B.RAMAN
Beijing seems as normal as ever. Widespread rumours disseminated by Chinese microblogs about a tussle for power and even an attempted coup after the March 15,2012, sacking of Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality, have proved false.
2. According to some of these rumours, Bo enjoyed the support of Zhou Yongkang, the ninth-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China, who has been the head of the Party's powerful Political and Legal Affairs Committee, which oversees police and judicial matters, since 2007.
3.These rumours even alleged that there was an attempted coup by elements in the Ministry of Public Security associated with Zhou Yongkang and speculated that Zhou might also be on the way out.
4.These rumours spread by China’s 300 million strong Netizen community have proved false. Things have been normal in Beijing. President Hu Jintao arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of March 25 to attend the nuclear security summit and he is going ahead with his plans to visit New Delhi the coming week to attend the BRIC summit and to pay a bilateral visit to Cambodia. The Chinese have not suggested any changes in the programmes of foreign visitors to Beijing. Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from Hu later this year, met former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in Beijing, on March 23.
5. Even Zhou, who has been in the centre of these rumours, has been visible and functioning normally. The State-owned Xinhua news agency disseminated on March 22, a letter reported to have been written by Zhou to a conference of police and public security officials stressing the importance of better interactions between law enforcement officials and the public in order to improve their public image.
6. In the meanwhile, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, has disseminated a report that over 3000 police and public security officials from the provinces have been called to Beijing to attend a re-training programme starting on March 26. The significance of this retraining programme is not clear. Is this connected to the removal of Bo, whose No 2 and police chief, had allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to seek asylum in the US Consulate in Chengdu?
7. While the rumours have proved to be false, the fact that the rumours spread so fast and so widely should be a matter of concern to the Chinese leaders. This shows that anti-State and anti-Government elements have a capability for causing instability through orchestrated disinformation through the Net.
8. China’s real world seems to be normal, but not its virtual world which is being skilfully used by anti-State elements to create confusion. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, March 25, 2012
Saturday, March 24, 2012
A CHINESE COMMENT
I have received the following comment from a Chinese analyst:
----------------------------------
About your " India’s Evolving China Policy "
Crossed to your article from internet and wanted to say something to share with you.
First of all, your view is fairly in a matter-of-fact way, which opens up the door for others to comment and discuss further. Not like you, I don't have much influence in China policy making process. But many of common Chinese have similar thinking as mine in that India and China have a lot in common. Only the border dispute has been causing two counties some troubles and such tension will not to go away any time soon, look like. But this shouldn't stop the two countries from keeping a close relation and work together rather than seeing each other as the main threat and enemy. Like I and many of my India friends, if we don't touch such sensitive topic, we can stay together and work together fine. Then what's the solution for this sensitive border dispute? Both India and China are stakeholders who have interests in this field. This should be treated in a business-like manor and both parties share the ownership, invest to it and share
the profit out of this investment. Thinking about eliminating the heavy arm buildup in this region, the cost saving from this along will be very significant to both parties. Hope the policy makers from both India and China have the same view.
I'd like to ready your new articles on such topic in the future. Send me a copy if you have a new one next time. Thank you very much.
----------------------------------
About your " India’s Evolving China Policy "
Crossed to your article from internet and wanted to say something to share with you.
First of all, your view is fairly in a matter-of-fact way, which opens up the door for others to comment and discuss further. Not like you, I don't have much influence in China policy making process. But many of common Chinese have similar thinking as mine in that India and China have a lot in common. Only the border dispute has been causing two counties some troubles and such tension will not to go away any time soon, look like. But this shouldn't stop the two countries from keeping a close relation and work together rather than seeing each other as the main threat and enemy. Like I and many of my India friends, if we don't touch such sensitive topic, we can stay together and work together fine. Then what's the solution for this sensitive border dispute? Both India and China are stakeholders who have interests in this field. This should be treated in a business-like manor and both parties share the ownership, invest to it and share
the profit out of this investment. Thinking about eliminating the heavy arm buildup in this region, the cost saving from this along will be very significant to both parties. Hope the policy makers from both India and China have the same view.
I'd like to ready your new articles on such topic in the future. Send me a copy if you have a new one next time. Thank you very much.
SRI LANKA: MOVING FORWARD
B.RAMAN
The unhappiness in Sri Lanka over the Indian vote in favour of the resolution in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on the question of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils ---action in respect of past violations during the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations against the LTTE and to safeguard their human rights in future in the form of a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils--- is understandable.
2. This unhappiness is unlikely to turn into bitterness. Even in the past, the Sinhalese were unhappy over what they perceived as the Indian support to the LTTE in the years before its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. This unhappiness never turned into bitterness and hatred for India.
3. Anyone who knows Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese well would be aware of their genuine goodwill for India. There were instances in the past when Sri Lankan Governments had taken steps which were detrimental to Indian interests. A typical example was before the 1971 India-Pakistan war when they allowed Pakistani Air Force planes carrying men and supplies to East Pakistan to refuel in Sri Lankan airports. When Indira Gandhi strongly objected to this, they discontinued it.
4. Their anger and unhappiness against India tend to remain ephemeral. Despite their best or worst efforts, neither China nor Pakistan has ever been able to create a permanent estrangement between India and Sri Lanka. There are historic, cultural and religious bonds between the Indians and the Sri Lankans. These are natural and evolved over hundreds of years. No synthetic bonds of Sri Lanka with China or Pakistan, created during moments of unhappiness and opportunism, can replace the natural bonds between India and Sri Lanka.
5. I do not rate highly the dangers of Sri Lanka throwing itself into the arms of China or Pakistan to spite India for its vote against it in Geneva. When the unhappiness subsides---as it is likely to--- Sri Lanka will realise that the Indian role in Geneva was more nuanced with considerable empathy for it. India stood in the way of the undoubted Human Rights violations being equated with war crimes. We equally stood in the way of a Human Rights Diktat to Sri Lanka by the US and other Western powers.
6. The resolution was neither a reprimand nor a rebuke. It was an expression of concern over the evasive attitude of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa on the question of action against those who committed serious Human Rights violations in the final stages of the anti-LTTE operations. India was as much concerned over this evasion as the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Western powers. India chose to give expression to these concerns bilaterally during political and diplomatic interactions with the Sri Lankan leaders and officials. Since the Rajapaksa Government chose to literally ignore the bilateral expression of these concerns, the Government of India found itself with no other option but to join in a multilateral expression of concern in Geneva.
7.Initially, I was not in favour of India joining the US-led exercise in Geneva to take a more assertive position against the evasive attitude of the Rajapaksa Government. But, after seeing the way the Government of India played a moderating role in Geneva in making the resolution a reasonable and not authoritarian expression of concerns, I do praise the delicate Indian diplomacy.
8. We do not have to be worried about the Chinese grand-standing at Geneva. The vigorous Chinese opposition was dictated not by a profusion of grief and tears for Sri Lanka, but by fears of what could happen if the international focus turns to the continued Chinese violations of the Human Rights of the Tibetans and the Uighurs. It goes to our credit that we did not allow fears of similar allegations against our counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to restrain the expression of our concerns over the violations of the Human Rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. There was less political hypocrisy in our stand as compared to that of China.
9. India too has reasons to be unhappy with the Rajapaksa Government for trying to wriggle out of its commitments to the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Government of India to find a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils. After having prevailed against the LTTE with considerable Indian help, it has deplorably gone back on its commitments. If it continues to follow on the path of evasion and tries to impose a dictated solution on the Tamils, India has to act tough. I said so recently before the Geneva vote and I say so again. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The unhappiness in Sri Lanka over the Indian vote in favour of the resolution in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on the question of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils ---action in respect of past violations during the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations against the LTTE and to safeguard their human rights in future in the form of a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils--- is understandable.
2. This unhappiness is unlikely to turn into bitterness. Even in the past, the Sinhalese were unhappy over what they perceived as the Indian support to the LTTE in the years before its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. This unhappiness never turned into bitterness and hatred for India.
3. Anyone who knows Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese well would be aware of their genuine goodwill for India. There were instances in the past when Sri Lankan Governments had taken steps which were detrimental to Indian interests. A typical example was before the 1971 India-Pakistan war when they allowed Pakistani Air Force planes carrying men and supplies to East Pakistan to refuel in Sri Lankan airports. When Indira Gandhi strongly objected to this, they discontinued it.
4. Their anger and unhappiness against India tend to remain ephemeral. Despite their best or worst efforts, neither China nor Pakistan has ever been able to create a permanent estrangement between India and Sri Lanka. There are historic, cultural and religious bonds between the Indians and the Sri Lankans. These are natural and evolved over hundreds of years. No synthetic bonds of Sri Lanka with China or Pakistan, created during moments of unhappiness and opportunism, can replace the natural bonds between India and Sri Lanka.
5. I do not rate highly the dangers of Sri Lanka throwing itself into the arms of China or Pakistan to spite India for its vote against it in Geneva. When the unhappiness subsides---as it is likely to--- Sri Lanka will realise that the Indian role in Geneva was more nuanced with considerable empathy for it. India stood in the way of the undoubted Human Rights violations being equated with war crimes. We equally stood in the way of a Human Rights Diktat to Sri Lanka by the US and other Western powers.
6. The resolution was neither a reprimand nor a rebuke. It was an expression of concern over the evasive attitude of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa on the question of action against those who committed serious Human Rights violations in the final stages of the anti-LTTE operations. India was as much concerned over this evasion as the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Western powers. India chose to give expression to these concerns bilaterally during political and diplomatic interactions with the Sri Lankan leaders and officials. Since the Rajapaksa Government chose to literally ignore the bilateral expression of these concerns, the Government of India found itself with no other option but to join in a multilateral expression of concern in Geneva.
7.Initially, I was not in favour of India joining the US-led exercise in Geneva to take a more assertive position against the evasive attitude of the Rajapaksa Government. But, after seeing the way the Government of India played a moderating role in Geneva in making the resolution a reasonable and not authoritarian expression of concerns, I do praise the delicate Indian diplomacy.
8. We do not have to be worried about the Chinese grand-standing at Geneva. The vigorous Chinese opposition was dictated not by a profusion of grief and tears for Sri Lanka, but by fears of what could happen if the international focus turns to the continued Chinese violations of the Human Rights of the Tibetans and the Uighurs. It goes to our credit that we did not allow fears of similar allegations against our counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to restrain the expression of our concerns over the violations of the Human Rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. There was less political hypocrisy in our stand as compared to that of China.
9. India too has reasons to be unhappy with the Rajapaksa Government for trying to wriggle out of its commitments to the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Government of India to find a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils. After having prevailed against the LTTE with considerable Indian help, it has deplorably gone back on its commitments. If it continues to follow on the path of evasion and tries to impose a dictated solution on the Tamils, India has to act tough. I said so recently before the Geneva vote and I say so again. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, March 17, 2012
MY ARTICLE ON BO XINLAI: A DIFFERENT VIEW
i HAVE BEEN IN RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM AN AUSTRALIAN ANALYST ON MY ARTICLE ON THE FALL OF BO XINLAI
"Your portrait of Bo is the one-sided flattering version cultivated by him and which is swallowed by the netizen community. Bo was a charismatic but ruthless politician whose pursuit of "mafia" figures was carried out with considerable excesses. Some would argue that Bo sought, in doing so, to entrench himself as the paramount leader in Chongqing. His assiduous courting of the digital media and his public warfare against the mafia made his Party colleagues uneasy. Bo's family however brazenly wore the trappings of power - his son drove a Ferrari - suggesting that Bo himself was not the uncompromising moral crusader he made himself out to be.
"The Party leadership has never been comfortable with those who aspired to high office through high profile, public campaigns as these risked the collective, consensus-moded and cautious Party approach they favoured. The abortive attempt by the Police Chief to seek asylum at the US consulate was seen by Beijing as symptomatic of Bo's inability to manage the situation - regardless of the circumstances, this was a highly public and humiliating outcome. Whilst Bo was busily mounting his anti-corruption rhetoric, the detained Chief made a series of allegations (unfounded or not) against Bo that provided his Party detractors with the weapon to remove a person whose pathway to the highest Party positions was increasingly perceived as being based on building public opinion rather than on the Party's favoured internal consultative mechanisms."
"Your portrait of Bo is the one-sided flattering version cultivated by him and which is swallowed by the netizen community. Bo was a charismatic but ruthless politician whose pursuit of "mafia" figures was carried out with considerable excesses. Some would argue that Bo sought, in doing so, to entrench himself as the paramount leader in Chongqing. His assiduous courting of the digital media and his public warfare against the mafia made his Party colleagues uneasy. Bo's family however brazenly wore the trappings of power - his son drove a Ferrari - suggesting that Bo himself was not the uncompromising moral crusader he made himself out to be.
"The Party leadership has never been comfortable with those who aspired to high office through high profile, public campaigns as these risked the collective, consensus-moded and cautious Party approach they favoured. The abortive attempt by the Police Chief to seek asylum at the US consulate was seen by Beijing as symptomatic of Bo's inability to manage the situation - regardless of the circumstances, this was a highly public and humiliating outcome. Whilst Bo was busily mounting his anti-corruption rhetoric, the detained Chief made a series of allegations (unfounded or not) against Bo that provided his Party detractors with the weapon to remove a person whose pathway to the highest Party positions was increasingly perceived as being based on building public opinion rather than on the Party's favoured internal consultative mechanisms."
BO XILAI: FALL OF AN AMBITIOUS REGIONAL PARTY FUNCTIONARY
B.RAMAN
The state-owned Xinhua News Agency of China announced on March 15,2012, shortly after the end of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, China’s Parliament, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) has decided to remove Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality. He continues to be in the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee.
2.Bo, born in July 1949, had earlier served as the Mayor of Dalian in the Liaoning province, and then as the Governor of Liaoning and Minister of Commerce before being appointed as the Party chief of Chongqing in 2007.
3.He has been replaced by Zhang Dejiang a native of Tai'an in the Liaoning province. Zhang has been a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee since 2002 and a Vice- premier in the State Council since 2008.
4.Between 1995 and 2007,Zhang had served as Party chief in Jilin, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces. Both Zhang and Bo were considered protégés of Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu Jintao as the President and Party General Secretary.
5.Bo Xilai is the son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the CCP, and was considered a steadily rising member of the CCP’s new leadership. Because of his easy accessibility and informal and relaxed style of interaction with the people, he was a popular figure in the world of China’s GenNext and particularly among the rapidly growing community of China’s Netizens. He had more admirers and followers in the virtual world than in the real world.
6.What added to his popularity was his campaign against corruption and organised crime wherever he was posted and his image of being a people-friendly party functionary, who believed that the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong had its positive aspect in its caring for the ordinary people, which should not be discarded. While pursuing a policy of double-digit economic growth, he attached importance to welfare schemes for the less-privileged people. He was perceived as a votary of a New Left movement in the party and as a Maoist without the embarrassing evils of Maoism which made the Cultural Revolution a hated phenomenon.
7. He did not pose a threat to the present party leadership consisting of President Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Nor was he perceived as likely to pose a threat to the new leadership consisting of Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from President Hu later this year and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang who is tipped to take over from Prime Minister Wen before the next NPC session in March next year.
8. But, Bo was a source of increasing unease and embarrassment because of his popularity in the large community of netizens, his advocacy of people-friendly economic policies, his transparent and charismatic style of leadership which was in refreshing contrast to the old style of leadership which kept a distance from the people (barring Wen) and his praise for some aspects of Mao’s policies.
9. Easing him out could have proved counter-productive, but the embarrassing action of Bo’s No2 Wang Lijun, the police chief, in visiting the US Consulate in Chengdu allegedly in an unsuccessful attempt to seek political asylum in the US, provided the leadership with an opportunity to tar Bo and have him eased out.
10. The party has taken care not to cite the action of Wang as the immediate cause of Bo’s removal. His policy mistakes have been cited as the cause for his removal. At the same time, the Party leadership is keen that Bo’s removal is not viewed by the netizens as an attempt by the leadership to prevent political reforms. In his briefing of the media on the NPC proceedings a day before the decision to sack Bo, Wen underlined the importance of political reforms without specifying what kind of reforms he had in mind and stressed the importance of preventing another Cultural Revolution.
11. In a speech to party cadre trainees delivered on March 1 and published in the Party media on March 16,Xi, who will also be taking over as the Party Secretary from Hu, has stressed the importance of purity of thought and party unity. It was a hint to the party cadres that Bo’s (whose name was not mentioned by Xi) policies and actions threatened to distort the party’s ideology and create disunity. "To maintain the party's ideological purity is to guarantee the unity of the party," said Xi, accusing some members of "a lack or principles and corrupt behaviour which is not conducive to the purity of the party".
12. Bo did not have much of a following outside the areas where he had served. He was a competent and popular regional leader who looked upon himself as having a national stature. He was politically ambitious. His undoubted following in the community of Netizens would not have been sufficient to propel him forward on his ambitious path. By cutting his wings in time, the party leadership has sought to ensure that he will not be able to take off. ( 17-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The state-owned Xinhua News Agency of China announced on March 15,2012, shortly after the end of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, China’s Parliament, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) has decided to remove Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality. He continues to be in the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee.
2.Bo, born in July 1949, had earlier served as the Mayor of Dalian in the Liaoning province, and then as the Governor of Liaoning and Minister of Commerce before being appointed as the Party chief of Chongqing in 2007.
3.He has been replaced by Zhang Dejiang a native of Tai'an in the Liaoning province. Zhang has been a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee since 2002 and a Vice- premier in the State Council since 2008.
4.Between 1995 and 2007,Zhang had served as Party chief in Jilin, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces. Both Zhang and Bo were considered protégés of Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu Jintao as the President and Party General Secretary.
5.Bo Xilai is the son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the CCP, and was considered a steadily rising member of the CCP’s new leadership. Because of his easy accessibility and informal and relaxed style of interaction with the people, he was a popular figure in the world of China’s GenNext and particularly among the rapidly growing community of China’s Netizens. He had more admirers and followers in the virtual world than in the real world.
6.What added to his popularity was his campaign against corruption and organised crime wherever he was posted and his image of being a people-friendly party functionary, who believed that the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong had its positive aspect in its caring for the ordinary people, which should not be discarded. While pursuing a policy of double-digit economic growth, he attached importance to welfare schemes for the less-privileged people. He was perceived as a votary of a New Left movement in the party and as a Maoist without the embarrassing evils of Maoism which made the Cultural Revolution a hated phenomenon.
7. He did not pose a threat to the present party leadership consisting of President Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Nor was he perceived as likely to pose a threat to the new leadership consisting of Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from President Hu later this year and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang who is tipped to take over from Prime Minister Wen before the next NPC session in March next year.
8. But, Bo was a source of increasing unease and embarrassment because of his popularity in the large community of netizens, his advocacy of people-friendly economic policies, his transparent and charismatic style of leadership which was in refreshing contrast to the old style of leadership which kept a distance from the people (barring Wen) and his praise for some aspects of Mao’s policies.
9. Easing him out could have proved counter-productive, but the embarrassing action of Bo’s No2 Wang Lijun, the police chief, in visiting the US Consulate in Chengdu allegedly in an unsuccessful attempt to seek political asylum in the US, provided the leadership with an opportunity to tar Bo and have him eased out.
10. The party has taken care not to cite the action of Wang as the immediate cause of Bo’s removal. His policy mistakes have been cited as the cause for his removal. At the same time, the Party leadership is keen that Bo’s removal is not viewed by the netizens as an attempt by the leadership to prevent political reforms. In his briefing of the media on the NPC proceedings a day before the decision to sack Bo, Wen underlined the importance of political reforms without specifying what kind of reforms he had in mind and stressed the importance of preventing another Cultural Revolution.
11. In a speech to party cadre trainees delivered on March 1 and published in the Party media on March 16,Xi, who will also be taking over as the Party Secretary from Hu, has stressed the importance of purity of thought and party unity. It was a hint to the party cadres that Bo’s (whose name was not mentioned by Xi) policies and actions threatened to distort the party’s ideology and create disunity. "To maintain the party's ideological purity is to guarantee the unity of the party," said Xi, accusing some members of "a lack or principles and corrupt behaviour which is not conducive to the purity of the party".
12. Bo did not have much of a following outside the areas where he had served. He was a competent and popular regional leader who looked upon himself as having a national stature. He was politically ambitious. His undoubted following in the community of Netizens would not have been sufficient to propel him forward on his ambitious path. By cutting his wings in time, the party leadership has sought to ensure that he will not be able to take off. ( 17-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, March 15, 2012
MY THOUGHTS ON CHINA
B.RAMAN
( Prepared for my intervention during the session on “Strategy & Security Imperatives” at the seminar on India & China: The Way Forward being organised by the Chennai Centre For China Studies on March 16,2012)
Stability maintenance and sovereignty assertion are the two sides of China’s strategic policy-making.
2. Stability maintenance refers to coping effectively with internal security problems which continue to confront the country in increasing measure not merely in the peripheral areas of Xinjiang,Tibet and Inner Mongolia inhabited by ethnic minorities, but also in the Han-inhabited hinterland.
3. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have not succeeded in pacifying the ethnic minorities despite large-scale economic development, which has definitely improved the quality of life for the Muslim Uighurs and the Buddhist Tibetans and Mongols.
4. Despite their considerable intelligence, Chinese policy-makers have not been able to understand that man does not live by bread alone. He wants self-respect. He wants recognition of his unique personality and ethnic characteristics. He wants to be able to admire his own icons and choose his own leaders, instead of having to pay homage to icons and leaders imposed on him by the Government and the party.
5. The Chinese Government and Party have given the ethnic minorities enough and to eat, a quality of life the like of which they had not enjoyed before---modern roads and railways, modern telecommunications, modern technologies, opportunities for better education, better jobs with better salaries than in the past and modern medicare.
6. In spite of this, they have not been to create in the Tibetans feelings of loyalty to the Government and the Party and devotion to the Panchen Lama of the Party creation. Their loyalty and devotion continue to be to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and they yearn for the days when the Dalai Lamas used to live in their midst and spiritually guide them.
7. The ideologues of the Communist Party have not been able to understand the meaning and importance of spirituality. They think more and better quality bread is all that matters. The Uighurs and the Tibetans struggling for their self-assertion have shown with determination that they want more than bread, that they continue to be proud of their past and their ethnicity and that they want the spiritual and ethnic aspects of their past back.
8. The continuing clashes between the will of the State and the Party and the will of the individuals and their community are to be seen in the increasing flow of reports from the Tibetan and Uighur areas regarding self-immolations of Tibetan monks, protests by students and others over the attempts to impose the Han culture on them, the spread of the Be Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Dress Tibetan and Live Tibetan non-coperation movement patterned after Mahatma Gandhi’s satyagraha against the British and violent clashes between Uighur youth and the security forces.
9. The dissatisfaction and alienation of the minorities have been compounded by the dissatisfaction of growing sections of even the Han majority over the arbitrary aspects of governance and decision making. This arbitrariness has been vividly demonstrated in land acquisitions in different parts of the country for the development of infrastructure and in the growing indifference of the affluent new class of the Party to the feelings, grievances and anger of the common man.
10. It is not only the ethnic minorities who have been asserting themselves. It is also the common man in the Han majority who has started asserting himself through protests, gherao (act of surrounding) of Government and party officials and resistance to the enforcement of arbitrary decisions.2011 was the year the common man in the Han community made himself seen and heard by the outside world.
11.There is a new destabilising factor on the horizon in China--- the vast community of netizens, who have no access to the traditional Government and party controlled media, but who have been able to take advantage of their access to the virtual world to expose the affluence of the new class in the party and government, the unhappiness of the people and the lack of democracy and the arbitrariness in governance which have made the Chinese economic miracle possible.
12. Till now, the world has been dazzled by the Chinese economic miracle without realising at what human cost it has come. Thanks to the Chinese netizens, the world is gradually becoming aware of the darker side of the miracle.
13. Threats to China’s internal stability are increasingly an important factor in its strategic policy-making. Modernisation of the internal security apparatus has consequently been receiving greater budgetary allocations than the modernisation of its external security apparatus.
14. Despite their growing preoccupation with the internal security situation, the Chinese Government and Party have not given up or diluted their attempts to assert what they consider as their historic territorial sovereignty--- whether in the East China Sea against Japan or South China Sea against some ASEAN countries or across the Himalayas against India. China’s preoccupation with its internal security problems should not induce us to underestimate its determination to assert its territorial sovereignty. Its pursuit of economic, military and Net power have two objectives--- sovereignty assertion and power enhancement and projection. It has not allowed the increasing cost of internal stability maintenance to come in the way of enhancing its military strength and capabilities.
15. These are the ground realities of China today. Arising from these ground realities, three scenarios are possible in the coming years:
( a ).Scenario I: The Chinese Government and Party are overwhelmed by a relentless assertion of the will of the common man, resulting in a collapse of communism in Chinese colours as a binding factor.
(b). Scenario II: Because of its internal security problems, China adopts a more restrained and a more moderate external posture and controls its assertive impulses.
(c ).Scenario III: It gives free rein to its assertive impulses abroad in order to divert attention from its internal security problems and rationalise and justify its suppression of domestic dissidence.
16. It would be difficult to predict which scenario is more likely. All the three are equally possible. While hoping for the first or second scenario, India should not fail to prepare itself for the third. The lead-time available to India is already much reduced because of our tardy start, our belated realisation of the implications of a militarily strong China and our poor implementation of even the inadequate plans that we have drawn up for strengthening our infrastructure on the Chinese border and for modernising our armed forces.
17. Unfortunately, we continue to suffer from a Pakistan obsession in our thinking and planning. While we should continue to monitor Pakistan, our focus has to shift to China--- whether in our intelligence community or in the armed forces or in our policy-makers or in our still vastly inadequate community of strategic thinkers. ( 16-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
( Prepared for my intervention during the session on “Strategy & Security Imperatives” at the seminar on India & China: The Way Forward being organised by the Chennai Centre For China Studies on March 16,2012)
Stability maintenance and sovereignty assertion are the two sides of China’s strategic policy-making.
2. Stability maintenance refers to coping effectively with internal security problems which continue to confront the country in increasing measure not merely in the peripheral areas of Xinjiang,Tibet and Inner Mongolia inhabited by ethnic minorities, but also in the Han-inhabited hinterland.
3. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have not succeeded in pacifying the ethnic minorities despite large-scale economic development, which has definitely improved the quality of life for the Muslim Uighurs and the Buddhist Tibetans and Mongols.
4. Despite their considerable intelligence, Chinese policy-makers have not been able to understand that man does not live by bread alone. He wants self-respect. He wants recognition of his unique personality and ethnic characteristics. He wants to be able to admire his own icons and choose his own leaders, instead of having to pay homage to icons and leaders imposed on him by the Government and the party.
5. The Chinese Government and Party have given the ethnic minorities enough and to eat, a quality of life the like of which they had not enjoyed before---modern roads and railways, modern telecommunications, modern technologies, opportunities for better education, better jobs with better salaries than in the past and modern medicare.
6. In spite of this, they have not been to create in the Tibetans feelings of loyalty to the Government and the Party and devotion to the Panchen Lama of the Party creation. Their loyalty and devotion continue to be to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and they yearn for the days when the Dalai Lamas used to live in their midst and spiritually guide them.
7. The ideologues of the Communist Party have not been able to understand the meaning and importance of spirituality. They think more and better quality bread is all that matters. The Uighurs and the Tibetans struggling for their self-assertion have shown with determination that they want more than bread, that they continue to be proud of their past and their ethnicity and that they want the spiritual and ethnic aspects of their past back.
8. The continuing clashes between the will of the State and the Party and the will of the individuals and their community are to be seen in the increasing flow of reports from the Tibetan and Uighur areas regarding self-immolations of Tibetan monks, protests by students and others over the attempts to impose the Han culture on them, the spread of the Be Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Dress Tibetan and Live Tibetan non-coperation movement patterned after Mahatma Gandhi’s satyagraha against the British and violent clashes between Uighur youth and the security forces.
9. The dissatisfaction and alienation of the minorities have been compounded by the dissatisfaction of growing sections of even the Han majority over the arbitrary aspects of governance and decision making. This arbitrariness has been vividly demonstrated in land acquisitions in different parts of the country for the development of infrastructure and in the growing indifference of the affluent new class of the Party to the feelings, grievances and anger of the common man.
10. It is not only the ethnic minorities who have been asserting themselves. It is also the common man in the Han majority who has started asserting himself through protests, gherao (act of surrounding) of Government and party officials and resistance to the enforcement of arbitrary decisions.2011 was the year the common man in the Han community made himself seen and heard by the outside world.
11.There is a new destabilising factor on the horizon in China--- the vast community of netizens, who have no access to the traditional Government and party controlled media, but who have been able to take advantage of their access to the virtual world to expose the affluence of the new class in the party and government, the unhappiness of the people and the lack of democracy and the arbitrariness in governance which have made the Chinese economic miracle possible.
12. Till now, the world has been dazzled by the Chinese economic miracle without realising at what human cost it has come. Thanks to the Chinese netizens, the world is gradually becoming aware of the darker side of the miracle.
13. Threats to China’s internal stability are increasingly an important factor in its strategic policy-making. Modernisation of the internal security apparatus has consequently been receiving greater budgetary allocations than the modernisation of its external security apparatus.
14. Despite their growing preoccupation with the internal security situation, the Chinese Government and Party have not given up or diluted their attempts to assert what they consider as their historic territorial sovereignty--- whether in the East China Sea against Japan or South China Sea against some ASEAN countries or across the Himalayas against India. China’s preoccupation with its internal security problems should not induce us to underestimate its determination to assert its territorial sovereignty. Its pursuit of economic, military and Net power have two objectives--- sovereignty assertion and power enhancement and projection. It has not allowed the increasing cost of internal stability maintenance to come in the way of enhancing its military strength and capabilities.
15. These are the ground realities of China today. Arising from these ground realities, three scenarios are possible in the coming years:
( a ).Scenario I: The Chinese Government and Party are overwhelmed by a relentless assertion of the will of the common man, resulting in a collapse of communism in Chinese colours as a binding factor.
(b). Scenario II: Because of its internal security problems, China adopts a more restrained and a more moderate external posture and controls its assertive impulses.
(c ).Scenario III: It gives free rein to its assertive impulses abroad in order to divert attention from its internal security problems and rationalise and justify its suppression of domestic dissidence.
16. It would be difficult to predict which scenario is more likely. All the three are equally possible. While hoping for the first or second scenario, India should not fail to prepare itself for the third. The lead-time available to India is already much reduced because of our tardy start, our belated realisation of the implications of a militarily strong China and our poor implementation of even the inadequate plans that we have drawn up for strengthening our infrastructure on the Chinese border and for modernising our armed forces.
17. Unfortunately, we continue to suffer from a Pakistan obsession in our thinking and planning. While we should continue to monitor Pakistan, our focus has to shift to China--- whether in our intelligence community or in the armed forces or in our policy-makers or in our still vastly inadequate community of strategic thinkers. ( 16-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
SRI LANKA: TIME TO USE THE BIG STICK
B.RAMAN
We have seen how the human rights violation issue is often used by terrorist and insurgent organisations and their supporters to demoralise the security forces.
2. We had seen how after the Khalistani terrorism was defeated in Punjab, dozens of police officers were sought to be harassed in Punjab on the ground that they had allegedly violated the human rights of the people while putting down terrorism. A senior Indian Police Service officer, who was harassed by human rights activists, even committed suicide. He was unable to bear the humiliation and the mental harassment.
3. We had also seen how India was sought to be reprimanded before the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1994 for allegedly violating the human rights of the Kashmiris. Pakistan, which spearheaded the campaign against India, failed to have India rebuked due to lack of support from Iran and other countries.
4. We should keep our past experience in mind while taking a decision on what should be our stand on the resolution which is proposed to be moved by the US and some other countries in the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva against Sri Lanka for alleged violations of the human rights of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan Army while putting down the terrorism and insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009.
5. Certain issues need to be underlined. Firstly, the Sri Lankan Army had every right and obligation to crush the LTTE, which had carried out innumerable acts of horrendous terrorism in Sri Lankan and Indian territory, including the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, our former Prime Minister, in May 1991.
6. Secondly, there were serious violations of the human rights of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan Army during its anti-LTTE operations. These violations were partly due to the disproportionate use of force by the Sri Lankan Army and partly due to the deliberate use of civilians by the LTTE in order to protect itself.
7. Thirdly, disproportionate use of force during counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations had taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan too, but they were not considered as amounting to war crimes. It will be absurd and unfair to treat the violations in Sri Lanka as amounting to war crimes, as demanded by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora which has been in the forefront of the campaign against the Sri Lankan Government.
8. Fourthly, the fact that the LTTE had indulged in horrible acts of terrorism against the civilian population is not an excuse for the violations of the human rights of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan security forces. These violations call for a full-fledged enquiry and follow-up action against those responsible. Instead of doing so, the Sri Lankan Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has been conducting itself in an unsophisticated and crude manner while evading its responsibility for holding enquiries that would carry conviction to the Tamils living in Sri Lanka, whose conviction is more important than that of the Tamil diaspora.
9. Fifthly, the credibility of the Rajapaksa Government has been further undermined by its wriggling out of the commitments to India and other States of the international community for finding a satisfactory political solution to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. After having crushed the LTTE, it has been trying to impose a dictated political solution on the Tamils and has disregarded all the promises that it had made to India in this regard.
10. Sixthly, the Government of India finds itself in a dilemma as a result of the duplicity of the Rajapaksa Government after it succeeded against the LTTE.
11.Despite India’s justified dissatisfaction against the Rajapaksa Government, it would be counter-productive for it to join the US and other countries in having Sri Lanka condemned before the UN HRC. It is totally incorrect and unwise on the part of the Tamil Nadu political parties to exercise undue pressure on an increasingly weakening Manmohan Singh Government to join the US and others in having Sri Lanka condemned.
12. While standing against the condemnation of Sri Lanka by the UNHRC, India should use all means of political and economic pressure at its disposal to make the Rajapaksa Government hold credible enquiries into the human rights violations with follow-up action against those responsible and to meet its commitments to the Tamil people.
13. India should not hesitate to use the big stick against the Rajapaksa Government due to fears that it might drive it into the arms of China and Pakistan. Indian unhappiness can hurt Sri Lanka and it should be made clear that we would not hesitate to hurt it if it continues to follow its present policy of duplicity.
14. Our present dilemma in Sri Lanka is due to our inability and unwillingness to talk and act tough when the time for it has come. The time to use the big stick has come.( 15-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
We have seen how the human rights violation issue is often used by terrorist and insurgent organisations and their supporters to demoralise the security forces.
2. We had seen how after the Khalistani terrorism was defeated in Punjab, dozens of police officers were sought to be harassed in Punjab on the ground that they had allegedly violated the human rights of the people while putting down terrorism. A senior Indian Police Service officer, who was harassed by human rights activists, even committed suicide. He was unable to bear the humiliation and the mental harassment.
3. We had also seen how India was sought to be reprimanded before the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1994 for allegedly violating the human rights of the Kashmiris. Pakistan, which spearheaded the campaign against India, failed to have India rebuked due to lack of support from Iran and other countries.
4. We should keep our past experience in mind while taking a decision on what should be our stand on the resolution which is proposed to be moved by the US and some other countries in the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva against Sri Lanka for alleged violations of the human rights of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan Army while putting down the terrorism and insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009.
5. Certain issues need to be underlined. Firstly, the Sri Lankan Army had every right and obligation to crush the LTTE, which had carried out innumerable acts of horrendous terrorism in Sri Lankan and Indian territory, including the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, our former Prime Minister, in May 1991.
6. Secondly, there were serious violations of the human rights of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan Army during its anti-LTTE operations. These violations were partly due to the disproportionate use of force by the Sri Lankan Army and partly due to the deliberate use of civilians by the LTTE in order to protect itself.
7. Thirdly, disproportionate use of force during counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations had taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan too, but they were not considered as amounting to war crimes. It will be absurd and unfair to treat the violations in Sri Lanka as amounting to war crimes, as demanded by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora which has been in the forefront of the campaign against the Sri Lankan Government.
8. Fourthly, the fact that the LTTE had indulged in horrible acts of terrorism against the civilian population is not an excuse for the violations of the human rights of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan security forces. These violations call for a full-fledged enquiry and follow-up action against those responsible. Instead of doing so, the Sri Lankan Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has been conducting itself in an unsophisticated and crude manner while evading its responsibility for holding enquiries that would carry conviction to the Tamils living in Sri Lanka, whose conviction is more important than that of the Tamil diaspora.
9. Fifthly, the credibility of the Rajapaksa Government has been further undermined by its wriggling out of the commitments to India and other States of the international community for finding a satisfactory political solution to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. After having crushed the LTTE, it has been trying to impose a dictated political solution on the Tamils and has disregarded all the promises that it had made to India in this regard.
10. Sixthly, the Government of India finds itself in a dilemma as a result of the duplicity of the Rajapaksa Government after it succeeded against the LTTE.
11.Despite India’s justified dissatisfaction against the Rajapaksa Government, it would be counter-productive for it to join the US and other countries in having Sri Lanka condemned before the UN HRC. It is totally incorrect and unwise on the part of the Tamil Nadu political parties to exercise undue pressure on an increasingly weakening Manmohan Singh Government to join the US and others in having Sri Lanka condemned.
12. While standing against the condemnation of Sri Lanka by the UNHRC, India should use all means of political and economic pressure at its disposal to make the Rajapaksa Government hold credible enquiries into the human rights violations with follow-up action against those responsible and to meet its commitments to the Tamil people.
13. India should not hesitate to use the big stick against the Rajapaksa Government due to fears that it might drive it into the arms of China and Pakistan. Indian unhappiness can hurt Sri Lanka and it should be made clear that we would not hesitate to hurt it if it continues to follow its present policy of duplicity.
14. Our present dilemma in Sri Lanka is due to our inability and unwillingness to talk and act tough when the time for it has come. The time to use the big stick has come.( 15-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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