serious allegations that they are making against each other do not speak of a happy, contented and energetic officer cadre on the go against the terrorists. They speak of the worrisome state of inter-personal relations among sections of the senior officers.
8.If inter-personal tensions are the cause of the poor morale in the Mumbai police, inter-service tensions are the cause of the malaise in the R&AW. When Indira Gandhi created the R&AW in September 1968, she had desired that it should not be a carbon copy of the Intelligence Bureau dominated by police officers. It was her wish that the new organisation should recruit its officers from a much wider reservoir in the open market.
9. After a little more than 30 years, those who entered the officer cadre of the organisation from the open market have reached senior levels and rightly aspire to become the head of the organisation. It is a legitimate aspiration. Some of the reported decisions regarding promotions at senior levels have rightly or wrongly created an impression that an attempt is being made to deny them a chance to occupy the chair of the head of the organisation.
10. The Special Task Force For the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, had in 2000 recommended that we should study and adopt the good prctices of the concept of the intelligence community as it has evolved over the years in the US. This concept looks upon all the intelligence agencies as constituting a single community and all decisions--- whether in resect of human or material resources---- are required to be taken in the over-all interest of the community and the nation as a whole instead of in the interest of any individual agency of the community.
11. This recommendation was accepted by the Government, but there appears to have been foot-dragging in its implementation. Had the intelligence community concept been followed in decision-making, the kind of inter-service tensions that one finds in the R&AW now might not have been there.
12. The Prime Minister has an important role in the maintenance of morale and efficiency in the intelligence community similar to the role played by the US President. He should personally look into the reasons for the poor morale not only in the R&AW, but also in the Mumbai Police and address them in order to promote team work in our counter-terrorism machinery. ( 26-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinetr Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The citizens of this country have valid reasons to be concerned over indications of poor morale and a deteriorating esprit de corps in the Mumbai Police and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), our external intelligence agency.
2. One may have the best of technical capabilities and unlimited resources, but if the human element responsible for using them effectively is disgruntled and pulling in different directions, our counter-terrorism machinery runs the danger of failing once again as shockingly as it did on 26/11 of last year.
3. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Home Minister P.Chidambaram, National Security Adviser M.K.Narayanan and Congress (I) leader Sonia Gandhi show no signs of being the least concerned over the poor state of morale in the Mumbai Police and the R&AW.
4. One does not need to have access to inside information to realise that the staff morale is far from satisfactory in two segments of our counter-terrorism machinery that will have to play an important role in preventing another 26/11.We have had three acts of mass casualty terrorism committed in Mumbai by Pakistan-based terrorists.
5. To prevent another----either in Mumbai or elsewhere--- we need a revamped and rejuvenated police machinery in Mumbai which will act as a team in detecting and neutralising any new conspiracy. The role of the R&AW, which has the task of monitoring the plans and activities of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its terrorist creations, will be equally important. If the officers of the Mumbai Police and the R&AW are in a disspirited state of mind, the terrorists from Pakistan and their ISI creators will find the road open for a repeat of 26/11.
6. One has to only read carefully the reports appearing with disturbing frequency in the media to realise that the morale of the human element is in a poor shape. When morale and esprit de corps are poor, the human elements in the counter-terrorism machinery spend their time more in countering each other through the medium of an obliging media than in countering the terrorists.
7. The stories that some senior officers of the Mumbai Police are disseminating about each other and the serious allegations that they are making against each other do not speak of a happy, contented and energetic officer cadre on the go against the terrorists. They speak of the worrisome state of inter-personal relations among sections of the senior officers.
8.If inter-personal tensions are the cause of the poor morale in the Mumbai police, inter-service tensions are the cause of the malaise in the R&AW. When Indira Gandhi created the R&AW in September 1968, she had desired that it should not be a carbon copy of the Intelligence Bureau dominated by police officers. It was her wish that the new organisation should recruit its officers from a much wider reservoir in the open market.
9. After a little more than 30 years, those who entered the officer cadre of the organisation from the open market have reached senior levels and rightly aspire to become the head of the organisation. It is a legitimate aspiration. Some of the reported decisions regarding promotions at senior levels have rightly or wrongly created an impression that an attempt is being made to deny them a chance to occupy the chair of the head of the organisation.
10. The Special Task Force For the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, had in 2000 recommended that we should study and adopt the good prctices of the concept of the intelligence community as it has evolved over the years in the US. This concept looks upon all the intelligence agencies as constituting a single community and all decisions--- whether in resect of human or material resources---- are required to be taken in the over-all interest of the community and the nation as a whole instead of in the interest of any individual agency of the community.
11. This recommendation was accepted by the Government, but there appears to have been foot-dragging in its implementation. Had the intelligence community concept been followed in decision-making, the kind of inter-service tensions that one finds in the R&AW now might not have been there.
12. The Prime Minister has an important role in the maintenance of morale and efficiency in the intelligence community similar to the role played by the US President. He should personally look into the reasons for the poor morale not only in the R&AW, but also in the Mumbai Police and address them in order to promote team work in our counter-terrorism machinery. ( 26-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinetr Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
26/11 FAILS TO SHAKE US UP
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.582
B.RAMAN
Our capabilities for prevention of an act of terrorism as well as for its effective termination if prevention fails were found wanting in Mumbai on 26/11 last year.
Some prior intelligence was available, but it was found inadequate by the navy and the police which were responsible for follow-up action. Co-ordination between the intelligence agencies and those responsible for physical security was weak. There was inadequate interaction between governmental agencies and the management of the hotels. P.Chidambaram himself admitted in the Lok Sabha after assuming charge as the Home Minister that responsibility for follow-up action was diffused. The agencies responsible for termination after the terrorists had struck took time to mobilize themselves and act against the terrorists.
One could see from the various steps initiated by Chidambaram such as the decentralization of the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSGs), creating regional hubs of the NSG, strengthening its capacity for rapid mobilization and movement etc that we should be in a better position to confront the terrorists today if we are taken by surprise than we were on 26/11 of last year.
Certain steps have also been initiated for strengthening our prevention capability. The Multi-Agency Centre in the Intelligence Bureau,which is responsible for intelligence collection, sharing and co-ordinated action, has been revamped.There has been a regular monitoring of the intelligence process by the Minister himself. Action has been taken for creating a constantly updated database of information which could help in prevention and making it accessible to senior officers responsible for prevention.
Co-operation with foreign intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies has been strengthened and we have not hesitated to borrow good practices from foreign agencies and adapt them to our needs. After a visit by Chidambaram to the US, there has been a talk of our setting up a national counter-terrorism centre patterned after the centre set up in the US after 9/11. Joint command and joint action are among the operating principles of the US centre. These concepts are meant to ensure that there will be no buck-passing in counter-terrorism.
The National Investigation Agency set up post-26/11 to strengthen our capability for co-ordinated investigation of terrorist activities of a pan-Indian nature has had a slow start. The reasons for this are not clear.
The public has a right to ask whether as a result of these measures we are in a position to prevent another 26/11 just as the US has been able to prevent another 9/11. If, despite our best efforts, prevention again fails, are we in a better position to confront the terrorists more effectively than we did last year?
Till the Federal Bureau of Investigation detected the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s Chicago cell consisting of David Coleman Headley and Tahawuur Hussain Rana and discovered the LET’s plans to mount another terrorist attack in India using its US-based assets, we had a certain satisfaction about the perceived improvement in our capability and alertness.
After the FBI detected the cell and we found on the basis of the FBI tip-off that the US-based assets of the LET had been operating in India for nearly two years before 26/11 and even after 26/11 when we were supposed to be in a state of heightened alert, we ought to be bothered by the thought that the proclaimed improvement has been not up to the mark. The undetected activities of Headley and Rana clearly show the shocking state of our immigration controls and our failure to investigate thoroughly the 26/11 strikes.
Casualness in action and leadership has always been the bane of our counter-terrorism machinery. We wake up and act energetically for a few weeks after a terrorist attack and then go back into our casual mode. That is what has happened even after the traumatic strike of 26/11.
What we needed after 26/11 was a dramatic shake-up of our counter-terrorism machinery in order to improve leadership, enforce accountability, strengthen capacities and weed out casualness and incompetence. The fact that the machinery continues to function in the same haphazard manner as it was functioning before 26/11 should be all too evident to any objective analyst.
The fact that there has been no major act of jihadi terrorism outside J&K since September last year is no guarantee that surprises of the kind we faced on 26/11 are a thing of the past. They are not. The way Headley and Rana noticed and exploited gaps in our security architecture is another nasty surprise. Thanks to the FBI they were thwarted before they could execute their plans for another 26/11.
How many more Headleys, Ranas and the like are living in our midst and conspiring against us? Unless they are neutralized, another surprise is waiting to happen.
Most of the jihadi terrorism continues to originate from Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the past, the terrorists used to come across the border or through the seas. Now, they are trying to come from third countries in the West by assuming non-Muslim and non-Pakistani and non-Bangladeshi identities. They are faster in thinking new ways of surprising us than we are in refusing to be surprised.
There has hardly been any thinking in policy-making circles as to how to deal with the source of this evil. Their command and control, which is exercised from Pakistan, is still intact because of our inability to disrupt it.
If any more surprises are to be averted, we have to act at home as well as in Pakistan and Bangladesh. (25-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Our capabilities for prevention of an act of terrorism as well as for its effective termination if prevention fails were found wanting in Mumbai on 26/11 last year.
Some prior intelligence was available, but it was found inadequate by the navy and the police which were responsible for follow-up action. Co-ordination between the intelligence agencies and those responsible for physical security was weak. There was inadequate interaction between governmental agencies and the management of the hotels. P.Chidambaram himself admitted in the Lok Sabha after assuming charge as the Home Minister that responsibility for follow-up action was diffused. The agencies responsible for termination after the terrorists had struck took time to mobilize themselves and act against the terrorists.
One could see from the various steps initiated by Chidambaram such as the decentralization of the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSGs), creating regional hubs of the NSG, strengthening its capacity for rapid mobilization and movement etc that we should be in a better position to confront the terrorists today if we are taken by surprise than we were on 26/11 of last year.
Certain steps have also been initiated for strengthening our prevention capability. The Multi-Agency Centre in the Intelligence Bureau,which is responsible for intelligence collection, sharing and co-ordinated action, has been revamped.There has been a regular monitoring of the intelligence process by the Minister himself. Action has been taken for creating a constantly updated database of information which could help in prevention and making it accessible to senior officers responsible for prevention.
Co-operation with foreign intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies has been strengthened and we have not hesitated to borrow good practices from foreign agencies and adapt them to our needs. After a visit by Chidambaram to the US, there has been a talk of our setting up a national counter-terrorism centre patterned after the centre set up in the US after 9/11. Joint command and joint action are among the operating principles of the US centre. These concepts are meant to ensure that there will be no buck-passing in counter-terrorism.
The National Investigation Agency set up post-26/11 to strengthen our capability for co-ordinated investigation of terrorist activities of a pan-Indian nature has had a slow start. The reasons for this are not clear.
The public has a right to ask whether as a result of these measures we are in a position to prevent another 26/11 just as the US has been able to prevent another 9/11. If, despite our best efforts, prevention again fails, are we in a better position to confront the terrorists more effectively than we did last year?
Till the Federal Bureau of Investigation detected the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s Chicago cell consisting of David Coleman Headley and Tahawuur Hussain Rana and discovered the LET’s plans to mount another terrorist attack in India using its US-based assets, we had a certain satisfaction about the perceived improvement in our capability and alertness.
After the FBI detected the cell and we found on the basis of the FBI tip-off that the US-based assets of the LET had been operating in India for nearly two years before 26/11 and even after 26/11 when we were supposed to be in a state of heightened alert, we ought to be bothered by the thought that the proclaimed improvement has been not up to the mark. The undetected activities of Headley and Rana clearly show the shocking state of our immigration controls and our failure to investigate thoroughly the 26/11 strikes.
Casualness in action and leadership has always been the bane of our counter-terrorism machinery. We wake up and act energetically for a few weeks after a terrorist attack and then go back into our casual mode. That is what has happened even after the traumatic strike of 26/11.
What we needed after 26/11 was a dramatic shake-up of our counter-terrorism machinery in order to improve leadership, enforce accountability, strengthen capacities and weed out casualness and incompetence. The fact that the machinery continues to function in the same haphazard manner as it was functioning before 26/11 should be all too evident to any objective analyst.
The fact that there has been no major act of jihadi terrorism outside J&K since September last year is no guarantee that surprises of the kind we faced on 26/11 are a thing of the past. They are not. The way Headley and Rana noticed and exploited gaps in our security architecture is another nasty surprise. Thanks to the FBI they were thwarted before they could execute their plans for another 26/11.
How many more Headleys, Ranas and the like are living in our midst and conspiring against us? Unless they are neutralized, another surprise is waiting to happen.
Most of the jihadi terrorism continues to originate from Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the past, the terrorists used to come across the border or through the seas. Now, they are trying to come from third countries in the West by assuming non-Muslim and non-Pakistani and non-Bangladeshi identities. They are faster in thinking new ways of surprising us than we are in refusing to be surprised.
There has hardly been any thinking in policy-making circles as to how to deal with the source of this evil. Their command and control, which is exercised from Pakistan, is still intact because of our inability to disrupt it.
If any more surprises are to be averted, we have to act at home as well as in Pakistan and Bangladesh. (25-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
26/11:QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE POSED & ANSWERED
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 581
B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai left many important questions unanswered, if not unposed.
What kind of intelligence was available----from the Indian as well as foreign agencies?
How and by whom were the reports analysed, assessed and disseminated?
Were the gaps in the available intelligence identified and was action taken to fill those gaps?
What follow-up action was taken on the available intelligence----however inadequate it might have been?
What action was taken to strengthen physical security----- hotel and coastal security---- in Mumbai keeping in view the fact that the available intelligence---even if general and not specific--- spoke of likely sea-borne attacks on hotels, the Taj Mahal Hotel being one of them?
Who co-ordinated the physical security measures in the Governments of India and Maharashtra?
Some media reports immediately after the attack had quoted a senior executive in the Taj Mahal Hotel as saying that security was strengthened in the hotel for some days before the attack, but was subsequently down-graded. Who took the decision to down-grade physical security? On what basis?
Who co-ordinated the investigation after the terrorist attacks? What was the role of the Government of India in the co-ordination?
Were the foreigners, who escaped from the custody of the terrorists, debriefed thoroughly after they were rescued before they were allowed to go back to their countries? Who debriefed them? Were the debriefings recorded in writing? Where are those notes kept?If they were not debriefed, why? Was their being allowed to leave India without being debriefed due to negligence or was it the result of a conscious decision? If so, who took that decision?
Was a detailed reconstruction of the terrorist attacks made? Who made that reconstruction? What were the conclusions of that reconstruction?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the 10 Pakistani terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan, no other Pakistani accomplice was involved on the ground in Mumbai?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the two Indian Muslims arrested and prosecuted, there was no involvement of any other Indian Muslim?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any pre-9/11 reccee of the places attacked by the LET or its accomplices?
Did the police seize the guest registers of the hotels attacked, make out a list of persons of Pakistani origin who had stayed there in the months preceding the attacks and verify their background? If so, did the name of David Colemn Headley, who had reportedly stayed twice in the Taj Mahal Hotel, figure in that list? The fact that the Mumbai Police became aware of Headley's stay in the hotel only after they were tipped off by the FBI recently show that the registers were either not scrutinised or were scrutinised superficially.
Did the police seize the immigration records of the Mumbai airport to check the particulars of persons of Pakistani origin who had arrived in the days preceding the attacks and left in the hours following the attacks?
Were the investigators able to get any evidence beyond the confession of Kasab, the lone terrorist captured alive?
2. 26/11 in Mumbai was the most well-planned, well-organised and well-executed terrorist attack since 9/11 in the US. The National Commission appointed in the US made a detailed enquiry into the sins of commission and omission, which made 9/11 possible. Its report was debated in the US Congress and made available to the public. The relatives of US citizens killed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes mobilised themselves to ensure that there would be no cover-up, that the truth would be brought out and that follow-up action would be taken to identify and remove the deficiencies in the intelligence and physical security agencies.
3.The Government of India, by taking advantage of the apathy and confusion in the Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP), has skilfully avoided any enquiry into the 26/11 terrorist attacks and diverted public attention away from its sins of commission and omission. The Government of Maharashtra did appoint an enquiry committee headed by S.D.Pradhan, former Home Secretary, but its report has been classified and not shared with the legislattive assembly and the public on the unconvincing ground that releasing it could affect the ongoing prosecution.
4.The relatives of the security forces officers and civilians, who were killed by the terrorists, should emulate the relatives of those killed on 9/11 in the US, mobilise themselves and campaign for the constitution of a national commission to enquire into the terrorist strikes.
5. Kavita Karkare, the widow of Hemant Karkare, the brave head of the anti-terrorism squad of the Maharashtra Police who was brutally killed by the terrorists, should take the lead in the matter.
6. I had known Hemant personally. I met him for the first time at a seminar in Bangalore in February last year. I subsequently met him again in Jaipur in May last year after the explosions caused by the Indian Mujahideen. We were in telephonic contact with each other off and on. He never failed to return my calls-----whether they were professional or personal. He was an extremely sincere officer who, like the other officers killed by the terrorists, sacrificed his life in the fight against terrorism. Their sacrifice and the sacrifice of the civilians who were killed should not be allowed to go in vain. (24-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai left many important questions unanswered, if not unposed.
What kind of intelligence was available----from the Indian as well as foreign agencies?
How and by whom were the reports analysed, assessed and disseminated?
Were the gaps in the available intelligence identified and was action taken to fill those gaps?
What follow-up action was taken on the available intelligence----however inadequate it might have been?
What action was taken to strengthen physical security----- hotel and coastal security---- in Mumbai keeping in view the fact that the available intelligence---even if general and not specific--- spoke of likely sea-borne attacks on hotels, the Taj Mahal Hotel being one of them?
Who co-ordinated the physical security measures in the Governments of India and Maharashtra?
Some media reports immediately after the attack had quoted a senior executive in the Taj Mahal Hotel as saying that security was strengthened in the hotel for some days before the attack, but was subsequently down-graded. Who took the decision to down-grade physical security? On what basis?
Who co-ordinated the investigation after the terrorist attacks? What was the role of the Government of India in the co-ordination?
Were the foreigners, who escaped from the custody of the terrorists, debriefed thoroughly after they were rescued before they were allowed to go back to their countries? Who debriefed them? Were the debriefings recorded in writing? Where are those notes kept?If they were not debriefed, why? Was their being allowed to leave India without being debriefed due to negligence or was it the result of a conscious decision? If so, who took that decision?
Was a detailed reconstruction of the terrorist attacks made? Who made that reconstruction? What were the conclusions of that reconstruction?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the 10 Pakistani terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan, no other Pakistani accomplice was involved on the ground in Mumbai?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the two Indian Muslims arrested and prosecuted, there was no involvement of any other Indian Muslim?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any pre-9/11 reccee of the places attacked by the LET or its accomplices?
Did the police seize the guest registers of the hotels attacked, make out a list of persons of Pakistani origin who had stayed there in the months preceding the attacks and verify their background? If so, did the name of David Colemn Headley, who had reportedly stayed twice in the Taj Mahal Hotel, figure in that list? The fact that the Mumbai Police became aware of Headley's stay in the hotel only after they were tipped off by the FBI recently show that the registers were either not scrutinised or were scrutinised superficially.
Did the police seize the immigration records of the Mumbai airport to check the particulars of persons of Pakistani origin who had arrived in the days preceding the attacks and left in the hours following the attacks?
Were the investigators able to get any evidence beyond the confession of Kasab, the lone terrorist captured alive?
2. 26/11 in Mumbai was the most well-planned, well-organised and well-executed terrorist attack since 9/11 in the US. The National Commission appointed in the US made a detailed enquiry into the sins of commission and omission, which made 9/11 possible. Its report was debated in the US Congress and made available to the public. The relatives of US citizens killed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes mobilised themselves to ensure that there would be no cover-up, that the truth would be brought out and that follow-up action would be taken to identify and remove the deficiencies in the intelligence and physical security agencies.
3.The Government of India, by taking advantage of the apathy and confusion in the Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP), has skilfully avoided any enquiry into the 26/11 terrorist attacks and diverted public attention away from its sins of commission and omission. The Government of Maharashtra did appoint an enquiry committee headed by S.D.Pradhan, former Home Secretary, but its report has been classified and not shared with the legislattive assembly and the public on the unconvincing ground that releasing it could affect the ongoing prosecution.
4.The relatives of the security forces officers and civilians, who were killed by the terrorists, should emulate the relatives of those killed on 9/11 in the US, mobilise themselves and campaign for the constitution of a national commission to enquire into the terrorist strikes.
5. Kavita Karkare, the widow of Hemant Karkare, the brave head of the anti-terrorism squad of the Maharashtra Police who was brutally killed by the terrorists, should take the lead in the matter.
6. I had known Hemant personally. I met him for the first time at a seminar in Bangalore in February last year. I subsequently met him again in Jaipur in May last year after the explosions caused by the Indian Mujahideen. We were in telephonic contact with each other off and on. He never failed to return my calls-----whether they were professional or personal. He was an extremely sincere officer who, like the other officers killed by the terrorists, sacrificed his life in the fight against terrorism. Their sacrifice and the sacrifice of the civilians who were killed should not be allowed to go in vain. (24-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
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