B.RAMAN
Long before President Barack Obama of the US started speaking of the need for a change in outlook, attitudes and policies, a man in Japan, known as Mr.Clean, had been speaking of the need for a change in Japanese outlook, attitudes and policies. In fact, he is reportedly fond of collecting pictures and stone images of frogs and displaying them prominently as curios. It is said that the word in the Japanese language for a frog also means 'change'. He wanted to underline his determination to bring about a change.
2. His name is Katsuya Okada. He is 56 years old. He took over as the new Foreign Minister of Japan in the Cabinet of Prime Minister YukioHatoyama, which took office in Tokyo on September 16,2009. Both India and China should have reasons to be gratified by his being appointed as the Foreign Minister. More than other Japanese leaders,Okada has been saying for some years that it is time for Japan to be
less and less US-centric and more and more Asia-centric. For him, Asia means India and China and then other countries.
3. When he was head of the Democratic Partry of Japan (DPJ) before 2005 and in that capacity led the party to the elections to the lower House of the Diet in 2005, China and India were the flavour of the DPJ's manifesto, drafted under his leadership. It said of India and China: "The most important element in building a peaceful and prosperous Asia is the rise of China. Depending on China's future course of action, the rise of China can be an opportunity for greater peace and prosperity in Asia, on one hand, or a risk bringing confusion and stagnation, on
the other hand. It will be greatly in Japan's interest if China maintains its sustainable growth; while properly addressing its environmental and energy problems; overcomes social crises to consolidate political stability; and, contributes, as a major power, to the peace and prosperity of Asia, becoming a responsible force in the region. India is expected to be a nucleus of Asian economic development in the
21st century along with Japan, China, South Korea, and ASEAN. It projects a unique charisma not only as an economic, demographic, and cultural/ philosophical giant but also as a huge democracy.Establishing and maintaining a close relationship, including strategic, with this India will be in the national interests of Japan and will expand Japan's diplomatic options."
4. India "projects a unique charisma not only as an economic, demographic, and cultural/ philosophical giant but also as a huge democracy." These were his words of 2005. The Chinese were also very pleased by what the manifesto of 2005 had to say about Japan's imperial past:"The Japanese must bear in mind that the offended will not easily forget the pain and humiliation, while the offenders are liable to amnesia. It is absolutely undeniable, as recorded in Prime Minister Murayama's remark of August 15, 1995, that Japan's invasion and occupation brought tremendous loss and pain to our neighboring countries. After honestly and humbly reflecting on our past conduct, we must work determinedly to build a future-oriented relationship with our Asian neighbors. This will be a common perception within the new Japanese
government and the center pillar of its foreign policy. In this spirit, the new government will open a new national facility to pay tribute to past war victims as well as any future casualties of international lines of duty. It will also work steadily to strengthen joint initiatives with neighboring countries toward achieving a shared perception of historical issues."
5. If the DPJ had won the elections in 2005,India and China would have received priority attention in a Cabinet headed by Okada.Unfortunately, it did badly in the elections and Okada resigned from the leadership of the Party. Under Hatoyama, who took over the party leadership in May last, Okada's warm references to India disappeared from the manifesto of 2009. Despite his being the Secretary-General of
the Party, Okada was apparently unable to make Hatoyama think of India too while finalising the manifesto. The only reference to India in it was not in the section on foreign policy, but in the section on environment under climate change.
6. Will Okada, as Foreign Minister, reiterate the importance of Indo-Japanese strategic relationship as part of the new Government's over-all strategic architecture? That is the question to which we in India should be looking for an answer. I have been reading the English language media reports from Tokyo ever since the DPJ won its historic victory in the recent elections. Hatoyama was very active in getting to know the heads of many diplomatic missions in Tokyo. The Heads of missions of the US, Russia, China and South Korea prominently figured in
reports on his meetings with the diplomatic corps. I did not find the name of the Head of the Indian mission. One hopes it was an omission by the media and not by Hatoyama. There is, however, one important news, if it is correct. Hatoyama is planning a visit to India in December.
7. A word of caution about Okada would be in order. He used to believe that in order to stop Pakistani nuclear proliferation activites,attention needed to be paid to solving the Kashmir dispute. He reportedly believed that so long as the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved, Pakistan would continue to add to his nuclear arsenal by hook or by crook.
8. Some interesting quotes from Okada's pre-election interviews:
"Japan will continue to see the US as its most important ally but won't be as subservient as it has been in the past.It's like Japan hasn't had its own diplomacy, or its own opinions." (Associated Press)
"First, we should create a relationship of trust between the leaders of the two countries, then set bilateral priorities, including on global issues such as global warming and poverty, and discuss in what order to try to resolve them." (Reuters)
"First, Japan itself must properly assess the fact that it embarked on that wretched, foolish war. In that sense, our position is quite different from that of successive LDP governments." (Reuters)
9.Okada, who is the son of a supermarket owner, had studied in the Harvard University. He started his political career in the Liberal Democratic Party, which he left in 1993. An often-mentioned negative streak in him is that he has had the reputation of being inflexibly rigid.The DPJ has an absolute majority in the lower House, but not in the upper House where it will have to depend on the smaller Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and the People's New Party (PNP), both of which have a strong anti-US agenda. Since in Japan the two Houses have almost equal powers, no policy changes can be implemented without the support of the upper House. Okada may have to makecompromises on certain issues. The two smaller parties supporting the coalition may not support a high-profile foreign policy role for Japan.Flexibility in dealing with them might be required. Hatoyama has the reputation of being more flexible and willing to make compromises than Okada. (17-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
OBAMA DUCKS DALAI LAMA
B.RAMAN
Valerie Jarrett, a senior adviser and assistant to US President Barack Obama, accompanied by Maria Otero, the Undersecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs in the US State Department, visited Dharamshala on September 14,2009, and met His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche, the Prime Minister of the Tibetan-Government-in-exile.
2. His Holiness is to visit the US next month in response to long-pending invitations from US non-Governmental organisations supporting the Tibetan cause. During the course of his stay, he had also planned to visit Washington DC and his supporters in the US were trying to arrange a courtesy call on President Barack Obama. His Holiness and his advisers were hopeful of the courtesy call materialising despite opposition from China.
3. This was the first time that a team of US officials including a Presidential aide had visited Dharamshala before a planned visit by His Holiness to Washington DC. This gave rise to euphoric expectations in Dharamshala that the US officials were coming to finalise the details of a meeting with Obama. There was considerable disappointment in the entourage of His Holiness when it turned out that the two officials had specially flown to Dharamshala to request His Holiness not to visit Washington DC before Obama's first visit to China scheduled for November. Obama is reportedly worried that any meeting with His Holiness before his visit to China might spoil the atmosphere for his talks with the Chinese leaders.
4.The two officials are reported to have sought the understanding of His Holiness for the inability of Obama to meet His Holiness before his visit to China.They are reported to have suggested that during his visit to the US next month His Holiness should avoid any high-profile visit to Washington. They are also reported to have promised that during his talks with the Chinese leaders, Obama would take up the issue of the revival of the dialogue between Chinese officials and the aides of His Holiness and that he would inform His Holiness of the results of his talks on Tibet in Beijing after his return to Washington DC. They said that a fresh date for the visit of His Holiness to Washington could be discussed after the President returns from China.
5. There is palpable disappointment in the entourage of His Holiness over the lack of enthusiasm of Obama for a meeting with His Holiness, which became evident during the discussions with the two US officials. The disappointment was evident in the remarks of Samdhong Rinpoche to journalists on September 15. He said: "A lot of nations are adopting a policy of appeasement (towards China). Even the US
Government is doing some kind of appeasement.Today, economic interests are much greater than other interests."
6. However, Rinpoche added: " I understand why Obama is not meeting the Dalai Lama before his Chinese trip. It is common sense.Obama should not irritate the Chinese leadership. China's greatest irritation is His Holiness, wherever he goes."
7.His Holiness is going ahead with his plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh in November, which could more or less coincide with Obama's visit to China. The US officials were reported to be worried that the Chinese anger over the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh might come in the way of the success of Obama's promised efforts to persuade Beijing to resume its dialogue with His Holiness. It is not clear whether they gave any advice to His Holiness in this matter. It is also not yet clear whether the Dalai Lama will go ahead with his visit to Washington next
month to meet his Congressional supporters or cut it out of his itinerary in the US.
8. To lessen the obvious disappointment in Dharamshala,Jarrett assured His Holiness of Obama's interest in protecting the human rights of the Tibetans. A statement issued by the office of His Holiness said: "She (Jarrett) reiterated President Obama's commitment to support the Tibetan people in protecting their distinct religious, linguistic, and cultural heritage and securing respect for their human rights and civil liberties.She said the President commends the Dalai Lama for being consistent in looking for a solution based on Tibetan autonomy with the People's Republic of China.She discussed with His Holiness the best way the US could assist in the resolution for the Tibetan issue,particularly in the light of the first visit by President Obama to China in November. "(16-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Valerie Jarrett, a senior adviser and assistant to US President Barack Obama, accompanied by Maria Otero, the Undersecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs in the US State Department, visited Dharamshala on September 14,2009, and met His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Samdhong Rinpoche, the Prime Minister of the Tibetan-Government-in-exile.
2. His Holiness is to visit the US next month in response to long-pending invitations from US non-Governmental organisations supporting the Tibetan cause. During the course of his stay, he had also planned to visit Washington DC and his supporters in the US were trying to arrange a courtesy call on President Barack Obama. His Holiness and his advisers were hopeful of the courtesy call materialising despite opposition from China.
3. This was the first time that a team of US officials including a Presidential aide had visited Dharamshala before a planned visit by His Holiness to Washington DC. This gave rise to euphoric expectations in Dharamshala that the US officials were coming to finalise the details of a meeting with Obama. There was considerable disappointment in the entourage of His Holiness when it turned out that the two officials had specially flown to Dharamshala to request His Holiness not to visit Washington DC before Obama's first visit to China scheduled for November. Obama is reportedly worried that any meeting with His Holiness before his visit to China might spoil the atmosphere for his talks with the Chinese leaders.
4.The two officials are reported to have sought the understanding of His Holiness for the inability of Obama to meet His Holiness before his visit to China.They are reported to have suggested that during his visit to the US next month His Holiness should avoid any high-profile visit to Washington. They are also reported to have promised that during his talks with the Chinese leaders, Obama would take up the issue of the revival of the dialogue between Chinese officials and the aides of His Holiness and that he would inform His Holiness of the results of his talks on Tibet in Beijing after his return to Washington DC. They said that a fresh date for the visit of His Holiness to Washington could be discussed after the President returns from China.
5. There is palpable disappointment in the entourage of His Holiness over the lack of enthusiasm of Obama for a meeting with His Holiness, which became evident during the discussions with the two US officials. The disappointment was evident in the remarks of Samdhong Rinpoche to journalists on September 15. He said: "A lot of nations are adopting a policy of appeasement (towards China). Even the US
Government is doing some kind of appeasement.Today, economic interests are much greater than other interests."
6. However, Rinpoche added: " I understand why Obama is not meeting the Dalai Lama before his Chinese trip. It is common sense.Obama should not irritate the Chinese leadership. China's greatest irritation is His Holiness, wherever he goes."
7.His Holiness is going ahead with his plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh in November, which could more or less coincide with Obama's visit to China. The US officials were reported to be worried that the Chinese anger over the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh might come in the way of the success of Obama's promised efforts to persuade Beijing to resume its dialogue with His Holiness. It is not clear whether they gave any advice to His Holiness in this matter. It is also not yet clear whether the Dalai Lama will go ahead with his visit to Washington next
month to meet his Congressional supporters or cut it out of his itinerary in the US.
8. To lessen the obvious disappointment in Dharamshala,Jarrett assured His Holiness of Obama's interest in protecting the human rights of the Tibetans. A statement issued by the office of His Holiness said: "She (Jarrett) reiterated President Obama's commitment to support the Tibetan people in protecting their distinct religious, linguistic, and cultural heritage and securing respect for their human rights and civil liberties.She said the President commends the Dalai Lama for being consistent in looking for a solution based on Tibetan autonomy with the People's Republic of China.She discussed with His Holiness the best way the US could assist in the resolution for the Tibetan issue,particularly in the light of the first visit by President Obama to China in November. "(16-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART IV
B.RAMAN
The anti-Shia incidents of 1988-93 led to two developments. A number of new political groups of the Shias came into being, despite the ban on political activities. They started demanding that the NA should be converted into a separate province to be called the Karakoram Province with an elected Legislative Assembly and the same status as the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). This demand was strongly
opposed by the political parties of the POK, a predominantly Sunni area, and by the Sunni political groups of the NA, which demanded that the NA should be merged with the POK.
2. The "Friday Times" of October 15-21,1992, quoted Muhammad Yahya Shah, the Chief Convenor of the Hunza-Nager Movement, one of these new Shia organisations, as saying as follows: "We were ruled by the whites during the British days, but we are now being ruled by the browns from the plains...... The rapid settling-in of mostly Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside, particularly the trading classes, has created
a sense of acute insecurity among the local Shias and resulted in antagonistic perceptions between the locals and outsiders.... The genie is out of the bottle. Political reform has been abandoned in favour of extremism, which the Government is abetting in order to prolong its unconstitutional militarisation. The economic and environmental plundering continues unabated. During Qasim Shah's tenure as Minister of NA, the forests were denuded rapidly. In the 1988 conflict, 400000 acres of jungle were depleted and the wood smuggled out. Marco Polo sheep, an endangered species, was hunted in the hundreds by the previous Corps Commander, Lt.Gen.Ali Akbar, who used helicopter gunships for his sport."
3. The same issue of the "Friday Times" quoted Muzzafar Ali, another Shia leader and General Secretary of the NA Bar Association, as saying: " The Government is instigating violence to suppress our genuine demands. In Pakistan, three Supreme Court Judges have to confirm a Sessions Judge's verdict. Here things happen in total negation of legal procedures as enshrined in the Constitution. A single senior judge from down-country confirms a verdict functioning as an autonomous Judicial Commissioner. He is at times even junior to the local Sessions Judge. The State-subject rules remained enforced in Indian Kashmir after 1947, while we blundered by getting integrated,without adequate guarantees, into Pakistan for the sake of Muslim brotherhood. We have ended up without a Constitution, representation,
even without civil or judicial rights as are available to our Pakistani brothers."
4. Opposing the demand of the Shias for a separate Karakoram Province, a group of Sunni leaders of the POK filed a petition before the POK High Court on October 16,1990, demanding that the NA, being Kashmiri territory, should be merged with the POK. Delivering the judgement on March 8,1993, Justice Abdul Majeed Mallick, Chief Justice of the POK High Court, ruled as follows:
"The NA are and have been part of the State of J&K as it existed before and on August 15,1947."
" The NA are part of Azad J&K and are to be construed and acknowledged as such."
"The detachment of the NA from the rest of Azad J&K is tantamount to a violation of the Resolutions of the Security Council of March 30, 1951, and January 24,1957."
"The State-subjects residing in the NA have been deprived of the benefits of fundamental rights enshrined in the Interim Constitution during the past without lawful authority. These rights are admissible and exercisable by them."
5. Refusing to accept the judgement, the Government of Pakistan said in a statement issued on March 11,1993: "The Azad J&K Government has no jurisdiction over the NA, which are under the administrative control of Pakistan and historically had been administered by the Central Government. There is no question of passing on the administrative jurisdiction of the NA to the AJK Government." (16-9-09)---To be
continued
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The anti-Shia incidents of 1988-93 led to two developments. A number of new political groups of the Shias came into being, despite the ban on political activities. They started demanding that the NA should be converted into a separate province to be called the Karakoram Province with an elected Legislative Assembly and the same status as the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). This demand was strongly
opposed by the political parties of the POK, a predominantly Sunni area, and by the Sunni political groups of the NA, which demanded that the NA should be merged with the POK.
2. The "Friday Times" of October 15-21,1992, quoted Muhammad Yahya Shah, the Chief Convenor of the Hunza-Nager Movement, one of these new Shia organisations, as saying as follows: "We were ruled by the whites during the British days, but we are now being ruled by the browns from the plains...... The rapid settling-in of mostly Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside, particularly the trading classes, has created
a sense of acute insecurity among the local Shias and resulted in antagonistic perceptions between the locals and outsiders.... The genie is out of the bottle. Political reform has been abandoned in favour of extremism, which the Government is abetting in order to prolong its unconstitutional militarisation. The economic and environmental plundering continues unabated. During Qasim Shah's tenure as Minister of NA, the forests were denuded rapidly. In the 1988 conflict, 400000 acres of jungle were depleted and the wood smuggled out. Marco Polo sheep, an endangered species, was hunted in the hundreds by the previous Corps Commander, Lt.Gen.Ali Akbar, who used helicopter gunships for his sport."
3. The same issue of the "Friday Times" quoted Muzzafar Ali, another Shia leader and General Secretary of the NA Bar Association, as saying: " The Government is instigating violence to suppress our genuine demands. In Pakistan, three Supreme Court Judges have to confirm a Sessions Judge's verdict. Here things happen in total negation of legal procedures as enshrined in the Constitution. A single senior judge from down-country confirms a verdict functioning as an autonomous Judicial Commissioner. He is at times even junior to the local Sessions Judge. The State-subject rules remained enforced in Indian Kashmir after 1947, while we blundered by getting integrated,without adequate guarantees, into Pakistan for the sake of Muslim brotherhood. We have ended up without a Constitution, representation,
even without civil or judicial rights as are available to our Pakistani brothers."
4. Opposing the demand of the Shias for a separate Karakoram Province, a group of Sunni leaders of the POK filed a petition before the POK High Court on October 16,1990, demanding that the NA, being Kashmiri territory, should be merged with the POK. Delivering the judgement on March 8,1993, Justice Abdul Majeed Mallick, Chief Justice of the POK High Court, ruled as follows:
"The NA are and have been part of the State of J&K as it existed before and on August 15,1947."
" The NA are part of Azad J&K and are to be construed and acknowledged as such."
"The detachment of the NA from the rest of Azad J&K is tantamount to a violation of the Resolutions of the Security Council of March 30, 1951, and January 24,1957."
"The State-subjects residing in the NA have been deprived of the benefits of fundamental rights enshrined in the Interim Constitution during the past without lawful authority. These rights are admissible and exercisable by them."
5. Refusing to accept the judgement, the Government of Pakistan said in a statement issued on March 11,1993: "The Azad J&K Government has no jurisdiction over the NA, which are under the administrative control of Pakistan and historically had been administered by the Central Government. There is no question of passing on the administrative jurisdiction of the NA to the AJK Government." (16-9-09)---To be
continued
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, September 14, 2009
CHINA'S STRATEGIC INTRUSIONS IN INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD
B.RAMAN
"The Chinese long-term strategy with regard to India has many facets. The trans-border developments are only one---but the most important--- component of their strategy. There are other components---namely, strengthening their relationship with Pakistan in order to confront India with the danger of a two-front war should it try to change militarily the status quo either in respect of China or in respect of
Pakistan with regard to Jammu & Kashmir; giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability for threatening India; weakening the Indian influence in the rest of South Asia and strengthening their presence and influence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal; creating a presence for their Navy in the Indian Ocean region and opposing India's attempts to emerge as an Asian power on par with China. Till recently, we had no well thought-out long-term strategy with regard to China----neither in the border region, nor in South Asia nor in the Indian Ocean region.
Only recently the initial rudiments of such a strategy have been appearing. Our attempts to strengthen our strategic relationship with the US and Japan is one such building-block of this comprehensive strategy. Our proactive Indian Ocean policy is another building block. But we find ourselves handicapped in further developing such a comprehensive strategy because we have let our influence be weakened in
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. "
---From my article of September 8,2009, titled "India-China: Dangerous Hysteria" available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3398.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite all the abusive mails and comments that I have been getting and to which I am used over my article deploring the hysteria that is being created by some of our strategic analysts and the media over the trans-border developments, I am not unduly concerned over the reports of continuing Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory. These intrusions were initially confined to the Eastern sector and now
are being reported from other sectors too.
2. When a border is not demarcated on the ground and when there is no common understanding between the two sides as to what constitutes the line of actual control due to the Chinese reluctance to exchange with us maps indicating their understanding of the LAC,such intrusions are bound to take place from both sides. Such intrusions used to be a recurring feature across the India-Myanmar border
before the two countries demarcated the border except in the trijunction areas to the north and the south. Such intrusions were also a normal feature across the Sino-Myanmar border in the Northern Shan State and the Kachin State before the Sino-Myanmar border was demarcated in the 1970s except in the northern trijunction where the borders of India, China and Myanmar meet, which remains undetermined and undemarcated till today.
3.What I would be worried about is any illegal occupation by the Chinese of territory claimed by them either in the Arunachal Pradesh or in the Ladakh sector. The 1962 war occurred not because the Government of India ignored reports of intrusions, which are instances of trespass, but because it ignored and played down intelligence reports of illegal occupation of Indian territory by the Chinese in sectors such as Aksai Chin in Ladakh and their incorporating them into Chinese territory. It is our failure and reluctance to counter such outrageous instances of illegal occupation of Indian territory which inexorably led to 1962.
4.The Chinese used to have the habit of illegally occupying territory claimed by them if they had an opportunity of doing so, They did it in Indian territory before 1962. They did it in Myanmar in the late 1960s.They did it with regard to the Philippines when they quietly occupied in 1995 the South China sea island of Mischief Reef, which the Philippines claimed as its territory. After the furore caused by their illegal occupation of the Mischief Reef, I am not aware of any further instance of illegal occupation of foreign territory by the Chinese. If there is, I would be happy to stand corrected.
5. I have stated this many times before and I state this again that the Chinese would continue to stall the border talks with India by even not exchanging maps on the LAC till the Dalai Lama dies. They are not satisfied that that they have pacified Tibet once and for all. The Lhasa uprising of March 2008 has created fresh doubts in their mind about the prospects for continued political stability in Tibet. They are determined to impose on the Tibetans a successor to His Holiness, when he dies, chosen by the Communist Party of China. They do fear that there will be opposition to their nominee from the Tibetans and that this could lead to disturbances in Tibet, in which the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) will play an important part. They want to keep a pressure point which they can use against India in order to make it control the TYC. A continuing dispute with India over Arunachal Pradesh will, in their calculation, help them in dealing with any-post Dalai Lama
instability. It has been my assessment that the border talks will show some movement for the better or for the worse only after the death of His Holiness and not before.
6. The question for our policy-makers is whether we facilitate the Chinese game of stalling till His Holiness dies or whether we insist on a settlement here and now and if so, what are the options that could be explored. It was in that context that I suggested that we explore the possibility of a status quo plus solution under which in return for the Chinese accepting the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh, we could consider accommodating some of their interests in Tawang, about which they seem to be doing a song and dance. I was amazed by a flood of mails accusing me of suggesting that we hand over Tawang to the Chinese. Where have I said so?
7. What are the Chinese interests in Tawang? Nobody knows for certain. I have asked many retired military officers whether Tawang would have any military significance for the Chinese. They said no. The Chinese themselves have cited what they consider as the historic and religious links of Tawang with Tibet. They even claim that there are records to show that the residents of Tawang paid their taxes to the set-up of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and not to the British Government in New Delhi. They have not made a similar claim regarding the rest of Arunachal Pradesh. They have also pointed out that one of the previous Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang. The Singapore Foreign Minister, who had recently visited Lhasa, has been quoted as saying that the Chinese are worried that after the death of His Holiness, his followers might proclaim a child of Tawang as the incarnation of His Holiness. If that is so, they should try to get hold of Tawang before His Holiness dies instead of waiting till his death.
8. I have been suggesting to many think tanks in India that instead of getting hysterical over Tawang, we must do a detailed research,analysis and assessment of the Chinese obsession with Tawang. Nobody has done so till now.
9. In a commentary on the observations of the Singapore Foreign Minister contributed to the South Asia Analysis Group (www.southasiaanalysis.org), Brig.Subash Kapila, a fine military intelligence officer with whom I had the pleasure and privilege of being associated, has raised a very important question: the Chinese did not show the same obsession with Tawang in the past as they seem to be doing now. He has pointed out that the Chinese even withdrew from Tawang in 1962 after having occupied it. If Tawang was that important to them, they should not have withdrawn from there. Why did they do so?
10. The answer is simple. Long after they withdrew from Tawang, sections of the US media carried reports, based on interviews with the Tibetan Khampas, that the Khampa revolt in the 1950s against the Chinese occupation of Tibet was orchestrated by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and India's Intelligence Bureau then headed by the legendary B.N.Mullick. One does not know whether these claims or allegations were correct, but the Chinese presumed that they were. The fact that after the failure of the Khampa revolt, His Holiness and his entourage made a dash for Tawang has added to the strength of the Chinese presumption. The Chinese fear that if there is a joint attempt by the Indian and US intelligence to destabilise Tibet after His Holiness, that attempt could be directed from Tawang. .
11. I am not a military expert. But I have spent nearly three decades in the intelligence profession. From whatever little I know of the craft of intelligence, I could say that if there is one place on the Indo-Tibetan border from where a covert action to destabilise Tibet can be mounted with some success that is Tawang. I am, therefore, not surprised that the Indian presence in Tawang gives them the creeps. When I suggested a status quo plus formula what I had in mind was an Indian guarantee that New Delhi would not allow Tawang to be used to destabilise Tibet after the death of His Holiness in return for a Chinese acceptance of the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. I do not know whether this will work with the Chinese, but it is worth trying.
12. I am not unduly worried over the continuing reports of Chinese troop intrusions. We are fortunate in having a competent, professional army, which is capable of taking care of them. There is no need for a hysteria over the intrusions. I am more worried about the diplomatic,economic and strategic intrusions which the Chinese are quietly making in our neighbourhood and the inability of our diplomacy
to counter them. What are those strategic Chinese intrusions around us in our neighbourhood?
The winning of the contract for the second stage of the Hambantota port development project in Sri Lanka.
The winning of the contract for the Colombo-Kalutara road in Sri Lanka.
The winning of the contract for the improvement of the Kyaukpu port on the Arakan coast of Myanmar.
The winning of the permission from the military junta of Myanmar for the construction of two pipelines---one for gas and the other for oil--- from Kyaukpu to Yunnan.These pipelines will carry not only gas and oil produced locally but also brought by Chinese tankers from West Asia and Africa. We claim to have great influence over the junta in Myanmar.It has reportedly agreed to sell to China gas found by a consortium of which an Indian public sector company was a member. After millions of rupees of Indian investment, gas is struck and the Myanmar junta sells that gas to the Chinese. We watch it sucking our thumbs.
The reported furtive negotiations with the Government of Bangladesh for a pipeline to carry gas from Bangladesh to Yunnan via the Arakan area of Myanmar.
The proposal for a railway line from Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Pakistan to Xinjiang for which a feasibility study was ordered by the akistan Government two weeks ago.
Talks with the Pakistani and the Iranian authorities for a gas pipeline to take Iranian gas to Xinjiang.
13. What contracts of strategic significance India has won in our neighbourhood? Zilch.
14. What progress India has made in strengthening its strategic presence in its neighbourhood? Zilch.
15. How effective Indian strategic and economic diplomacy has been in our neighbourhood? Zilch.
16. It is time to be worried and howling over the way China has made strategic inroads in our neighbourhood and over the failure of our diplomacy to counter it.
17. Our Army can take care of China. Can our diplomats take care of China? ( 14-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"The Chinese long-term strategy with regard to India has many facets. The trans-border developments are only one---but the most important--- component of their strategy. There are other components---namely, strengthening their relationship with Pakistan in order to confront India with the danger of a two-front war should it try to change militarily the status quo either in respect of China or in respect of
Pakistan with regard to Jammu & Kashmir; giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability for threatening India; weakening the Indian influence in the rest of South Asia and strengthening their presence and influence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal; creating a presence for their Navy in the Indian Ocean region and opposing India's attempts to emerge as an Asian power on par with China. Till recently, we had no well thought-out long-term strategy with regard to China----neither in the border region, nor in South Asia nor in the Indian Ocean region.
Only recently the initial rudiments of such a strategy have been appearing. Our attempts to strengthen our strategic relationship with the US and Japan is one such building-block of this comprehensive strategy. Our proactive Indian Ocean policy is another building block. But we find ourselves handicapped in further developing such a comprehensive strategy because we have let our influence be weakened in
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. "
---From my article of September 8,2009, titled "India-China: Dangerous Hysteria" available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3398.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite all the abusive mails and comments that I have been getting and to which I am used over my article deploring the hysteria that is being created by some of our strategic analysts and the media over the trans-border developments, I am not unduly concerned over the reports of continuing Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory. These intrusions were initially confined to the Eastern sector and now
are being reported from other sectors too.
2. When a border is not demarcated on the ground and when there is no common understanding between the two sides as to what constitutes the line of actual control due to the Chinese reluctance to exchange with us maps indicating their understanding of the LAC,such intrusions are bound to take place from both sides. Such intrusions used to be a recurring feature across the India-Myanmar border
before the two countries demarcated the border except in the trijunction areas to the north and the south. Such intrusions were also a normal feature across the Sino-Myanmar border in the Northern Shan State and the Kachin State before the Sino-Myanmar border was demarcated in the 1970s except in the northern trijunction where the borders of India, China and Myanmar meet, which remains undetermined and undemarcated till today.
3.What I would be worried about is any illegal occupation by the Chinese of territory claimed by them either in the Arunachal Pradesh or in the Ladakh sector. The 1962 war occurred not because the Government of India ignored reports of intrusions, which are instances of trespass, but because it ignored and played down intelligence reports of illegal occupation of Indian territory by the Chinese in sectors such as Aksai Chin in Ladakh and their incorporating them into Chinese territory. It is our failure and reluctance to counter such outrageous instances of illegal occupation of Indian territory which inexorably led to 1962.
4.The Chinese used to have the habit of illegally occupying territory claimed by them if they had an opportunity of doing so, They did it in Indian territory before 1962. They did it in Myanmar in the late 1960s.They did it with regard to the Philippines when they quietly occupied in 1995 the South China sea island of Mischief Reef, which the Philippines claimed as its territory. After the furore caused by their illegal occupation of the Mischief Reef, I am not aware of any further instance of illegal occupation of foreign territory by the Chinese. If there is, I would be happy to stand corrected.
5. I have stated this many times before and I state this again that the Chinese would continue to stall the border talks with India by even not exchanging maps on the LAC till the Dalai Lama dies. They are not satisfied that that they have pacified Tibet once and for all. The Lhasa uprising of March 2008 has created fresh doubts in their mind about the prospects for continued political stability in Tibet. They are determined to impose on the Tibetans a successor to His Holiness, when he dies, chosen by the Communist Party of China. They do fear that there will be opposition to their nominee from the Tibetans and that this could lead to disturbances in Tibet, in which the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) will play an important part. They want to keep a pressure point which they can use against India in order to make it control the TYC. A continuing dispute with India over Arunachal Pradesh will, in their calculation, help them in dealing with any-post Dalai Lama
instability. It has been my assessment that the border talks will show some movement for the better or for the worse only after the death of His Holiness and not before.
6. The question for our policy-makers is whether we facilitate the Chinese game of stalling till His Holiness dies or whether we insist on a settlement here and now and if so, what are the options that could be explored. It was in that context that I suggested that we explore the possibility of a status quo plus solution under which in return for the Chinese accepting the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh, we could consider accommodating some of their interests in Tawang, about which they seem to be doing a song and dance. I was amazed by a flood of mails accusing me of suggesting that we hand over Tawang to the Chinese. Where have I said so?
7. What are the Chinese interests in Tawang? Nobody knows for certain. I have asked many retired military officers whether Tawang would have any military significance for the Chinese. They said no. The Chinese themselves have cited what they consider as the historic and religious links of Tawang with Tibet. They even claim that there are records to show that the residents of Tawang paid their taxes to the set-up of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and not to the British Government in New Delhi. They have not made a similar claim regarding the rest of Arunachal Pradesh. They have also pointed out that one of the previous Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang. The Singapore Foreign Minister, who had recently visited Lhasa, has been quoted as saying that the Chinese are worried that after the death of His Holiness, his followers might proclaim a child of Tawang as the incarnation of His Holiness. If that is so, they should try to get hold of Tawang before His Holiness dies instead of waiting till his death.
8. I have been suggesting to many think tanks in India that instead of getting hysterical over Tawang, we must do a detailed research,analysis and assessment of the Chinese obsession with Tawang. Nobody has done so till now.
9. In a commentary on the observations of the Singapore Foreign Minister contributed to the South Asia Analysis Group (www.southasiaanalysis.org), Brig.Subash Kapila, a fine military intelligence officer with whom I had the pleasure and privilege of being associated, has raised a very important question: the Chinese did not show the same obsession with Tawang in the past as they seem to be doing now. He has pointed out that the Chinese even withdrew from Tawang in 1962 after having occupied it. If Tawang was that important to them, they should not have withdrawn from there. Why did they do so?
10. The answer is simple. Long after they withdrew from Tawang, sections of the US media carried reports, based on interviews with the Tibetan Khampas, that the Khampa revolt in the 1950s against the Chinese occupation of Tibet was orchestrated by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and India's Intelligence Bureau then headed by the legendary B.N.Mullick. One does not know whether these claims or allegations were correct, but the Chinese presumed that they were. The fact that after the failure of the Khampa revolt, His Holiness and his entourage made a dash for Tawang has added to the strength of the Chinese presumption. The Chinese fear that if there is a joint attempt by the Indian and US intelligence to destabilise Tibet after His Holiness, that attempt could be directed from Tawang. .
11. I am not a military expert. But I have spent nearly three decades in the intelligence profession. From whatever little I know of the craft of intelligence, I could say that if there is one place on the Indo-Tibetan border from where a covert action to destabilise Tibet can be mounted with some success that is Tawang. I am, therefore, not surprised that the Indian presence in Tawang gives them the creeps. When I suggested a status quo plus formula what I had in mind was an Indian guarantee that New Delhi would not allow Tawang to be used to destabilise Tibet after the death of His Holiness in return for a Chinese acceptance of the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. I do not know whether this will work with the Chinese, but it is worth trying.
12. I am not unduly worried over the continuing reports of Chinese troop intrusions. We are fortunate in having a competent, professional army, which is capable of taking care of them. There is no need for a hysteria over the intrusions. I am more worried about the diplomatic,economic and strategic intrusions which the Chinese are quietly making in our neighbourhood and the inability of our diplomacy
to counter them. What are those strategic Chinese intrusions around us in our neighbourhood?
The winning of the contract for the second stage of the Hambantota port development project in Sri Lanka.
The winning of the contract for the Colombo-Kalutara road in Sri Lanka.
The winning of the contract for the improvement of the Kyaukpu port on the Arakan coast of Myanmar.
The winning of the permission from the military junta of Myanmar for the construction of two pipelines---one for gas and the other for oil--- from Kyaukpu to Yunnan.These pipelines will carry not only gas and oil produced locally but also brought by Chinese tankers from West Asia and Africa. We claim to have great influence over the junta in Myanmar.It has reportedly agreed to sell to China gas found by a consortium of which an Indian public sector company was a member. After millions of rupees of Indian investment, gas is struck and the Myanmar junta sells that gas to the Chinese. We watch it sucking our thumbs.
The reported furtive negotiations with the Government of Bangladesh for a pipeline to carry gas from Bangladesh to Yunnan via the Arakan area of Myanmar.
The proposal for a railway line from Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Pakistan to Xinjiang for which a feasibility study was ordered by the akistan Government two weeks ago.
Talks with the Pakistani and the Iranian authorities for a gas pipeline to take Iranian gas to Xinjiang.
13. What contracts of strategic significance India has won in our neighbourhood? Zilch.
14. What progress India has made in strengthening its strategic presence in its neighbourhood? Zilch.
15. How effective Indian strategic and economic diplomacy has been in our neighbourhood? Zilch.
16. It is time to be worried and howling over the way China has made strategic inroads in our neighbourhood and over the failure of our diplomacy to counter it.
17. Our Army can take care of China. Can our diplomats take care of China? ( 14-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, September 13, 2009
GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART III
B.RAMAN
The first signs of political ferment against Islamabad appeared in 1971 when an organisation called the Tanzeem-e-Millat (TM) started operating in Gilgit despite the ban on political activities. In 1974, Johar Ali Khan, the founder of the party, called for a strike to demand the repeal of the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCRs) and the recognition of the basic rights of the locals.When the agitation took a violent turn, A.R.Siddiqui, the then Deputy Commissioner, ordered the Gilgit Scouts, a para-military unit raised by the British and with a history of over a
hundred years, to fire on the agitators and disperse them. They refused to open fire on fellow-Shias. He then grabbed a rifle from a soldier of the Gilgit Scouts and opened fire on the crowd himself. One agitator was killed and the crowd dispersed.Johar Ali Khan and 15 others were arrested and taken to the jail. A large number of Shias raided the jail and got them freed. They were subsequently re-arrested.
2. Following these violent incidents---the first in the history of the NA since the Pakistan Army occupied it--- Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, then in power in Islamabad, issued a notification disbanding the Gilgit Scouts as a punishment for its refusing to fire on the Shia agitators. The disbanding of the unit hurt the feelings of the Shias. It also threw a large number, who served in the Scouts, out of job.This marked the beginning of the alienation of the Shias of the NA against Islamabad.Tracing the history of the alienation of the Shias of the NA,the
"FridayTimes", a weekly of Lahore, wrote in its issue of October 15-21,1992, as follows: " The Gilgit Scouts was the only credible law-enforcing agency from pre-Partition times. Northerners generally resent the undoing of this centuries-old institution."
3. The widespread anger caused by the disbanding of the Gilgit Scouts led to the emergence of a number of anti-Government religious organisations of the Shias. To counter this, the local Army authorities allegedly encouraged the formation of pro-Government organisations by the Sunnis. This injected the poison of religious sectarianism in the NA, which like the rest of Jammu & Kashmir, had historically
remained a tolerant society.
4. The injection of this poison led to an anti-Shia carnage in Gilgit in May 1988. This was followed by more anti-Shia incidents in 1990, 1992 and 1993. In its issue of April 1990, the "Herald", the monthly journal of the "Dawn" group of publications of Karachi, wrote as follows: " In May 1988,low-intensity political rivalry and sectarian tension ignited into full-scale carnage as thousands of armed tribesmen from outside Gilgit district invaded Gilgit along the Karakoram Highway. Nobody stopped them. They destroyed crops and houses, lynched and burnt people to death in the villages around Gilgit Town. The number of dead and injured was put in the hundreds, but numbers alone tell nothing of the savagery of the invading hordes and the chilling impact it has left on these peaceful valleys. Today, less than two years later, Gilgit is an arsenal and every man is ready to fight. In March 1990, when the Administration raided homes in Gilgit Town to seize weapons, one was
reminded of Karachi and Beirut, not Shangri-la. In February and March this year, sectarian violence in Gilgit claimed several lives in the worst flare-up since May,1988."
5. The "Herald" did not identify "the invading hordes" or their leader. These hordes consisted of Mehsuds and Wazirs from the Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Their leader was a man called Osama bin Laden. He was then the blue-eyed Mujahideen of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 1988 was the year which saw the end of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Before the Soviets announced their intention to withdraw, the attacks by the Afghan and Arab Mujahideens were intensified. An increased number of private flights organised by the CIA brought in more and more weapons for use by the Mujahideen against the Soviet troops. Some of these weapons were diverted by the ISI to the Mehsuds and the Wazirs, who carried out during 1988 the greatest massacre of Shias in
the history of the sub-continent since India and Pakistan became independent in 1947. More Shias of Gilgit were killed by bin Laden's Mehsuds and Wazirs in 1988 than the Shias (Hazaras) killed by the Taliban during the five years of its rule in Afghanistan.
6. Since the support of these tribals and of OBL and his Arab Mujahideen was needed in the culminating battles against the Soviet troops, the Western world maintained a silence on the carnage of the Shias. Till "Herald" broke the story of the carnage two years later, the outside world hardly had an idea of the ferocity of the suppression of the Shias of Gilgit by the Pakistan Army with the help of the invading tribal hordes from the FATA.
7. Writing on the same subject, the "Friday Times" (October 15-21, 1992) said as follows:" In 1988, 150 people were killed when armed lashkars from Chilas and Kohistan--- a predominantly Sunni and an exceptionally militant region-- raided the Shia-dominated region of Gilgit.After eight days of uninterrupted carnage, the military was finally called in and curfew imposed. Zia-ul-Haq's regime exploited the Shia-Sunni chasm. The invasion from outside has ignited an inferno of instability that has continued to blaze with the passage of time. It has
militarised an otherwise peaceful environment into a ghetto of blind hatreds and animosities."
8.Twenty-eight Shias were killed in Gilgit Town in May,1992. Latif Hasan, a well-known Shia leader of the Town, was murdered in broad daylight by masked assassins, leading to retaliatory attacks by Shias on the Sunnis, killing six of them. On August 18,1993, 20 Shias were killed in the same town and the authorities had to impose a curfew.
9. Strongly condemning the anti-Shia incidents in the NA, Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi, the chief of the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, the Shia political organisation of Pakistan, demanded the dismissal of the Inspector-General of Police of the NA. The "Frontier Post" of August 28,1993, quoted him as saying as follows: "Due to wrong policies and inappropriate tactics of the IGP of the Northern Areas, the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the Pakistan Army had to leave the peaks of Siachen for the streets of Gilgit. The bureaucracy and the authorities of the Northern Areas, who do not have the fear of accountability, have started interfering in the beliefs, customs, traditions and religious affairs of the poor people."
10. The year 1988 saw not only the "invading hordes" of Sunni tribals trained and motivated by OBL coming down the Karakoram Highway constructed with Chinese assistance in territory, which belongs to India. It also saw the movement of the first heavily-protected convoy of Chinese vehicles carrying Chinese weaponry, including short-range missiles, and nuclear-related equipment down the same Highway.The Karakoram Highway had become AQ Khan's Proliferation Highway. Many more convoys carrying such material have since come down this Highway---most of them carrying weaponry meant for the Pakistani Armed Forces and some carrying weapons meant for Iran.
11. Iran, which was dependent on this Highway for the movement of some of its military imports from China, chose to maintain a silence on the plight of the Shias of Gilgit. ( 14-9-09) To be continued
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The first signs of political ferment against Islamabad appeared in 1971 when an organisation called the Tanzeem-e-Millat (TM) started operating in Gilgit despite the ban on political activities. In 1974, Johar Ali Khan, the founder of the party, called for a strike to demand the repeal of the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCRs) and the recognition of the basic rights of the locals.When the agitation took a violent turn, A.R.Siddiqui, the then Deputy Commissioner, ordered the Gilgit Scouts, a para-military unit raised by the British and with a history of over a
hundred years, to fire on the agitators and disperse them. They refused to open fire on fellow-Shias. He then grabbed a rifle from a soldier of the Gilgit Scouts and opened fire on the crowd himself. One agitator was killed and the crowd dispersed.Johar Ali Khan and 15 others were arrested and taken to the jail. A large number of Shias raided the jail and got them freed. They were subsequently re-arrested.
2. Following these violent incidents---the first in the history of the NA since the Pakistan Army occupied it--- Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, then in power in Islamabad, issued a notification disbanding the Gilgit Scouts as a punishment for its refusing to fire on the Shia agitators. The disbanding of the unit hurt the feelings of the Shias. It also threw a large number, who served in the Scouts, out of job.This marked the beginning of the alienation of the Shias of the NA against Islamabad.Tracing the history of the alienation of the Shias of the NA,the
"FridayTimes", a weekly of Lahore, wrote in its issue of October 15-21,1992, as follows: " The Gilgit Scouts was the only credible law-enforcing agency from pre-Partition times. Northerners generally resent the undoing of this centuries-old institution."
3. The widespread anger caused by the disbanding of the Gilgit Scouts led to the emergence of a number of anti-Government religious organisations of the Shias. To counter this, the local Army authorities allegedly encouraged the formation of pro-Government organisations by the Sunnis. This injected the poison of religious sectarianism in the NA, which like the rest of Jammu & Kashmir, had historically
remained a tolerant society.
4. The injection of this poison led to an anti-Shia carnage in Gilgit in May 1988. This was followed by more anti-Shia incidents in 1990, 1992 and 1993. In its issue of April 1990, the "Herald", the monthly journal of the "Dawn" group of publications of Karachi, wrote as follows: " In May 1988,low-intensity political rivalry and sectarian tension ignited into full-scale carnage as thousands of armed tribesmen from outside Gilgit district invaded Gilgit along the Karakoram Highway. Nobody stopped them. They destroyed crops and houses, lynched and burnt people to death in the villages around Gilgit Town. The number of dead and injured was put in the hundreds, but numbers alone tell nothing of the savagery of the invading hordes and the chilling impact it has left on these peaceful valleys. Today, less than two years later, Gilgit is an arsenal and every man is ready to fight. In March 1990, when the Administration raided homes in Gilgit Town to seize weapons, one was
reminded of Karachi and Beirut, not Shangri-la. In February and March this year, sectarian violence in Gilgit claimed several lives in the worst flare-up since May,1988."
5. The "Herald" did not identify "the invading hordes" or their leader. These hordes consisted of Mehsuds and Wazirs from the Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Their leader was a man called Osama bin Laden. He was then the blue-eyed Mujahideen of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 1988 was the year which saw the end of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Before the Soviets announced their intention to withdraw, the attacks by the Afghan and Arab Mujahideens were intensified. An increased number of private flights organised by the CIA brought in more and more weapons for use by the Mujahideen against the Soviet troops. Some of these weapons were diverted by the ISI to the Mehsuds and the Wazirs, who carried out during 1988 the greatest massacre of Shias in
the history of the sub-continent since India and Pakistan became independent in 1947. More Shias of Gilgit were killed by bin Laden's Mehsuds and Wazirs in 1988 than the Shias (Hazaras) killed by the Taliban during the five years of its rule in Afghanistan.
6. Since the support of these tribals and of OBL and his Arab Mujahideen was needed in the culminating battles against the Soviet troops, the Western world maintained a silence on the carnage of the Shias. Till "Herald" broke the story of the carnage two years later, the outside world hardly had an idea of the ferocity of the suppression of the Shias of Gilgit by the Pakistan Army with the help of the invading tribal hordes from the FATA.
7. Writing on the same subject, the "Friday Times" (October 15-21, 1992) said as follows:" In 1988, 150 people were killed when armed lashkars from Chilas and Kohistan--- a predominantly Sunni and an exceptionally militant region-- raided the Shia-dominated region of Gilgit.After eight days of uninterrupted carnage, the military was finally called in and curfew imposed. Zia-ul-Haq's regime exploited the Shia-Sunni chasm. The invasion from outside has ignited an inferno of instability that has continued to blaze with the passage of time. It has
militarised an otherwise peaceful environment into a ghetto of blind hatreds and animosities."
8.Twenty-eight Shias were killed in Gilgit Town in May,1992. Latif Hasan, a well-known Shia leader of the Town, was murdered in broad daylight by masked assassins, leading to retaliatory attacks by Shias on the Sunnis, killing six of them. On August 18,1993, 20 Shias were killed in the same town and the authorities had to impose a curfew.
9. Strongly condemning the anti-Shia incidents in the NA, Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi, the chief of the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, the Shia political organisation of Pakistan, demanded the dismissal of the Inspector-General of Police of the NA. The "Frontier Post" of August 28,1993, quoted him as saying as follows: "Due to wrong policies and inappropriate tactics of the IGP of the Northern Areas, the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the Pakistan Army had to leave the peaks of Siachen for the streets of Gilgit. The bureaucracy and the authorities of the Northern Areas, who do not have the fear of accountability, have started interfering in the beliefs, customs, traditions and religious affairs of the poor people."
10. The year 1988 saw not only the "invading hordes" of Sunni tribals trained and motivated by OBL coming down the Karakoram Highway constructed with Chinese assistance in territory, which belongs to India. It also saw the movement of the first heavily-protected convoy of Chinese vehicles carrying Chinese weaponry, including short-range missiles, and nuclear-related equipment down the same Highway.The Karakoram Highway had become AQ Khan's Proliferation Highway. Many more convoys carrying such material have since come down this Highway---most of them carrying weaponry meant for the Pakistani Armed Forces and some carrying weapons meant for Iran.
11. Iran, which was dependent on this Highway for the movement of some of its military imports from China, chose to maintain a silence on the plight of the Shias of Gilgit. ( 14-9-09) To be continued
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART II
B.RAMAN
Between 1949 and 1974, the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) was governed directly from Islamabad through Punjabi and Pashtun officers deputed from the federal Government services. In 1974, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto gave it a facade of an autonomous governing set-up through an Interim Constitution. He called it an Interim Constitution because he contended that the Kashmiris would be given a final constitution after a plebiscite had been held under the UN auspices. Even now, it is ruled under this so-called Interim Constitution.
2. This Interim Constitution provided for a President of the POK as the head of State, a Prime Minister as the head of the Government and a Legislative Assembly consisting of 40 directly elected and eight indirectly elected members. It also allowed the POK to have its own national flag and to issue its own passports to its residents. The POK flag and passports were different from those of Pakistan. However, the POK passports were not recognised by foreign countries. The inhabitants of the territory, therefore, travelled with Pakistani passports.The Interim Constitution also provided for a POK National Anthem, an Election Commission, an Auditor-General, a Supreme Court, a High Court and subordinate courts.
3.The exercise of powers by this ostensibly autonomous set-up is strictly limited by the following provisions:
Only candidates, who sign a declaration that Kashmir is a part of Pakistan, can contest the elections to the Legislative Assembly.
Under Article 32 of the Interim Constitution, the Legislative Assembly cannot make any laws relating to the defence and security of the territory, currency, external affairs and trade.
All important decisions of the POK Government, including appointments of Judges and senior officials, are subject to approval by a body called the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, whose Secretariat is based in Islamabad and functions under a Minister of the central Government designated as the Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas ( of Pakistan) Affairs. The Council is presided over by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and consists of five Federal Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister, the Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas ( of Pakistan) Affairs, who is an ex-officio member, the President of the POK and the
Prime Minister of the POK, or in his absence, one of his Ministers. This Council was not given any jurisdiction over the NA.
4. Even this facade of a separate set-up was denied to the NA, which was incorporated into Pakistan as a centrally administered tribal area like the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) near the Afghan border. Like the FATA, the NA was also governed under what was called the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR) framed by the British during the colonial days for dealing with what they looked upon as the criminal tribes of the areas bordering Afghanistan. The people of the NA were not given passports and were not allowed to travel or migrate abroad. Every resident had to report to his local Police Station once a month and all movements from one village to another had to be reported to the police station. Collective fines were imposed on entire villages for crimes or violations of law and order committed by individual inhabitants of the villages.
5. Till Octobrer 1994, the people of the NA had no right of adult franchise. The territory had no elected Assembly or even municipal councils and no representation in the National Assembly. Political parties were banned. In 1994, the Benazir Bhutto Government allowed political parties of Pakistan, but not of the POK, to extend their activities to the NA and set up branches there. The PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the Muttahida Qaumi Party of Altaf Hussain, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TJP), a Shia party, opened branches in the NA. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) encouraged the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni extremist party which has been campaigning for the declaration of the Shias as anti-Muslim, to expand its activities in the NA to counter the activities of the TJP.
6. In October,1994, party-based elections to a 26-member council called the NA Executive Council were held. It was announced on March 31,1995, that its members would have the same status, emoluments and privileges as the members of the NWFP Legislative Assembly,thereby giving it a facade of a provincial Legislative Assembly, but, in reality, the Executive Council was given only recommendatory
powers and not legislative powers. Five of its members were designated as Advisers to the Federal Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs, Mohammad Afzal Khan. He told the National Assembly on March 26,1996, that the Advisers would have the same status and powers as the Ministers of the POK Government. Even the POK Ministers have very limited powers, but even those limited
powers were not given to the NA Advisers. The Minister's statement was just an eye-wash.
7. The NA continued to be ruled directly from Islamabad by the Minister of State For Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs. with the help of six officers----all non-natives----deputed from outside. These officers were the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Commissioner,the Deputy Commissioner, the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), the Judicial Commissioner and the Chief Engineer, Public Works. While the posts of the CEO and Chief Engineer were generally filled by serving or retired army officers, the other posts were filled by officers taken on deputation from Punjab or the NWFP. There was no right of appeal against the judgements of the Judicial Commissioner. The Pakistan Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over him.
8. These so-called political and administrative reforms introduced by the Benazir Bhutto Government failed to satisfy the locals and to reverse the process of alienation of the people, which had started in 1971. ( 13-9-09) To be continued.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Between 1949 and 1974, the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) was governed directly from Islamabad through Punjabi and Pashtun officers deputed from the federal Government services. In 1974, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto gave it a facade of an autonomous governing set-up through an Interim Constitution. He called it an Interim Constitution because he contended that the Kashmiris would be given a final constitution after a plebiscite had been held under the UN auspices. Even now, it is ruled under this so-called Interim Constitution.
2. This Interim Constitution provided for a President of the POK as the head of State, a Prime Minister as the head of the Government and a Legislative Assembly consisting of 40 directly elected and eight indirectly elected members. It also allowed the POK to have its own national flag and to issue its own passports to its residents. The POK flag and passports were different from those of Pakistan. However, the POK passports were not recognised by foreign countries. The inhabitants of the territory, therefore, travelled with Pakistani passports.The Interim Constitution also provided for a POK National Anthem, an Election Commission, an Auditor-General, a Supreme Court, a High Court and subordinate courts.
3.The exercise of powers by this ostensibly autonomous set-up is strictly limited by the following provisions:
Only candidates, who sign a declaration that Kashmir is a part of Pakistan, can contest the elections to the Legislative Assembly.
Under Article 32 of the Interim Constitution, the Legislative Assembly cannot make any laws relating to the defence and security of the territory, currency, external affairs and trade.
All important decisions of the POK Government, including appointments of Judges and senior officials, are subject to approval by a body called the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, whose Secretariat is based in Islamabad and functions under a Minister of the central Government designated as the Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas ( of Pakistan) Affairs. The Council is presided over by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and consists of five Federal Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister, the Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas ( of Pakistan) Affairs, who is an ex-officio member, the President of the POK and the
Prime Minister of the POK, or in his absence, one of his Ministers. This Council was not given any jurisdiction over the NA.
4. Even this facade of a separate set-up was denied to the NA, which was incorporated into Pakistan as a centrally administered tribal area like the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) near the Afghan border. Like the FATA, the NA was also governed under what was called the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR) framed by the British during the colonial days for dealing with what they looked upon as the criminal tribes of the areas bordering Afghanistan. The people of the NA were not given passports and were not allowed to travel or migrate abroad. Every resident had to report to his local Police Station once a month and all movements from one village to another had to be reported to the police station. Collective fines were imposed on entire villages for crimes or violations of law and order committed by individual inhabitants of the villages.
5. Till Octobrer 1994, the people of the NA had no right of adult franchise. The territory had no elected Assembly or even municipal councils and no representation in the National Assembly. Political parties were banned. In 1994, the Benazir Bhutto Government allowed political parties of Pakistan, but not of the POK, to extend their activities to the NA and set up branches there. The PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the Muttahida Qaumi Party of Altaf Hussain, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TJP), a Shia party, opened branches in the NA. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) encouraged the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni extremist party which has been campaigning for the declaration of the Shias as anti-Muslim, to expand its activities in the NA to counter the activities of the TJP.
6. In October,1994, party-based elections to a 26-member council called the NA Executive Council were held. It was announced on March 31,1995, that its members would have the same status, emoluments and privileges as the members of the NWFP Legislative Assembly,thereby giving it a facade of a provincial Legislative Assembly, but, in reality, the Executive Council was given only recommendatory
powers and not legislative powers. Five of its members were designated as Advisers to the Federal Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs, Mohammad Afzal Khan. He told the National Assembly on March 26,1996, that the Advisers would have the same status and powers as the Ministers of the POK Government. Even the POK Ministers have very limited powers, but even those limited
powers were not given to the NA Advisers. The Minister's statement was just an eye-wash.
7. The NA continued to be ruled directly from Islamabad by the Minister of State For Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs. with the help of six officers----all non-natives----deputed from outside. These officers were the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Commissioner,the Deputy Commissioner, the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), the Judicial Commissioner and the Chief Engineer, Public Works. While the posts of the CEO and Chief Engineer were generally filled by serving or retired army officers, the other posts were filled by officers taken on deputation from Punjab or the NWFP. There was no right of appeal against the judgements of the Judicial Commissioner. The Pakistan Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over him.
8. These so-called political and administrative reforms introduced by the Benazir Bhutto Government failed to satisfy the locals and to reverse the process of alienation of the people, which had started in 1971. ( 13-9-09) To be continued.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INDIA-CHINA: THE FROZEN VISION OF 1962
B.RAMAN
While speaking at a meeting organised by the Indo-Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Chennai on August 17,2009, I had called for an India-China-Japan trialogue on maritime security----initially at the non-Governmental level to be upgraded subsequently to the Governmental level. The text of my talk may be seen at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3361.html
2. On September 8,2009, worried by the likely consequences of the mounting anti-China demonisation campaign indulged in by some members of our community of strategic analysts, I wrote an article titled " India-China: Dangerous Hysteria", which is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3398.html .
3.I was amazed and disturbed by the kind of vituperative mail I got from many Indian readers of my article. All sorts of abuses were hurled at me---- "senile", "confused", " a dunce", " bought over by the Chinese" etc etc. The comments of the strategic analysts, which triggered off my article, and the vituperative mail, which I received in response to my article, only confirmed my fears that large sections of our civil society and strategic analysts' community continue to be caught in the mental quagmire of 1962 and are unable to rid themselves of the frozen vision of 1962. They are not prepared to look at China through glasses of 2009.
4. After I wrote my controversial article, I happened to attend an interesting interaction with a distinguished Taiwanese, who was educated in a prestigious US university and who is a good friend of India.One of the members of the audience asked him for his assessment of Sino-Indian relations. He almost expressed identical thoughts when he said that he was worried to note that Indian thinking and reflexes on China continue to be governed by the memories of the 1962 experience and that Indian analysts, when writing on China, continued to look behind rather than forward. He pointed out how millions of Taiwanese had died at the hands of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and how millions of Chinese had died at the hands of the Japanese . Despite this, instead of continuing to nurse suspicions and fears arising from the past, Taiwan had considerably improved its relations with China and Beijing and Tokyo are in the process of improving their bilateral relations despite their continuing dispute over the East China Sea islands. He felt it was time for India to rid itself of the bitter memories of the past and start looking to the future in its relations with China.
5. When he asked me for my views on Sino-Indian relations, I replied that there are three components in India----the political leadership and the serving bureaucracy, the business class and the civil society, including the community of strategic analysts and retired bureaucrats.While the political leadership, the serving bureaucracy and the business class want to be forward-looking, large sections of the civil society and strategic analysts continue to be chained to the past and tend to discourage any forward movement. As a result, the relations are moving at variable speeds---- a little faster in the case of the political leadership,the serving bureaucracy and the business class and much slower in the case of the civil society and the non-governmental strategic analysts' community.
6. In the context of this, I was pleasantly surprised to read in "The Hindu" of September 13, the views on China of two recently retired Foreign Secretaries of the Government of India---- Shyam Saran and Shiv Shankar Menon. Their views as reported by "The Hindu" were restricted to the sphere of maritime security, but indicate a desire to look for ways of working with China instead of treating China all the
time with suspicion.
7. To cite from the remarks of Saran while addressing a seminar on Security and Development at Port Blair in the Andamans on September 5: India should actively participate in shaping an emerging economic and security architecture in the region in close collaboration with all stakeholders, including China. This arrangement should be open, inclusive and loosely structured.... India needs a nuanced policy (towards China) that builds upon possible areas of congruence and deals firmly, though prudently, with situations where interests are threatened.There is no inevitability of conflict with China. There is enough space in the region and beyond for both China and India to be ascendant.
8. To cite from the remarks of Menon during a lecture at the National Maritime Foundation of New Delhi on September 11: China and other States can choose to be part of the solution rather than that of the problem. "My question is, therefore, if energy and trade flows and security are the issues, why not begin discussing collective security arrangements among the major powers concerned? "
9. The refreshing views expressed by the two recently-retired Foreign Secretaries, which are unlikely to be shared by the brigade of compulsive demonisers of China in the strategic analysts' community and in our media, have come in the wake of changing perceptions of China in countries such as Australia, the US and Japan, which were as paranoiac about China till recently as we are even now. There is a
growing realisation in recent months that the cause of international and regional peace and security might be served better by treating China as a possible security partner than as a security threat.
10. One noticed this change of attitude first in Australia after Kevin Rudd became the Prime Minister after defeating John Howard and his party. He has made Australia distance itself from multilateral security mechanisms such as the five-power naval exercise of 2007 by the navies of the US, Australia, India, Japan and Singapore on the ground that such mechanisms cause unnecessary concerns to China. One could also see a change --- from compulsive suspicion to looking for areas of better understanding--- in the attitude of the administration of President Barack Obama towards China. This change was recently reflected in a proposal for a joint naval exercise involving the navies of the US, Australia and China. Some reputed Australian non-Governmental analysts have also been saying in the margins of international seminars on maritime security that though China might not be an Indian Ocean power, it has legitimate interests and concerns relating to the Indian Ocean and hence it should be associated in any dialogue mechanism pertaining to the Indian Ocean. In a seminar attended by me, I even heard an Australian non-governmental analyst arguing that, as a confidence-building measure, India should take the initiative in proposing the inclusion of China in dialogues regarding security in the Indian Ocean.
11.Yukio Hatoyama, the new Prime Minister of Japan, also thinks differently from his predecessors in respect of China and is likely to initiate moves to improve Japan's relations with China.He believes that China should be made part of the solution to the security problems of the region instead of being suspected as an important cause of the problems.
12. At a time when attitudes are thus changing, India should not remain like an old Japanese soldier of the Second World War, who was discovered some years ago living in an uninhabited and isolated island, thinking that the war was still on and without realising that the war ended years ago and that the world had changed beyond recognition.
13. It has to be admitted that no other country in the world has the kind of problems that India has with China----- arising from its adamant attitude in claiming Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh, its nuclear and missile supply relationship with Pakistan, its opposition to India being associated with the UN Security Council as a permanent member and with all the dialogue and security mechanisms in the ASEAN and East Asian regions etc. Its attitudes naturally create a suspicion in the minds of large sections of our civil society that there continues to be a certain malevolence in China's attitude to India.
14. A positive change in the attitude of the Indian civil society to China can come about only if this Indian perception of Chinese malevolence is lessened. How to bring about positive perceptional changes on both sides is a question which should engage the attention of analysts in both countries. Any campaign of hysteria and mutual demonisation in India as well as in China will come in the way of efforts
to bring about changes in attitude on both sides.( 13-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
While speaking at a meeting organised by the Indo-Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Chennai on August 17,2009, I had called for an India-China-Japan trialogue on maritime security----initially at the non-Governmental level to be upgraded subsequently to the Governmental level. The text of my talk may be seen at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3361.html
2. On September 8,2009, worried by the likely consequences of the mounting anti-China demonisation campaign indulged in by some members of our community of strategic analysts, I wrote an article titled " India-China: Dangerous Hysteria", which is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3398.html .
3.I was amazed and disturbed by the kind of vituperative mail I got from many Indian readers of my article. All sorts of abuses were hurled at me---- "senile", "confused", " a dunce", " bought over by the Chinese" etc etc. The comments of the strategic analysts, which triggered off my article, and the vituperative mail, which I received in response to my article, only confirmed my fears that large sections of our civil society and strategic analysts' community continue to be caught in the mental quagmire of 1962 and are unable to rid themselves of the frozen vision of 1962. They are not prepared to look at China through glasses of 2009.
4. After I wrote my controversial article, I happened to attend an interesting interaction with a distinguished Taiwanese, who was educated in a prestigious US university and who is a good friend of India.One of the members of the audience asked him for his assessment of Sino-Indian relations. He almost expressed identical thoughts when he said that he was worried to note that Indian thinking and reflexes on China continue to be governed by the memories of the 1962 experience and that Indian analysts, when writing on China, continued to look behind rather than forward. He pointed out how millions of Taiwanese had died at the hands of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and how millions of Chinese had died at the hands of the Japanese . Despite this, instead of continuing to nurse suspicions and fears arising from the past, Taiwan had considerably improved its relations with China and Beijing and Tokyo are in the process of improving their bilateral relations despite their continuing dispute over the East China Sea islands. He felt it was time for India to rid itself of the bitter memories of the past and start looking to the future in its relations with China.
5. When he asked me for my views on Sino-Indian relations, I replied that there are three components in India----the political leadership and the serving bureaucracy, the business class and the civil society, including the community of strategic analysts and retired bureaucrats.While the political leadership, the serving bureaucracy and the business class want to be forward-looking, large sections of the civil society and strategic analysts continue to be chained to the past and tend to discourage any forward movement. As a result, the relations are moving at variable speeds---- a little faster in the case of the political leadership,the serving bureaucracy and the business class and much slower in the case of the civil society and the non-governmental strategic analysts' community.
6. In the context of this, I was pleasantly surprised to read in "The Hindu" of September 13, the views on China of two recently retired Foreign Secretaries of the Government of India---- Shyam Saran and Shiv Shankar Menon. Their views as reported by "The Hindu" were restricted to the sphere of maritime security, but indicate a desire to look for ways of working with China instead of treating China all the
time with suspicion.
7. To cite from the remarks of Saran while addressing a seminar on Security and Development at Port Blair in the Andamans on September 5: India should actively participate in shaping an emerging economic and security architecture in the region in close collaboration with all stakeholders, including China. This arrangement should be open, inclusive and loosely structured.... India needs a nuanced policy (towards China) that builds upon possible areas of congruence and deals firmly, though prudently, with situations where interests are threatened.There is no inevitability of conflict with China. There is enough space in the region and beyond for both China and India to be ascendant.
8. To cite from the remarks of Menon during a lecture at the National Maritime Foundation of New Delhi on September 11: China and other States can choose to be part of the solution rather than that of the problem. "My question is, therefore, if energy and trade flows and security are the issues, why not begin discussing collective security arrangements among the major powers concerned? "
9. The refreshing views expressed by the two recently-retired Foreign Secretaries, which are unlikely to be shared by the brigade of compulsive demonisers of China in the strategic analysts' community and in our media, have come in the wake of changing perceptions of China in countries such as Australia, the US and Japan, which were as paranoiac about China till recently as we are even now. There is a
growing realisation in recent months that the cause of international and regional peace and security might be served better by treating China as a possible security partner than as a security threat.
10. One noticed this change of attitude first in Australia after Kevin Rudd became the Prime Minister after defeating John Howard and his party. He has made Australia distance itself from multilateral security mechanisms such as the five-power naval exercise of 2007 by the navies of the US, Australia, India, Japan and Singapore on the ground that such mechanisms cause unnecessary concerns to China. One could also see a change --- from compulsive suspicion to looking for areas of better understanding--- in the attitude of the administration of President Barack Obama towards China. This change was recently reflected in a proposal for a joint naval exercise involving the navies of the US, Australia and China. Some reputed Australian non-Governmental analysts have also been saying in the margins of international seminars on maritime security that though China might not be an Indian Ocean power, it has legitimate interests and concerns relating to the Indian Ocean and hence it should be associated in any dialogue mechanism pertaining to the Indian Ocean. In a seminar attended by me, I even heard an Australian non-governmental analyst arguing that, as a confidence-building measure, India should take the initiative in proposing the inclusion of China in dialogues regarding security in the Indian Ocean.
11.Yukio Hatoyama, the new Prime Minister of Japan, also thinks differently from his predecessors in respect of China and is likely to initiate moves to improve Japan's relations with China.He believes that China should be made part of the solution to the security problems of the region instead of being suspected as an important cause of the problems.
12. At a time when attitudes are thus changing, India should not remain like an old Japanese soldier of the Second World War, who was discovered some years ago living in an uninhabited and isolated island, thinking that the war was still on and without realising that the war ended years ago and that the world had changed beyond recognition.
13. It has to be admitted that no other country in the world has the kind of problems that India has with China----- arising from its adamant attitude in claiming Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh, its nuclear and missile supply relationship with Pakistan, its opposition to India being associated with the UN Security Council as a permanent member and with all the dialogue and security mechanisms in the ASEAN and East Asian regions etc. Its attitudes naturally create a suspicion in the minds of large sections of our civil society that there continues to be a certain malevolence in China's attitude to India.
14. A positive change in the attitude of the Indian civil society to China can come about only if this Indian perception of Chinese malevolence is lessened. How to bring about positive perceptional changes on both sides is a question which should engage the attention of analysts in both countries. Any campaign of hysteria and mutual demonisation in India as well as in China will come in the way of efforts
to bring about changes in attitude on both sides.( 13-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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