B.RAMAN
Certain recent events in the Maldives attributed to Islamic hardliners and their opportunistic political supporters need the attention of the Indian authorities. These events indicate support from small sections of the population for an Islamic campaign in favour of an ideology that seems to have been inspired by that of the Taliban of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
2.The number of people supporting this ideological campaign is still small, but the fact that these forces, however small, have established a base for their activities in a country known for its tolerant society should be a matter of concern.
3.The Maldivian authorities have till now succeeded in keeping these forces under control by rallying the tolerant sections of the population, but there is a danger of the anger over the economic difficulties faced by the population being exploited by Islamic hardliners for a religious radicalisation of the population.
4. A wake-up call was sounded during the SAARC summit in November when these elements vandalised and allegedly stole two monuments gifted to the Maldives by President Mahinda Rajapakse of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan. They objected to these monuments as anti-Islamic on the ground that they contained idols.
5. It was reported that the monument gifted by Sri Lanka contained a statue of a lion, the national symbol of Sri Lanka, and that the one gifted by Pakistan had a depiction of the Buddha. Following protests by the Islamic hardliners, Pakistan reportedly agreed to re-design the monument in order to remove the depiction of the Buddha, but despite this attempts were allegedly made to set it on fire and it was stolen.
6. The religious Adhaalath Party and the party of former President of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the Progressive Party of the Maldives (PPM), proclaimed those responsible for vandalising the monument to be “national heroes”.
7. The Adhaalath Party President Sheikh Imran Abdulla told the local media that the monument gifted by Pakistan “should not be kept on Maldivian soil for a single day” and “should be removed immediately.” He added: “We believe it conflicts with the constitution of the Maldives, the Religious Unity Act of 1994 and the regulations under the Act because it depicted objects of worship that denied the oneness of God.”
8. A Member of the Progressive Party of the Maldives (PPM), Ahmed ‘Marz’ Saleem, filed a case with the police against the Maldives Customs Department for allowing ’idols’ to be imported to the Maldives for the SAARC Summit. He accused the Government of attempting “to erase Islam from the country.” He alleged that the Government had dissolved the Quran Department, the Arabiyya School and separate mosques for women.
9. These incidents were followed by two demonstrations on December 23,2011, one in support of the Government and against the Islamic hardliners and the other organised by the Islamic hardliners. The demonstration by the Islamic hardliners reportedly attracted about 5000 people whereas many more responded to the demonstration in support of the Government.
10. The demonstration in support of Islam was spearheaded by a coalition of six parties and some non-Governmental organisations. The demonstrators were wearing T-Shirts reading “Maldivians in defense of Islam”. They carried placards and banners reading as follows: “We stand united for Islam and the nation”, “No idols in this holy land”, “No to the Zionist Murderers”, “No to El Al Airlines” and “We stand for peace” . It has been alleged that to promote tourism the Government has allowed Israel’s El Al Airlines to operate a service to the Maldives.
11. The speakers at a meeting organised by the hardliners denied that they are supporting jihadi terrorism. Till now the indications are that the main aim of this coalition is to use the slogan of danger to Islam as a weapon to win the Presidential elections due in 2013. It should be a matter of concern if their ill-advised exploitation of religious issues to discredit President Nasheed plays into the hands of fundamentalist elements alien to the tolerant culture of the Maldives and creates a mini epi-centre of Islamic fundamentalism to the south of India. ( 25-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, December 25, 2011
Saturday, December 24, 2011
UK TRAVEL ADVISORY ON MALDIVES : POSSIBLE SOCIAL UNREST
B.RAMAN
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has issued the following reviewed and updated travel advisory on the Maldives on December 25,2011:
“Maldives has been going through a period of political transition. Social unrest is possible and some past demonstrations on the capital, Malé, and other islands have resulted in violence. You should avoid demonstrations and beware of spontaneous gatherings. A number of protests have recently taken place in Malé and we are aware of reports that further demonstrations are being organised, including on 23 December. Please exercise caution at this time.
“There is no British diplomatic mission in Maldives. A Consular Correspondent in the capital, Malé can liaise with the British High Commission in Sri Lanka on emergency consular matters. They can be contacted through the British High Commission in Colombo.
‘There is a general threat from terrorism and attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places frequented by expatriates, foreign travellers including tourists.
‘The main types of incident for which British nationals required consular assistance in Maldives in 2009 were for lost/stolen passports and hospitalisations. Petty crime occurs and you should take care of your valuables and other personal possessions.
“All British nationals who are resident and/or working in Maldives should register with the British High Commission in Colombo.
“You should take out comprehensive travel and medical insurance before travelling.” (25-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has issued the following reviewed and updated travel advisory on the Maldives on December 25,2011:
“Maldives has been going through a period of political transition. Social unrest is possible and some past demonstrations on the capital, Malé, and other islands have resulted in violence. You should avoid demonstrations and beware of spontaneous gatherings. A number of protests have recently taken place in Malé and we are aware of reports that further demonstrations are being organised, including on 23 December. Please exercise caution at this time.
“There is no British diplomatic mission in Maldives. A Consular Correspondent in the capital, Malé can liaise with the British High Commission in Sri Lanka on emergency consular matters. They can be contacted through the British High Commission in Colombo.
‘There is a general threat from terrorism and attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places frequented by expatriates, foreign travellers including tourists.
‘The main types of incident for which British nationals required consular assistance in Maldives in 2009 were for lost/stolen passports and hospitalisations. Petty crime occurs and you should take care of your valuables and other personal possessions.
“All British nationals who are resident and/or working in Maldives should register with the British High Commission in Colombo.
“You should take out comprehensive travel and medical insurance before travelling.” (25-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
PAKISTAN ARMY: BACK FROM THE BARRACKS---NEED FOR ALERT IN INDIA
B.RAMAN
Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who had taken the Army back into the barracks after succeeding Gen.Pervez Musharraf as the COAS and announced that the Army would no longer dabble in politics, has reversed his past stand and re-asserted the role of the Army as one among equals --- along with the Executive, legislature and the judiciary--- in matters concerning national security.
2. His action in filing before the Supreme Court a separate affidavit in connection with the enquiry being undertaken by the court under Chief justice Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhury into L’Affaire Memogate, without getting the affidavit vetted by the Ministry of Defence and approved by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani indicates the assertion of the right of the Army to take an independent view in matters concerning national security without having its view approved by the elected Executive.
3.L’Affaire Memogate refers to the allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, that at the instance of Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador to the US, he (Ijaz) had passed on a memo drafted by him (Ijaz) to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressing the concerns of the Pakistan Government over the possibility of a military coup after the US raid into Abbottabad on May 2 last to kill Osama bin Laden.
4. The matter is already under enquiry by a committee of the National Assembly and Haqqani has resigned as the Ambassador to the US. Expressing his dissatisfaction over the enquiry by the committee of the National Assembly, Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif), who himself was overthrown in a coup in 1999 by the Army then headed by Musharraf, filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking an enquiry by the court. Other petitions on similar lines have also been filed by private individuals.
5. Taking notice of these petitions, the Supreme Court had called for affidavits giving their comments, inter alia, from President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, the Ministry of Defence, Haqqani, Ijaz, Kayani and Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The affidavits submitted by Kayani and Pasha do not oppose the enquiry by the Supreme Court whereas the Government’s view has been that since a committee of the National Assembly was already enquiring into the matter, there was no need for an enquiry by the court.
6. Kayani and Pasha have taken a diametrically opposite stand of not questioning the need for a separate enquiry by the court. A careful reading of their affidavits would also indicate that they do not question the veracity of the claims of Ijaz which have been strongly denied by Haqqani. Thus acting independently, the Army has taken a stand which is at variance with the stand of the Government and Haqqani and has sought to give credence to the version of Ijaz.
7. An equally intriguing aspect is that Lt Gen (retd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi , Defence Secretary, submitted his own affidavit to the court without getting it cleared by the Government. In this affidavit, he took up the stand that the Army and the ISI were not under the operational control of the Ministry of Defence. What this amounts to is his saying that Kayani and Pasha were entitled to take up an independent stand before the court without having it approved by the Government.
8.It is this open assertion before the court of the independence of the army in national security matters in an enquiry initiated on the basis of a petition by Nawaz that made Gilani express in comments to the National Assembly and at a public gathering that there was a conspiracy against the Government. He also rejected the notion of the independence of the Army in national security matters and underlined that the Army is subordinate to the Government and cannot be a state within the state.
9. In comments apparently in response to those of Gilani, Kayani, during a visit to Army posts in the Mohmand and Kurram agencies on December 23,2011, denied the feverish speculations of a possible coup and asserted the correctness of the position taken by the Army on the Memogate issue. He reportedly said: “Irrespective of all other considerations, there can be no compromise on national security.” He strongly dispelled the speculations of a military takeover and said that “these are misleading and are being used as a bogey to divert focus from the real issues.”
10. In separate comments, Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury has ruled out any ex-post facto validation of a coup. There has never been any danger of a coup because of the present independence of the judiciary.
11. The real outcome of the present controversy is that the elected Government has found whatever little control it had over the Army eroded. The Army is back from the barracks as a political gladiator, determined to play an independent role in matters concerning national security without having to secure the approval of the civilian Government.
12. What we are seeing in Pakistan is not a de jure military coup that would require ex-post facto validation by the court, but a de facto coup that would not require any such validation.
13.It is likely that the Army, to further assert its independence and to rally the support of the religious parties and jihadi forces, might encourage and incite these forces to increase their activities against India in order to re-justify the primacy of the army in national security matters and to underline that the Army better protects national interests than the elected civilian leadership. India has to be alert to the dangers of a new surge in terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and new attacks of mass fatality terrorism in the rest of India. (24-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who had taken the Army back into the barracks after succeeding Gen.Pervez Musharraf as the COAS and announced that the Army would no longer dabble in politics, has reversed his past stand and re-asserted the role of the Army as one among equals --- along with the Executive, legislature and the judiciary--- in matters concerning national security.
2. His action in filing before the Supreme Court a separate affidavit in connection with the enquiry being undertaken by the court under Chief justice Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhury into L’Affaire Memogate, without getting the affidavit vetted by the Ministry of Defence and approved by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani indicates the assertion of the right of the Army to take an independent view in matters concerning national security without having its view approved by the elected Executive.
3.L’Affaire Memogate refers to the allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, that at the instance of Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador to the US, he (Ijaz) had passed on a memo drafted by him (Ijaz) to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressing the concerns of the Pakistan Government over the possibility of a military coup after the US raid into Abbottabad on May 2 last to kill Osama bin Laden.
4. The matter is already under enquiry by a committee of the National Assembly and Haqqani has resigned as the Ambassador to the US. Expressing his dissatisfaction over the enquiry by the committee of the National Assembly, Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif), who himself was overthrown in a coup in 1999 by the Army then headed by Musharraf, filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking an enquiry by the court. Other petitions on similar lines have also been filed by private individuals.
5. Taking notice of these petitions, the Supreme Court had called for affidavits giving their comments, inter alia, from President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, the Ministry of Defence, Haqqani, Ijaz, Kayani and Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The affidavits submitted by Kayani and Pasha do not oppose the enquiry by the Supreme Court whereas the Government’s view has been that since a committee of the National Assembly was already enquiring into the matter, there was no need for an enquiry by the court.
6. Kayani and Pasha have taken a diametrically opposite stand of not questioning the need for a separate enquiry by the court. A careful reading of their affidavits would also indicate that they do not question the veracity of the claims of Ijaz which have been strongly denied by Haqqani. Thus acting independently, the Army has taken a stand which is at variance with the stand of the Government and Haqqani and has sought to give credence to the version of Ijaz.
7. An equally intriguing aspect is that Lt Gen (retd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi , Defence Secretary, submitted his own affidavit to the court without getting it cleared by the Government. In this affidavit, he took up the stand that the Army and the ISI were not under the operational control of the Ministry of Defence. What this amounts to is his saying that Kayani and Pasha were entitled to take up an independent stand before the court without having it approved by the Government.
8.It is this open assertion before the court of the independence of the army in national security matters in an enquiry initiated on the basis of a petition by Nawaz that made Gilani express in comments to the National Assembly and at a public gathering that there was a conspiracy against the Government. He also rejected the notion of the independence of the Army in national security matters and underlined that the Army is subordinate to the Government and cannot be a state within the state.
9. In comments apparently in response to those of Gilani, Kayani, during a visit to Army posts in the Mohmand and Kurram agencies on December 23,2011, denied the feverish speculations of a possible coup and asserted the correctness of the position taken by the Army on the Memogate issue. He reportedly said: “Irrespective of all other considerations, there can be no compromise on national security.” He strongly dispelled the speculations of a military takeover and said that “these are misleading and are being used as a bogey to divert focus from the real issues.”
10. In separate comments, Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury has ruled out any ex-post facto validation of a coup. There has never been any danger of a coup because of the present independence of the judiciary.
11. The real outcome of the present controversy is that the elected Government has found whatever little control it had over the Army eroded. The Army is back from the barracks as a political gladiator, determined to play an independent role in matters concerning national security without having to secure the approval of the civilian Government.
12. What we are seeing in Pakistan is not a de jure military coup that would require ex-post facto validation by the court, but a de facto coup that would not require any such validation.
13.It is likely that the Army, to further assert its independence and to rally the support of the religious parties and jihadi forces, might encourage and incite these forces to increase their activities against India in order to re-justify the primacy of the army in national security matters and to underline that the Army better protects national interests than the elected civilian leadership. India has to be alert to the dangers of a new surge in terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and new attacks of mass fatality terrorism in the rest of India. (24-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, December 19, 2011
KIM JONG-UN: LITTLE KNOWN RULER OF AN UNPREDICTABLE STATE
B.RAMAN
One need not be surprised by the regional and global nervousness over the death of Kim Jong-Il, the ruler of North Korea, following a heart attack reportedly suffered by him on board a train on the morning of December 17,2011, and by the naming of his third son and party-anointed successor Kim Jong-Un (pronounced Kim Jong-Woon) as the new ruler by the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and Government within two days of Kim Jong-Il’s death. Kim Jong-Un is still to be appointed as the General Secretary of the Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which are the official designations of the ruler of North Korea. Kim Jong-Un can be elected to these posts only by the Party Central Committee. Kim Il-Sung, the first President, was designated after his death in 1994 as the “Eternal President”. Hence nobody else is designated as the President.
2.The fact that the death of Kim Jong-Il and his succession as expected by Kim Jong-Un were announced so fast would indicate that there was no apparent attempt to challenge his succession either by other members of the family or by senior elements in the party and the Army, which had a role in decision-making.
3. The reports of considerable nervousness--even in China which had a benign and close relationship with Kim Jong-Il—could be attributed to the fact that so little was known politically about North Korea and its new ruler to friends as well as perceived foes of the country.
4.North Korea is the only post-cold war remnant of an old style Communist State, with an old style communist political structure, with old-style secretive ways of functioning. However, it differed from other Communist States of the past in its dynastic succession. Its founder in 1948 Kim Il-Sung was succeeded on his death in 1994 by his son Kim Jong-il , who in turn has now been succeeded by Kim Jong-Un.
5. Kim Jong-il had been groomed by his father for over 10 years to be his successor. He, therefore, had no challengers on his assuming office in 1994 and thereafter. The 28-year-old Kim Jong-Un, on the contrary, had been groomed by his father hardly for 15 months before he found himself exercising the powers of the office. It is, therefore, natural that many observers of North Korea, even in China, apprehend that Kim Jong-Un might not have had sufficient time to overcome opposition to his rise in power from family circles---particularly his two elder brothers who were overlooked by his father on the reported ground that they were unfit to rule the country--- as well as from the party and the Korean People’s Army, the main pillars of power in the world’s remaining State concealed from the rest of the international community by a communist-style iron curtain.
6. So little is known about North Korea---its political infrastructure, its decision-making apparatus, the inter-personal and inter-institutional relationships that determine political stability, the state of its economy and its military mind-set. To the outside world ---particularly to its neighbour South Korea--- North Korea has been an unpredictable State with unpredictable reflexes and adventurist impulses.
7. Even less is known about the new ruler. All that is known about the pre-2009 brand of Kim Jong-Un is that he was the third son of his father born to his third wife --- reportedly a Japanese of Korean origin--- that he had at least three, if not longer, years of schooling in the international school of Berne, the capital of Switzerland, where he acquired a working knowledge of English, French and German, that on his return from his Swiss school he studied from 2002 to 2006 in the Kim Il-Sung military university named after his grandfather. He became active in party and Government affairs in 2007 as a member of the organisational committee of the party and as an official of the Ministry of Public Security, which was responsible for the collection of external intelligence.
8. Till 2009, his name had never figured even in rumours as a possible successor to Kim Jong-Il. He was considered too young and too inexperienced in party and Army affairs with very little exposure to the party as well as the Army. The general expectation till 2009 was that one of his two elder brothers might succeed Kim Jong-Il. Following a stroke reportedly suffered by Kim Jong-Il around this period, rumours started circulating in South Korea that Kim Jong-Il was disillusioned with his two elder sons and was, therefore, contemplating to make Kim Jong-Un his would-be successor at the third conference of the WPK, which was scheduled to be held on September 28,2010.
9. These rumours acquired credence in August 2010, when Kim Jong-Il undertook an official visit to China----the second in the year that was very unusual--- a month before the party conference. There were strong rumours that Kim Jong-Un had accompanied his father.
10. Kim's visit was confined to Jilin and Heilongjiang, where he visited several agricultural and industrial establishments---- reportedly in order to learn from the Chinese experience in the modernisation of its economy. In this connection, the Chinese media referred to a visit earlier made by him ----without saying when--- to Vietnam to learn from its experience in modernisation. Kim Jong-Il visited a food processing factory, a high-speed train factory and an elementary school in Jilin where his father had studied in the 1920s.
11. The Chinese State TV reported that President Hu Jintao had met Kim Jong-il in Changchun, the capital of the Jilin province, on August 27, 2010. It carried visuals of the meeting between the two leaders and a report on a banquet hosted by Hu in honour of the North Korean leader.
12. An important objective of the visit was to brief the Chinese leaders about what Kim Jong-Il called "the rising generation" and to reassure Beijing that the expected generational changes would not affect North Korean bonds with China. He was quoted as having stated as follows at the banquet hosted by President Hu: "With the international situation remaining complicated, it is our important historical mission to hand over to the rising generation the baton of the traditional friendship passed over by the revolutionary forerunners of the two countries as a precious asset so as to carry it forward through generations."
13. This strengthened speculation that at the party meeting in September,2010, Kim Jong-Il might officially indicate his plans for his succession which might involve the elevation of Kim Jong-Un. Why did Kim Jong-Il feel the need to reassure the Chinese that the "rising generation" would be as close to China as the present generation and the preceding one of his father? Was his visit to the Chinese school which his father had attended meant to emphasise the close links of his family with China and calm possible Chinese misgivings about the impact of the Swiss upbringing of Kim Jong-Un on future North Korean policies?
14. China has reasons to be worried by the rise of Kim Jong-un to power. He has never studied in China in so far as it is known, he has had very little exposure to China, its leadership and people and his only limited exposure to the outside world has been in Switzerland. Would it have any impact on North Korea’s policies. King Jong-il apparently anticipated that such questions would trouble Beijing were his third son to become his successor and he wanted to reassure them that there would be no change in the primacy accorded by North Korea to its relations with China.
15.Chinese views over what could happen in North Korea after Kim Jong-il were reflected in a “Global Times” article of September 28, 2010, which said: “Despite varied versions of the successor choice and to which post the figure will be elevated to at the meeting, some analysts are dismissing the possibility of political chaos as a result of such a transition, saying the country won't undergo any significant policy change that could pose downsides on the security situation of the Korean Peninsula and northeast Asia. A stable North Korea is in China's national interests, regardless of who will be the next leader, experts say.”
16. The visit to China by the father and reportedly his son too was followed by the expected elevation of Kim Jong-Un at the party conference held on September 28,2010. Kim Jong-Un and Kim Kyong Hui, the 64-year-old influential sister of Kim Jong-Il, were elected as members of the 124-member Central Committee. But, surprisingly, while Kim Kyong Hui was elected a member of the important Politbureau of the Central Committee, Kim Jong-Un was not, thereby giving her a more important position in the party. The speculation was that she and her husband would act as mentors in putting Kim Jong-Un through his paces. Will they be content with doing so or will they try to upstage Kim Jong-Un and manipulate themselves into power. This is a question that would worry Kim Jong-Un in the months to come.
17. The party conference also elected Kim Jong-Un as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the other Vice-Chairman being Ri Yong Ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA). While Kim Jong-Un, who had never held a military rank before, was appointed a General, Ri Yong Ho was promoted as Vice-Marshal. Thus, Ri Yong Ho was given a more important position in the Commission.
18.Thus, Kim Jong-Un was given only the third position in the Party after his father and aunt and the third position in the Central Military Commission after his father and Ho. Despite this, the message that came out from the conference was that it had endorsed Kim Jong-Il’s plans to make his third son his successor. Till now, there were no reports of any opposition to this.
19. The transition in North Korea would be of great interest and concern to China, South Korea, Japan, the US and India. Any political instability in North Korea could cause large refugee influx into China. China would be nervous over the dangers of Kim Jong-Un cutting North Korea’s links with China and giving his policies a pro-Western orientation. For South Korea, the transition could be a threat as well as an opportunity. A threat because of the possibility of an insecure leader giving full rein to North Korea’s adventurist impulses that would most probably be directed at South Korea. An opportunity because of the possibility of a more moderate leader working towards a re-unification of the two Koreas.
20. South Korea, Japan and the US would be worried over the nuclear policies of the new ruler. Would he be inclined to resume the six-power talks on the nuclear issue or would he maintain the present hardline in his attempt to avoid any threat from the army or make it even harder.
21. Indian concerns would be over North Korea’s nuclear and missile relationship with Pakistan. This picked up momentum under Kim Jong-Il after Benazir Bhutto’s visit to North Korea during her second tenure as the Prime Minister (1993-96) and have continued since then. Will Kim Jong-Un maintain this relationship or even develop it further?
22. It is likely that till Kim Jong-Un consolidates his position and feels secure in office, he would continue his father’s policy of close relations with China and placating the Army’s expectations on the nuclear issue---whether on the question of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal or its military and missile supply relationship with Pakistan. Any new policy initiatives are unlikely.
23. If there is instability arising from a post-succession power struggle, North Korea’s unpredictable and adventurist impulses could come to the fore. ( 19-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
One need not be surprised by the regional and global nervousness over the death of Kim Jong-Il, the ruler of North Korea, following a heart attack reportedly suffered by him on board a train on the morning of December 17,2011, and by the naming of his third son and party-anointed successor Kim Jong-Un (pronounced Kim Jong-Woon) as the new ruler by the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and Government within two days of Kim Jong-Il’s death. Kim Jong-Un is still to be appointed as the General Secretary of the Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which are the official designations of the ruler of North Korea. Kim Jong-Un can be elected to these posts only by the Party Central Committee. Kim Il-Sung, the first President, was designated after his death in 1994 as the “Eternal President”. Hence nobody else is designated as the President.
2.The fact that the death of Kim Jong-Il and his succession as expected by Kim Jong-Un were announced so fast would indicate that there was no apparent attempt to challenge his succession either by other members of the family or by senior elements in the party and the Army, which had a role in decision-making.
3. The reports of considerable nervousness--even in China which had a benign and close relationship with Kim Jong-Il—could be attributed to the fact that so little was known politically about North Korea and its new ruler to friends as well as perceived foes of the country.
4.North Korea is the only post-cold war remnant of an old style Communist State, with an old style communist political structure, with old-style secretive ways of functioning. However, it differed from other Communist States of the past in its dynastic succession. Its founder in 1948 Kim Il-Sung was succeeded on his death in 1994 by his son Kim Jong-il , who in turn has now been succeeded by Kim Jong-Un.
5. Kim Jong-il had been groomed by his father for over 10 years to be his successor. He, therefore, had no challengers on his assuming office in 1994 and thereafter. The 28-year-old Kim Jong-Un, on the contrary, had been groomed by his father hardly for 15 months before he found himself exercising the powers of the office. It is, therefore, natural that many observers of North Korea, even in China, apprehend that Kim Jong-Un might not have had sufficient time to overcome opposition to his rise in power from family circles---particularly his two elder brothers who were overlooked by his father on the reported ground that they were unfit to rule the country--- as well as from the party and the Korean People’s Army, the main pillars of power in the world’s remaining State concealed from the rest of the international community by a communist-style iron curtain.
6. So little is known about North Korea---its political infrastructure, its decision-making apparatus, the inter-personal and inter-institutional relationships that determine political stability, the state of its economy and its military mind-set. To the outside world ---particularly to its neighbour South Korea--- North Korea has been an unpredictable State with unpredictable reflexes and adventurist impulses.
7. Even less is known about the new ruler. All that is known about the pre-2009 brand of Kim Jong-Un is that he was the third son of his father born to his third wife --- reportedly a Japanese of Korean origin--- that he had at least three, if not longer, years of schooling in the international school of Berne, the capital of Switzerland, where he acquired a working knowledge of English, French and German, that on his return from his Swiss school he studied from 2002 to 2006 in the Kim Il-Sung military university named after his grandfather. He became active in party and Government affairs in 2007 as a member of the organisational committee of the party and as an official of the Ministry of Public Security, which was responsible for the collection of external intelligence.
8. Till 2009, his name had never figured even in rumours as a possible successor to Kim Jong-Il. He was considered too young and too inexperienced in party and Army affairs with very little exposure to the party as well as the Army. The general expectation till 2009 was that one of his two elder brothers might succeed Kim Jong-Il. Following a stroke reportedly suffered by Kim Jong-Il around this period, rumours started circulating in South Korea that Kim Jong-Il was disillusioned with his two elder sons and was, therefore, contemplating to make Kim Jong-Un his would-be successor at the third conference of the WPK, which was scheduled to be held on September 28,2010.
9. These rumours acquired credence in August 2010, when Kim Jong-Il undertook an official visit to China----the second in the year that was very unusual--- a month before the party conference. There were strong rumours that Kim Jong-Un had accompanied his father.
10. Kim's visit was confined to Jilin and Heilongjiang, where he visited several agricultural and industrial establishments---- reportedly in order to learn from the Chinese experience in the modernisation of its economy. In this connection, the Chinese media referred to a visit earlier made by him ----without saying when--- to Vietnam to learn from its experience in modernisation. Kim Jong-Il visited a food processing factory, a high-speed train factory and an elementary school in Jilin where his father had studied in the 1920s.
11. The Chinese State TV reported that President Hu Jintao had met Kim Jong-il in Changchun, the capital of the Jilin province, on August 27, 2010. It carried visuals of the meeting between the two leaders and a report on a banquet hosted by Hu in honour of the North Korean leader.
12. An important objective of the visit was to brief the Chinese leaders about what Kim Jong-Il called "the rising generation" and to reassure Beijing that the expected generational changes would not affect North Korean bonds with China. He was quoted as having stated as follows at the banquet hosted by President Hu: "With the international situation remaining complicated, it is our important historical mission to hand over to the rising generation the baton of the traditional friendship passed over by the revolutionary forerunners of the two countries as a precious asset so as to carry it forward through generations."
13. This strengthened speculation that at the party meeting in September,2010, Kim Jong-Il might officially indicate his plans for his succession which might involve the elevation of Kim Jong-Un. Why did Kim Jong-Il feel the need to reassure the Chinese that the "rising generation" would be as close to China as the present generation and the preceding one of his father? Was his visit to the Chinese school which his father had attended meant to emphasise the close links of his family with China and calm possible Chinese misgivings about the impact of the Swiss upbringing of Kim Jong-Un on future North Korean policies?
14. China has reasons to be worried by the rise of Kim Jong-un to power. He has never studied in China in so far as it is known, he has had very little exposure to China, its leadership and people and his only limited exposure to the outside world has been in Switzerland. Would it have any impact on North Korea’s policies. King Jong-il apparently anticipated that such questions would trouble Beijing were his third son to become his successor and he wanted to reassure them that there would be no change in the primacy accorded by North Korea to its relations with China.
15.Chinese views over what could happen in North Korea after Kim Jong-il were reflected in a “Global Times” article of September 28, 2010, which said: “Despite varied versions of the successor choice and to which post the figure will be elevated to at the meeting, some analysts are dismissing the possibility of political chaos as a result of such a transition, saying the country won't undergo any significant policy change that could pose downsides on the security situation of the Korean Peninsula and northeast Asia. A stable North Korea is in China's national interests, regardless of who will be the next leader, experts say.”
16. The visit to China by the father and reportedly his son too was followed by the expected elevation of Kim Jong-Un at the party conference held on September 28,2010. Kim Jong-Un and Kim Kyong Hui, the 64-year-old influential sister of Kim Jong-Il, were elected as members of the 124-member Central Committee. But, surprisingly, while Kim Kyong Hui was elected a member of the important Politbureau of the Central Committee, Kim Jong-Un was not, thereby giving her a more important position in the party. The speculation was that she and her husband would act as mentors in putting Kim Jong-Un through his paces. Will they be content with doing so or will they try to upstage Kim Jong-Un and manipulate themselves into power. This is a question that would worry Kim Jong-Un in the months to come.
17. The party conference also elected Kim Jong-Un as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the other Vice-Chairman being Ri Yong Ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA). While Kim Jong-Un, who had never held a military rank before, was appointed a General, Ri Yong Ho was promoted as Vice-Marshal. Thus, Ri Yong Ho was given a more important position in the Commission.
18.Thus, Kim Jong-Un was given only the third position in the Party after his father and aunt and the third position in the Central Military Commission after his father and Ho. Despite this, the message that came out from the conference was that it had endorsed Kim Jong-Il’s plans to make his third son his successor. Till now, there were no reports of any opposition to this.
19. The transition in North Korea would be of great interest and concern to China, South Korea, Japan, the US and India. Any political instability in North Korea could cause large refugee influx into China. China would be nervous over the dangers of Kim Jong-Un cutting North Korea’s links with China and giving his policies a pro-Western orientation. For South Korea, the transition could be a threat as well as an opportunity. A threat because of the possibility of an insecure leader giving full rein to North Korea’s adventurist impulses that would most probably be directed at South Korea. An opportunity because of the possibility of a more moderate leader working towards a re-unification of the two Koreas.
20. South Korea, Japan and the US would be worried over the nuclear policies of the new ruler. Would he be inclined to resume the six-power talks on the nuclear issue or would he maintain the present hardline in his attempt to avoid any threat from the army or make it even harder.
21. Indian concerns would be over North Korea’s nuclear and missile relationship with Pakistan. This picked up momentum under Kim Jong-Il after Benazir Bhutto’s visit to North Korea during her second tenure as the Prime Minister (1993-96) and have continued since then. Will Kim Jong-Un maintain this relationship or even develop it further?
22. It is likely that till Kim Jong-Un consolidates his position and feels secure in office, he would continue his father’s policy of close relations with China and placating the Army’s expectations on the nuclear issue---whether on the question of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal or its military and missile supply relationship with Pakistan. Any new policy initiatives are unlikely.
23. If there is instability arising from a post-succession power struggle, North Korea’s unpredictable and adventurist impulses could come to the fore. ( 19-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, December 18, 2011
THE CHINESE PROTESTER: PEOPLE’S UNREST IN “SHOWCASE” PROVINCE OF CHINA UNNERVES LEADERSHIP
B.RAMAN
The Chinese leadership has been unnerved by the persisting and spreading protest of the people of Wukan, a fishing village ( population 13000) in the Guangdong province of Southern China, where the Chinese economic miracle started in the 1990s and which is always projected as a “showcase” province of China.
2. The protest movement was initially directed against forcible land acquisitions at arbitrarily low prices by the local authorities. It has since turned into a protest against the alleged death of a protester in police custody and against the illegal detention of four other protesters by the police.
3.Wukan has been the scene of sporadic protests against arbitrary land acquisitions for months. The present protest started in September when plans for the construction of a residential project were announced. This involved the acquisition of valuable farm land for the project.
4. The protest has now assumed an uncontrollable dimension for the last 10 days following the death of a protester who was arrested by the local police. The police have claimed that he died of a heart attack, but the villagers have alleged that he was beaten to death by the police.
5.Shops and schools have been closed in the village for the last one week and police reinforcements have been rushed from adjoining villages and towns. The police have reportedly blockaded the village to prevent the protesters from visiting other villages to gather support.
6. The protesters have driven out local officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and occupied the local offices of the party. On December 18, they warned that if the body of the protester was not handed over to them and if the four protesters in police custody are not released by December 21, they would march to the offices of the Government located at nearby Lufeng city and occupy them too.
7. The protesters have accused the police of trying to starve the local villagers into submission by stopping the flow of essential commodities into the village from adjoining villages.
8. News and pictures of the protest movement have been spreading across China through micro-blogs despite the efforts of the Ministry of Public Security to block them. According to Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, a video showing several thousand villagers congregating at the Mazu Temple in Wukan village, near the port city of Shanwei, was posted on popular microblogging sites Sina and Tencent Weibo, and was quickly removed by censors. The video showed large numbers of villagers sitting on the ground in the temple courtyard in protest at the detention of their representatives by police. "Down with corrupt officials!" the crowd chanted, then, "Compensation for blood spilled!"
9.The Government has imposed new restrictions regarding registration for microblogs making it obligatory for service providers to verify the identities of the microbloggers before allowing them to use assumed names and to share the real identities with the Ministry of Public Security when called upon to do so in the interest of internal security.
10.This has had no effect on the micro-bloggers, who continue to disseminate news and pics of the unrest in the Wukan village. The Government is worried that the unrest is being orchestrated by unpatriotic elements to cause internal confusion and political instability in the months preceding important Party and National People’s Congress (NPC) meetings early next year to designate the new leadership of the Party and the State to take over from the present leadership when it completes its tenure in 2012 and 2013.
11. The following tweet , which is believed to have originated in Honolulu, has been circulating in the internet: “This only the beginning. The beginning of an end of a regime. Stand strong people, united for your cause. Some people already gave their lives; don't let them go to waste.”
12. The Government’s concerns were enhanced on December 18 when a small protest in sympathy with the villagers of Wukan was held in Guangzhou, the capital of the province.
13.The seriousness of the concerns of the Party and the Government over the situation would be evident from the cancellation, announced on December 13, of the scheduled visits of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Nepal and Myanmar in December. Even though the Chinese Embassies in Nepal and Myanmar have attributed the cancellation to Wen’s preoccupation with preparations for the Party and NPC meetings next year, many attribute the cancellations to the worries of the leadership over dangers of internal political instability. ( 19-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The Chinese leadership has been unnerved by the persisting and spreading protest of the people of Wukan, a fishing village ( population 13000) in the Guangdong province of Southern China, where the Chinese economic miracle started in the 1990s and which is always projected as a “showcase” province of China.
2. The protest movement was initially directed against forcible land acquisitions at arbitrarily low prices by the local authorities. It has since turned into a protest against the alleged death of a protester in police custody and against the illegal detention of four other protesters by the police.
3.Wukan has been the scene of sporadic protests against arbitrary land acquisitions for months. The present protest started in September when plans for the construction of a residential project were announced. This involved the acquisition of valuable farm land for the project.
4. The protest has now assumed an uncontrollable dimension for the last 10 days following the death of a protester who was arrested by the local police. The police have claimed that he died of a heart attack, but the villagers have alleged that he was beaten to death by the police.
5.Shops and schools have been closed in the village for the last one week and police reinforcements have been rushed from adjoining villages and towns. The police have reportedly blockaded the village to prevent the protesters from visiting other villages to gather support.
6. The protesters have driven out local officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and occupied the local offices of the party. On December 18, they warned that if the body of the protester was not handed over to them and if the four protesters in police custody are not released by December 21, they would march to the offices of the Government located at nearby Lufeng city and occupy them too.
7. The protesters have accused the police of trying to starve the local villagers into submission by stopping the flow of essential commodities into the village from adjoining villages.
8. News and pictures of the protest movement have been spreading across China through micro-blogs despite the efforts of the Ministry of Public Security to block them. According to Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, a video showing several thousand villagers congregating at the Mazu Temple in Wukan village, near the port city of Shanwei, was posted on popular microblogging sites Sina and Tencent Weibo, and was quickly removed by censors. The video showed large numbers of villagers sitting on the ground in the temple courtyard in protest at the detention of their representatives by police. "Down with corrupt officials!" the crowd chanted, then, "Compensation for blood spilled!"
9.The Government has imposed new restrictions regarding registration for microblogs making it obligatory for service providers to verify the identities of the microbloggers before allowing them to use assumed names and to share the real identities with the Ministry of Public Security when called upon to do so in the interest of internal security.
10.This has had no effect on the micro-bloggers, who continue to disseminate news and pics of the unrest in the Wukan village. The Government is worried that the unrest is being orchestrated by unpatriotic elements to cause internal confusion and political instability in the months preceding important Party and National People’s Congress (NPC) meetings early next year to designate the new leadership of the Party and the State to take over from the present leadership when it completes its tenure in 2012 and 2013.
11. The following tweet , which is believed to have originated in Honolulu, has been circulating in the internet: “This only the beginning. The beginning of an end of a regime. Stand strong people, united for your cause. Some people already gave their lives; don't let them go to waste.”
12. The Government’s concerns were enhanced on December 18 when a small protest in sympathy with the villagers of Wukan was held in Guangzhou, the capital of the province.
13.The seriousness of the concerns of the Party and the Government over the situation would be evident from the cancellation, announced on December 13, of the scheduled visits of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Nepal and Myanmar in December. Even though the Chinese Embassies in Nepal and Myanmar have attributed the cancellation to Wen’s preoccupation with preparations for the Party and NPC meetings next year, many attribute the cancellations to the worries of the leadership over dangers of internal political instability. ( 19-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, December 17, 2011
MEDIA& POLICE: COPING WITH GENERATION BARKHA
B.RAMAN
( This is a post-seminar expansion of introductory observations made by me at a seminar on Police and Media at Hyderabad on December 15 and 16,2011)
Concepts keep evolving. When I was in service, one used to talk of media management by the police. It is now a hated concept. After I left service in August,1994, one started talking of perception management. This too has now fallen into disfavour. One now talks of perception correction. It is a politically neutral concept acceptable both to the police and the media.
2. Police officers have a right and a responsibility to identify wrong perceptions created by the media either consciously or unconsciously and have them corrected. For that, continuous interaction between the police and the media is necessary---- not only in times of crisis, but also in normal times.
3. Cordial relations with the media is not just a question of entertaining it from time to time. It is a question of respecting it as playing a useful role in keeping its spotlight on the police and winning its respect through our professionalism.
4. A good professional doesn’t have to all the time strut around projecting himself as one. He will be sensed from a distance by the media and the public. Professionalism is a combination of various factors---your competence, your efficiency, your record, your integrity and your ability to earn respect by giving respect.
5. The media expects from us respect, accessibility and a willingness to share correct information that can be shared for the benefit of the media and the public and in the interest of the public and the nation. If these factors are kept in mind, one can more effectively than at present prevent the emergence of wrong perceptions and correct wrong perceptions that arise despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them.
6.Not only concepts evolve, but the media landscape also keeps evolving. When I was in service, dealing with the media was simple. Today, it has become difficult and complex. In those days, we had to deal only with the print media and the Government-run electronic media. The media landscape has since changed beyond recognition due to the mushrooming of privately-run TV and radio networks, the easy availability of foreign channels for the viewers due to satellite TV, the blooming of the new media which has enabled any individual with the required motivation and energy to become a virtual journalist.
7. The rapid advance of media-related technologies has further empowered the media and given the police the impression and feeling of having been disempowered. The police, like other wings of the Government, does not know how to deal with this phenomenon of an aggressive and assertive media and equally aggressive and assertive citizens. Those who understand this phenomenal change in the media landscape and use it for their benefit are the driving force of today. Those, who do not, find themselves left far behind by the march of the new forces and new ideas in the real and virtual world of the media.
8. Without a proper understanding of the new forces and the new ideas sweeping across the media world, the police, like other wings of the Government, will not be able to deal with the multiplying complexities of media relations today.
9. The journalist profile has also been evolving. When I was in service, I had to deal with journos who were in their late 40s or early 50s. They were reverential to senior Government servants, they were respecters of persons and they knew and respected the Laxman Rekha in the relations between the media and the Government.
10. Today, while the media continues to be driven commercially by people in their middle ages, it is driven professionally by journos in their 20s and 30s. There has been a spectacular bloom of young journos, who respect no age, who respect no person, who respect no authority and who observe no Laxman Rekha. For them, getting at the news and reporting it as they think it should be reported is the end-all and be-all of their profession.
11. Today’s young journos, unlike their predecessors, are risk-takers and risk-seekers. Their predecessors used to come to us for advice and briefing before they undertook any dangerous reporting assignment. Today’s journos don’t care. The moment they decide to go somewhere to get the news, they make a dash for it without worrying about the risks and dangers. A new generation of journos has come up since the Kargil conflict driven by a fearsome passion to get at the news even if they have to ruffle the feathers of those in authority. I call it the Barkha generation---- full of determination, drive and courage. Look at the way Barkha dashed into rebel-controlled Libya without worrying about the consequences for her.
12. The Barkha generation has its positive and negative qualities. Look at the way it complicated the handling of the Kandahar hijacking in December 1999. Look at the way Barkha, in alleged disregard of the difficulties of the police and other security forces, covered the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. I am yet to come across a single IPS officer who does not talk critically of the way she covered the 26/11 strikes. Look at the way she went after a blogger who chose to criticise her style of news coverage. She would expect the Police to understand and be responsive to her style of news coverage, but she could not understand and be responsive to a blogger’s criticism---however immoderate—of her style of reporting. This brought out the double standards adopted by some of the young journos of today.
13. We have not yet found an answer to the question as to how to cope with this new generation of journos with its insatiable hunger for the Breaking News because many of us are not even aware that the media world of today and the ever-bubbling journos of today are unrecognisably different from those of yesterday. This question has to be debated carefully in our search for an answer.
14.Look how poorly we understand the mind-boggling reach and potential of the new media. How many of us have thought of ways of using the new media for disseminating the correct news, for projecting the police point of view and for correcting wrong perceptions? Improving the conventional ways and style of relationship with the media alone is not sufficient. The police has to be proactive in the world of the new media. Instead of understanding the new media and its social networks and benefitting from them, we are thinking of curbing and even suppressing them. This shows that while the mindset of Generation Next in the media world is galloping forward, our mindset remains shackled to the past. It is time to break this. (18-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
( This is a post-seminar expansion of introductory observations made by me at a seminar on Police and Media at Hyderabad on December 15 and 16,2011)
Concepts keep evolving. When I was in service, one used to talk of media management by the police. It is now a hated concept. After I left service in August,1994, one started talking of perception management. This too has now fallen into disfavour. One now talks of perception correction. It is a politically neutral concept acceptable both to the police and the media.
2. Police officers have a right and a responsibility to identify wrong perceptions created by the media either consciously or unconsciously and have them corrected. For that, continuous interaction between the police and the media is necessary---- not only in times of crisis, but also in normal times.
3. Cordial relations with the media is not just a question of entertaining it from time to time. It is a question of respecting it as playing a useful role in keeping its spotlight on the police and winning its respect through our professionalism.
4. A good professional doesn’t have to all the time strut around projecting himself as one. He will be sensed from a distance by the media and the public. Professionalism is a combination of various factors---your competence, your efficiency, your record, your integrity and your ability to earn respect by giving respect.
5. The media expects from us respect, accessibility and a willingness to share correct information that can be shared for the benefit of the media and the public and in the interest of the public and the nation. If these factors are kept in mind, one can more effectively than at present prevent the emergence of wrong perceptions and correct wrong perceptions that arise despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them.
6.Not only concepts evolve, but the media landscape also keeps evolving. When I was in service, dealing with the media was simple. Today, it has become difficult and complex. In those days, we had to deal only with the print media and the Government-run electronic media. The media landscape has since changed beyond recognition due to the mushrooming of privately-run TV and radio networks, the easy availability of foreign channels for the viewers due to satellite TV, the blooming of the new media which has enabled any individual with the required motivation and energy to become a virtual journalist.
7. The rapid advance of media-related technologies has further empowered the media and given the police the impression and feeling of having been disempowered. The police, like other wings of the Government, does not know how to deal with this phenomenon of an aggressive and assertive media and equally aggressive and assertive citizens. Those who understand this phenomenal change in the media landscape and use it for their benefit are the driving force of today. Those, who do not, find themselves left far behind by the march of the new forces and new ideas in the real and virtual world of the media.
8. Without a proper understanding of the new forces and the new ideas sweeping across the media world, the police, like other wings of the Government, will not be able to deal with the multiplying complexities of media relations today.
9. The journalist profile has also been evolving. When I was in service, I had to deal with journos who were in their late 40s or early 50s. They were reverential to senior Government servants, they were respecters of persons and they knew and respected the Laxman Rekha in the relations between the media and the Government.
10. Today, while the media continues to be driven commercially by people in their middle ages, it is driven professionally by journos in their 20s and 30s. There has been a spectacular bloom of young journos, who respect no age, who respect no person, who respect no authority and who observe no Laxman Rekha. For them, getting at the news and reporting it as they think it should be reported is the end-all and be-all of their profession.
11. Today’s young journos, unlike their predecessors, are risk-takers and risk-seekers. Their predecessors used to come to us for advice and briefing before they undertook any dangerous reporting assignment. Today’s journos don’t care. The moment they decide to go somewhere to get the news, they make a dash for it without worrying about the risks and dangers. A new generation of journos has come up since the Kargil conflict driven by a fearsome passion to get at the news even if they have to ruffle the feathers of those in authority. I call it the Barkha generation---- full of determination, drive and courage. Look at the way Barkha dashed into rebel-controlled Libya without worrying about the consequences for her.
12. The Barkha generation has its positive and negative qualities. Look at the way it complicated the handling of the Kandahar hijacking in December 1999. Look at the way Barkha, in alleged disregard of the difficulties of the police and other security forces, covered the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. I am yet to come across a single IPS officer who does not talk critically of the way she covered the 26/11 strikes. Look at the way she went after a blogger who chose to criticise her style of news coverage. She would expect the Police to understand and be responsive to her style of news coverage, but she could not understand and be responsive to a blogger’s criticism---however immoderate—of her style of reporting. This brought out the double standards adopted by some of the young journos of today.
13. We have not yet found an answer to the question as to how to cope with this new generation of journos with its insatiable hunger for the Breaking News because many of us are not even aware that the media world of today and the ever-bubbling journos of today are unrecognisably different from those of yesterday. This question has to be debated carefully in our search for an answer.
14.Look how poorly we understand the mind-boggling reach and potential of the new media. How many of us have thought of ways of using the new media for disseminating the correct news, for projecting the police point of view and for correcting wrong perceptions? Improving the conventional ways and style of relationship with the media alone is not sufficient. The police has to be proactive in the world of the new media. Instead of understanding the new media and its social networks and benefitting from them, we are thinking of curbing and even suppressing them. This shows that while the mindset of Generation Next in the media world is galloping forward, our mindset remains shackled to the past. It is time to break this. (18-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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