B.RAMAN
Karachi stands in danger of turning into another Beirut of the 1970s and 1980s if the Government of Pakistan does not wake up in time to the implications of the unending clashes between the Mohajirs and the Pashtuns, between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and between the Shias and the Sunnis.
2. Since the late 1980s, these animosities have led to periodic spells of ethnic and sectarian violence---almost amounting to a civil war. In the past, the situation was further aggravated by the ethnic animosity between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis. This animosity has since died down after the Pakistan People’s Party, which is largely of mainstream Sindhis, took the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of the Mohajirs, into the ruling federal coalition in Islamabad and the provincial coalition in Karachi after the elections of 2008.
3. The ethnic animosities have been compounded by sectarian animosities arising from the fact that the Mohajirs and the Sindhis largely belong to the more tolerant Barelvi sect of sub-continental Sunni Islam whereas the Pashtuns are largely the followers of the more intolerant Deobandi-Wahabi sects. The fact that many of the Mohajirs, who are the migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra and Gujarat provinces of India, have a large number of highly educated and prosperous Shias in their community has made the problem more complex by making them frequent targets of the extremist Sunni elements belonging to organisations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Lashkar-eJhangvi.
4. The animosities of the past arising from ethnic and sectarian factors have been aggravated by fears of a change in the demographic composition of Karachi. Before 1947, Karachi was a Sindhi city. After Pakistan was formed in 1947, it turned into a Mohajir city, due to the large influx of Barelvis and Shias from India. Mohajir means refugees. These are the refugees from India.
5. Since 1947, Karachi has been a city of refugees. Initially, it is the refugees from India (the Mohajirs) who dominated the politics and economy of the city, gradually reducing the Sindhis to an urban minority.
6. Since the trouble erupted in Afghanistan in the 1980s, there has been a continuous influx of Pashtun refugees into Karachi--- initially from Afghanistan as the fighting between the Afghan Mujahideen and the Soviet troops gathered momentum and subsequently after 9/11 from Pakistan’s Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) Province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as Al Qaeda and Taliban set up their safehaven in the Pashtun belt.
7. As a result of this steady Pashtun influx, there is a danger of Karachi one day turning into a Pashtun city. There has been no official census of the different ethnic groups in Karachi. It is believed that the Mohajirs are still the largest single ethnic group in the city, but as the number of Pashtun refugees increases, the Mohajirs fear they may be reduced to a minority in the years to come. Karachi is already the largest Pashtun city in Pakistan, with even more Pashtun population than Peshawar, the capital of the KP province.
8. It is the fear of an eventual Pashtunisation and Wahabisation of Karachi that has made the Mohajirs take to violence to stop the flow of more Pashtuns from the Pashtun belt and to counter their growing hold on the Karachi economy. The Pashtuns, who migrated before 9/11, are largely the supporters of the moderate Awami National Party (ANP), which is in power in the KP province and is a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. The MQM alleges that many of the Pashtuns, who have been migrating since 9/11, have sympathies with the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. Despite this, the ANP has been taking up their cause because of the ethnic affinity.
9. This has added a political dimension to the violence with the MQM trying to counter the presence and influence of the ANP in Karachi, despite its reputation as a party of moderate Pashtuns.
10. Karachi has been seeing eruptions of ethnic and sectarian violence from time to time for over two decades now. It has taken a disturbingly virulent form since last year.
11. According to the “Daily Times” of Lahore of January 1,2011, during 2010, at least 705 people, including 488 political and religious leaders and activists, fell prey to targeted killings in Karachi. In addition,74 others died in explosions all over Karachi during the year. As against 779 people who died due to ethnic and sectarian violence in Karachi during 2010, only 427 people died due to the acts of suicide terrorism by the Pakistani Taliban in the entire non-Pashtun belt of Pakistan and 797 in the Pashtun belt. This would give an indication of the seriousness of the situation in Karachi, which is considered the economic capital of Pakistan. The situation in Karachi has been as serious as that in the Pashtun belt and much more serious than that in the non-Pashtun belt.
12.This virulence has aggravated further this year resulting in over 1000 deaths since the beginning of this year, with over 100 deaths in the last five days. From targeted killings of each other by different ethnic and sectarian groups, it has degenerated into a Beirut-like situation with the use of more and more sophisticated weapons by the fighting groups and attacks on infrastructure such as electric transformers and electricity supply lines. Whereas in the past, mainly individuals were targeted and killed, now there are group clashes in different areas which have resulted in many internally displaced persons moving from one area to another seeking protection.
13. The situation has serious implications because of the fact that Karachi is the economic capital of Pakistan and has the only satisfactorily functioning major international port catering to the external trade of Pakistan. The continued flow of logistic supplies, which come by sea, to the NATO forces in Afghanistan, would depend on a satisfactory internal security situation in this city. Moreover, Karachi has the only major naval base of Pakistan.
14. Despite these factors, the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has been ineffective in restoring law and order despite the fact that the MQM and the ANP were its coalition partners till now. Recently, there have been unconfirmed reports of the MQM having left the coalition due to the postponement of elections to the Assembly of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir from the Kashmiri refugee constituency in Karachi. Mr.Gilani has, however, denied that the MQM has carried out its threat to leave the coalition.
15. Some analysts in Pakistan look upon the recent spurt in violence in Karachi as an attempt by the MQM to intimidate the Federal Government into conceding its demands. Whatever may be the truth, the fact is that the situation in Karachi has been going from bad to worse. If this continues unchecked and unattended, the two Talibans may be the ultimate beneficiaries. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, July 9, 2011
Friday, July 8, 2011
INDIA--PAKISTAN: LEARNING TO LIKE EACH OTHER
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article of June 27,2011, titled “Introspection in Pakistan: Will it Endure?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4572.html )
After 64 years of hating, distrusting and wishing ill of each other, have India and Pakistan started learning to like each other?
Things seem to be changing.
Glacially, bien sur. But changing all the same.
If you concentrate intensely, you can feel the change under your feet.
We are still harsh to each other, but not as harsh as before.
We still distrust each other, but not as intensely as before.
We still talk ill of each other, but not with as much venom as before.
We still hail the discomfiture of each other, but not with as much glee as before.
We still demonise each other, but not with as much pleasure as before.
The lingo is changing for the better, though one is not certain how long this would last.
Read the recent remarks of Smt.Nirupama Rao, our outgoing Foreign Secretary, on Pakistan and terrorism.
As forthright as always, but not as rudely condemnatory as in the past. There is a willingness to look at terrorism in a broader sub-continental perspective than in a purely national perspective.
Read the recent remarks of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan at a seminar. “India is our most important neighbour.”
No Pakistani leader would have had the courage to say so in public in the past, even if he felt so in his heart of hearts. The fear that one might stir up the hornet’s nest of anti-India fundamentalists would have inhibited the open expression of any such feeling.
One could now sense a feeling of confidence in the Pakistani political leadership that less negative statements about India might have greater public support than in the past.
Pakistan post-Abbottabad is not the same as Pakistan pre Abbottabad. There is an intense introspection regarding Pakistan’s relations with the US. India has been a conceptual beneficiary of this introspection
Questions not asked in the past are being asked now. Is the US a dependable friend?
Is it wise to develop a dependence on the US?
Has the time come to have a re-look at Pakistan’s relations with India in order to reduce its dependence on the US?
Is it possible for India and Pakistan to get along with each other? Should one allow persisting differences over individual issues such as Kashmir and terrorism come in the way of a greater comfort level in the over-all bilateral relations?
Keep discussing the differences over individual issues, but do not allow the persisting differences to continue to add venom to the over-all relations.
There is a willingness to project the bilateral relations in benign than in compulsively malign terms as in the past.
Is it for real or is it chimerical?
Is it durable or will it end like past rays of hope leading to even greater bitterness than earlier?
These are valid questions. One should not hesitate to pose them, but one should not allow these questions to continue to make us prisoners of the past.
It is time to think in terms of getting out of the clutches of the past and moving into the welcoming arms of the future.
Is this possible? Yes, if we continue to travel on the road of learning to like each other.
There are incipient signs of new thinking in both India and Pakistan. These signs must not be allowed to wither away. ( 10-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article of June 27,2011, titled “Introspection in Pakistan: Will it Endure?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4572.html )
After 64 years of hating, distrusting and wishing ill of each other, have India and Pakistan started learning to like each other?
Things seem to be changing.
Glacially, bien sur. But changing all the same.
If you concentrate intensely, you can feel the change under your feet.
We are still harsh to each other, but not as harsh as before.
We still distrust each other, but not as intensely as before.
We still talk ill of each other, but not with as much venom as before.
We still hail the discomfiture of each other, but not with as much glee as before.
We still demonise each other, but not with as much pleasure as before.
The lingo is changing for the better, though one is not certain how long this would last.
Read the recent remarks of Smt.Nirupama Rao, our outgoing Foreign Secretary, on Pakistan and terrorism.
As forthright as always, but not as rudely condemnatory as in the past. There is a willingness to look at terrorism in a broader sub-continental perspective than in a purely national perspective.
Read the recent remarks of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan at a seminar. “India is our most important neighbour.”
No Pakistani leader would have had the courage to say so in public in the past, even if he felt so in his heart of hearts. The fear that one might stir up the hornet’s nest of anti-India fundamentalists would have inhibited the open expression of any such feeling.
One could now sense a feeling of confidence in the Pakistani political leadership that less negative statements about India might have greater public support than in the past.
Pakistan post-Abbottabad is not the same as Pakistan pre Abbottabad. There is an intense introspection regarding Pakistan’s relations with the US. India has been a conceptual beneficiary of this introspection
Questions not asked in the past are being asked now. Is the US a dependable friend?
Is it wise to develop a dependence on the US?
Has the time come to have a re-look at Pakistan’s relations with India in order to reduce its dependence on the US?
Is it possible for India and Pakistan to get along with each other? Should one allow persisting differences over individual issues such as Kashmir and terrorism come in the way of a greater comfort level in the over-all bilateral relations?
Keep discussing the differences over individual issues, but do not allow the persisting differences to continue to add venom to the over-all relations.
There is a willingness to project the bilateral relations in benign than in compulsively malign terms as in the past.
Is it for real or is it chimerical?
Is it durable or will it end like past rays of hope leading to even greater bitterness than earlier?
These are valid questions. One should not hesitate to pose them, but one should not allow these questions to continue to make us prisoners of the past.
It is time to think in terms of getting out of the clutches of the past and moving into the welcoming arms of the future.
Is this possible? Yes, if we continue to travel on the road of learning to like each other.
There are incipient signs of new thinking in both India and Pakistan. These signs must not be allowed to wither away. ( 10-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
INDIAN & CHINESE INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA
B.RAMAN
SYNOPSIS OF A PAPER FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND,VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011
China is not a South Asian power, but it has acquired an important South Asian presence by taking advantage of certain factors which work in its favour and to India’s detriment:
(a). Firstly, no contentious issues bedevil its relations with any of the South Asian nations. It has not allowed the absence of an agreement with Bhutan on the border issue and its concerns over the activities of Tibetan refugees from Nepalese territory to come in the way of its strengthening its bilateral relations with the countries of the South Asian region. As against this, persisting problems in India’s bilateral relations with these countries work to India’s detriment. These countries have a higher comfort level in their relations with China than in their relations with India.
(b).Secondly, there is a huge hunger for the development of infrastructure in the South Asian counties in the form of ports, railways, roads etc. China, which has built up a huge cash reserve from its surplus external trade balances, has been able to meet their requirements of funds for infrastructure projects. Indian ability in this regard is severely limited. China has built up a large reserve of construction engineers of world class with experience in developing the infrastructure under difficult conditions in China. It has been able to utilise them for its construction projects in these countries. India’s over-focus on the IT sector and under-focus on the engineering sector have come in the way of building a similar pool of construction engineers. As a result, China has been better able to meet the infrastructure requirements of the South Asian countries than India.
( c ) Thirdly,China has been aggressive in meeting the requirements of these countries for arms and ammunition. It has also been actively helping Pakistan in developing a civil and military nuclear capability. There have been reports that it might help Bangladesh in developing a civil nuclear capability.
2.It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
3.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to providee the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
SYNOPSIS OF A PAPER FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND,VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011
China is not a South Asian power, but it has acquired an important South Asian presence by taking advantage of certain factors which work in its favour and to India’s detriment:
(a). Firstly, no contentious issues bedevil its relations with any of the South Asian nations. It has not allowed the absence of an agreement with Bhutan on the border issue and its concerns over the activities of Tibetan refugees from Nepalese territory to come in the way of its strengthening its bilateral relations with the countries of the South Asian region. As against this, persisting problems in India’s bilateral relations with these countries work to India’s detriment. These countries have a higher comfort level in their relations with China than in their relations with India.
(b).Secondly, there is a huge hunger for the development of infrastructure in the South Asian counties in the form of ports, railways, roads etc. China, which has built up a huge cash reserve from its surplus external trade balances, has been able to meet their requirements of funds for infrastructure projects. Indian ability in this regard is severely limited. China has built up a large reserve of construction engineers of world class with experience in developing the infrastructure under difficult conditions in China. It has been able to utilise them for its construction projects in these countries. India’s over-focus on the IT sector and under-focus on the engineering sector have come in the way of building a similar pool of construction engineers. As a result, China has been better able to meet the infrastructure requirements of the South Asian countries than India.
( c ) Thirdly,China has been aggressive in meeting the requirements of these countries for arms and ammunition. It has also been actively helping Pakistan in developing a civil and military nuclear capability. There have been reports that it might help Bangladesh in developing a civil nuclear capability.
2.It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
3.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to providee the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, July 7, 2011
JIANG ZEMIN'S HEALTH: CURIOUSER & CURIOUSER
B.RAMAN
At a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was directing all discussions in the print,TV and new media towards its achievements during the 90 years of its existence, a section of determined netizens of the country operating clandestinely with the help of microblogs has managed to hijack the discussion and divert it away from a debate on the achievements of the party.
2. Instead, they have succeeded in drawing attention to the nervousness of the CPC over its future and over the effectiveness of its political control. They have done this by the simple act of spreading through microblogs rumours that Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of President Hu Jintao, as the President, the CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, had passed away in a Beijing military hospital after suffering a massive heart attack when he had come to Beijing from Shanghai to attend a gala function held by the CPC on July 1,2011, chaired by Hu, to mark the 90th anniversary of the party.
3.Of the leadership triumvirate of the pre-Hu and post-Deng Xiaoping era, only former Prime Ministers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji attended the function. Jiang was conspicuous by his absence.
4. This set off rumours regarding the reasons for his absence. It has been known in China that Jiang, who is 84, has been in indifferent health for some months and was undergoing treatment in a Shanghai military hospital. Some months ago there were similar rumours of his death, which subsequently proved to be false.
5.At that time, one did not witness on the net the kind of frenzied speculation and rumour-mongering as one witnessed this time since the night of July 5 after a Hong Kong newspaper, one of whose share-holders is reportedly related to Jiang, carried the first report of the possible death of Jiang.
6. The Chinese authorities were taken aback when discussions on the achievements of the CPC disappeared from many microblogs, which started feverishly spreading rumours about the death of Jiang and searching for more information on the subject.
7. The microblogs have become the most important barometer of the state of the Chinese nation. They have also become the most disconcerting whistle-blower in modern China which manage to disseminate politically inconvenient and militarily sensitive news circumventing the firewalls erected by the Ministry of Public Security and other measures taken by it to prevent the spread of potentially destabilising news through the net.
8.One had repeatedly seen the new power of the new media during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the party committees. More significant details of the deliberations came from the microblogs than from the party and government controlled publicity organs.
9. In the past, the Chinese authorities had dealt with this phenomenon in a mature way. They had sought to strengthen their control over the new media through appropriate technologies instead of arresting and harassing the people behind this phenomenon. But their nervousness over their inability to control this phenomenon remains.
10. When the Net rumours about the death of Jiang started spreading like wild fire, their first reaction to the rumour spread was to try to suppress it through technical means. The much simpler way of countering the rumours by telling the truth to the people or through an official denial of the rumours occurred to them only on the morning of July 7 when the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated a report denying the rumours. This was followed by a report carried by the HK newspaper marking its distance from its initial story.
11. These denials have not ended the prairie fire of rumours across the Net. The previous speculation was whether Jiang was really dead, and, if so, when, where and why he died. The latest speculation after Xinhua came out with the official denial is why the Chinese authorities behaved in such a bizarre manner for nearly 48 hours before putting out an official denial. What explains their nervousness over the initial speculation regarding Jiang’s death?
12. Information about the health of ruling political leaders is always treated as a state secret in China. Mao Dze Dong and Deng died as leaders still wielding influence and authority at the time of their death. One could understand the nervousness that prevailed in the CPC as their death approached due to fears that their death could lead to a political turmoil inside the party as well as the country. This danger almost materialised after Mao’s death, but not after Deng’s.
13. Jiang is not a serving political leader. He is a retired leader, who has been ailing for some time and whose last public appearance was in 2009.There has been unverified speculation about his still retaining some influence in the CPC and hence being in a position to influence the post-Hu leadership even from his death bed.However, it is doubtful what kind of influence an ex-leader spending more time in hospital than outside could wield.
14. Still, sections of the CPC leadership were apparently worried over the possibility of a turmoil in the public or the party or both after his death and wanted to make sure that this would not happen before letting him die. There is a paucity of correct information regarding what has been happening in China.
15. Sometimes even a State-organised paucity of information could be the basis of a political assessment. One assessment that one could make is that whatever the rest of the world might say, sections of the CPC leadership are not certain in their mind that they are presiding over a politically stable country free of any potential surprises. That is the assessment that comes out loud and clear from the extreme nervousness of the CPC leadership over the Net speculation regarding Jiang’s health. (8-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
At a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was directing all discussions in the print,TV and new media towards its achievements during the 90 years of its existence, a section of determined netizens of the country operating clandestinely with the help of microblogs has managed to hijack the discussion and divert it away from a debate on the achievements of the party.
2. Instead, they have succeeded in drawing attention to the nervousness of the CPC over its future and over the effectiveness of its political control. They have done this by the simple act of spreading through microblogs rumours that Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of President Hu Jintao, as the President, the CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, had passed away in a Beijing military hospital after suffering a massive heart attack when he had come to Beijing from Shanghai to attend a gala function held by the CPC on July 1,2011, chaired by Hu, to mark the 90th anniversary of the party.
3.Of the leadership triumvirate of the pre-Hu and post-Deng Xiaoping era, only former Prime Ministers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji attended the function. Jiang was conspicuous by his absence.
4. This set off rumours regarding the reasons for his absence. It has been known in China that Jiang, who is 84, has been in indifferent health for some months and was undergoing treatment in a Shanghai military hospital. Some months ago there were similar rumours of his death, which subsequently proved to be false.
5.At that time, one did not witness on the net the kind of frenzied speculation and rumour-mongering as one witnessed this time since the night of July 5 after a Hong Kong newspaper, one of whose share-holders is reportedly related to Jiang, carried the first report of the possible death of Jiang.
6. The Chinese authorities were taken aback when discussions on the achievements of the CPC disappeared from many microblogs, which started feverishly spreading rumours about the death of Jiang and searching for more information on the subject.
7. The microblogs have become the most important barometer of the state of the Chinese nation. They have also become the most disconcerting whistle-blower in modern China which manage to disseminate politically inconvenient and militarily sensitive news circumventing the firewalls erected by the Ministry of Public Security and other measures taken by it to prevent the spread of potentially destabilising news through the net.
8.One had repeatedly seen the new power of the new media during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the party committees. More significant details of the deliberations came from the microblogs than from the party and government controlled publicity organs.
9. In the past, the Chinese authorities had dealt with this phenomenon in a mature way. They had sought to strengthen their control over the new media through appropriate technologies instead of arresting and harassing the people behind this phenomenon. But their nervousness over their inability to control this phenomenon remains.
10. When the Net rumours about the death of Jiang started spreading like wild fire, their first reaction to the rumour spread was to try to suppress it through technical means. The much simpler way of countering the rumours by telling the truth to the people or through an official denial of the rumours occurred to them only on the morning of July 7 when the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated a report denying the rumours. This was followed by a report carried by the HK newspaper marking its distance from its initial story.
11. These denials have not ended the prairie fire of rumours across the Net. The previous speculation was whether Jiang was really dead, and, if so, when, where and why he died. The latest speculation after Xinhua came out with the official denial is why the Chinese authorities behaved in such a bizarre manner for nearly 48 hours before putting out an official denial. What explains their nervousness over the initial speculation regarding Jiang’s death?
12. Information about the health of ruling political leaders is always treated as a state secret in China. Mao Dze Dong and Deng died as leaders still wielding influence and authority at the time of their death. One could understand the nervousness that prevailed in the CPC as their death approached due to fears that their death could lead to a political turmoil inside the party as well as the country. This danger almost materialised after Mao’s death, but not after Deng’s.
13. Jiang is not a serving political leader. He is a retired leader, who has been ailing for some time and whose last public appearance was in 2009.There has been unverified speculation about his still retaining some influence in the CPC and hence being in a position to influence the post-Hu leadership even from his death bed.However, it is doubtful what kind of influence an ex-leader spending more time in hospital than outside could wield.
14. Still, sections of the CPC leadership were apparently worried over the possibility of a turmoil in the public or the party or both after his death and wanted to make sure that this would not happen before letting him die. There is a paucity of correct information regarding what has been happening in China.
15. Sometimes even a State-organised paucity of information could be the basis of a political assessment. One assessment that one could make is that whatever the rest of the world might say, sections of the CPC leadership are not certain in their mind that they are presiding over a politically stable country free of any potential surprises. That is the assessment that comes out loud and clear from the extreme nervousness of the CPC leadership over the Net speculation regarding Jiang’s health. (8-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
THE CBI & THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT : Q & A
B.RAMAN
I have received a number of questions from readers regarding the recent decision of the Government to totally exempt the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) from the operation of the Right To Information Act. Previously, for four years, the CBI did not enjoy such exemption. This sudden decision of the Government to grant a total exemption to the CBI has been sought to be justified on grounds of national security. There has been criticism of the Government action from advocates of greater transparency in the functioning of our intelligence and investigation agencies. I have tried to answer the questions to the extent possible:
Question: Is the CBI a national security organisation such as the Intelligence Bureau and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) are?
A. It is not, but it does have a national security role to a limited extent. It is essentially an agency for the investigation of criminal cases entrusted to it. These cases fall into two categories---- cases of corruption and other common law crimes of a serious nature and cases of terrorism and related offences such as the counterfeiting of currency notes. After the National Investigation Agency (NIA) came into existence in 2009, the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases of a specified nature was transferred to it from the CBI. Despite this, the CBI continues to have a responsibility for follow-up action on cases registered before the NIA came into existence. The CBI played an important role in the investigation of the March 1993 blasts in Mumbai and other important terrorist attacks. It continues to have responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of important cases involving mafia groups and their nexus with terrorist groups. When the NIA gets going completely, the CBI’s responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of cases relating to terrorism and mafia activities will be considerably reduced and it will focus almost entirely on the investigation of corruption cases and other common law crimes not necessarily having an impact on national security. However, the CBI cannot be treated on par with the IB and the R&AW because it is not a clandestine organisation operating covertly. Whereas the IB and the R&AW are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, some aspects of the CBI’s work such as its budget are subject to scrutiny by relevant committees of the Parliament such as the Estimates Committee. Thus, to treat the CBI on par with the IB and the R&AW for giving it the benefit of total exemption was unwarranted.
Q. What must have made the Government bring the CBI under the totally exempted category after having kept it out of this category for four years?
A. It is difficult to answer this question categorically in the absence of details. Advocates of Right to Information should examine whether there is scope for forcing the Government to disclose these details which made it reverse its earlier decision not to exempt the CBI. Vague answers such as “national security grounds” should not be accepted. The apparent suddenness and abruptness with which the Government took this decision would indicate that the CBI was probably in receipt of a request under the Right to Information Act for some information which it was not in a position to legitimately deny. The Government, therefore, decided that instead of denying the specific information requested for which could have put the Government in an embarrassing position, it would totally exempt the CBI. One example of such information that I could think of could be relating to the past investigation in the Bofors case. There could have been other similar cases.
Q. Why is the BJP supporting the Government’s decision to grant total exemption to the CBI?
A. One possibility is that the BJP genuinely feels that since the CBI had in the past investigated terrorism-related cases and now continues to investigate mafia-related cases, it should have the benefit of total exemption.
Q. Is granting total exemption to the CBI the only way of preventing disclosure of information relating to cases with national security implications such as terrorism, mafia activities, counterfeiting etc?
A. No. Without including the CBI in the list of totally exempted organisations, the Government could have suggested to the CBI to take advantage of those provisions in the Act for denying information in cases having a bearing on national security on a case by case basis. The public has a right to a lot of information relating to the CBI such as its administration, methods of recruitment and training, budgetary control etc. At the same time, it should not have the right to seek information relating to investigation of on-going cases---- whether of corruption or of other common law crime or terrorism-related. These two requirements could have been easily met by continuing to keep the CBI in the not-exempted category. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
I have received a number of questions from readers regarding the recent decision of the Government to totally exempt the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) from the operation of the Right To Information Act. Previously, for four years, the CBI did not enjoy such exemption. This sudden decision of the Government to grant a total exemption to the CBI has been sought to be justified on grounds of national security. There has been criticism of the Government action from advocates of greater transparency in the functioning of our intelligence and investigation agencies. I have tried to answer the questions to the extent possible:
Question: Is the CBI a national security organisation such as the Intelligence Bureau and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) are?
A. It is not, but it does have a national security role to a limited extent. It is essentially an agency for the investigation of criminal cases entrusted to it. These cases fall into two categories---- cases of corruption and other common law crimes of a serious nature and cases of terrorism and related offences such as the counterfeiting of currency notes. After the National Investigation Agency (NIA) came into existence in 2009, the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases of a specified nature was transferred to it from the CBI. Despite this, the CBI continues to have a responsibility for follow-up action on cases registered before the NIA came into existence. The CBI played an important role in the investigation of the March 1993 blasts in Mumbai and other important terrorist attacks. It continues to have responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of important cases involving mafia groups and their nexus with terrorist groups. When the NIA gets going completely, the CBI’s responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of cases relating to terrorism and mafia activities will be considerably reduced and it will focus almost entirely on the investigation of corruption cases and other common law crimes not necessarily having an impact on national security. However, the CBI cannot be treated on par with the IB and the R&AW because it is not a clandestine organisation operating covertly. Whereas the IB and the R&AW are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, some aspects of the CBI’s work such as its budget are subject to scrutiny by relevant committees of the Parliament such as the Estimates Committee. Thus, to treat the CBI on par with the IB and the R&AW for giving it the benefit of total exemption was unwarranted.
Q. What must have made the Government bring the CBI under the totally exempted category after having kept it out of this category for four years?
A. It is difficult to answer this question categorically in the absence of details. Advocates of Right to Information should examine whether there is scope for forcing the Government to disclose these details which made it reverse its earlier decision not to exempt the CBI. Vague answers such as “national security grounds” should not be accepted. The apparent suddenness and abruptness with which the Government took this decision would indicate that the CBI was probably in receipt of a request under the Right to Information Act for some information which it was not in a position to legitimately deny. The Government, therefore, decided that instead of denying the specific information requested for which could have put the Government in an embarrassing position, it would totally exempt the CBI. One example of such information that I could think of could be relating to the past investigation in the Bofors case. There could have been other similar cases.
Q. Why is the BJP supporting the Government’s decision to grant total exemption to the CBI?
A. One possibility is that the BJP genuinely feels that since the CBI had in the past investigated terrorism-related cases and now continues to investigate mafia-related cases, it should have the benefit of total exemption.
Q. Is granting total exemption to the CBI the only way of preventing disclosure of information relating to cases with national security implications such as terrorism, mafia activities, counterfeiting etc?
A. No. Without including the CBI in the list of totally exempted organisations, the Government could have suggested to the CBI to take advantage of those provisions in the Act for denying information in cases having a bearing on national security on a case by case basis. The public has a right to a lot of information relating to the CBI such as its administration, methods of recruitment and training, budgetary control etc. At the same time, it should not have the right to seek information relating to investigation of on-going cases---- whether of corruption or of other common law crime or terrorism-related. These two requirements could have been easily met by continuing to keep the CBI in the not-exempted category. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA IS 76
B.RAMAN
His Holiness the Dalai Lama is 76 today. Happy returns of the day Your Holiness.
2. The day passed off without any incident in the so-called Tibet autonomous region of China, in the Sichuan province and other Tibetan-inhabited areas.
3. In the past, the Tibetan followers of the Dalai Lama used to close their shops and other establishments on his birthday as a mark of respect to him. The Chinese did not interfere with this.
4. However, for the last few years, they have made it illegal for anyone to observe the birthday of His Holiness. As a result, people are forced to observe it in the privacy of their homes. Reports received from the Tibetan areas of China indicate that they did so this year too. In addition, Tibetan monks in monasteries held special prayers on the occasion.
5. The Dalai Lama’s 76th birthday was preceded by anti-China protests in the Kardze and Ngaba prefectures in recent weeks. The local official newspaper “Ganzi Daily” reported on July 5 that Liu Daoping, the party chief in Kardze, had called for harsh measures against any “secessionist activities.”
6. On July 5, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated extracts of a special commentary carried by the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” on His Holiness. The Xinhua despatch said:
“The People's Daily, flagship newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC), ran a commentary on Tuesday, saying the retirement of Dalai Lama will not save the Dalai "clique" from failure.
“The commentary said that no matter what objectives the Dalai Lama pursues, whether "Tibetan Independence" or the "Middle Way Approach," and no matter how he acts on stage or controls his puppets from backstage, he will fail.
"No matter who heads the 'exiled Tibetan government,'" its illegal nature will not be altered," according to the commentary.
“For the future of Dalai Lama himself, there is no other option for him than to abandon all secessionist acts and speeches and meet the central government's demands, added the commentary.
"The past 60 years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet witnessed serfdom being replaced by a socialist system, the rapid development of Tibet, a remarkable improvement of the Tibetan people's lives, and closer inter-connections between Tibet and other parts of China, and people of all ethnic groups have developed a deeper understanding of the reactionary nature of the 'clique'," said the commentary.
“The Dalai Lama announced his plan to step down as the political head of the "exiled Tibetan government" on March 10.
“The year 2011 marks the 60th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet.”
6-7-11
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
His Holiness the Dalai Lama is 76 today. Happy returns of the day Your Holiness.
2. The day passed off without any incident in the so-called Tibet autonomous region of China, in the Sichuan province and other Tibetan-inhabited areas.
3. In the past, the Tibetan followers of the Dalai Lama used to close their shops and other establishments on his birthday as a mark of respect to him. The Chinese did not interfere with this.
4. However, for the last few years, they have made it illegal for anyone to observe the birthday of His Holiness. As a result, people are forced to observe it in the privacy of their homes. Reports received from the Tibetan areas of China indicate that they did so this year too. In addition, Tibetan monks in monasteries held special prayers on the occasion.
5. The Dalai Lama’s 76th birthday was preceded by anti-China protests in the Kardze and Ngaba prefectures in recent weeks. The local official newspaper “Ganzi Daily” reported on July 5 that Liu Daoping, the party chief in Kardze, had called for harsh measures against any “secessionist activities.”
6. On July 5, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated extracts of a special commentary carried by the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” on His Holiness. The Xinhua despatch said:
“The People's Daily, flagship newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC), ran a commentary on Tuesday, saying the retirement of Dalai Lama will not save the Dalai "clique" from failure.
“The commentary said that no matter what objectives the Dalai Lama pursues, whether "Tibetan Independence" or the "Middle Way Approach," and no matter how he acts on stage or controls his puppets from backstage, he will fail.
"No matter who heads the 'exiled Tibetan government,'" its illegal nature will not be altered," according to the commentary.
“For the future of Dalai Lama himself, there is no other option for him than to abandon all secessionist acts and speeches and meet the central government's demands, added the commentary.
"The past 60 years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet witnessed serfdom being replaced by a socialist system, the rapid development of Tibet, a remarkable improvement of the Tibetan people's lives, and closer inter-connections between Tibet and other parts of China, and people of all ethnic groups have developed a deeper understanding of the reactionary nature of the 'clique'," said the commentary.
“The Dalai Lama announced his plan to step down as the political head of the "exiled Tibetan government" on March 10.
“The year 2011 marks the 60th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet.”
6-7-11
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
IMPROVING MEDIA LITERACY IN CHINA: ATTENTION DR.MANMOHAN SINGH
B.RAMAN
At a time when the office of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is confused and hesitant in its response to the opportunities and challenges relating to the use of the Internet for improving communications with the citizens and for improving governance, it would be useful to study how China is responding to the new media. In this connection, a study published by the “People’s Daily” of the Communist Party of China on July 1,2011, under the title “How microblogging power shakes reality in China” is annexed.
ANNEXURE
( Text of the Article)
As more and more people are turning to microblogging as a means to participate in public affairs and to express their personal opinions, it has become particularly important for government officials to improve their media literacy.
Microblogging was introduced in China in 2009 and has quickly developed into a major channel of public opinions within less than three years. Many hot incidents were first exposed through microblog posts, including the accidentally exposed affair between a bureau director in Liyang, Jiangsu province and a local married woman, the Guo Meimei incident and a badly photo-shopped picture of Huili County government officials. There are more than 640,000 microblog posts concerning the Guo Meimei incident alone.
This has shown the great power of microblogging and made government officials realize that the Internet and reality are becoming increasingly intertwined, and so are public opinion platforms and social administration. Apparently unaware that his microblog posts could be seen by other users, the bureau director paid a heavy price for detailing his affair with a married woman via microblogging. After the badly photo-shopped picture was exposed, the Huili County government issued a quick apology using a newly registered Sina microblog account, successfully preventing the incident from escalating as the "fake South China tiger photos" incident did.
Sina Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging site operated by Sina Corporation, has attracted more than 1.4 million users alone. Objectively speaking, the fast rise of microblogging has enhanced the ability of local governments and leading cadres to communicate with the public and to respond appropriately to unexpected incidents.
Local governments, which were formerly unfamiliar and resistant, have now begun to actively utilize microblogs. Seeking advice from netizens via microblogs has become a popular practice among many local governments. Certain government officials in Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces recently attended special seminars on microblogging, and the Nanjing municipal government issued a directive requiring any emergency event in the city to be posted on microblogs within one hour. It is gratifying to see government officials using microblogs to improve governance.
However, according to the "Research Report on Microblogs for Chinese Political Affairs," only 1,700 government agencies and 720 government officials have verified microblog accounts as of March this year, which reflects that most officials are unfamiliar with microblogging, the new battlefield of public opinion.
Although some officials and cadres still cannot adapt to the new public opinion pattern of the microblogging era, it has already become an inevitable phenomenon that the people will participate in public affairs and express their opinions by microblogging. Topics regarding government policies, public administration, and cadres' words and deeds usually turn into hot topics very quickly.
In fact, most microbloggers' behaviors of "surrounding to watch" and "participating in" are ultimately out of their goodwill of caring about the work of local governments and their sincere desire to help local governments overcome shortcomings. The thing that makes microblogging a perfect platform for responding to concerns is goodwill and sincerity.
If governments can correctly and properly guide public opinions, use microblogging as a good platform to learn about public opinions and the wisdom of the people, and find and solve problems as soon as possible, forming a widely-participated, orderly and interactive microblogging public opinion environment is completely possible. Microblogging will also become a "release valve" of social emotions and the "lubricant" of government-public relations.
From the forum to microblogging, the people's enthusiasm and ability to participate in public affairs has greatly risen along with the Internet, which is developing at an unbelievable speed. After rumors frequently appeared on microblogs, some special anti-rumor plates, such as Rumor Grinder and Rumor-Refuting League, have also appeared. It reflects that microblogging is maturating and people's participation on the Internet has increased. However, some negative problems, such as privacy violations, radical emotions and rumor starting and spreading, still exist to some extent.
Under this condition, social administrators should especially adhere to the principle of "treating, using and managing properly" to improve the attainment of the media, pay attention to the public opinion platform of microblogging, respond to social concerns and guide the people's participation.
The innovation of social administration cannot go without the innovation of "virtual community" administration. If the governments realize it earlier, their work will become easy earlier.
By Shan Xuegang from People's Daily Online and the article is translated by People's Daily Online.
At a time when the office of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is confused and hesitant in its response to the opportunities and challenges relating to the use of the Internet for improving communications with the citizens and for improving governance, it would be useful to study how China is responding to the new media. In this connection, a study published by the “People’s Daily” of the Communist Party of China on July 1,2011, under the title “How microblogging power shakes reality in China” is annexed.
ANNEXURE
( Text of the Article)
As more and more people are turning to microblogging as a means to participate in public affairs and to express their personal opinions, it has become particularly important for government officials to improve their media literacy.
Microblogging was introduced in China in 2009 and has quickly developed into a major channel of public opinions within less than three years. Many hot incidents were first exposed through microblog posts, including the accidentally exposed affair between a bureau director in Liyang, Jiangsu province and a local married woman, the Guo Meimei incident and a badly photo-shopped picture of Huili County government officials. There are more than 640,000 microblog posts concerning the Guo Meimei incident alone.
This has shown the great power of microblogging and made government officials realize that the Internet and reality are becoming increasingly intertwined, and so are public opinion platforms and social administration. Apparently unaware that his microblog posts could be seen by other users, the bureau director paid a heavy price for detailing his affair with a married woman via microblogging. After the badly photo-shopped picture was exposed, the Huili County government issued a quick apology using a newly registered Sina microblog account, successfully preventing the incident from escalating as the "fake South China tiger photos" incident did.
Sina Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging site operated by Sina Corporation, has attracted more than 1.4 million users alone. Objectively speaking, the fast rise of microblogging has enhanced the ability of local governments and leading cadres to communicate with the public and to respond appropriately to unexpected incidents.
Local governments, which were formerly unfamiliar and resistant, have now begun to actively utilize microblogs. Seeking advice from netizens via microblogs has become a popular practice among many local governments. Certain government officials in Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces recently attended special seminars on microblogging, and the Nanjing municipal government issued a directive requiring any emergency event in the city to be posted on microblogs within one hour. It is gratifying to see government officials using microblogs to improve governance.
However, according to the "Research Report on Microblogs for Chinese Political Affairs," only 1,700 government agencies and 720 government officials have verified microblog accounts as of March this year, which reflects that most officials are unfamiliar with microblogging, the new battlefield of public opinion.
Although some officials and cadres still cannot adapt to the new public opinion pattern of the microblogging era, it has already become an inevitable phenomenon that the people will participate in public affairs and express their opinions by microblogging. Topics regarding government policies, public administration, and cadres' words and deeds usually turn into hot topics very quickly.
In fact, most microbloggers' behaviors of "surrounding to watch" and "participating in" are ultimately out of their goodwill of caring about the work of local governments and their sincere desire to help local governments overcome shortcomings. The thing that makes microblogging a perfect platform for responding to concerns is goodwill and sincerity.
If governments can correctly and properly guide public opinions, use microblogging as a good platform to learn about public opinions and the wisdom of the people, and find and solve problems as soon as possible, forming a widely-participated, orderly and interactive microblogging public opinion environment is completely possible. Microblogging will also become a "release valve" of social emotions and the "lubricant" of government-public relations.
From the forum to microblogging, the people's enthusiasm and ability to participate in public affairs has greatly risen along with the Internet, which is developing at an unbelievable speed. After rumors frequently appeared on microblogs, some special anti-rumor plates, such as Rumor Grinder and Rumor-Refuting League, have also appeared. It reflects that microblogging is maturating and people's participation on the Internet has increased. However, some negative problems, such as privacy violations, radical emotions and rumor starting and spreading, still exist to some extent.
Under this condition, social administrators should especially adhere to the principle of "treating, using and managing properly" to improve the attainment of the media, pay attention to the public opinion platform of microblogging, respond to social concerns and guide the people's participation.
The innovation of social administration cannot go without the innovation of "virtual community" administration. If the governments realize it earlier, their work will become easy earlier.
By Shan Xuegang from People's Daily Online and the article is translated by People's Daily Online.
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