Friday, July 15, 2011
MUMBAI BLASTS 13/7 : Q & A
B.RAMAN
Q.Can the three blasts in Mumbai on July 13,2011, be attributed to an intelligence failure?
A.Yes. I have always held that every successful terrorist strike is due to either an intelligence or a security failure or both.
Q.But the Home Minister Shri P.Chidambaram has said that despite there being no flow of intelligence, there was no intelligence failure. What did he mean by it?
A.Many, including some foreign analysts, have been mystified by his remarks. Most of the queries that I received from abroad sought my explanation of his remarks. I replied that what he probably meant was that while there was no intelligence indicating the possibility of the blasts, he would not attribute the paucity of intelligence to any failure on the part of the agencies. They tried their best to collect intelligence, but this particular intelligence did not come their way. That is what he appears to have meant.
Q. Would you accept his explanation?
A. There was definitely a failure of intelligence. Whether this was due to any institutional failure on the part of the intelligence agencies or not could be established only by an enquiry into how the terrorists managed to carry out the successful strikes. Unfortunately, after each terrorist strike, our Government has avoided holding a detailed enquiry as to how the terrorists succeeded. The enquiry ordered by the Maharashtra State Govt after the 26/11 terrorist strikes only went into the deficiencies of the police. The deficiencies of the central agencies were not enquired into by the Government of India. The result: We have not learnt the right lessons. That is why most of our discourse on dealing with terrorism is on general terms and not in specific terms as a result of lessons drawn from each strike. In other countries, each strike involving large casualties or damage is followed by a detailed enquiry to draw the right lessons.
Q.Presuming there was an intelligence failure, where and how did it occur?
A. As of now there are four possibilities. Either the terrorist strike was carried out by a reactivated old cell of an existing indigenous organisation which had been lying dormant because of the stepped up security measures after 26/11 or it was carried out by a new cell of a new indigenous organisation or by one or more angry indigenous individuals with no organisational affiliation. If it was the first possibility, the surveillance of the old cells was apparently unsatisfactory. If it was the second or third, apparently their coming into being had escaped the attention of the agencies and the police. If these three possibilities involving indigenous elements are ruled out, there is a fourth possibility of the commission of the attack by external elements which had managed to sneak into India despite the stepped up immigration controls introduced after the 26/11 strikes.
Q.What could this be due to?
A. Poor penetration of terrorist organisations---old or new. Timely human intelligence comes through successful penetration. Good penetration comes through good contacts in the community from which the terrorist organisation or individual terrorists have arisen. There is always a reluctance on the part of the community to co-operate with the police against its members suspected of involvement in terrorism. The available means of overcoming this resistance have to be examined.
Q. How about technical intelligence (TECHINT)?
A. There does not appear to have been any TECHINT in the form of electronic chatter through telephones or the Internet. This could be due to gaps in the TECHINT capability of the agencies or the successful adoption of evasive techniques by the terrorists or their not adopting any of the technical means for communication among themselves. What exactly was the reason for the non-flow of TECHINT could be established only if and when one or more of the perpetrators are arrested and interrogated.
Q.Any other point that needs to be considered?
A. There was possibly a certain complacency on the part of the intelligence agencies since there had been no major terrorist strike for some months. The terrorists probably noticed the slackening of vigilance and struck.
Q. Could there have been a security failure that was behind the successful terrorist strike?
A. One security dimension comes into the picture in respect of the procurement of the materials required for the improvisation of an explosive device. Three kinds of materials are required for an IED--- the explosive itself, the detonator and the timer or a remote control device. The final results of the forensic examination are not yet available. The present indicators are that the terrorists had used ammonium nitrate possibly with a booster and made more lethal than normal by mixing it with projectiles and furnace oil, and a timer, possibly the alarm mechanism of a mobile telephone. The ammonium nitrate which is the ingredient of nitrogenous fertilisers is easily available for procurement in India. After the use of the ammonium nitrate in large quantities in the attempt to blow up the New York World trade Centre in February,1993, by Ramzi Yousef and its subsequent use in other terrorist strikes many Western countries are reported to have issued instructions to all wholesale and retail dealers in fertilisers that they should alert the police if any suspicious-looking person, who is not a genuine farmer, seeks to procure nitrogenous fertilisers. A terrorist cell was disrupted in Canada when one of its members tried to procure a large quantity of fertilisers and the dealer, who became suspicious, alerted the police. In India, it is difficult to impose such curbs since terrorists can easily procure the ammonium nitrate from friends in the farmer community instead of from a dealer. The alarm mechanism of a mobile telephone can also be easily procured without attracting suspicion. Procurement of detonators can cause suspicion, but here too one can easily procure from friends in the community of industrial users of detonators such as granite quarry owners. Al Umma of Tamil Nadu reportedly stole detonators from quarry owners. It, therefore, becomes difficult to detect the preparations for an act of terrorism at the stage of procurement of the IED components unless the terrorists use military-grade explosives procured either locally or from other countries.
Another security dimension arises in respect of the planting of the IEDs after they have been assembled clandestinely. The planting could be prevented in places where there is an access control. In public places, where there is no access control, it becomes very difficult to prevent the planting of an IED unless it is detected accidentally as it was in respect of the jihadi bomber who sought to plant an IED in the Times Square of New York last year. His IED, at the time of planting, reportedly started emitting smoke. An alert member of the public noticed it and he was caught and the IED neutralised. It was more luck than physical security which prevented this attempted strike.
The third dimension is about the utility of Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras. The CCTV can help prevent the planting of an IED in an infrastructure building where there is a central control room constantly monitoring the happenings with the help of CCTV images. CCTV cameras have a very limited preventive role in public places such as crowded streets. They are helpful in investigation after the blasts had taken place, but not in detecting the planting of the IEDs. The CCTV cameras in the London tube stations helped in identifying the perpetrators after they had carried out the terrorist strikes in July,2005. They could not help in prevention.
It has been reported that CCTV footages are available in respect of the Opera House scene in Mumbai where one of the IEDs was planted. Their examination could help the investigators if heavy rain during the planting had not affected the quality of the images.
The only way of detecting an IED in a public place with no access control is through the alertness of the public. They have to be constantly briefed by the police as to what to look for.
Q.It has been reported that there were heavy rains before, during and after the blasts. Any comments on that?
A. It is remarkable that despite the rains all the three IEDs detonated at the fixed time without any malfunctioning. This would indicate that the perpetrators had taken the required precautions to ensure that the rains would not affect the detonation of the IEDs at the fixed time. This speaks well of the quality of expertise of the perpetrators. They were not novices.
It has been reported that the police were facing difficulty in determining where exactly the IEDs were planted. This could have been due to the rains. After a blast, two kinds of examinations are done---the visual and the forensic. During the visual examination, one looks for indicators like craters caused by the detonation, the kind of debris at the scene including the remnants of the detonator and the timer etc. The rains would have definitely created difficulties in the visual and forensic examination. It is ironic, but normal that while the rains seem to have created difficulties for the investigators, they do not seem to have created difficulties for the perpetrators.
“The Hindu” (July 16) has reported that the police have since established that one of the IEDs was kept in a scooter.
Q. There has been talk of a wired body being found near the scene in the Zaveri Bazaar area. Could this indicate that one of the blasts might have been caused by a suicide bomber?
A. If a suicide bomber was involved his body would not have been found intact. If the IED was fixed to the upper part of the body his head would have been severed by the force of the blast and thrown far away. If the IED was fixed in the lower part of the body, the legs would have been severed. If the dead body was intact, the possibility of a suicide explosion becomes less. But, how to explain the wires around the body? The answer to this could be found only by the investigators.
Suicide terrorism is a common feature in Pakistan since 2007. In India, we have had instances of suicidal terrorism (fedayeen attacks) against heavily protected targets, but not suicide terrorism except by the LTTE when it killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. If it is established that one of the blasts was caused by a suicide terrorist, this would indicate the definitive involvement of jihadi terrorists.
“The Hindu” (July 16) has reported that the Mumbai Police have identified the dead body and ruled out a suicide bomber. There was no wire on his body, but only an electronic chip inside one of his injuries. This might have got embedded due to the force of the blast. However, there has been no official statement from the Police so far.
Q. Who might have been responsible for the explosions?
A. So far, there are no clear indicators. There has been no claim of responsibility. If Indigenous elements were involved there was a possibility that claims of responsibility would have been made. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) had in the past claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks carried out by it. Pakistani organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) claim responsibility when they carry out a strike in Jammu & Kashmir. When they carry out a strike outside J&K, they either do not claim responsibility or do so in the name of a fictitious organisation of India. After 26/11, the LET claimed responsibility in the name of a fictitious organisation called the Deccan Mujahideen. If individual jihadis, without organisational affiliation, who are called Jundullas (Soldiers of Allah) are involved, no claim of responsibility is made. There is no evidence so far on the basis of which a reasonable surmise could be made as to who might have been responsible.
Q. Shri Prithviraj Chavan, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, has said that mobile phone services literally collapsed for 15 minutes after the blasts making it difficult for him to communicate with the police.
A. Nothing surprising. This happened in London immediately after the blasts of July 2005. Thousands and thousands of anxious persons were trying to contact their relatives. The mobile services got jammed preventing the Police Commissioner from contacting his men in the field. The police thought of advising mobile companies to suspend their services, but did not do so due to a fear that this might add to the panic. Corrective measures were reportedly taken subsequently. I was under the impression that corrective measures had been taken in India too, because one had not heard of such collapse of the mobile services after the explosions of 2008 by the IM in Delhi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Bengaluru or during the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Why this happened this time? This needs to be examined. ( 16-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, July 14, 2011
MUMBAI: EROSION OF FAITH IN SECURITY
B.RAMAN,Camp Vizag
The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh's reported decision to visit Mumbai in the wake of the new series of orchestrated and timed explosions on July 13 reflects his embarrassment and concern over the blasts.
2.The embarrassment arises from the continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism capability even after the much vaunted improvements introduced after the 26/11 strikes. The deficiencies relate to the preventive and surveillance capabilities of our intelligence agencies and the police. The concern should be over the likely negative political impact of the success of the terrorists in circumventing the security measures.
3. The Government's credibility in relation to counter-terrorism is likely to suffer further erosion----particularly in Mumbai, whose population has been the target of five instances of high casualty terrorist attacks ---in 1993,2003,2006,2008 and 2011. The argument about the difficulties faced by the intelligence and security agencies in preventing terrorist attacks will not carry conviction to the people. While they may accept one or two surprise attacks, they would find it difficult to accept repeated attacks not only in Mumbai but also in other cities.
4. Other cities---New York. Madrid and London---have had isolated mass casualty attacks, but the police was able to ensure that there were no more attacks. It would be natural for the public to ask why this has not been possible for our security agencies.
5 Despite arrests made after past attacks, terrorist organisations still have at their disposal a seemingly unending stream of recruits who are willing to be trained and used to carry out attacks. A worrisome aspect is that our security agencies and the police have been unable to quantify the total number of trained terrorists still available to the organizations and neutralize them. They have also been unable to identify and block the sources of recruitment.
6.The attacks of July13,2011, ----like those of 1993,2003 and 2006 and unlike those of 2008--- were multi-targeted and well orchestrated with a single modus operandi. They required good motivation and some training and not sophisticated expertise. The 2008 attacks were commando-style and multi-targeted with multiple modus-operandi---use of explosives and hand-held weapons and hostage-taking. They required considerable training and sophistication. Hand-held weapons were used in addition to explosives in 1993 too.
7.No claim of responsibility has so far been made. There has been no electronic interception of suspect messages----electronic chatter as professionals call it----which might give a clue as to who might have been responsible. The security agencies are, therefore, groping in the dark in identifying the organisation responsible.
8.Coastal security and immigration controls have been tightened up after the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The possibility of outsiders sneaking in to carry out the attacks is somewhat low. The greater possibility is that the attacks were carried out by some people normally resident in India---- maybe, Indian nationals or foreigners. The investigating agencies should keep an open mind and avoid jumping to conclusions.
9.The reports about a wired body and a separated head being found in one of the spots need to be carefully investigated. If these reports are correct, this would be a disturbing indicator of an act of suicide terrorism with possible foreign influence.
10.If these reports are ultimately ruled out as not correct, the only other possibility is of timed strikes, which might have been carried out either with mechanical (clocks or the alarm mechanism of a mobile telephone) or with chemical timers. The 1993 strikes were carried out by Dawood Ibrahim's men with chemical timers of US-origin obtained by them from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
11. The reported use of ammonium nitrate speaks of a lethargy in imposing checks on the sale of nitrogenous fertilisers despite this being repeatedly used as the explosive material by different terrorist groups in copy-cat acts in different countries of the world. Western countries have imposed checks on the sale of nitrogenous fertilisers. In Canada, sleeper cells were caught when they sought to buy nitrogenous fertilisers. It is not clear whether we have imposed similar checks.
12. Whether it is the Indian Mujahideen (IM) or any other organisation which is ultimately found to have been responsible,it wanted to disprove the official claims of having broken its back. This may not remain a one-city phenomenon. We must be prepared to prevent the danger of similar attacks in other cities.
13. We should not allow the latest blasts to disrupt the on-going dialogue process with Pakistan unless there is concrete evidence to show that either the ISI or Pakistan-trained elements were involved. (14-7-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi)
The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh's reported decision to visit Mumbai in the wake of the new series of orchestrated and timed explosions on July 13 reflects his embarrassment and concern over the blasts.
2.The embarrassment arises from the continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism capability even after the much vaunted improvements introduced after the 26/11 strikes. The deficiencies relate to the preventive and surveillance capabilities of our intelligence agencies and the police. The concern should be over the likely negative political impact of the success of the terrorists in circumventing the security measures.
3. The Government's credibility in relation to counter-terrorism is likely to suffer further erosion----particularly in Mumbai, whose population has been the target of five instances of high casualty terrorist attacks ---in 1993,2003,2006,2008 and 2011. The argument about the difficulties faced by the intelligence and security agencies in preventing terrorist attacks will not carry conviction to the people. While they may accept one or two surprise attacks, they would find it difficult to accept repeated attacks not only in Mumbai but also in other cities.
4. Other cities---New York. Madrid and London---have had isolated mass casualty attacks, but the police was able to ensure that there were no more attacks. It would be natural for the public to ask why this has not been possible for our security agencies.
5 Despite arrests made after past attacks, terrorist organisations still have at their disposal a seemingly unending stream of recruits who are willing to be trained and used to carry out attacks. A worrisome aspect is that our security agencies and the police have been unable to quantify the total number of trained terrorists still available to the organizations and neutralize them. They have also been unable to identify and block the sources of recruitment.
6.The attacks of July13,2011, ----like those of 1993,2003 and 2006 and unlike those of 2008--- were multi-targeted and well orchestrated with a single modus operandi. They required good motivation and some training and not sophisticated expertise. The 2008 attacks were commando-style and multi-targeted with multiple modus-operandi---use of explosives and hand-held weapons and hostage-taking. They required considerable training and sophistication. Hand-held weapons were used in addition to explosives in 1993 too.
7.No claim of responsibility has so far been made. There has been no electronic interception of suspect messages----electronic chatter as professionals call it----which might give a clue as to who might have been responsible. The security agencies are, therefore, groping in the dark in identifying the organisation responsible.
8.Coastal security and immigration controls have been tightened up after the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The possibility of outsiders sneaking in to carry out the attacks is somewhat low. The greater possibility is that the attacks were carried out by some people normally resident in India---- maybe, Indian nationals or foreigners. The investigating agencies should keep an open mind and avoid jumping to conclusions.
9.The reports about a wired body and a separated head being found in one of the spots need to be carefully investigated. If these reports are correct, this would be a disturbing indicator of an act of suicide terrorism with possible foreign influence.
10.If these reports are ultimately ruled out as not correct, the only other possibility is of timed strikes, which might have been carried out either with mechanical (clocks or the alarm mechanism of a mobile telephone) or with chemical timers. The 1993 strikes were carried out by Dawood Ibrahim's men with chemical timers of US-origin obtained by them from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
11. The reported use of ammonium nitrate speaks of a lethargy in imposing checks on the sale of nitrogenous fertilisers despite this being repeatedly used as the explosive material by different terrorist groups in copy-cat acts in different countries of the world. Western countries have imposed checks on the sale of nitrogenous fertilisers. In Canada, sleeper cells were caught when they sought to buy nitrogenous fertilisers. It is not clear whether we have imposed similar checks.
12. Whether it is the Indian Mujahideen (IM) or any other organisation which is ultimately found to have been responsible,it wanted to disprove the official claims of having broken its back. This may not remain a one-city phenomenon. We must be prepared to prevent the danger of similar attacks in other cities.
13. We should not allow the latest blasts to disrupt the on-going dialogue process with Pakistan unless there is concrete evidence to show that either the ISI or Pakistan-trained elements were involved. (14-7-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi)
Sunday, July 10, 2011
CHINA'S STRATEGIC EGGS IN SOUTH ASIA
B.RAMAN
(A PAPER PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011 )
China is not a South Asian power, but it has been seeking to build up for itself a strong South Asian presence which could cater to its strategic needs in the long term.
2.It has made inroads in the South Asian countries in recent years by taking advantage of their hunger for the development of their infrastructure and their requirement of financial assistance for major infrastructure projects and for the exploitation of their natural resources.
3. While India too has been helping these countries in these fields, China has definitely had an advantage over India due to its large cash reserve built up from its huge trade surpluses and the reservoir of excellent construction engineers with experience in infrastructure building which it has built up over the years.
4. The fact that China has no contentious issues affecting its bilateral relations with these countries --- as against many contentious issues in the relations of India with its neighbours--- has also worked to its advantage.
5. The Chinese policy in the South Asian region has a mix of the strategic and the opportunistic dimensions--- that is, working for carefully calculated long-term strategic objectives while not missing short and medium term opportunities that come its way. One sees the strategic dimension in the case of its relations with Pakistan. One sees a mix of the two in its relations with other South Asian countries.
6. Its relations with Pakistan, which continue to enjoy the highest priority, are driven by a strong strategic calculus. That calculus arises from its perceived need for a second front to keep India preoccupied.
7. In its strategic calculation, its ability to prevent a military conflict with India would depend on a strong military-related capability in Tibet and a strong Pakistani military capability in the nuclear and conventional fields.
8. That is what it has been trying to do. It has been trying to see that Pakistan has an edge over India in its military nuclear capability, including the delivery vehicles. It has been strengthening Pakistan’s offensive and defensive air and naval capabilities. After the recent raid by the US naval commandos in Abbottabad to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2,2011, it has promised to expedite the delivery of aircraft needed by the PAF to strengthen its air defence capability.
9. Simultaneously, it has also been helping Pakistan in repairing and upgrading the Karakoram Highway and has promised to help in the construction of other roads. A feasibility study for the construction of a railway line from Xinjiang through Gilgit-Baltistan has been undertaken.
10. Of the various proposals received from Pakistan for the development of its infrastructure, China has given high priority to those relating to Gilgit-Baltistan and low priority to those relating to Balochistan. It has not shown an interest in taking up for the time being Pakistan’s proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar commercial port built earlier with Chinese assistance into a naval base. Similarly, it has been going slow in follow-up action on other pending Pakistani proposals for the construction of a petro-chemical complex in Gwadar and oil-gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang.
11. The priority given by China to infrastructure projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area is meant to enable Pakistan protect this area from any future Indian threats and give the Pakistani armed forces the capability to pose a credible threat to India, which would serve China’s strategic objective too.
12. There have been unconfirmed reports from a US journalist about the presence of a little over 10,000 Chinese troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If true, these reports would further underline China’s strategic objectives in Pakistan.
13. A significant development post-Abbottabad was the strong defence of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record by Beijing and its attempts to see that no harm came to Pakistan as a result of US suspicions regarding possible Pakistani complicity--- governmental or non-governmental--- in sheltering OBL for a little over five years in Abbottabad.
14.Thus, China’s strategic interest in protecting Pakistan, strengthening its capabilities and maintaining the effectiveness of the threat that it could pose to India in times of need remains as strong as ever. It will remain so even if there is an improvement in India’s relations with China and Pakistan.
15. The Sino-Pakistan axis means not only the need for our being able to fight on two fronts simultaneously in times of war, but also a two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in times of peace. Collection of intelligence ---human and technical-- from China requires capabilities totally different from those required for the collection of intelligence from Pakistan. Our strategic planning has to cater to requirements in times of war as well as peace.
16. Next to Pakistan, Nepal enjoys the second priority in China’s strategic calculation. The importance of Nepal to China’s strategic thinkers and planners arises not only because of its potential for being used against India in times of peace as well as war, but also because of its potential to India for being used to create instability in Tibet if there are disturbances there after the death of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In China’s calculation, Nepal can be a double-edged sword.
17.How to strengthen the potential of Nepal for being used against India? It is for this purpose that the Chinese have been trying to extend their road and rail network from Tibet to Nepal and to develop close relations with the Maoists headed by Prachanda and their cadres who are likely to be integrated into the Nepal army. Strengthening China’s political, economic and military influence in Nepal by taking advantage of the presence of the Maoists in power is an important objective of Beijing.
18. Military-military relationship has been given increasing attention since 1998, when the Nepal Army started sending officers and soldiers to study in Chinese military universities. In the academic year 2006/2007 , 21 officers and soldiers of the Nepal Army went to China for training. China has sent military officers to participate in the adventure trainings organized by the Nepal Army since 2002.
19. Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5,2008, the then Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said:"Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia."
20.That is the principal reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us.
21.China has already given indications of its interest in strengthening the value of Nepal as a passage to South Asia by connecting the road network in Tibet with that in Nepal and by extending the railway line to Lhasa to Kathmandu. If China succeeds in concretising these ideas, the threats to our security will be enhanced.
22.China has other reasons to welcome the rise of the Maoists to power in Nepal. It is hoping with reason that Nepal would stop the anti-China activities of the 1000-strong community of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They have been in the forefront of the agitation against the Han colonisation of Tibet. Some of them are being used by the US Govt.funded Radio Free Asia for producing programmes directed to the Tibetans. China apprehends that if there is unrest in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama, these refugees might be utilised by the US----with the complicity of India--- to destabilise the Chinese presence in Tibet. It is hoping to pre-empt this with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government in Kathmandu.
23.India finds itself in Nepal in a situation not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar----all the time having to compete with China for political influence and economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there is a second player in China. In Myanmar, whenever the former military Government had to choose between Indian and Chinese interests, it always chose the Chinese interests because of its fear of China and its gratitude to China for the support extended by it to the former military junta in international fora such as the UN Security Council. In Nepal whenever there is a conflict between Indian and Chinese interests, a Maoist-dominated Govt. may choose Chinese interests not out of fear or gratitude but out of considerations of ideological affinity.
24. It is in India’s interest to see that China does not succeed in its objectives in Nepal. In Pakistan, India has no cards which it can use to counter the Chinese objectives. In Nepal, India has more cards than China and it should not hesitate to use them intelligently to counter the Chinese designs. India continues to have a much stronger economic presence in Nepal than China. India still has many objective allies in the non-Maoist segment of the population and administration. It should not hesitate to use these cards to maintain its influence in Nepal and to counter the Chinese designs.
25.Bangladesh has the third priority for China. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China , an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.
26.At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.
27.Sheikh Hasina also reportedly discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed. There has also been talk of a Chinese-aided railway line from Yunnan to Bangladesh via Myanmar
28.Bangladesh news agencies reported that during the visit of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to Dhaka on June 13 and 14,2010, Mr.Xi “proposed to give assistance to Bangladesh for building a deep seaport in Chittagong and installing the country's first space satellite”. Briefing reporters on the outcome of the talks, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said the Chinese side assured more investment in Bangladesh, and promised to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance by allowing more Bangladeshi products to have duty-free access to the Chinese market. She added that the Chinese agreed to help Bangladesh in ensuring food security and in combating militancy and terrorism.
29.Sri Lanka occupies the fourth place in Chinese strategic planning in South Asia. More than 50 per cent of the funding received by Sri Lanka from abroad for construction and development projects since President Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power came from China. China has been assisting Sri Lanka in the construction of the Hambantota port, the Maththala international airport at Hambantota, a new container terminal in Colombo and the Colombo--Katunayake Expressway. It has also agreed to help in the modernisation of the railways.
30.There are no indications so far that China is going to help Sri Lanka in upgrading the commercial port at Hambantota the first stage of which has already been commissioned into a naval base for use by the Chinese or the Sri Lankan Navy or both. Hambantota is a good example of the opportunistic dimension of China’s strategic thinking and planning. The idea for the construction of an international port of modern standards comparable to if not better than Colombo at Hambantota was reportedly initially broached by the Sri Lankan Government with the Government of India. When New Delhi did not react positively, Colombo turned to Beijing which pounced on the opportunity to get a foothold in the port sector in Sri Lanka.
31.The indications are that China’s interest in helping the countries of the South Asian region in the development of their port infrastructure is related to its need to ensure the security of its energy supplies from West Asia and Africa. It has no naval power projection dimension at present.
32. Till now, the main driver of China’s strategic interest in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong has been the perceived need for refuelling, re-stocking and rest and recreation facilities for its oil/gas tankers and naval ships deputed for anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area. China is not yet interested in an overseas naval base, but is interested in overseas logistic facilities for its oil/gas tankers and for its naval vessels.
33. Individual retired officers of the People’s Liberation Army ( Navy) have been talking of the likely long-term need for an overseas naval base in the Indian Ocean area, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been discouraging such talk. Presently, the Chinese interest in playing a role in the development of the port infrastructure is not designed to place its Navy in a position as to be able to challenge the primacy presently enjoyed by the Navies of the US and India in the Indian Ocean region.
34. China has seen as to how the over-assertiveness of its Navy in the South China Sea has had a negative impact on the comfort level of its relations with the ASEAN countries. The Indian Ocean is not comparable to the South China Sea. China has no territorial claims to islands in the Indian Ocean area. It has no disputes relating to fishing and exploration of oil and gas with any of the countries of the Indian Ocean region. China and its Navy are, therefore, welcomed by the countries of the region. This comfortable position could change if China graduates from energy security to power projection in its strategic planning for the Indian Ocean region.
35. I do not expect this to happen in the short and medium terms (five to 10 years). However, if the Chinese strategic thinking changes in the long-term, what could be the new threats to India and what will be the options for our Navy? We have to start thinking on this.
36. After Pakistan, Sri Lanka provides a good example of the use of a military supply relationship by China to advance its strategic interests. Over the years, we had seen how China uses its military supply relationship with Pakistan in the nuclear and conventional fields for keeping Pakistan closely tied to it and for countering India. In recent years, we have been seeing the use of a military supply relationship with Sri Lanka for increasing the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka. The Chinese readiness to supply modern and heavy arms and ammunition to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces without worrying about the moral implications of its actions played an important role in helping the Sri Lankan Army crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ruthlessly. Next to an infrastructure development relationship, a military supply relationship has become an important addition to China’s basket of strategic eggs.
37. I will make a passing reference to the incipient Chinese interest in the Maldives, which has emerged as a favourite tourist destination of Chinese tourists. China has been helping the Maldives in the fields of house construction and modernising some aspects of its banking infrastructure such as the installation and operation of Automatic Teller Machines for the benefit of foreign tourists. We have to closely monitor the evolution of its interest in the Maldives.
38 .It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector in the South Asian region. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this.
39.India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
40.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to provide the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
(A PAPER PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011 )
China is not a South Asian power, but it has been seeking to build up for itself a strong South Asian presence which could cater to its strategic needs in the long term.
2.It has made inroads in the South Asian countries in recent years by taking advantage of their hunger for the development of their infrastructure and their requirement of financial assistance for major infrastructure projects and for the exploitation of their natural resources.
3. While India too has been helping these countries in these fields, China has definitely had an advantage over India due to its large cash reserve built up from its huge trade surpluses and the reservoir of excellent construction engineers with experience in infrastructure building which it has built up over the years.
4. The fact that China has no contentious issues affecting its bilateral relations with these countries --- as against many contentious issues in the relations of India with its neighbours--- has also worked to its advantage.
5. The Chinese policy in the South Asian region has a mix of the strategic and the opportunistic dimensions--- that is, working for carefully calculated long-term strategic objectives while not missing short and medium term opportunities that come its way. One sees the strategic dimension in the case of its relations with Pakistan. One sees a mix of the two in its relations with other South Asian countries.
6. Its relations with Pakistan, which continue to enjoy the highest priority, are driven by a strong strategic calculus. That calculus arises from its perceived need for a second front to keep India preoccupied.
7. In its strategic calculation, its ability to prevent a military conflict with India would depend on a strong military-related capability in Tibet and a strong Pakistani military capability in the nuclear and conventional fields.
8. That is what it has been trying to do. It has been trying to see that Pakistan has an edge over India in its military nuclear capability, including the delivery vehicles. It has been strengthening Pakistan’s offensive and defensive air and naval capabilities. After the recent raid by the US naval commandos in Abbottabad to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2,2011, it has promised to expedite the delivery of aircraft needed by the PAF to strengthen its air defence capability.
9. Simultaneously, it has also been helping Pakistan in repairing and upgrading the Karakoram Highway and has promised to help in the construction of other roads. A feasibility study for the construction of a railway line from Xinjiang through Gilgit-Baltistan has been undertaken.
10. Of the various proposals received from Pakistan for the development of its infrastructure, China has given high priority to those relating to Gilgit-Baltistan and low priority to those relating to Balochistan. It has not shown an interest in taking up for the time being Pakistan’s proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar commercial port built earlier with Chinese assistance into a naval base. Similarly, it has been going slow in follow-up action on other pending Pakistani proposals for the construction of a petro-chemical complex in Gwadar and oil-gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang.
11. The priority given by China to infrastructure projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area is meant to enable Pakistan protect this area from any future Indian threats and give the Pakistani armed forces the capability to pose a credible threat to India, which would serve China’s strategic objective too.
12. There have been unconfirmed reports from a US journalist about the presence of a little over 10,000 Chinese troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If true, these reports would further underline China’s strategic objectives in Pakistan.
13. A significant development post-Abbottabad was the strong defence of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record by Beijing and its attempts to see that no harm came to Pakistan as a result of US suspicions regarding possible Pakistani complicity--- governmental or non-governmental--- in sheltering OBL for a little over five years in Abbottabad.
14.Thus, China’s strategic interest in protecting Pakistan, strengthening its capabilities and maintaining the effectiveness of the threat that it could pose to India in times of need remains as strong as ever. It will remain so even if there is an improvement in India’s relations with China and Pakistan.
15. The Sino-Pakistan axis means not only the need for our being able to fight on two fronts simultaneously in times of war, but also a two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in times of peace. Collection of intelligence ---human and technical-- from China requires capabilities totally different from those required for the collection of intelligence from Pakistan. Our strategic planning has to cater to requirements in times of war as well as peace.
16. Next to Pakistan, Nepal enjoys the second priority in China’s strategic calculation. The importance of Nepal to China’s strategic thinkers and planners arises not only because of its potential for being used against India in times of peace as well as war, but also because of its potential to India for being used to create instability in Tibet if there are disturbances there after the death of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In China’s calculation, Nepal can be a double-edged sword.
17.How to strengthen the potential of Nepal for being used against India? It is for this purpose that the Chinese have been trying to extend their road and rail network from Tibet to Nepal and to develop close relations with the Maoists headed by Prachanda and their cadres who are likely to be integrated into the Nepal army. Strengthening China’s political, economic and military influence in Nepal by taking advantage of the presence of the Maoists in power is an important objective of Beijing.
18. Military-military relationship has been given increasing attention since 1998, when the Nepal Army started sending officers and soldiers to study in Chinese military universities. In the academic year 2006/2007 , 21 officers and soldiers of the Nepal Army went to China for training. China has sent military officers to participate in the adventure trainings organized by the Nepal Army since 2002.
19. Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5,2008, the then Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said:"Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia."
20.That is the principal reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us.
21.China has already given indications of its interest in strengthening the value of Nepal as a passage to South Asia by connecting the road network in Tibet with that in Nepal and by extending the railway line to Lhasa to Kathmandu. If China succeeds in concretising these ideas, the threats to our security will be enhanced.
22.China has other reasons to welcome the rise of the Maoists to power in Nepal. It is hoping with reason that Nepal would stop the anti-China activities of the 1000-strong community of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They have been in the forefront of the agitation against the Han colonisation of Tibet. Some of them are being used by the US Govt.funded Radio Free Asia for producing programmes directed to the Tibetans. China apprehends that if there is unrest in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama, these refugees might be utilised by the US----with the complicity of India--- to destabilise the Chinese presence in Tibet. It is hoping to pre-empt this with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government in Kathmandu.
23.India finds itself in Nepal in a situation not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar----all the time having to compete with China for political influence and economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there is a second player in China. In Myanmar, whenever the former military Government had to choose between Indian and Chinese interests, it always chose the Chinese interests because of its fear of China and its gratitude to China for the support extended by it to the former military junta in international fora such as the UN Security Council. In Nepal whenever there is a conflict between Indian and Chinese interests, a Maoist-dominated Govt. may choose Chinese interests not out of fear or gratitude but out of considerations of ideological affinity.
24. It is in India’s interest to see that China does not succeed in its objectives in Nepal. In Pakistan, India has no cards which it can use to counter the Chinese objectives. In Nepal, India has more cards than China and it should not hesitate to use them intelligently to counter the Chinese designs. India continues to have a much stronger economic presence in Nepal than China. India still has many objective allies in the non-Maoist segment of the population and administration. It should not hesitate to use these cards to maintain its influence in Nepal and to counter the Chinese designs.
25.Bangladesh has the third priority for China. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China , an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.
26.At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.
27.Sheikh Hasina also reportedly discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed. There has also been talk of a Chinese-aided railway line from Yunnan to Bangladesh via Myanmar
28.Bangladesh news agencies reported that during the visit of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to Dhaka on June 13 and 14,2010, Mr.Xi “proposed to give assistance to Bangladesh for building a deep seaport in Chittagong and installing the country's first space satellite”. Briefing reporters on the outcome of the talks, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said the Chinese side assured more investment in Bangladesh, and promised to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance by allowing more Bangladeshi products to have duty-free access to the Chinese market. She added that the Chinese agreed to help Bangladesh in ensuring food security and in combating militancy and terrorism.
29.Sri Lanka occupies the fourth place in Chinese strategic planning in South Asia. More than 50 per cent of the funding received by Sri Lanka from abroad for construction and development projects since President Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power came from China. China has been assisting Sri Lanka in the construction of the Hambantota port, the Maththala international airport at Hambantota, a new container terminal in Colombo and the Colombo--Katunayake Expressway. It has also agreed to help in the modernisation of the railways.
30.There are no indications so far that China is going to help Sri Lanka in upgrading the commercial port at Hambantota the first stage of which has already been commissioned into a naval base for use by the Chinese or the Sri Lankan Navy or both. Hambantota is a good example of the opportunistic dimension of China’s strategic thinking and planning. The idea for the construction of an international port of modern standards comparable to if not better than Colombo at Hambantota was reportedly initially broached by the Sri Lankan Government with the Government of India. When New Delhi did not react positively, Colombo turned to Beijing which pounced on the opportunity to get a foothold in the port sector in Sri Lanka.
31.The indications are that China’s interest in helping the countries of the South Asian region in the development of their port infrastructure is related to its need to ensure the security of its energy supplies from West Asia and Africa. It has no naval power projection dimension at present.
32. Till now, the main driver of China’s strategic interest in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong has been the perceived need for refuelling, re-stocking and rest and recreation facilities for its oil/gas tankers and naval ships deputed for anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area. China is not yet interested in an overseas naval base, but is interested in overseas logistic facilities for its oil/gas tankers and for its naval vessels.
33. Individual retired officers of the People’s Liberation Army ( Navy) have been talking of the likely long-term need for an overseas naval base in the Indian Ocean area, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been discouraging such talk. Presently, the Chinese interest in playing a role in the development of the port infrastructure is not designed to place its Navy in a position as to be able to challenge the primacy presently enjoyed by the Navies of the US and India in the Indian Ocean region.
34. China has seen as to how the over-assertiveness of its Navy in the South China Sea has had a negative impact on the comfort level of its relations with the ASEAN countries. The Indian Ocean is not comparable to the South China Sea. China has no territorial claims to islands in the Indian Ocean area. It has no disputes relating to fishing and exploration of oil and gas with any of the countries of the Indian Ocean region. China and its Navy are, therefore, welcomed by the countries of the region. This comfortable position could change if China graduates from energy security to power projection in its strategic planning for the Indian Ocean region.
35. I do not expect this to happen in the short and medium terms (five to 10 years). However, if the Chinese strategic thinking changes in the long-term, what could be the new threats to India and what will be the options for our Navy? We have to start thinking on this.
36. After Pakistan, Sri Lanka provides a good example of the use of a military supply relationship by China to advance its strategic interests. Over the years, we had seen how China uses its military supply relationship with Pakistan in the nuclear and conventional fields for keeping Pakistan closely tied to it and for countering India. In recent years, we have been seeing the use of a military supply relationship with Sri Lanka for increasing the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka. The Chinese readiness to supply modern and heavy arms and ammunition to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces without worrying about the moral implications of its actions played an important role in helping the Sri Lankan Army crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ruthlessly. Next to an infrastructure development relationship, a military supply relationship has become an important addition to China’s basket of strategic eggs.
37. I will make a passing reference to the incipient Chinese interest in the Maldives, which has emerged as a favourite tourist destination of Chinese tourists. China has been helping the Maldives in the fields of house construction and modernising some aspects of its banking infrastructure such as the installation and operation of Automatic Teller Machines for the benefit of foreign tourists. We have to closely monitor the evolution of its interest in the Maldives.
38 .It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector in the South Asian region. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this.
39.India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
40.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to provide the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, July 9, 2011
KARACHI, BEIRUT OF SOUTH ASIA
B.RAMAN
Karachi stands in danger of turning into another Beirut of the 1970s and 1980s if the Government of Pakistan does not wake up in time to the implications of the unending clashes between the Mohajirs and the Pashtuns, between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and between the Shias and the Sunnis.
2. Since the late 1980s, these animosities have led to periodic spells of ethnic and sectarian violence---almost amounting to a civil war. In the past, the situation was further aggravated by the ethnic animosity between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis. This animosity has since died down after the Pakistan People’s Party, which is largely of mainstream Sindhis, took the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of the Mohajirs, into the ruling federal coalition in Islamabad and the provincial coalition in Karachi after the elections of 2008.
3. The ethnic animosities have been compounded by sectarian animosities arising from the fact that the Mohajirs and the Sindhis largely belong to the more tolerant Barelvi sect of sub-continental Sunni Islam whereas the Pashtuns are largely the followers of the more intolerant Deobandi-Wahabi sects. The fact that many of the Mohajirs, who are the migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra and Gujarat provinces of India, have a large number of highly educated and prosperous Shias in their community has made the problem more complex by making them frequent targets of the extremist Sunni elements belonging to organisations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Lashkar-eJhangvi.
4. The animosities of the past arising from ethnic and sectarian factors have been aggravated by fears of a change in the demographic composition of Karachi. Before 1947, Karachi was a Sindhi city. After Pakistan was formed in 1947, it turned into a Mohajir city, due to the large influx of Barelvis and Shias from India. Mohajir means refugees. These are the refugees from India.
5. Since 1947, Karachi has been a city of refugees. Initially, it is the refugees from India (the Mohajirs) who dominated the politics and economy of the city, gradually reducing the Sindhis to an urban minority.
6. Since the trouble erupted in Afghanistan in the 1980s, there has been a continuous influx of Pashtun refugees into Karachi--- initially from Afghanistan as the fighting between the Afghan Mujahideen and the Soviet troops gathered momentum and subsequently after 9/11 from Pakistan’s Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) Province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as Al Qaeda and Taliban set up their safehaven in the Pashtun belt.
7. As a result of this steady Pashtun influx, there is a danger of Karachi one day turning into a Pashtun city. There has been no official census of the different ethnic groups in Karachi. It is believed that the Mohajirs are still the largest single ethnic group in the city, but as the number of Pashtun refugees increases, the Mohajirs fear they may be reduced to a minority in the years to come. Karachi is already the largest Pashtun city in Pakistan, with even more Pashtun population than Peshawar, the capital of the KP province.
8. It is the fear of an eventual Pashtunisation and Wahabisation of Karachi that has made the Mohajirs take to violence to stop the flow of more Pashtuns from the Pashtun belt and to counter their growing hold on the Karachi economy. The Pashtuns, who migrated before 9/11, are largely the supporters of the moderate Awami National Party (ANP), which is in power in the KP province and is a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. The MQM alleges that many of the Pashtuns, who have been migrating since 9/11, have sympathies with the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. Despite this, the ANP has been taking up their cause because of the ethnic affinity.
9. This has added a political dimension to the violence with the MQM trying to counter the presence and influence of the ANP in Karachi, despite its reputation as a party of moderate Pashtuns.
10. Karachi has been seeing eruptions of ethnic and sectarian violence from time to time for over two decades now. It has taken a disturbingly virulent form since last year.
11. According to the “Daily Times” of Lahore of January 1,2011, during 2010, at least 705 people, including 488 political and religious leaders and activists, fell prey to targeted killings in Karachi. In addition,74 others died in explosions all over Karachi during the year. As against 779 people who died due to ethnic and sectarian violence in Karachi during 2010, only 427 people died due to the acts of suicide terrorism by the Pakistani Taliban in the entire non-Pashtun belt of Pakistan and 797 in the Pashtun belt. This would give an indication of the seriousness of the situation in Karachi, which is considered the economic capital of Pakistan. The situation in Karachi has been as serious as that in the Pashtun belt and much more serious than that in the non-Pashtun belt.
12.This virulence has aggravated further this year resulting in over 1000 deaths since the beginning of this year, with over 100 deaths in the last five days. From targeted killings of each other by different ethnic and sectarian groups, it has degenerated into a Beirut-like situation with the use of more and more sophisticated weapons by the fighting groups and attacks on infrastructure such as electric transformers and electricity supply lines. Whereas in the past, mainly individuals were targeted and killed, now there are group clashes in different areas which have resulted in many internally displaced persons moving from one area to another seeking protection.
13. The situation has serious implications because of the fact that Karachi is the economic capital of Pakistan and has the only satisfactorily functioning major international port catering to the external trade of Pakistan. The continued flow of logistic supplies, which come by sea, to the NATO forces in Afghanistan, would depend on a satisfactory internal security situation in this city. Moreover, Karachi has the only major naval base of Pakistan.
14. Despite these factors, the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has been ineffective in restoring law and order despite the fact that the MQM and the ANP were its coalition partners till now. Recently, there have been unconfirmed reports of the MQM having left the coalition due to the postponement of elections to the Assembly of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir from the Kashmiri refugee constituency in Karachi. Mr.Gilani has, however, denied that the MQM has carried out its threat to leave the coalition.
15. Some analysts in Pakistan look upon the recent spurt in violence in Karachi as an attempt by the MQM to intimidate the Federal Government into conceding its demands. Whatever may be the truth, the fact is that the situation in Karachi has been going from bad to worse. If this continues unchecked and unattended, the two Talibans may be the ultimate beneficiaries. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Karachi stands in danger of turning into another Beirut of the 1970s and 1980s if the Government of Pakistan does not wake up in time to the implications of the unending clashes between the Mohajirs and the Pashtuns, between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and between the Shias and the Sunnis.
2. Since the late 1980s, these animosities have led to periodic spells of ethnic and sectarian violence---almost amounting to a civil war. In the past, the situation was further aggravated by the ethnic animosity between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis. This animosity has since died down after the Pakistan People’s Party, which is largely of mainstream Sindhis, took the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of the Mohajirs, into the ruling federal coalition in Islamabad and the provincial coalition in Karachi after the elections of 2008.
3. The ethnic animosities have been compounded by sectarian animosities arising from the fact that the Mohajirs and the Sindhis largely belong to the more tolerant Barelvi sect of sub-continental Sunni Islam whereas the Pashtuns are largely the followers of the more intolerant Deobandi-Wahabi sects. The fact that many of the Mohajirs, who are the migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra and Gujarat provinces of India, have a large number of highly educated and prosperous Shias in their community has made the problem more complex by making them frequent targets of the extremist Sunni elements belonging to organisations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Lashkar-eJhangvi.
4. The animosities of the past arising from ethnic and sectarian factors have been aggravated by fears of a change in the demographic composition of Karachi. Before 1947, Karachi was a Sindhi city. After Pakistan was formed in 1947, it turned into a Mohajir city, due to the large influx of Barelvis and Shias from India. Mohajir means refugees. These are the refugees from India.
5. Since 1947, Karachi has been a city of refugees. Initially, it is the refugees from India (the Mohajirs) who dominated the politics and economy of the city, gradually reducing the Sindhis to an urban minority.
6. Since the trouble erupted in Afghanistan in the 1980s, there has been a continuous influx of Pashtun refugees into Karachi--- initially from Afghanistan as the fighting between the Afghan Mujahideen and the Soviet troops gathered momentum and subsequently after 9/11 from Pakistan’s Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) Province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as Al Qaeda and Taliban set up their safehaven in the Pashtun belt.
7. As a result of this steady Pashtun influx, there is a danger of Karachi one day turning into a Pashtun city. There has been no official census of the different ethnic groups in Karachi. It is believed that the Mohajirs are still the largest single ethnic group in the city, but as the number of Pashtun refugees increases, the Mohajirs fear they may be reduced to a minority in the years to come. Karachi is already the largest Pashtun city in Pakistan, with even more Pashtun population than Peshawar, the capital of the KP province.
8. It is the fear of an eventual Pashtunisation and Wahabisation of Karachi that has made the Mohajirs take to violence to stop the flow of more Pashtuns from the Pashtun belt and to counter their growing hold on the Karachi economy. The Pashtuns, who migrated before 9/11, are largely the supporters of the moderate Awami National Party (ANP), which is in power in the KP province and is a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. The MQM alleges that many of the Pashtuns, who have been migrating since 9/11, have sympathies with the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. Despite this, the ANP has been taking up their cause because of the ethnic affinity.
9. This has added a political dimension to the violence with the MQM trying to counter the presence and influence of the ANP in Karachi, despite its reputation as a party of moderate Pashtuns.
10. Karachi has been seeing eruptions of ethnic and sectarian violence from time to time for over two decades now. It has taken a disturbingly virulent form since last year.
11. According to the “Daily Times” of Lahore of January 1,2011, during 2010, at least 705 people, including 488 political and religious leaders and activists, fell prey to targeted killings in Karachi. In addition,74 others died in explosions all over Karachi during the year. As against 779 people who died due to ethnic and sectarian violence in Karachi during 2010, only 427 people died due to the acts of suicide terrorism by the Pakistani Taliban in the entire non-Pashtun belt of Pakistan and 797 in the Pashtun belt. This would give an indication of the seriousness of the situation in Karachi, which is considered the economic capital of Pakistan. The situation in Karachi has been as serious as that in the Pashtun belt and much more serious than that in the non-Pashtun belt.
12.This virulence has aggravated further this year resulting in over 1000 deaths since the beginning of this year, with over 100 deaths in the last five days. From targeted killings of each other by different ethnic and sectarian groups, it has degenerated into a Beirut-like situation with the use of more and more sophisticated weapons by the fighting groups and attacks on infrastructure such as electric transformers and electricity supply lines. Whereas in the past, mainly individuals were targeted and killed, now there are group clashes in different areas which have resulted in many internally displaced persons moving from one area to another seeking protection.
13. The situation has serious implications because of the fact that Karachi is the economic capital of Pakistan and has the only satisfactorily functioning major international port catering to the external trade of Pakistan. The continued flow of logistic supplies, which come by sea, to the NATO forces in Afghanistan, would depend on a satisfactory internal security situation in this city. Moreover, Karachi has the only major naval base of Pakistan.
14. Despite these factors, the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has been ineffective in restoring law and order despite the fact that the MQM and the ANP were its coalition partners till now. Recently, there have been unconfirmed reports of the MQM having left the coalition due to the postponement of elections to the Assembly of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir from the Kashmiri refugee constituency in Karachi. Mr.Gilani has, however, denied that the MQM has carried out its threat to leave the coalition.
15. Some analysts in Pakistan look upon the recent spurt in violence in Karachi as an attempt by the MQM to intimidate the Federal Government into conceding its demands. Whatever may be the truth, the fact is that the situation in Karachi has been going from bad to worse. If this continues unchecked and unattended, the two Talibans may be the ultimate beneficiaries. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, July 8, 2011
INDIA--PAKISTAN: LEARNING TO LIKE EACH OTHER
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article of June 27,2011, titled “Introspection in Pakistan: Will it Endure?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4572.html )
After 64 years of hating, distrusting and wishing ill of each other, have India and Pakistan started learning to like each other?
Things seem to be changing.
Glacially, bien sur. But changing all the same.
If you concentrate intensely, you can feel the change under your feet.
We are still harsh to each other, but not as harsh as before.
We still distrust each other, but not as intensely as before.
We still talk ill of each other, but not with as much venom as before.
We still hail the discomfiture of each other, but not with as much glee as before.
We still demonise each other, but not with as much pleasure as before.
The lingo is changing for the better, though one is not certain how long this would last.
Read the recent remarks of Smt.Nirupama Rao, our outgoing Foreign Secretary, on Pakistan and terrorism.
As forthright as always, but not as rudely condemnatory as in the past. There is a willingness to look at terrorism in a broader sub-continental perspective than in a purely national perspective.
Read the recent remarks of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan at a seminar. “India is our most important neighbour.”
No Pakistani leader would have had the courage to say so in public in the past, even if he felt so in his heart of hearts. The fear that one might stir up the hornet’s nest of anti-India fundamentalists would have inhibited the open expression of any such feeling.
One could now sense a feeling of confidence in the Pakistani political leadership that less negative statements about India might have greater public support than in the past.
Pakistan post-Abbottabad is not the same as Pakistan pre Abbottabad. There is an intense introspection regarding Pakistan’s relations with the US. India has been a conceptual beneficiary of this introspection
Questions not asked in the past are being asked now. Is the US a dependable friend?
Is it wise to develop a dependence on the US?
Has the time come to have a re-look at Pakistan’s relations with India in order to reduce its dependence on the US?
Is it possible for India and Pakistan to get along with each other? Should one allow persisting differences over individual issues such as Kashmir and terrorism come in the way of a greater comfort level in the over-all bilateral relations?
Keep discussing the differences over individual issues, but do not allow the persisting differences to continue to add venom to the over-all relations.
There is a willingness to project the bilateral relations in benign than in compulsively malign terms as in the past.
Is it for real or is it chimerical?
Is it durable or will it end like past rays of hope leading to even greater bitterness than earlier?
These are valid questions. One should not hesitate to pose them, but one should not allow these questions to continue to make us prisoners of the past.
It is time to think in terms of getting out of the clutches of the past and moving into the welcoming arms of the future.
Is this possible? Yes, if we continue to travel on the road of learning to like each other.
There are incipient signs of new thinking in both India and Pakistan. These signs must not be allowed to wither away. ( 10-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article of June 27,2011, titled “Introspection in Pakistan: Will it Endure?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4572.html )
After 64 years of hating, distrusting and wishing ill of each other, have India and Pakistan started learning to like each other?
Things seem to be changing.
Glacially, bien sur. But changing all the same.
If you concentrate intensely, you can feel the change under your feet.
We are still harsh to each other, but not as harsh as before.
We still distrust each other, but not as intensely as before.
We still talk ill of each other, but not with as much venom as before.
We still hail the discomfiture of each other, but not with as much glee as before.
We still demonise each other, but not with as much pleasure as before.
The lingo is changing for the better, though one is not certain how long this would last.
Read the recent remarks of Smt.Nirupama Rao, our outgoing Foreign Secretary, on Pakistan and terrorism.
As forthright as always, but not as rudely condemnatory as in the past. There is a willingness to look at terrorism in a broader sub-continental perspective than in a purely national perspective.
Read the recent remarks of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan at a seminar. “India is our most important neighbour.”
No Pakistani leader would have had the courage to say so in public in the past, even if he felt so in his heart of hearts. The fear that one might stir up the hornet’s nest of anti-India fundamentalists would have inhibited the open expression of any such feeling.
One could now sense a feeling of confidence in the Pakistani political leadership that less negative statements about India might have greater public support than in the past.
Pakistan post-Abbottabad is not the same as Pakistan pre Abbottabad. There is an intense introspection regarding Pakistan’s relations with the US. India has been a conceptual beneficiary of this introspection
Questions not asked in the past are being asked now. Is the US a dependable friend?
Is it wise to develop a dependence on the US?
Has the time come to have a re-look at Pakistan’s relations with India in order to reduce its dependence on the US?
Is it possible for India and Pakistan to get along with each other? Should one allow persisting differences over individual issues such as Kashmir and terrorism come in the way of a greater comfort level in the over-all bilateral relations?
Keep discussing the differences over individual issues, but do not allow the persisting differences to continue to add venom to the over-all relations.
There is a willingness to project the bilateral relations in benign than in compulsively malign terms as in the past.
Is it for real or is it chimerical?
Is it durable or will it end like past rays of hope leading to even greater bitterness than earlier?
These are valid questions. One should not hesitate to pose them, but one should not allow these questions to continue to make us prisoners of the past.
It is time to think in terms of getting out of the clutches of the past and moving into the welcoming arms of the future.
Is this possible? Yes, if we continue to travel on the road of learning to like each other.
There are incipient signs of new thinking in both India and Pakistan. These signs must not be allowed to wither away. ( 10-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
INDIAN & CHINESE INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA
B.RAMAN
SYNOPSIS OF A PAPER FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND,VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011
China is not a South Asian power, but it has acquired an important South Asian presence by taking advantage of certain factors which work in its favour and to India’s detriment:
(a). Firstly, no contentious issues bedevil its relations with any of the South Asian nations. It has not allowed the absence of an agreement with Bhutan on the border issue and its concerns over the activities of Tibetan refugees from Nepalese territory to come in the way of its strengthening its bilateral relations with the countries of the South Asian region. As against this, persisting problems in India’s bilateral relations with these countries work to India’s detriment. These countries have a higher comfort level in their relations with China than in their relations with India.
(b).Secondly, there is a huge hunger for the development of infrastructure in the South Asian counties in the form of ports, railways, roads etc. China, which has built up a huge cash reserve from its surplus external trade balances, has been able to meet their requirements of funds for infrastructure projects. Indian ability in this regard is severely limited. China has built up a large reserve of construction engineers of world class with experience in developing the infrastructure under difficult conditions in China. It has been able to utilise them for its construction projects in these countries. India’s over-focus on the IT sector and under-focus on the engineering sector have come in the way of building a similar pool of construction engineers. As a result, China has been better able to meet the infrastructure requirements of the South Asian countries than India.
( c ) Thirdly,China has been aggressive in meeting the requirements of these countries for arms and ammunition. It has also been actively helping Pakistan in developing a civil and military nuclear capability. There have been reports that it might help Bangladesh in developing a civil nuclear capability.
2.It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
3.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to providee the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
SYNOPSIS OF A PAPER FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND,VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011
China is not a South Asian power, but it has acquired an important South Asian presence by taking advantage of certain factors which work in its favour and to India’s detriment:
(a). Firstly, no contentious issues bedevil its relations with any of the South Asian nations. It has not allowed the absence of an agreement with Bhutan on the border issue and its concerns over the activities of Tibetan refugees from Nepalese territory to come in the way of its strengthening its bilateral relations with the countries of the South Asian region. As against this, persisting problems in India’s bilateral relations with these countries work to India’s detriment. These countries have a higher comfort level in their relations with China than in their relations with India.
(b).Secondly, there is a huge hunger for the development of infrastructure in the South Asian counties in the form of ports, railways, roads etc. China, which has built up a huge cash reserve from its surplus external trade balances, has been able to meet their requirements of funds for infrastructure projects. Indian ability in this regard is severely limited. China has built up a large reserve of construction engineers of world class with experience in developing the infrastructure under difficult conditions in China. It has been able to utilise them for its construction projects in these countries. India’s over-focus on the IT sector and under-focus on the engineering sector have come in the way of building a similar pool of construction engineers. As a result, China has been better able to meet the infrastructure requirements of the South Asian countries than India.
( c ) Thirdly,China has been aggressive in meeting the requirements of these countries for arms and ammunition. It has also been actively helping Pakistan in developing a civil and military nuclear capability. There have been reports that it might help Bangladesh in developing a civil nuclear capability.
2.It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
3.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to providee the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, July 7, 2011
JIANG ZEMIN'S HEALTH: CURIOUSER & CURIOUSER
B.RAMAN
At a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was directing all discussions in the print,TV and new media towards its achievements during the 90 years of its existence, a section of determined netizens of the country operating clandestinely with the help of microblogs has managed to hijack the discussion and divert it away from a debate on the achievements of the party.
2. Instead, they have succeeded in drawing attention to the nervousness of the CPC over its future and over the effectiveness of its political control. They have done this by the simple act of spreading through microblogs rumours that Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of President Hu Jintao, as the President, the CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, had passed away in a Beijing military hospital after suffering a massive heart attack when he had come to Beijing from Shanghai to attend a gala function held by the CPC on July 1,2011, chaired by Hu, to mark the 90th anniversary of the party.
3.Of the leadership triumvirate of the pre-Hu and post-Deng Xiaoping era, only former Prime Ministers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji attended the function. Jiang was conspicuous by his absence.
4. This set off rumours regarding the reasons for his absence. It has been known in China that Jiang, who is 84, has been in indifferent health for some months and was undergoing treatment in a Shanghai military hospital. Some months ago there were similar rumours of his death, which subsequently proved to be false.
5.At that time, one did not witness on the net the kind of frenzied speculation and rumour-mongering as one witnessed this time since the night of July 5 after a Hong Kong newspaper, one of whose share-holders is reportedly related to Jiang, carried the first report of the possible death of Jiang.
6. The Chinese authorities were taken aback when discussions on the achievements of the CPC disappeared from many microblogs, which started feverishly spreading rumours about the death of Jiang and searching for more information on the subject.
7. The microblogs have become the most important barometer of the state of the Chinese nation. They have also become the most disconcerting whistle-blower in modern China which manage to disseminate politically inconvenient and militarily sensitive news circumventing the firewalls erected by the Ministry of Public Security and other measures taken by it to prevent the spread of potentially destabilising news through the net.
8.One had repeatedly seen the new power of the new media during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the party committees. More significant details of the deliberations came from the microblogs than from the party and government controlled publicity organs.
9. In the past, the Chinese authorities had dealt with this phenomenon in a mature way. They had sought to strengthen their control over the new media through appropriate technologies instead of arresting and harassing the people behind this phenomenon. But their nervousness over their inability to control this phenomenon remains.
10. When the Net rumours about the death of Jiang started spreading like wild fire, their first reaction to the rumour spread was to try to suppress it through technical means. The much simpler way of countering the rumours by telling the truth to the people or through an official denial of the rumours occurred to them only on the morning of July 7 when the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated a report denying the rumours. This was followed by a report carried by the HK newspaper marking its distance from its initial story.
11. These denials have not ended the prairie fire of rumours across the Net. The previous speculation was whether Jiang was really dead, and, if so, when, where and why he died. The latest speculation after Xinhua came out with the official denial is why the Chinese authorities behaved in such a bizarre manner for nearly 48 hours before putting out an official denial. What explains their nervousness over the initial speculation regarding Jiang’s death?
12. Information about the health of ruling political leaders is always treated as a state secret in China. Mao Dze Dong and Deng died as leaders still wielding influence and authority at the time of their death. One could understand the nervousness that prevailed in the CPC as their death approached due to fears that their death could lead to a political turmoil inside the party as well as the country. This danger almost materialised after Mao’s death, but not after Deng’s.
13. Jiang is not a serving political leader. He is a retired leader, who has been ailing for some time and whose last public appearance was in 2009.There has been unverified speculation about his still retaining some influence in the CPC and hence being in a position to influence the post-Hu leadership even from his death bed.However, it is doubtful what kind of influence an ex-leader spending more time in hospital than outside could wield.
14. Still, sections of the CPC leadership were apparently worried over the possibility of a turmoil in the public or the party or both after his death and wanted to make sure that this would not happen before letting him die. There is a paucity of correct information regarding what has been happening in China.
15. Sometimes even a State-organised paucity of information could be the basis of a political assessment. One assessment that one could make is that whatever the rest of the world might say, sections of the CPC leadership are not certain in their mind that they are presiding over a politically stable country free of any potential surprises. That is the assessment that comes out loud and clear from the extreme nervousness of the CPC leadership over the Net speculation regarding Jiang’s health. (8-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
At a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was directing all discussions in the print,TV and new media towards its achievements during the 90 years of its existence, a section of determined netizens of the country operating clandestinely with the help of microblogs has managed to hijack the discussion and divert it away from a debate on the achievements of the party.
2. Instead, they have succeeded in drawing attention to the nervousness of the CPC over its future and over the effectiveness of its political control. They have done this by the simple act of spreading through microblogs rumours that Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of President Hu Jintao, as the President, the CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, had passed away in a Beijing military hospital after suffering a massive heart attack when he had come to Beijing from Shanghai to attend a gala function held by the CPC on July 1,2011, chaired by Hu, to mark the 90th anniversary of the party.
3.Of the leadership triumvirate of the pre-Hu and post-Deng Xiaoping era, only former Prime Ministers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji attended the function. Jiang was conspicuous by his absence.
4. This set off rumours regarding the reasons for his absence. It has been known in China that Jiang, who is 84, has been in indifferent health for some months and was undergoing treatment in a Shanghai military hospital. Some months ago there were similar rumours of his death, which subsequently proved to be false.
5.At that time, one did not witness on the net the kind of frenzied speculation and rumour-mongering as one witnessed this time since the night of July 5 after a Hong Kong newspaper, one of whose share-holders is reportedly related to Jiang, carried the first report of the possible death of Jiang.
6. The Chinese authorities were taken aback when discussions on the achievements of the CPC disappeared from many microblogs, which started feverishly spreading rumours about the death of Jiang and searching for more information on the subject.
7. The microblogs have become the most important barometer of the state of the Chinese nation. They have also become the most disconcerting whistle-blower in modern China which manage to disseminate politically inconvenient and militarily sensitive news circumventing the firewalls erected by the Ministry of Public Security and other measures taken by it to prevent the spread of potentially destabilising news through the net.
8.One had repeatedly seen the new power of the new media during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the party committees. More significant details of the deliberations came from the microblogs than from the party and government controlled publicity organs.
9. In the past, the Chinese authorities had dealt with this phenomenon in a mature way. They had sought to strengthen their control over the new media through appropriate technologies instead of arresting and harassing the people behind this phenomenon. But their nervousness over their inability to control this phenomenon remains.
10. When the Net rumours about the death of Jiang started spreading like wild fire, their first reaction to the rumour spread was to try to suppress it through technical means. The much simpler way of countering the rumours by telling the truth to the people or through an official denial of the rumours occurred to them only on the morning of July 7 when the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated a report denying the rumours. This was followed by a report carried by the HK newspaper marking its distance from its initial story.
11. These denials have not ended the prairie fire of rumours across the Net. The previous speculation was whether Jiang was really dead, and, if so, when, where and why he died. The latest speculation after Xinhua came out with the official denial is why the Chinese authorities behaved in such a bizarre manner for nearly 48 hours before putting out an official denial. What explains their nervousness over the initial speculation regarding Jiang’s death?
12. Information about the health of ruling political leaders is always treated as a state secret in China. Mao Dze Dong and Deng died as leaders still wielding influence and authority at the time of their death. One could understand the nervousness that prevailed in the CPC as their death approached due to fears that their death could lead to a political turmoil inside the party as well as the country. This danger almost materialised after Mao’s death, but not after Deng’s.
13. Jiang is not a serving political leader. He is a retired leader, who has been ailing for some time and whose last public appearance was in 2009.There has been unverified speculation about his still retaining some influence in the CPC and hence being in a position to influence the post-Hu leadership even from his death bed.However, it is doubtful what kind of influence an ex-leader spending more time in hospital than outside could wield.
14. Still, sections of the CPC leadership were apparently worried over the possibility of a turmoil in the public or the party or both after his death and wanted to make sure that this would not happen before letting him die. There is a paucity of correct information regarding what has been happening in China.
15. Sometimes even a State-organised paucity of information could be the basis of a political assessment. One assessment that one could make is that whatever the rest of the world might say, sections of the CPC leadership are not certain in their mind that they are presiding over a politically stable country free of any potential surprises. That is the assessment that comes out loud and clear from the extreme nervousness of the CPC leadership over the Net speculation regarding Jiang’s health. (8-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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