B.RAMAN
The unrest in the Tibetan areas of China ---Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan--- continues in different forms. The unrest was triggered off in March last by unhappiness among the Tibetans of Sichuan over the continued suppression of their political, religious and ethnic rights by the Chinese authorities and over their attempts to punish anyone who proclaimed his or her loyalty to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
2.The unrest in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan has taken the form of a chain of self-immolations by young Tibetan monks of the large Kirti monastery. The Chinese authorities have not been able to stop these acts or attempted acts of self-immolation despite their removing a large number of monks of the monastery to a military detention camp euphemistically called a re-education centre and punishing those present at the time of the self-immolations on charges of abetment to suicide. They have also been forcing senior monks to come out with statements condemning self-immolations as unBuddhist and have launched a campaign against His Holiness for not condemning self-immolations.
3. Despite these suppressive measures, acts or attempted acts of self-immolation continue with nine so far. In the latest incident reported on October 17, 2011, a nun is reported to have committed self-immolation. This is the first instance of a self-immolation by a nun in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. Wamgmo, the 20-year-old nun, was from the Mamo or Dechen Choekorling Nunnery, which has about 350 nuns in Ngaba. Nuns from here had also participated in the March 2008 protest movement,
4. The same day, the Chinese police opened fire on a group of protesting Tibetans, injuring two of them. There were no fatalities. The shooting followed a protest the previous day in the Khekor township of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture. A group of seven Tibetans protested in front of the local police station and shouted slogans calling for freedom for Tibet, the return of His Holiness from exile and the release from jail of His Holiness the Panchen Lama, chosen by the Dalai Lama in accordance with Tibetan Buddhist traditions. The Chinese have jailed him and the Communist Party of China has nominated its own Panchen Lama who has not been accepted by the Tibetans.
5.The self-immolations in Sichuan have been accompanied by protests and commercial strikes by Tibetans in the towns and villages to which those committing self-immolation belonged. The Tibetan community of Sichuan observed a day of fasting and protest on October 19 to express solidarity with the families of those who committed self-immolation. The acts of self-immolation have not so far spread to other Tibetan areas outside Sichuan.
6. However, a Tibetan-consciousness movement has been spreading right across the Tibetan belt. The objective of the movement is to enhance the consciousness of the Tibetans---particularly the youth--- about the distinct nature of the Tibetan culture as distinguished from the Han culture and to impress upon the youth the importance of preserving the Tibetan culture and maintaining their loyalty and devotion to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The monasteries have been in the forefront of this movement.
7. As part of this Tibetan-consciousness movement, Tibetans are being encouraged to dress in typical Tibetan style, speak among themselves only in the Tibetan language, eat only Tibetan food and participate in joint prayer meetings. Reports received from Tibet and other Tibetan areas say that thousands of Tibetans---many of them youth—are participating in the peaceful gatherings organised by this movement. The Chinese authorities have till now refrained from disrupting this movement lest it lead to any violence.
8. At the Sershul monastery in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province, more than 20,000 Tibetan monks and others gathered from Oct. 6-13 to take part in discussions on Tibetan-consciousness. In an earlier Tibetan-consciousness gathering from Oct. 2-5 at the Dzogchen monastery, also in Kardze, a senior religious leader spoke to more than 10,000 Tibetans on the Tibetan identity. Pledges to struggle for Tibetan freedom through non-violent means were taken
9.Similar gatherings were held in eight other places during September and October, including one gathering of about 1,400 monks in Nangchen in the Yulshul (in Chinese, Yushu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai province.
10. The absence of acts of self-immolation, protest meetings and commercial strikes in Tibet itself should not be misconstrued to mean that the struggle for Tibetan rights, which led to a mass flare-up in 2008, is showing signs of subsiding. It has taken a different form. The presence of thousands of Tibetans---particularly Tibetan youth--- in the Tibetan-consciousness gatherings in Tibet speaks of the continuing pride of the Tibetans in their Tibetan personality, culture and religious faith.
11. The Tibetan struggle for the protection and preservation of their self-identity and their loyalty and devotion to His Holiness remain as strong as ever. What should be encouraging is that a new generation Tibetan activists, different from those who were in the vanguard of the 2008 flare-up, has emerged and is now leading the Tibetan struggle. The new generation believes in a peaceful struggle. It feels that the violence of March 2008 played into the hands of the Chinese and enabled them to use brutal force to suppress the movement.( 25-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
Sunday, October 23, 2011
CHOPPER RELEASE SPEAKS WELL OF GEN.KAYANI
B.RAMAN
On October 23,2011, an Indian military helicopter with four military personnel on board strayed into Pakistani air space in the Skardu region of Gilgit-Baltistan due to bad weather.
2. According to official accounts of the Pakistani Army, the occupants of the helicopter consisted of one Lt.Col, two Majors and a junior commissioned officer. On detecting the crossing of the helicopter into Pakistani air space, planes of the Pakistani Air Force took off and made it land in the Skardu area.
3. After questioning the occupants of the copter regarding the circumstances under which it crossed over into Pakistani air space, they were allowed to take off and return to the Kargil area of India the same day within a few hours.
4. According to official accounts emanating from New Delhi, the Armies of the two countries sorted out the incident in a professional and cordial manner by using the hotline that exists between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries.
5.Even though the incident was unintentional, the Pakistan Army could have played it up as having a sinister motive and detained the copter and its occupants ostensibly for long interrogation.
6. At a time when the Pakistani Army is under tremendous pressure from the US to mount operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, its Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS ), could have exploited the incident to mount a PSYWAR against India in order to project as if Pakistan continued to face a military threat from India.
7. The Pakistan Army resisted that temptation, treated the incident in the low-key in which it deserved to be treated, consciously avoided dramatizing it and let the chopper and its occupants fly back to India within a few hours.
8. This speaks highly of Gen.Kayani as a military professional. His positive and cool reflexes as reflected during the incident need to be noted, acknowledged and hailed by India. The way the Pakistani military and political leadership resisted the temptation to exploit the incident for ulterior purposes needs to be highlighted and praised.
9. We do not hesitate to criticise what we see as the negative traits and reflexes of the Pakistan Army in matters relating to India. In equal measure, we should not hesitate to highlight and hail the positive traits and reflexes of the Pakistani military leadership. The manner in which the Pakistani military leadership handled the incident is worthy of high praise.
10. One is reminded that during the crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001, Gen.Kayani was the Director-General of Military Operations in Rawalpindi. It was reported that the US was highly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis. He has shown a similar cool temperament on October 23.
11. Should the good vibrations generated by the Pakistani gesture remain an isolated act without follow-up? I don’t think so. This should be used as a starting point for setting up a more substantial military-military relationship between the armies of the two countries as a distrust-reducing measure. This is the time for us to consider inviting Gen.Kayani to visit India.
12. One should note too the commendable restraint shown by the media of the two countries in reporting on the incident. This augurs well for the future.( 24-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
On October 23,2011, an Indian military helicopter with four military personnel on board strayed into Pakistani air space in the Skardu region of Gilgit-Baltistan due to bad weather.
2. According to official accounts of the Pakistani Army, the occupants of the helicopter consisted of one Lt.Col, two Majors and a junior commissioned officer. On detecting the crossing of the helicopter into Pakistani air space, planes of the Pakistani Air Force took off and made it land in the Skardu area.
3. After questioning the occupants of the copter regarding the circumstances under which it crossed over into Pakistani air space, they were allowed to take off and return to the Kargil area of India the same day within a few hours.
4. According to official accounts emanating from New Delhi, the Armies of the two countries sorted out the incident in a professional and cordial manner by using the hotline that exists between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries.
5.Even though the incident was unintentional, the Pakistan Army could have played it up as having a sinister motive and detained the copter and its occupants ostensibly for long interrogation.
6. At a time when the Pakistani Army is under tremendous pressure from the US to mount operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, its Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS ), could have exploited the incident to mount a PSYWAR against India in order to project as if Pakistan continued to face a military threat from India.
7. The Pakistan Army resisted that temptation, treated the incident in the low-key in which it deserved to be treated, consciously avoided dramatizing it and let the chopper and its occupants fly back to India within a few hours.
8. This speaks highly of Gen.Kayani as a military professional. His positive and cool reflexes as reflected during the incident need to be noted, acknowledged and hailed by India. The way the Pakistani military and political leadership resisted the temptation to exploit the incident for ulterior purposes needs to be highlighted and praised.
9. We do not hesitate to criticise what we see as the negative traits and reflexes of the Pakistan Army in matters relating to India. In equal measure, we should not hesitate to highlight and hail the positive traits and reflexes of the Pakistani military leadership. The manner in which the Pakistani military leadership handled the incident is worthy of high praise.
10. One is reminded that during the crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001, Gen.Kayani was the Director-General of Military Operations in Rawalpindi. It was reported that the US was highly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis. He has shown a similar cool temperament on October 23.
11. Should the good vibrations generated by the Pakistani gesture remain an isolated act without follow-up? I don’t think so. This should be used as a starting point for setting up a more substantial military-military relationship between the armies of the two countries as a distrust-reducing measure. This is the time for us to consider inviting Gen.Kayani to visit India.
12. One should note too the commendable restraint shown by the media of the two countries in reporting on the incident. This augurs well for the future.( 24-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, October 22, 2011
US: TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY ON PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
The indicators from reliable sources in Pakistan are that the just-concluded visit ( October 21,2011) of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to Pakistan at the head of a high-power delegation including the new incumbents to the important posts of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),David Petraeus, failed to have the necessary impact on the military as well as civilian leadership.
2. What she was expecting was a clear commitment from the Pakistani leadership with a time-bound plan of operation to neutralise the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, an arm of the Afghan Taliban, in the Pashtun belt in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)---particularly in North Waziristan.
3. The Pakistani civilian and military leaders were as evasive as ever and the Army headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), avoided making any commitment on this issue despite cautions emanating from identified and unidentified sources in Washington regarding the likely punitive consequences of continued Pakistani inaction against the terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory from which, according to the US, attacks are launched against NATO and Afghan targets in Afghan territory.
4. As the US moves towards the Presidential elections next year, the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan have been stalling on the ground. Spectacular decapitation strikes against high-value targets through pilotless Drone aircraft and commando actions such as the one that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2 last have not produced any major qualitative change in the ground situation.
5. Successful decapitation strikes need time to produce results on the ground situation. The Obama Administration wants quick results that would enable it to start thinning out the US troop presence in Afghanistan well before next-year’s elections when Mr.Obama will be seeking re-election.
6. Such quick results in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations come only from successful strikes against terrorist sanctuaries and other infrastructure on the ground through a mix of air and ground actions. Such a mix facilitated the elimination of OBL in Abbottabad, but it is difficult to repeat it against widely-scattered terrorist infrastructure.
7. The US faces a dilemma because it does not have the stomach for sustained ground operations by its forces in Pakistani territory. Any ground operation by the US forces that is confined to North Waziristan alone would not produce enduring results because the entire Pakistan---its tribal belt as well as the non-tribal hinterland--- provides a strategic depth to the Afghan Taliban, including its Haqqani network.
8. The cruel reality is that without the co-operation of the Pakistan Army, the US is not in a position to mount a successful counter-sanctuary operation in Pakistani territory. The Pakistan Army has a clear understanding of the limitations to the ground action capabilities of the US in Pakistani territory. Such limitations do not arise from Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as it is generally presumed. They arise from the nature of the tribal belt and the vast non-tribal hinterland.
9. There are no quick answers to the operational dilemma faced by the US in Pakistan. The US has to realise that Pakistan as constituted presently will continue to keep coming in the way of the over-all strategic objectives of the US in the Af-Pak region. Unless the Pakistani capabilities are weakened, there is going to be no enduring solution to the US dilemma in Pakistan. Economic and military sanctions alone will not weaken Pakistan’s capabilities in view of the assistance that would be forthcoming to Pakistan from China and Saudi Arabia.
10. The only enduring way of weakening the capability of Pakistan is to work strategically for changing the very nature of Pakistan as it is constituted presently by identifying friendly elements in Pakistan such as the Balochs, the Mohajirs and the Shias and helping them in achieving their objective of freeing themselves from the control of the Pakistani Army.
11. These three elements have been struggling on their own, but they have not made much headway due to lack of external support and absence of strategic unity amongst them. If they can be persuaded to come together in a Southern Alliance and struggle jointly and if their political objectives are supported by the outside world---the US particularly—one may see the beginning of the process of weakening the capability of the Pakistani Army to stand in the way of peace and stability in the region.
12. The time has come for a clear realisation that Pakistan as constituted presently is the problem in the region and that unless the non-radical sections of the Pakistani society are helped to assert themselves, no enduring solution would be possible. ( 23-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The indicators from reliable sources in Pakistan are that the just-concluded visit ( October 21,2011) of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to Pakistan at the head of a high-power delegation including the new incumbents to the important posts of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),David Petraeus, failed to have the necessary impact on the military as well as civilian leadership.
2. What she was expecting was a clear commitment from the Pakistani leadership with a time-bound plan of operation to neutralise the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, an arm of the Afghan Taliban, in the Pashtun belt in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)---particularly in North Waziristan.
3. The Pakistani civilian and military leaders were as evasive as ever and the Army headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), avoided making any commitment on this issue despite cautions emanating from identified and unidentified sources in Washington regarding the likely punitive consequences of continued Pakistani inaction against the terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory from which, according to the US, attacks are launched against NATO and Afghan targets in Afghan territory.
4. As the US moves towards the Presidential elections next year, the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan have been stalling on the ground. Spectacular decapitation strikes against high-value targets through pilotless Drone aircraft and commando actions such as the one that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2 last have not produced any major qualitative change in the ground situation.
5. Successful decapitation strikes need time to produce results on the ground situation. The Obama Administration wants quick results that would enable it to start thinning out the US troop presence in Afghanistan well before next-year’s elections when Mr.Obama will be seeking re-election.
6. Such quick results in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations come only from successful strikes against terrorist sanctuaries and other infrastructure on the ground through a mix of air and ground actions. Such a mix facilitated the elimination of OBL in Abbottabad, but it is difficult to repeat it against widely-scattered terrorist infrastructure.
7. The US faces a dilemma because it does not have the stomach for sustained ground operations by its forces in Pakistani territory. Any ground operation by the US forces that is confined to North Waziristan alone would not produce enduring results because the entire Pakistan---its tribal belt as well as the non-tribal hinterland--- provides a strategic depth to the Afghan Taliban, including its Haqqani network.
8. The cruel reality is that without the co-operation of the Pakistan Army, the US is not in a position to mount a successful counter-sanctuary operation in Pakistani territory. The Pakistan Army has a clear understanding of the limitations to the ground action capabilities of the US in Pakistani territory. Such limitations do not arise from Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as it is generally presumed. They arise from the nature of the tribal belt and the vast non-tribal hinterland.
9. There are no quick answers to the operational dilemma faced by the US in Pakistan. The US has to realise that Pakistan as constituted presently will continue to keep coming in the way of the over-all strategic objectives of the US in the Af-Pak region. Unless the Pakistani capabilities are weakened, there is going to be no enduring solution to the US dilemma in Pakistan. Economic and military sanctions alone will not weaken Pakistan’s capabilities in view of the assistance that would be forthcoming to Pakistan from China and Saudi Arabia.
10. The only enduring way of weakening the capability of Pakistan is to work strategically for changing the very nature of Pakistan as it is constituted presently by identifying friendly elements in Pakistan such as the Balochs, the Mohajirs and the Shias and helping them in achieving their objective of freeing themselves from the control of the Pakistani Army.
11. These three elements have been struggling on their own, but they have not made much headway due to lack of external support and absence of strategic unity amongst them. If they can be persuaded to come together in a Southern Alliance and struggle jointly and if their political objectives are supported by the outside world---the US particularly—one may see the beginning of the process of weakening the capability of the Pakistani Army to stand in the way of peace and stability in the region.
12. The time has come for a clear realisation that Pakistan as constituted presently is the problem in the region and that unless the non-radical sections of the Pakistani society are helped to assert themselves, no enduring solution would be possible. ( 23-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 21, 2011
LIBYA: AN OLD EVIL IS DEAD, A NEW EVIL IS BORN
B.RAMAN
No right-thinking person would shed tears over the death of Gaddafi, the Libyan dictator, but any well-informed analyst with his feet firmly on the ground would be nervous over the likely sequel to his elimination.
2.Gaddafi suppressed his people. He used brutal force against them. He funded, trained and armed many of the West Asian terrorist organisations, that claimed to be fighting for the Palestinian cause against Israel and the West. He funded and armed the Irish Republican Army to make the British bleed. Under him, the Libyan intelligence became a brutal sponsor of terrorism against the West ---particularly after the alleged death of his daughter in a US air strike in 1986 when Ronald Reagan was the US President.
3. His intelligence blew up a French civilian plane in Africa and a Pan-Am Aircraft of the US near Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988. He partly funded Pakistan’s Islamic bomb along with Saudi Arabia and Iran. He was a menace who deserved to be eliminated.
4. Post-9/11, he gave signs of a new friendly Gaddafi on the horizon. He handed over his intelligence officers to the West for trial. He paid huge compensations to the relatives of those who died in the two explosions aboard a French and US aircraft. He kept away from Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda. After the US found out about his nuclear acquisitions with the help of Pakistan’s A.Q.Khan, he made a clean breast of his nuclear acquisitions and destroyed them to the satisfaction of the West. This merited a “Thank you” visit to Libya by the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
5. Gaddafi fondly hoped that these mitigating actions by him would spare him a brutal fate. They didn’t. The ideal thing would have been for the West to ensure that like Iraq’s Saddam Hussain, Gadaffi too died in the gallows after a due process of law. Instead, it let him be killed in an uncivilised manner by his enraged captors, who will be the new rulers of Libya.
6. One might blame his captors for their uncivilised behaviour, but many in the Islamic world would convince themselves that this uncivilised behaviour could have been prevented if the West had wanted to. The West wanted his death to be a grim warning to others of Gaddafi’s ilk who stood in the way of Western interests. He died in a horrible manner, but his death could haunt the West for some years to come.
7. Other nuclear aspirants like the rulers of Iran and North Korea would conclude, rightly or wrongly, that it was unwise on the part of Gaddafi to have voluntarily given by his nuclear card. The West would find Iran and North Korea even more recalcitrant on the nuclear issue.
8. There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq before the US intervention in 2003. AQ, Iraq, was born as a result of the US intervention. Its founding father Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed some years ago, but there are other trained cadres who have been keeping Iraq bleeding.
9. Gaddafi kept AQ many fathoms away from Libya,but he could not prevent angry individual Libyans from gravitating to the Af-Pak region to join AQ. Abu Faraj al-Libi, now in Guantanamao Bay, is one such example. There are other Libyan recruits in the AQ.A new AQ, Libya, to avenge the US-sponsored or at least blessed intervention in Libya will be on the cards.
10. There is an ominous aspect about Libya which was not there in Iraq. In return for the Libyan funding of Pakistan’s Islamic bomb, A.Q.Khan had trained many Libyan nuclear scientists in Pakistan’s nuclear establishments to run Libya’s nuclear infrastructure. To please the US and the UK, Gaddafi dismantled his nuclear infrastructure to their satisfaction, but the Pakistan-trained nuclear scientists are still around.AQ will look for them. ( 22-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
No right-thinking person would shed tears over the death of Gaddafi, the Libyan dictator, but any well-informed analyst with his feet firmly on the ground would be nervous over the likely sequel to his elimination.
2.Gaddafi suppressed his people. He used brutal force against them. He funded, trained and armed many of the West Asian terrorist organisations, that claimed to be fighting for the Palestinian cause against Israel and the West. He funded and armed the Irish Republican Army to make the British bleed. Under him, the Libyan intelligence became a brutal sponsor of terrorism against the West ---particularly after the alleged death of his daughter in a US air strike in 1986 when Ronald Reagan was the US President.
3. His intelligence blew up a French civilian plane in Africa and a Pan-Am Aircraft of the US near Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988. He partly funded Pakistan’s Islamic bomb along with Saudi Arabia and Iran. He was a menace who deserved to be eliminated.
4. Post-9/11, he gave signs of a new friendly Gaddafi on the horizon. He handed over his intelligence officers to the West for trial. He paid huge compensations to the relatives of those who died in the two explosions aboard a French and US aircraft. He kept away from Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda. After the US found out about his nuclear acquisitions with the help of Pakistan’s A.Q.Khan, he made a clean breast of his nuclear acquisitions and destroyed them to the satisfaction of the West. This merited a “Thank you” visit to Libya by the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
5. Gaddafi fondly hoped that these mitigating actions by him would spare him a brutal fate. They didn’t. The ideal thing would have been for the West to ensure that like Iraq’s Saddam Hussain, Gadaffi too died in the gallows after a due process of law. Instead, it let him be killed in an uncivilised manner by his enraged captors, who will be the new rulers of Libya.
6. One might blame his captors for their uncivilised behaviour, but many in the Islamic world would convince themselves that this uncivilised behaviour could have been prevented if the West had wanted to. The West wanted his death to be a grim warning to others of Gaddafi’s ilk who stood in the way of Western interests. He died in a horrible manner, but his death could haunt the West for some years to come.
7. Other nuclear aspirants like the rulers of Iran and North Korea would conclude, rightly or wrongly, that it was unwise on the part of Gaddafi to have voluntarily given by his nuclear card. The West would find Iran and North Korea even more recalcitrant on the nuclear issue.
8. There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq before the US intervention in 2003. AQ, Iraq, was born as a result of the US intervention. Its founding father Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed some years ago, but there are other trained cadres who have been keeping Iraq bleeding.
9. Gaddafi kept AQ many fathoms away from Libya,but he could not prevent angry individual Libyans from gravitating to the Af-Pak region to join AQ. Abu Faraj al-Libi, now in Guantanamao Bay, is one such example. There are other Libyan recruits in the AQ.A new AQ, Libya, to avenge the US-sponsored or at least blessed intervention in Libya will be on the cards.
10. There is an ominous aspect about Libya which was not there in Iraq. In return for the Libyan funding of Pakistan’s Islamic bomb, A.Q.Khan had trained many Libyan nuclear scientists in Pakistan’s nuclear establishments to run Libya’s nuclear infrastructure. To please the US and the UK, Gaddafi dismantled his nuclear infrastructure to their satisfaction, but the Pakistan-trained nuclear scientists are still around.AQ will look for them. ( 22-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 17, 2011
INDIA-VIETNAM OIL/GAS COOPERATION SPARKS JINGOISTIC ANGER IN CHINESE MEDIA
B.RAMAN
On October 12,2011, the ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group PetroVietnam (PV) signed at New Delhi an agreement on cooperation in the field of oil and gas. It was signed in the presence of the President of Vietnam Mr. Truong Tan Sang, who was on a visit to India, and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh.
2.It will be a framework agreement, which will be in force for three years. Its aim is to promote long-term cooperation in the field of oil and gas. The co-operation, which is already in force since 1988 under framework agreements signed from time to time since then, covers aspects such as the exchange of information on the petroleum industry, exchange of working visits by officials and specialists in various domains of the petroleum industry, new investments, expansion and operations of oil and gas exploration and production including refining, transportation and supply in Vietnam and India, and as well as to third countries.
3. The starting-block of the co-operation was the signing of a Production Sharing Contract ( PSC) between the Hydrocarbon India Ltd., (renamed later as ONGC Videsh Limited) and PetroVietnam on May 19, 1988, under which the Indian company was allowed to explore for gas in Block 06.1. This block contributes about 50% of the gas requirement of Vietnam.
4. Subsequently, in June 2006, PetroVietnam awarded two more blocks for exploration to the Indian company. These blocks called blocks 127 and 128 in the Phu Kanh basin in Vietnam were awarded to OVL after a regular bidding process.
5. Details of these three blocks as disseminated by the Indian company through the web are as follows:
Block 06.1 :
Participating Companies and their Shares :OVL-45%,BP-35% ,PV-20% ,(Operator - British Petroleum (BP))
OVL, British Petroleum (Operator) and PetroVietnam have developed the Lan Tay field in Block 06.1 offshore Vietnam. The field started commercial production of Gas in January, 2003. The project is operated by British Petroleum. OVL’s share of production from the project was 2.249 BCM of gas and 0.038 MMT of condensate during 2010-11 as compared to 1.967 BCM of gas and 0.042 MMT of condensate during 2009-10. OVL’s share of the development expenditure was about USD 244 Million till March 31, 2011.
Block 127 :
It is an offshore deepwater Block, located at water depth of more than 400 meters with 9,246 sq km area in Vietnam. The PSC for the Block was signed on 24th May, 2006. OVL holds 100% stake in the Block with Operatorship. OVL has acquired 1,150 sq km 3D seismic data in the Block and the interpretation of the seismic data has been completed. Location for drilling of exploration well was identified and a well was drilled in July 2009 to a depth of 1265 mts. As there was no hydrocarbon presence, the Company has decided to relinquish the block to Petrovietnam. The Company had invested approx USD 68 million till March 31, 2010.
Block 128 :
OVL signed a contract for 100% stake in the project in May, 2006. The project is operated by OVL. OVL had deployed the Rig Hakuryu-V on well B 128-RV-1X on 2nd September 2009 for drilling. However, the rig could not be anchored despite adding Piggy Back to the existing anchors. The drilling activity was terminated and it is planned that the location would be drilled in 2012 subject to successful field testing of anchors. OVL has invested about USD 46 million till March 31, 2011.
6. In June 2006, the OVL had said as follows: “With this, OVL has bagged both blocks it had bid for among nine offered for global competitive bidding in Vietnam's 2004 Licensing Round. "With the award of Blocks 127 and 128 for offshore exploration in Vietnam, OVL is consolidating its existing presence with 45 percent participating interest in the gas-producing properties of Lan Do and Lan Tay offshore blocks," said OVL chairman Subir Raha. Blocks 127 and 128 are close to Nam Con Son project that sources gas from Lan Do and Lan Tay fields discovered by OVL (then Hydrocarbons India Ltd) in 1992 and 1993 respectively. OVL holds 45 percent participating interest in exploration activities in what is the biggest oil and gas project in Vietnam. The new exploration blocks awarded to OVL have in-place reserves of around 190 million tonnes of oil and oil-equivalent gas. With oil equity or participating interests in over a dozen countries including Russia and Sudan, OVL now has operatorship in four offshore exploration blocks. This includes the Farsi block in Iran, Najweet Najeem in Qatar and Blocks 127 and 128 in Vietnam. OVL is also the operator of an onshore exploration block in Libya.”
7. In September 2010,PetroVietnam chairman Dinh La Thang confirmed that his group had planned to submit a proposal to buy stakes in BP’s upstream offshore projects. Vietnam and BP are involved in four projects, the Lan Tay-Lan Do gas field in Block 06.1, Nam Con Son pipeline system, Phu My 3 power plant and BP Petco lubricant joint venture. BP planned to transfer stakes from the first three projects, but not the last one. A BP Vietnam representative said BP had informed the Vietnamese Government of its intention to explore options for divestment of its upstream assets and was now awaiting approval. She said: “Our top priority is to continue safe and reliable operations now, during transition and thereafter.”
8.Dinh was quoted by the local press as saying that under the agreement signed among partners of the above projects, if one of the partners wanted to withdraw the investment capital or quit the project it would offer priority rights to buy stakes to the other partners in the project. “We have already made a plan to coordinate with the Indian partner [the third partner in those projects] to buy those stakes,” he said. Sections of the media quoted India’s then Petroleum Secretary S Sundareshan as saying that India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and PetroVietnam would jointly bid for BP’s assets in Vietnam.
9. Thus, since May 1988,the OVL had been involved in oil and gas exploration in Vietnam. In the first block 06.1 awarded in May 1988, the OVL had a 45 per cent stake, the BP had a 35 per cent stake and the PV a 20 per cent stake. Even though the project has been working successfully, BP decided last year to disinvest its holdings reportedly due to poor security conditions and talks were on for the OVL and the PV to buy it.
10. In the remaining two blocks awarded to the OVL in 2006, the OVL has a 100 per cent stake. In Block 127 no oil or gas has been found and there were reports that the OVL was planning to disinvest it to the PV. Exploration work is still going on in Block 128 without any discovery of oil or gas so far. In the meanwhile, there have been reports that Essar, another Indian company, was also planning to enter the field of oil and gas exploration in co-operation with the PV.
11. China did not formally raise any objection to any of the agreements or projects till last year despite the fact that Indo-Vietnamese co-operation in the field of oil and gas is now 23 years old. Last year on two occasions, Chinese officials were reported to have privately informed their US counterparts that China considered the South China Sea also as its core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet. By core interest, China means an issue on which no compromise on the question of sovereignty is possible. Neither the US nor the ASEAN countries have accepted the new Chinese assertion of the South China Sea as of core interest to China with Chinese sovereignty paramount.
12. Since the beginning of this year, sections of the Chinese media and non-Governmental experts have mounted a campaign to oppose the Vietnamese action in awarding these three blocks to an Indian company for exploration on the ground that these blocks belonged to China. The Chinese contention has been rejected by Vietnam.
13. The firm adherence of the OVL and the PV to the contracts of 1988 and 2006 in respect of these blocks has infuriated the Chinese. After the signing of the three-year framework agreement at New Delhi on October 12, the party-owned “Global Times” and the “China Energy News”, owned by the party-owned “People’s Daily”, have come out with comments of a jingoistic nature on the subject.
14. In an editorial published on October 14, the “Global Times” wrote: “Both countries clearly know what this means for China. China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China in the area. By inking pacts with Vietnam, India probably has deeper considerations in its regional strategy than simply getting barrels of oil and gas. India is willing to fish in the troubled waters of the South China Sea so as to accumulate bargaining chips on other issues with China. There is strong political motivation behind the exploration projects. China's vocal objections may not be heeded. China must take practical and firm actions to make these projects fall through. China should denounce this agreement as illegal. Once India and Vietnam initiate their exploration, China can send non-military forces to disturb their work, and cause dispute or friction to halt the two countries' exploration. In other words, China should let them know that economic profits via such cooperation can hardly match the risk.” .
15.In a front-page commentary published on October 16, the “China Energy News” said: “India is playing with fire by agreeing to explore for oil with Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea. India's energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool. On the question of cooperation with Vietnam, the bottom line for Indian companies is that they must not enter into the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Challenging the core interests of a large, rising country for unknown oil at the bottom of the sea will not only lead to a crushing defeat for the Indian oil company, but will most likely seriously harm India's whole energy security and interrupt its economic development. Indian oil company policy makers should consider the interests of their own country, and turn around at the soonest opportunity and leave the South China Sea."
16.The association of the Indian company with exploration for oil and gas in the blocks awarded by Vietnam is 23 years old. One of the blocks is already producing gas, in one block exploration has been given up as there was no oil or gas and in the third the exploration is still going on.
17.After having kept quiet for 23 years, sections of the party-owned media in China have mounted a jingoistic campaign against India and Vietnam ---more particularly against India--- on the ground that the exploration violates China’s core interest. Till now, for the last 23 years, China had never tried to disrupt the Indian exploration through the use of force, but now the “Global Times” has urged the Government to use force to disrupt the Indian exploration.
18.It is not yet known whether the media comments reflect the views of the Chinese Government. The options available to India if the Chinese security forces use force in future to disrupt the exploration have to be carefully examined so that we are not taken by surprise. At the same time, the matter has to be discussed at the diplomatic level with the Chinese authorities. It is apparent from the campaign that there is a lot of lack of knowledge of the long Indian association with oil/gas exploration in the community of Chinese strategic analysts. This has to be rectified. ( 17-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
On October 12,2011, the ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group PetroVietnam (PV) signed at New Delhi an agreement on cooperation in the field of oil and gas. It was signed in the presence of the President of Vietnam Mr. Truong Tan Sang, who was on a visit to India, and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh.
2.It will be a framework agreement, which will be in force for three years. Its aim is to promote long-term cooperation in the field of oil and gas. The co-operation, which is already in force since 1988 under framework agreements signed from time to time since then, covers aspects such as the exchange of information on the petroleum industry, exchange of working visits by officials and specialists in various domains of the petroleum industry, new investments, expansion and operations of oil and gas exploration and production including refining, transportation and supply in Vietnam and India, and as well as to third countries.
3. The starting-block of the co-operation was the signing of a Production Sharing Contract ( PSC) between the Hydrocarbon India Ltd., (renamed later as ONGC Videsh Limited) and PetroVietnam on May 19, 1988, under which the Indian company was allowed to explore for gas in Block 06.1. This block contributes about 50% of the gas requirement of Vietnam.
4. Subsequently, in June 2006, PetroVietnam awarded two more blocks for exploration to the Indian company. These blocks called blocks 127 and 128 in the Phu Kanh basin in Vietnam were awarded to OVL after a regular bidding process.
5. Details of these three blocks as disseminated by the Indian company through the web are as follows:
Block 06.1 :
Participating Companies and their Shares :OVL-45%,BP-35% ,PV-20% ,(Operator - British Petroleum (BP))
OVL, British Petroleum (Operator) and PetroVietnam have developed the Lan Tay field in Block 06.1 offshore Vietnam. The field started commercial production of Gas in January, 2003. The project is operated by British Petroleum. OVL’s share of production from the project was 2.249 BCM of gas and 0.038 MMT of condensate during 2010-11 as compared to 1.967 BCM of gas and 0.042 MMT of condensate during 2009-10. OVL’s share of the development expenditure was about USD 244 Million till March 31, 2011.
Block 127 :
It is an offshore deepwater Block, located at water depth of more than 400 meters with 9,246 sq km area in Vietnam. The PSC for the Block was signed on 24th May, 2006. OVL holds 100% stake in the Block with Operatorship. OVL has acquired 1,150 sq km 3D seismic data in the Block and the interpretation of the seismic data has been completed. Location for drilling of exploration well was identified and a well was drilled in July 2009 to a depth of 1265 mts. As there was no hydrocarbon presence, the Company has decided to relinquish the block to Petrovietnam. The Company had invested approx USD 68 million till March 31, 2010.
Block 128 :
OVL signed a contract for 100% stake in the project in May, 2006. The project is operated by OVL. OVL had deployed the Rig Hakuryu-V on well B 128-RV-1X on 2nd September 2009 for drilling. However, the rig could not be anchored despite adding Piggy Back to the existing anchors. The drilling activity was terminated and it is planned that the location would be drilled in 2012 subject to successful field testing of anchors. OVL has invested about USD 46 million till March 31, 2011.
6. In June 2006, the OVL had said as follows: “With this, OVL has bagged both blocks it had bid for among nine offered for global competitive bidding in Vietnam's 2004 Licensing Round. "With the award of Blocks 127 and 128 for offshore exploration in Vietnam, OVL is consolidating its existing presence with 45 percent participating interest in the gas-producing properties of Lan Do and Lan Tay offshore blocks," said OVL chairman Subir Raha. Blocks 127 and 128 are close to Nam Con Son project that sources gas from Lan Do and Lan Tay fields discovered by OVL (then Hydrocarbons India Ltd) in 1992 and 1993 respectively. OVL holds 45 percent participating interest in exploration activities in what is the biggest oil and gas project in Vietnam. The new exploration blocks awarded to OVL have in-place reserves of around 190 million tonnes of oil and oil-equivalent gas. With oil equity or participating interests in over a dozen countries including Russia and Sudan, OVL now has operatorship in four offshore exploration blocks. This includes the Farsi block in Iran, Najweet Najeem in Qatar and Blocks 127 and 128 in Vietnam. OVL is also the operator of an onshore exploration block in Libya.”
7. In September 2010,PetroVietnam chairman Dinh La Thang confirmed that his group had planned to submit a proposal to buy stakes in BP’s upstream offshore projects. Vietnam and BP are involved in four projects, the Lan Tay-Lan Do gas field in Block 06.1, Nam Con Son pipeline system, Phu My 3 power plant and BP Petco lubricant joint venture. BP planned to transfer stakes from the first three projects, but not the last one. A BP Vietnam representative said BP had informed the Vietnamese Government of its intention to explore options for divestment of its upstream assets and was now awaiting approval. She said: “Our top priority is to continue safe and reliable operations now, during transition and thereafter.”
8.Dinh was quoted by the local press as saying that under the agreement signed among partners of the above projects, if one of the partners wanted to withdraw the investment capital or quit the project it would offer priority rights to buy stakes to the other partners in the project. “We have already made a plan to coordinate with the Indian partner [the third partner in those projects] to buy those stakes,” he said. Sections of the media quoted India’s then Petroleum Secretary S Sundareshan as saying that India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and PetroVietnam would jointly bid for BP’s assets in Vietnam.
9. Thus, since May 1988,the OVL had been involved in oil and gas exploration in Vietnam. In the first block 06.1 awarded in May 1988, the OVL had a 45 per cent stake, the BP had a 35 per cent stake and the PV a 20 per cent stake. Even though the project has been working successfully, BP decided last year to disinvest its holdings reportedly due to poor security conditions and talks were on for the OVL and the PV to buy it.
10. In the remaining two blocks awarded to the OVL in 2006, the OVL has a 100 per cent stake. In Block 127 no oil or gas has been found and there were reports that the OVL was planning to disinvest it to the PV. Exploration work is still going on in Block 128 without any discovery of oil or gas so far. In the meanwhile, there have been reports that Essar, another Indian company, was also planning to enter the field of oil and gas exploration in co-operation with the PV.
11. China did not formally raise any objection to any of the agreements or projects till last year despite the fact that Indo-Vietnamese co-operation in the field of oil and gas is now 23 years old. Last year on two occasions, Chinese officials were reported to have privately informed their US counterparts that China considered the South China Sea also as its core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet. By core interest, China means an issue on which no compromise on the question of sovereignty is possible. Neither the US nor the ASEAN countries have accepted the new Chinese assertion of the South China Sea as of core interest to China with Chinese sovereignty paramount.
12. Since the beginning of this year, sections of the Chinese media and non-Governmental experts have mounted a campaign to oppose the Vietnamese action in awarding these three blocks to an Indian company for exploration on the ground that these blocks belonged to China. The Chinese contention has been rejected by Vietnam.
13. The firm adherence of the OVL and the PV to the contracts of 1988 and 2006 in respect of these blocks has infuriated the Chinese. After the signing of the three-year framework agreement at New Delhi on October 12, the party-owned “Global Times” and the “China Energy News”, owned by the party-owned “People’s Daily”, have come out with comments of a jingoistic nature on the subject.
14. In an editorial published on October 14, the “Global Times” wrote: “Both countries clearly know what this means for China. China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China in the area. By inking pacts with Vietnam, India probably has deeper considerations in its regional strategy than simply getting barrels of oil and gas. India is willing to fish in the troubled waters of the South China Sea so as to accumulate bargaining chips on other issues with China. There is strong political motivation behind the exploration projects. China's vocal objections may not be heeded. China must take practical and firm actions to make these projects fall through. China should denounce this agreement as illegal. Once India and Vietnam initiate their exploration, China can send non-military forces to disturb their work, and cause dispute or friction to halt the two countries' exploration. In other words, China should let them know that economic profits via such cooperation can hardly match the risk.” .
15.In a front-page commentary published on October 16, the “China Energy News” said: “India is playing with fire by agreeing to explore for oil with Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea. India's energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool. On the question of cooperation with Vietnam, the bottom line for Indian companies is that they must not enter into the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Challenging the core interests of a large, rising country for unknown oil at the bottom of the sea will not only lead to a crushing defeat for the Indian oil company, but will most likely seriously harm India's whole energy security and interrupt its economic development. Indian oil company policy makers should consider the interests of their own country, and turn around at the soonest opportunity and leave the South China Sea."
16.The association of the Indian company with exploration for oil and gas in the blocks awarded by Vietnam is 23 years old. One of the blocks is already producing gas, in one block exploration has been given up as there was no oil or gas and in the third the exploration is still going on.
17.After having kept quiet for 23 years, sections of the party-owned media in China have mounted a jingoistic campaign against India and Vietnam ---more particularly against India--- on the ground that the exploration violates China’s core interest. Till now, for the last 23 years, China had never tried to disrupt the Indian exploration through the use of force, but now the “Global Times” has urged the Government to use force to disrupt the Indian exploration.
18.It is not yet known whether the media comments reflect the views of the Chinese Government. The options available to India if the Chinese security forces use force in future to disrupt the exploration have to be carefully examined so that we are not taken by surprise. At the same time, the matter has to be discussed at the diplomatic level with the Chinese authorities. It is apparent from the campaign that there is a lot of lack of knowledge of the long Indian association with oil/gas exploration in the community of Chinese strategic analysts. This has to be rectified. ( 17-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, October 15, 2011
CALL FOR PROTESTS BY TIBETANS ON OCTOBER 19
B.RAMAN
According to Tibetan sources in the Sichuan province of China, leaflets in the Tibetan language have been circulating in the Tibetan areas of the province calling for a day of protests and fasting on October 19 in solidarity with a similar observance by Tibetans all over the world to condemn the continued oppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese and the military detention of a large number of Tibetan monks of the Kirti monastery in the province since March following the self-immolation of a young monk.
2. Anger over the military detention of the monks ostensibly for self-education has led to seven incidents of self-immolation by monks since then. The anger has been further aggravated by the arrests of many monks by the Chinese on charges of abetment at suicide for not stopping the self-immolations and by the Chinese refusal to hand over the dead bodies of the monks who committed self-immolation to the monastery or the village to which they belonged. The Chinese have been cremating the dead bodies and handing over only the ashes.
3. Since the beginning of this month there has been a number of incidents of peaceful street protests and closing down of shops by Tibetans in the Sichuan province. Three days of protests and shop closures between October 8 and 10 have been reported from the Ngaba area of Sichuan . There have been many incidents of Tibetan flags being hoisted in public places after removing the Chinese national flags. The Chinese authorities have detained a number of persons to interrogate them as to who is behind these incidents, but they have not been able to stop such incidents
4. In one incident reported on October 13 from the Khakor subdistrict of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture, some local Tibetans managed to remove a Chinese flag from a police station and hoist a Tibetan flag .
5. On October 1, the Chinese National Day, about 200 Tibetans had staged a protest demonstration at Serthar after the police tore a Tibetan flag and a large photo of his Holiness the Dalai Lama from a building and threw them into the street.
6. There has been a war of words between the Chinese authorities and the Tibetan Government-in-exile headed by Harvard-educated Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay over these incidents. On October 11, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin accused the members of the so-called "Dalai clique" of not only failing to condemn the self-immolations, but also publicizing them to inspire more self-immolations. The Tibetan government-in-exile condemned these remarks and said that China should first put an end to its "repression" in Tibet. It also accused Chinese security personnel of violating basic human rights by assaulting monks who attempted self-immolation.
7. No incidents have been reported from Tibet itself. The protest movement has till now been confined to the Sichuan province. (15-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
According to Tibetan sources in the Sichuan province of China, leaflets in the Tibetan language have been circulating in the Tibetan areas of the province calling for a day of protests and fasting on October 19 in solidarity with a similar observance by Tibetans all over the world to condemn the continued oppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese and the military detention of a large number of Tibetan monks of the Kirti monastery in the province since March following the self-immolation of a young monk.
2. Anger over the military detention of the monks ostensibly for self-education has led to seven incidents of self-immolation by monks since then. The anger has been further aggravated by the arrests of many monks by the Chinese on charges of abetment at suicide for not stopping the self-immolations and by the Chinese refusal to hand over the dead bodies of the monks who committed self-immolation to the monastery or the village to which they belonged. The Chinese have been cremating the dead bodies and handing over only the ashes.
3. Since the beginning of this month there has been a number of incidents of peaceful street protests and closing down of shops by Tibetans in the Sichuan province. Three days of protests and shop closures between October 8 and 10 have been reported from the Ngaba area of Sichuan . There have been many incidents of Tibetan flags being hoisted in public places after removing the Chinese national flags. The Chinese authorities have detained a number of persons to interrogate them as to who is behind these incidents, but they have not been able to stop such incidents
4. In one incident reported on October 13 from the Khakor subdistrict of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture, some local Tibetans managed to remove a Chinese flag from a police station and hoist a Tibetan flag .
5. On October 1, the Chinese National Day, about 200 Tibetans had staged a protest demonstration at Serthar after the police tore a Tibetan flag and a large photo of his Holiness the Dalai Lama from a building and threw them into the street.
6. There has been a war of words between the Chinese authorities and the Tibetan Government-in-exile headed by Harvard-educated Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay over these incidents. On October 11, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin accused the members of the so-called "Dalai clique" of not only failing to condemn the self-immolations, but also publicizing them to inspire more self-immolations. The Tibetan government-in-exile condemned these remarks and said that China should first put an end to its "repression" in Tibet. It also accused Chinese security personnel of violating basic human rights by assaulting monks who attempted self-immolation.
7. No incidents have been reported from Tibet itself. The protest movement has till now been confined to the Sichuan province. (15-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 14, 2011
MANY MORE ABBOTTABADS WAITING TO BE DISCOVERED IN PAKISTAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 741
B.RAMAN
When Abu Zubaidah, who was reportedly No.3 of Al Qaeda at the time of 9/11, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was not in the tribal belt. It was in the house of a local office-bearer of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Faislabad, a city of Pakistani Punjab.
2. When Ramzi Binalshib, another top gun of Al Qaeda, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in Karachi.
3. When Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who co-ordinated the 9/11 strikes in the US on behalf of Osama bin Laden and who slit the throat of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in the house of a women’s wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi right under the nose of the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army.
4. When Osama bin Laden himself was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and killed, it was found to be in Abbottabad near the training academy of the Pakistan Army.
5. The US is now looking for the rabbit-holes of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has taken over the leadership of Al Qaeda, Jallaludin and Serajuddin Haqqani of the so-called Haqqani network, Mulla Mohammad Omar of the Afghan Taliban, and Hakimullah Mehsud of the Pakistani Taliban.
6.Their rabbit-holes are likely to be in areas outside the reach of the Drones. While continuing the Drone strikes to keep the jihadi top guns running for cover, the US should also look for other Abbottabads strewn across Pakistan.
7. It was good human intelligence that led the CIA to the rabbit-hole of OBL. The Navy SEALS followed later. It is good human intelligence which will again lead the CIA to the rabbit-holes of others badly wanted.
8. The US should seek allies in this hunt. Those allies could come from the Mohajirs of Karachi, the Balochs of Karachi and Balochistan and the Shias of the Kurram Agency and Gilgit-Baltistan. They are as fed up with the jihadis and their ISI master as the US.
9. The US should constitute them into a Southern Alliance against terrorism and give them the capability and the resources to hunt effectively. They will expect a quid pro quo in the form political support for their grievances. The US should not hesitate to give them the support they want.
10. It is time to think strategically of a future dispensation in Pakistan that would help in achieving final and durable victory against jihadi terrorism with ISI’s characteristics. A Southern Alliance of non-radical elements of the present Pakistan, which are as unhappy about jihadi terrorism and the ISI as the US, has to be the linchpin of such a strategy.
11. Start thinking, start acting. ( 15-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
When Abu Zubaidah, who was reportedly No.3 of Al Qaeda at the time of 9/11, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was not in the tribal belt. It was in the house of a local office-bearer of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Faislabad, a city of Pakistani Punjab.
2. When Ramzi Binalshib, another top gun of Al Qaeda, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in Karachi.
3. When Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who co-ordinated the 9/11 strikes in the US on behalf of Osama bin Laden and who slit the throat of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in the house of a women’s wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi right under the nose of the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army.
4. When Osama bin Laden himself was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and killed, it was found to be in Abbottabad near the training academy of the Pakistan Army.
5. The US is now looking for the rabbit-holes of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has taken over the leadership of Al Qaeda, Jallaludin and Serajuddin Haqqani of the so-called Haqqani network, Mulla Mohammad Omar of the Afghan Taliban, and Hakimullah Mehsud of the Pakistani Taliban.
6.Their rabbit-holes are likely to be in areas outside the reach of the Drones. While continuing the Drone strikes to keep the jihadi top guns running for cover, the US should also look for other Abbottabads strewn across Pakistan.
7. It was good human intelligence that led the CIA to the rabbit-hole of OBL. The Navy SEALS followed later. It is good human intelligence which will again lead the CIA to the rabbit-holes of others badly wanted.
8. The US should seek allies in this hunt. Those allies could come from the Mohajirs of Karachi, the Balochs of Karachi and Balochistan and the Shias of the Kurram Agency and Gilgit-Baltistan. They are as fed up with the jihadis and their ISI master as the US.
9. The US should constitute them into a Southern Alliance against terrorism and give them the capability and the resources to hunt effectively. They will expect a quid pro quo in the form political support for their grievances. The US should not hesitate to give them the support they want.
10. It is time to think strategically of a future dispensation in Pakistan that would help in achieving final and durable victory against jihadi terrorism with ISI’s characteristics. A Southern Alliance of non-radical elements of the present Pakistan, which are as unhappy about jihadi terrorism and the ISI as the US, has to be the linchpin of such a strategy.
11. Start thinking, start acting. ( 15-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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