B.RAMAN
The veto by Russia and China on February 4,2012, of a resolution in the UN Security Council that called upon Syrian President Bashar Assad to step down in the face of the persisting movement against his regime is based not on an objective assessment of the ground situation in Syria, but on subjective apprehensions of the implications for the present leaderships in Russia and China should street movements in the Arab countries succeed with external support.
2. The action of the Western powers in pressing for a vote on the resolution, which enjoyed the expected support of the Arab League and the surprise support of India and Pakistan, in the face of a near certainty of a Russian-Chinese veto was motivated by two factors.
3. The first factor was the need to keep the anti-Assad movement in Syria alive despite the brutal suppression by the regime by conveying to it a message of international solidarity. The second factor was the desire to convey a message of hope to the anti-Vladimir Putin dissident elements in Russia and the anti-Communist Party of China elements in China that they too could one day benefit from similar international solidarity if they kept their movements against the Governments in Moscow and Beijing alive.
4.The domestic situation in Russia is showing signs of some turbulence in the face of allegations against the fairness and legality of the recent elections to the Parliament. In China, opposition to the policies of the regime from Tibetan and Uighur elements has been gathering strength and assuming a violent form. Moreover, the economic difficulties are leading to instances of defiance of Governmental and Party authority even from the majority Han elements in the coastal areas.
5. It would be premature to talk of a united anti-regime movement in Russia and China, but there are definitely reports of the emergence of multiple pockets of dissidence against the present regimes. It is important for the West to ensure that these dissident pockets and scattered protest movements do not lose hope in the face of the suppression by the regimes.
6.The West views the ground situation in Syria from the immediate perspective of bringing into power a new regime without a messy military intervention as one saw in Iraq and Libya and from the medium and long-term perspective of encouraging the growth of dissidence in Russia and China.
7. The determined veto of Russia and China on Syria is an indication of their fear that regime change through international solidarity with domestic protest movements could one day endanger their own regimes.
8. The problem is that the Assad regime cannot be saved. It is only a question of time before it falls due to the protest movement. The isolation of Russia and China and the widespread criticism of their veto would convey oxygen to the dissident movements in Russia and China too.
9.India did well in coming to terms with reality and in supporting the resolution. It keeps India on the side of the Syrian people fighting against a repressive regime. So long as external military intervention is not involved, there is no reason why India should remain neutral.
10. Pakistan’s support for the resolution in the face of the Chinese opposition to it is significant. It is a welcome initiative by the civilian Government in Islamabad not to put its eggs in the Chinese basket in the face of the popular anti-regime movements across the region.( 5-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, February 4, 2012
Friday, February 3, 2012
INDIA-CHINA: NEED FOR A TWO-PRONGED POLICY
B.RAMAN
In a prepared testimony before the US Senate Committee on Intelligence on February 1,2012, James Clapper, Director, National Intelligence, is reported to have stated as follows: "Despite public statements intended to downplay tensions between India and China, we judge that India is increasingly concerned about China's posture along their disputed border and Beijing's perceived aggressive posture in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. The Indian Army believes a major Sino-Indian conflict is not imminent, but the Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean. Although Chinese leaders have affirmed their commitment to a peaceful and pragmatic foreign policy - and especially to stable relations with China's neighbours and the rest of the world - Beijing may take actions contrary to that goal if it perceives that China's sovereignty or national security is being seriously challenged."
2. It is an unhappy formulation which has given rise to some sensational stories as if there is an undercurrent of tensions in the relations between India and China and the Indian Army is preparing itself for the eventuality of a limited conflict with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) if these tensions are not resolved.
3. So far as I could see, there are no tensions in our bilateral relations with China. The bilateral trade continues to develop impressively. Exchanges and strategic dialogue at different levels---political, bureaucratic and security forces--- continue to take place and efforts are being made to identify new areas of co-operation such as counter-piracy.
4. However, there are serious concerns in India, which require careful management so that they do not damage the attempts being made to increase mutual trust and the comfort level between the two countries. If these concerns are not understood and appreciated by China and if attempts are not made by it to address them, the relations could take a turn for the worse in the medium and long-term.
5. The persisting Indian concerns relate to the apparent Chinese determination to change the sovereignty status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh area which has been coming in the way of a mutually satisfactory border settlement, the continuing temptation in Beijing to use the Pakistan card against India, the growing Chinese military capability , particularly its capability to fight a covert cyber warfare without being detected, and China’s strategic activism in other countries of South Asia and in the Indian Ocean, which could prove detrimental to Indian interests.
6. If China is really keen to qualitatively and strategically improve its relations with India, it has to take due note of these concerns and remove the question marks in the Indian mind as to what China is up to. One does not get the impression that it is doing so.
7.Behind a façade of smoothening phraseology, it continues to take a rigid stand on the question of sovereignty in the Arunachal Pradesh area and to strengthen its military-relevant infrastructure in the areas of Tibet bordering Arunachal Pradesh. This naturally adds to the suspicion in the Indian mind that China has not ruled out a possible enforcement of its territorial claims through military means, if satisfaction through diplomacy is not possible.
8. China’s action in practically recognising Pakistan’s sovereignty over the disputed territories of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan while avoiding recognising Indian sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and reports of Chinese military activism in the Gilgit-Baltistan area have added to India’s past concerns over China’s military, nuclear and missile supply relationship with Pakistan. The growing Sino-Pakistan axis, which has now assumed new and ominous dimensions, cannot but come in the way of a totally normal relationship between India and China.
9. While Indian strategic thinkers and planners had been aware of the implications of the modernisation of China’s military capabilities and its infrastructure development in Tibetan areas adjoining Arunachal Pradesh, only now they have become aware----not yet adequately---of the implications of China’s growing and well-concealed cyber warfare capability. In the past, we allowed ourselves to lag behind China in infrastructure development in the border areas and only now we are trying to catch up with it. We have belatedly woken up to the realisation that despite being an important IT power, we have remained in the dark about China’s cyber warfare capabilities.
10. We still do not have a well thought-out policy on how to deal with Chinese activism in other countries of South Asia and in the Indian Ocean---particularly in the Indian Ocean countries which used to be close to India----such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. Countering Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean area requires not only a strengthening of our navy, but also our capability for naval diplomacy, a subject that has remained neglected till now.
11. If China is genuinely interested in a normalisation of its relations with India, it must take note of these concerns and address them, but it has not been doing so. Under these circumstances, India has only two options of equal importance: strengthen its national capabilities so that it is not taken by surprise by Chinese intentions and build up a network of strategic relationships with countries such as the US, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Australia which feel concerned over Chinese intentions, objectives and capabilities for their own reasons.
12. How to follow this two-pronged policy without giving rise to unmanageable tensions in our relations with China is a question that needs to be discussed in depth by our strategic thinkers and policy-makers. One gets an impression---rightly or wrongly—that we are not doing so. Ad hocism and casualness continue to be the defining characteristics of our China-related thinking and policies. ( 4-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
In a prepared testimony before the US Senate Committee on Intelligence on February 1,2012, James Clapper, Director, National Intelligence, is reported to have stated as follows: "Despite public statements intended to downplay tensions between India and China, we judge that India is increasingly concerned about China's posture along their disputed border and Beijing's perceived aggressive posture in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. The Indian Army believes a major Sino-Indian conflict is not imminent, but the Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean. Although Chinese leaders have affirmed their commitment to a peaceful and pragmatic foreign policy - and especially to stable relations with China's neighbours and the rest of the world - Beijing may take actions contrary to that goal if it perceives that China's sovereignty or national security is being seriously challenged."
2. It is an unhappy formulation which has given rise to some sensational stories as if there is an undercurrent of tensions in the relations between India and China and the Indian Army is preparing itself for the eventuality of a limited conflict with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) if these tensions are not resolved.
3. So far as I could see, there are no tensions in our bilateral relations with China. The bilateral trade continues to develop impressively. Exchanges and strategic dialogue at different levels---political, bureaucratic and security forces--- continue to take place and efforts are being made to identify new areas of co-operation such as counter-piracy.
4. However, there are serious concerns in India, which require careful management so that they do not damage the attempts being made to increase mutual trust and the comfort level between the two countries. If these concerns are not understood and appreciated by China and if attempts are not made by it to address them, the relations could take a turn for the worse in the medium and long-term.
5. The persisting Indian concerns relate to the apparent Chinese determination to change the sovereignty status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh area which has been coming in the way of a mutually satisfactory border settlement, the continuing temptation in Beijing to use the Pakistan card against India, the growing Chinese military capability , particularly its capability to fight a covert cyber warfare without being detected, and China’s strategic activism in other countries of South Asia and in the Indian Ocean, which could prove detrimental to Indian interests.
6. If China is really keen to qualitatively and strategically improve its relations with India, it has to take due note of these concerns and remove the question marks in the Indian mind as to what China is up to. One does not get the impression that it is doing so.
7.Behind a façade of smoothening phraseology, it continues to take a rigid stand on the question of sovereignty in the Arunachal Pradesh area and to strengthen its military-relevant infrastructure in the areas of Tibet bordering Arunachal Pradesh. This naturally adds to the suspicion in the Indian mind that China has not ruled out a possible enforcement of its territorial claims through military means, if satisfaction through diplomacy is not possible.
8. China’s action in practically recognising Pakistan’s sovereignty over the disputed territories of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan while avoiding recognising Indian sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and reports of Chinese military activism in the Gilgit-Baltistan area have added to India’s past concerns over China’s military, nuclear and missile supply relationship with Pakistan. The growing Sino-Pakistan axis, which has now assumed new and ominous dimensions, cannot but come in the way of a totally normal relationship between India and China.
9. While Indian strategic thinkers and planners had been aware of the implications of the modernisation of China’s military capabilities and its infrastructure development in Tibetan areas adjoining Arunachal Pradesh, only now they have become aware----not yet adequately---of the implications of China’s growing and well-concealed cyber warfare capability. In the past, we allowed ourselves to lag behind China in infrastructure development in the border areas and only now we are trying to catch up with it. We have belatedly woken up to the realisation that despite being an important IT power, we have remained in the dark about China’s cyber warfare capabilities.
10. We still do not have a well thought-out policy on how to deal with Chinese activism in other countries of South Asia and in the Indian Ocean---particularly in the Indian Ocean countries which used to be close to India----such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. Countering Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean area requires not only a strengthening of our navy, but also our capability for naval diplomacy, a subject that has remained neglected till now.
11. If China is genuinely interested in a normalisation of its relations with India, it must take note of these concerns and address them, but it has not been doing so. Under these circumstances, India has only two options of equal importance: strengthen its national capabilities so that it is not taken by surprise by Chinese intentions and build up a network of strategic relationships with countries such as the US, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Australia which feel concerned over Chinese intentions, objectives and capabilities for their own reasons.
12. How to follow this two-pronged policy without giving rise to unmanageable tensions in our relations with China is a question that needs to be discussed in depth by our strategic thinkers and policy-makers. One gets an impression---rightly or wrongly—that we are not doing so. Ad hocism and casualness continue to be the defining characteristics of our China-related thinking and policies. ( 4-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, February 2, 2012
S.E.JOSHI: FORMER LEGENDARY CHIEF OF R&AW PASSES AWAY
B.RAMAN
S.E.Joshi, who served as Secretary (R ) in the Cabinet Secretariat and in that capacity headed the Research & Analysis Wing from April 1986 to April 1987, passed away at Mumbai on the morning of February 3,2012. Joshi, who was 83, had been ailing for some time.
2. He joined the Indian Police Service (IPS) in 1952 and underwent training in the Central Police Training College in Mount Abu.
3. He was allotted to the Maharashtra cadre. After serving for some years in his parent cadre, he joined the Intelligence Bureau under the earmarking scheme as a Joint Assistant Director. Under this scheme, officers who did exceptionally well in the CPTC were permanently taken into the IB after they had completed their field training in their parent cadre.
4. After serving for some years in different Branches of the IB dealing with internal intelligence, he joined the Pakistan Branch of the IB and served as an analyst as well as an operative. He was transferred to the R&AW when it was formed on September 21,1968.
5. He became a highly regarded Pakistan expert and served for a number of years as an analyst as well as an operative. He rose to be the head of the Pakistan Division of the R&AW with the rank of a Joint Secretary. In that capacity, he supervised the Branches of the R&AW which dealt with operations as well as analysis. In 1984, he resigned from the IPS and was permanently absorbed in the R&AW.
6.In April 1986, on the retirement of Shri G.C.Saxena, Joshi succeeded him as Secretary ( R). When he reached the age of superannuation in April 1987, Rajiv Gandhi, the then PM, wanted him to continue for one more year in recognition of his excellent record so that he had a total tenure of two years. Joshi declined to do so on the ground that it would be unfair to his successor ( Shri A.K.Verma)
7. He was one of the finest operational officers --- a secret agent in the real sense of the term ---- produced by the R&AW---his speciality being Pakistan-related penetration operations. He was a spook in the classical mould and strongly believed that a spook should remain a spook from the day he joined the profession till his death. He maintained a very low profile, never talked about himself and rarely socialised.He was an officer of legendary personal integrity. He declined to accept offers of post-retirement posts made by Rajiv Gandhi.
8.After his retirement, he settled down in Mumbai and was living mostly in Mumbai and occasionally in Amaravati, his home town.
9. While in service he learnt homeopathy and was practising homeopathy in his spare time, helping poor people free of cost. ( 3-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
S.E.Joshi, who served as Secretary (R ) in the Cabinet Secretariat and in that capacity headed the Research & Analysis Wing from April 1986 to April 1987, passed away at Mumbai on the morning of February 3,2012. Joshi, who was 83, had been ailing for some time.
2. He joined the Indian Police Service (IPS) in 1952 and underwent training in the Central Police Training College in Mount Abu.
3. He was allotted to the Maharashtra cadre. After serving for some years in his parent cadre, he joined the Intelligence Bureau under the earmarking scheme as a Joint Assistant Director. Under this scheme, officers who did exceptionally well in the CPTC were permanently taken into the IB after they had completed their field training in their parent cadre.
4. After serving for some years in different Branches of the IB dealing with internal intelligence, he joined the Pakistan Branch of the IB and served as an analyst as well as an operative. He was transferred to the R&AW when it was formed on September 21,1968.
5. He became a highly regarded Pakistan expert and served for a number of years as an analyst as well as an operative. He rose to be the head of the Pakistan Division of the R&AW with the rank of a Joint Secretary. In that capacity, he supervised the Branches of the R&AW which dealt with operations as well as analysis. In 1984, he resigned from the IPS and was permanently absorbed in the R&AW.
6.In April 1986, on the retirement of Shri G.C.Saxena, Joshi succeeded him as Secretary ( R). When he reached the age of superannuation in April 1987, Rajiv Gandhi, the then PM, wanted him to continue for one more year in recognition of his excellent record so that he had a total tenure of two years. Joshi declined to do so on the ground that it would be unfair to his successor ( Shri A.K.Verma)
7. He was one of the finest operational officers --- a secret agent in the real sense of the term ---- produced by the R&AW---his speciality being Pakistan-related penetration operations. He was a spook in the classical mould and strongly believed that a spook should remain a spook from the day he joined the profession till his death. He maintained a very low profile, never talked about himself and rarely socialised.He was an officer of legendary personal integrity. He declined to accept offers of post-retirement posts made by Rajiv Gandhi.
8.After his retirement, he settled down in Mumbai and was living mostly in Mumbai and occasionally in Amaravati, his home town.
9. While in service he learnt homeopathy and was practising homeopathy in his spare time, helping poor people free of cost. ( 3-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
THE PROOF OF THE SC VERDICT PUDDING WILL BE IN THE VOTING
B.RAMAN
The Supreme Court verdict announced on February 2,2012, on three issues which had come up before it relating to the 2G licences issued by A.Raja, former Telecom Minister, as a member of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, has been greeted with typical bureaucratic rationalisation by the Government, the Congress Party and their spokesmen.
2. The three salient points of the verdict are:
(a). The cancellation by the court of the 122 licences issued by Raja under the first come, first served principle and its directive to issue fresh licences after auctions. This is not a judicial finding on the charges of corruption against Raja for which he is separately under trial, but a finding on the vitiated manner in which the telecom policy was formulated and sought to be implemented by Raja in his capacity as a member of the Cabinet. Thus, by indirect implication, it is a verdict not just against Raja as an individual Minister, but against the Cabinet as a whole and the Prime Minister for the manner in which they functioned or failed to function in matters relating to the award of licences. No amount of bureaucratic rationalisation of the verdict as a disapproval of a policy that has been in existence since 2003 and not of the Cabinet that implemented the policy will convince educated and well-informed sections of the population that while a policy has been discredited, the Government has not been. Dr.Manmohan Singh and his Cabinet stand discredited for the way they allowed Raja to run the Telecom Ministry in an unconstitutional and arbitrary manner according to his own whims and fancies.
(b).The decision of the court not to intervene at this stage in the matter of a CBI enquiry into the allegations of wrong-doing as the former Finance Minister against Shri P.Chidambaram, the present Home Minister. While letting the trial court before which this matter already figures come to a finding, the Supreme Court bench has fixed a time-limit of two weeks for the trial court to reach a conclusion. Thus, the status quo continues at least for two weeks more.
( c ). The decision not to appoint a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to continue to monitor the CBI investigation on behalf of the SC, but to let the Central Vigilance Commissioner, who is already responsible for supervising the work of the CBI, monitor this investigation too.
3. Thus, while the first decision is a serious reflection ---if not a formal indictment--- on the functioning or non-functioning of the Cabinet headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh in matters relating to the award of the licences, the other two decisions need not cause any discomfiture to the Government for the present.
4. One would have expected the Government and the Congress to accept without any attempt at rationalisation or prevarication the negative implications of the SC verdict and set in motion correctives by way of action against Ministers responsible for the conscious distortion of the formulation and implementation of the telecom policy.
5. Instead of doing so, the Government and the Congress have initiated an exercise to claim that there were no policy misdeeds on the part of the Government and that the vitiation of the process for the award of the licences was due to the Government inheriting a policy---since found arbitrary and unconstitutional—from the previous Government headed by Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee.
6. Since we are in the midst of the election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, the Congress would be committing a hara-kiri if the Government were to accept responsibility for the policy misdeeds pointed out by the SC bench. An exercise in rationalisation and prevarication, however unfortunate, was therefore inevitable.
7. The only way of making the Government and the Congress pay a price for their established misdeeds is by making this an electoral issue. The implications of the SC decision have to be explained to the rural voters in a simple language with simple arguments which they can understand. No amount of TV debates in high-flown English with rhetorical arguments and flourishes will make the rural voters realise the gravity of the misdeeds of the Government and the Congress Party.
8. Instead of refashioning their election campaign in an appropriate manner to convince the rural voters, the spokesmen of all opposition parties have been busy scoring TV debating points which is not going to have any impact on the rural voters. The opposition committed a similar mistake after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Instead of taking the sins of commission and omission of the Govt directly to the people, they took them to the TV studios and anchors. The result: No impact on the election results.
9. The Congress is calculating on the opposition committing a similar mistake this time. It suits the Congress to keep the debate confined to the TV studios. TV debates have some impact on urban, but not rural viewers.
10. If the opposition does not effectively exploit the issue in the election campaign, the Congress is hoping to avoid a rout in the elections and that could be the end of the Government’s and the Congress Party’s discomfiture.
11. In a democracy, the proof of the pudding is in the voting. The Congress understands this better than the opposition. ( 3-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Supreme Court verdict announced on February 2,2012, on three issues which had come up before it relating to the 2G licences issued by A.Raja, former Telecom Minister, as a member of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, has been greeted with typical bureaucratic rationalisation by the Government, the Congress Party and their spokesmen.
2. The three salient points of the verdict are:
(a). The cancellation by the court of the 122 licences issued by Raja under the first come, first served principle and its directive to issue fresh licences after auctions. This is not a judicial finding on the charges of corruption against Raja for which he is separately under trial, but a finding on the vitiated manner in which the telecom policy was formulated and sought to be implemented by Raja in his capacity as a member of the Cabinet. Thus, by indirect implication, it is a verdict not just against Raja as an individual Minister, but against the Cabinet as a whole and the Prime Minister for the manner in which they functioned or failed to function in matters relating to the award of licences. No amount of bureaucratic rationalisation of the verdict as a disapproval of a policy that has been in existence since 2003 and not of the Cabinet that implemented the policy will convince educated and well-informed sections of the population that while a policy has been discredited, the Government has not been. Dr.Manmohan Singh and his Cabinet stand discredited for the way they allowed Raja to run the Telecom Ministry in an unconstitutional and arbitrary manner according to his own whims and fancies.
(b).The decision of the court not to intervene at this stage in the matter of a CBI enquiry into the allegations of wrong-doing as the former Finance Minister against Shri P.Chidambaram, the present Home Minister. While letting the trial court before which this matter already figures come to a finding, the Supreme Court bench has fixed a time-limit of two weeks for the trial court to reach a conclusion. Thus, the status quo continues at least for two weeks more.
( c ). The decision not to appoint a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to continue to monitor the CBI investigation on behalf of the SC, but to let the Central Vigilance Commissioner, who is already responsible for supervising the work of the CBI, monitor this investigation too.
3. Thus, while the first decision is a serious reflection ---if not a formal indictment--- on the functioning or non-functioning of the Cabinet headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh in matters relating to the award of the licences, the other two decisions need not cause any discomfiture to the Government for the present.
4. One would have expected the Government and the Congress to accept without any attempt at rationalisation or prevarication the negative implications of the SC verdict and set in motion correctives by way of action against Ministers responsible for the conscious distortion of the formulation and implementation of the telecom policy.
5. Instead of doing so, the Government and the Congress have initiated an exercise to claim that there were no policy misdeeds on the part of the Government and that the vitiation of the process for the award of the licences was due to the Government inheriting a policy---since found arbitrary and unconstitutional—from the previous Government headed by Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee.
6. Since we are in the midst of the election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, the Congress would be committing a hara-kiri if the Government were to accept responsibility for the policy misdeeds pointed out by the SC bench. An exercise in rationalisation and prevarication, however unfortunate, was therefore inevitable.
7. The only way of making the Government and the Congress pay a price for their established misdeeds is by making this an electoral issue. The implications of the SC decision have to be explained to the rural voters in a simple language with simple arguments which they can understand. No amount of TV debates in high-flown English with rhetorical arguments and flourishes will make the rural voters realise the gravity of the misdeeds of the Government and the Congress Party.
8. Instead of refashioning their election campaign in an appropriate manner to convince the rural voters, the spokesmen of all opposition parties have been busy scoring TV debating points which is not going to have any impact on the rural voters. The opposition committed a similar mistake after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Instead of taking the sins of commission and omission of the Govt directly to the people, they took them to the TV studios and anchors. The result: No impact on the election results.
9. The Congress is calculating on the opposition committing a similar mistake this time. It suits the Congress to keep the debate confined to the TV studios. TV debates have some impact on urban, but not rural viewers.
10. If the opposition does not effectively exploit the issue in the election campaign, the Congress is hoping to avoid a rout in the elections and that could be the end of the Government’s and the Congress Party’s discomfiture.
11. In a democracy, the proof of the pudding is in the voting. The Congress understands this better than the opposition. ( 3-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
INDIA: BACK TO FRANCE
B.RAMAN
The Government of India must press ahead with its last-lap negotiations with Dassault Aviation of France for the finalisation of the definitive contract for the acquisition of 126 Rafale multi-role fighters.
2.Now that the decision of the Indian Air Force to go for Rafale has been announced, attempts will be made by others who failed in their bid to sell their aircraft to the IAF such as the European consortium producing the Typhoon to create confusion in the minds of the Indian political leadership and public opinion about the wisdom of the decision to choose the French aircraft.
3.Arms trade is a dirty business and often a Psywar is waged with no holds barred to create suspicions in the minds of the buyer about rival competitors. We had seen this dirty Psywar in the run-up to our decision to acquire a modern jet trainer aircraft. Both British and French arms dealers and their agents fought a bitter Psywar against each other by planting stories which were meant to create doubts in the mind of P.V.Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister.
4. I was in service at that time and had personal knowledge of the way stories---which ultimately turned out to be false--- were planted through politicians, bureaucrats and journalists to create doubts in the minds of the decision-makers about the integrity of those involved in the decision-making and of the decision-making process itself. As a result, there was inordinate delay in signing the final contract for the purchase of advance jet trainers.
5. The British particularly played a very dirty game by planting suspicions in the minds of Narasimha Rao through their contacts in the Indian intelligence community. It is quite likely that history may repeat itself and a similar Psywar may again start. The only way of pre-empting and preventing it is by pressing ahead with the negotiations with Dassault Aviation and signing the final contract quickly. The longer the delay, the dirtier will be the Psywar.
6. Analysts have already started discussing about possible strategic collateral benefits to India as a result of the IAF’s decision to go for Rafale. Two possible benefits have been highlighted---- a greater keenness on the part of the French to step-up their co-operation with India in the nuclear and space fields and a revival of the 1970s project for co-operation between the intelligence agencies of India and France to monitor developments in the Indian Ocean in the waters to the West of India.
7. The credit for giving a French orientation to India’s strategic thinking should go to Indira Gandhi. Her bitter experience with the USA’s Nixon Administration during the 1971 events that led to the birth of Bangladesh and the difficulties sought to be created by the US in the way of our nuclear and space programmes after the 1974 nuclear test made her turn to France for understanding and co-operation. At her instance, R.N.Kao, the then head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), our external intelligence agency, visited France in 1974 for meetings with Le Comte Alexandre de Marenches, the then head of the French external intelligence, Michel Poniatowski, the then French Interior Minister, and Giscard d’Estaing, the then French President.
8.Kao’s fruitful discussions in France facilitated the co-operation between the two countries in the nuclear and space fields and led to an agreement between the external intelligence agencies of the two countries for operational co-operation to monitor developments in the Indian Ocean. Their common targets were the fleets of the US and the Soviet navies.
9. The intelligence co-operation progressed in fits and starts till the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October,1984. After her death, the operational co-operation lost momentum, though intelligence-sharing continued. No other Indian political leader after Indira Gandhi and no other intelligence chief after Kao and no other intelligence chief of France after Le Comte evinced similar interest and enthusiasm for operational co-operation between the external intelligence agencies of the two countries.
10. The interests of both the intelligence agencies have changed since 1984. They no longer have common concerns over the activities of the US and Russian navies in the Indian Ocean. If operational co-operation----as distinguished from intelligence sharing---is to be revived in a meaningful manner, we have to identify new areas of common concern. Two such areas are the activities of the Somali pirates and the intentions, capabilities and activities of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean.
11. There is already a mechanism for co-operation between the Navies of India and the NATO countries to counter piracy. Joint monitoring of the activities of the Chinese Navy is a subject of common concern for India and France that has not received adequate attention till now.
12. In the favourable strategic ambiance that is likely to follow the Rafael contract, we should revive and intensify the pre-1984 operational co-operation in the Indian Ocean ----with different targets this time. Such a project for Indo-French co-operation need not come in the way of our ongoing strategic co-operation with the US. It can supplement it. ( 2-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Government of India must press ahead with its last-lap negotiations with Dassault Aviation of France for the finalisation of the definitive contract for the acquisition of 126 Rafale multi-role fighters.
2.Now that the decision of the Indian Air Force to go for Rafale has been announced, attempts will be made by others who failed in their bid to sell their aircraft to the IAF such as the European consortium producing the Typhoon to create confusion in the minds of the Indian political leadership and public opinion about the wisdom of the decision to choose the French aircraft.
3.Arms trade is a dirty business and often a Psywar is waged with no holds barred to create suspicions in the minds of the buyer about rival competitors. We had seen this dirty Psywar in the run-up to our decision to acquire a modern jet trainer aircraft. Both British and French arms dealers and their agents fought a bitter Psywar against each other by planting stories which were meant to create doubts in the mind of P.V.Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister.
4. I was in service at that time and had personal knowledge of the way stories---which ultimately turned out to be false--- were planted through politicians, bureaucrats and journalists to create doubts in the minds of the decision-makers about the integrity of those involved in the decision-making and of the decision-making process itself. As a result, there was inordinate delay in signing the final contract for the purchase of advance jet trainers.
5. The British particularly played a very dirty game by planting suspicions in the minds of Narasimha Rao through their contacts in the Indian intelligence community. It is quite likely that history may repeat itself and a similar Psywar may again start. The only way of pre-empting and preventing it is by pressing ahead with the negotiations with Dassault Aviation and signing the final contract quickly. The longer the delay, the dirtier will be the Psywar.
6. Analysts have already started discussing about possible strategic collateral benefits to India as a result of the IAF’s decision to go for Rafale. Two possible benefits have been highlighted---- a greater keenness on the part of the French to step-up their co-operation with India in the nuclear and space fields and a revival of the 1970s project for co-operation between the intelligence agencies of India and France to monitor developments in the Indian Ocean in the waters to the West of India.
7. The credit for giving a French orientation to India’s strategic thinking should go to Indira Gandhi. Her bitter experience with the USA’s Nixon Administration during the 1971 events that led to the birth of Bangladesh and the difficulties sought to be created by the US in the way of our nuclear and space programmes after the 1974 nuclear test made her turn to France for understanding and co-operation. At her instance, R.N.Kao, the then head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), our external intelligence agency, visited France in 1974 for meetings with Le Comte Alexandre de Marenches, the then head of the French external intelligence, Michel Poniatowski, the then French Interior Minister, and Giscard d’Estaing, the then French President.
8.Kao’s fruitful discussions in France facilitated the co-operation between the two countries in the nuclear and space fields and led to an agreement between the external intelligence agencies of the two countries for operational co-operation to monitor developments in the Indian Ocean. Their common targets were the fleets of the US and the Soviet navies.
9. The intelligence co-operation progressed in fits and starts till the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October,1984. After her death, the operational co-operation lost momentum, though intelligence-sharing continued. No other Indian political leader after Indira Gandhi and no other intelligence chief after Kao and no other intelligence chief of France after Le Comte evinced similar interest and enthusiasm for operational co-operation between the external intelligence agencies of the two countries.
10. The interests of both the intelligence agencies have changed since 1984. They no longer have common concerns over the activities of the US and Russian navies in the Indian Ocean. If operational co-operation----as distinguished from intelligence sharing---is to be revived in a meaningful manner, we have to identify new areas of common concern. Two such areas are the activities of the Somali pirates and the intentions, capabilities and activities of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean.
11. There is already a mechanism for co-operation between the Navies of India and the NATO countries to counter piracy. Joint monitoring of the activities of the Chinese Navy is a subject of common concern for India and France that has not received adequate attention till now.
12. In the favourable strategic ambiance that is likely to follow the Rafael contract, we should revive and intensify the pre-1984 operational co-operation in the Indian Ocean ----with different targets this time. Such a project for Indo-French co-operation need not come in the way of our ongoing strategic co-operation with the US. It can supplement it. ( 2-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
PAKISTAN: BACK FROM THE BRINK
B.RAMAN
The war of nerves involving the elected Executive, the Army and the Judiciary in Pakistan over the so-called Memogate has noticeably subsided with all the three withdrawing from the brink for the present.
2. The main credit for the thaw should go to Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Supreme Court. who, heading a nine-member bench of the court, ordered the removal of the restrictions on the foreign travel of Hussain Haqqani, the former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, on January 30,2012.
3. The bench ordered the removal of the travel restrictions after it became apparent that Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, on whose allegations the Supreme Court ordered an enquiry by a judicial commission into the Memogate affair, was avoiding coming to Pakistan to testify before the Commission on the ground that there could be threats to his security if he came to Pakistan. He wanted his statement to be recorded in Europe, to which the Commission was not agreeable.
4. The evasion and the reluctance of Ijaz to come to Pakistan considerably weakened the case against Haqqani and the credibility of Ijaz, as the principal witness. While keeping the enquiry by the judicial commission going and giving a two-months extension to the Commission, the bench headed by the Chief Justice lifted the restrictions on the travel of Haqqani, who reportedly left for Dubai the next morning.
5. President Asif Ali Zardari as well as the US, with both of whom Haqqani had a good equation, have reasons to be gratified by the decision of the Bench. If Ijaz had testified before the Commission and if the Commission had concluded that Ijaz’s allegations were correct, Haqqani might have been found guilty of an act of treason for seeking US help against the Pakistan Army and this might have made Zardari’s position untenable.
6.This danger has now been averted as a result of the reluctance of Ijaz to come to Pakistan and testify before the judicial commission. Suspicion that Ijaz, who is a US citizen of Pakistani origin, avoided testifying after having made the initial allegations against Haqqani, under US pressure would remain strong.
7.The US would not have wanted either Haqqani or Zardari, with both of whom it has had close contacts since the days of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, to suffer politically as a result of any adverse finding of the Commission. If Ijaz had gone ahead and helped the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) by testifying against Haqqani , he would have stood in danger of meeting the same fate as Gulam Nabi Fai, another US citizen of Pakistani origin, who is now facing trial in the US on a charge of having links with the ISI.
8.Chief Justice Chaudhury has come out creditably from the affair. There is no reason to believe that the decision to remove the curbs on Haqqani was taken by the bench under any external pressure. It appears to have been an independent decision taken after an objective evaluation of the case in the light of the evasion and reluctance of Ijaz. This would further strengthen the reputation of the Chief Justice as an independent-minded judge not amenable to any pressure either from the Executive or the Army.
9. The weakening of the credibility of Ijaz has also deprived the Army of any pretext for intervention on the ground that the Memogate could have endangered national security. This would give a breather to the Executive. During the entire war of nerves that lasted nearly two months, Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani conducted themselves with self-assurance and dignity, without letting themselves be bulldozed into any hasty or panic reaction which might have led to a confrontation with the Army.
10. The loser in the entire affair will be Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), who was instrumental in getting a judicial enquiry initiated in preference to the enquiry by the National Security Committee of the Parliament, in the hope that an adverse finding by the Judicial Commission might make the position of Zardari untenable and set in motion a train of events leading to premature elections to the National Assembly. There is every reason to believe that his calculations have proved wrong.
11, While the Executive and the Judiciary have emerged with their reputation intact, if not enhanced, the Army and the opposition have suffered some embarrassment. This makes the chances of a classical coup by the Generals even less likely than before.
12. While the Memogate affair is in the process of being defused, there are indications that the differences between the Executive and the Army over relations with the US continue. According to reliable sources, while Zardari is keen that the time has come to end the confrontation with the US, the Army is still dragging its feet on the question of re-opening the NATO’s logistic supply routes to Afghanistan from the Karachi port and handing over to the US a Pakistani doctor, who had allegedly collaborated with the CIA in checking the identity of OBL before the Abbottabad raid. These two issues have defied a solution due to the sulking by the Pakistani Army over a US/NATO air attack on a Pakistani border post in November that led to the death of over 20 military/para-military personnel.
13.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, looks upon these issues as purely within the competence of the Army. Zardari is not in a position to have the Executive’s will prevail in this matter.
14. While the lack of convergence between the Executive and the Army over relations with the US continues,there is so far no reason to fear that this could lead to a confrontation between the two. ( 1-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The war of nerves involving the elected Executive, the Army and the Judiciary in Pakistan over the so-called Memogate has noticeably subsided with all the three withdrawing from the brink for the present.
2. The main credit for the thaw should go to Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Supreme Court. who, heading a nine-member bench of the court, ordered the removal of the restrictions on the foreign travel of Hussain Haqqani, the former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, on January 30,2012.
3. The bench ordered the removal of the travel restrictions after it became apparent that Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, on whose allegations the Supreme Court ordered an enquiry by a judicial commission into the Memogate affair, was avoiding coming to Pakistan to testify before the Commission on the ground that there could be threats to his security if he came to Pakistan. He wanted his statement to be recorded in Europe, to which the Commission was not agreeable.
4. The evasion and the reluctance of Ijaz to come to Pakistan considerably weakened the case against Haqqani and the credibility of Ijaz, as the principal witness. While keeping the enquiry by the judicial commission going and giving a two-months extension to the Commission, the bench headed by the Chief Justice lifted the restrictions on the travel of Haqqani, who reportedly left for Dubai the next morning.
5. President Asif Ali Zardari as well as the US, with both of whom Haqqani had a good equation, have reasons to be gratified by the decision of the Bench. If Ijaz had testified before the Commission and if the Commission had concluded that Ijaz’s allegations were correct, Haqqani might have been found guilty of an act of treason for seeking US help against the Pakistan Army and this might have made Zardari’s position untenable.
6.This danger has now been averted as a result of the reluctance of Ijaz to come to Pakistan and testify before the judicial commission. Suspicion that Ijaz, who is a US citizen of Pakistani origin, avoided testifying after having made the initial allegations against Haqqani, under US pressure would remain strong.
7.The US would not have wanted either Haqqani or Zardari, with both of whom it has had close contacts since the days of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, to suffer politically as a result of any adverse finding of the Commission. If Ijaz had gone ahead and helped the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) by testifying against Haqqani , he would have stood in danger of meeting the same fate as Gulam Nabi Fai, another US citizen of Pakistani origin, who is now facing trial in the US on a charge of having links with the ISI.
8.Chief Justice Chaudhury has come out creditably from the affair. There is no reason to believe that the decision to remove the curbs on Haqqani was taken by the bench under any external pressure. It appears to have been an independent decision taken after an objective evaluation of the case in the light of the evasion and reluctance of Ijaz. This would further strengthen the reputation of the Chief Justice as an independent-minded judge not amenable to any pressure either from the Executive or the Army.
9. The weakening of the credibility of Ijaz has also deprived the Army of any pretext for intervention on the ground that the Memogate could have endangered national security. This would give a breather to the Executive. During the entire war of nerves that lasted nearly two months, Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani conducted themselves with self-assurance and dignity, without letting themselves be bulldozed into any hasty or panic reaction which might have led to a confrontation with the Army.
10. The loser in the entire affair will be Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), who was instrumental in getting a judicial enquiry initiated in preference to the enquiry by the National Security Committee of the Parliament, in the hope that an adverse finding by the Judicial Commission might make the position of Zardari untenable and set in motion a train of events leading to premature elections to the National Assembly. There is every reason to believe that his calculations have proved wrong.
11, While the Executive and the Judiciary have emerged with their reputation intact, if not enhanced, the Army and the opposition have suffered some embarrassment. This makes the chances of a classical coup by the Generals even less likely than before.
12. While the Memogate affair is in the process of being defused, there are indications that the differences between the Executive and the Army over relations with the US continue. According to reliable sources, while Zardari is keen that the time has come to end the confrontation with the US, the Army is still dragging its feet on the question of re-opening the NATO’s logistic supply routes to Afghanistan from the Karachi port and handing over to the US a Pakistani doctor, who had allegedly collaborated with the CIA in checking the identity of OBL before the Abbottabad raid. These two issues have defied a solution due to the sulking by the Pakistani Army over a US/NATO air attack on a Pakistani border post in November that led to the death of over 20 military/para-military personnel.
13.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, looks upon these issues as purely within the competence of the Army. Zardari is not in a position to have the Executive’s will prevail in this matter.
14. While the lack of convergence between the Executive and the Army over relations with the US continues,there is so far no reason to fear that this could lead to a confrontation between the two. ( 1-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
FINAL END OF BARKHA’S AGONY: SHAMELESS MEDIA McCARTHYISM BITES THE DUST
B.RAMAN
The Press Trust of India has reported as follows on January 31,2012:
“In a significant disclosure, the Union government today told the Supreme Court that the Radia tapes broadcast by media organisations were tampered with and the government agencies were not responsible for its leakage.
“Placing a confidential report in a sealed envelope before a bench headed by Justice G S Singhvi, the government said there were eight to ten agencies, including service providers, involved in the tapping of telephonic conversation of former corporate lobbyist Niira Radia.
“The bench went through a few initial pages of the report which stated there was tampering with the conversations which were released by media.
“The report says the starting and the end point of the conversation do not match with the original tapes, Justice Singhvi said referring to the report.
“He said the report also says that officers, who had conducted the probe, do not know who has leaked it.
"It is quite possible that someone else has done it," the bench said.
2.It is the final end of the agony sought to be inflicted on Barkha Dutt, the shining TV journalist, by some jealous members of Barkha’s journalistc fraternity and by some Hindutva elements which came together in an unholy alliance to damage her personal and professional reputation, demoralise her and drive her out of TV journalism.
3. Each had its own agenda for their determined pursuit of their attempt to destroy her reputation. If professional jealousy was the driving force of the Media McCarthyism unleashed against her by sections of the journalistic community, her consistent and courageous support to various causes dear to her --- whether in Jammu and Kashmir or Gujarat, whether relating to artist M.F.Hussain or writer Salman Rushdie, whether the human rights of the religious or ethnic minorities--- triggered the irrational rage of the Hindutva elements against her.
4. Even before the Government of India informed the court of its findings regarding the fabrication of the tapes, the insidious campaign against Barkha had failed. Her recent celebrated interviews with Oprah Winfrey, the US TV star, and Salman Rushdie showed---if additional proof was needed--- that her adversaries had miserably failed to tarnish her reputation and to damage her personal and professional morale, which has remained as high as ever.
5. She now has reasons to be gratified by the findings. Barkha, a true professional to her hard core, is not the person who will gloat in public over her personal and professional vindication, but if the members of this unholy alliance have even the slightest trace of decency in them, they at least owe her an apology in public even if she does not ask for it.
6.I am giving below extracts from what I had written about the insidious campaign against her since December 1,2010:
There is nothing inappropriate or unethical in Barkha's writings, reportage and actions. As regards her private conversations with Radia over phone she has explained the background and context and denied any malafide or unethical intention. Her explanation should be accepted instead of trying to fix her through an inquisition. ( 1-12-10)---From my article of December 1,2010, titled “Fixing Barkha Dutt” at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2010/11/fixing-barkha-dutt.html
I chose to defend Barkha because I strongly feel that her hard-earned reputation as a young, courageous and successful journalist, is sought to be besmirched----wittingly or unwittingly---- on the basis of an incomplete and motivated narrative. It is incomplete because only about three per cent of the total number of about 5800 intercepts has been made public. This clearly indicates that there has been a careful selection of the intercepts to be leaked to the press. Who made the selection? With what motive? Unless one has answers to these questions, there should be a big question mark over the narrative.—From my article of December 7,2010, titled IT'S DANGEROUS TO DEFEND BARKHA DUTT at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2010/12/its-dangerous-to-defend-barkha-dutt.html
Whatever may be the ultimate outcome of the investigation and other enquiries into the Radia tapes, one has strong reasons to believe that this shameful episode represented "Media McCarthyism" of the worst kind in order to tarnish the reputation of Barkha and ridicule and intimidate those supporting her. One would be entitled to expect that the media houses and journalists, who allegedly played a role in fanning this "Media McCarthyism" against Barkha, would now have the grace to apologise to her in public. From my article of April 19,2011, titled BARKHA DUTT : VICTIM OF MEDIA McCARTHYISM ? at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2011/04/barkha-dutt-victim-of-media-mccarthyism.html
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Press Trust of India has reported as follows on January 31,2012:
“In a significant disclosure, the Union government today told the Supreme Court that the Radia tapes broadcast by media organisations were tampered with and the government agencies were not responsible for its leakage.
“Placing a confidential report in a sealed envelope before a bench headed by Justice G S Singhvi, the government said there were eight to ten agencies, including service providers, involved in the tapping of telephonic conversation of former corporate lobbyist Niira Radia.
“The bench went through a few initial pages of the report which stated there was tampering with the conversations which were released by media.
“The report says the starting and the end point of the conversation do not match with the original tapes, Justice Singhvi said referring to the report.
“He said the report also says that officers, who had conducted the probe, do not know who has leaked it.
"It is quite possible that someone else has done it," the bench said.
2.It is the final end of the agony sought to be inflicted on Barkha Dutt, the shining TV journalist, by some jealous members of Barkha’s journalistc fraternity and by some Hindutva elements which came together in an unholy alliance to damage her personal and professional reputation, demoralise her and drive her out of TV journalism.
3. Each had its own agenda for their determined pursuit of their attempt to destroy her reputation. If professional jealousy was the driving force of the Media McCarthyism unleashed against her by sections of the journalistic community, her consistent and courageous support to various causes dear to her --- whether in Jammu and Kashmir or Gujarat, whether relating to artist M.F.Hussain or writer Salman Rushdie, whether the human rights of the religious or ethnic minorities--- triggered the irrational rage of the Hindutva elements against her.
4. Even before the Government of India informed the court of its findings regarding the fabrication of the tapes, the insidious campaign against Barkha had failed. Her recent celebrated interviews with Oprah Winfrey, the US TV star, and Salman Rushdie showed---if additional proof was needed--- that her adversaries had miserably failed to tarnish her reputation and to damage her personal and professional morale, which has remained as high as ever.
5. She now has reasons to be gratified by the findings. Barkha, a true professional to her hard core, is not the person who will gloat in public over her personal and professional vindication, but if the members of this unholy alliance have even the slightest trace of decency in them, they at least owe her an apology in public even if she does not ask for it.
6.I am giving below extracts from what I had written about the insidious campaign against her since December 1,2010:
There is nothing inappropriate or unethical in Barkha's writings, reportage and actions. As regards her private conversations with Radia over phone she has explained the background and context and denied any malafide or unethical intention. Her explanation should be accepted instead of trying to fix her through an inquisition. ( 1-12-10)---From my article of December 1,2010, titled “Fixing Barkha Dutt” at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2010/11/fixing-barkha-dutt.html
I chose to defend Barkha because I strongly feel that her hard-earned reputation as a young, courageous and successful journalist, is sought to be besmirched----wittingly or unwittingly---- on the basis of an incomplete and motivated narrative. It is incomplete because only about three per cent of the total number of about 5800 intercepts has been made public. This clearly indicates that there has been a careful selection of the intercepts to be leaked to the press. Who made the selection? With what motive? Unless one has answers to these questions, there should be a big question mark over the narrative.—From my article of December 7,2010, titled IT'S DANGEROUS TO DEFEND BARKHA DUTT at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2010/12/its-dangerous-to-defend-barkha-dutt.html
Whatever may be the ultimate outcome of the investigation and other enquiries into the Radia tapes, one has strong reasons to believe that this shameful episode represented "Media McCarthyism" of the worst kind in order to tarnish the reputation of Barkha and ridicule and intimidate those supporting her. One would be entitled to expect that the media houses and journalists, who allegedly played a role in fanning this "Media McCarthyism" against Barkha, would now have the grace to apologise to her in public. From my article of April 19,2011, titled BARKHA DUTT : VICTIM OF MEDIA McCARTHYISM ? at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2011/04/barkha-dutt-victim-of-media-mccarthyism.html
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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