B.RAMAN
Shock and shame have greeted the news about an incident which took place in the Amboli area of Mumbai on October 20,2011, in which two honourable young men of Mumbai---Keenan Santos and Reuben Fernandes--- were surrounded and brutally killed by a group of hooligans and their supporters when Keenan and Reuben protested against their misbehaviour towards their girl friends and tried to defend themselves from attacks by the enraged hooligans.
2. We owe a debt of gratitude to Vidyut, a keen Tweeter activist of Mumbai, for her painstaking research into the incident from open source information and for posting the details in her blog titled “Aamjanata” at “ Facts of the Murder of Keenan and Reuben http://aamjanata.com/facts-of-the-murder-of-keenan-and-reuben/
3.Barkha Dutt, the Group Editor and President of the Board of Editors of the NDTV, telecast a special discussion on the incident under her “The Buck Stops Here” programme on November 8,2011.She had invited the families and girl friends of the brave men who were brutally killed, a cross-section of opinion-makers and members of the public for the discussion which was recorded in Mumbai on the night of November 7.
4. The stamp of high quality of Barkha’s programmes was there in this debate too. She needs to be complimented for taking the initiative in producing her unimaginably and unbearably poignant show. At the same time, I would be failing in my duty if I did not record my surprise over Barkha’s omission to invite Vidyut to be a member of the panel. Nobody had shown greater indignation than Vidyut over the murders and nobody has done a more painstaking research into the incident than Vidyut. She should have been the first choice for the panel.
5.The shocking incident highlights how dishonourable many of us are in our attitude to women and behaviour towards them. It has been reported that the people who misbehaved towards the girl friends of Keenan and Reuben come from the under-privileged and uneducated sections of our society, but we find instances of such shocking behaviour in all layers of our society---privileged or under-privileged, educated or uneducated, sophisticated or unsophisticated.
6. In our society, the word behaviour has two meanings. It has one meaning when it comes to behaviour towards men and another in respect of behaviour towards women. Large sections of our society tend to presume that in our behaviour towards women certain extra liberties---in words or action--- are understandable and even permissible. Words and actions which we may look down upon when employed against men, we treat as natural and rationalise them when employed against women.
7. It is this tendency to rationalise misbehaviour towards women and our reluctance to come down heavily on those misbehaving towards women that is responsible not only for the increasing number of incidents of misbehaviour towards them, but also for the shocking insensitivity and callousness of the police in dealing with such incidents.
8. I believe in what I often describe as an honour code in relation to women whom I take out. I consider myself morally responsible for their physical protection and honour. I am in a high state of tension till they reach home and inform me over phone that they have reached home safely. It is evident that Reuben and Keenan had a similar honour code. They considered themselves morally responsible for the protection and honour of their girl friends. They lost their lives in an act of extraordinary bravery after they tried to protect them from attempted misbehaviour by the hooligans.
9. They reacted according to their sense of honour. We should applaud them for their bravery and sense of honour and refrain from analysing whether their actions were wise or advisable. We should also salute the fortitude and sense of honour and pride of their families and girl friends for expressing their pride over the way Keenan and Reuben reacted. We need more such families, more such relatives and more such women.
10. The most shocking aspect of the incident was the utterly shameful and shocking and inhuman inaction of a group of about 40 bystanders, who watched the two boys being surrounded and murdered by the hooligans without the least attempt to go to their rescue. They watched as if they were watching a street play. I can understand --- but will not excuse--- if there were only one or two bystanders and they were afraid of intervening. There were about 40 of them. There was no excuse for their inaction. There were so many things they could have done. They could have raised an alarm and collected more people. They could have intervened physically. But they did nothing. They just watched--- not in horror, not with shock, but just with a sense of disinterested curiosity. They probably saw it as a quarrel between young men over women and as none of their business. Even the use of a knife by one of the hooligans for repeatedly stabbing did not make them intervene.
11. Even more shocking than the passive attitude of the bystanders was the attitude of some of the people in a nearby restaurant as narrated by one of the girl friends to Barkha. According to her, after the hooligans had run away, when she pleaded to the people in the restaurant to help her in taking care of the injured and dying, none of them came forward to help her. Can one imagine anything more inhuman and callous?
12. This inaction of the bystanders and others shows to what extent inhuman traits have seeped into our society. The only way of dealing with it is through education and creation of awareness of our duty as members of the society and citizens of this country. Under the law, watching a person being killed without going to his or her rescue is itself a crime. The police should prosecute not only the perpetrators, but also those bystanders who can be identified.
13. The incident also speaks very poorly of the state of our police. It shows the extent of the lack of fear of the police and the law in many sections of our society. The inability or reluctance of the Police to enforce the law effectively is responsible for the growing number of such incidents. I am myself an ex-police officer and I feel ashamed of myself for the kind of ineffective, shameless and prideless police that we have created. I was surprised by the attitude of a retired police officer in Barkha’s panel. I didn’t discern even the slightest trace of embarrassment, shame and indignation in his interventions during the debate.
14. It is important for our senior police officers to sit up and act to reverse the inexorable process of decay of our police force. How can the police blame the citizenry alone for such shocking incidents when the police itself has become a paragon of inaction? ( 9-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Monday, November 7, 2011
IRAN: ISRAELI PSYWAR INDICATES LACK OF CONFIDENCE
B.RAMAN
The stepped-up PSYWAR by Israel against Iran on the question of the possibility of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities indicates an underlying lack of confidence in Israel’s military and intelligence circles over the chances of success of any military strike against Iran.
2.One does not see in Israel of today the kind of confidence that it had in 1981 that it would be able to succeed with a clandestine air strike against Iraq’s OSIRAK nuclear reactor then under construction with French assistance and manage the consequences.
3. The Mossad--- the Israeli external intelligence agency---of today is not the Mossad of 1981. There has been a decline in its professionalism despite the success of some of its recent sabotage operations against Iran’s nuclear establishment. The public opposition by some of the retired senior intelligence officers such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, to any military action against Iran reflects the lack of confidence about the success of a military strike against Iran amongst officers who retired only recently and hence must be up-to-date in their knowledge of the Israeli capabilities against Iran.
4. There are conflicting reports about the stand of serving officers. While some reports say that the serving officers are confident that Israel can successfully carry out a military strike against Iran, other indicators are that even some serving officers share the misgivings of the retired officers. It is believed that the statements against a military strike issued by these retired officers reflects not only their lack of confidence in the success of a military strike, but also of some of the serving officers who had worked under them when they headed the agencies.
5.Unless there is an assessment backed by a majority of the serving military and intelligence officers that a military strike will be successful in neutralising Iran’s retaliatory capability and nuclear facilities, those in the political leadership in favour of immediate action headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may find it difficult to go ahead with a military strike.
6. The unusual high-octane PSYWAR mounted by Israeli leaders talking and threatening from roof-top regarding the likelihood of a military strike reflects not Israeli confidence in its ability to carry out a successful strike, but the persisting misgivings in the national security decision-making circles as to whether a strike would be successful.
7. Israeli national security and intelligence culture forbids public airing of military plans and debates before an imminent military action. The fact that such a public airing is being done now by the Government as part of its PSYWAR and that retired senior intelligence officers no longer feel bound by their culture of discretion and self-restraint are indicators of a lack of confidence in the political and professional circles regarding the chances of success of a military strike.
8. There would have been little opposition to a military strike if there was total confidence that it would succeed. The lack of unanimity of support for a strike is an indicator of the lack of such total confidence.
9. Israel of today is not the Israel of 1981. It no longer has the confidence that it can prevail in having its national security will and interests enforced. Iran is counting on this in going ahead with its nuclear plans, but it will be committing a serious mistake if it underestimates Israel’s penchant to take risks and act if its leaders and people feel that their national survival is at stake. (8-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The stepped-up PSYWAR by Israel against Iran on the question of the possibility of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities indicates an underlying lack of confidence in Israel’s military and intelligence circles over the chances of success of any military strike against Iran.
2.One does not see in Israel of today the kind of confidence that it had in 1981 that it would be able to succeed with a clandestine air strike against Iraq’s OSIRAK nuclear reactor then under construction with French assistance and manage the consequences.
3. The Mossad--- the Israeli external intelligence agency---of today is not the Mossad of 1981. There has been a decline in its professionalism despite the success of some of its recent sabotage operations against Iran’s nuclear establishment. The public opposition by some of the retired senior intelligence officers such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, to any military action against Iran reflects the lack of confidence about the success of a military strike against Iran amongst officers who retired only recently and hence must be up-to-date in their knowledge of the Israeli capabilities against Iran.
4. There are conflicting reports about the stand of serving officers. While some reports say that the serving officers are confident that Israel can successfully carry out a military strike against Iran, other indicators are that even some serving officers share the misgivings of the retired officers. It is believed that the statements against a military strike issued by these retired officers reflects not only their lack of confidence in the success of a military strike, but also of some of the serving officers who had worked under them when they headed the agencies.
5.Unless there is an assessment backed by a majority of the serving military and intelligence officers that a military strike will be successful in neutralising Iran’s retaliatory capability and nuclear facilities, those in the political leadership in favour of immediate action headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may find it difficult to go ahead with a military strike.
6. The unusual high-octane PSYWAR mounted by Israeli leaders talking and threatening from roof-top regarding the likelihood of a military strike reflects not Israeli confidence in its ability to carry out a successful strike, but the persisting misgivings in the national security decision-making circles as to whether a strike would be successful.
7. Israeli national security and intelligence culture forbids public airing of military plans and debates before an imminent military action. The fact that such a public airing is being done now by the Government as part of its PSYWAR and that retired senior intelligence officers no longer feel bound by their culture of discretion and self-restraint are indicators of a lack of confidence in the political and professional circles regarding the chances of success of a military strike.
8. There would have been little opposition to a military strike if there was total confidence that it would succeed. The lack of unanimity of support for a strike is an indicator of the lack of such total confidence.
9. Israel of today is not the Israel of 1981. It no longer has the confidence that it can prevail in having its national security will and interests enforced. Iran is counting on this in going ahead with its nuclear plans, but it will be committing a serious mistake if it underestimates Israel’s penchant to take risks and act if its leaders and people feel that their national survival is at stake. (8-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
COMMENTS FROM A WELL-PLACED & WELL-INFORMED READER
B.RAMAN
I have received the following comments on my article "If Israel Attacks Iran" from a well-placed and well-informed reader:
It appears that Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain [monarchy], Kuwait, Oman are lobbying for an IDF (Israeli Defence Force) strike. [since they appear to have failed to persuade the US and Europeans to strike against Iran's nuclear program.]
What role Saudi Arabia might play in a strike on Iran, even if they deny their role?
According to several military analysts, Iran lacks the ability to disrupt the port of Hormuz. As a practical matter, how can they do it?
Iran's air defense capability is extremely limited. And their fighter aircraft lack functional avionics and electronics. Iran lacks accurate long range rockets. Their primary ability to strike at Israel is Hezbollah. But would Hezbollah risk a war with most Lebanese to help Khamenei? Both Khamenei and Nasrallah are focusing their limited resources on helping Assad survive. [Assad is apparently using Hezbollah Arab fighters inside Syria against the Syrian resistance.]
Their priority is to help Assad survive. This will be more important to them than retaliating for an Israeli strike [or a joint Israeli, Saudi strike.]
You seem to think the US and Europeans won't support a military strike on Iran. Before the attempted assasination of the Saudi ambassador inside the US, you were 100% right. But the failed assasination has changed things. There is now serious talk about military action in Europe and the US, which the Sunni Arab countries are exploiting with their powerful lobbies.
More than 80% of Sunni Arabs have a negative view of Iran in recent Arab public opinion polls. This is the highest negative rating ever recorded. Much of this is because of the role of IRGC in helping Assad against the Syrian resistance. This increases the odds of a military strike against Iran.
I have received the following comments on my article "If Israel Attacks Iran" from a well-placed and well-informed reader:
It appears that Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain [monarchy], Kuwait, Oman are lobbying for an IDF (Israeli Defence Force) strike. [since they appear to have failed to persuade the US and Europeans to strike against Iran's nuclear program.]
What role Saudi Arabia might play in a strike on Iran, even if they deny their role?
According to several military analysts, Iran lacks the ability to disrupt the port of Hormuz. As a practical matter, how can they do it?
Iran's air defense capability is extremely limited. And their fighter aircraft lack functional avionics and electronics. Iran lacks accurate long range rockets. Their primary ability to strike at Israel is Hezbollah. But would Hezbollah risk a war with most Lebanese to help Khamenei? Both Khamenei and Nasrallah are focusing their limited resources on helping Assad survive. [Assad is apparently using Hezbollah Arab fighters inside Syria against the Syrian resistance.]
Their priority is to help Assad survive. This will be more important to them than retaliating for an Israeli strike [or a joint Israeli, Saudi strike.]
You seem to think the US and Europeans won't support a military strike on Iran. Before the attempted assasination of the Saudi ambassador inside the US, you were 100% right. But the failed assasination has changed things. There is now serious talk about military action in Europe and the US, which the Sunni Arab countries are exploiting with their powerful lobbies.
More than 80% of Sunni Arabs have a negative view of Iran in recent Arab public opinion polls. This is the highest negative rating ever recorded. Much of this is because of the role of IRGC in helping Assad against the Syrian resistance. This increases the odds of a military strike against Iran.
IF ISRAEL ATTACKS IRAN
B.RAMAN
Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities? If so, how will it go about it? What will be the consequences?
2. A PSYWAR has been mounted from Israel regarding the strong likelihood and imminence of an attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna report ---as it is widely expected to---- that Iran has repaired the damages suffered by the computer network of its enrichment complex as a result of a virus (Stuxnet) allegedly planted by the Israeli intelligence and has resumed its enrichment operations full steam with the objective of acquiring weapons grade enrichment capability.
3. Such a report would mean that Israel’s sabotage operations to paralyse the enrichment facilities on which it was relying as an alternative to direct military strikes have failed to produce the desired results leaving it with no other option but direct military strikes to destroy the enrichment facilities that Iran has built up.
4. Should Israel undertake a military strike and if so, when? This question is being debated now in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles. It is apparent that any Israeli military strike may have to be unilateral because the West----including the US--- are not prepared to support a military strike. They feel that paralysing sanctions should be given an opportunity to force Iran to see reason and make Iran give up its plans for achieving a capability for weapons grade enrichment.
5. Israel’s faith in sanctions and sabotage as options to neutralise Iran’s capabilities has weakened and there is growing conviction in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles that the time for a direct military strike against Iran has arrived. If Israel does not act before November-end, the onset of winter and the heavy cloud cover during winter may make precise missile strikes difficult.
6. Political and diplomatic pressure from the US and other Western countries is unlikely to have any impact on Israeli decision-making which will be influenced purely by the assessment of the military and the intelligence agencies regarding the likelihood of success of a military operation.
7. Success means success in destroying Iran’s enrichment capabilities and success in destroying Iran’s capability for retaliation against Israel. When Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor under construction with French assistance in June,1981, the dangers of a retaliatory strike by Iraq against Israel were not a worrisome factor in the planning. It was known that Iraq did not have such a capability.
8. Iran has a strong retaliatory capability against Israel in the form of its missiles. Its Air Force is facing problems due to the reported unserviceability of many of its planes because of the sanctions. It, therefore, plans to rely on its missiles for a retaliatory strike on Israel. The Israeli forces will, therefore, have to either destroy the Iranian retaliatory capability in advance before attacking the nuclear facilities or attack the two simultaneously.
9. The final decision on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will depend on the confidence of the Israeli military and intelligence leadership that it can destroy Iran’s retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike.
10. While serving officers of the Israeli intelligence seem to be confident that a neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability will be doable, some retired officers of the Israeli intelligence such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, have expressed misgivings on this. They have advised the Government against any adventurist impulses.
11. If Israel succeeds in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Teheran will have two options----- block the Strait of Hormuz thereby creating serious dislocations in oil supply or undertake a long-term sabotage operation directed against the West without affecting the oil supply.
12. Blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact not only on the global economy, but also on Iran’s own economy at a time when its economy is already facing serious difficulties due to the economic sanctions. Success of a long-term sabotage operation will be doubtful since Iran is unlikely to enjoy the ground solidarity of the Sunni world. The Sunni countries are as worried as Israel over Iran’s nuclear aspirations. They will condemn Israeli military strikes, but will not do anything in support of Iran beyond that.
13. In view of what has been stated above,if Israel succeeds in neutralising Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Iran may decide that it has no other option but to gulp it and keep sulking---- as Saddam Hussein did post-1981.
14. If an Israeli military strike is successful, the consequences for the region and the global economy may not be serious. If it is not successful, the consequences could be far-reaching. (7-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities? If so, how will it go about it? What will be the consequences?
2. A PSYWAR has been mounted from Israel regarding the strong likelihood and imminence of an attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna report ---as it is widely expected to---- that Iran has repaired the damages suffered by the computer network of its enrichment complex as a result of a virus (Stuxnet) allegedly planted by the Israeli intelligence and has resumed its enrichment operations full steam with the objective of acquiring weapons grade enrichment capability.
3. Such a report would mean that Israel’s sabotage operations to paralyse the enrichment facilities on which it was relying as an alternative to direct military strikes have failed to produce the desired results leaving it with no other option but direct military strikes to destroy the enrichment facilities that Iran has built up.
4. Should Israel undertake a military strike and if so, when? This question is being debated now in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles. It is apparent that any Israeli military strike may have to be unilateral because the West----including the US--- are not prepared to support a military strike. They feel that paralysing sanctions should be given an opportunity to force Iran to see reason and make Iran give up its plans for achieving a capability for weapons grade enrichment.
5. Israel’s faith in sanctions and sabotage as options to neutralise Iran’s capabilities has weakened and there is growing conviction in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles that the time for a direct military strike against Iran has arrived. If Israel does not act before November-end, the onset of winter and the heavy cloud cover during winter may make precise missile strikes difficult.
6. Political and diplomatic pressure from the US and other Western countries is unlikely to have any impact on Israeli decision-making which will be influenced purely by the assessment of the military and the intelligence agencies regarding the likelihood of success of a military operation.
7. Success means success in destroying Iran’s enrichment capabilities and success in destroying Iran’s capability for retaliation against Israel. When Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor under construction with French assistance in June,1981, the dangers of a retaliatory strike by Iraq against Israel were not a worrisome factor in the planning. It was known that Iraq did not have such a capability.
8. Iran has a strong retaliatory capability against Israel in the form of its missiles. Its Air Force is facing problems due to the reported unserviceability of many of its planes because of the sanctions. It, therefore, plans to rely on its missiles for a retaliatory strike on Israel. The Israeli forces will, therefore, have to either destroy the Iranian retaliatory capability in advance before attacking the nuclear facilities or attack the two simultaneously.
9. The final decision on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will depend on the confidence of the Israeli military and intelligence leadership that it can destroy Iran’s retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike.
10. While serving officers of the Israeli intelligence seem to be confident that a neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability will be doable, some retired officers of the Israeli intelligence such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, have expressed misgivings on this. They have advised the Government against any adventurist impulses.
11. If Israel succeeds in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Teheran will have two options----- block the Strait of Hormuz thereby creating serious dislocations in oil supply or undertake a long-term sabotage operation directed against the West without affecting the oil supply.
12. Blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact not only on the global economy, but also on Iran’s own economy at a time when its economy is already facing serious difficulties due to the economic sanctions. Success of a long-term sabotage operation will be doubtful since Iran is unlikely to enjoy the ground solidarity of the Sunni world. The Sunni countries are as worried as Israel over Iran’s nuclear aspirations. They will condemn Israeli military strikes, but will not do anything in support of Iran beyond that.
13. In view of what has been stated above,if Israel succeeds in neutralising Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Iran may decide that it has no other option but to gulp it and keep sulking---- as Saddam Hussein did post-1981.
14. If an Israeli military strike is successful, the consequences for the region and the global economy may not be serious. If it is not successful, the consequences could be far-reaching. (7-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
TIBETAN UNREST SHOWS SIGNS OF SPREADING FROM SICHUAN TO TIBET
B.RAMAN
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: "Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay , the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.” ( 2-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: "Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay , the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.” ( 2-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 31, 2011
MY TAKE ON SHRI KATJU’S CRITICISM OF OUR TV CHANNELS
B.RAMAN
In an interview to Karan Thapar, TV journalist, former Chief Justice Markandey Katju, who presently heads the Press Council, has repeated his strong criticism of our media in general and of the TV media in particular. The text of the interview is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/197593/media-deliberately-dividing-people-pci-chief.html .
2.Some of his criticism seems to have been over-stated. The TV media has also to make both ends meet. Our TV channels are not charitable or philanthropic or non-profit organisations. Unless they make profit, they can’t provide professional services. Unless they have a steadily rising community of viewers, they can’t make profit. How to attract viewer interest is an important question that has to influence their policy-making. If growing sections of viewers prefer non-serious coverage such as of events in the film world, for example, can they ignore their preferences? They can’t.
3. A compromise has to be made if they have to survive----between the professional and the non-professional, between the serious and the non-serious, between the profound and the frivolous. If our TV channels are dishing out to us a mix of all this as a result of the professional compromise which they have to constantly make in the interest of survival, we cannot make over-righteous criticism of their performance as Shri Katju seems to have done.
4. The focus has to be not on the seemingly frivolous part of their coverage---one doesn’t have to watch it if one doesn’t like it--- but on the serious part of it. There has to be parameters to ensure that the serious part is governed by professional considerations without any non-professional agenda. An exercise to draw up a list of such parameters has not received the attention it deserves so far even though there has been a mushrooming of our private TV news channels since the first Gulf war of 1991.
5.In drawing up such parameters one has to go into questions such as: Are different view-points given adequate coverage? Is there favouritism in the selection of panels? Do commercial considerations influence the composition of the panels and the airing of different points of view? Is there a discreet black-listing of inconvenient moulders of public opinion either by the owners of the channels or their anchors? Is there a mechanism by which the criticisms, protests and grievances of the viewers are given serious attention and a response is given to them?
6. Who will lay down such parameters in the interest of professional excellence and public good? The Press Council can’t do it now since it has no powers or responsibility in respect of the TV world. The owners of the TV channels have shown no interest in such an exercise. Since the beginning of this year, I have been strongly voicing a demand through the Twitter world for an ombudsman in our TV news channels similar to what “The Hindu” has.
7. “The Hindu’s” ombudsman is not a paragon of professional virtues, but the creation of it by the paper at least showed that it was aware of the need to pay attention to the views of the readers regarding how the paper was run. One does not find a similar awareness among the owners of our TV channels and their anchors.
8. The prima donna culture and mindset that have permeated into our community of news anchors have made them totally impervious to the need to pay attention to the views and complaints of the viewers. They couldn’t care less about your criticisms or honest opinions. When you criticise, the reply that comes is “use the remote”.
9. The world of our TV news channels is becoming a copy-cat version of our film world. It is this aspect that should be causing concern and needs the attention of the decreasing number of serious-minded professionals still in the TV world.
10.There is one other aspect to which I had drawn attention earlier after the successful hunger-strike of Anna Hazare. That is the failure of our Doordarshan and All-India Radio to evolve into a public broadcasting service of professional excellence that would provide a serious alternative to the kichdi dished out by our private channels. The stunted evolution of the DD and the AIR is due to the continuing political stranglehold on them. This has to be broken. Only public pressure can do it. ( 1-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
In an interview to Karan Thapar, TV journalist, former Chief Justice Markandey Katju, who presently heads the Press Council, has repeated his strong criticism of our media in general and of the TV media in particular. The text of the interview is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/197593/media-deliberately-dividing-people-pci-chief.html .
2.Some of his criticism seems to have been over-stated. The TV media has also to make both ends meet. Our TV channels are not charitable or philanthropic or non-profit organisations. Unless they make profit, they can’t provide professional services. Unless they have a steadily rising community of viewers, they can’t make profit. How to attract viewer interest is an important question that has to influence their policy-making. If growing sections of viewers prefer non-serious coverage such as of events in the film world, for example, can they ignore their preferences? They can’t.
3. A compromise has to be made if they have to survive----between the professional and the non-professional, between the serious and the non-serious, between the profound and the frivolous. If our TV channels are dishing out to us a mix of all this as a result of the professional compromise which they have to constantly make in the interest of survival, we cannot make over-righteous criticism of their performance as Shri Katju seems to have done.
4. The focus has to be not on the seemingly frivolous part of their coverage---one doesn’t have to watch it if one doesn’t like it--- but on the serious part of it. There has to be parameters to ensure that the serious part is governed by professional considerations without any non-professional agenda. An exercise to draw up a list of such parameters has not received the attention it deserves so far even though there has been a mushrooming of our private TV news channels since the first Gulf war of 1991.
5.In drawing up such parameters one has to go into questions such as: Are different view-points given adequate coverage? Is there favouritism in the selection of panels? Do commercial considerations influence the composition of the panels and the airing of different points of view? Is there a discreet black-listing of inconvenient moulders of public opinion either by the owners of the channels or their anchors? Is there a mechanism by which the criticisms, protests and grievances of the viewers are given serious attention and a response is given to them?
6. Who will lay down such parameters in the interest of professional excellence and public good? The Press Council can’t do it now since it has no powers or responsibility in respect of the TV world. The owners of the TV channels have shown no interest in such an exercise. Since the beginning of this year, I have been strongly voicing a demand through the Twitter world for an ombudsman in our TV news channels similar to what “The Hindu” has.
7. “The Hindu’s” ombudsman is not a paragon of professional virtues, but the creation of it by the paper at least showed that it was aware of the need to pay attention to the views of the readers regarding how the paper was run. One does not find a similar awareness among the owners of our TV channels and their anchors.
8. The prima donna culture and mindset that have permeated into our community of news anchors have made them totally impervious to the need to pay attention to the views and complaints of the viewers. They couldn’t care less about your criticisms or honest opinions. When you criticise, the reply that comes is “use the remote”.
9. The world of our TV news channels is becoming a copy-cat version of our film world. It is this aspect that should be causing concern and needs the attention of the decreasing number of serious-minded professionals still in the TV world.
10.There is one other aspect to which I had drawn attention earlier after the successful hunger-strike of Anna Hazare. That is the failure of our Doordarshan and All-India Radio to evolve into a public broadcasting service of professional excellence that would provide a serious alternative to the kichdi dished out by our private channels. The stunted evolution of the DD and the AIR is due to the continuing political stranglehold on them. This has to be broken. Only public pressure can do it. ( 1-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
KARGIL-RETURNED
Sitakant Mahapatra of 1961 IAS batch,Orissa cadre
--------------------
He carried in his breast pocket,
when he went, many things.
From his mother,a packet
of sacred nirmalya rice,
a small,framed photo of Jagannath.
And from their garden, in a handbag,
eight half-ripe mangoes and ten pieces
of cheese-molasses rice-cakes his mother
had stayed up late making for him.
He kept also in his breast pocket,
two treasured pictures of Sumitra
long-haired and dreamy-eyed before
their marriage and of Sonali on his lap.
He took as well Sumitra's kiss,planted
stealthily as a lighting strike on his cheek,
and from inexperienced Sonali, after
much persuasion and a KitKat bribe.
a shy kiss too---both warm until he reached Kargil.
He carried countless sobs in his breast
and suppressed tears, till their faces
disappeared like stars in the distant sky.
He returned in a wooden box
covered with a Tricolour, eyes closed,
cheeks ice-cold, face pale as dried flowers.
This time he carried nothing, not
chocolates for Sonali, nor toys, nor clothes;
nor a sari for Sumitra, nor a shawl
or eye-glasses for his mother.
He returned empty-handed. Like a bird,
sinless, but struck by a lethal arrow, he
circled and in a plane plummeted
to the ground, to Sumitra and Sonali
on his birthday.
---Taken from the edited "Memoirs" of the 1961 batch of All-India and Central Services officers who completed 50 years since we joined the service in May-June,1961
--------------------
He carried in his breast pocket,
when he went, many things.
From his mother,a packet
of sacred nirmalya rice,
a small,framed photo of Jagannath.
And from their garden, in a handbag,
eight half-ripe mangoes and ten pieces
of cheese-molasses rice-cakes his mother
had stayed up late making for him.
He kept also in his breast pocket,
two treasured pictures of Sumitra
long-haired and dreamy-eyed before
their marriage and of Sonali on his lap.
He took as well Sumitra's kiss,planted
stealthily as a lighting strike on his cheek,
and from inexperienced Sonali, after
much persuasion and a KitKat bribe.
a shy kiss too---both warm until he reached Kargil.
He carried countless sobs in his breast
and suppressed tears, till their faces
disappeared like stars in the distant sky.
He returned in a wooden box
covered with a Tricolour, eyes closed,
cheeks ice-cold, face pale as dried flowers.
This time he carried nothing, not
chocolates for Sonali, nor toys, nor clothes;
nor a sari for Sumitra, nor a shawl
or eye-glasses for his mother.
He returned empty-handed. Like a bird,
sinless, but struck by a lethal arrow, he
circled and in a plane plummeted
to the ground, to Sumitra and Sonali
on his birthday.
---Taken from the edited "Memoirs" of the 1961 batch of All-India and Central Services officers who completed 50 years since we joined the service in May-June,1961
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)