B.RAMAN
The Chinese media have started informing the Chinese people of the tensions in Pakistan’s ties with the US without any editorial comment so far. There have been no comments from the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry either till now.
2. On September 27,2011, the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” carried a report of the State-owned Xinhua news agency datelined Islamabad stating that Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had gone to Saudi Arabia for talks with his Saudi counterparts.
3. The Xinhua despatch said that the decision to send Lt.Gen.Pasha to Saudi Arabia was taken on the recommendation of the Corps Commanders of the Pakistan Army, who met at Islamabad on September 25, “to brief Saudi leaders on the Pakistan-U.S. tension.”. However, the Pakistani military spokesman Maj Gen Ather Abbas denied that Lt.Gen.Pasha had gone to Saudi Arabia and insisted that Lt.Gen Pasha was in Islamabad.
4. The Xinhua report added: “Pakistan is likely to send envoys to other friendly countries in view of the tension with the U.S., sources said.”
5.The party-owned “Global Times” carried two reports of the AFP/Reuters news agencies relating, inter alia, to the unconnected visits of General James Mattis, the US CENTCOM Commander, and Mr.Meng Jianzhu, the Chinese Minister For Public Security, to Islamabad and the cancellation of the visit of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), to London.
6. While the Chinese media has so far restricted itself to reporting the arrival of the Chinese Public Security Minister in Islamabad, the Pakistani media has given more details of the visit.
7. Among those he has already met are President Asif Ali Zardari, Mr.Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister, Gen.Kayani and Gen. Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
8. It was reported that Mr.Jianzhu and Gen. Wynne discussed “the emerging geo-strategic situation of the region”. Mr.Jianzhu was quoted by a Pakistan Army statement as having praised “the role played by the armed forces of Pakistan in the fight against terror”.
9. Mr.Jianzhu was quoted by the Pakistani media as saying that China stood by Pakistan and reaffirming China’s support to Pakistan in the fight against militancy and for the promotion of regional peace and stability.
10.During his meeting with President Zardari on the night of September 26, officials of the two countries signed a number of agreements reportedly valued at US $ 250 million on economic and technical assistance, flood relief and rehabilitation of some damaged parts of the National Highways networks. Pakistani media reported that the Governor and the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan were among those present during the signing ceremony.
11.In reply to local journalists who asked whether the visit was connected to the tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US, Mr.Rehman Malik said: “Let’s not talk USA here. I am here with my friend from China. China is always there for us in the most difficult moments. China has supported Pakistan at every critical juncture of its history. We are grateful to it.”
12.Mr.Jianzhu told local journalists: “We are celebrating 2011 as year of friendship following the completion of 60 years of friendship of China and Pakistan. I have come to Pakistan to further beef up ties”.
13. Thus, both sides were anxious to avoid giving the impression that Mr.Jianzhu’s visit was connected to the tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US. According to reliable Pakistani sources, the visit had been arranged much before the eruption of the current tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US and was connected to the year-long observance of the 60th anniversary of the setting-up of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
14.Mr.Jianzhu is in charge of China’s Police and internal security and oversees co-operation in counter-terrorism with Pakistan---particularly against the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) operating from sanctuaries in North Waziristan.
15. China would be as much interested as the US in effective Pakistani action against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in North Waziristan because the sanctuaries of the IMET are also reportedly located in the same area.
16. While strongly supporting Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record as it did after the US raid to kill Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2 last, China would avoid giving the impression of taking sides with Pakistan in its dispute with the US on the question of action against the Haqqani network. China will have nothing to gain by justifying Pakistan’s inaction against the Haqqani network. While avoiding any adverse ( to Pakistan) public comments on this issue, China would nudge Pakistan into acting against all terrorist sanctuaries in North Waziristan--- whether of Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network or the IMET. (27-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
Monday, September 26, 2011
Sunday, September 25, 2011
US-PAKISTAN: SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY FACE-SAVING OPTION CONTINUES
B.RAMAN
The search for a mutually face-saving option in the dramatic turn of events in the relations between the US and Pakistan has continued over the week-end.
2.The dramatic turn came following the testimonies of Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr.Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on September 22,2011.
3. In his testimony, Admiral Mullen not only repeated--- in stronger language than in the past--- US accusations of links between the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the Haqqani network on the other, but also blamed the Haqqani network for three of the recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan---two in Kabul and one in the Wardak province. One of the attacks in Kabul was directed at the US Embassy and the Wardak attack was directed at a NATO base in which US troops are stationed.
4. The strongly-worded allegations about the ISI-aided (according to the US) Haqqani Network’s involvement in attacks on US personnel and interests in Afghanistan, gave rise to a brief debate in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the options available to the US in the light of the new accusations against the ISI and the Haqqani network.
5. When asked about it, Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think it would be helpful to describe what those options would look like and talk about what operational steps we may or may not take.”
6.Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, then asked Mr.Panetta: “Are Pakistani leaders aware of what options are open to us so that they’re not caught by any surprise if in fact we take steps against that network?”
7.Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think they would be surprised by the actions that we might or might not take.” In this connection, he referred to recent interactions at high levels with Pakistani officials.
8. What stood out in the Senate Armed Services Committee was the blunt allegations of Admiral Mullen against Pakistan and the more nuanced remarks of Mr.Panetta who indirectly admitted that weaknesses in physical security in Afghanistan had contributed to the successes of the Haqqani network.
9.According to agency reports of Mr.Panetta’s testimony, Mr. Panetta said the American military had a difficult job ahead and had to do better in preventing the insurgents from carrying out raids like the one on the Embassy. He added:“While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down — and down substantially in areas where we concentrated the surge — we must be more effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of insurgents to create perceptions of decreasing security.”
10. In this connection, it needs to be noted that Pakistan has been repeatedly saying that the successes of the Taliban as a whole and the Haqqani network in Afghanistan were due to weaknesses in the NATO’s counter-inurgency measures and that, instead of admitting this, the US was trying to shift the entire blame on to Pakistan.
11. A reference to possible US options also figured in the intervention of Senator John McCain, the senior Republican member of the committee, who described the Haqqani network’s attacks in Afghanistan as “the fundamental reality from which we must proceed in re-evaluating our policy towards Pakistan”. At the same time, he urged US lawmakers to recognise that abandoning Pakistan was not the answer. He added: “We tried that once. We cut off US assistance to Pakistan in the past and the problem got worse, not better. I say this with all humility, not recognising just yet what a better alternative approach would be.”
12. In his opening remarks, Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, also referred to the question of US options. He said: “I was glad to read a few days ago that Pakistan’s leaders have been personally informed that we are in fact going to… act more directly.”
13. The over-all impression from the discussions in the Senate Armed Services Committee was, firstly, that since there is now evidence of the role of the ISI-supported Haqqani network in direct attacks on US nationals and interests, the US has to act against the network in a robust manner if Pakistan does not act and, secondly, any action that the US takes should not have an enduring negative effect on the over-all relations between the US and Pakistan.
14. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s discussions have not yet been followed by a discussion by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by the more moderate Senator John Kerry, on the US options.
15. In the meanwhile, closely following the Senate Armed Services Committee’s debate, US CENTCOM commander General James N. Mattis visited Islamabad on September 24-25 and met, among others, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and General Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is not yet known whether he met any of the civilian leaders.
16.His discussions with Gen.Kayani and Gen.Wyne were followed by an unscheduled meeting of the Corps Commanders on September 25. The fact that after these meetings Gen.Kayani left for London as scheduled would indicate that in the assessment of the Pakistan Army no imminent new development is likely.
17.My sources in Pakistan project the discussions of the CENTCOM Commander as the possible beginning of a de-escalation exercise from both sides and of a search for a mutually face-saving option. The restrained language used by both sides during the visit of the CENTCOM Commander is significant. The Pakistani Army and the US Embassy issued separate statements on his visit and discussions.
18. The Pakistan Army statement on Gen Wynne’s meeting with Gen Mattis quoted the former as having spoken about “achieving enduring peace in the region… through mutual trust and cooperation”. It added that Gen Wynne expressed concern over the “negative statements emanating from (the) US” and “ stressed upon addressing the irritants in relationship which are a result of an extremely complex situation.”.
19.The US Embassy statement said: “The Generals had candid discussions about the current challenges in the US-Pakistan relationship. However, General Mattis also emphasised the vital role the Pakistan military plays in international security efforts to protect the Pakistani and Afghan people and the need for persistent engagement among the militaries of the US, Pakistan and other states in the region.”
20. It is interesting to note that the leaders of the civilian Government ---barring President Asif Ali Zardari--- have reacted much more strongly to Admiral Mullen’s allegations than the Pakistani military leadership. Gen.Kayani has restricted himself to describing Admiral Mullen’s allegations as “unfortunate and disturbing” and “not based on facts.” In an editorial, “Dawn” of Karachi has described the statements emanating from the Generals as “controlled reaction”.
21. As against this, statements emanating from the civilian leaders have been unbridled, indicating a nervousness on their part that absence of strong reactions could be misinterpreted by the Army as softness towards the US.
22. What action the Pakistan Army ultimately takes in response to the US pressure would depend not on the views of the civilian leaders, but on the assessment of the Corps Commanders. While details of the Corps Commanders’ meeting are not available, my sources say that the consensus was against unwise escalation of rhetoric.
23. “Dawn” itself ( September 26) has reported as follows on the Corps Commanders’ meeting: “A source privy to discussions at the conference revealed that de-escalation efforts were afoot. “Escalation is harmful. In the cost-benefit analysis there appears to be no benefit of a confrontation.” His claim was corroborated by another senior official. But there was nothing to suggest that the army had agreed to act against the Haqqani network under US pressure. The army is rather asking for developing strategic coherence and clarity about US goals in Afghanistan and thinks that operational differences would be addressed.”
24.There have been similar suspicions and distrust between the Armies and the intelligence agencies of the two countries in the past. The first was in 1993 when the Clinton Administration placed Pakistan on a list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism following suspicions that Gen.Javed Nasir, the then head of the ISI, had instigated the Afghan Mujahideen not to sell back to the CIA the unused Stinger missiles supplied by the CIA for use against the Soviet troops. The US removed Pakistan from this list after the Nawaz Sharif Government, then in power, removed Nasir and other officers named by the US from the ISI.
25. The second was after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US and before the launch of US military operations against the Taliban in October,2001. The US alleged that Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, the then head of the ISI, and Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff, were instigating the Taliban not to succumb to US pressure for action against Osama bin Laden. In response to US pressure, Gen.Musharraf shifted both of them from their key posts.
26. There is so far no indication that the US has been demanding action against Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, who is on extension after superannuation, and other ISI officers suspected by the US of colluding with the Haqqani network. Such a demand should not be ruled out.
27. The Obama Administration may not like to get involved in a messy ground operation in North Waziristan in the months before next year’s Presidential elections. It would prefer that Pakistan acts more robustly against the Haqqani network. This would involve a Swat Valley like ground operation in North Waziristan supported possibly by US air strikes from its bases in Afghanistan. Would Gen.Kayani be able to sell such an option to his Corps Commanders?
28. A concern in the minds of the Corps Commanders would be that any impression of a joint operation by Pakistan and the US could lead to desertions from the Pakistan Army, a phenomenon that has been absent till now. Past desertions were mainly from the Frontier Corps and other para-military forces. Desertions from the Army would be a serious development.
29. What the Corps Commanders would want in return for ground operations in North Waziristan is the US strengthening the air strike capability of the Pakistani military through the supply of Drones and related technology and more F-16 aircraft. If the US agrees to strengthen Pakistan’s offensive air strike capability, that would have implications for India.
30. It may be recalled that in 1999 when there was mounting pressure on the Nawaz Sharif Government for action against Arab members of Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries near the Afghan border in the Pakistani territory, Gen.Musharraf, then COAS, suggested shifting them to new sanctuaries in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If Gen.Kayani toys with a similar idea in respect of the Haqqani network, it could have implications for the internal security situation in Jammu & Kashmir.
31. How Pakistan reacts to the US pressure is a matter that should be closely monitored by India. It would be foolhardy to lull ourselves into complacency thinking that Pakistan is about to implode or unravel. It is unlikely to. (26-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The search for a mutually face-saving option in the dramatic turn of events in the relations between the US and Pakistan has continued over the week-end.
2.The dramatic turn came following the testimonies of Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr.Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on September 22,2011.
3. In his testimony, Admiral Mullen not only repeated--- in stronger language than in the past--- US accusations of links between the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the Haqqani network on the other, but also blamed the Haqqani network for three of the recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan---two in Kabul and one in the Wardak province. One of the attacks in Kabul was directed at the US Embassy and the Wardak attack was directed at a NATO base in which US troops are stationed.
4. The strongly-worded allegations about the ISI-aided (according to the US) Haqqani Network’s involvement in attacks on US personnel and interests in Afghanistan, gave rise to a brief debate in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the options available to the US in the light of the new accusations against the ISI and the Haqqani network.
5. When asked about it, Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think it would be helpful to describe what those options would look like and talk about what operational steps we may or may not take.”
6.Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, then asked Mr.Panetta: “Are Pakistani leaders aware of what options are open to us so that they’re not caught by any surprise if in fact we take steps against that network?”
7.Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think they would be surprised by the actions that we might or might not take.” In this connection, he referred to recent interactions at high levels with Pakistani officials.
8. What stood out in the Senate Armed Services Committee was the blunt allegations of Admiral Mullen against Pakistan and the more nuanced remarks of Mr.Panetta who indirectly admitted that weaknesses in physical security in Afghanistan had contributed to the successes of the Haqqani network.
9.According to agency reports of Mr.Panetta’s testimony, Mr. Panetta said the American military had a difficult job ahead and had to do better in preventing the insurgents from carrying out raids like the one on the Embassy. He added:“While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down — and down substantially in areas where we concentrated the surge — we must be more effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of insurgents to create perceptions of decreasing security.”
10. In this connection, it needs to be noted that Pakistan has been repeatedly saying that the successes of the Taliban as a whole and the Haqqani network in Afghanistan were due to weaknesses in the NATO’s counter-inurgency measures and that, instead of admitting this, the US was trying to shift the entire blame on to Pakistan.
11. A reference to possible US options also figured in the intervention of Senator John McCain, the senior Republican member of the committee, who described the Haqqani network’s attacks in Afghanistan as “the fundamental reality from which we must proceed in re-evaluating our policy towards Pakistan”. At the same time, he urged US lawmakers to recognise that abandoning Pakistan was not the answer. He added: “We tried that once. We cut off US assistance to Pakistan in the past and the problem got worse, not better. I say this with all humility, not recognising just yet what a better alternative approach would be.”
12. In his opening remarks, Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, also referred to the question of US options. He said: “I was glad to read a few days ago that Pakistan’s leaders have been personally informed that we are in fact going to… act more directly.”
13. The over-all impression from the discussions in the Senate Armed Services Committee was, firstly, that since there is now evidence of the role of the ISI-supported Haqqani network in direct attacks on US nationals and interests, the US has to act against the network in a robust manner if Pakistan does not act and, secondly, any action that the US takes should not have an enduring negative effect on the over-all relations between the US and Pakistan.
14. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s discussions have not yet been followed by a discussion by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by the more moderate Senator John Kerry, on the US options.
15. In the meanwhile, closely following the Senate Armed Services Committee’s debate, US CENTCOM commander General James N. Mattis visited Islamabad on September 24-25 and met, among others, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and General Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is not yet known whether he met any of the civilian leaders.
16.His discussions with Gen.Kayani and Gen.Wyne were followed by an unscheduled meeting of the Corps Commanders on September 25. The fact that after these meetings Gen.Kayani left for London as scheduled would indicate that in the assessment of the Pakistan Army no imminent new development is likely.
17.My sources in Pakistan project the discussions of the CENTCOM Commander as the possible beginning of a de-escalation exercise from both sides and of a search for a mutually face-saving option. The restrained language used by both sides during the visit of the CENTCOM Commander is significant. The Pakistani Army and the US Embassy issued separate statements on his visit and discussions.
18. The Pakistan Army statement on Gen Wynne’s meeting with Gen Mattis quoted the former as having spoken about “achieving enduring peace in the region… through mutual trust and cooperation”. It added that Gen Wynne expressed concern over the “negative statements emanating from (the) US” and “ stressed upon addressing the irritants in relationship which are a result of an extremely complex situation.”.
19.The US Embassy statement said: “The Generals had candid discussions about the current challenges in the US-Pakistan relationship. However, General Mattis also emphasised the vital role the Pakistan military plays in international security efforts to protect the Pakistani and Afghan people and the need for persistent engagement among the militaries of the US, Pakistan and other states in the region.”
20. It is interesting to note that the leaders of the civilian Government ---barring President Asif Ali Zardari--- have reacted much more strongly to Admiral Mullen’s allegations than the Pakistani military leadership. Gen.Kayani has restricted himself to describing Admiral Mullen’s allegations as “unfortunate and disturbing” and “not based on facts.” In an editorial, “Dawn” of Karachi has described the statements emanating from the Generals as “controlled reaction”.
21. As against this, statements emanating from the civilian leaders have been unbridled, indicating a nervousness on their part that absence of strong reactions could be misinterpreted by the Army as softness towards the US.
22. What action the Pakistan Army ultimately takes in response to the US pressure would depend not on the views of the civilian leaders, but on the assessment of the Corps Commanders. While details of the Corps Commanders’ meeting are not available, my sources say that the consensus was against unwise escalation of rhetoric.
23. “Dawn” itself ( September 26) has reported as follows on the Corps Commanders’ meeting: “A source privy to discussions at the conference revealed that de-escalation efforts were afoot. “Escalation is harmful. In the cost-benefit analysis there appears to be no benefit of a confrontation.” His claim was corroborated by another senior official. But there was nothing to suggest that the army had agreed to act against the Haqqani network under US pressure. The army is rather asking for developing strategic coherence and clarity about US goals in Afghanistan and thinks that operational differences would be addressed.”
24.There have been similar suspicions and distrust between the Armies and the intelligence agencies of the two countries in the past. The first was in 1993 when the Clinton Administration placed Pakistan on a list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism following suspicions that Gen.Javed Nasir, the then head of the ISI, had instigated the Afghan Mujahideen not to sell back to the CIA the unused Stinger missiles supplied by the CIA for use against the Soviet troops. The US removed Pakistan from this list after the Nawaz Sharif Government, then in power, removed Nasir and other officers named by the US from the ISI.
25. The second was after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US and before the launch of US military operations against the Taliban in October,2001. The US alleged that Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, the then head of the ISI, and Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff, were instigating the Taliban not to succumb to US pressure for action against Osama bin Laden. In response to US pressure, Gen.Musharraf shifted both of them from their key posts.
26. There is so far no indication that the US has been demanding action against Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, who is on extension after superannuation, and other ISI officers suspected by the US of colluding with the Haqqani network. Such a demand should not be ruled out.
27. The Obama Administration may not like to get involved in a messy ground operation in North Waziristan in the months before next year’s Presidential elections. It would prefer that Pakistan acts more robustly against the Haqqani network. This would involve a Swat Valley like ground operation in North Waziristan supported possibly by US air strikes from its bases in Afghanistan. Would Gen.Kayani be able to sell such an option to his Corps Commanders?
28. A concern in the minds of the Corps Commanders would be that any impression of a joint operation by Pakistan and the US could lead to desertions from the Pakistan Army, a phenomenon that has been absent till now. Past desertions were mainly from the Frontier Corps and other para-military forces. Desertions from the Army would be a serious development.
29. What the Corps Commanders would want in return for ground operations in North Waziristan is the US strengthening the air strike capability of the Pakistani military through the supply of Drones and related technology and more F-16 aircraft. If the US agrees to strengthen Pakistan’s offensive air strike capability, that would have implications for India.
30. It may be recalled that in 1999 when there was mounting pressure on the Nawaz Sharif Government for action against Arab members of Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries near the Afghan border in the Pakistani territory, Gen.Musharraf, then COAS, suggested shifting them to new sanctuaries in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If Gen.Kayani toys with a similar idea in respect of the Haqqani network, it could have implications for the internal security situation in Jammu & Kashmir.
31. How Pakistan reacts to the US pressure is a matter that should be closely monitored by India. It would be foolhardy to lull ourselves into complacency thinking that Pakistan is about to implode or unravel. It is unlikely to. (26-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, September 24, 2011
MRS.SONIA GANDHI: LEAD THE FIGHT AGAINST CANCER
B.RAMAN
A few days ago, Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the Congress President, returned to New Delhi after a month-long stay abroad ---presumed to be in New York--- for medical treatment, which necessitated a surgery. According to party spokespersons, she has recovered well from her ailment and has started the process of resuming her normal political activities. We wish her well as she resumes her normal routine.
2. The nature of her ailment, which necessitated a surgery, has not been disclosed to the public, but it is widely believed that the treatment was for cancer in an undisclosed part of her body.
3.I am writing this article as a cancer patient myself, who has been under treatment for 22 months now for metastasised (widely spread before detected) cancer in the lower part of the abdomen. Before it was detected, the cancer had affected my prostate, the urinary bladder, a nearby bone and a lymph node. Fortunately, it has not caused me any pain so far. My body has been responding well to the treatment.
4. For a month after my cancer was detected in 2009, I was out of circulation, but, thereafter, even while undergoing the treatment, I have resumed my normal physical and intellectual activities. I have been writing as regularly as before, participating in seminars and TV discussions as frequently as before and travelling inside India as often as before. The quality of my life has not changed in any significant manner as a result of my cancer and the treatment.
5. What I have learnt during this period is that cancer is like any other physical ailment. It is not a tragedy. It is not the end of the world. It is not something to be ashamed of. One can fight cancer as one fights any other ailment and still lead an active and energetic life.
6. From the beginning, I have been very transparent about my cancer. I take the initiative in sharing not only with my friends and relatives, but also with my readers and the general public news of my treatment and the progress that I have been making in my fight against cancer. After every quarterly medical check-up, I myself post in my blog details of my condition as told to me by my doctor. I have written two articles on my fight against cancer, posted them in my blog and widely disseminated them through the Internet. I have seen to it that there is no unnecessary and undesirable mystery about my cancer. Mystery gives rise to avoidable speculation, which is not advisable for a public personage.
7. The cheerful manner in which I have been fighting it and voluntarily sharing the information with others has given me a certain pride in myself. I also like to think that it has enhanced the respect in which I am held by others.
8.The alleged secrecy surrounding the exact nature of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi’s ailment and the details of the progress in her treatment were discussed in some detail and with considerable sympathy by Ms.Nirmala Subramanian of “The Hindu” in an editorial page article earlier this week. She needs to be complimented for handling a personally and politically sensitive subject with considerable understanding and seriousness ---- while taking care not to hurt the feelings of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family members.
9. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family have a right to privacy in matters relating to her ailment and her medical treatment. Since she occupies an important position as the leader of a party which is leading the present coalition Government, the public too has a right to know as much as possible about her health. It is not obscene curiosity. It is a way of reassuring ourselves that Mrs.Sonia Gandhi has been responding well to the treatment and that her normal personal and political life will not be affected in any way by the treatment.
10. Till some years ago, all over the world, cancer was treated as something to be kept a secret. People diagnosed with cancer often used to disappear from public view and avoid contacts and sharing with other human beings. Now, the attitude to cancer has changed and continues to change.
11. Doctors and social activists discourage cancer patients from withdrawing into a shell. They encourage them to share freely with others the details of their ailment and the treatment and to continue to lead as active and as energetic a life as possible.
12. Cancer has to be fought and can be fought successfully without allowing your life-style to be affected significantly. In the fight against cancer, the psychological aspect is as important as the medicinal aspect. Fight, share and be active--- that is the message of today to all cancer patients.
13. In our country, many hospitals are encouraging cancer patients to develop the right mental attitude to strengthen their capability for handling the psychological dimension. A couple of days ago, a Chennai hospital had organised a get-together of cancer patients as part of such an exercise.
14.In our country, knowledge of cancer is still limited. As a result, many ---patients as well as their relatives---look upon cancer as a tragedy and as the beginning of the end of life. Doctors are trying to reassure people that it is not.
15. In the fight against cancer and in the campaign to spread awareness of the importance of will power and the right mental attitude to the ailment, Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, her children and party can play a very important role by fighting and sharing. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi is already on the way to becoming her usual active self after her return from the US.
16. She should not remain satisfied with merely resuming an active personal and political life. She should with gusto take over the leadership in public of the fight against cancer. She cannot do this effectively if she and those close to her continue to maintain secrecy about her ailment and the treatment. She must share the details with the public and contribute to the fight against cancer.
17. That’s what Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi would have done in similar circumstances. That’s what Mrs.Sonia Gandhi should do. As the opening shot of the exercise, she should let herself be interviewed on a good and responsible TV channel on her ailment and treatment . She should use this opportunity to convey to the public her determination to serve the people as before despite the ailment. ( 25-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
A few days ago, Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the Congress President, returned to New Delhi after a month-long stay abroad ---presumed to be in New York--- for medical treatment, which necessitated a surgery. According to party spokespersons, she has recovered well from her ailment and has started the process of resuming her normal political activities. We wish her well as she resumes her normal routine.
2. The nature of her ailment, which necessitated a surgery, has not been disclosed to the public, but it is widely believed that the treatment was for cancer in an undisclosed part of her body.
3.I am writing this article as a cancer patient myself, who has been under treatment for 22 months now for metastasised (widely spread before detected) cancer in the lower part of the abdomen. Before it was detected, the cancer had affected my prostate, the urinary bladder, a nearby bone and a lymph node. Fortunately, it has not caused me any pain so far. My body has been responding well to the treatment.
4. For a month after my cancer was detected in 2009, I was out of circulation, but, thereafter, even while undergoing the treatment, I have resumed my normal physical and intellectual activities. I have been writing as regularly as before, participating in seminars and TV discussions as frequently as before and travelling inside India as often as before. The quality of my life has not changed in any significant manner as a result of my cancer and the treatment.
5. What I have learnt during this period is that cancer is like any other physical ailment. It is not a tragedy. It is not the end of the world. It is not something to be ashamed of. One can fight cancer as one fights any other ailment and still lead an active and energetic life.
6. From the beginning, I have been very transparent about my cancer. I take the initiative in sharing not only with my friends and relatives, but also with my readers and the general public news of my treatment and the progress that I have been making in my fight against cancer. After every quarterly medical check-up, I myself post in my blog details of my condition as told to me by my doctor. I have written two articles on my fight against cancer, posted them in my blog and widely disseminated them through the Internet. I have seen to it that there is no unnecessary and undesirable mystery about my cancer. Mystery gives rise to avoidable speculation, which is not advisable for a public personage.
7. The cheerful manner in which I have been fighting it and voluntarily sharing the information with others has given me a certain pride in myself. I also like to think that it has enhanced the respect in which I am held by others.
8.The alleged secrecy surrounding the exact nature of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi’s ailment and the details of the progress in her treatment were discussed in some detail and with considerable sympathy by Ms.Nirmala Subramanian of “The Hindu” in an editorial page article earlier this week. She needs to be complimented for handling a personally and politically sensitive subject with considerable understanding and seriousness ---- while taking care not to hurt the feelings of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family members.
9. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family have a right to privacy in matters relating to her ailment and her medical treatment. Since she occupies an important position as the leader of a party which is leading the present coalition Government, the public too has a right to know as much as possible about her health. It is not obscene curiosity. It is a way of reassuring ourselves that Mrs.Sonia Gandhi has been responding well to the treatment and that her normal personal and political life will not be affected in any way by the treatment.
10. Till some years ago, all over the world, cancer was treated as something to be kept a secret. People diagnosed with cancer often used to disappear from public view and avoid contacts and sharing with other human beings. Now, the attitude to cancer has changed and continues to change.
11. Doctors and social activists discourage cancer patients from withdrawing into a shell. They encourage them to share freely with others the details of their ailment and the treatment and to continue to lead as active and as energetic a life as possible.
12. Cancer has to be fought and can be fought successfully without allowing your life-style to be affected significantly. In the fight against cancer, the psychological aspect is as important as the medicinal aspect. Fight, share and be active--- that is the message of today to all cancer patients.
13. In our country, many hospitals are encouraging cancer patients to develop the right mental attitude to strengthen their capability for handling the psychological dimension. A couple of days ago, a Chennai hospital had organised a get-together of cancer patients as part of such an exercise.
14.In our country, knowledge of cancer is still limited. As a result, many ---patients as well as their relatives---look upon cancer as a tragedy and as the beginning of the end of life. Doctors are trying to reassure people that it is not.
15. In the fight against cancer and in the campaign to spread awareness of the importance of will power and the right mental attitude to the ailment, Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, her children and party can play a very important role by fighting and sharing. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi is already on the way to becoming her usual active self after her return from the US.
16. She should not remain satisfied with merely resuming an active personal and political life. She should with gusto take over the leadership in public of the fight against cancer. She cannot do this effectively if she and those close to her continue to maintain secrecy about her ailment and the treatment. She must share the details with the public and contribute to the fight against cancer.
17. That’s what Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi would have done in similar circumstances. That’s what Mrs.Sonia Gandhi should do. As the opening shot of the exercise, she should let herself be interviewed on a good and responsible TV channel on her ailment and treatment . She should use this opportunity to convey to the public her determination to serve the people as before despite the ailment. ( 25-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, September 23, 2011
ANOTHER MASSACRE OF HAZARAS IN BALOCHISTAN BY PRO-AL QAEDA ELEMENTS
B.RAMAN
Twenty-six Shia pilgrims belonging to the Hazara community were dragged out of a bus in which they were travelling at Mastung in Balochistan on September 20,2011, lined up and shot dead by unidentified gunmen suspected to be belonging to the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which is close to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three others----of unknown sectarian or ethnic origin--- were killed subsequently. They were medical attendants who were in an ambulance which was rushing to the spot of the massacre.
2. The Hazaras have been the frequent targets of attacks in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan by anti-Shia groups----by the Taliban and the LeJ in particular. One would recall the massacre of the Hazaras in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September 1996 and allowed the LeJ to operate in Pakistan from sanctuaries in Afghan territory.
3. The Hazaras of Pakistan, who were suspected by Al Qaeda and the LeJ, of letting themselves be used by the US intelligence in its hunt for Osama bin Laden, subsequently became the targets of the LeJ. There have been many attacks on the Hazaras, who are to be found in large numbers in Balochistan.
4. Surprisingly, despite the suspected hostility of the Hazaras to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the LeJ, Osama bin Laden chose to have his hide-out in Abbottabad, where there is a sizable Hazara community. Ever since bin Laden was killed by the US Navy SEALS in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2, the LeJ has reportedly been suspecting that some members of the Hazara community of Abbottabad might have helped the US intelligence in tracking down bin Laden.
5. Since the death of bin Laden, there have been three attacks on the Hazaras in Balochistan by suspected cadres of the LeJ. There have been fears that the LeJ might attack the Hazaras of Abbottabad too----but this has not happened so far.
6. The Shias of Pakistan in general and the Hazaras of Balochistan in particular have been living in dread ever since the release on bail by a court in July of Malik Ishaq, the leader of the LeJ, who was under imprisonment since 1997 facing charges in over 40 cases of terrorism----many of them directed against the Shias and Iranians living and working in Pakistan. He was ordered to be released on grounds of weak evidence by the same judge (Justice Asif Saeed Khosa ), who was earlier a member of the Lahore High Court bench that had ordered the release of Hafiz Mohad Sayeed of the Lashkar-e-Toiba on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of which Hafiz is the Amir had any links with the LET, which was involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Justice Khosa is now in the Supreme Court.
7. Since his release, Ishaq has been touring in Punjab making venomous speeches against the Shias and justifying the LeJ’s attacks on the Shias as meant to protect the honour of the holy Prophet. In one of his speeches to his followers after his release from jail, he had said: “Prisons will not stop our mission. The LeJ is not a terrorist outfit. It was set up to ensure proper respect for the companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).Our struggle will continue.”
8.Fears that his hate speeches might lead to a fresh wave of attacks on the Shias of Punjab and Sindh have not materialised so far. However, there has been a surge in the attacks on the Hazaras of Balochistan. Some reports allege that the Mastung massacre was actually in retaliation for an unsuccessful attack on a gathering of Sunni followers of Ishaq in Alipur by suspected Shia elements.
9. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had used the services of Ishaq and three others to negotiate with a group of terrorists who had raided the GHQ at Rawalpindi in October ,2009, and taken hostage a number of officers. Among others whose services were used by the ISI were Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the chief of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, from which the LeJ was born following a split, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the Amir of the Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM) and Mufti Abdul Rauf, the younger brother of Maulana Masood Azhar the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad. They were flown in special aircraft from different places in Punjab to Rawalpindi to help the ISI in securing the release of the hostages.
10. Following the Mastung massacre of the Hazaras, the Punjab Government has placed Ishaq under house arrest for 10 days. ( 24-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Twenty-six Shia pilgrims belonging to the Hazara community were dragged out of a bus in which they were travelling at Mastung in Balochistan on September 20,2011, lined up and shot dead by unidentified gunmen suspected to be belonging to the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which is close to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three others----of unknown sectarian or ethnic origin--- were killed subsequently. They were medical attendants who were in an ambulance which was rushing to the spot of the massacre.
2. The Hazaras have been the frequent targets of attacks in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan by anti-Shia groups----by the Taliban and the LeJ in particular. One would recall the massacre of the Hazaras in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September 1996 and allowed the LeJ to operate in Pakistan from sanctuaries in Afghan territory.
3. The Hazaras of Pakistan, who were suspected by Al Qaeda and the LeJ, of letting themselves be used by the US intelligence in its hunt for Osama bin Laden, subsequently became the targets of the LeJ. There have been many attacks on the Hazaras, who are to be found in large numbers in Balochistan.
4. Surprisingly, despite the suspected hostility of the Hazaras to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the LeJ, Osama bin Laden chose to have his hide-out in Abbottabad, where there is a sizable Hazara community. Ever since bin Laden was killed by the US Navy SEALS in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2, the LeJ has reportedly been suspecting that some members of the Hazara community of Abbottabad might have helped the US intelligence in tracking down bin Laden.
5. Since the death of bin Laden, there have been three attacks on the Hazaras in Balochistan by suspected cadres of the LeJ. There have been fears that the LeJ might attack the Hazaras of Abbottabad too----but this has not happened so far.
6. The Shias of Pakistan in general and the Hazaras of Balochistan in particular have been living in dread ever since the release on bail by a court in July of Malik Ishaq, the leader of the LeJ, who was under imprisonment since 1997 facing charges in over 40 cases of terrorism----many of them directed against the Shias and Iranians living and working in Pakistan. He was ordered to be released on grounds of weak evidence by the same judge (Justice Asif Saeed Khosa ), who was earlier a member of the Lahore High Court bench that had ordered the release of Hafiz Mohad Sayeed of the Lashkar-e-Toiba on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of which Hafiz is the Amir had any links with the LET, which was involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Justice Khosa is now in the Supreme Court.
7. Since his release, Ishaq has been touring in Punjab making venomous speeches against the Shias and justifying the LeJ’s attacks on the Shias as meant to protect the honour of the holy Prophet. In one of his speeches to his followers after his release from jail, he had said: “Prisons will not stop our mission. The LeJ is not a terrorist outfit. It was set up to ensure proper respect for the companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).Our struggle will continue.”
8.Fears that his hate speeches might lead to a fresh wave of attacks on the Shias of Punjab and Sindh have not materialised so far. However, there has been a surge in the attacks on the Hazaras of Balochistan. Some reports allege that the Mastung massacre was actually in retaliation for an unsuccessful attack on a gathering of Sunni followers of Ishaq in Alipur by suspected Shia elements.
9. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had used the services of Ishaq and three others to negotiate with a group of terrorists who had raided the GHQ at Rawalpindi in October ,2009, and taken hostage a number of officers. Among others whose services were used by the ISI were Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the chief of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, from which the LeJ was born following a split, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the Amir of the Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM) and Mufti Abdul Rauf, the younger brother of Maulana Masood Azhar the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad. They were flown in special aircraft from different places in Punjab to Rawalpindi to help the ISI in securing the release of the hostages.
10. Following the Mastung massacre of the Hazaras, the Punjab Government has placed Ishaq under house arrest for 10 days. ( 24-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, September 22, 2011
US FRETS & FUMES AGAINST PAKISTAN, BUT FINDS ITS OPTIONS LIMITED
B.RAMAN
The past few days have seen the US fretting and fuming against Pakistan for its use of the Haqqani network to make the US forces bleed in Afghanistan reach an unprecedented new high.
2.This has been due to the US intelligence concluding that the Haqqani network, backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was responsible for three recent terrorist strikes---two in Kabul directed against the hotel Inter-Continental (June) and the US Embassy ( September 13) and one (September 11 ) in the Wardak province against a NATO base in which many US troops were injured.
3.While the US agencies seem convinced of the ISI’s role in backing these attacks, they still do not have an answer to the question as to why the ISI has been doing this. What does Pakistan hope to gain not only by ignoring the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network, but even by facilitating the Haqqani network’s acts of terrorism directed against US troops and interests in Afghanistan.
4. The Pakistani defiance of the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network has an underlying mix of two motives---one strategic and the other tactical. The strategic motive is to make it clear to the US that the success of President Barack Obama’s plans for a thinning out of the US presence in Afghanistan well before next year’s Presidential elections would depend on the US accepting Pakistan’s strategic interests and presence in Afghanistan. The tactical motive is to give vent to its anger over the USA’s unilateral raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 last. The ISI cannot hit out at US interests in Pakistani territory. It is, therefore, doing so in Afghan territory.
5. In Pakistan’s calculation it holds two strong cards against the US which would continue to enable it to defy the US pressure to act. The strongest of these cards is the continuing US dependence on Pakistan for the transit of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory. The US attempts to develop alternate options through Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have not made the required headway that could enable the US to reduce its dependence on Pakistan significantly. The option to airlift the supplies directly to Afghanistan will be expensive and will result in a big surge in the cost of the US military operations in Afghanistan.
6. The other card which Pakistan thinks it holds is next year’s US presidential elections and Mr.Obama’s keenness to reduce the US involvement before the elections. Pakistan feels that this would rule out any undue escalation of US operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory. As the elections approach, Mr.Obama may not want to get involved in a new bloody phase of the US operations in Afghanistan---this time directed against the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory.
7. The US operations against the Haqqani network have till now been confined to the use of Drone (pilotless plane) strikes from the US bases in Afghanistan. The Drone strikes have been effective against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, but have been ineffective against the Haqqani network due to the poor flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the exact location of its bases in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the movements of its leaders and cadres. For reasons that are not clear to me, while the flow of HUMINT and TECHINT about Al Qaeda and its other affiliates to the US agencies has improved, they continue to grope in the dark about the Haqqani network. This is evident from their inability to prevent repeated attacks on US targets in Afghanistan and from the poor record of the Drone strikes against the Haqqani network.
8. The US has to remove from the Pakistani mind the impression that the US is pathetically dependent on the transit of logistic supplies for the NATO forces through Pakistani territory. This would be possible only by the US immediately starting an air bridge from its bases in the Gulf to Afghanistan to ferry by air the logistic supplies directly to the NATO bases. This has to be done whatever be the surge in the cost of the operation.
9. Once the US frees itself of its dependence on Pakistan, other options would be available such as declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism and stopping all aid and ground operations in the FATA to supplement the present Drone-dependent operations. ( 23-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The past few days have seen the US fretting and fuming against Pakistan for its use of the Haqqani network to make the US forces bleed in Afghanistan reach an unprecedented new high.
2.This has been due to the US intelligence concluding that the Haqqani network, backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was responsible for three recent terrorist strikes---two in Kabul directed against the hotel Inter-Continental (June) and the US Embassy ( September 13) and one (September 11 ) in the Wardak province against a NATO base in which many US troops were injured.
3.While the US agencies seem convinced of the ISI’s role in backing these attacks, they still do not have an answer to the question as to why the ISI has been doing this. What does Pakistan hope to gain not only by ignoring the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network, but even by facilitating the Haqqani network’s acts of terrorism directed against US troops and interests in Afghanistan.
4. The Pakistani defiance of the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network has an underlying mix of two motives---one strategic and the other tactical. The strategic motive is to make it clear to the US that the success of President Barack Obama’s plans for a thinning out of the US presence in Afghanistan well before next year’s Presidential elections would depend on the US accepting Pakistan’s strategic interests and presence in Afghanistan. The tactical motive is to give vent to its anger over the USA’s unilateral raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 last. The ISI cannot hit out at US interests in Pakistani territory. It is, therefore, doing so in Afghan territory.
5. In Pakistan’s calculation it holds two strong cards against the US which would continue to enable it to defy the US pressure to act. The strongest of these cards is the continuing US dependence on Pakistan for the transit of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory. The US attempts to develop alternate options through Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have not made the required headway that could enable the US to reduce its dependence on Pakistan significantly. The option to airlift the supplies directly to Afghanistan will be expensive and will result in a big surge in the cost of the US military operations in Afghanistan.
6. The other card which Pakistan thinks it holds is next year’s US presidential elections and Mr.Obama’s keenness to reduce the US involvement before the elections. Pakistan feels that this would rule out any undue escalation of US operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory. As the elections approach, Mr.Obama may not want to get involved in a new bloody phase of the US operations in Afghanistan---this time directed against the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory.
7. The US operations against the Haqqani network have till now been confined to the use of Drone (pilotless plane) strikes from the US bases in Afghanistan. The Drone strikes have been effective against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, but have been ineffective against the Haqqani network due to the poor flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the exact location of its bases in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the movements of its leaders and cadres. For reasons that are not clear to me, while the flow of HUMINT and TECHINT about Al Qaeda and its other affiliates to the US agencies has improved, they continue to grope in the dark about the Haqqani network. This is evident from their inability to prevent repeated attacks on US targets in Afghanistan and from the poor record of the Drone strikes against the Haqqani network.
8. The US has to remove from the Pakistani mind the impression that the US is pathetically dependent on the transit of logistic supplies for the NATO forces through Pakistani territory. This would be possible only by the US immediately starting an air bridge from its bases in the Gulf to Afghanistan to ferry by air the logistic supplies directly to the NATO bases. This has to be done whatever be the surge in the cost of the operation.
9. Once the US frees itself of its dependence on Pakistan, other options would be available such as declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism and stopping all aid and ground operations in the FATA to supplement the present Drone-dependent operations. ( 23-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
RABBANI’S ASSASSINATION : A WAKE-UP CALL FOR INDIA
B.RAMAN
The assassination on September 20,2011, of Burhanuddin Rabbani , a Tajik leader of Afghanistan, is of strategic significance to India.
2.Rabbani was the President of Afghanistan in the 1990s when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister ( 1993-96) of Pakistan. After the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September,1996, he became a prominent leader of the Tajik-dominant Northern Alliance motivated by the late Ahmed Shah Masood which played an active role in assisting the US post-9/11 in the defeat of the Taliban. It was Rabbani who, with Benazir’s concurrence, allowed Osama bin Laden to shift from Khartoum in the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan when the Sudan came under pressure from the US to act against bin Laden. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 it took bin Laden under its protection and shifted him to Kandahar where Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and its Shura were also based.
3. In the subsequent fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped the Taliban while a triumvirate consisting of India, Russia and Iran supported the Northern Alliance. The success of Al Qaeda in having Masood assassinated through an Arab suicide bomber a day before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland could not dent the fighting capability of the Northern Alliance, which paved the way for the victory of the US forces, which defeated the Taliban and captured power in Afghanistan after freeing the country from the control of the Taliban.
4. Subsequently under pressure from Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who viewed the Northern Alliance as a pro-India and anti-Pakistan group, the Alliance and its leaders found themselves marginalised in the new dispensation in Kabul---with the blessings of the US.
5. The political rehabilitation of Rabbani by President Hamid Karzai and his appointment as the head of the High Peace Council to hold talks with the Taliban and wean it away from the military conflict which it had been waging from its sanctuaries in the Quetta area of Balochistan, set alarm bells ringing in Pakistan’s GHQ.
6.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, saw in it a possible prelude to the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force on the ground with the blessings of India in order to counter once again the Taliban and the ISI should they stage a come-back in Kabul after the US-led NATO forces thin out from Afghanistan as planned by President Barack Obama. The concern in the GHQ was enhanced when Rabbani visited New Delhi in July last to seek India’s support for the peace process. The GHQ saw in his visit a hidden objective---- to discuss with Indian leaders and officials the possible future scenarios should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul.
7. The assassination of Rabbani was a pre-emptive strike by unidentified elements----which could be the Taliban or the Haqqani network or Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe Islami or Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda--- to prevent the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force capable of standing up to the Taliban and its affiliates. It was a warning to Karzai against any future alliance with the Tajijks. It was meant to drive a wedge between the Pashtuns and the Tajijks. There is no other way of explaining the assassination.
8. The explanation advanced by some analysts that the assassination was meant to derail the peace process and indicated the presence of elements in the Taliban which are opposed to the peace talks, does not sound convincing. If the Taliban wanted to derail the peace process, all it had to do was to withdraw from the talks with Rabbani and his Council. It did not have to kill Rabbani. He was killed not because he posed a danger immediately, but because he was viewed by the Taliban and its affiliates as likely to pose a danger in the future should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul. His assassination could weaken the support of the Tajiks for Karzai and make Karzai even more vulnerable to pressure from the Taliban than he has been till now.
9. The assassination has strategic implications for India. It could weaken the Tajik leadership, which has been an objective ally of India. It could weaken Karzai with whom India has built up an excellent working relationship. In the uncertain period after the thinning out of the US presence starts, India would need strong allies in Afghanistan--- in all the communities. It is likely that in the months to come more of the leaders who are perceived by the Taliban and the ISI as well disposed to India might be eliminated one by one.
10. What options would be available to India? This is a question that needs to be discussed by New Delhi with those in Afghanistan with whom it has a close relationship as well as with the US. Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have been cultivating Pakistan and vice versa. It is doubtful whether Russia would be amenable to the kind of co-operation that India and Russia had developed after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in 1996. Iran is out of question now in view of the hostility of the US to the present Iranian regime.
11. Co-operation with the US is the only strategic option we have. The US is now as concerned as we are over Pakistani machinations in Afghanistan. It could be more amenable to feelers from India for joint moves by India and the US to prevent a return to power of the Taliban with the ISI’s backing. Till now, the US has been hesitant to let India play any major role in training and equipping the Afghan security forces due to a fear over its adverse fall-out in Pakistan. We should persuade the US to get rid of its hesitation and let India play a more important role in this regard. This is the first step that would be called for. Others have to be identified. India and the US should not hum and haw and wait till the events overtake them. ( 22-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: SORBONNE75 )
The assassination on September 20,2011, of Burhanuddin Rabbani , a Tajik leader of Afghanistan, is of strategic significance to India.
2.Rabbani was the President of Afghanistan in the 1990s when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister ( 1993-96) of Pakistan. After the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September,1996, he became a prominent leader of the Tajik-dominant Northern Alliance motivated by the late Ahmed Shah Masood which played an active role in assisting the US post-9/11 in the defeat of the Taliban. It was Rabbani who, with Benazir’s concurrence, allowed Osama bin Laden to shift from Khartoum in the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan when the Sudan came under pressure from the US to act against bin Laden. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 it took bin Laden under its protection and shifted him to Kandahar where Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and its Shura were also based.
3. In the subsequent fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped the Taliban while a triumvirate consisting of India, Russia and Iran supported the Northern Alliance. The success of Al Qaeda in having Masood assassinated through an Arab suicide bomber a day before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland could not dent the fighting capability of the Northern Alliance, which paved the way for the victory of the US forces, which defeated the Taliban and captured power in Afghanistan after freeing the country from the control of the Taliban.
4. Subsequently under pressure from Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who viewed the Northern Alliance as a pro-India and anti-Pakistan group, the Alliance and its leaders found themselves marginalised in the new dispensation in Kabul---with the blessings of the US.
5. The political rehabilitation of Rabbani by President Hamid Karzai and his appointment as the head of the High Peace Council to hold talks with the Taliban and wean it away from the military conflict which it had been waging from its sanctuaries in the Quetta area of Balochistan, set alarm bells ringing in Pakistan’s GHQ.
6.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, saw in it a possible prelude to the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force on the ground with the blessings of India in order to counter once again the Taliban and the ISI should they stage a come-back in Kabul after the US-led NATO forces thin out from Afghanistan as planned by President Barack Obama. The concern in the GHQ was enhanced when Rabbani visited New Delhi in July last to seek India’s support for the peace process. The GHQ saw in his visit a hidden objective---- to discuss with Indian leaders and officials the possible future scenarios should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul.
7. The assassination of Rabbani was a pre-emptive strike by unidentified elements----which could be the Taliban or the Haqqani network or Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe Islami or Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda--- to prevent the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force capable of standing up to the Taliban and its affiliates. It was a warning to Karzai against any future alliance with the Tajijks. It was meant to drive a wedge between the Pashtuns and the Tajijks. There is no other way of explaining the assassination.
8. The explanation advanced by some analysts that the assassination was meant to derail the peace process and indicated the presence of elements in the Taliban which are opposed to the peace talks, does not sound convincing. If the Taliban wanted to derail the peace process, all it had to do was to withdraw from the talks with Rabbani and his Council. It did not have to kill Rabbani. He was killed not because he posed a danger immediately, but because he was viewed by the Taliban and its affiliates as likely to pose a danger in the future should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul. His assassination could weaken the support of the Tajiks for Karzai and make Karzai even more vulnerable to pressure from the Taliban than he has been till now.
9. The assassination has strategic implications for India. It could weaken the Tajik leadership, which has been an objective ally of India. It could weaken Karzai with whom India has built up an excellent working relationship. In the uncertain period after the thinning out of the US presence starts, India would need strong allies in Afghanistan--- in all the communities. It is likely that in the months to come more of the leaders who are perceived by the Taliban and the ISI as well disposed to India might be eliminated one by one.
10. What options would be available to India? This is a question that needs to be discussed by New Delhi with those in Afghanistan with whom it has a close relationship as well as with the US. Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have been cultivating Pakistan and vice versa. It is doubtful whether Russia would be amenable to the kind of co-operation that India and Russia had developed after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in 1996. Iran is out of question now in view of the hostility of the US to the present Iranian regime.
11. Co-operation with the US is the only strategic option we have. The US is now as concerned as we are over Pakistani machinations in Afghanistan. It could be more amenable to feelers from India for joint moves by India and the US to prevent a return to power of the Taliban with the ISI’s backing. Till now, the US has been hesitant to let India play any major role in training and equipping the Afghan security forces due to a fear over its adverse fall-out in Pakistan. We should persuade the US to get rid of its hesitation and let India play a more important role in this regard. This is the first step that would be called for. Others have to be identified. India and the US should not hum and haw and wait till the events overtake them. ( 22-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, September 21, 2011
THE INDIAN SUMMER
(Joe Dassin’s song of 1975)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQ9acTpB0ic
-----------------------
You know, I have never been as happy as I was that morning
We were walking along the beach a bit like this,
It was autumn, an autumn when weather was nice
A season that exists only in North America
Down there one calls it the Indian Summer
This one was simply ours
With your long blue dress you resembled a watercolor by Marie Laurence.
And I remember, I remember very well
What I told you that morning
A year, a century, an eternity ago.
I told you: We will be going, where you want to go, whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer.
Today I'm far away from that morning of autumn
But it's like I am still there
I'm thinking of you
Where are you?
Do I still exist for you?
I'm watching this wave that will never reach the sand
You see, I'm lying down on the sand
And I'm remembering the rising tide flowing in, the sun and happiness drifting away into the sea
An eternity, a century, a year ago
We will be going, where you want to go whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQ9acTpB0ic
-----------------------
You know, I have never been as happy as I was that morning
We were walking along the beach a bit like this,
It was autumn, an autumn when weather was nice
A season that exists only in North America
Down there one calls it the Indian Summer
This one was simply ours
With your long blue dress you resembled a watercolor by Marie Laurence.
And I remember, I remember very well
What I told you that morning
A year, a century, an eternity ago.
I told you: We will be going, where you want to go, whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer.
Today I'm far away from that morning of autumn
But it's like I am still there
I'm thinking of you
Where are you?
Do I still exist for you?
I'm watching this wave that will never reach the sand
You see, I'm lying down on the sand
And I'm remembering the rising tide flowing in, the sun and happiness drifting away into the sea
An eternity, a century, a year ago
We will be going, where you want to go whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)