B.RAMAN
According to Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, Zhu Mingguo, deputy leader of the Guangdong provincial Government in China, which witnessed a people’s revolt in the village of Wukan towards the end of last year in protest against arbitrary land acquisitions, told a conference of the labour department of the Government on February 20,2012, that the provincial Government planned to train 10,000 "public opinion guides" in the coming months to correct public misperceptions about Government and Party policies.
2. He stressed the need for Government and party officials to keep pace with the new generation of Chinese society, which is Web-savvy and is able to use the Net for propagating criticisms of Government and party policies.
3.According to the “Guangdong Daily”, as cited by RFA, Zhu told the participants in the conference that they should ensure that the voice of the Communist Party continued to be heard in an age of social networking. They should take opinion formation and education to the next level, Zhu reportedly told the meeting, and "guide society to an ardent love of the Party and of socialism."
4. The RFA has reported as follows in a commentary on the conference: “Guangzhou-based Internet commentator Ye Du said the report had sparked considerable discussion in some quarters of the Chinese Internet, with posts announcing that "the 50-cent army is hiring again," in a reference to netizens' satirical name for the government's battalion of paid opinion-makers. The fact that the villagers of Wukan kept going with the struggle to protect their rights has set a huge example to rural communities and petitioners all over China," Ye said. "In recent days, there have been a number of demonstrations by large numbers of retired military personnel who have used the same methods in their petitioning."
5.The RFA commentary further quoted Ye as saying as follows: “Now that rural residents know how to use the Internet and microblogs as channels to release information, the authorities must boost their workforce by hiring even more people to curb them. They want to prevent negative news from getting out and circulating."
6.According to Ye, as cited by the RFA commentary, the Government's strategy is now focused on influencing public opinion rather than on the impossible task of censoring every microblog posting on the massively popular Sina Weibo service. "News gets out on Sina Weibo very fast indeed," Ye said. "Within one or two minutes, your news can reach several million people, and the authorities can't keep up with blocking all of it." (25-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, February 24, 2012
Thursday, February 23, 2012
WAKE-UP CALL OF SO-CALLED RADIA TAPES
B.RAMAN
Some developments of recent months have highlighted the need for a tight control over electronic snooping by intelligence and security agencies.
2.The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) stressed the need for improving our technical intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities by setting up an Indian equivalent of the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA), which is exclusively responsible for the collection of communications intelligence.
3.Thus came into existence the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) as the primary TECHINT agency of the Government of India. Simultaneously, since the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US,TECHINT capabilities have been strengthened in individual agencies of our intelligence community.
4.This period has also seen a mushrooming of private telecommunication companies. Some of them are of foreign origin, including from China. As a result, the weak architecture and dos and don’ts laid down before 1999 for a strict, centralised control over the snooping process have been further weakened---with agencies not authorised to do snooping managing to do so by various means such as allegedly using their contacts in the private telecom companies.
5.Private telecom companies have been doing their own snooping of each other to meet the requirements of competition. Thus, snooping capabilities have expanded beyond imagination over the last 10 years. The evolution of the centralised control architecture has not kept pace with the expansion of the snooping capabilities.
6. As a result, one finds that the protection of the right to communications privacy of the citizens of this country no longer receives the kind of attention that it used to receive before 1999. A wake-up call on the dangers of unbridled electronic snooping was sounded in the case of the so-called Niiru Radia tapes. One saw the worrisome phenomenon of a multiplicity of agencies doing snooping in total violation of the do’s and don’t’s laid down and leaking out tampered versions of the intercepts in total disregard of the right to communications privacy of innocent citizens.
7. Recent reports in the media indicate that there has been no attempt to draw the right lessons from the Radia tapes controversy. It would seem that more and more capabilities for snooping on communications of the citizens are being acquired by different agencies, without strengthening the safety precautions to ensure that the capabilities are used only against established or strongly-suspected wrong-doers in accordance with a laid-down procedure approved at the highest level.
8. If the Government does not immediately act to strengthen the mechanism for preventing the misuse of these capabilities, we may find that there is no longer any restraints in the matter of interception of communications and that electronic snoopers of Indian and foreign origin have been running amok across our communications spectra.
9. More violation of the rights of the citizens and weakening of our national security may be the ultimate outcome. It is worrisome that none of these issues receives the attention of our political class, which is more interested in playing partisan politics than in debating issues relating to our national security--- in a professional manner without politicising the debate. The tendency of our political class to politicise every debate on security issues has been the bane of our national security management.
10. The debate should also focus on the need for setting up at least a modicum of parliamentary oversight over our intelligence community and over the way they are using their newly-acquired capabilities and technologies.
11.The question of introducing some kind of parliamentary oversight has been debated from time to time since 1989 when V.P.Singh, the then Prime Minister, raised it for the first time.
12.There has been no forward movement since then due to lack of interest in our political class and resistance from the intelligence agencies which fear – not without valid reasons—that in the era of coalition politics and increasing nexus between sections of the political class and the criminal world, it would be inadvisable to introduce the same methods of parliamentary oversight as in Western countries, particularly in the US and the UK.
13. However strong and valid the reservations of the intelligence agencies, we should not take their no as the final answer. It is important to devise ways of parliamentary oversight which would suit the conditions in the Indian political landscape. This is a matter that needs to be examined by a high-powered committee.( 23-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Some developments of recent months have highlighted the need for a tight control over electronic snooping by intelligence and security agencies.
2.The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) stressed the need for improving our technical intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities by setting up an Indian equivalent of the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA), which is exclusively responsible for the collection of communications intelligence.
3.Thus came into existence the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) as the primary TECHINT agency of the Government of India. Simultaneously, since the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US,TECHINT capabilities have been strengthened in individual agencies of our intelligence community.
4.This period has also seen a mushrooming of private telecommunication companies. Some of them are of foreign origin, including from China. As a result, the weak architecture and dos and don’ts laid down before 1999 for a strict, centralised control over the snooping process have been further weakened---with agencies not authorised to do snooping managing to do so by various means such as allegedly using their contacts in the private telecom companies.
5.Private telecom companies have been doing their own snooping of each other to meet the requirements of competition. Thus, snooping capabilities have expanded beyond imagination over the last 10 years. The evolution of the centralised control architecture has not kept pace with the expansion of the snooping capabilities.
6. As a result, one finds that the protection of the right to communications privacy of the citizens of this country no longer receives the kind of attention that it used to receive before 1999. A wake-up call on the dangers of unbridled electronic snooping was sounded in the case of the so-called Niiru Radia tapes. One saw the worrisome phenomenon of a multiplicity of agencies doing snooping in total violation of the do’s and don’t’s laid down and leaking out tampered versions of the intercepts in total disregard of the right to communications privacy of innocent citizens.
7. Recent reports in the media indicate that there has been no attempt to draw the right lessons from the Radia tapes controversy. It would seem that more and more capabilities for snooping on communications of the citizens are being acquired by different agencies, without strengthening the safety precautions to ensure that the capabilities are used only against established or strongly-suspected wrong-doers in accordance with a laid-down procedure approved at the highest level.
8. If the Government does not immediately act to strengthen the mechanism for preventing the misuse of these capabilities, we may find that there is no longer any restraints in the matter of interception of communications and that electronic snoopers of Indian and foreign origin have been running amok across our communications spectra.
9. More violation of the rights of the citizens and weakening of our national security may be the ultimate outcome. It is worrisome that none of these issues receives the attention of our political class, which is more interested in playing partisan politics than in debating issues relating to our national security--- in a professional manner without politicising the debate. The tendency of our political class to politicise every debate on security issues has been the bane of our national security management.
10. The debate should also focus on the need for setting up at least a modicum of parliamentary oversight over our intelligence community and over the way they are using their newly-acquired capabilities and technologies.
11.The question of introducing some kind of parliamentary oversight has been debated from time to time since 1989 when V.P.Singh, the then Prime Minister, raised it for the first time.
12.There has been no forward movement since then due to lack of interest in our political class and resistance from the intelligence agencies which fear – not without valid reasons—that in the era of coalition politics and increasing nexus between sections of the political class and the criminal world, it would be inadvisable to introduce the same methods of parliamentary oversight as in Western countries, particularly in the US and the UK.
13. However strong and valid the reservations of the intelligence agencies, we should not take their no as the final answer. It is important to devise ways of parliamentary oversight which would suit the conditions in the Indian political landscape. This is a matter that needs to be examined by a high-powered committee.( 23-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
NEED FOR NCTC: CASE BADLY HANDLED
B.RAMAN
( An edited version of this has been carried by “The Hindu” on February 23,2012,http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2920554.ece )
Before 9/11 the assessment in the US was that terrorist threats to the US from abroad would be more serious than home-based threats. The responsibility for co-ordinating preventive action was, therefore, vested in the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA), which handles external intelligence.
The CIA had a Counter-terrorism Centre (CTC) to perform tasks of co-ordination and follow-up action on the intelligence collected by the various agencies. The CTC had officers taken on deputation from different agencies. They worked under a CIA officer.
The Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee set up in May 2000 a Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW and the then Governor of J&K. Among its members were Shri M.K.Narayanan, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, Shri K.Raghunath, former Foreign Secretary, Shri P.P. Shrivatsava, former Special Secretary, Home Affairs, and myself.
Its report recommended, inter alia, the setting-up of a CTC on the US model with deputationists from different agencies to improve co-ordination and follow-up action in counter-terrorism. Since in India, the IB had the over-all responsibility for counter-terrorism and liaison with the State Police it suggested that the CTC should be part of the IB and should work under the DIB.
It looked upon the CTC as a clandestine wing of the IB, which itself is a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It, therefore, did not recommend any legal powers for the CTC so that the clandestine nature of its operations was not affected.
The Vajpayee Government set up the CTC, under an executive order, as part of the IB but, for reasons not clear to me, it named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and not the CTC.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US brought out serious gaps in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. It was, therefore decided by the Bush Administration in 2004 to set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as an independent institution not under the control of any of the existing agencies. It was placed under the Director, National Intelligence, who is one of the personal staff of the President.
Whereas the US model of the CTC was given up after 9/11 due to inadequacies in its functioning, the Indian model of the MAC, patterned after the US CTC model, has continued functioning. Neither the Vajpayee Government nor the Manmohan Singh Government revisited the recommendations of the Saxena Task Force in the light of the 9/11 lessons.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai brought out gaps in the functioning of the MAC. Flow of preventive intelligence and follow-up action on even the limited intelligence that was available were unsatisfactory. In a statement in the Lok Sabha after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram admitted that the responsibility for follow-up-action on the available intelligence was diffused.
He, therefore, decided to set up the NCTC after a visit to the US. His model of the Indian NCTC differed from the US model in two respects. The US NCTC is an independent institution not coming under the control of any of the existing agencies. In India, it is proposed to be made a wing of the IB and will work under the DIB.
In the US, the NCTC is a legal institution set up under a Congressional legislation after bipartisan consultations, but it does not have any legal powers to act on its own in matters such as arrest, detention, interrogation, searches etc.
The Indian model has been set up under an executive notification under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. This has obviated the need for fresh legislation for its creation and for fresh political consulations at the Centre and with the States.
More seriously, the Indian NCTC is sought to be given powers of arrest and searches as part of its preventive operations.
The granting of these powers to the IB through the NCTC mechanism could have two undesirable consequences. Firstly, allegations of misuse of the IB for harassing political opponents. Secondly, it will affect the role of the IB as a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It will be preoccupied defending its arrests before the courts and against allegations of human rights violations. Moreover, presently the IB enjoys protection from the Right to Information Act. If it has these powers and starts functioning as an intelligence collection agency cum central police, it may no longer be able to enjoy this protection.
The Home Minister had two options: Either make the NCTC an independent institution if he felt that it must have the powers of arrest and searches . Or if he felt that it must work under the IB, make it a division of the IB without giving it these powers.
His unwise action in making it part of the IB with these powers could prove counterproductive. He should not stand on false prestige. He should re-visit the proposed NCTC architecture in consultation with political parties and the States.
It needs to be underlined that there is no opposition in the country to the NCTC concept, which is necessary. The opposition is to the manner in which it has been set up without adequate consultations and to some of its features.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Research & Analysis Wing,Govt. of India )
( An edited version of this has been carried by “The Hindu” on February 23,2012,http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2920554.ece )
Before 9/11 the assessment in the US was that terrorist threats to the US from abroad would be more serious than home-based threats. The responsibility for co-ordinating preventive action was, therefore, vested in the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA), which handles external intelligence.
The CIA had a Counter-terrorism Centre (CTC) to perform tasks of co-ordination and follow-up action on the intelligence collected by the various agencies. The CTC had officers taken on deputation from different agencies. They worked under a CIA officer.
The Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee set up in May 2000 a Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW and the then Governor of J&K. Among its members were Shri M.K.Narayanan, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, Shri K.Raghunath, former Foreign Secretary, Shri P.P. Shrivatsava, former Special Secretary, Home Affairs, and myself.
Its report recommended, inter alia, the setting-up of a CTC on the US model with deputationists from different agencies to improve co-ordination and follow-up action in counter-terrorism. Since in India, the IB had the over-all responsibility for counter-terrorism and liaison with the State Police it suggested that the CTC should be part of the IB and should work under the DIB.
It looked upon the CTC as a clandestine wing of the IB, which itself is a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It, therefore, did not recommend any legal powers for the CTC so that the clandestine nature of its operations was not affected.
The Vajpayee Government set up the CTC, under an executive order, as part of the IB but, for reasons not clear to me, it named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and not the CTC.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US brought out serious gaps in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. It was, therefore decided by the Bush Administration in 2004 to set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as an independent institution not under the control of any of the existing agencies. It was placed under the Director, National Intelligence, who is one of the personal staff of the President.
Whereas the US model of the CTC was given up after 9/11 due to inadequacies in its functioning, the Indian model of the MAC, patterned after the US CTC model, has continued functioning. Neither the Vajpayee Government nor the Manmohan Singh Government revisited the recommendations of the Saxena Task Force in the light of the 9/11 lessons.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai brought out gaps in the functioning of the MAC. Flow of preventive intelligence and follow-up action on even the limited intelligence that was available were unsatisfactory. In a statement in the Lok Sabha after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram admitted that the responsibility for follow-up-action on the available intelligence was diffused.
He, therefore, decided to set up the NCTC after a visit to the US. His model of the Indian NCTC differed from the US model in two respects. The US NCTC is an independent institution not coming under the control of any of the existing agencies. In India, it is proposed to be made a wing of the IB and will work under the DIB.
In the US, the NCTC is a legal institution set up under a Congressional legislation after bipartisan consultations, but it does not have any legal powers to act on its own in matters such as arrest, detention, interrogation, searches etc.
The Indian model has been set up under an executive notification under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. This has obviated the need for fresh legislation for its creation and for fresh political consulations at the Centre and with the States.
More seriously, the Indian NCTC is sought to be given powers of arrest and searches as part of its preventive operations.
The granting of these powers to the IB through the NCTC mechanism could have two undesirable consequences. Firstly, allegations of misuse of the IB for harassing political opponents. Secondly, it will affect the role of the IB as a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. It will be preoccupied defending its arrests before the courts and against allegations of human rights violations. Moreover, presently the IB enjoys protection from the Right to Information Act. If it has these powers and starts functioning as an intelligence collection agency cum central police, it may no longer be able to enjoy this protection.
The Home Minister had two options: Either make the NCTC an independent institution if he felt that it must have the powers of arrest and searches . Or if he felt that it must work under the IB, make it a division of the IB without giving it these powers.
His unwise action in making it part of the IB with these powers could prove counterproductive. He should not stand on false prestige. He should re-visit the proposed NCTC architecture in consultation with political parties and the States.
It needs to be underlined that there is no opposition in the country to the NCTC concept, which is necessary. The opposition is to the manner in which it has been set up without adequate consultations and to some of its features.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Research & Analysis Wing,Govt. of India )
Friday, February 17, 2012
THE TIBETAN SATYAGRAHA
B.RAMAN
The recent hardline statements from the Han rulers of Tibet expressing concern over the situation in Tibet and their determination to crush the so-called splittist movement is a reflection of their nervousness. This nervousness is the result of their inability to understand what has been going on in the Tibetan areas of China and to crush the post-2008 Tibetan emulation of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent strategic resistance movement called the Satyagraha meaning the struggle for the truth.
2. The Chinese managed to crush the violent uprising of 2008, but they have not been able to crush the Tibetan yearning for freedom. They have not been able to eradicate the Tibetan love for His Holiness the Dalai Lama and their devotion to their Buddhist religion. They have not been able to destroy the Tibetan pride in their identity.
3. The Tibetans---particularly the GenNext--- realised that a better way of asserting their pride and independence and keeping alive their hopes for the end of what they consider as the Han colonisation of Tibet would be to emulate Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle against the British colonial regime in India.
4. Thus was born the Lhakar movement. Lhakar means White Wednesday---- a day associated, in their eyes, with the soul of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Every Wednesday, thousands of Tibetans---men, women and children---- are meeting in their villages and towns to take the following pledges:
I am Tibetan. This is my national flag.
I am Tibetan. I wear Chupa(tibetan dress).
I am Tibetan. I eat dried cheese.
I am Tibetan. I work for Tibetan Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I eat Tsampa (Tibetan staple food).
I am Tibetan. I drink Tibetan salted butter tea.
I am Tibetan. I speak Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. My parents are Tibetan. My leader is His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
I am Tibetan. I am a disciple of His Holiness.
I am Tibetan. My father is a Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. Tibetan blood flows in my body.
I am Tibetan. I will continue to work for Tibet's Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I am proud of being Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. I am Thangka painter and an activist for Tibet's Independence.
5. They express their determination to preserve their Tibetan identity and their refusal to be assimilated into the Han culture and identity. Eat Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Dress Tibetan, Think Tibetan, Live Tibetan, Die Tibetan--- that is their motto.
6. The Tibetans themselves describe the Lhakar movement as follows: “ Lhakar is a homegrown, Tibetan self-reliance movement that started in the aftermath of the 2008 uprising. In spite of China’s intensified crackdown, Tibetans have embraced the power of strategic nonviolent resistance. Every Wednesday, a growing number of Tibetans are making special effort to wear traditional clothes, speak Tibetan, eat in Tibetan restaurants and buy from Tibetan-owned businesses. They channel their spirit of resistance into social, cultural and economic activities that are self-constructive (promoting Tibetan language, culture and identity) and non-cooperative (refusing to support Chinese institutions and businesses).”
7. The Lhakar movement has unnerved the Chinese. They do not know how to stop its spread. The resistance movement has taken other forms too---- self-immolation by Tibetan monks---- since March last year, there have been 24 self-immolation attempts, of which 22 ended in fatalities--- insistence on keeping the pictures of His Holiness in the monasteries, refusal to fly the Chinese flag and exhibit the pictures of Chinese leaders in the monasteries, refusal to observe the Chinese New Year’s Day, refusal by monks to perform their religious duties in monasteries in which Chinese security forces are posted, refusal to attend the so-called re-education camps organised by the Chinese Government and party authorities.
8. The Chinese have sent reinforcements of their security forces to the Tibetan areas and cut off all Net connections. Despite this, the movement is showing no signs of abating. On the contrary, it is gathering strength.
9.Gandhiji’s non-violent struggle finally succeeded against the British and forced them to quit India. Will the Tibetan non-violent struggle succeed against the Han Chinese? The Han Chinese are more ruthless than the British. The Tibetans would need the moral support of the international community---particularly India--- to keep their struggle alive and triumph finally. Even if considerations of RealPolitik prevent the Government of India from extending moral support to the Tibetans, Indian public opinion should not let them down. They are emulating our own freedom struggle. They are following in the footsteps of our own legendary leaders who fought against the British. The Indian public opinion has a moral obligation to empathise with the Tibetan satyagraha and support it morally. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The recent hardline statements from the Han rulers of Tibet expressing concern over the situation in Tibet and their determination to crush the so-called splittist movement is a reflection of their nervousness. This nervousness is the result of their inability to understand what has been going on in the Tibetan areas of China and to crush the post-2008 Tibetan emulation of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent strategic resistance movement called the Satyagraha meaning the struggle for the truth.
2. The Chinese managed to crush the violent uprising of 2008, but they have not been able to crush the Tibetan yearning for freedom. They have not been able to eradicate the Tibetan love for His Holiness the Dalai Lama and their devotion to their Buddhist religion. They have not been able to destroy the Tibetan pride in their identity.
3. The Tibetans---particularly the GenNext--- realised that a better way of asserting their pride and independence and keeping alive their hopes for the end of what they consider as the Han colonisation of Tibet would be to emulate Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle against the British colonial regime in India.
4. Thus was born the Lhakar movement. Lhakar means White Wednesday---- a day associated, in their eyes, with the soul of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Every Wednesday, thousands of Tibetans---men, women and children---- are meeting in their villages and towns to take the following pledges:
I am Tibetan. This is my national flag.
I am Tibetan. I wear Chupa(tibetan dress).
I am Tibetan. I eat dried cheese.
I am Tibetan. I work for Tibetan Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I eat Tsampa (Tibetan staple food).
I am Tibetan. I drink Tibetan salted butter tea.
I am Tibetan. I speak Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. My parents are Tibetan. My leader is His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
I am Tibetan. I am a disciple of His Holiness.
I am Tibetan. My father is a Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. Tibetan blood flows in my body.
I am Tibetan. I will continue to work for Tibet's Struggle.
I am Tibetan. I am proud of being Tibetan.
I am Tibetan. I am Thangka painter and an activist for Tibet's Independence.
5. They express their determination to preserve their Tibetan identity and their refusal to be assimilated into the Han culture and identity. Eat Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Dress Tibetan, Think Tibetan, Live Tibetan, Die Tibetan--- that is their motto.
6. The Tibetans themselves describe the Lhakar movement as follows: “ Lhakar is a homegrown, Tibetan self-reliance movement that started in the aftermath of the 2008 uprising. In spite of China’s intensified crackdown, Tibetans have embraced the power of strategic nonviolent resistance. Every Wednesday, a growing number of Tibetans are making special effort to wear traditional clothes, speak Tibetan, eat in Tibetan restaurants and buy from Tibetan-owned businesses. They channel their spirit of resistance into social, cultural and economic activities that are self-constructive (promoting Tibetan language, culture and identity) and non-cooperative (refusing to support Chinese institutions and businesses).”
7. The Lhakar movement has unnerved the Chinese. They do not know how to stop its spread. The resistance movement has taken other forms too---- self-immolation by Tibetan monks---- since March last year, there have been 24 self-immolation attempts, of which 22 ended in fatalities--- insistence on keeping the pictures of His Holiness in the monasteries, refusal to fly the Chinese flag and exhibit the pictures of Chinese leaders in the monasteries, refusal to observe the Chinese New Year’s Day, refusal by monks to perform their religious duties in monasteries in which Chinese security forces are posted, refusal to attend the so-called re-education camps organised by the Chinese Government and party authorities.
8. The Chinese have sent reinforcements of their security forces to the Tibetan areas and cut off all Net connections. Despite this, the movement is showing no signs of abating. On the contrary, it is gathering strength.
9.Gandhiji’s non-violent struggle finally succeeded against the British and forced them to quit India. Will the Tibetan non-violent struggle succeed against the Han Chinese? The Han Chinese are more ruthless than the British. The Tibetans would need the moral support of the international community---particularly India--- to keep their struggle alive and triumph finally. Even if considerations of RealPolitik prevent the Government of India from extending moral support to the Tibetans, Indian public opinion should not let them down. They are emulating our own freedom struggle. They are following in the footsteps of our own legendary leaders who fought against the British. The Indian public opinion has a moral obligation to empathise with the Tibetan satyagraha and support it morally. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
CREATION OF A KGB IN INDIA: ONLY JAYALALITA HAS GOT HER FEARS RIGHT
B.RAMAN
Of all the Chief Ministers, who have protested against the proposed creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India with effect from March 1,2012 without consulting the State Governments, only J.Jayalalita, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, has got it right.
2. She has made it clear that her objection is not to the creation of the NCTC to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability. Nor is her objection based on fears of dilution of the principle of federalism.
3. Her objections are to two features of the proposed NCTC mechanism--- the powers of arrests and searches sought to be given to the NCTC, which will be a division of the IB, a clandestine intelligence organisation, and the provision for the setting-up of inter-State intelligence teams by the NCTC.
4. She has reportedly described these provisions as highly objectionable and said that the powers of arrest and searches given to the IB through the mechanism of the NCTC under Section 2 ( e ) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 “can be misused to suit ends that are motivated by reasons other than fighting terrorism. Moreover, setting up of inter-state intelligence teams by the NCTC is tantamount to usurping the legitimate rights of the States.”
5. I would not agree with her fears regarding the proposed inter-State intelligence teams. Such teams may be necessary to deal with pan-Indian terrorist groups such as the Indian Mujahideen which have their sleeper cells right across India in many States.
6. But, I do share her fears about the possible misuse of the powers of arrest and searches by the NCTC Division of the IB against political opponents by branding them as associated with terrorism. During the emergency of 1975-77, Indira Gandhi had many of her political opponents arrested by having them branded as threats to national security.
7. A Government with authoritarian reflexes in future may be tempted to misuse the powers of arrest given to the IB through the NCTC for having political opponents arrested by having them branded as associated with terrorism.
8. The IB is a secret intelligence organisation. It has no accountability to Parliament in respect of its work. We do not have a system of parliamentary intelligence oversight committees. We depend on the executive without any checks and balances to ensure that the IB functions according to the law of the land.
9.The British, during their colonial rule, did not consider it necessary or wise to give the powers of arrest and searches to the IB for any purpose. They observed the sacred principle that a clandestine intelligence collection agency should not have the powers of arrest. None of the Governments that had held office in New Delhi since our independence had considered it necessary or wise to give such powers to the IB.
10. The practice of giving powers of arrest to the intelligence agencies was started by Lenin and Stalin when they set up the KGB, the all-powerful Soviet intelligence agency, in order to enable it to deal with so-called counter-revolutionaries. Many other authoritarian countries have since given these powers to their intelligence agencies.
11. The IB has till now not had these powers. In spite of that, during the Emergency there were serious allegations of the misuse of the IB and the CBI by the Indira Gandhi Government to harass the opponents of the emergency. Instances of such misuse were documented by the Shah Commission and the L.P.Singh Committee set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into them.
12. If there could be such gross misdeeds when the IB did not have any powers of arrest, imagine how much more could there be when a clandestine organisation, not accountable to Parliament, is given such powers on the ground that those powers would be required to deal with terrorism.
13. Congress spokesmen defending the NCTC mechanism have sought to ridicule those criticising the objectionable provisions of the NCTC as opposed to strengthening our counter-terrorism capability. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The opposition is not to the NCTC as such, but to some objectionable features of it.
14. Instead of standing on false prestige, the Government of India should have a re-look at some of the worrisome features of the NCTC mechanism in consultation with other political parties and State Governments. It is not just a question of respecting the principles of federalism. It is a question of adhering to the principles of a genuine democracy. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Of all the Chief Ministers, who have protested against the proposed creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India with effect from March 1,2012 without consulting the State Governments, only J.Jayalalita, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, has got it right.
2. She has made it clear that her objection is not to the creation of the NCTC to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability. Nor is her objection based on fears of dilution of the principle of federalism.
3. Her objections are to two features of the proposed NCTC mechanism--- the powers of arrests and searches sought to be given to the NCTC, which will be a division of the IB, a clandestine intelligence organisation, and the provision for the setting-up of inter-State intelligence teams by the NCTC.
4. She has reportedly described these provisions as highly objectionable and said that the powers of arrest and searches given to the IB through the mechanism of the NCTC under Section 2 ( e ) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 “can be misused to suit ends that are motivated by reasons other than fighting terrorism. Moreover, setting up of inter-state intelligence teams by the NCTC is tantamount to usurping the legitimate rights of the States.”
5. I would not agree with her fears regarding the proposed inter-State intelligence teams. Such teams may be necessary to deal with pan-Indian terrorist groups such as the Indian Mujahideen which have their sleeper cells right across India in many States.
6. But, I do share her fears about the possible misuse of the powers of arrest and searches by the NCTC Division of the IB against political opponents by branding them as associated with terrorism. During the emergency of 1975-77, Indira Gandhi had many of her political opponents arrested by having them branded as threats to national security.
7. A Government with authoritarian reflexes in future may be tempted to misuse the powers of arrest given to the IB through the NCTC for having political opponents arrested by having them branded as associated with terrorism.
8. The IB is a secret intelligence organisation. It has no accountability to Parliament in respect of its work. We do not have a system of parliamentary intelligence oversight committees. We depend on the executive without any checks and balances to ensure that the IB functions according to the law of the land.
9.The British, during their colonial rule, did not consider it necessary or wise to give the powers of arrest and searches to the IB for any purpose. They observed the sacred principle that a clandestine intelligence collection agency should not have the powers of arrest. None of the Governments that had held office in New Delhi since our independence had considered it necessary or wise to give such powers to the IB.
10. The practice of giving powers of arrest to the intelligence agencies was started by Lenin and Stalin when they set up the KGB, the all-powerful Soviet intelligence agency, in order to enable it to deal with so-called counter-revolutionaries. Many other authoritarian countries have since given these powers to their intelligence agencies.
11. The IB has till now not had these powers. In spite of that, during the Emergency there were serious allegations of the misuse of the IB and the CBI by the Indira Gandhi Government to harass the opponents of the emergency. Instances of such misuse were documented by the Shah Commission and the L.P.Singh Committee set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into them.
12. If there could be such gross misdeeds when the IB did not have any powers of arrest, imagine how much more could there be when a clandestine organisation, not accountable to Parliament, is given such powers on the ground that those powers would be required to deal with terrorism.
13. Congress spokesmen defending the NCTC mechanism have sought to ridicule those criticising the objectionable provisions of the NCTC as opposed to strengthening our counter-terrorism capability. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The opposition is not to the NCTC as such, but to some objectionable features of it.
14. Instead of standing on false prestige, the Government of India should have a re-look at some of the worrisome features of the NCTC mechanism in consultation with other political parties and State Governments. It is not just a question of respecting the principles of federalism. It is a question of adhering to the principles of a genuine democracy. ( 18-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
AVOIDABLE CONTROVERSY OVER NCTC
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of January 13,2012, titled “ a Counter-Terrorism Czar In Indian Colours” at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2012/01/counter-terrorism-czar-in-indian.html )
There has been an avoidable and unfortunate controversy over the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which, according to the media, is to become operational from March 1,2012.
2. Going by the media reports on it, the NCTC, which is meant to co-ordinate intelligence collection, analysis and assessment and follow-up action in matters relating to terrorism, will differ from the NCTC set up in the US after 9/11 in two important respects.
3. In the US, the NCTC is an independent institution functioning under the supervision of the Director, National Intelligence (DNI). It co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies of the Intelligence Community. The chiefs of the various intelligence agencies having any role in counter-terrorism do not have any powers of supervision over it. The idea of making it independent was to ensure that it would take an objective view of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of different agencies and ensure proper-coordination. The expectation was that being an independent agency, its functioning will not be affected by inter-agency clashes and egos.
4. As per the media reports, the NCTC being set up in India will not be an independent institution. It will be part of the IB and Director, IB, will supervise its functioning. This could come in the way of an independent audit and supervision of the functioning of the counter-terrorism division of the IB. Whatever deficiencies are there presently in the exercise of the counter-terrorism functions of the IB will get duplicated and magnified instead of being identified and rectified.
5. The post-9/11 creation of the NCTC in the US was meant to strengthen the preventive capability by improving the collection, analysis and assessment of terrorism-related intelligence and effective follow-up action. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US were attributed to inadequate intelligence and unsatisfactory follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. The same was the case in India in respect of 26/11.
6. The NCTC in the US has no powers of arrest, interrogation, investigation and prosecution. The responsibility in these matters continues to be that of the FBI. In India, if media reports are to be believed, the NCTC has been given the powers to arrest and carry out searches under Section 43 (A) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
7.Till now, in India, these powers belong to only the National Investigation Agency (NIC) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) at the Centre and the Police in the States. By giving these powers to the NCTC too, we are going to create confusion in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases.
8. Moreover, the IB does not have such powers. It is a clandestine organisation for the secret collection of intelligence. In all genuinely democratic countries, intelligence agencies are not given powers of arrest, searches and interrogation due to fears that such powers may be misused under pressure from the political leadership against political opponents. Only in authoritarian countries do intelligence agencies have powers of arrest and searches.
9. In India, the IB informally associates itself with all terrorism-related interrogation, but the arrests and searches are made either by the Police or by the NIA or the CBI. By creating a multiplicity of organisations having such powers and by giving these powers to the NCTC which will work under the DIB, we will be taking an unwise step which could further politicise our handling of counter-terrorism. (17-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
( To be read in continuation of my article of January 13,2012, titled “ a Counter-Terrorism Czar In Indian Colours” at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2012/01/counter-terrorism-czar-in-indian.html )
There has been an avoidable and unfortunate controversy over the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which, according to the media, is to become operational from March 1,2012.
2. Going by the media reports on it, the NCTC, which is meant to co-ordinate intelligence collection, analysis and assessment and follow-up action in matters relating to terrorism, will differ from the NCTC set up in the US after 9/11 in two important respects.
3. In the US, the NCTC is an independent institution functioning under the supervision of the Director, National Intelligence (DNI). It co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies of the Intelligence Community. The chiefs of the various intelligence agencies having any role in counter-terrorism do not have any powers of supervision over it. The idea of making it independent was to ensure that it would take an objective view of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of different agencies and ensure proper-coordination. The expectation was that being an independent agency, its functioning will not be affected by inter-agency clashes and egos.
4. As per the media reports, the NCTC being set up in India will not be an independent institution. It will be part of the IB and Director, IB, will supervise its functioning. This could come in the way of an independent audit and supervision of the functioning of the counter-terrorism division of the IB. Whatever deficiencies are there presently in the exercise of the counter-terrorism functions of the IB will get duplicated and magnified instead of being identified and rectified.
5. The post-9/11 creation of the NCTC in the US was meant to strengthen the preventive capability by improving the collection, analysis and assessment of terrorism-related intelligence and effective follow-up action. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US were attributed to inadequate intelligence and unsatisfactory follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. The same was the case in India in respect of 26/11.
6. The NCTC in the US has no powers of arrest, interrogation, investigation and prosecution. The responsibility in these matters continues to be that of the FBI. In India, if media reports are to be believed, the NCTC has been given the powers to arrest and carry out searches under Section 43 (A) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
7.Till now, in India, these powers belong to only the National Investigation Agency (NIC) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) at the Centre and the Police in the States. By giving these powers to the NCTC too, we are going to create confusion in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases.
8. Moreover, the IB does not have such powers. It is a clandestine organisation for the secret collection of intelligence. In all genuinely democratic countries, intelligence agencies are not given powers of arrest, searches and interrogation due to fears that such powers may be misused under pressure from the political leadership against political opponents. Only in authoritarian countries do intelligence agencies have powers of arrest and searches.
9. In India, the IB informally associates itself with all terrorism-related interrogation, but the arrests and searches are made either by the Police or by the NIA or the CBI. By creating a multiplicity of organisations having such powers and by giving these powers to the NCTC which will work under the DIB, we will be taking an unwise step which could further politicise our handling of counter-terrorism. (17-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, February 16, 2012
COUNTER-TERRORISM: NEED TO REVISIT SECURITY PROCEDURES
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.744
B.RAMAN
Since 2007, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Iranian territory. In some of these instances, the terrorists had attached small magnetic bombs to the exterior of the victims’ cars.
2.The latest attack took place on January 11, 2012, when Mostafa Ahamdi Roshan, described by Western sources as a Deputy Director in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, died in a blast in Tehran shortly after two assailants on a motorcycle placed a small magnetic bomb on his car.
3. It was reported by Iranian sources that the bomb was probably a shaped charge that directed all the explosive power inside the car, killing its occupants without causing any collateral damage to bystanders in the area. The explosive device was meant to kill the occupants without resulting in a blowing up of the car which could have led to a large number of casualties from the splinters of the exploding car.
4. It has been reported that Iranian investigators have been able to collect considerable details regarding this modus operandi, the kind of device used and the organisation behind these attacks from a terrorist who was caught along with the device towards the end of 2010 before he could carry out the attack. On the basis of his interrogation details of which were telecast by the Iranian TV, the Iranian security agencies have alleged that these attacks are being carried out by terrorists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-regime terrorist organisation, motivated, funded, trained and equipped by Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency.
5. From the media reports of the February 13,2012, terrorist attack at New Delhi on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle, it is apparent that it had features similar to the attacks on the vehicles of Iranian nuclear scientists--- a shaped uni-directional instantaneous explosive charge meant to kill only the occupants of the car without causing collateral damage and stuck to the rear of the car by a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist, who managed to get away after his act.
6. This MO, meant to kill targeted individuals with an explosive device by a motor-cycle borne terrorist without killing innocent civilians, would call for a re-visit to our security procedures for the protection of high-value individual targets of terrorists.
7.Access control and prior sanitisation through anti-explosive checks are the two basic procedures followed for protecting high-value targets of terrorists. The use of a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist to attach an explosive device to a car is meant to circumvent access control and prior sanitisation procedures.
8. The MO of using a motor-cycle borne terrorist to beat access control has been followed by terrorists in many countries, including Pakistan, for the last 30 years. In the past, terrorists using this MO used either a hand-held weapon fired by a terrorist sitting in the rear or a hand-grenade. When a hand-held weapon or a hand-grenade is used chances of success are not always guaranteed unless it was a suicide attack.
9. In the case of magnetic bombs stuck to the metallic portion of a car by a speeding terrorist, chances of success in killing or maiming targeted individuals increase without adding to innocent civilian casualties.
10. The Israeli diplomat attacked was a high-value target of the terrorists, but not a VIP protectee. She, therefore, did not enjoy the benefit of access control through the use of pilot and escort vehicles. It was easy to attack her from a motor-cycle.
11.Is it possible to devise new security procedures by which high-value targets of terrorists, who do not enjoy the benefit of VIP protection procedures, can be better protected? This is a question which needs to be examined by our security experts. ( 17-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
Since 2007, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Iranian territory. In some of these instances, the terrorists had attached small magnetic bombs to the exterior of the victims’ cars.
2.The latest attack took place on January 11, 2012, when Mostafa Ahamdi Roshan, described by Western sources as a Deputy Director in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, died in a blast in Tehran shortly after two assailants on a motorcycle placed a small magnetic bomb on his car.
3. It was reported by Iranian sources that the bomb was probably a shaped charge that directed all the explosive power inside the car, killing its occupants without causing any collateral damage to bystanders in the area. The explosive device was meant to kill the occupants without resulting in a blowing up of the car which could have led to a large number of casualties from the splinters of the exploding car.
4. It has been reported that Iranian investigators have been able to collect considerable details regarding this modus operandi, the kind of device used and the organisation behind these attacks from a terrorist who was caught along with the device towards the end of 2010 before he could carry out the attack. On the basis of his interrogation details of which were telecast by the Iranian TV, the Iranian security agencies have alleged that these attacks are being carried out by terrorists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-regime terrorist organisation, motivated, funded, trained and equipped by Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency.
5. From the media reports of the February 13,2012, terrorist attack at New Delhi on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle, it is apparent that it had features similar to the attacks on the vehicles of Iranian nuclear scientists--- a shaped uni-directional instantaneous explosive charge meant to kill only the occupants of the car without causing collateral damage and stuck to the rear of the car by a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist, who managed to get away after his act.
6. This MO, meant to kill targeted individuals with an explosive device by a motor-cycle borne terrorist without killing innocent civilians, would call for a re-visit to our security procedures for the protection of high-value individual targets of terrorists.
7.Access control and prior sanitisation through anti-explosive checks are the two basic procedures followed for protecting high-value targets of terrorists. The use of a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist to attach an explosive device to a car is meant to circumvent access control and prior sanitisation procedures.
8. The MO of using a motor-cycle borne terrorist to beat access control has been followed by terrorists in many countries, including Pakistan, for the last 30 years. In the past, terrorists using this MO used either a hand-held weapon fired by a terrorist sitting in the rear or a hand-grenade. When a hand-held weapon or a hand-grenade is used chances of success are not always guaranteed unless it was a suicide attack.
9. In the case of magnetic bombs stuck to the metallic portion of a car by a speeding terrorist, chances of success in killing or maiming targeted individuals increase without adding to innocent civilian casualties.
10. The Israeli diplomat attacked was a high-value target of the terrorists, but not a VIP protectee. She, therefore, did not enjoy the benefit of access control through the use of pilot and escort vehicles. It was easy to attack her from a motor-cycle.
11.Is it possible to devise new security procedures by which high-value targets of terrorists, who do not enjoy the benefit of VIP protection procedures, can be better protected? This is a question which needs to be examined by our security experts. ( 17-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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