B.RAMAN
The “Dawn” of Karachi reported on February 25,2012, that the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has reportedly decided against extending the tenure of Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who has been the Director General (DG) of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate since October,2008. According to it, he may reportedly be transferred to the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as its head.
2.Pasha reached the age of superannuation in March last year. On the recommendation of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Prime Minister Gilani, who is the appointing authority of all intelligence chiefs, granted him one year’s extension in service as well as in his tenure as the DG of the ISI.
3.When he was appointed as the ISI chief in succession to the controversial Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj, who was distrusted by the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which suspected him of being the brain behind the explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul and the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, Pasha had the unique advantage of enjoying the confidence of his Army Chief, the elected civilian Government and the US.
4.After his extension, his image has taken a beating due to the unilateral US raid in Abbottabad on May 2,2011, which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, the subsequent Memogate scandal relating to a Memo allegedly passed on by Mansoor Ijaz, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, to Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the alleged instance of Hussain Haqqani, then Pakistani Ambassador to the US, seeking US intervention to prevent a feared coup by Kayani, and a serious disruption of military-military and intelligence-intelligence relations between the US and Pakistan following an alleged US/NATO raid on a Pakistani border post in the last week of November in which many Pakistani military and para-military personnel were killed.
5.There has been an undeclared cold war between the military and intelligence services of the two countries since the last week of November resulting in a disruption of exchanges of visits, meetings at senior levels, and NATO logistic supplies to Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
6.There have been reliable indications that the elected civilian leadership ----particularly President Asif Ali Zardari--- has been unhappy over the turn for the worse in the bilateral relations, but has been unable to override the objections of the Army and the ISI to a premature mending of the relations with the US.
7.So long as Pasha is the head of the ISI, in view of his total identification with the post-May 2011 policies of Kayani, a reversal of the downslide in the relations with the US is unlikely. But the exit of Pasha from the post of DG of the ISI might provide the civilian leadership with an opportunity to appoint a successor who can try to reverse the downslide.
8.The appointing authority for the post of the DG, ISI, is the Prime Minister. Though the Prime Minister generally appoints an Army officer recommended by the COAS, there have been three instances in the past when an elected Prime Minister had appointed someone to whom the COAS was opposed. These were retired Major-Gen. Shamshur Rehman Kallue, who was recalled from retirement by Mrs.Benazir Bhutto in 1989 and appointed as the DG of the ISI, Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir and Lt.Gen.Ziauddin, who were appointed by Nawaz Sharif during his first and second tenures as Prime Minister respectively. Piqued by these appointments, the Army boycotted Kallue, Nasir and Ziauddin thereby reducing their effectiveness and increasing the importance of the Directors-General of Military Intelligence, who were relied upon by the COAS for carrying out his orders.
9.The “Dawn” has also reported as follows : “In what may come as a surprising development, the Government may appoint a non-military official or a retired military officer as the new chief of the ISI. At least four senior military officers, including the Corps Commander Lahore Lieutenant General Rashid, Corps Commander Karachi Lieutenant General Zaheer-ul-Islam, Deputy Director General ISI Major General Asfandyar Pataudi and the incumbent DG Military Intelligence Major General Noshad Kayani are also being considered for the slot to be vacated by Pasha.”
10. Last year, after the Abbottabad raid, there was speculation in Pakistan that Maj-Gen Pataudi may replace Pasha as the ISI chief, but this did not happen. Pataudi will still be an attractive candidate for the US and the Pakistani civilian leadership because of his reputation as a liberal and clean officer, but he is still only a Major-Gen and may have to be promoted as Lt.Gen. superseding his seniors before he can take over as the DG,ISI. Moreover, Kayani may not like his being preferred to others who are known to be close to him. Sections of the Pakistani media had speculated last year that he was related to the Nawab of Pataudi family in India. If this is correct, it is doubtful whether the Army would want someone with links to India as the ISI chief.
11. It is very doubtful whether the civilian leadership would appoint a civilian to this post. It could provoke the Army and add to the confrontation between the civilian leadership and the Army. Since there is a precedent of a retired Army officer enjoying the confidence of the elected leadership being recalled and asked to take over as the DG,ISI, one should not rule this out.
12. Among names of retired officers that come to mind are Lt.Gen. Asad Durrani, who was the DG of the ISI during Nawaz Sharif’s first tenure as the Prime Minister, and Maj-Gen.Mahmud Ali Durrani, former Ambassador to the US before Haqqani. Asad Durrani was close to Nawaz, but had subsequently ingratiated himself with Benazir Bhutto. He is presently very active in the Track-2 circles trying for a dialogue between India and Pakistan.
13. When Gilani took over as the Prime Minister in 2008, he appointed Mahmud Ali Durrani as his National Security Adviser, but he was removed following a controversy over his confirming in public that Ajmal Kasab, the sole survivor of the Lashkar-e-Toiba group that carried out terrorist strikes in Mumbai on 26/11, was a Pakistani national.
14. Despite his unceremonious exit, he maintains good relations with Zardari, the US and serving Army officers who are supporters of Pervez Musharraf. He had played an active role in bringing about an understanding between Musharraf and Benazir which led to her return from political exile in October, 2007.
15. Among other retired officers with an intelligence background known to Zardari are Lt-Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi and Lt-Gen Naseem Rana, both of whom had headed the ISI during Benazir’s second tenure as the Prime Minister. Lt-Gen. Qazi is now a member of the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) and represents it in the Senate. That might rule him out from consideration. Rana is from the Signal Corps and was not known as a heavy weight. His chances should, therefore, be low. ( 26-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, February 25, 2012
NCTC: ARREST & THEN INFORM THE STATE POLICE
B.RAMAN
In a letter to the Chief Ministers, who have expressed their reservations over certain features of the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), Shri P.Chidambaram, the Union Home Minister, has stated, inter alia as follows: “Before we take the next steps, I have asked the Home Secretary to call a meeting of the Directors General of Police and the Heads of the Anti-Terrorist Organisations/Forces of the State Governments and discuss in detail the scope and functions of the NCTC.”
2. This tends to confirm the claims of Ms.Mamata Banerjee, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who had met the Prime Minister at New Delhi on this subject that the Government has decided to withhold further follow-up action on the NCTC till there were prior consultations with the States. The Government of India needs to be complimented for not standing on false prestige and agreeing to hold consultations with the States “before we take the next steps”
3. With his letter, Shri Chidambaram has enclosed a note giving the background to the proposed creation of the NCTC and its salient features. The note states inter alia: “A body mandated to deal with counter terrorism must have, in certain circumstances, an operational capability. This is true of all counter terrorism bodies in the world. When engaged in counter terrorism operations, the officers must have the power to arrest and the power to search which are the bare minimum powers that would be necessary. Besides, the powers conferred under section 43A must be read with the duty under section 43B to produce the person or article without unnecessary delay before the nearest police station (which will be under the State Government), and the SHO of the Police Station will take further action in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC.”
4. The claim made in the summary regarding the position in other countries does not seem to be factually correct. In the US, the NCTC,created under law in 2004, as an independent institution to function under the supervision of Director, National Intelligence, has not been given any executive powers. Its charter says: “NCTC assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies as part of its strategic planning duties, but NCTC does not direct the execution of any resulting operations.”
5. In the UK, the powers of arrest are still exclusively vested in the police. The Secret Service, known as MI-5, which is responsible for secret intelligence collection and covert action against terrorism, does not have these powers. A paper on Counter-Terrorism Strategy submitted by the British Government to their Parliament in July 2006 says as follows: “Covert operational counter-terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is conducted by the
Security Service in close collaboration with police forces across the country and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police. The police are responsible for taking executive action, such as arrests, and conducting the investigation against those suspected of involvement in terrorism. The SIS and GCHQ, in collaboration with intelligence and security partners overseas, operate covertly in support of the Security Service to disrupt terrorist threat.”
6. SIS is the Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI-6, which is the UK’s external intelligence agency. GCHQ is the General Communications Headquarters which is the UK’s TECHINT agency. It is the UK’s equivalent of the USA’s National Security Agency and our National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
7.The Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), created in pursuance of the recommendation of the Task Force set up by the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, has tasks of joint analysis, joint assessment, joint identification of follow-up action required and assigning responsibilities for follow-up action. It will get its follow-up operations executed by other empowered agencies and the State Police. It has no executive powers of its own.
8. The NCTC is proposed to be given executive powers of follow-up action on its own on the basis of its assessment and informing the State Police thereafter. At present, the MAC alerts the State Police and suggests arrest of a suspect by them. In future, the NCTC can arrest a suspect on its own, hand him over to the police and direct it to start an investigation.
9. This is apparently meant to deal with contingencies where the State Police drag their feet in making an arrest--- for example a BJP Government in respect of a suspected Hindu terrorist or some other Government in respect of a Muslim terrorist. The MAC is at present without powers to deal with such instances. The NCTC can, in future, arrest the suspect without alerting the police, take his house search, hand him over to the police and then direct it to start an investigation.
10. This is a power with serious implications for misuse, with the NCTC, taking its orders from the Intelligence Bureau, arresting a person in a State without keeping the Police in the picture and then confronting the Police with a fait accompli.
11. In other countries, the NCTCs or their equivalent came into being as part of a detailed National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was formulated after extensive political consultations and debate in the Parliament. In India, 41 years after terrorism made its appearance and over three years after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, we still do not have a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy drawn up in consultation with the political parties and States.
12. Without such a strategy, attempts are being made to smuggle through a mechanism with executive powers to enable the IB to make arrests in certain cases on its own through the NCTC without the prior knowledge of the States.
13. A note on the NCTC of the US taken from its web site is annexed.( 25-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
ANNEXURE
USA’S NCTC MECHANISM
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 in August 2004, and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). NCTC implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: “Breaking the older mold of national government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, s
staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”
The Director of NCTC is a Deputy Secretary-equivalent with a unique, dual line of reporting: (1) to the President regarding Executive branch-wide counterterrorism planning, and (2) to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the President, and National and Homeland Security Councils.
NCTC is staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and agencies (approximately 60 percent of whom are detailed to NCTC). NCTC is organizationally part of the ODNI.
NCTC’s core missions are derived primarily from IRTPA, as supplemented by other statutes, Executive Orders, and Intelligence Community Directives. NCTC’s mission statement succinctly summarizes its key responsibilities and value-added contributions: “Lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”
“Analyzing the Threat”
By law, NCTC serves as the primary organization in the United States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism).
NCTC integrates foreign and domestic analysis from across the Intelligence Community (IC) and produces a wide-range of detailed assessments designed to support senior policymakers and other members of the policy, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities. Prime examples of NCTC analytic products include items for the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB). NCTC is also the central player in the ODNI’s Homeland Threat Task Force, which orchestrates interagency collaboration and keeps senior policymakers informed about threats to the Homeland via a weekly update.
NCTC leads the IC in providing expertise and analysis of key terrorism-related issues, with immediate and far-reaching impact. For example, NCTC’s Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group leads the IC’s efforts on radicalization issues. NCTC’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Group pools scarce analytical, subject matter, and scientific expertise from NCTC and CIA on these critical issues.
NCTC also evaluates the quality of CT analytic production, the training of analysts working CT, and the strengths and weaknesses of the CT analytic workforce. NCTC created the Analytic Framework for Counterterrorism, aimed at reducing redundancy of effort by delineating the roles of the IC’s various CT analytic components. NCTC also created a working group for alternative analysis to help improve the overall rigor and quality of CT analysis.
“Sharing that Information”
By law, NCTC serves as the USG’s central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism intelligence analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. NCTC collocates more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing. NCTC is a model of interagency information sharing.
Through the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), NCTC maintains a consolidated repository of information on international terrorist identities and provides the authoritative database supporting the Terrorist Screening Center and the USG’s watchlisting system. The Center also produces NCTC Online (NOL) and NCTC Online CURRENT, classified websites that make CT products and articles available to users across approximately 75 USG agencies, departments, military services and major commands. NCTC’s Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) facilitates information sharing between the IC and State, Local, Tribal, and Private partners – in coordination with DHS, FBI, and other members of the ITACG Advisory Council.
NCTC also provides the CT community with 24/7 situational awareness, terrorism threat reporting, and incident information tracking. NCTC hosts three daily secure video teleconferences (SVTC) and maintains constant voice and electronic contact with major Intelligence and CT Community players and foreign partners.
“Integrating All Instruments of National Power”
By law, NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies engaged in the War on Terror, through a single and truly joint planning process.
NCTC’s planning efforts include broad, strategic plans such as the landmark National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP). First approved by the President in June 2006 and then again in September 2008, the NIP is the USG’s comprehensive and evolving strategic plan to implement national CT priorities into concerted interagency action.
NCTC also prepares far more granular, targeted action plans to ensure integration, coordination, and synchronization on key issues, such as countering violent extremism, terrorist use of the internet, terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, and counter-options (after an attack). NCTC also leads Interagency Task Forces designed to analyze, monitor, and disrupt potential terrorist attacks.
NCTC assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies as part of its strategic planning duties, but NCTC does not direct the execution of any resulting operations.
NCTC monitors the alignment of all CT resources against the NIP and provides advice and recommendations to policy officials to enhance mission success.
The Director of NCTC is also the CT Mission Manager for the IC, per DNI directive3. Thus implementing a key recommendation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. In that role, NCTC leads the CT community in identifying critical intelligence problems, key knowledge gaps, and major resource constraints. NCTC also created the CT Intelligence Plan (CTIP) to translate the NIP and the National Intelligence Strategy into a common set of priority activities for the IC, and to establish procedures for assessing how the IC is performing against those objectives.
NCTC, in partnership with NSC and HSC, is leading reform of CT policy architecture to streamline policymaking and clarify missions.
In a letter to the Chief Ministers, who have expressed their reservations over certain features of the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), Shri P.Chidambaram, the Union Home Minister, has stated, inter alia as follows: “Before we take the next steps, I have asked the Home Secretary to call a meeting of the Directors General of Police and the Heads of the Anti-Terrorist Organisations/Forces of the State Governments and discuss in detail the scope and functions of the NCTC.”
2. This tends to confirm the claims of Ms.Mamata Banerjee, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who had met the Prime Minister at New Delhi on this subject that the Government has decided to withhold further follow-up action on the NCTC till there were prior consultations with the States. The Government of India needs to be complimented for not standing on false prestige and agreeing to hold consultations with the States “before we take the next steps”
3. With his letter, Shri Chidambaram has enclosed a note giving the background to the proposed creation of the NCTC and its salient features. The note states inter alia: “A body mandated to deal with counter terrorism must have, in certain circumstances, an operational capability. This is true of all counter terrorism bodies in the world. When engaged in counter terrorism operations, the officers must have the power to arrest and the power to search which are the bare minimum powers that would be necessary. Besides, the powers conferred under section 43A must be read with the duty under section 43B to produce the person or article without unnecessary delay before the nearest police station (which will be under the State Government), and the SHO of the Police Station will take further action in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC.”
4. The claim made in the summary regarding the position in other countries does not seem to be factually correct. In the US, the NCTC,created under law in 2004, as an independent institution to function under the supervision of Director, National Intelligence, has not been given any executive powers. Its charter says: “NCTC assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies as part of its strategic planning duties, but NCTC does not direct the execution of any resulting operations.”
5. In the UK, the powers of arrest are still exclusively vested in the police. The Secret Service, known as MI-5, which is responsible for secret intelligence collection and covert action against terrorism, does not have these powers. A paper on Counter-Terrorism Strategy submitted by the British Government to their Parliament in July 2006 says as follows: “Covert operational counter-terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is conducted by the
Security Service in close collaboration with police forces across the country and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police. The police are responsible for taking executive action, such as arrests, and conducting the investigation against those suspected of involvement in terrorism. The SIS and GCHQ, in collaboration with intelligence and security partners overseas, operate covertly in support of the Security Service to disrupt terrorist threat.”
6. SIS is the Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI-6, which is the UK’s external intelligence agency. GCHQ is the General Communications Headquarters which is the UK’s TECHINT agency. It is the UK’s equivalent of the USA’s National Security Agency and our National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
7.The Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), created in pursuance of the recommendation of the Task Force set up by the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, has tasks of joint analysis, joint assessment, joint identification of follow-up action required and assigning responsibilities for follow-up action. It will get its follow-up operations executed by other empowered agencies and the State Police. It has no executive powers of its own.
8. The NCTC is proposed to be given executive powers of follow-up action on its own on the basis of its assessment and informing the State Police thereafter. At present, the MAC alerts the State Police and suggests arrest of a suspect by them. In future, the NCTC can arrest a suspect on its own, hand him over to the police and direct it to start an investigation.
9. This is apparently meant to deal with contingencies where the State Police drag their feet in making an arrest--- for example a BJP Government in respect of a suspected Hindu terrorist or some other Government in respect of a Muslim terrorist. The MAC is at present without powers to deal with such instances. The NCTC can, in future, arrest the suspect without alerting the police, take his house search, hand him over to the police and then direct it to start an investigation.
10. This is a power with serious implications for misuse, with the NCTC, taking its orders from the Intelligence Bureau, arresting a person in a State without keeping the Police in the picture and then confronting the Police with a fait accompli.
11. In other countries, the NCTCs or their equivalent came into being as part of a detailed National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was formulated after extensive political consultations and debate in the Parliament. In India, 41 years after terrorism made its appearance and over three years after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, we still do not have a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy drawn up in consultation with the political parties and States.
12. Without such a strategy, attempts are being made to smuggle through a mechanism with executive powers to enable the IB to make arrests in certain cases on its own through the NCTC without the prior knowledge of the States.
13. A note on the NCTC of the US taken from its web site is annexed.( 25-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
ANNEXURE
USA’S NCTC MECHANISM
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 in August 2004, and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). NCTC implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: “Breaking the older mold of national government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, s
staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”
The Director of NCTC is a Deputy Secretary-equivalent with a unique, dual line of reporting: (1) to the President regarding Executive branch-wide counterterrorism planning, and (2) to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the President, and National and Homeland Security Councils.
NCTC is staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and agencies (approximately 60 percent of whom are detailed to NCTC). NCTC is organizationally part of the ODNI.
NCTC’s core missions are derived primarily from IRTPA, as supplemented by other statutes, Executive Orders, and Intelligence Community Directives. NCTC’s mission statement succinctly summarizes its key responsibilities and value-added contributions: “Lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”
“Analyzing the Threat”
By law, NCTC serves as the primary organization in the United States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism).
NCTC integrates foreign and domestic analysis from across the Intelligence Community (IC) and produces a wide-range of detailed assessments designed to support senior policymakers and other members of the policy, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities. Prime examples of NCTC analytic products include items for the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB). NCTC is also the central player in the ODNI’s Homeland Threat Task Force, which orchestrates interagency collaboration and keeps senior policymakers informed about threats to the Homeland via a weekly update.
NCTC leads the IC in providing expertise and analysis of key terrorism-related issues, with immediate and far-reaching impact. For example, NCTC’s Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group leads the IC’s efforts on radicalization issues. NCTC’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Group pools scarce analytical, subject matter, and scientific expertise from NCTC and CIA on these critical issues.
NCTC also evaluates the quality of CT analytic production, the training of analysts working CT, and the strengths and weaknesses of the CT analytic workforce. NCTC created the Analytic Framework for Counterterrorism, aimed at reducing redundancy of effort by delineating the roles of the IC’s various CT analytic components. NCTC also created a working group for alternative analysis to help improve the overall rigor and quality of CT analysis.
“Sharing that Information”
By law, NCTC serves as the USG’s central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism intelligence analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. NCTC collocates more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing. NCTC is a model of interagency information sharing.
Through the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), NCTC maintains a consolidated repository of information on international terrorist identities and provides the authoritative database supporting the Terrorist Screening Center and the USG’s watchlisting system. The Center also produces NCTC Online (NOL) and NCTC Online CURRENT, classified websites that make CT products and articles available to users across approximately 75 USG agencies, departments, military services and major commands. NCTC’s Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) facilitates information sharing between the IC and State, Local, Tribal, and Private partners – in coordination with DHS, FBI, and other members of the ITACG Advisory Council.
NCTC also provides the CT community with 24/7 situational awareness, terrorism threat reporting, and incident information tracking. NCTC hosts three daily secure video teleconferences (SVTC) and maintains constant voice and electronic contact with major Intelligence and CT Community players and foreign partners.
“Integrating All Instruments of National Power”
By law, NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies engaged in the War on Terror, through a single and truly joint planning process.
NCTC’s planning efforts include broad, strategic plans such as the landmark National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP). First approved by the President in June 2006 and then again in September 2008, the NIP is the USG’s comprehensive and evolving strategic plan to implement national CT priorities into concerted interagency action.
NCTC also prepares far more granular, targeted action plans to ensure integration, coordination, and synchronization on key issues, such as countering violent extremism, terrorist use of the internet, terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, and counter-options (after an attack). NCTC also leads Interagency Task Forces designed to analyze, monitor, and disrupt potential terrorist attacks.
NCTC assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies as part of its strategic planning duties, but NCTC does not direct the execution of any resulting operations.
NCTC monitors the alignment of all CT resources against the NIP and provides advice and recommendations to policy officials to enhance mission success.
The Director of NCTC is also the CT Mission Manager for the IC, per DNI directive3. Thus implementing a key recommendation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. In that role, NCTC leads the CT community in identifying critical intelligence problems, key knowledge gaps, and major resource constraints. NCTC also created the CT Intelligence Plan (CTIP) to translate the NIP and the National Intelligence Strategy into a common set of priority activities for the IC, and to establish procedures for assessing how the IC is performing against those objectives.
NCTC, in partnership with NSC and HSC, is leading reform of CT policy architecture to streamline policymaking and clarify missions.
Friday, February 24, 2012
CHINA: “ BETTER TO COUNTER MICROBLOGS THAN TO BLOCK THEM”
B.RAMAN
According to Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, Zhu Mingguo, deputy leader of the Guangdong provincial Government in China, which witnessed a people’s revolt in the village of Wukan towards the end of last year in protest against arbitrary land acquisitions, told a conference of the labour department of the Government on February 20,2012, that the provincial Government planned to train 10,000 "public opinion guides" in the coming months to correct public misperceptions about Government and Party policies.
2. He stressed the need for Government and party officials to keep pace with the new generation of Chinese society, which is Web-savvy and is able to use the Net for propagating criticisms of Government and party policies.
3.According to the “Guangdong Daily”, as cited by RFA, Zhu told the participants in the conference that they should ensure that the voice of the Communist Party continued to be heard in an age of social networking. They should take opinion formation and education to the next level, Zhu reportedly told the meeting, and "guide society to an ardent love of the Party and of socialism."
4. The RFA has reported as follows in a commentary on the conference: “Guangzhou-based Internet commentator Ye Du said the report had sparked considerable discussion in some quarters of the Chinese Internet, with posts announcing that "the 50-cent army is hiring again," in a reference to netizens' satirical name for the government's battalion of paid opinion-makers. The fact that the villagers of Wukan kept going with the struggle to protect their rights has set a huge example to rural communities and petitioners all over China," Ye said. "In recent days, there have been a number of demonstrations by large numbers of retired military personnel who have used the same methods in their petitioning."
5.The RFA commentary further quoted Ye as saying as follows: “Now that rural residents know how to use the Internet and microblogs as channels to release information, the authorities must boost their workforce by hiring even more people to curb them. They want to prevent negative news from getting out and circulating."
6.According to Ye, as cited by the RFA commentary, the Government's strategy is now focused on influencing public opinion rather than on the impossible task of censoring every microblog posting on the massively popular Sina Weibo service. "News gets out on Sina Weibo very fast indeed," Ye said. "Within one or two minutes, your news can reach several million people, and the authorities can't keep up with blocking all of it." (25-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
According to Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, Zhu Mingguo, deputy leader of the Guangdong provincial Government in China, which witnessed a people’s revolt in the village of Wukan towards the end of last year in protest against arbitrary land acquisitions, told a conference of the labour department of the Government on February 20,2012, that the provincial Government planned to train 10,000 "public opinion guides" in the coming months to correct public misperceptions about Government and Party policies.
2. He stressed the need for Government and party officials to keep pace with the new generation of Chinese society, which is Web-savvy and is able to use the Net for propagating criticisms of Government and party policies.
3.According to the “Guangdong Daily”, as cited by RFA, Zhu told the participants in the conference that they should ensure that the voice of the Communist Party continued to be heard in an age of social networking. They should take opinion formation and education to the next level, Zhu reportedly told the meeting, and "guide society to an ardent love of the Party and of socialism."
4. The RFA has reported as follows in a commentary on the conference: “Guangzhou-based Internet commentator Ye Du said the report had sparked considerable discussion in some quarters of the Chinese Internet, with posts announcing that "the 50-cent army is hiring again," in a reference to netizens' satirical name for the government's battalion of paid opinion-makers. The fact that the villagers of Wukan kept going with the struggle to protect their rights has set a huge example to rural communities and petitioners all over China," Ye said. "In recent days, there have been a number of demonstrations by large numbers of retired military personnel who have used the same methods in their petitioning."
5.The RFA commentary further quoted Ye as saying as follows: “Now that rural residents know how to use the Internet and microblogs as channels to release information, the authorities must boost their workforce by hiring even more people to curb them. They want to prevent negative news from getting out and circulating."
6.According to Ye, as cited by the RFA commentary, the Government's strategy is now focused on influencing public opinion rather than on the impossible task of censoring every microblog posting on the massively popular Sina Weibo service. "News gets out on Sina Weibo very fast indeed," Ye said. "Within one or two minutes, your news can reach several million people, and the authorities can't keep up with blocking all of it." (25-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, February 23, 2012
WAKE-UP CALL OF SO-CALLED RADIA TAPES
B.RAMAN
Some developments of recent months have highlighted the need for a tight control over electronic snooping by intelligence and security agencies.
2.The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) stressed the need for improving our technical intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities by setting up an Indian equivalent of the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA), which is exclusively responsible for the collection of communications intelligence.
3.Thus came into existence the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) as the primary TECHINT agency of the Government of India. Simultaneously, since the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US,TECHINT capabilities have been strengthened in individual agencies of our intelligence community.
4.This period has also seen a mushrooming of private telecommunication companies. Some of them are of foreign origin, including from China. As a result, the weak architecture and dos and don’ts laid down before 1999 for a strict, centralised control over the snooping process have been further weakened---with agencies not authorised to do snooping managing to do so by various means such as allegedly using their contacts in the private telecom companies.
5.Private telecom companies have been doing their own snooping of each other to meet the requirements of competition. Thus, snooping capabilities have expanded beyond imagination over the last 10 years. The evolution of the centralised control architecture has not kept pace with the expansion of the snooping capabilities.
6. As a result, one finds that the protection of the right to communications privacy of the citizens of this country no longer receives the kind of attention that it used to receive before 1999. A wake-up call on the dangers of unbridled electronic snooping was sounded in the case of the so-called Niiru Radia tapes. One saw the worrisome phenomenon of a multiplicity of agencies doing snooping in total violation of the do’s and don’t’s laid down and leaking out tampered versions of the intercepts in total disregard of the right to communications privacy of innocent citizens.
7. Recent reports in the media indicate that there has been no attempt to draw the right lessons from the Radia tapes controversy. It would seem that more and more capabilities for snooping on communications of the citizens are being acquired by different agencies, without strengthening the safety precautions to ensure that the capabilities are used only against established or strongly-suspected wrong-doers in accordance with a laid-down procedure approved at the highest level.
8. If the Government does not immediately act to strengthen the mechanism for preventing the misuse of these capabilities, we may find that there is no longer any restraints in the matter of interception of communications and that electronic snoopers of Indian and foreign origin have been running amok across our communications spectra.
9. More violation of the rights of the citizens and weakening of our national security may be the ultimate outcome. It is worrisome that none of these issues receives the attention of our political class, which is more interested in playing partisan politics than in debating issues relating to our national security--- in a professional manner without politicising the debate. The tendency of our political class to politicise every debate on security issues has been the bane of our national security management.
10. The debate should also focus on the need for setting up at least a modicum of parliamentary oversight over our intelligence community and over the way they are using their newly-acquired capabilities and technologies.
11.The question of introducing some kind of parliamentary oversight has been debated from time to time since 1989 when V.P.Singh, the then Prime Minister, raised it for the first time.
12.There has been no forward movement since then due to lack of interest in our political class and resistance from the intelligence agencies which fear – not without valid reasons—that in the era of coalition politics and increasing nexus between sections of the political class and the criminal world, it would be inadvisable to introduce the same methods of parliamentary oversight as in Western countries, particularly in the US and the UK.
13. However strong and valid the reservations of the intelligence agencies, we should not take their no as the final answer. It is important to devise ways of parliamentary oversight which would suit the conditions in the Indian political landscape. This is a matter that needs to be examined by a high-powered committee.( 23-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Some developments of recent months have highlighted the need for a tight control over electronic snooping by intelligence and security agencies.
2.The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) stressed the need for improving our technical intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities by setting up an Indian equivalent of the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA), which is exclusively responsible for the collection of communications intelligence.
3.Thus came into existence the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) as the primary TECHINT agency of the Government of India. Simultaneously, since the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US,TECHINT capabilities have been strengthened in individual agencies of our intelligence community.
4.This period has also seen a mushrooming of private telecommunication companies. Some of them are of foreign origin, including from China. As a result, the weak architecture and dos and don’ts laid down before 1999 for a strict, centralised control over the snooping process have been further weakened---with agencies not authorised to do snooping managing to do so by various means such as allegedly using their contacts in the private telecom companies.
5.Private telecom companies have been doing their own snooping of each other to meet the requirements of competition. Thus, snooping capabilities have expanded beyond imagination over the last 10 years. The evolution of the centralised control architecture has not kept pace with the expansion of the snooping capabilities.
6. As a result, one finds that the protection of the right to communications privacy of the citizens of this country no longer receives the kind of attention that it used to receive before 1999. A wake-up call on the dangers of unbridled electronic snooping was sounded in the case of the so-called Niiru Radia tapes. One saw the worrisome phenomenon of a multiplicity of agencies doing snooping in total violation of the do’s and don’t’s laid down and leaking out tampered versions of the intercepts in total disregard of the right to communications privacy of innocent citizens.
7. Recent reports in the media indicate that there has been no attempt to draw the right lessons from the Radia tapes controversy. It would seem that more and more capabilities for snooping on communications of the citizens are being acquired by different agencies, without strengthening the safety precautions to ensure that the capabilities are used only against established or strongly-suspected wrong-doers in accordance with a laid-down procedure approved at the highest level.
8. If the Government does not immediately act to strengthen the mechanism for preventing the misuse of these capabilities, we may find that there is no longer any restraints in the matter of interception of communications and that electronic snoopers of Indian and foreign origin have been running amok across our communications spectra.
9. More violation of the rights of the citizens and weakening of our national security may be the ultimate outcome. It is worrisome that none of these issues receives the attention of our political class, which is more interested in playing partisan politics than in debating issues relating to our national security--- in a professional manner without politicising the debate. The tendency of our political class to politicise every debate on security issues has been the bane of our national security management.
10. The debate should also focus on the need for setting up at least a modicum of parliamentary oversight over our intelligence community and over the way they are using their newly-acquired capabilities and technologies.
11.The question of introducing some kind of parliamentary oversight has been debated from time to time since 1989 when V.P.Singh, the then Prime Minister, raised it for the first time.
12.There has been no forward movement since then due to lack of interest in our political class and resistance from the intelligence agencies which fear – not without valid reasons—that in the era of coalition politics and increasing nexus between sections of the political class and the criminal world, it would be inadvisable to introduce the same methods of parliamentary oversight as in Western countries, particularly in the US and the UK.
13. However strong and valid the reservations of the intelligence agencies, we should not take their no as the final answer. It is important to devise ways of parliamentary oversight which would suit the conditions in the Indian political landscape. This is a matter that needs to be examined by a high-powered committee.( 23-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
NEED FOR NCTC: CASE BADLY HANDLED
B.RAMAN
( An edited version of this has been carried by “The Hindu” on February 23,2012,http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2920554.ece )
Before 9/11 the assessment in the US was that terrorist threats to the US from abroad would be more serious than home-based threats. The responsibility for co-ordinating preventive action was, therefore, vested in the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA), which handles external intelligence.
The CIA had a Counter-terrorism Centre (CTC) to perform tasks of co-ordination and follow-up action on the intelligence collected by the various agencies. The CTC had officers taken on deputation from different agencies. They worked under a CIA officer.
The Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee set up in May 2000 a Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW and the then Governor of J&K. Among its members were Shri M.K.Narayanan, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, Shri K.Raghunath, former Foreign Secretary, Shri P.P. Shrivatsava, former Special Secretary, Home Affairs, and myself.
Its report recommended, inter alia, the setting-up of a CTC on the US model with deputationists from different agencies to improve co-ordination and follow-up action in counter-terrorism. Since in India, the IB had the over-all responsibility for counter-terrorism and liaison with the State Police it suggested that the CTC should be part of the IB and should work under the DIB.
It looked upon the CTC as a clandestine wing of the IB, which itself is a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It, therefore, did not recommend any legal powers for the CTC so that the clandestine nature of its operations was not affected.
The Vajpayee Government set up the CTC, under an executive order, as part of the IB but, for reasons not clear to me, it named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and not the CTC.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US brought out serious gaps in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. It was, therefore decided by the Bush Administration in 2004 to set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as an independent institution not under the control of any of the existing agencies. It was placed under the Director, National Intelligence, who is one of the personal staff of the President.
Whereas the US model of the CTC was given up after 9/11 due to inadequacies in its functioning, the Indian model of the MAC, patterned after the US CTC model, has continued functioning. Neither the Vajpayee Government nor the Manmohan Singh Government revisited the recommendations of the Saxena Task Force in the light of the 9/11 lessons.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai brought out gaps in the functioning of the MAC. Flow of preventive intelligence and follow-up action on even the limited intelligence that was available were unsatisfactory. In a statement in the Lok Sabha after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram admitted that the responsibility for follow-up-action on the available intelligence was diffused.
He, therefore, decided to set up the NCTC after a visit to the US. His model of the Indian NCTC differed from the US model in two respects. The US NCTC is an independent institution not coming under the control of any of the existing agencies. In India, it is proposed to be made a wing of the IB and will work under the DIB.
In the US, the NCTC is a legal institution set up under a Congressional legislation after bipartisan consultations, but it does not have any legal powers to act on its own in matters such as arrest, detention, interrogation, searches etc.
The Indian model has been set up under an executive notification under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. This has obviated the need for fresh legislation for its creation and for fresh political consulations at the Centre and with the States.
More seriously, the Indian NCTC is sought to be given powers of arrest and searches as part of its preventive operations.
The granting of these powers to the IB through the NCTC mechanism could have two undesirable consequences. Firstly, allegations of misuse of the IB for harassing political opponents. Secondly, it will affect the role of the IB as a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It will be preoccupied defending its arrests before the courts and against allegations of human rights violations. Moreover, presently the IB enjoys protection from the Right to Information Act. If it has these powers and starts functioning as an intelligence collection agency cum central police, it may no longer be able to enjoy this protection.
The Home Minister had two options: Either make the NCTC an independent institution if he felt that it must have the powers of arrest and searches . Or if he felt that it must work under the IB, make it a division of the IB without giving it these powers.
His unwise action in making it part of the IB with these powers could prove counterproductive. He should not stand on false prestige. He should re-visit the proposed NCTC architecture in consultation with political parties and the States.
It needs to be underlined that there is no opposition in the country to the NCTC concept, which is necessary. The opposition is to the manner in which it has been set up without adequate consultations and to some of its features.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Research & Analysis Wing,Govt. of India )
( An edited version of this has been carried by “The Hindu” on February 23,2012,http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2920554.ece )
Before 9/11 the assessment in the US was that terrorist threats to the US from abroad would be more serious than home-based threats. The responsibility for co-ordinating preventive action was, therefore, vested in the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA), which handles external intelligence.
The CIA had a Counter-terrorism Centre (CTC) to perform tasks of co-ordination and follow-up action on the intelligence collected by the various agencies. The CTC had officers taken on deputation from different agencies. They worked under a CIA officer.
The Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee set up in May 2000 a Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW and the then Governor of J&K. Among its members were Shri M.K.Narayanan, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, Shri K.Raghunath, former Foreign Secretary, Shri P.P. Shrivatsava, former Special Secretary, Home Affairs, and myself.
Its report recommended, inter alia, the setting-up of a CTC on the US model with deputationists from different agencies to improve co-ordination and follow-up action in counter-terrorism. Since in India, the IB had the over-all responsibility for counter-terrorism and liaison with the State Police it suggested that the CTC should be part of the IB and should work under the DIB.
It looked upon the CTC as a clandestine wing of the IB, which itself is a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It, therefore, did not recommend any legal powers for the CTC so that the clandestine nature of its operations was not affected.
The Vajpayee Government set up the CTC, under an executive order, as part of the IB but, for reasons not clear to me, it named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and not the CTC.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US brought out serious gaps in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. It was, therefore decided by the Bush Administration in 2004 to set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as an independent institution not under the control of any of the existing agencies. It was placed under the Director, National Intelligence, who is one of the personal staff of the President.
Whereas the US model of the CTC was given up after 9/11 due to inadequacies in its functioning, the Indian model of the MAC, patterned after the US CTC model, has continued functioning. Neither the Vajpayee Government nor the Manmohan Singh Government revisited the recommendations of the Saxena Task Force in the light of the 9/11 lessons.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai brought out gaps in the functioning of the MAC. Flow of preventive intelligence and follow-up action on even the limited intelligence that was available were unsatisfactory. In a statement in the Lok Sabha after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram admitted that the responsibility for follow-up-action on the available intelligence was diffused.
He, therefore, decided to set up the NCTC after a visit to the US. His model of the Indian NCTC differed from the US model in two respects. The US NCTC is an independent institution not coming under the control of any of the existing agencies. In India, it is proposed to be made a wing of the IB and will work under the DIB.
In the US, the NCTC is a legal institution set up under a Congressional legislation after bipartisan consultations, but it does not have any legal powers to act on its own in matters such as arrest, detention, interrogation, searches etc.
The Indian model has been set up under an executive notification under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. This has obviated the need for fresh legislation for its creation and for fresh political consulations at the Centre and with the States.
More seriously, the Indian NCTC is sought to be given powers of arrest and searches as part of its preventive operations.
The granting of these powers to the IB through the NCTC mechanism could have two undesirable consequences. Firstly, allegations of misuse of the IB for harassing political opponents. Secondly, it will affect the role of the IB as a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It will be preoccupied defending its arrests before the courts and against allegations of human rights violations. Moreover, presently the IB enjoys protection from the Right to Information Act. If it has these powers and starts functioning as an intelligence collection agency cum central police, it may no longer be able to enjoy this protection.
The Home Minister had two options: Either make the NCTC an independent institution if he felt that it must have the powers of arrest and searches . Or if he felt that it must work under the IB, make it a division of the IB without giving it these powers.
His unwise action in making it part of the IB with these powers could prove counterproductive. He should not stand on false prestige. He should re-visit the proposed NCTC architecture in consultation with political parties and the States.
It needs to be underlined that there is no opposition in the country to the NCTC concept, which is necessary. The opposition is to the manner in which it has been set up without adequate consultations and to some of its features.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Research & Analysis Wing,Govt. of India )
Friday, February 17, 2012
THE TIBETAN SATYAGRAHA
B.RAMAN
The recent hardline statements from the Han rulers of Tibet expressing concern over the situation in Tibet and their determination to crush the so-called splittist movement is a reflection of their nervousness. This nervousness is the result of their inability to understand what has been going on in the Tibetan areas of China and to crush the post-2008 Tibetan emulation of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent strategic resistance movement called the Satyagraha meaning the struggle for the truth.
2. The Chinese managed to crush the violent uprising of 2008, but they have not been able to crush the Tibetan yearning for freedom. They have not been able to eradicate the Tibetan love for His Holiness the Dalai Lama and their devotion to their Buddhist religion. They have not been able to destroy the Tibetan pride in their identity.
3. The Tibetans---particularly the GenNext--- realised that a better way of asserting their pride and independence and keeping alive their hopes for the end of what they consider as the Han colonisation of Tibet would be to emulate Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle against the British colonial regime in India.
4. Thus was born the Lhakar movement. Lhakar means White Wednesday---- a day associated, in their eyes, with the soul of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Every Wednesday, thousands of Tibetans---men, women and children---- are meeting in their villages and towns to take the following pledges:
I am Tibetan. This is my national flag.
I am Tibetan. I wear Chupa(tibetan dress).
I am Tibetan. I eat dried cheese.
I am Tibetan. I work for Tibetan Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I eat Tsampa (Tibetan staple food).
I am Tibetan. I drink Tibetan salted butter tea.
I am Tibetan. I speak Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. My parents are Tibetan. My leader is His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
I am Tibetan. I am a disciple of His Holiness.
I am Tibetan. My father is a Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. Tibetan blood flows in my body.
I am Tibetan. I will continue to work for Tibet's Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I am proud of being Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. I am Thangka painter and an activist for Tibet's Independence.
5. They express their determination to preserve their Tibetan identity and their refusal to be assimilated into the Han culture and identity. Eat Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Dress Tibetan, Think Tibetan, Live Tibetan, Die Tibetan--- that is their motto.
6. The Tibetans themselves describe the Lhakar movement as follows: “ Lhakar is a homegrown, Tibetan self-reliance movement that started in the aftermath of the 2008 uprising. In spite of China’s intensified crackdown, Tibetans have embraced the power of strategic nonviolent resistance. Every Wednesday, a growing number of Tibetans are making special effort to wear traditional clothes, speak Tibetan, eat in Tibetan restaurants and buy from Tibetan-owned businesses. They channel their spirit of resistance into social, cultural and economic activities that are self-constructive (promoting Tibetan language, culture and identity) and non-cooperative (refusing to support Chinese institutions and businesses).”
7. The Lhakar movement has unnerved the Chinese. They do not know how to stop its spread. The resistance movement has taken other forms too---- self-immolation by Tibetan monks---- since March last year, there have been 24 self-immolation attempts, of which 22 ended in fatalities--- insistence on keeping the pictures of His Holiness in the monasteries, refusal to fly the Chinese flag and exhibit the pictures of Chinese leaders in the monasteries, refusal to observe the Chinese New Year’s Day, refusal by monks to perform their religious duties in monasteries in which Chinese security forces are posted, refusal to attend the so-called re-education camps organised by the Chinese Government and party authorities.
8. The Chinese have sent reinforcements of their security forces to the Tibetan areas and cut off all Net connections. Despite this, the movement is showing no signs of abating. On the contrary, it is gathering strength.
9.Gandhiji’s non-violent struggle finally succeeded against the British and forced them to quit India. Will the Tibetan non-violent struggle succeed against the Han Chinese? The Han Chinese are more ruthless than the British. The Tibetans would need the moral support of the international community---particularly India--- to keep their struggle alive and triumph finally. Even if considerations of RealPolitik prevent the Government of India from extending moral support to the Tibetans, Indian public opinion should not let them down. They are emulating our own freedom struggle. They are following in the footsteps of our own legendary leaders who fought against the British. The Indian public opinion has a moral obligation to empathise with the Tibetan satyagraha and support it morally. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The recent hardline statements from the Han rulers of Tibet expressing concern over the situation in Tibet and their determination to crush the so-called splittist movement is a reflection of their nervousness. This nervousness is the result of their inability to understand what has been going on in the Tibetan areas of China and to crush the post-2008 Tibetan emulation of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent strategic resistance movement called the Satyagraha meaning the struggle for the truth.
2. The Chinese managed to crush the violent uprising of 2008, but they have not been able to crush the Tibetan yearning for freedom. They have not been able to eradicate the Tibetan love for His Holiness the Dalai Lama and their devotion to their Buddhist religion. They have not been able to destroy the Tibetan pride in their identity.
3. The Tibetans---particularly the GenNext--- realised that a better way of asserting their pride and independence and keeping alive their hopes for the end of what they consider as the Han colonisation of Tibet would be to emulate Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle against the British colonial regime in India.
4. Thus was born the Lhakar movement. Lhakar means White Wednesday---- a day associated, in their eyes, with the soul of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Every Wednesday, thousands of Tibetans---men, women and children---- are meeting in their villages and towns to take the following pledges:
I am Tibetan. This is my national flag.
I am Tibetan. I wear Chupa(tibetan dress).
I am Tibetan. I eat dried cheese.
I am Tibetan. I work for Tibetan Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I eat Tsampa (Tibetan staple food).
I am Tibetan. I drink Tibetan salted butter tea.
I am Tibetan. I speak Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. My parents are Tibetan. My leader is His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
I am Tibetan. I am a disciple of His Holiness.
I am Tibetan. My father is a Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. Tibetan blood flows in my body.
I am Tibetan. I will continue to work for Tibet's Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I am proud of being Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. I am Thangka painter and an activist for Tibet's Independence.
5. They express their determination to preserve their Tibetan identity and their refusal to be assimilated into the Han culture and identity. Eat Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Dress Tibetan, Think Tibetan, Live Tibetan, Die Tibetan--- that is their motto.
6. The Tibetans themselves describe the Lhakar movement as follows: “ Lhakar is a homegrown, Tibetan self-reliance movement that started in the aftermath of the 2008 uprising. In spite of China’s intensified crackdown, Tibetans have embraced the power of strategic nonviolent resistance. Every Wednesday, a growing number of Tibetans are making special effort to wear traditional clothes, speak Tibetan, eat in Tibetan restaurants and buy from Tibetan-owned businesses. They channel their spirit of resistance into social, cultural and economic activities that are self-constructive (promoting Tibetan language, culture and identity) and non-cooperative (refusing to support Chinese institutions and businesses).”
7. The Lhakar movement has unnerved the Chinese. They do not know how to stop its spread. The resistance movement has taken other forms too---- self-immolation by Tibetan monks---- since March last year, there have been 24 self-immolation attempts, of which 22 ended in fatalities--- insistence on keeping the pictures of His Holiness in the monasteries, refusal to fly the Chinese flag and exhibit the pictures of Chinese leaders in the monasteries, refusal to observe the Chinese New Year’s Day, refusal by monks to perform their religious duties in monasteries in which Chinese security forces are posted, refusal to attend the so-called re-education camps organised by the Chinese Government and party authorities.
8. The Chinese have sent reinforcements of their security forces to the Tibetan areas and cut off all Net connections. Despite this, the movement is showing no signs of abating. On the contrary, it is gathering strength.
9.Gandhiji’s non-violent struggle finally succeeded against the British and forced them to quit India. Will the Tibetan non-violent struggle succeed against the Han Chinese? The Han Chinese are more ruthless than the British. The Tibetans would need the moral support of the international community---particularly India--- to keep their struggle alive and triumph finally. Even if considerations of RealPolitik prevent the Government of India from extending moral support to the Tibetans, Indian public opinion should not let them down. They are emulating our own freedom struggle. They are following in the footsteps of our own legendary leaders who fought against the British. The Indian public opinion has a moral obligation to empathise with the Tibetan satyagraha and support it morally. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
CREATION OF A KGB IN INDIA: ONLY JAYALALITA HAS GOT HER FEARS RIGHT
B.RAMAN
Of all the Chief Ministers, who have protested against the proposed creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India with effect from March 1,2012 without consulting the State Governments, only J.Jayalalita, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, has got it right.
2. She has made it clear that her objection is not to the creation of the NCTC to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability. Nor is her objection based on fears of dilution of the principle of federalism.
3. Her objections are to two features of the proposed NCTC mechanism--- the powers of arrests and searches sought to be given to the NCTC, which will be a division of the IB, a clandestine intelligence organisation, and the provision for the setting-up of inter-State intelligence teams by the NCTC.
4. She has reportedly described these provisions as highly objectionable and said that the powers of arrest and searches given to the IB through the mechanism of the NCTC under Section 2 ( e ) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 “can be misused to suit ends that are motivated by reasons other than fighting terrorism. Moreover, setting up of inter-state intelligence teams by the NCTC is tantamount to usurping the legitimate rights of the States.”
5. I would not agree with her fears regarding the proposed inter-State intelligence teams. Such teams may be necessary to deal with pan-Indian terrorist groups such as the Indian Mujahideen which have their sleeper cells right across India in many States.
6. But, I do share her fears about the possible misuse of the powers of arrest and searches by the NCTC Division of the IB against political opponents by branding them as associated with terrorism. During the emergency of 1975-77, Indira Gandhi had many of her political opponents arrested by having them branded as threats to national security.
7. A Government with authoritarian reflexes in future may be tempted to misuse the powers of arrest given to the IB through the NCTC for having political opponents arrested by having them branded as associated with terrorism.
8. The IB is a secret intelligence organisation. It has no accountability to Parliament in respect of its work. We do not have a system of parliamentary intelligence oversight committees. We depend on the executive without any checks and balances to ensure that the IB functions according to the law of the land.
9.The British, during their colonial rule, did not consider it necessary or wise to give the powers of arrest and searches to the IB for any purpose. They observed the sacred principle that a clandestine intelligence collection agency should not have the powers of arrest. None of the Governments that had held office in New Delhi since our independence had considered it necessary or wise to give such powers to the IB.
10. The practice of giving powers of arrest to the intelligence agencies was started by Lenin and Stalin when they set up the KGB, the all-powerful Soviet intelligence agency, in order to enable it to deal with so-called counter-revolutionaries. Many other authoritarian countries have since given these powers to their intelligence agencies.
11. The IB has till now not had these powers. In spite of that, during the Emergency there were serious allegations of the misuse of the IB and the CBI by the Indira Gandhi Government to harass the opponents of the emergency. Instances of such misuse were documented by the Shah Commission and the L.P.Singh Committee set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into them.
12. If there could be such gross misdeeds when the IB did not have any powers of arrest, imagine how much more could there be when a clandestine organisation, not accountable to Parliament, is given such powers on the ground that those powers would be required to deal with terrorism.
13. Congress spokesmen defending the NCTC mechanism have sought to ridicule those criticising the objectionable provisions of the NCTC as opposed to strengthening our counter-terrorism capability. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The opposition is not to the NCTC as such, but to some objectionable features of it.
14. Instead of standing on false prestige, the Government of India should have a re-look at some of the worrisome features of the NCTC mechanism in consultation with other political parties and State Governments. It is not just a question of respecting the principles of federalism. It is a question of adhering to the principles of a genuine democracy. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Of all the Chief Ministers, who have protested against the proposed creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India with effect from March 1,2012 without consulting the State Governments, only J.Jayalalita, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, has got it right.
2. She has made it clear that her objection is not to the creation of the NCTC to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability. Nor is her objection based on fears of dilution of the principle of federalism.
3. Her objections are to two features of the proposed NCTC mechanism--- the powers of arrests and searches sought to be given to the NCTC, which will be a division of the IB, a clandestine intelligence organisation, and the provision for the setting-up of inter-State intelligence teams by the NCTC.
4. She has reportedly described these provisions as highly objectionable and said that the powers of arrest and searches given to the IB through the mechanism of the NCTC under Section 2 ( e ) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 “can be misused to suit ends that are motivated by reasons other than fighting terrorism. Moreover, setting up of inter-state intelligence teams by the NCTC is tantamount to usurping the legitimate rights of the States.”
5. I would not agree with her fears regarding the proposed inter-State intelligence teams. Such teams may be necessary to deal with pan-Indian terrorist groups such as the Indian Mujahideen which have their sleeper cells right across India in many States.
6. But, I do share her fears about the possible misuse of the powers of arrest and searches by the NCTC Division of the IB against political opponents by branding them as associated with terrorism. During the emergency of 1975-77, Indira Gandhi had many of her political opponents arrested by having them branded as threats to national security.
7. A Government with authoritarian reflexes in future may be tempted to misuse the powers of arrest given to the IB through the NCTC for having political opponents arrested by having them branded as associated with terrorism.
8. The IB is a secret intelligence organisation. It has no accountability to Parliament in respect of its work. We do not have a system of parliamentary intelligence oversight committees. We depend on the executive without any checks and balances to ensure that the IB functions according to the law of the land.
9.The British, during their colonial rule, did not consider it necessary or wise to give the powers of arrest and searches to the IB for any purpose. They observed the sacred principle that a clandestine intelligence collection agency should not have the powers of arrest. None of the Governments that had held office in New Delhi since our independence had considered it necessary or wise to give such powers to the IB.
10. The practice of giving powers of arrest to the intelligence agencies was started by Lenin and Stalin when they set up the KGB, the all-powerful Soviet intelligence agency, in order to enable it to deal with so-called counter-revolutionaries. Many other authoritarian countries have since given these powers to their intelligence agencies.
11. The IB has till now not had these powers. In spite of that, during the Emergency there were serious allegations of the misuse of the IB and the CBI by the Indira Gandhi Government to harass the opponents of the emergency. Instances of such misuse were documented by the Shah Commission and the L.P.Singh Committee set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into them.
12. If there could be such gross misdeeds when the IB did not have any powers of arrest, imagine how much more could there be when a clandestine organisation, not accountable to Parliament, is given such powers on the ground that those powers would be required to deal with terrorism.
13. Congress spokesmen defending the NCTC mechanism have sought to ridicule those criticising the objectionable provisions of the NCTC as opposed to strengthening our counter-terrorism capability. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The opposition is not to the NCTC as such, but to some objectionable features of it.
14. Instead of standing on false prestige, the Government of India should have a re-look at some of the worrisome features of the NCTC mechanism in consultation with other political parties and State Governments. It is not just a question of respecting the principles of federalism. It is a question of adhering to the principles of a genuine democracy. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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