INDER GUJRAL & INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

B.RAMAN

‘The Hindu” of February 26,2013, has carried an article  titled “ No Solace In This Quantum of Accountability” written by Samir Saran, Vice-President, and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, Programme Co-Ordinstor of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF).It is about the accountability of the intelligence agencies.

2. My views on accountability are well known and I do not feel the need to repeat them. I wanted to comment on the following observation by the two writers: “ If folklore has it right, if R&AW had a charter, it would have legally pre-empted a former Prime Minister’s order to abandon operations in Pakistan. It cost India 30 years worth of accumulated ground assets and priceless reach.”

3. The reference is apparently to former Prime Minister Inder Gujral. It is not correct that Gujral ordered the R&AW operations in Pakistan to be abandoned. The R&AW had two kinds of operations in Pakistan---- for intelligence collection and covert action.

4.He ordered only the operations for covert action to be closed since he felt that such a gesture might facilitate his efforts to improve relations with Pakistan under the so-called Gujral Doctrine. He did not order the intelligence collection operations to be discontinued. It would have been stupid on his part  to have done so. He, like all our Prime Ministers before and after him, understood the importance of a good intelligence collection capability in Pakistan. What he ordered to be closed accounted for only about 15 per cent of the R&AW’s operations in Pakistan. He encouraged the remaining 85 per cent to continue.

5. There was a debate in the intelligence community over the wisdom of his order to wind up the covert action operations. Many senior officers met him and explained to him that building a covert action capability took a long time. If one day the Government felt the need for resuming covert actions, there would be no trained and experienced assets on the ground. It was suggested to him that if he felt strongly on the subject, the covert action operations should be suspended, but not discontinued. He could not be convinced.

6. When the NDA Government under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee came to office, the intelligence community was hoping that he would cancel Gujral’s decision and order  the resumption of covert action operations in Pakistan. To their surprise, they found that Vajpayee too, like Gujral, wanted the R&AW to focus on intelligence collection in Pakistan and avoid operations for covert action.

7. Some serving officers, who felt disappointed by the reluctance of Vajpayee to  resume covert actions, arranged a meeting for me with Brajesh Mishra, the then National Security Adviser. I met him in his office in New Delhi, and explained to him the importance of resuming our covert action operations in Pakistan.

8. He gave me a patient hearing and said: “ I am already convinced. You don’t have to convince me. But the Prime Minister (Vajpayee) thinks otherwise. We have to carry out his wishes.”

9.There the matter ended. Even if the R&AW had a charter, there was no question of its being able to pre-empt Gujral’s orders. As R.N.Kao used to say, the R&AW and the IB are the two clandestine swords of the Prime Minister. It is upto him to decide how they will be used. His desires and orders have to be observed. No intelligence chief can overlook them---charter or no charter. (26-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India)

DECLINE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM LEADERSHIP

B.RAMAN

( Written at the request of the Economic Times, New Delhi, and carried by it on February 23,2013)

The two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad on February 21,2013, in which 14 persons are reported to have died, cannot be categorized as mass fatality terrorism. The blasts were directed at soft targets in a crowded area. Details available so far do not indicate what could have been the motive or who might have been the perpetrators. The police as well as the public should refrain from speculation that could mislead and distort the investigation.

2. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) did not have any unique signature. The explosive used does not appear to have been of a sophisticated kind . Fertiliser-based ammonium nitrate, which is easy to procure and which can be lethal when mixed with certain chemicals, is the main suspect for the present. For many years now, terrorists in many countries have been using ammonium nitrate-based IEDs, for their acts of terrorism.

3. Expertise in the fabrication of IEDS using ammonium nitrate as the core material is available in many web sites run by terrorist organisations. No special training is required in the matter. In Western countries, the counter-terrorism agencies have been able to reduce the use of ammonium nitrate by terrorists by imposing strict regulations on their storage and sale to persons who are not genuine farmers. We are yet to impose and enforce similar regulations in India.

4. If it turns out that ammonium nitrate has been used once again for an act of terror, priority should be given to measures for imposing such regulations in India.

5. Our counter-terrorism agencies continue to face the threat of sporadic acts of terrorism carried out by individuals or groups wanting to give vent to their anger against the State or other communities. While our police and intelligence agencies are able to collect intelligence regarding sustained acts of terrorism by groups with known objectives, targets and modus operandi, they face difficulty in monitoring the activities of individuals and groups indulging in sporadic acts of terrorism triggered by anger of the moment due to some reason or the other.

6.While sustained domestic terrorism of the kind witnessed before 2008 is by and large under control, sporadic attacks of the kind witnessed in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad pose a problem for our intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies.

7. The State Police have to play a more active role in preventing sporadic acts of terrorism and they have to be assisted by the central agencies. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which has remained a non-starter due to reservations from some States ruled by non-Congress parties, might have strengthened the joint capability of the Centre and the States for preventing sporadic terrorism. The absence of a political consensus on the NCTC leaves a big gap in our counter-terrorism architecture.

8. We face three kinds of terrorism--- state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Pakistan, domestic terrorism of a sustained nature  and domestic terrorism of a sporadic kind. While the threat of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan continues, it has not repeated itself after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Domestic terrorism of a sustained nature of the kind that we witnessed in 2007 and 2008 due to the activities of the Indian Mujahideen has been disrupted by the action taken by our central agencies and the State police to identify and disrupt their sleeper cells. Terrorism of the sporadic kind continues as seen in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad

9. Shri P.Chidambaram, who took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes, managed to strengthen our capabilities against all the three kinds of terrorism. His drive, though sometimes controversial as in the case of the NCTC, kept our agencies on their toes. The kind of vigorous leadership that he provided to our counter-terrorism efforts, has been missing since Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde took over from him last year. Counter-terrorism leadership is once again in a state of  decline as it was before 26/11.

10. Terrorists---whether the Pakistan State-sponsored or the domestic kind---- are looking for weaknesses in our counter-terrorism architecture which they can exploit to step up their activities. Incidents like those of Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad and our inability to detect them and identify the perpetrators definitively, will enable them as well as Pakistan to take advantage of the weaknesses that seem to be re-emerging in our counter-terrorism capabilities.

11. Without effective and dynamic leadership, even the best of counter-terrorism machinery will fail to deliver. Such leadership and drive have been missing under Shri Shinde’s stewardship of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

12. The Prime Minister, assisted by his National Security Adviser and the National Security Council Secretariat, which is part of the PMO, has to play a more active role for reversing this decline. Otherwise, we may be in for another nasty surprise as we faced on 26/11.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India. )

COUNTER-TERRORISM:NOTHING TO LEARN, NOTHING TO FORGET

B.RAMAN

It is less than 48 hours since the two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad on the evening of February 21,2013, resulted in the death of 16 innocent civilians.

2. The police and the intelligence agencies are still in the preliminary stages of the investigation. They have not yet done a reconstruction of the act of terrorism. The collection and examination of the forensic evidence have not yet been completed .No arrests and interrogation have been made yet.

3. Instead of waiting till the investigation makes substantial progress, the police and the agencies, with the help of sensation-hungry media, have already started pointing the finger at the Muslim community, the Indian Mujahideen and Pakistan.

4. If there is terror, it has to be a Muslim. If he is a Muslim, he has to be from the IM. If it is the IM, it must have acted at the instance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). That seems to be the thinking reflex of the police and the agencies.

5. In October last, according to the Delhi Police, a Muslim suspect belonging to the IM told them during his interrogation that the IM had recced the Dilsukhnagar area as a possible target. From this, one could have reasonable suspicion that the IM might have carried out the attack. To strengthen the suspicion, one must have additional evidence which has not been forthcoming till now. Despite this, the police and the agencies in their mind have already  turned the suspicion into certainty. Almost the entire investigation is now focused on the IM, overlooking other possibilities.

6. One cannot think of a more unprofessional way of dealing with terrorism. Very often, our initial hasty conclusions remain unproved or uncorroborated. That is why the investigation of so many of our terrorism cases  has reached a dead end. Many of the cases  remain undetected or unprosecuted or unsuccessful even if prosecuted.

7. After every few months, we are taken by surprise by a new act of terrorism because we didn’t investigate professionally the previous acts of terrorism. Our track record has been one of hurtling from one hasty conclusion to another.

8. Instead of learning lessons from the past, we continue repeating the same mistakes. Imprecise intelligence, alerts not followed up by ground action to strengthen physical security, lack of beat patrolling by the police despite our talking about it for years, absence of professional reconstruction of an act of terrorism to determine how the terrorists managed to succeed, cover-up of the sins of commission and omission of our police and agencies----- that has been our track record. Unless we get out of this unprofessional rut, terrorists will continue to strike with impunity and innocent civilians will continue to die. ( 23-2-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

MY TAKE ON HYDERABAD BLASTS

B.RAMAN

Eleven persons are reported to have been killed and over 20 injured in two well-timed explosions in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad around 7  PM on February 21,2013.

2. Initial reports indicated that one of the improvised explosive devices had been placed in a cycle or motor-bike and the other inside a tiffin box.These reports are yet to be confirmed. The two blasts appear to have been well-timed and not remote-controlled.

3.I do not so far see any sign of sophistication in the assembly of the IEDs and the synchronization of the blasts. There are no reports of any crater on the ground.If a powerful explosive material had been used, there would have been craters at the place where the IEDs had been placed.

4.The deaths and injuries seem to have been caused by the power of the blasts and not by the use of any projectiles such as nails, bicycle ball-bearings etc.When an IED is placed in a cycle or motor-bike, there would naturally be projectiles in the form of the splinters, but no other projectile has been discovered.

5.Reports of damages to nearby buildings also do not indicate the use of any powerful explosive material. The timer might have been of a conventional nature in the form of a mechanical ( with a clock attachment) or chemical device.

6.Two timed IEDs of this nature could have been easily assembled and planted by one or two terrorists. The involvement of a large team is unlikely.

7.The limited geographical area of the blasts also rules out the involvement of a large team of terrorists.The objective of the perpetrators was obviously to cause fatalities as an act of reprisal.

8.The indications till now are that the two blasts are the handiwork of locals who were in a position to assemble the devices quickly and use them.

9.Till more evidence is forthcoming, it would be advisable not to speculate on the motive and the possible identity of the perpetrators. (21-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )

MY TAKE ON THE COPTER SCAM

B.RAMAN

The 12 AgustaWestland helicopters ordered for the Air Force for VVIP duties were meant for use by the Special Protection Group (SPG) for the transport of SPG protectees and also for the transport of other VVIPs not entitled to SPG protection. While the Air Force was responsible for the procurement of the best copters available and for their maintenance and for providing the crew for manning them, the SPG was responsible for indicating to the Air Force before the procurement the minimum safety and comfort requirements that must be met by the copters.

2. All that the late Shri Brajesh Mishra, the then National Security Adviser, reportedly did in 2003 was to point out in file that the inputs from the SPG had not been adequately reflected in working out the minimum requirements that the copters should meet. He did the right thing in doing so and it would be absurd on the part of anyone to contend that his action contributed the first step in the chain of wrong-doing relating to the final procurement that came about in 2010.

3.The wrong-doing came about during the subsequent action on the contract for finalizing the financial and other details. It would seem that someone in India as well as abroad claimed credit for bringing about the changes in the minimum requirements consequent upon the action of Shri Mishra and made illegal financial gains.

4.The copter scam brings to mind the Bofors scam of the 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister. When the first details of the Bofors scam emerged in 1987,it became apparent that a small group of persons close to Rajiv Gandhi in India and Europe had financially benefitted from the contract.

5.Instead of ascertaining the truth, the Government of Rajiv Gandhi entered into a huge charade to prevent the truth from coming out. While making a huge pretense of having the matter investigated through the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and enquired into by a Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Government actually tried to have the illegalities covered up.

6.The truth of the illegal dealings ultimately emerged despite the cover-up exercise mounted by the Government due to some independent enquiries made by some brilliant journalists of the print media, with “The Hindu” being in the forefront. Despite the brilliant investigative reporting by the print media, the wrong-doers in India and Europe managed to escape prosecution due to the cover-up by the Government and its complicity in protecting the wrong-doers.

7. The CBI under Rajiv Gandhi came in for criticism for acting as a cover-up and not an investigating agency. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the CBI’s reputation hit the mud. It let itself be used by the Government as a willing tool for ensuring the cover-up.

8. It needs to be underlined that the huge web of corruption surrounding the Bofors contract did not vitiate the original decision of the Army to go for the Bofors, which played an important role in defeating the Pakistani intruders during the Kargil conflict of 1999.

9. It is important to keep this in mind because there have been demands for the cancellation of the contract for the delivery of the Westland copters. We should take a professional and not a self-righteous decision in the matter based on our evaluation of the performance of the three copters already delivered and their suitability for VVIP duties. We have already delayed by more than a decade the procurement process and a further delay as a result of any cancellation may  not be advisable.

10. At the same time, public and political opinion should ensure that a Bofors-like cover-up is not repeated by using the CBI as a tool for a diversionary exercise to prevent the truth from coming  out. India Against Corruption of Anna Hazare and the Aam Admi Party of Arvind Kejriwal as well as our media should play an active role in this matter.

11.One cannot expect a thorough-going investigation by the CBI so long as it acts under the supervision of the Government in the investigation. The CBI team investigating the copter scam should be placed under the day-to-day supervision of a special team of legal luminaries to be constituted by the Supreme Court. In the Bofors scam, the CBI team was placed under the supervision of the JPC which was dominated by the Congress and it saw to it that the CBI did not go after the truth.

12. There are three sets of wrong-doers in the copter scam. The first are the Indian nationals involved. The names of some close relatives of a former Air Force Chief have come up in this connection. Possibly, there are others. In the Bofors scam, the Indians in India and the diaspora managed to escape prosecution due to the protection extended to them by the then Government. We should see that this does not happen now.

13. The other two sets are intermediaries in Europe who played a role in the scam and senior officials of the Italian mother company (Finmecannica). The success of the CBI in establishing the truth about their role would depend on the co-operation extended by the Italian, Swiss and other European Governments. Here, the pressure of our diplomacy would be important.

14. In the Bofors scam, the Swiss and Swedish authorities were willing to co-operate, but it was the Rajiv Gandhi Government which avoided taking their co-operation lest the truth come out. Public and political opinion should see that this charade is not repeated by the present Government. (16-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter:@SORBONNE75  )

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEALING WITH A DEFIANT NORTH KOREA

B.RAMAN

 

North Korea’s third nuclear  test  was not secretive. Its first two tests were with plutonium. One does not know whether it used plutonium or enriched uranium in the third. There were indications from Pyongyang about the impending test. It spoke well of the Kim Joing-un regime that it was speaking openly of the impending test even at the risk of its being a failure. We had seen similar transparency earlier in respect of a rocket launch that failed in April last. Transparency in such sensitive matters likely to have an impact on national prestige reflects its confidence in its scientists and its ability to withstand any adverse political impact of a failure.

2. The long history of collusion between North Korea on the one side and Pakistan and Iran on the other in the clandestine development of nuclear and missile technologies is well known. This collusion started when Zukfiquar Ali Bhutto was the Pakistani Foreign Minister before the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and continued for many years thereafter. The missiles for nuclear technology exchange between North Korea and Pakistan added to Pakistan’s missile capability against India in exchange for North Korea developing a military nuclear capability. China was in the picture regarding this collusion. The exchanges of visits by the political leaders and experts of North Korea and Pakistan took place via China. Some of the road consignments from North Korea were received by Pakistan via the Chinese constructed Karakoram Highway.

3.However, one had not seen new evidence of continuing collusion ever since the clandestine activities of Pakistani scientist A.Q.Khan were exposed in 2004 and seeming action was initiated against him by Gen.Pervez Musharraf under US pressure. This does not mean that the collusion had stopped after A.Q.Khan was exposed and placed under house arrest. It only means that the two countries probably used more clandestine and restricted exchanges.

4. North Korea’s persistence on the nuclear-missile road poses serious threats to the security of Souh Korea, Japan and the US and is a matter of concern to China too which would not want a rogue state as its perceived ally.

5.It also poses a threat to the national security of India because of the past Pakistani links and Israel because of the past links with Iran. Till now, the US has been trying to neutralize North Korean capabilities through sanctions. They have not worked so far and will not work in future. Sanctions never worked against Pakistan and have not worked against Iran.

6.US hopes that China will collaborate  in making North Korea see reason have been belied so far. It will not be in China’s interest to weaken North Korea which would benefit Japan and South Korea.

7.The US has to think of  neutralizing North Korea’s capabilities through covert action to make its computer network dysfunctional and other means. The US should join hands with Japan, South Korea, India and Israel to target North Korea’s nuclear and missile establishments through covert action.

8. Israel would be happy to co-operate in this venture. India should be too.

9. This may please be read in continuation of my article of 2003 titled   'The Pakistan-North Korea nexus' at http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/apr/08spec.htm?sc_cid=twshare … ( 13-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

 

ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

B.RAMAN

Intelligence agencies have to be accountable to the Executive. Otherwise, there will be no secrecy in their functioning. Without effective secrecy, there cannot be clandestine collection of intelligence having a bearing on national security. Nowhere in the world ---not even in the much cited US--- is the executive not primarily responsible for the effective functioning  of the clandestine agencies.

2.However, in an increasing number of democracies, the Executive voluntarily shares with the legislature part of the responsibility for monitoring the performance of the secret agencies to ensure their competence to protect national security and to prevent wrong-doings.

3.In the US, the Executive and the Congress negotiate from time to time the ground rules for sharing this responsibility. The ground rules are so designed that in the anxiety to provide for accountability, the capability of the agencies to function as the clandestine arm of the State is not blunted.

4.The US Congress now has the following powers in respect of the agencies of the intelligence community:

·      To satisfy itself regarding the professional suitability of the heads of the agencies. The Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee goes into the suitability of designated heads and has to confirm their appointment.

·      To go into the overall budgetary allocations for different agencies and satisfy itself that correct national security priorities are observed in making the allocations. The Congress does not, however, go into allocations for individual clandestine operations. For example, the Congressional Oversight Committees decide whether allocations made for monitoring nuclear developments in North Korea are adequate and appropriate, but cannot go into how the allocations are utilized on individual operations.

·      To examine the intelligence produced  by the agencies to satisfy itself that they adequately meet the national security needs.

·      To enquire into instances of wrong-doing by the intelligence agencies.

5.The Executive and the two Houses of the Congress decide for themselves as to how they will exercise their shared responsibility without encroaching on each other’s turf. The culture of bipartisanship in the US facilitates decisions relating to intelligence agencies being taken by the Executive and the two Parties in the Congress in continuous  consultation with each other. Congressional leaders exercise their shared responsibility in such a manner as not to weaken national security.

6. The time has come  to consider the introduction in the Indian intelligence community the concept of shared responsibility between the Executive and the Parliament for monitoring the performance of the intelligence agencies. Certain difficulties will arise in this regard which have to be addressed first:

·      In India, we still do not have the concept of an intelligence community functioning as an organic whole. Each agency functions as an autonomous unit.

·      Our intelligence agencies were set up under executive orders and not through an act of Parliament. Unless there is an act of Parliament formalizing the existence and functioning of the agencies, the question of a parliamentary role will remain vague

·      There is no bipartisan culture in India. We have a multiplicity of political parties and coalitions. How to lay the ground rules under which a Parliament with a plethora of parties will play a role in monitoring the performance of the agencies? The more the parties involved in monitoring the performance of the agencies the less will be the secrecy. The concept of a national security culture has not evolved in our political class. Consequently, there will always be attempts by different parties to embarrass each other than to strengthen the intelligence community.

7.While I have always been a strong advocate of giving Parliament a role in monitoring the performance of the agencies, before this can be done the issues mentioned above have to be resolved through multi-party consensus. While the US model may not suit India, the British model can be considered for adoption with suitable changes and safeguards.

8.In the British model, the Prime Minister continues to play the leadership role in deciding the ground rules for joint Executive-Legislature monitoring of the performance of the agencies. Under the British political culture, the political parties do not challenge the primacy of the Prime Minister in matters relating to the intelligence agencies.

9. If we have to introduce the system in India, the political parties have to accept the primacy of the Prime Minister in matters relating to the secret agencies and the Prime Minister and the ruling coalition have to concede that the time has  come to give the Parliament a role in this matter.

10.Once there is a gentlemen’s agreement on this, the nuts and bolts can be decided through joint consultations. ( 13-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi.Twitter: @SORBONNE75)