B.RAMAN
It is 23 years today since Jammu & Kashmir saw the beginning of the ethnic-cleansing of the Kashmiri Pandits, the original inhabitants of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), from their homeland at the instigation of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) by a group of Kashmiri jihadi elements trained, armed and motivated by the ISI.
2. The lead in this act of ethnic-cleansing was initially taken by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Other jihadi organisations, which subsequently came into existence after having been trained and armed by the ISI, kept the ethnic-cleansing going till practically all the Kashmiri Pandits were driven out after having been subjected to numerous indignities and brutalities such as rape of women, torture, forcible seizure of property belonging to the Pandits etc.
3. The Pandits, who survived these acts of indignities and brutalities, were forced to leave their homeland and seek shelter in camps for refugees set up in Jammu and Delhi. Within a few weeks of the outbreak of the ethnic cleansing, a majority of the Pandits found themselves reduced to the miserable status of refugees in their own country.
4. As the Pandits and their wifes and children were subjected to indignities and brutalities and driven out of their homeland, the State of India totally caught by surprise watched helplessly and pusillanimously, as the plans of the ISI to change the demographic composition of the Kashmir Valley in order to make it a predominantly Muslim area were sought to be implements by the jihadis trained by the ISI.
5. Neither V.P.Singh, who was the Prime Minister when the ethnic-cleansing was carried out nor any of his successors had the least idea of how to deal with the situation. There were various options available. I would cite only two. The first option was to direct the Army to re-establish Indian sovereignty over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan as a punitive measure. Pakistan had by then acquired a military nuclear capability, but not a nuclear arsenal. It did not have a satisfactory delivery capability. We could have, therefore, easily re-taken the POK and Gilgit-Baltistan without fear of provoking a nuclear war. The V.P.Singh Government did not exercise this option.
6. The other option was to train and arm the Pandits and ask them to go back and re-occupy their property and fight against the ISI-trained jihadis. This option was carefully examined and given up as not advisable. There were legitimate fears that this option could polarise for ever the relations between the Muslims and the Hindus and play into the hands of the jihadis who wanted such polarisation.
7. The option finally chosen was to look after the Pandits in the refugee camps and other areas where they had settled down with their relatives and wait for the restoration of normalcy in the Valley so that these refugees could be helped to go back, re-establish their ownership of their property and resume a life of dignity as the residents of their traditional homeland.
8. The Pandits have been waiting for 23 years hoping that the day of their return with honour and security to their homeland would come. It has not so far despite the considerable improvement in the ground situation. In the meanwhile, the plight of the Pandits has been slowly forgotten. Everybody sheds crocodile tears over their sufferings, but there is nothing more by way of action. The future of the Kashmiri Pandits as an important dimension of the Kashmir problem is less and less talked about.
9. There was one man, who spent his years of retirement in attempts to ensure that the promises made by the nation to restore the honour and dignity of the Pandits was not forgotten. He took a lively interest in their future and interacted vigorously with leaders of the Government and opposition political parties to see that this dimension of the Kashmir problem was not forgotten.
10. His name was R.N.Kao, a Kashmiri himself, who was the legendary founding father of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). The Kashmir tragedy broke out five years after he finally retired from public service in 1984. From 1989 onwards till his death in 2002, he devoted a lot of his time to his self-assumed task of restoring the honour and dignity of the Pandits.
11. Since Kao’s death in 2002, the Kashmiri Pandits find themselves orphaned. There is no one at the political or bureaucratic level, who is prepared to come to the forefront, stick his neck out and demand action to restore the dignity and honour of the Pandits. Hopes that the BJP-led Government would pay lively attention to the future of the Pandits were sadly belied. The BJP-led Government was as confused and as inactive as any of the other Governments that had held office since 1989.
12.How to move forward? Two realities have to be kept in mind. Firstly, it is too late in the day to think of identifying and punishing those who were responsible for the ethnic-cleansing. Any ill-advised attempt to do so would complicate the situation further.
13. Secondly, the return of the Pandits to their homeland cannot be enforced unilaterally by the Governments of India and the State. It has to be the outcome of a consensus among different political parties of the State and leaders of different communities. The Government of India has a moral responsibility for working towards such a consensus. Presently, it has not been doing so. It should be made to do so through public pressure. It is time to stop meaningless breast-beating on the plight of the Pandits and their future. It is time to work for concrete ways of enabling their return to their homeland in dignity and honour. ( 19-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Monday, January 16, 2012
ISLAMABAD: WHERE WILL THE BUCK STOP?
B.RAMAN
I had tweeted as follows last night: “Nothing dramatic likely tomorrow”
2. Nothing dramatic has happened in Islamabad today. Justice Asif Khosa, the single Judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court who has been hearing the petition relating to the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), has reportedly issued a notice to Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani asking him to show cause why action for contempt of court cannot be taken against him . He has asked Gilani to personally appear before him on January 19 to give his explanation.
3. Gilani will have the following options: Either refuse to appear before the Judge on the ground that the Judge has no jurisdiction to summon him or go in appeal to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a larger bench to hear the case.
4. If Gilani refuses to appear, the single judge can pass an ex-parte order holding him guilty of contempt of court and directing him to vacate his office as the Prime Minister. Gilani can go in appeal against this order too before a larger bench. In the worst case scenario, President Asif Ali Zardari can refuse to implement this order and move for the impeachment of the Judge on grounds of violating the Constitution.
5. Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, who levelled the original allegations against Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, is reported to have sought time till January 25 to appear before the Commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court, which has been asked by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, to enquire into the allegations made by Ijaz.
6. It is doubtful as of now whether Ijaz, who has reportedly been shuttling between Geneva and London without going back to the US since he levelled his allegations against Haqqani in November last, will go to Pakistan to testify before the Commission. He is a US citizen. His bread and butter and most of his investments are in the US. James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Bill Clinton, is one of his business partners.
7. Ijaz is, therefore, amenable to US pressure. He is unlikely to do anything which might displease the US Government and his friends in the US Administration. Many in the US Administration and Congress have strong sympathies with Hussain Haqqani. They would not like Ijaz to do anything further that could harm Haqqani. Ijaz would be under considerable pressure not to testify before the Pakistani Commission.
8. If he finally decides not to testify, the case against Haqqani could fail. In their conduct and remarks, Zardari and Gilani are exhibiting considerable self-confidence vis-à-vis the Army. Their confidence could be attributable to their conviction that the US will prevent Ijaz from testifying. It has to be seen whether this proves to be correct( 16-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
I had tweeted as follows last night: “Nothing dramatic likely tomorrow”
2. Nothing dramatic has happened in Islamabad today. Justice Asif Khosa, the single Judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court who has been hearing the petition relating to the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), has reportedly issued a notice to Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani asking him to show cause why action for contempt of court cannot be taken against him . He has asked Gilani to personally appear before him on January 19 to give his explanation.
3. Gilani will have the following options: Either refuse to appear before the Judge on the ground that the Judge has no jurisdiction to summon him or go in appeal to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a larger bench to hear the case.
4. If Gilani refuses to appear, the single judge can pass an ex-parte order holding him guilty of contempt of court and directing him to vacate his office as the Prime Minister. Gilani can go in appeal against this order too before a larger bench. In the worst case scenario, President Asif Ali Zardari can refuse to implement this order and move for the impeachment of the Judge on grounds of violating the Constitution.
5. Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, who levelled the original allegations against Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, is reported to have sought time till January 25 to appear before the Commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court, which has been asked by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, to enquire into the allegations made by Ijaz.
6. It is doubtful as of now whether Ijaz, who has reportedly been shuttling between Geneva and London without going back to the US since he levelled his allegations against Haqqani in November last, will go to Pakistan to testify before the Commission. He is a US citizen. His bread and butter and most of his investments are in the US. James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Bill Clinton, is one of his business partners.
7. Ijaz is, therefore, amenable to US pressure. He is unlikely to do anything which might displease the US Government and his friends in the US Administration. Many in the US Administration and Congress have strong sympathies with Hussain Haqqani. They would not like Ijaz to do anything further that could harm Haqqani. Ijaz would be under considerable pressure not to testify before the Pakistani Commission.
8. If he finally decides not to testify, the case against Haqqani could fail. In their conduct and remarks, Zardari and Gilani are exhibiting considerable self-confidence vis-à-vis the Army. Their confidence could be attributable to their conviction that the US will prevent Ijaz from testifying. It has to be seen whether this proves to be correct( 16-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, January 15, 2012
TIME FOR SOLIDARITY WITH BALOCHS
B.RAMAN
The Killing Fields of Balochistan have started shocking the conscience of the international community. Not only non-governmental human rights organisations, but even Governmental spokesmen of other countries---including a spokesperson of the US State Department in response to Tweets on the sufferings of the Balochs--- have started getting over their hesitation in expressing their concern over the steady flow of reports from Balochistan about the atrocities committed by the Pakistani security forces on the people of Balochistan.
2. The atrocities have taken many forms. Brutal killing of the Baloch youth in false encounters for opposing State repression. Custodial deaths of Baloch youth rounded up by the security forces for interrogation on their suspected association with the on-going freedom struggle. Hundreds of missing Balochs, who were rounded up by the Security Forces for interrogation and who have since disappeared from public view and public conscience. Frequent recoveries of dead bodies of Baloch youth here, there, everywhere after they were allegedly tortured to death. Despite all this, the Baloch freedom struggle continues unabated.
3. Even the conscience of right-thinking sections of the Pakistani civil society have been shocked by the atrocities committed on the Balochs by the Pakistani security forces which bring to mind the atrocities committed on the Bengalis of the then East Pakistan before 1971.
4.Balochistan is the largest State in Pakistan with the smallest population as compared to East Pakistan which had more people than the then West Pakistan. The atrocities committed by the Pakistani Security Forces in East Pakistan led to the exodus into India of millions of Bengalis. They brought with them dramatic accounts of what was happening in East Pakistan shocking our conscience and that of the international community.
5.There has been no similar exodus of the Balochs. Balochs fleeing from the crushing boots of the Pakistani Security Forces have nowhere to go. They can’t flee into Iran which has been brutally suppressing a freedom struggle of its own Balochs. They can’t flee into Afghanistan which continues to be in a state of war. They can’t flee to other parts of Pakistan which will not accept them.
6. They find themselves bottled up in Balochistan---- slowly and brutally killed one after the other without the rest of the world coming to know about the details. The Baloch diaspora in the West is very small. It is unable to play an effective and articulate role in drawing attention to the goings-on in Balochistan. It is trying bravely to do so, but with very limited success.
7. Even though the Western world has started showing signs of being disturbed by reports suggesting a systematic genocide of the Balochs by the Pakistani Security Forces, they are unable to go beyond expressing lip sympathy for the bleeding Balochs.
8.Against this background, the Balochs have been bewildered by the silence of Governmental and non-Governmental India. The Indian Government has been understandably silent because at a time when it has been trying to improve its relations with Pakistan it would find it difficult to come out openly in moral---if not material---support of the Balochs.
9. But why is the Indian civil society silent? Why is non-Governmental India silent? Why is the world of the Indian media silent? Why are well-known TV personalities like Barkha Dutt, Srinivasan Jain, Sonia Singh, Rajdeep Sardesai, Sagarika Ghose, Suhasini Haider, Rahul Kanwal, Karan Thapar, Arnab Goswami silent? Why is the Indian print media silent? Why are the opposition political forces observing a silence in the matter? Why has the Indian strategic community closed its eyes to Balochistan?
10. We do not have to be defensive just because some sections of our Jammu & Kashmir continue to be alienated. But we do not deal with the alienated sections of J & K the way the Pakistanis have been dealing with the Balochs. Despite occasional acts of violence, we have a thriving democracy in J&K. The Kashmiris are more prosperous than the people in many other parts of India. We have not imposed an Iron Curtain in J&K as Pakistan has imposed one in Balochistan. We ought to be proud of the way we have been dealing with the insurgencies in J & K and the North-East in a humanitarian manner despite occasional aberrations.
11. Let us not allow allegations that emanate from time to time from Pakistan regarding J&K inhibit us from expressing our solidarity with the suffering people of Balochistan. One understands that the Government cannot be articulate and active in this matter. But the civil society has to be articulate and active in giving vent to its shock and anguish over the reports of the suppression of the Balochs.
12. The Baloch youth have shown over the last four or five years that they are capable of keeping their freedom struggle sustained on their own without the need for external support. But they do need the moral solidarity of the Indian civil society. They deserve it.
13. The time for expressing our moral solidarity with them has come. ( 16-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Killing Fields of Balochistan have started shocking the conscience of the international community. Not only non-governmental human rights organisations, but even Governmental spokesmen of other countries---including a spokesperson of the US State Department in response to Tweets on the sufferings of the Balochs--- have started getting over their hesitation in expressing their concern over the steady flow of reports from Balochistan about the atrocities committed by the Pakistani security forces on the people of Balochistan.
2. The atrocities have taken many forms. Brutal killing of the Baloch youth in false encounters for opposing State repression. Custodial deaths of Baloch youth rounded up by the security forces for interrogation on their suspected association with the on-going freedom struggle. Hundreds of missing Balochs, who were rounded up by the Security Forces for interrogation and who have since disappeared from public view and public conscience. Frequent recoveries of dead bodies of Baloch youth here, there, everywhere after they were allegedly tortured to death. Despite all this, the Baloch freedom struggle continues unabated.
3. Even the conscience of right-thinking sections of the Pakistani civil society have been shocked by the atrocities committed on the Balochs by the Pakistani security forces which bring to mind the atrocities committed on the Bengalis of the then East Pakistan before 1971.
4.Balochistan is the largest State in Pakistan with the smallest population as compared to East Pakistan which had more people than the then West Pakistan. The atrocities committed by the Pakistani Security Forces in East Pakistan led to the exodus into India of millions of Bengalis. They brought with them dramatic accounts of what was happening in East Pakistan shocking our conscience and that of the international community.
5.There has been no similar exodus of the Balochs. Balochs fleeing from the crushing boots of the Pakistani Security Forces have nowhere to go. They can’t flee into Iran which has been brutally suppressing a freedom struggle of its own Balochs. They can’t flee into Afghanistan which continues to be in a state of war. They can’t flee to other parts of Pakistan which will not accept them.
6. They find themselves bottled up in Balochistan---- slowly and brutally killed one after the other without the rest of the world coming to know about the details. The Baloch diaspora in the West is very small. It is unable to play an effective and articulate role in drawing attention to the goings-on in Balochistan. It is trying bravely to do so, but with very limited success.
7. Even though the Western world has started showing signs of being disturbed by reports suggesting a systematic genocide of the Balochs by the Pakistani Security Forces, they are unable to go beyond expressing lip sympathy for the bleeding Balochs.
8.Against this background, the Balochs have been bewildered by the silence of Governmental and non-Governmental India. The Indian Government has been understandably silent because at a time when it has been trying to improve its relations with Pakistan it would find it difficult to come out openly in moral---if not material---support of the Balochs.
9. But why is the Indian civil society silent? Why is non-Governmental India silent? Why is the world of the Indian media silent? Why are well-known TV personalities like Barkha Dutt, Srinivasan Jain, Sonia Singh, Rajdeep Sardesai, Sagarika Ghose, Suhasini Haider, Rahul Kanwal, Karan Thapar, Arnab Goswami silent? Why is the Indian print media silent? Why are the opposition political forces observing a silence in the matter? Why has the Indian strategic community closed its eyes to Balochistan?
10. We do not have to be defensive just because some sections of our Jammu & Kashmir continue to be alienated. But we do not deal with the alienated sections of J & K the way the Pakistanis have been dealing with the Balochs. Despite occasional acts of violence, we have a thriving democracy in J&K. The Kashmiris are more prosperous than the people in many other parts of India. We have not imposed an Iron Curtain in J&K as Pakistan has imposed one in Balochistan. We ought to be proud of the way we have been dealing with the insurgencies in J & K and the North-East in a humanitarian manner despite occasional aberrations.
11. Let us not allow allegations that emanate from time to time from Pakistan regarding J&K inhibit us from expressing our solidarity with the suffering people of Balochistan. One understands that the Government cannot be articulate and active in this matter. But the civil society has to be articulate and active in giving vent to its shock and anguish over the reports of the suppression of the Balochs.
12. The Baloch youth have shown over the last four or five years that they are capable of keeping their freedom struggle sustained on their own without the need for external support. But they do need the moral solidarity of the Indian civil society. They deserve it.
13. The time for expressing our moral solidarity with them has come. ( 16-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, January 14, 2012
WEN’S HUG & FLY VISIT TO NEPAL
B.RAMAN
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China, who had cancelled a scheduled visit to Nepal in December for unexplained reasons, halted in Kathmandu for a little more than four hours on January 14,2012, while on his way from Beijing to Saudi Arabia for an official visit.
2. This is the first time a Chinese Prime Minister had visited Nepal since the visit of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in 2001. There have been a number of high-level visits of political and military figures from Nepal to China since the Nepalese Maoists came overground, suspended their insurgency and joined the power structure in Nepal, but reciprocal visits from the Chinese side to Nepal were very few.
3.However, the Chinese have considerably stepped up assistance to the Nepalese since the end of the monarchy in 2008 and established a "comprehensive and cooperative partnership" with Nepal in 2009.
4. China has strong security concerns in Nepal due to the presence of about 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepalese territory and their support to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the radical Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC).
5. These concerns have been magnified by fresh indicators of unrest in the Tibetan community of China---particularly in Western Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai regions. There have been 16 self-immolation attempts since the beginning of last year by pro-Dalai Lama monks and others. Twelve of them were reported last year and four in the first 15 days of this year. Fourteen of these attempts were in Western Sichuan and one each in Tibet and Qinghai.
6. The large-scale round-up and detention in a special military camp of suspected pro-Dalai Lama monks of the Kirti monastery in Sichuan last year have aggravated the situation leading to frequent public demonstrations in support of those attempting self-immolation. The public demonstrations remained largely non-violent last year, but since the beginning of this year there have been two violent attacks by enraged Tibetans on Police Stations.
7. In the latest violent attack reported on January 14, a crowd of about 1000 Tibetans demanding the body of a Tibetan who committed self-immolation the same day attacked a police station where, they suspected, the body was kept. The Police reportedly opened fire to disperse the protesters killing two of them---one of them a woman.
8. The affected areas have been far away from the Nepal border. The fact that Tibet itself has remained relatively calm with only one incident last year would indicate that these self-immolations and the subsequent protest demonstrations were largely spontaneous due to local anger against the Chinese security forces and not inspired or instigated by the Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
9. The Chinese are worried over the danger of a recrudescence of unrest and violence in Tibet, particularly Lhasa, similar to the violent outbreak of 2008 and have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese authorities to tighten controls over the refugees and to allow the Chinese Ministries of Public and State Security to post more intelligence officers in the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu.
10.During his brief visit to Kathmandu, Wen met, among others, Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav and Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai.
11.Wen was quoted by the local media as saying as follows: “My trip is aimed at consolidating good-neighbourly friendship, deepening cooperation and boosting the joint development of China and Nepal.”
12. A joint statement issued at the end of his visit said: "As a close neighbour of Nepal, the Chinese side is pleased to see the progress in the peace process in Nepal and sincerely hopes that Nepal will realize peace, stability and prosperity, including the drafting of a new constitution in the near future. Nepal firmly supports the efforts of the Chinese side to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and will not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities by using Nepali territory,"
13.Wen was further quoted as saying: “China and Nepal are good neighbours, good friends and good partners. China supports Nepal's peace and constitutional process, and its efforts to safeguard independence, sovereignty, territorial integration and national unification. China is ready to provide, within its capacity, assistance to Nepal for economic and social development and believes that Nepal can overcome difficulties to realize the goal of building a new Nepal.”.
14.Wen reportedly pledged $140 million in aid to Nepal of which US $ 20 million would be spent on consolidating the peace process and US $ two million for strengthening the police. Nepal has reportedly sought Chinese assistance for a modern airport at Pokhra, for the development of its railway network and for the construction of three hydel power stations. ( 15-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China, who had cancelled a scheduled visit to Nepal in December for unexplained reasons, halted in Kathmandu for a little more than four hours on January 14,2012, while on his way from Beijing to Saudi Arabia for an official visit.
2. This is the first time a Chinese Prime Minister had visited Nepal since the visit of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in 2001. There have been a number of high-level visits of political and military figures from Nepal to China since the Nepalese Maoists came overground, suspended their insurgency and joined the power structure in Nepal, but reciprocal visits from the Chinese side to Nepal were very few.
3.However, the Chinese have considerably stepped up assistance to the Nepalese since the end of the monarchy in 2008 and established a "comprehensive and cooperative partnership" with Nepal in 2009.
4. China has strong security concerns in Nepal due to the presence of about 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepalese territory and their support to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the radical Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC).
5. These concerns have been magnified by fresh indicators of unrest in the Tibetan community of China---particularly in Western Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai regions. There have been 16 self-immolation attempts since the beginning of last year by pro-Dalai Lama monks and others. Twelve of them were reported last year and four in the first 15 days of this year. Fourteen of these attempts were in Western Sichuan and one each in Tibet and Qinghai.
6. The large-scale round-up and detention in a special military camp of suspected pro-Dalai Lama monks of the Kirti monastery in Sichuan last year have aggravated the situation leading to frequent public demonstrations in support of those attempting self-immolation. The public demonstrations remained largely non-violent last year, but since the beginning of this year there have been two violent attacks by enraged Tibetans on Police Stations.
7. In the latest violent attack reported on January 14, a crowd of about 1000 Tibetans demanding the body of a Tibetan who committed self-immolation the same day attacked a police station where, they suspected, the body was kept. The Police reportedly opened fire to disperse the protesters killing two of them---one of them a woman.
8. The affected areas have been far away from the Nepal border. The fact that Tibet itself has remained relatively calm with only one incident last year would indicate that these self-immolations and the subsequent protest demonstrations were largely spontaneous due to local anger against the Chinese security forces and not inspired or instigated by the Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
9. The Chinese are worried over the danger of a recrudescence of unrest and violence in Tibet, particularly Lhasa, similar to the violent outbreak of 2008 and have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese authorities to tighten controls over the refugees and to allow the Chinese Ministries of Public and State Security to post more intelligence officers in the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu.
10.During his brief visit to Kathmandu, Wen met, among others, Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav and Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai.
11.Wen was quoted by the local media as saying as follows: “My trip is aimed at consolidating good-neighbourly friendship, deepening cooperation and boosting the joint development of China and Nepal.”
12. A joint statement issued at the end of his visit said: "As a close neighbour of Nepal, the Chinese side is pleased to see the progress in the peace process in Nepal and sincerely hopes that Nepal will realize peace, stability and prosperity, including the drafting of a new constitution in the near future. Nepal firmly supports the efforts of the Chinese side to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and will not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities by using Nepali territory,"
13.Wen was further quoted as saying: “China and Nepal are good neighbours, good friends and good partners. China supports Nepal's peace and constitutional process, and its efforts to safeguard independence, sovereignty, territorial integration and national unification. China is ready to provide, within its capacity, assistance to Nepal for economic and social development and believes that Nepal can overcome difficulties to realize the goal of building a new Nepal.”.
14.Wen reportedly pledged $140 million in aid to Nepal of which US $ 20 million would be spent on consolidating the peace process and US $ two million for strengthening the police. Nepal has reportedly sought Chinese assistance for a modern airport at Pokhra, for the development of its railway network and for the construction of three hydel power stations. ( 15-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, January 13, 2012
A COUNTER-TERRORISM CZAR IN INDIAN COLOURS
B.RAMAN
Before 9/11, there was a counter-terrorism centre ( CTC ) in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US, which had officers from various agencies, that formed part of the counter-terrorism community of the US. It worked under a CIA Officer. Its task was co-ordination of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of various agencies to facilitate the analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence relating to terrorism flowing from different agencies and ensure effective follow-up action. Its main role was in prevention. It had no role in investigation and prosecution.
2. When it was created, this Centre was placed under the CIA for the following reasons:
(a).Before 9/11, the conventional wisdom in the US was that threats from terrorists would be mainly to US nationals and interests abroad. Since the CIA was an external intelligence agency, it was felt that the nodal set-up for the co-ordination of follow-up action should function under the supervision of the CIA.
(b). Till 2004, Director,CIA, wore two hats. He was the head of the CIA. He was also designated as Director, Central Intelligence. In the second capacity, he was responsible for the co-ordination of the functioning of all agencies of the US intelligence community. Since the Counter-Terrorism Centre was to co-ordinate follow-up action on all terrorism-related intelligence, it was felt that the responsibility for c-ordination should vest in the Director, CIA, in his second capacity as the Director, Central Intelligence.
3. The enquiry by the National Commission appointed by President George Bush into the 9/11 terrorist strikes brought home to the US the dangers posed to US Homeland security from home-grown terrorists as well as terrorists based abroad. It also revealed deficiencies in the co-ordinating roles of the Director, Central Intelligence, and of the CTC of the CIA. It was felt that there was no effective analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence flowing from the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies and no effective and co-ordinated follow-up to neutralise the threats revealed by the flowing intelligence.
4. The National Commission enquiry led to the following decisions:
(a). To create an NCTC to co-ordinate the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies which form part of the counter-terrorism community and to co-ordinate follow-up action to prevent acts of terrorism.
( b ).To divest the Director,CIA, of his responsibilities as the Director, Central Intelligence, and to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, (DNI) directly under the President to co-ordinate the functioning of various intelligence agencies.
( c ). To place the NCTC under the supervision of the DNI and not under the heads of any of the intelligence agencies which will continue to have the responsibility for the collection of terrorism-related intelligence.
5. Since 2005, the US Counter-Terrorism architecture is as follows:
(a) Each agency has its own counter-terrorism division for the collection, analysis, assessment and fusion of intelligence and follow-up action.
(b) The NCTC co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies and ensures co-ordinated follow-up action. Its role is preventive and not in investigation and prosecution.
(c) The NCTC functions under the DNI. The heads of the agencies have no control over its functioning.
6.The GC Saxena Task Force on intelligence revamp, set up by the Government in 2000, studied the working of the CTC of the CIA and recommended the creation of a similar counter-terrorism centre to be placed in the IB consisting of officers of various agencies and headed by an IB officer. The Government created it in the IB, but for reasons not clear to me, called it a Multi-Agency Centre and not a counter-terrorism centre. It did not get going for a long time because of the reported reluctance of the R&AW and MI to depute their officers to work in the MAC under an IB officer.
7.The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. Normally, the recommendation of the Saxena Task Force for the creation of a CTC in the IB should have been re-examined in the light of the 9/11 strikes in the US and the exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA, which led to the decision to create the NCTC under the DNI. This was not done till the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
8. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai revealed more or less the same deficiencies in our counter-terrorism architecture as the deficiencies in the counter-terrorism architecture of the US revealed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes. Namely, inadequate intelligence and lack of co-ordinated follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. In his first statement to the Lok Sabha on the 26/11 terrorist strikes after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram said that the responsibility for follow-up action on available intelligence was found to be diffused.
9. Shortly thereafter, he had visited the US to study the working of the Department of Homeland Security and the NCTC, both of which came into being after 9/11. He came back a strong votary of two ideas: For the creation of a separate Ministry of Internal Security patterned after the Department of Homeland Security of the US and for the creation of an NCTC patterned after its US counterpart.
10. Shri Chidambaram’s ideas differed in one important respect from the Counter-terrorism architecture created in the US. In the US, the newly set up DNI oversees the functioning of the NCTC. Shri Chidambaram reportedly wanted that the entire counter-terrorism architecture, including the proposed NCTC, should function under the Minister for Home Affairs till his idea of a Ministry of Internal Security was accepted and implemented. That is, he wanted the National Security Adviser to be divested of all counter-terrorism responsibilities and the Home Minister to be made the counter-terrorism Czar of the Government of India.
11. There was speculation ( seemed well-informed) in the media at that time that Shri M.K. Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, viewed this as a negative reflection of his handling of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and strongly opposed the ideas of Shri Chidambaram. There was a long examination of Shri Chidambaram’s ideas. What has come out on January 12,2012, as a result of this examination is neither an ass nor a mule, but something in between and not recognisable.
12. There will be an emaciated-at-birth NCTC which will not be independent , but will form part of the IB. Thus, there will be no independent supervision over the performance of the follow-up action role. The NSA will have no responsibility for counter-terrorism. As desired by him, Shri Chidambaram will be the Czar for counter-terrorism, but he will be a Czar in Indian colours, not given the necessary tools for being an effective Czar.
13. In the US too, the NSA has no responsibility for counter-terrorism. This role is performed by an Adviser on Homeland Security to the President who is commonly referred to as the Adviser on Counter-Terrorism.
14. In my view, the proposed NCTC is unlikely to improve our capability for preventive action through effective follow-up action on the intelligence collected. ( 14-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Before 9/11, there was a counter-terrorism centre ( CTC ) in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US, which had officers from various agencies, that formed part of the counter-terrorism community of the US. It worked under a CIA Officer. Its task was co-ordination of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of various agencies to facilitate the analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence relating to terrorism flowing from different agencies and ensure effective follow-up action. Its main role was in prevention. It had no role in investigation and prosecution.
2. When it was created, this Centre was placed under the CIA for the following reasons:
(a).Before 9/11, the conventional wisdom in the US was that threats from terrorists would be mainly to US nationals and interests abroad. Since the CIA was an external intelligence agency, it was felt that the nodal set-up for the co-ordination of follow-up action should function under the supervision of the CIA.
(b). Till 2004, Director,CIA, wore two hats. He was the head of the CIA. He was also designated as Director, Central Intelligence. In the second capacity, he was responsible for the co-ordination of the functioning of all agencies of the US intelligence community. Since the Counter-Terrorism Centre was to co-ordinate follow-up action on all terrorism-related intelligence, it was felt that the responsibility for c-ordination should vest in the Director, CIA, in his second capacity as the Director, Central Intelligence.
3. The enquiry by the National Commission appointed by President George Bush into the 9/11 terrorist strikes brought home to the US the dangers posed to US Homeland security from home-grown terrorists as well as terrorists based abroad. It also revealed deficiencies in the co-ordinating roles of the Director, Central Intelligence, and of the CTC of the CIA. It was felt that there was no effective analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence flowing from the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies and no effective and co-ordinated follow-up to neutralise the threats revealed by the flowing intelligence.
4. The National Commission enquiry led to the following decisions:
(a). To create an NCTC to co-ordinate the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies which form part of the counter-terrorism community and to co-ordinate follow-up action to prevent acts of terrorism.
( b ).To divest the Director,CIA, of his responsibilities as the Director, Central Intelligence, and to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, (DNI) directly under the President to co-ordinate the functioning of various intelligence agencies.
( c ). To place the NCTC under the supervision of the DNI and not under the heads of any of the intelligence agencies which will continue to have the responsibility for the collection of terrorism-related intelligence.
5. Since 2005, the US Counter-Terrorism architecture is as follows:
(a) Each agency has its own counter-terrorism division for the collection, analysis, assessment and fusion of intelligence and follow-up action.
(b) The NCTC co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies and ensures co-ordinated follow-up action. Its role is preventive and not in investigation and prosecution.
(c) The NCTC functions under the DNI. The heads of the agencies have no control over its functioning.
6.The GC Saxena Task Force on intelligence revamp, set up by the Government in 2000, studied the working of the CTC of the CIA and recommended the creation of a similar counter-terrorism centre to be placed in the IB consisting of officers of various agencies and headed by an IB officer. The Government created it in the IB, but for reasons not clear to me, called it a Multi-Agency Centre and not a counter-terrorism centre. It did not get going for a long time because of the reported reluctance of the R&AW and MI to depute their officers to work in the MAC under an IB officer.
7.The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. Normally, the recommendation of the Saxena Task Force for the creation of a CTC in the IB should have been re-examined in the light of the 9/11 strikes in the US and the exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA, which led to the decision to create the NCTC under the DNI. This was not done till the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
8. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai revealed more or less the same deficiencies in our counter-terrorism architecture as the deficiencies in the counter-terrorism architecture of the US revealed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes. Namely, inadequate intelligence and lack of co-ordinated follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. In his first statement to the Lok Sabha on the 26/11 terrorist strikes after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram said that the responsibility for follow-up action on available intelligence was found to be diffused.
9. Shortly thereafter, he had visited the US to study the working of the Department of Homeland Security and the NCTC, both of which came into being after 9/11. He came back a strong votary of two ideas: For the creation of a separate Ministry of Internal Security patterned after the Department of Homeland Security of the US and for the creation of an NCTC patterned after its US counterpart.
10. Shri Chidambaram’s ideas differed in one important respect from the Counter-terrorism architecture created in the US. In the US, the newly set up DNI oversees the functioning of the NCTC. Shri Chidambaram reportedly wanted that the entire counter-terrorism architecture, including the proposed NCTC, should function under the Minister for Home Affairs till his idea of a Ministry of Internal Security was accepted and implemented. That is, he wanted the National Security Adviser to be divested of all counter-terrorism responsibilities and the Home Minister to be made the counter-terrorism Czar of the Government of India.
11. There was speculation ( seemed well-informed) in the media at that time that Shri M.K. Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, viewed this as a negative reflection of his handling of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and strongly opposed the ideas of Shri Chidambaram. There was a long examination of Shri Chidambaram’s ideas. What has come out on January 12,2012, as a result of this examination is neither an ass nor a mule, but something in between and not recognisable.
12. There will be an emaciated-at-birth NCTC which will not be independent , but will form part of the IB. Thus, there will be no independent supervision over the performance of the follow-up action role. The NSA will have no responsibility for counter-terrorism. As desired by him, Shri Chidambaram will be the Czar for counter-terrorism, but he will be a Czar in Indian colours, not given the necessary tools for being an effective Czar.
13. In the US too, the NSA has no responsibility for counter-terrorism. This role is performed by an Adviser on Homeland Security to the President who is commonly referred to as the Adviser on Counter-Terrorism.
14. In my view, the proposed NCTC is unlikely to improve our capability for preventive action through effective follow-up action on the intelligence collected. ( 14-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, January 12, 2012
PAKISTAN: STILL ON THE BRINK
B.RAMAN
The War of Nerves in Pakistan, which has degenerated into a War of the Institutions of the State, shows no signs of ending.
2. The lack of self-restraint on the part of the three institutions involved in the war---the elected executive, the Army and the judiciary--- has kept the country on the brink. The inflexible stand taken by the three institutions has created the danger of a possible institutional collapse, the main beneficiaries of which could be neither the elected executive, nor the army nor the judiciary, but the jihadi elements opposed to a liberal democracy who are waiting in the wings for the collapse of the State.
3.The jihadi elements, who had always advocated the end of the liberal democracy on the ground that it gives greater importance to the will of the people than to the will of Allah, are hoping that the present civil war of the institutions, might pave the way for the replacement of a liberal democratic State by a jihadi State. If this happens, the implications will be serious not only for the people of Pakistan, but for the international community as a whole.
4. There is a real danger of Pakistan becoming a failed State not as a result of a collapse of its economy and/or system of governance, but as a result of the civil war being waged by the institutions of the State.
5. The Army has united behind Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). According to reliable sources, the Corps Commanders and the Principal Staff Officers, who held a strategy session at the GHQ in Rawalpindi on January 12,2012, threw their weight behind Kayani and Lt.General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, and decided that the ISI should provide security to Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, who unwittingly or deliberately triggered off the present confrontation, to enable him to testify before the Judicial Enquiry Commission appointed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury to enquire into the allegations made by Ijaz against Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to US, in connection with the so-called Memogate.
6.The same sources say that the Army is firm that Hussain Haqqani must be punished for what it looks upon as an act of treason in complaining to the US Government against the Pakistan Army and seeking Washington’s intervention in the matter. Punishment of Haqqani is the minimum that the Army demands as a price for relenting in its fight against the elected executive.
7. The seeming support of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to Haqqani even before the serious allegations made by Ijaz against him had been formally enquired into and their action in providing security to Haqqani while dragging their feet on the question of security to Ijaz have added to the anger of the Army.
8.The judiciary’s determination to go ahead with its enquiry into the allegations of Ijaz despite the non-cooperation of the executive has encouraged the inflexible stand of the Army.
9. Despite whatever one might say about the domination of the Army in the Pakistani State, the anger of the military class against the political class in general and Haqqani in particular for allegedly seeking the intervention of the US against the Pakistan Army has to be understood instead of being ridiculed. The credibility of Kayani as the leader of the military class---in the eyes of his senior officers as well as the rank and file--- could suffer if he is seen as taking a soft line on this issue.
10. To save Pakistan from a looming institutional collapse, three steps are necessary:
(a). A statement by the Government that the law will be allowed to take its course against Haqqani and that the Government will not stand in the way of the judicial enquiry into the matter.
(b).A public assurance by Kayani that all the Army wants is action against Haqqani and that it has no intention of staging a coup to overthrow the elected Government.
( c ). A reiteration by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the judiciary’s determination not to provide ex-post facto validation to any coup staged by the Army.
11. At a time when there is a crying need for wisdom, discretion and self-imposed restraint on the part of the political class as a whole, the opportunistic attempts of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan to exploit the situation for their partisan purposes could push Pakistan down the precipice.
12.US policy-makers, who have nothing to learn and nothing to forget from their experiences in Pakistan, are adding to the complexities of the situation by coming out with statements and remarks which are seen by the military class as sympathetic to Haqqani. The US has to realise that it no longer has the same influence over the Pakistan Army as it used to have before May 2 last when its special forces unilaterally raided Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden. (13-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The War of Nerves in Pakistan, which has degenerated into a War of the Institutions of the State, shows no signs of ending.
2. The lack of self-restraint on the part of the three institutions involved in the war---the elected executive, the Army and the judiciary--- has kept the country on the brink. The inflexible stand taken by the three institutions has created the danger of a possible institutional collapse, the main beneficiaries of which could be neither the elected executive, nor the army nor the judiciary, but the jihadi elements opposed to a liberal democracy who are waiting in the wings for the collapse of the State.
3.The jihadi elements, who had always advocated the end of the liberal democracy on the ground that it gives greater importance to the will of the people than to the will of Allah, are hoping that the present civil war of the institutions, might pave the way for the replacement of a liberal democratic State by a jihadi State. If this happens, the implications will be serious not only for the people of Pakistan, but for the international community as a whole.
4. There is a real danger of Pakistan becoming a failed State not as a result of a collapse of its economy and/or system of governance, but as a result of the civil war being waged by the institutions of the State.
5. The Army has united behind Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). According to reliable sources, the Corps Commanders and the Principal Staff Officers, who held a strategy session at the GHQ in Rawalpindi on January 12,2012, threw their weight behind Kayani and Lt.General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, and decided that the ISI should provide security to Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, who unwittingly or deliberately triggered off the present confrontation, to enable him to testify before the Judicial Enquiry Commission appointed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury to enquire into the allegations made by Ijaz against Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to US, in connection with the so-called Memogate.
6.The same sources say that the Army is firm that Hussain Haqqani must be punished for what it looks upon as an act of treason in complaining to the US Government against the Pakistan Army and seeking Washington’s intervention in the matter. Punishment of Haqqani is the minimum that the Army demands as a price for relenting in its fight against the elected executive.
7. The seeming support of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to Haqqani even before the serious allegations made by Ijaz against him had been formally enquired into and their action in providing security to Haqqani while dragging their feet on the question of security to Ijaz have added to the anger of the Army.
8.The judiciary’s determination to go ahead with its enquiry into the allegations of Ijaz despite the non-cooperation of the executive has encouraged the inflexible stand of the Army.
9. Despite whatever one might say about the domination of the Army in the Pakistani State, the anger of the military class against the political class in general and Haqqani in particular for allegedly seeking the intervention of the US against the Pakistan Army has to be understood instead of being ridiculed. The credibility of Kayani as the leader of the military class---in the eyes of his senior officers as well as the rank and file--- could suffer if he is seen as taking a soft line on this issue.
10. To save Pakistan from a looming institutional collapse, three steps are necessary:
(a). A statement by the Government that the law will be allowed to take its course against Haqqani and that the Government will not stand in the way of the judicial enquiry into the matter.
(b).A public assurance by Kayani that all the Army wants is action against Haqqani and that it has no intention of staging a coup to overthrow the elected Government.
( c ). A reiteration by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the judiciary’s determination not to provide ex-post facto validation to any coup staged by the Army.
11. At a time when there is a crying need for wisdom, discretion and self-imposed restraint on the part of the political class as a whole, the opportunistic attempts of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan to exploit the situation for their partisan purposes could push Pakistan down the precipice.
12.US policy-makers, who have nothing to learn and nothing to forget from their experiences in Pakistan, are adding to the complexities of the situation by coming out with statements and remarks which are seen by the military class as sympathetic to Haqqani. The US has to realise that it no longer has the same influence over the Pakistan Army as it used to have before May 2 last when its special forces unilaterally raided Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden. (13-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
PAKISTAN:MAKING SENSE OUT OF WAR OF NERVES & WAR OF TWEETS
B.RAMAN
There are four factors in the current War of Nerves in Pakistan which centres around mutually contradictory perceptions of the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of the actions taken by different institutions of the state in relation to the hearing in the Pakistan Supreme Court on the veracity of the so-called Memogate.
2. To recall, the Memogate scandal refers to the allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, that the civilian leadership in Pakistan apprehended a coup by the Army after the US raid in Abbottabad on May 2 last which led to the death of Osama bin Laden. Ijaz had further alleged that in the wake of these fears the civilian Government used his contacts in the US administration through Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador in Washington DC, for having a memo reached to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeking US intervention to prevent a coup.
3. The allegations of Ijaz triggered off three parallel enquiries---- by the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), by the committee on national security of the National Assembly assisted by the Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme Court.
4. The Army was the first to move in the matter. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), despatched Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, to question Ijaz in Europe and take over from him his phone records pertaining to his telephone conversations with Haqqani in this matter. Kayani did not keep the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani informed of his action in this matter.
5. While it would be difficult to characterise the Army’s action as unconstitutional or illegal, it was definitely incorrect. Kayani should have taken the prior clearance of Gilani before despatching Pasha to Europe for questioning Ijaz.
6. The Govt of Gilani was the second to move in the matter. It moved for an enquiry by the Committee on National Security of the National Assembly into the allegations of Ijaz, which were denied by Haqqani, who returned to Islamabad to face the enquiry and resigned. The Govt. ordered the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Police, to assist the enquiry by the National Assembly committee. It did not seek the assistance of the ISI in the enquiry.
7.Up to this point, the action of Gilani was constitutional, legal and correct. But after moving for an enquiry by the National Assembly committee, Gilani took another action which was incorrect and which could turn out post facto to be illegal if Haqqani is found guilty of treason for seeking the intervention of a foreign power against the Pakistan Army. Gilani took Haqqani under his physical protection instead of ordering the Police to strengthen his physical security. Initially, Haqqani allegedly lived in the house of Zardari and then moved into a building controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office and its security set-up. This was totally unwise on the part of Gilani.
8. The Supreme Court was the third to move in to add to the confusion. It received a number of private interest petitions seeking a judicial enquiry into the allegations made by Ijaz against Haqqani. One of the petitions was from Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister and the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz faction ). The main intention of Nawaz in moving his petition was to exploit Ijaz’s allegations in his campaign against President Asif Ali Zardari and to teach a lesson to Haqqani, who in the 1990s had betrayed Nawaz by defecting from the PML to Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
9. Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury issued notices to the various dramatis personae calling for their comments on the sustainability of Nawaz’s petition and the follow-up action to be taken by the Supreme Court on it. The Govt. of Gilani held that Nawaz’s petition for a judicial enquiry was unsustainable and that only the National Assembly Committee was competent to enquire into it. The Army took up a position which indirectly endorsed the demand for a judicial enquiry on the ground that the allegations made by Ijaz, if true, had national security implications. The Defence Secretary, in his reply to the Supreme Court, took up a position which sought to endorse the position of Kayani and not Gilani.
10. Kayani and Pasha had submitted their proposed replies to the Supreme Court to the Defence Secretary Lt.Gen. (retd) Khalid Naeem Lodhi for vetting before forwarding them to the Supreme Court. The Defence Secretary allegedly forwarded their replies in toto to the Supreme Court without telling Gilani about it and without the approval of the Cabinet as required under the rules of procedure relating to Govt. business..
11. There was a furore in the PPP and the ruling coalition over the actions of the Defence Secretary who has been removed from his post by Gilani after an enquiry into his unauthorised actions.
12. After considering the replies received from the dramatis personae, the Chief Justice rejected the opposition of the Gilani Government to a judicial enquiry and ordered a judicial enquiry by a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court and consisting, among others, of one more provincial Chief Justice. Hussain Haqqani has challenged the constitutionality of the action of the Chief Justice in appointing an enquiry commission consisting, among others, of judges of provincial courts. While the Chief Justice plays a role in the appointment of the judges of the provincial courts, under the Pakistan Constitution, according to Haqqani’s petition, the provincial High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court. While the Chief Justice can appoint an enquiry commission consisting of judges of the Supreme Court, he cannot include provincial judges in it. In such matters, the power to appoint an enquiry commission with judges of provincial courts is with the Government and not with the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice has admitted Haqqani’s petition and ordered a hearing into it. But he has not accepted Haqqani’s request for a stay of the proceedings of the judicial commission till the hearing is completed and a ruling is given.
13. In the meanwhile, knowingly or unwittingly, China became a factor in the internal controversy between the Government of Gilani and Kayani. The COAS went on a five-day visit to China on January 4. During his talks in Beijing, Chinese leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, highlighted the role of the Pakistan Army in the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Before Kayani left for Beijing, the party-controlled People’s Daily sought an interview with Gilani on the on-going controversy. In his replies to questions from the People’s Daily, Gilani reportedly described the actions of Kayani and Pasha in submitting their replies to the Supreme Court directly without getting them vetted and approved by the Government as unconstitutional and illegal.
14. So far, my google searches have not yielded an authentic version of Gilani’s interview to the People’s Daily. The only version that is available is the one disseminated by the Pakistani media. Since Gilani has not denied Pakistani media reports of his interview to the People’s Daily, the Pakistani media reports in this regard must be taken as correct.
15.The most significant part of this injected China factor is that Beijing has praised the Army during Kayani’s visit without referring to his tussle with the Government and at the same time used the party journal for disseminating Gilani’s version of the tussle. Thus, it has sought to remove any impression that its sympathies were with the Army.
16.Kayani has reacted promptly to Gilani’s allegations made in his reported interview to the People’s Daily. In a statement issued through the media cell of the GHQ, the Army said: “There can be no allegation more serious than what the honourable prime minister has levelled against COAS and DG ISI and has unfortunately charged the officers for violation of the constitution. This has very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country”. The statement has underlined the fact that the replies of Kayani and Pasha were forwarded to the court through the Defence Secretary and not directly and hence there is no unconstitutionality or illegality by the Army and the ISI.
17. The statement significantly added: “. Allegiance to state and the constitution is and will always remain prime consideration for the respondent, who in this case has followed the book.”
18. What are the implications? The Defence Secretary, Kayani and Pasha were enjoying an extended tenure granted by the Government. The post-retirement contract of the Defence Secretary has been terminated by the Government due to his role in the controversy. The Army and the ISI apprehend that the Government might be contemplating a similar reversal of the extended tenure granted to Kayani and Pasha.
19. The Army has conveyed a message to the civilian leadership that while it has no intention of acting against the Government at present, it may not hesitate to act if the Government humiliates Kayani and Pasha by having them removed from office by cancelling their extended tenure. ( 12-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
There are four factors in the current War of Nerves in Pakistan which centres around mutually contradictory perceptions of the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of the actions taken by different institutions of the state in relation to the hearing in the Pakistan Supreme Court on the veracity of the so-called Memogate.
2. To recall, the Memogate scandal refers to the allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, that the civilian leadership in Pakistan apprehended a coup by the Army after the US raid in Abbottabad on May 2 last which led to the death of Osama bin Laden. Ijaz had further alleged that in the wake of these fears the civilian Government used his contacts in the US administration through Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador in Washington DC, for having a memo reached to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeking US intervention to prevent a coup.
3. The allegations of Ijaz triggered off three parallel enquiries---- by the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), by the committee on national security of the National Assembly assisted by the Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme Court.
4. The Army was the first to move in the matter. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), despatched Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, to question Ijaz in Europe and take over from him his phone records pertaining to his telephone conversations with Haqqani in this matter. Kayani did not keep the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani informed of his action in this matter.
5. While it would be difficult to characterise the Army’s action as unconstitutional or illegal, it was definitely incorrect. Kayani should have taken the prior clearance of Gilani before despatching Pasha to Europe for questioning Ijaz.
6. The Govt of Gilani was the second to move in the matter. It moved for an enquiry by the Committee on National Security of the National Assembly into the allegations of Ijaz, which were denied by Haqqani, who returned to Islamabad to face the enquiry and resigned. The Govt. ordered the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Police, to assist the enquiry by the National Assembly committee. It did not seek the assistance of the ISI in the enquiry.
7.Up to this point, the action of Gilani was constitutional, legal and correct. But after moving for an enquiry by the National Assembly committee, Gilani took another action which was incorrect and which could turn out post facto to be illegal if Haqqani is found guilty of treason for seeking the intervention of a foreign power against the Pakistan Army. Gilani took Haqqani under his physical protection instead of ordering the Police to strengthen his physical security. Initially, Haqqani allegedly lived in the house of Zardari and then moved into a building controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office and its security set-up. This was totally unwise on the part of Gilani.
8. The Supreme Court was the third to move in to add to the confusion. It received a number of private interest petitions seeking a judicial enquiry into the allegations made by Ijaz against Haqqani. One of the petitions was from Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister and the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz faction ). The main intention of Nawaz in moving his petition was to exploit Ijaz’s allegations in his campaign against President Asif Ali Zardari and to teach a lesson to Haqqani, who in the 1990s had betrayed Nawaz by defecting from the PML to Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
9. Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury issued notices to the various dramatis personae calling for their comments on the sustainability of Nawaz’s petition and the follow-up action to be taken by the Supreme Court on it. The Govt. of Gilani held that Nawaz’s petition for a judicial enquiry was unsustainable and that only the National Assembly Committee was competent to enquire into it. The Army took up a position which indirectly endorsed the demand for a judicial enquiry on the ground that the allegations made by Ijaz, if true, had national security implications. The Defence Secretary, in his reply to the Supreme Court, took up a position which sought to endorse the position of Kayani and not Gilani.
10. Kayani and Pasha had submitted their proposed replies to the Supreme Court to the Defence Secretary Lt.Gen. (retd) Khalid Naeem Lodhi for vetting before forwarding them to the Supreme Court. The Defence Secretary allegedly forwarded their replies in toto to the Supreme Court without telling Gilani about it and without the approval of the Cabinet as required under the rules of procedure relating to Govt. business..
11. There was a furore in the PPP and the ruling coalition over the actions of the Defence Secretary who has been removed from his post by Gilani after an enquiry into his unauthorised actions.
12. After considering the replies received from the dramatis personae, the Chief Justice rejected the opposition of the Gilani Government to a judicial enquiry and ordered a judicial enquiry by a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court and consisting, among others, of one more provincial Chief Justice. Hussain Haqqani has challenged the constitutionality of the action of the Chief Justice in appointing an enquiry commission consisting, among others, of judges of provincial courts. While the Chief Justice plays a role in the appointment of the judges of the provincial courts, under the Pakistan Constitution, according to Haqqani’s petition, the provincial High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court. While the Chief Justice can appoint an enquiry commission consisting of judges of the Supreme Court, he cannot include provincial judges in it. In such matters, the power to appoint an enquiry commission with judges of provincial courts is with the Government and not with the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice has admitted Haqqani’s petition and ordered a hearing into it. But he has not accepted Haqqani’s request for a stay of the proceedings of the judicial commission till the hearing is completed and a ruling is given.
13. In the meanwhile, knowingly or unwittingly, China became a factor in the internal controversy between the Government of Gilani and Kayani. The COAS went on a five-day visit to China on January 4. During his talks in Beijing, Chinese leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, highlighted the role of the Pakistan Army in the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Before Kayani left for Beijing, the party-controlled People’s Daily sought an interview with Gilani on the on-going controversy. In his replies to questions from the People’s Daily, Gilani reportedly described the actions of Kayani and Pasha in submitting their replies to the Supreme Court directly without getting them vetted and approved by the Government as unconstitutional and illegal.
14. So far, my google searches have not yielded an authentic version of Gilani’s interview to the People’s Daily. The only version that is available is the one disseminated by the Pakistani media. Since Gilani has not denied Pakistani media reports of his interview to the People’s Daily, the Pakistani media reports in this regard must be taken as correct.
15.The most significant part of this injected China factor is that Beijing has praised the Army during Kayani’s visit without referring to his tussle with the Government and at the same time used the party journal for disseminating Gilani’s version of the tussle. Thus, it has sought to remove any impression that its sympathies were with the Army.
16.Kayani has reacted promptly to Gilani’s allegations made in his reported interview to the People’s Daily. In a statement issued through the media cell of the GHQ, the Army said: “There can be no allegation more serious than what the honourable prime minister has levelled against COAS and DG ISI and has unfortunately charged the officers for violation of the constitution. This has very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country”. The statement has underlined the fact that the replies of Kayani and Pasha were forwarded to the court through the Defence Secretary and not directly and hence there is no unconstitutionality or illegality by the Army and the ISI.
17. The statement significantly added: “. Allegiance to state and the constitution is and will always remain prime consideration for the respondent, who in this case has followed the book.”
18. What are the implications? The Defence Secretary, Kayani and Pasha were enjoying an extended tenure granted by the Government. The post-retirement contract of the Defence Secretary has been terminated by the Government due to his role in the controversy. The Army and the ISI apprehend that the Government might be contemplating a similar reversal of the extended tenure granted to Kayani and Pasha.
19. The Army has conveyed a message to the civilian leadership that while it has no intention of acting against the Government at present, it may not hesitate to act if the Government humiliates Kayani and Pasha by having them removed from office by cancelling their extended tenure. ( 12-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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