BOSTON MARATHON EXPLOSIONS

B.RAMAN

 

THE FACTS: As reported by the BBC and the CNN:

•     Three persons, including an 8-year-old child, were killed in two explosions near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on the afternoon of April 15,2013.

•     Hospitals reported at least 144 people are being treated for injuries, with at least 17 of them in critical condition and 25 in serious condition. At least eight of them  are children. At least 10 people injured had limbs amputated. Several of the patients treated at Massachusetts General Hospital suffered injuries to lower limbs.

•     The two blasts were about 50 to 100 yards apart with a few minutes one after the other. A federal law enforcement official told CNN that both bombs were small, and initial tests showed no C-4 or other high-grade explosive material, suggesting that the packages used in the attack were crude explosive devices.

•     Authorities in Boston found at least one other explosive device , Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis said. Rep. Bill Keating of Massachusetts said two more were found. One unexploded device was found at a hotel on Boylston Street near the bomb site and another unexploded device was found at an undisclosed location.

·       There were no credible threats before the Marathon, a state government official said. There is no suspect in custody, but many people are being questioned, Davis said. Investigators warned police to be on the lookout for a "darker-skinned or black male" with a possible foreign accent in connection with the attack, according to a law enforcement advisory obtained by CNN. The man was seen with a black backpack and sweatshirt and was trying to get into a restricted area about five minutes before the first explosion, the lookout notice states. Also, a Saudi national with a leg wound was under guard at a Boston hospital in connection with the bombings, but investigators cannot say he is involved at this time and he is not in custody, a law enforcement official said.

·       In addition to scrutinizing images of surveillance cameras in the area, the FBI likely was issuing subpoenas for records from cell towers in the area to isolate and trace calls from around Copley Square at the time of the blasts, according to a former federal law enforcement official who now works in the intelligence community.

·       Mayor (Thomas) Menino said: “Our focus is on making sure that the area around Copley Square is safe and secured. I am asking everyone to stay away from Copley Square and let the first responders do their jobs."

·       The Federal Aviation Administration placed a flight restriction over the site of the blasts. Other cities, including New York and Washington, tightened security as a result. Following standard protocol, the White House cleared out an area in front of the West Wing.

·       Troops from the Massachusetts National Guard, already at the site as part of the marathon's security and crowd-management plan, were assisting police as well.

·       The FBI has taken over co-ordination of what it described as a "potential terrorist inquiry". Although President Obama, in his initial statement, did not use the word "terrorism", a White House official later said: "Any event with multiple explosive devices - as this appears to be - is clearly an act of terror and will be approached as an act of terror."

·       Officials in Washington said no group or individual had so far said they carried out the attack.

2. Since the 9/11 acts of catastrophic terrorism in the US Homeland carried out by Al Qaeda, using hijacked aircraft, there have been two attempted acts of catastrophic terrorism by Al Qaeda by causing explosions on US passenger aircraft flying from Europe to the US.

3. On 22 December 2001, Richard Reid, a British citizen, boarded American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami, wearing shoes packed with explosives, which he unsuccessfully tried to detonate. Passengers overpowered him on the plane, which quickly landed at Logan International Airport in Boston, , the closest US airport. He was  arrested and indicted. He was reported to have been motivated by Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan.

4. On December 26,2009, Abdul Mutallab, 23, a Nigerian, tried to detonate an explosive device, apparently a mix of powder and liquid,  on a North-West Airlines flight, coming from Nigeria via Amsterdam, and approaching Detroit. An alert passenger noticed him and he was overpowered. He was believed to have been motivated by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

5. The Boston Marathon blasts have coincided with a fast reportedly undertaken since March 19,2013, by 24 of the Al Qaeda suspects still held in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre to protest against the alleged inhuman conditions in the Centre. Activists of a Muslim group called Witness Against Torture (WAT) began a hunger strike  in solidarity with the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The group said in its web site: “We will gather for action in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and other cities domestically and internationally  to denounce the barbaric practice of torture and indefinite detention and to demand justice for the men at Guantanamo.” The solidarity fast by WAT was scheduled to last till March 30. A handful of activists plan to continue fasting every Friday until the prison is closed.

 6. There is so far no evidence to indicate that the Boston blasts might have been linked with the fast. No claim of responsibility for the blasts has been made so far and there is till now no evidence to show whether the blasts were carried out by individual rogue elements with personal grievances or ideologically motivated organisations.

7. While the US Homeland had previously seen acts of catastrophic terrorism and attempts to commit such acts through aircraft, this is the first time a conventional act of terrorism using improvised explosive devices has been committed, if the involvement of rogue individual elements is ruled out.

8. The perpetrators, whether rogue individuals or members of ideologically motivated organisations, have succeeded in evading physical security for the Boston Marathon in procuring explosive material, detonators and timers and planting the IEDs without being noticed by the extensive CCTV camera network along the Marathon route.

9. The local security authorities and the FBI do not appear to have received any advance inkling of a possible terrorist strike either through electronic chatter or from human sources.

10. The explosions show that despite the strengthening of homeland security in the US after 9/11, terrorists have managed to find intelligence and physical security gaps in the security network and exploited them. The Boston blasts also illustrate the difficulties in preventing conventional style attacks as against sophisticated catastrophic attacks. (16-4-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

BOSTON BLASTS: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
B.RAMAN

Three killed, over 100 injured in two explosions about two hours after the lead runners in the Boston Marathon had crossed the winning line on April 15,2013.

2.At least two other unexploded improvised explosive devices were reportedly defused by the police..An act of terrorism involving well-timed serial blasts.There was reportedly an interval of only a few minutes between the two explosions.

3.It was meant to be an act of mass casualty terrorism.If the IEDs had been planted along the route of the Marathon while it was on there might have been mass panic among the runners resulting in possible stampede. Fortunately, this did not happen.

4. Indications till now are that the perpetrators had used low or medium lethality explosives. There are reports of the limbs of some of the injured being blown away. If the explosive was not of high lethality, how did this happen?

5.Details of security checks during the Marathon are not known, but the perpetrators had successfully managed to evade whatever physical security was there while planting the IEDs.

6. No cliams of responsibility so far. No reports of any prior warnings.No indication that Homeland Security had any prior warning of a possible blast in the form of electronic chatter of the perpetratos or suspect interception and interrogation.The perpetrators had well maintained operational secrecy while planning and executing the blasts.

7. No indictation so far whether it was an act of rogue individuals or an organisation. The motive too is not clear. (16-4-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (etd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi. Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

CAN 1996 REPEAT ITSELF IN AFGHANISTAN?

B.RAMAN

As the US troops prepare to thin themselves out of Afghanistan starting from next year, India has to worry whether 1996 can repeat itself in Afghanistan, when the Taliban, with the help of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), captured power from the Afghan Mujahideen in Kabul and enforced its rule.

2. In searching for an answer to this question, one has to remember what happened after the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988:

1989:The Afghan Mujahideen, with ISI’s help, tried to have Najibullah’s army defeated at Jalalabad, so that they could set up a base there. They were defeated by Najibullah, who demonstrated the strength of his army.

1992:The Afghan Mujahideen succeeded in overthrowing Najib  by taking advantage of a US-encouraged split between Najibullah and Rashid Dostum and setting up their Govt in Kabul.

1994: Naseerullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto’s Interior Minister, promoted the formation of the Taliban in Kandahar to escort Asif Ali Zardari’s cotton convoys from Turkmenistan. The US established secret contacts with the Taliban to secure its support for a gas-oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan being planned by UNOCAL.

1996: The Taliban, with the ISI’s support, overthrew the Mujahideen Government in Kabul and set up its Government.

1996: Ahmed Shah Masood set up his Northern Alliance to counter the Taliban.

1996: Osama bin Laden shifted from Khartoum to Jalalabad and from there to Kandahar where Mulla Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, was based.

1998: bin Laden formed the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People for fighting against the US and Israel.

1998:Al Qaeda carried out explosions outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.US carried out reprisal Cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda camps in Jalalabad. Not successful.

1999:The US demanded that the Taliban should hand over bin Laden to it. It also demanded that Pakistan should force the Taliban to hand over bin Laden to it. Both the Taliban and Pakistan evaded the US demand

11/9/2001:Al Qaeda carried out its terror strikes in the US homeland.

October,2001:The US declared its war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda and ordered military action in Afghanistan. The Taliban was overthrown, but Omar and bin Laden crossed over to Pakistan, where they were given shelter by the ISI. The Northern Alliance collaborated with the US in its operations.

3.The sequence of events mentioned above was due to the following reasons:

·       The sudden and abrupt withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

·       The differences between the Pashtoons and the Uzbeks and the consequent lack of unity in the Najibullah Government.

·       The ambivalent US policy towards the Taliban. It hobnobbed with it initially in the hope of getting its support for the projected UNOCAL pipeline project and realised too late the pernicious nature of the Taliban.

·       The USA’s misplaced faith in Pakistani co-operation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

4. What is the position now as the US prepares to thin itself out?

·       Just as the Soviet troops withdrew in 1988 before effectively defeating the Mujahideen, the US is going to thin itself out before effectively defeating the Neo Taliban and the Haqqani Network, both of which continue to operate from Pakistan.

·       The command and control of Al Qaeda based in Pakistan has been badly disrupted, but not eliminated.

·       There could be political instability in Afghanistan after President Hamid Karzai completes his term next year leading once again to ethnic differences between the Pashtoons and non-Pashtoons.

·       The ambivalent US policy towards a possible political role for the so-called good Taliban post-2014 could add to uncertainties and instability.

·       In 1988, to facilitate the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan ensured that there were no attacks on the withdrawing Soviet troops by the Mujahideen. Pakistan had better control over the tribal areas on the Afghan border. Today. Pakistan has little control over the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and will have little ability to facilitate the withdrawal of US troops and equipment.

5. Qualitatively, the ground situation post-2014 will differ from that which prevailed in 1988 as follows:

·       The Soviet withdrawal in 1988 was abrupt and total with no Soviet presence left in Afghanistan. There was no air cover for the Soviet troops due to the effective use of the US-supplied Stinger missiles by the Mujahideen. The US withdrawal is going to be gradual and not abrupt and total. The US will still have some presence with the required air cover in Afghan territory to enable the Afghan troops perform their security role. The Soviet troops left Najibullah all alone without any back-up support to counter the Mujahideen. The US is unlikely to leave the Karzai (his successor’s) Government all alone.

·       The US fleet of Drones and their effective use will enable the US to prevent the Neo Taliban, the Haqqani network and Al Qaeda under Ayman Al-Zawahiri from re-grouping.

6. From 2014, the US will have the limited objective of preventing a come-back by a Neo Al Qaeda that could again pose a threat to the US homeland. The Neo Al Qaeda is presently focusing on Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Africa. After the US thin-out, it might be tempted to re-focus on the Af-Pak region. To prevent this, the US will need a continued capability to maintain a limited ground presence in Afghanistan and operate its fleet of Drones.

7. What should be India’s options and policies? If the post-1996 events are repeated in Afghanistan, India may again face serious security problems in Jammu & Kashmir and even in hinterland India. To prevent this, Indian policies should be focused on the following:

·       Continue to strengthen the Afghan security forces through training and supply of arms and ammunition.

·       Strengthen trilateral intelligence co-operation involving the intelligence agencies of India, Afghanistan and the US.

·       Encourage the US not to repeat the Soviet mistake of total withdrawal, but to maintain a minimum presence in Afghan territory to keep weakening the Neo Taliban and Neo Al Qaeda.

·       Encourage the US to continue using its Drone fleet and if the US faces any difficulty in using them from Afghan territory, allow the US to operate them from Indian bases.

·       Work for a smooth political transition after Karzai completes his term. ( 13-4-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

 

THE CASE AGAINST JAGDISH TYTLER

B.RAMAN

In its online edition, “Outlook” has carried a detailed chronology of the case against Jagdish Tytler, a functionary of the Congress (I), in connection with allegations of his involvement in the murder of some Sikhs during the massacre of about 3000 Sikhs in certain areas of Delhi after the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards from the Delhi Police on October 31,1984. This may be seen at http://blogs.outlookindia.com/default.aspx?ddm=10&pid=2961&eid=5

2. The massacres led to two kinds of complaints by sections of the Sikh community . The first was about studied inaction by the Delhi Police in the face of the massacres without effective action to stop them. The second was regarding the role of some functionaries of the Congress (I) in the massacres. Three of the Congress functionaries accused by some sections of the Sikh community of orchestrating the massacres were H.K.L.Bhagat, Jagdish Tytler and Sajjan Kumar. Bhagat is since dead. Tytler and Sajjan Kumar faced enquiries and investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

3. The Government of India ordered Ved Marwah, former Commissioner of Delhi Police, to enquire into complaints of police inaction. When it was found that he had taken his task seriously and was trying to identify police officers guilty of inaction, the enquiry was taken out of his hands. The whole thing was subsequently covered up.

4. The investigations by the CBI were perceived by large sections of public opinion to be another cover-up exercise to protect the Congress functionaries allegedly involved, particularly Tytler, who was alleged to be close to the family of Indira Gandhi. Tytler did not suffer any political or criminal consequences as a result of the investigations.

5.In 2007--- 23 years after the massacres--the CBI submitted to the trial court  a Final Report claiming that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant Tytler’s prosecution. As it was contended by some Sikhs that the CBI had not examined an eye-witness living in the US, a Sessions Court rejected the FR and ordered the CBI to further investigate the case and record the statement of the alleged eye-witness living in the US.

6. The CBI did so and submitted another FR in 2009 claiming that there was still no evidence to warrant the prosecution of Tytler. The court accepted the FR this time and the case against Tytler was sought to be closed once for all.

7. The “Outlook” narrative has quoted Ritu Sarin of the “Indian Express” as finding out that two senior officers of the CBI had recommended that the investigation should be completed and all the evidence put up before a court in the form of a charge-sheet against Tytler and it should be left to the court to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to convict Tytler.

8. According to “Outlook”, Ashwani Kumar, who was the Director of the CBI from August 2008 to November,2010, rejected their recommendation and ordered the submission of an FR once again stating that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of Tytler. This was done. After his retirement, Shri Ashwani Kumar has recently been appointed as the Governor of Nagaland. This appointment has come in for allegations in sections of the media as a quid pro quo for his decisions favouring the Government when he held office.

9. Following complaints by sections of the Sikh community that there are other eye-witness now living in the US, who were not examined by the CBI before submitting an FR for a second time in 2009, a Sessions Court has ordered a further  investigation of the charges against Tytler by the CBI.

10. The massacres of about 3000 Sikhs after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, with some functionaries of the Congress allegedly playing an active role in orchestrating the massacres, has illustrated the cover-up culture of the Congress, which pushed under the carpet complaints of inaction by the Delhi Police and then sought to distort the CBI investigation to ensure that no functionary of the Congress suffered adverse consequences.

11. A clean chit was twice sought to be given to Tytler on the basis of an incomplete investigation. He  continues to be an important member of the Congress, defended and protected by senior leaders of the Congress  and he roams around as a free man   appearing in one TV channel after another to discredit the witnesses against him outside a court of law.

12. In the years since 1984, the credibility of the CBI as the premier investigating agency of the Government of India has repeatedly taken a beating. The entire investigation process in the Government of India stands discredited at the political and professional levels and hardly anyone takes the CBI seriously

13. If the credibility of our criminal justice system has to be restored and if we have to win the confidence of the Sikh community, it is important that the further investigation against Tytler be done in a time-bound manner by a special investigation team reporting directly to the court.

14. We have failed to do justice to our Sikh community for nearly three decades after the massacres were committed. It is time to end this Government-sponsored charade of investigation and identify and punish the guilty. ( 12-4-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

KIM JONG-UN: CHINESE CONCERNS & CAUTION

 

 

 

 

B.RAMAN

As  Kim Jong-Un of North Korea, who completes one year as First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea on April 11,2013,uses North Korea’s power of escalatory rhetoric to threaten the region with the danger of a nuclear war if its demands are not met, there is increasing nervousness not only among North Korea’s perceived adversaries such as the US, South Korea and Japan, but also in its traditional friend next door, namely, China.

2. Does Kim realise the implications of the threats which he has been holding out against his adversaries? Does he realise that if he carries out his threats or if he loses control of the situation under the irrational force of his rhetoric, he would be seriously endangering not only the national interests and security of his own country, but also  those of North Korea’s traditional friends such as China?

3. Even Fidel Castro, in a recent column for a Cuban paper for which he writes now and then, has pointed out the likely dangers to North Korea’s traditional friends if the situation in the Korean peninsula gets out of control. He has not named the traditional friends of North Korea, but it is apparent he was having in mind China and Russia.

4. The Government and Party-controlled media in China has been increasingly---initially indirectly, now directly--- reflecting the concerns in China over the developing situation in the Korean peninsula in the wake of the recent North Korean nuclear and missile tests and the new sanctions sought to be imposed against it under pressure from the US.

5. The Chinese concerns are reflected very clearly in two commentaries carried by the ‘People’s Daily” and the “Global Times”, both run by the Communist Party of China, on April 11, coinciding with the first anniversary of  Kim Jong-Un’s leadership of the Party

6. The “People’s Daily” commentary, explaining China’s policy of not allowing trouble-making at its doorstep,  said: “ Not allowing troublemaking at the doorsteps of China means to stop the vicious circle of tension on the peninsula, to prevent any party from stirring up trouble, to oppose creating tension on purpose, and to say no to render the use of force to resolve the problem. Words and deeds that intensify the tensions on the Korean Peninsula should be condemned and opposed. Not allowing troublemaking at the doorsteps of China is not China's "Monroe Doctrine". China does not seek spheres of influence. China intends to maintain regional peace and stability on the Peninsula, and determine its own position and actions in accordance with the Peninsula situation on its own merits. At present, it is not without hope to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula.”

7. The “Global Times” was even more explicit in cautioning North Korea. It said:

“Since the transition of Pyongyang's leadership, the outside world has been speculating over the future direction of the regime. North Korea is sure to change, because its current situation is unsustainable and is placing huge pressure on the country. Escaping this pressure fits the North's interests and would allow the country to meet external expectations.

“During the past year, the nuclear issue has remained at the centre of the North's domestic and foreign policies. The new leadership has shown its resolve, which is to develop nuclear technologies, rather than solve the nuclear crisis. The regime has taken an extreme path.

“Pyongyang should clearly understand that it does not have the capability to dominate the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Its nuclear capacity to some extent makes it feel secure, but at the same time it worsens its international strategic environment. Pyongyang should drop its illusions that it can make the world stay silent over its desire for nuclear arms through its hard-line stance and deceptions.

“The international community will never permit North Korea to have the legal status of a nuclear country, because it would lead to more devastating consequences. A number of Asian countries have acquired nuclear weapons, but none of them use them in the manner North Korea envisions.

“The North Korean regime has to face up to the difficulties in returning to the international community if it refuses to give up its nuclear ambitions. Even if the US and South Korea make concessions, the North still confronts problems such as sanctions and economic obstacles. Concrete moves are needed to solve the current dilemma that the North faces.

“China respects North Korea, but it also holds the responsibility of preserving peace in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang's nuclear issue concerns China's national interests. We hope that the North Korean regime can stay rational and pay attention to the interests of the whole region as its bottom line. We also hope that its moves will not pose threats to the peace and stability of China's north-eastern area.

“North Korea has more difficulties in opening itself up to the world. The stances of South Korea, Japan and the US are partly the reason. Regardless of the situation, we believe the North still has a chance and we regret that it has become mired in this crisis. We hope the crisis is only temporary.”

8.A perusal of the recent comments in the Chinese media indicates that Chinese observers feel there is need for fresh thinking on the question of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capability. It seems to be their view that after all that has happened recently the question of a negotiated de-nuclearisation of North Korea is no longer a viable option. A more practical option could be to work for a freezing of North Korea’s capability at the present level in return for a Chinese offer of its nuclear umbrella to North Korea to calm its fears regarding the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea and Japan.

9. Will such an offer work? The US may not accept any attempt to legitimise North Korea’s present capability as that could create problems in relation to Iran. Moreover, the present North Korean leadership seems determined not to accept any externally imposed constraints on its nuclear and missile capabilities.

10. How to calm the North Korean leadership and de-escalate the situation? The Chinese do not seem to have an answer. They seem to know so little about the mind-set of Kim Jong-Un and his advisers. He has not visited China since assuming office. He had visited China along with his father, but as the ruler of North Korea after the death of his father Kim Jong-Il, he and his advisers have not maintained the same level of contacts with the party and PLA leadership of China as during the days of his father.

11. China is no longer an important and reliable window on North Korea as it used to be in the past. It is as confused by the policies and unpredictability of Kim Jong-Un and his advisers as the US and South Korea. As Kim, who had done his schooling in Switzerland, took over as the supreme leader in December 2011 after the death of his father, there was a fond expectation that his exposure to the West as a student might make him amenable to a policy of gradually opening up his country to the outside world.

12. This has not happened. Is it because he himself is not inclined to pursuing a policy of opening-up or because he is unable to overcome opposition from the old guards in the Army and the Party to any policy change. One has not so far seen in the Party and the Army a new generation wanting to experiment with new policies in the economic field.

13. In the face of a dearth of information regarding the new post-December 2011 leadership in North Korea, China has been finding the recent developments as unnerving as the rest of the international community. Apart from articulating its concerns and caution and expressing its hope that things will not reach a point of no return, China has been finding its ability to influence the developments in a constructive direction limited.  (11-4-13)

 

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTINUING FERMENT IN TIBETAN AREAS OF CHINA

 

 

 

B.RAMAN

The anti-Han and anti-Beijing ferment, marked by endless self-immolations of freedom-loving Tibetans---monks and others, young and old, men and women---- continues in the Tibetan areas of China.

2. There have already been 114 self-immolations so far---the majority in the Tibetan areas of  Sichuan, where the self-immolations started in 2009 following Chinese suppression of the monks of the Kirti monastery.

3. The Chinese attempts to intimidate the potential self-immolators by jailing friends and relatives of some self-immolators on charges of abetment of suicide have failed to crush the movement. The more the suppression, the more the self-immolations.

4. In their desperation, the Chinese projected the movement as orchestrated by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his overseas supporters and by the Voice of America. Finding that their allegations had no takers in the international community, they are now trying to blame some Tibetan followers of His Holiness in Dharamsala, India, for allegedly instigating the self-immolations.

5. On March 18,2013, the State-owned Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report:

“ Chinese police have sent co-investigation request to police authorities in related countries concerning a 32-year-old man who instigated a self-immolation incident in which two teenage boys died.

“Police in southwest China's Sichuan Province said two teenagers died after setting themselves ablaze in Jamcha Village, Ruoergai County, in the Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of Aba.

“Rinchen Tseli, 15, and Sonam Dakyi, 16, self-immolated on Feb. 19 and died at the scene, according to a statement released Monday by police authorities.

“Fear and homesickness prompted Ye Ja, a 17-year-old who had planned to self-immolate with the other two teens, to reconsider, said the statement.

“Police said they found that Rinchen Tseli's 32-year-old uncle, known as Tenpa Gyatso, among other names, organized the self-immolations. He formerly served as a monk in the Jage Monastery in Jamcha Village.

“Tenpa Gyatso illegally crossed the border to India's Dorje Monastery in 2007, and he was also a staff member with the press contact group of India's Kirti Monastery. He maintained close contact with Rinchen Tseli and inculcated the idea of "Tibet independence" upon him frequently, said the statement.

 “Since January, Tenpa Gyatso repeatedly incited Rinchen Tseli to self-immolate through the Internet-based smartphone chatting software WeChat and claimed that self-immolators are "national heroes," according to the statement.

“"The Indian side will carve your name on the Monument to Self-immolators in Takla Sala and pray for you. You will become an extraordinary man," Tenpa Gyatso encouraged Rinchen Tseli, according to the statement.

 

6. By “co-investigation request”, the Chinese apparently mean a request for mutual legal assistance in the investigation. The Xinhua despatch does not name the countries to which the co-investigation request has been addressed, but India is likely to be one of them since it has been alleged that Tenpa Gyatso works for a monastery  in India and was in China till 2007.

7. In the past, the Chinese had blamed organisations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and members of the diaspora for the self-immolations, without directly blaming anyone in India or seeking Indian assistance in the investigation. This is the first time they had named someone in India and sought mutual legal assistance in the investigation.

8. To my knowledge, India does not have a treaty on mutual legal assistance with China. We are not bound to take cognisance of Chinese allegations and request for legal assistance. India should not become an unwitting party to Chinese attempts to intimidate freedom-loving Tibetans.

9. In the meanwhile, the Chinese authorities are reported to have circulated in the Tibetan areas a list of “Unlawful” activities by Tibetans which would result in police action against them. According to Radio Free Asia, activities made punishable include fund-raising “in the name of social welfare,” urging protection of the environment or the Tibetan language, and conducting prayer rituals or other religious ceremonies if these carry “overtones” of support for Tibetan independence. ( 9-4-13)

 

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and ,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

 

PAKISTAN ELECTIONS---A PREVIEW

 

 

B.RAMAN

The forthcoming Pakistani elections to the National Assembly on May 11,2013, should be of close interest to India. Will the elections pave the way for another five years of civilian rule uninterrupted by Army intervention or will there be new instability prompting the Army to intervene? It is too early to answer this question, but certain issues need to be underlined.

2.Despite the usual ups and downs in Indo-Pakistan relations which come in the way of normalisation of bilateral ties, one has to acknowledge that the five years of rule by the coalition headed by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) saw a new mindset in Islamabad marked by a loosening of the historic obsession with the Kashmir issue. It is no longer Kashmir or nothing. The PPP-led Government showed a willingness to give a try to past suggestions from India and others, including the US and China, not to oppose progress in other issues such as bilateral trade by continuing to make the bilateral relations a hostage to the Kashmir issue.

3. While the Pakistan Army under Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, continued to regard India as the main threat to Pakistan and did not relent in its attempts to undermine any Indian role in Afghanistan, it did not come in the way of the attempts of the civilian Government to improve bilateral relations in other fields.

4. Indian attempts to encourage the signs of a new mindset in the Pakistani leadership were thwarted by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the lack of sincerity and seriousness in the Pakistani leadership in acting against Hafiz Mohd Sayeed, the Amir of the LET, and other Pakistan-based masterminds of the 26/11 strikes in Mumbai. The recent violation of the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir by the Pakistan Army and its brutal beheading of an Indian soldier added to suspicions that the Pakistani military leadership continued to give primacy to its traditional policy of keeping India bleeding in J&K.

5. Despite these negative factors, two seemingly positive factors need to be noted. The first is the absence of any major act of terrorism by ISI-sponsored jihadi organisations in Indian territory outside J&K after 26/11.The second is the similar absence of ISI-sponsored attacks on Indian targets in Afghanistan.

6. One would have thought that the ISI-sponsored organisations, particularly the LET, would have exploited the unhappiness among sections of the Muslim community over the execution of Afzal Guru, one of the perpetrators of the attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001, to revive mass fatality terrorist attacks in the Indian territory outside J&K. This has not happened. There is so far no credible evidence of any Pakistani hand in the recent terrorist incident in Hyderabad.

7. One has to be alert to the possibility of a reprisal attack by the LET and the Karachi-based Dawood Ibrahim group to avenge the recent confirmation by the Supreme Court of the sentences passed against the perpetrators of the March 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai, which marked the beginning of the ISI attempts to spread jihadi attacks to Indian territory outside J&K. There would be need for special security caution in Mumbai and Gujarat. There could be attempts by jihadi elements – indigenous or LET-orchestrated--- to discredit Narendra Modi as he emerges as the possible next Prime Minister by disturbing internal security in Gujarat.

8. While the strength and capability of the LET and other ISI-sponsored jihadi organisations for carrying out acts of mass fatality terrorism in hinterland India continue to improve, their lying low since 26/11 is an indicator of the Pakistan Army’s keenness not to be seen by the international community as coming in the way of the civilian leadership’s attempt to avoid new frictions in the relations with India.

9. The poll campaign in Pakistan is yet to pick up steam, but one could see that while the fundamentalist and jihadi organisations continue to be venomous in their attitude to India and in their determination to make India bleed whenever and wherever they can, the political mainstream is slowly coming round to the view that perennial hostility to India may prove counter-productive.

10. As one waits for a clearer indictor of the likely outcome of the polls, one has to be worried over the possibility of rogue elephant terrorist organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) causing major disruptions in the elections, particularly in the Pashtoon areas and in Karachi. If they can disrupt the elections in Karachi and aggravate the instability there, the political consequences could be unpredictable.

11. Keeping aside the security scenario, one notices from the reports coming out of Pakistan that there is so much disenchantment with the five-year rule of the PPP-led coalition that the chances of the Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League (PML) coming to power have improved despite some support for Imran Khan in Punjab and the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) province.

12. In Pakistan, the mainstream media is generally better disposed towards Nawaz Sharif than to Asif Ali Zardari. Despite their optimistic projections of the chances of Nawaz, one should not rule out a repeat of the 2008 elections--- with the PPP doing well in Sindh Rural and the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab, its ally Awami National Party (ANP) doing well in KP and the Pashtoon pockets of Karachi, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Altaf Hussain retaining its traditional Karachi strongholds and Nawz’s PML doing well in Central Punjab despite the challenge from Imran Khan. If Imran Khan does well it will be more at the expense of the PML and the ANP than  of the PPP.

13. Whether 2008 is repeated or whether a new combination of political forces emerges on top, it will be in India’s interest to welcome the continuance of civilian rule and remain engaged  with the  new civilian leadership in an attempt to give a benign direction to Indo-Pakistan relations. ( 7-4-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),  Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter @SORBONNE75)