Bullet point thoughts
1.Opportunistic bugs and not permanent ones.Fixed with easy to carry adhesives whenever a sensitive discussion was held with the complicity of an insider. Removed thereafter.Permanent bugs will not be fixed to walls. Will be fixed inside walls during construction or fitted clandestinely inside objects like ash trays, flower vases, landline telephones, table-lamps etc.
2. Not sophisticated transmitters. Sophisticated transmitters fixed on the wall would have interfered with mobile telephone functioning and immediately created suspicion.
3.Objective---Not interception of telephone calls, but snooping on discussions of the FM with aides, confidantes etc.
4. FM asked the CBDT to do a sweep because he probably did not trust the IB. He could have suspected that IB was snooping on his conversations/discussions.
5. If his suspicion was correct, the IB would not have done it on its own. Must have been on orders. Who gave the order?
6.If not the IB (unlikely), could be only corporate houses or suspected parties in corruption cases through private detective agencies.
7. Too late to find the truth or reconstruct. One can only speculate.
May develop this into an article later in the day. No time now as I have an important engagement whole of today.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
CHINESE RESTRAINT HAS ITS LIMITS, VIETNAM CAUTIONED
B.RAMAN
Through articles in the Chinese Communist Party controlled media that appeared on June 20 and 21,2011, the Chinese authorities have clearly warned of the likely consequences of what they see as the increasingly assertive policy of the Government of Vietnam in the South China Sea.
2. A confrontational mood has been developing in the wake of a live-ammunition exercise held by the Vietnamese Navy in the disputed area. The exercise took place on June 13,2011, for six hours around the Hon Ong Island about 40 kilometres off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam. The island is about 250 kilometers away from the Xisha ( Paracel) Islands and 1,000 kilometers away from the Nansha (Spratly) Islands. Vietnam announced the exercise after accusing China of hindering the operation of a Vietnamese oil and gas exploration boat for the second time in two weeks.
3. On June 14, Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung issued a decree about a potential military call-up. The decree explained who would be exempt from military draft if a war broke out. The decree was signed by the Prime Minister at the request of the Ministry of Defence.
4. The same day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry clarified that China would not resort to the use of force in the South China Sea. Hong Lei, its spokesperson, said: "We will not resort to the use of force or the threat of force. We hope relevant countries will do more for peace and stability in the region."
5. But, on June 15, China sent one of its largest maritime surveillance ships, the Haixun 31, to Singapore through the South China Sea. The Chinese media reported that Haixun-31 intended to monitor shipping and "protect maritime security" on its way to Singapore.
6.Haixun 31, from the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, under the Ministry of Transport, sailed from Zhuhai in the Guangdong province. The 3,000-ton, helicopter-equipped ship will monitor shipping, carry out surveying duties, inspect oil wells and "protect maritime security", Xinhua said. It also said that the ship will inspect foreign vessels anchored or operating in Chinese waters.
7.On June 17, the Government-controlled “China Daily” published details of the Chinese Government’s plans to strengthen its maritime surveillance capability. According to these details, by 2020, a total of 15,000 personnel, compared with 9,000 now, will serve in the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) Force under the State Oceanic Administration. The CMS air arm will be increased to 16 planes and the patrol fleet will have 350 vessels by 2015 and 520 by 2020. Currently, it has nine aircraft, more than 260 surveillance vessels and 280 law enforcement vehicles.
8. The same day, the “People's Daily” said that maritime defense forces recently staged three days and nights of exercises in the South China Sea, without specifying exactly when or where. The drills involved a total of 14 patrol boats, landing craft and submarine hunting boats, along with two military aircraft.The aim was to refine antisubmarine, resupply and island defense capabilities.
9. On June 20, the “People’s Daily” carried the first warning to Vietnam in an article titled “Vietnam should wake up to Danger !” by its columnist Li Hongmei. It said: “China proposes to settle disputes through peaceful negotiations, but never fears challenges from outside. Moreover, China will never move an inch on its core interest of sovereignty and territorial integrity and will always stand up for that at any cost. Therefore, it is highly advisable for Vietnam to rein in its overreaching ambition over the South China Sea, and dim its hope pinned on the U.S., for the simple reason that once the U.S. feels its own interests threatened, it will readily sacrifice the interests of the Asian countries on the periphery of South China Sea.”
10.On June 21, the Party-owned “Global Times” carried the second warning to Vietnam in the following words: “Depending on how the situation develops, China has to be ready for two plans: negotiate with Vietnam for a peaceful solution, or answer the provocation with political, economic or even military counterstrikes. We have to be clear about the possibility of the second option, so as to let Vietnam remain sober about the South China Sea issue….Vietnam has been trapped in an unrealistic belief that as long as the US balances out the South China Sea issue, it can openly challenge China's sovereignty, and walk away with huge gains….Since a limited military conflict with China over the South China Sea in 1988, Vietnam has been increasingly aggressive in grabbing islands as its own, ignoring China's traditional policy of "shelving disputes and developing jointly." It is pushing the limits of China's national interest and dignity. China has to send a clear message that it will take whatever measures necessary to protect its interests in the South China Sea. If Vietnam continues to provoke China in this region, China will first deal with it with maritime police forces, and if necessary, strike back with naval forces….If Vietnam wants to start a war, China has the confidence to destroy invading Vietnam battleships, despite possible objections from the international community. The US may add some uncertainty in the South China Sea. China will handle this carefully, and is not likely to engage in a direct confrontation with the US.”
11.Despite the escalating war of words, there is no evidence so far that the two countries are actually preparing themselves for a military confrontation. Further developments need to be closely monitored. (21-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Through articles in the Chinese Communist Party controlled media that appeared on June 20 and 21,2011, the Chinese authorities have clearly warned of the likely consequences of what they see as the increasingly assertive policy of the Government of Vietnam in the South China Sea.
2. A confrontational mood has been developing in the wake of a live-ammunition exercise held by the Vietnamese Navy in the disputed area. The exercise took place on June 13,2011, for six hours around the Hon Ong Island about 40 kilometres off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam. The island is about 250 kilometers away from the Xisha ( Paracel) Islands and 1,000 kilometers away from the Nansha (Spratly) Islands. Vietnam announced the exercise after accusing China of hindering the operation of a Vietnamese oil and gas exploration boat for the second time in two weeks.
3. On June 14, Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung issued a decree about a potential military call-up. The decree explained who would be exempt from military draft if a war broke out. The decree was signed by the Prime Minister at the request of the Ministry of Defence.
4. The same day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry clarified that China would not resort to the use of force in the South China Sea. Hong Lei, its spokesperson, said: "We will not resort to the use of force or the threat of force. We hope relevant countries will do more for peace and stability in the region."
5. But, on June 15, China sent one of its largest maritime surveillance ships, the Haixun 31, to Singapore through the South China Sea. The Chinese media reported that Haixun-31 intended to monitor shipping and "protect maritime security" on its way to Singapore.
6.Haixun 31, from the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, under the Ministry of Transport, sailed from Zhuhai in the Guangdong province. The 3,000-ton, helicopter-equipped ship will monitor shipping, carry out surveying duties, inspect oil wells and "protect maritime security", Xinhua said. It also said that the ship will inspect foreign vessels anchored or operating in Chinese waters.
7.On June 17, the Government-controlled “China Daily” published details of the Chinese Government’s plans to strengthen its maritime surveillance capability. According to these details, by 2020, a total of 15,000 personnel, compared with 9,000 now, will serve in the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) Force under the State Oceanic Administration. The CMS air arm will be increased to 16 planes and the patrol fleet will have 350 vessels by 2015 and 520 by 2020. Currently, it has nine aircraft, more than 260 surveillance vessels and 280 law enforcement vehicles.
8. The same day, the “People's Daily” said that maritime defense forces recently staged three days and nights of exercises in the South China Sea, without specifying exactly when or where. The drills involved a total of 14 patrol boats, landing craft and submarine hunting boats, along with two military aircraft.The aim was to refine antisubmarine, resupply and island defense capabilities.
9. On June 20, the “People’s Daily” carried the first warning to Vietnam in an article titled “Vietnam should wake up to Danger !” by its columnist Li Hongmei. It said: “China proposes to settle disputes through peaceful negotiations, but never fears challenges from outside. Moreover, China will never move an inch on its core interest of sovereignty and territorial integrity and will always stand up for that at any cost. Therefore, it is highly advisable for Vietnam to rein in its overreaching ambition over the South China Sea, and dim its hope pinned on the U.S., for the simple reason that once the U.S. feels its own interests threatened, it will readily sacrifice the interests of the Asian countries on the periphery of South China Sea.”
10.On June 21, the Party-owned “Global Times” carried the second warning to Vietnam in the following words: “Depending on how the situation develops, China has to be ready for two plans: negotiate with Vietnam for a peaceful solution, or answer the provocation with political, economic or even military counterstrikes. We have to be clear about the possibility of the second option, so as to let Vietnam remain sober about the South China Sea issue….Vietnam has been trapped in an unrealistic belief that as long as the US balances out the South China Sea issue, it can openly challenge China's sovereignty, and walk away with huge gains….Since a limited military conflict with China over the South China Sea in 1988, Vietnam has been increasingly aggressive in grabbing islands as its own, ignoring China's traditional policy of "shelving disputes and developing jointly." It is pushing the limits of China's national interest and dignity. China has to send a clear message that it will take whatever measures necessary to protect its interests in the South China Sea. If Vietnam continues to provoke China in this region, China will first deal with it with maritime police forces, and if necessary, strike back with naval forces….If Vietnam wants to start a war, China has the confidence to destroy invading Vietnam battleships, despite possible objections from the international community. The US may add some uncertainty in the South China Sea. China will handle this carefully, and is not likely to engage in a direct confrontation with the US.”
11.Despite the escalating war of words, there is no evidence so far that the two countries are actually preparing themselves for a military confrontation. Further developments need to be closely monitored. (21-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, June 20, 2011
INDO-PAK FOREIGN SECRETARIES’ TALKS
B.RAMAN
Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India’s Foreign Secretary, and her Pakistani counterpart Mr.Salman Bashir are to meet at Islamabad on June 23 and 24,2011. The meeting is expected to review the results of the meetings between the Home/Interior, Commerce and Defence Secretaries of the two countries held since the two Foreign Secretaries met at Thimphu in the margins of a SAARC meeting in February last. It would also discuss issues that are generally dealt with at the FS level such as matters relating to Jammu & Kashmir, peace and security, confidence-building measures and terrorism.
2. The two Foreign Secretaries will be meeting three months after Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani met at Mohali in Punjab on March 30, at the time of the India-Pakistan cricket semi-final in the World Cup tournament.
3. After the Mohali meeting there was speculation that one or more friendly cricket matches between the teams of the two countries could be played in Pakistan and that Dr.Manmohan Singh could avail of this opportunity to visit Pakistan to witness one of the matches and hold talks with Mr.Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari. There has been no further development in relation to this speculation, but there are indications that the Indian Prime Minister would not like the Mohali meeting to remain a one-shot affair without follow-up. It is, therefore, likely that the next step in the Mohali process would come up for discussion at the meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries.
4. India’s expectations regarding time-bound action by Pakistan to have the Pakistan-based co-conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai tried and sentenced have been belied so far. The trial of those arrested is being adjourned repeatedly indicating a continuing lack of sincerity on Pakistan’s part in acting against them. Moreover, the recent trial in Chicago of Tahawur Hussain Rana of the Chicago Cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has brought out a wealth of additional evidence that the real masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes have not yet been arrested by the Pakistani authorities.
5. Though the US Justice Department failed to have Rana convicted by the jury on a charge of involvement in the 26/11 strikes, his admission and the evidence given by David Coleman Headley, also of Chicago, who helped the LET by collecting operational information from Mumbai to facilitate the terrorist strikes, have clearly assisted in the reconstruction of the 26/11 strikes and the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the LET in them.
6. Till now, the Pakistani authorities have questioned the veracity of the evidence of Rana and Headley and have shown no inclination to arrest and prosecute Sajjid Mir of the LET and others who had masterminded the terrorist strikes. The Pakistani authorities have also shown no willingness to arrest Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the leader of the LET, who continues to indulge in high profile anti-Indian rhetoric without being checked by the Pakistani authorities. Nor have they acted against his terrorist infrastructure based in Pakistan.
7. However, while the anti-India rhetoric by the LET from its safehaven in Pakistan continues, one notices a decline in its anti-India actions in Indian territory outside J&K. There has been no major terrorist strike in Indian territory outside J&K after the Pune explosion of February 2010. There have been no reports of the detection of any new sleeper cells of the LET of a worrisome nature.
8. The reported death (if true) of Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the so-called 313 Brigade of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), in a recent Drone (unmanned plane) strike of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in South Waziristan has brought an end to the career of a dreaded terrorist who had acted as a mentor to the LET and the HUJI and had closely interacted with Headley in an attempt to use him for a terrorist strike in Copenhagen which did not materialise. He had also threatened to organise further terrorist strikes in India and had developed a close association with Al Qaeda.
9. The absence of any major terrorist strike in Indian territory outside J&K since February 2010, the non-discovery of any worrisome ISI-trained sleeper cells infiltrated into India and the death of Ilyas indicate a qualitative change in the terrorist situation on the ground. The threat of fresh 26/11 style terrorist strikes remains, but there has been a non-materialisation of the threat. This could be attributed to the ISI and the terrorist organisations sponsored by it choosing to lie low till the memories of the 26/11 strikes and the ISI’s role in it fade before attempting any major new terrorist strike in Indian territory. The pressure exercised by the US on Pakistan to keep the anti-India jihadi elements under leash, even if they are not eliminated, has worked so far.
10. Under these circumstances, the Indian strategy at the FS-level talks has to be to keep up the pressure on Pakistan to act against the conspirators of the 26/11 strikes and to let the US and other members of the international community remain aware of the continuing threats faced by India from Pakistan without relaxing whatever little pressure they have been exercising on Pakistan.
11. A heightened focus on Pakistan’s foot-dragging in relation to terrorism would be necessary without over-doing it in a manner that might come in the way of the continuation of the Mohali process to which the Indian Prime Minister attaches importance.
12. The tentative engagement at the political level the beginning of which was seen at Mohali has to be made more substantive without letting Pakistan form a wrong impression that the pressure on it in respect of the ISI’s continued sponsorship of terrorism is now a matter of the past. Achieving this nuanced objective will be one of the tasks of the Indian FS.
13. There has been a talk for some time of encouraging an interface with the Pakistani Army and the ISI at the professional level in the hope of diluting their anti-India mindset and making them more amenable to ideas of co-operation and wean them away from their compulsive itch towards confrontation. Ideas as to whether it would be worthwhile attempting this and, if so, how to go about it have been under discussion for over a year without any forward movement. Hopes of a forward movement during the FS-level talks on peace and security are slim as at present, but one should note that such ideas are still under in-house discussion in New Delhi. They have not yet come out of the in-house stage despite discreet nudgings by the US from time to time.
14 The avoidable tensions and war of words between the naval authorities of the two countries in recent days in connection with action against Somali pirates who had captured an Egyptian vessel (MV Suez) commanded by a Pakistani mercantile marine officer and having among its crew six Indian seamen have drawn attention to the lack of confidence-building measures between the two navies and a mechanism for co-operation against the Somali pirates who are becoming more and more active and more and more daring.
15. A basket of naval confidence-building measures was under discussion between the authorities of the two countries before the 26/11 terrorist strikes, but these discussions came to a screeching halt after 26/11. There has been no attempt to re-start the engine of naval confidence-building. The pre-26/11 discussions mainly related to conventional confidence-building to prevent or avert possible misunderstandings or mishaps during naval exercises by the navies of the two countries. An exercise to revive these discussions and to expand their scope to co-ordinated action against the Somali pirates is likely to be among the new subjects to be broached by the two FSs. This would be in addition to a review of the existing nuclear confidence-building measures.
16. The need to strengthen nuclear confidence-building has assumed additional importance after last month’s commando-style raid by a group of terrorists into the headquarters of the Pakistani naval air arm (PNS Mehran) at Karachi during which they destroyed two Orion maritime surveillance aircraft given by the US to Pakistan. The ease with which the terrorists penetrated a supposedly heavily-guarded set-up of the Pakistan Navy has added to fears in the international community, including India, about the dangers of a similar penetration in a Pakistani nuclear set-up. It is doubtful whether the Pakistanis would be inclined to discuss this sensitive topic with their Indian counterparts. Despite this, India should discreetly flag its concerns in the matter so that, if not now, at least later, a greater political maturity on both sides would facilitate a discussion on such touch-me-not issues.
17. The Pakistani authorities would want a more than marginal discussion on matters relating to J&K to convince their public and military opinion that this continues to be an important issue in the basket handled by the two Foreign Secretaries. In this context, a review of the confidence-building measures agreed to in the past in order to strengthen and expand them is likely. India would be interested in a discussion on reports of large-scale presence of Chinese military and non-military engineers in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Kashmir presently under Pakistani occupation, but it is doubtful whether this would figure in any meaningful way. (20-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India’s Foreign Secretary, and her Pakistani counterpart Mr.Salman Bashir are to meet at Islamabad on June 23 and 24,2011. The meeting is expected to review the results of the meetings between the Home/Interior, Commerce and Defence Secretaries of the two countries held since the two Foreign Secretaries met at Thimphu in the margins of a SAARC meeting in February last. It would also discuss issues that are generally dealt with at the FS level such as matters relating to Jammu & Kashmir, peace and security, confidence-building measures and terrorism.
2. The two Foreign Secretaries will be meeting three months after Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani met at Mohali in Punjab on March 30, at the time of the India-Pakistan cricket semi-final in the World Cup tournament.
3. After the Mohali meeting there was speculation that one or more friendly cricket matches between the teams of the two countries could be played in Pakistan and that Dr.Manmohan Singh could avail of this opportunity to visit Pakistan to witness one of the matches and hold talks with Mr.Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari. There has been no further development in relation to this speculation, but there are indications that the Indian Prime Minister would not like the Mohali meeting to remain a one-shot affair without follow-up. It is, therefore, likely that the next step in the Mohali process would come up for discussion at the meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries.
4. India’s expectations regarding time-bound action by Pakistan to have the Pakistan-based co-conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai tried and sentenced have been belied so far. The trial of those arrested is being adjourned repeatedly indicating a continuing lack of sincerity on Pakistan’s part in acting against them. Moreover, the recent trial in Chicago of Tahawur Hussain Rana of the Chicago Cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has brought out a wealth of additional evidence that the real masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes have not yet been arrested by the Pakistani authorities.
5. Though the US Justice Department failed to have Rana convicted by the jury on a charge of involvement in the 26/11 strikes, his admission and the evidence given by David Coleman Headley, also of Chicago, who helped the LET by collecting operational information from Mumbai to facilitate the terrorist strikes, have clearly assisted in the reconstruction of the 26/11 strikes and the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the LET in them.
6. Till now, the Pakistani authorities have questioned the veracity of the evidence of Rana and Headley and have shown no inclination to arrest and prosecute Sajjid Mir of the LET and others who had masterminded the terrorist strikes. The Pakistani authorities have also shown no willingness to arrest Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the leader of the LET, who continues to indulge in high profile anti-Indian rhetoric without being checked by the Pakistani authorities. Nor have they acted against his terrorist infrastructure based in Pakistan.
7. However, while the anti-India rhetoric by the LET from its safehaven in Pakistan continues, one notices a decline in its anti-India actions in Indian territory outside J&K. There has been no major terrorist strike in Indian territory outside J&K after the Pune explosion of February 2010. There have been no reports of the detection of any new sleeper cells of the LET of a worrisome nature.
8. The reported death (if true) of Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the so-called 313 Brigade of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), in a recent Drone (unmanned plane) strike of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in South Waziristan has brought an end to the career of a dreaded terrorist who had acted as a mentor to the LET and the HUJI and had closely interacted with Headley in an attempt to use him for a terrorist strike in Copenhagen which did not materialise. He had also threatened to organise further terrorist strikes in India and had developed a close association with Al Qaeda.
9. The absence of any major terrorist strike in Indian territory outside J&K since February 2010, the non-discovery of any worrisome ISI-trained sleeper cells infiltrated into India and the death of Ilyas indicate a qualitative change in the terrorist situation on the ground. The threat of fresh 26/11 style terrorist strikes remains, but there has been a non-materialisation of the threat. This could be attributed to the ISI and the terrorist organisations sponsored by it choosing to lie low till the memories of the 26/11 strikes and the ISI’s role in it fade before attempting any major new terrorist strike in Indian territory. The pressure exercised by the US on Pakistan to keep the anti-India jihadi elements under leash, even if they are not eliminated, has worked so far.
10. Under these circumstances, the Indian strategy at the FS-level talks has to be to keep up the pressure on Pakistan to act against the conspirators of the 26/11 strikes and to let the US and other members of the international community remain aware of the continuing threats faced by India from Pakistan without relaxing whatever little pressure they have been exercising on Pakistan.
11. A heightened focus on Pakistan’s foot-dragging in relation to terrorism would be necessary without over-doing it in a manner that might come in the way of the continuation of the Mohali process to which the Indian Prime Minister attaches importance.
12. The tentative engagement at the political level the beginning of which was seen at Mohali has to be made more substantive without letting Pakistan form a wrong impression that the pressure on it in respect of the ISI’s continued sponsorship of terrorism is now a matter of the past. Achieving this nuanced objective will be one of the tasks of the Indian FS.
13. There has been a talk for some time of encouraging an interface with the Pakistani Army and the ISI at the professional level in the hope of diluting their anti-India mindset and making them more amenable to ideas of co-operation and wean them away from their compulsive itch towards confrontation. Ideas as to whether it would be worthwhile attempting this and, if so, how to go about it have been under discussion for over a year without any forward movement. Hopes of a forward movement during the FS-level talks on peace and security are slim as at present, but one should note that such ideas are still under in-house discussion in New Delhi. They have not yet come out of the in-house stage despite discreet nudgings by the US from time to time.
14 The avoidable tensions and war of words between the naval authorities of the two countries in recent days in connection with action against Somali pirates who had captured an Egyptian vessel (MV Suez) commanded by a Pakistani mercantile marine officer and having among its crew six Indian seamen have drawn attention to the lack of confidence-building measures between the two navies and a mechanism for co-operation against the Somali pirates who are becoming more and more active and more and more daring.
15. A basket of naval confidence-building measures was under discussion between the authorities of the two countries before the 26/11 terrorist strikes, but these discussions came to a screeching halt after 26/11. There has been no attempt to re-start the engine of naval confidence-building. The pre-26/11 discussions mainly related to conventional confidence-building to prevent or avert possible misunderstandings or mishaps during naval exercises by the navies of the two countries. An exercise to revive these discussions and to expand their scope to co-ordinated action against the Somali pirates is likely to be among the new subjects to be broached by the two FSs. This would be in addition to a review of the existing nuclear confidence-building measures.
16. The need to strengthen nuclear confidence-building has assumed additional importance after last month’s commando-style raid by a group of terrorists into the headquarters of the Pakistani naval air arm (PNS Mehran) at Karachi during which they destroyed two Orion maritime surveillance aircraft given by the US to Pakistan. The ease with which the terrorists penetrated a supposedly heavily-guarded set-up of the Pakistan Navy has added to fears in the international community, including India, about the dangers of a similar penetration in a Pakistani nuclear set-up. It is doubtful whether the Pakistanis would be inclined to discuss this sensitive topic with their Indian counterparts. Despite this, India should discreetly flag its concerns in the matter so that, if not now, at least later, a greater political maturity on both sides would facilitate a discussion on such touch-me-not issues.
17. The Pakistani authorities would want a more than marginal discussion on matters relating to J&K to convince their public and military opinion that this continues to be an important issue in the basket handled by the two Foreign Secretaries. In this context, a review of the confidence-building measures agreed to in the past in order to strengthen and expand them is likely. India would be interested in a discussion on reports of large-scale presence of Chinese military and non-military engineers in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Kashmir presently under Pakistani occupation, but it is doubtful whether this would figure in any meaningful way. (20-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
Sunday, June 19, 2011
DEALING WITH SOMALI PIRACY: STILL GROPING IN THE DARK
B.RAMAN
(To be read in continuation of my article of April 19,2011, titled “Somali Pirates Say They Are At War With India” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers45/paper4432.html )
We are still groping in the dark in matters relating to action against the Somali pirates, who are more and more active despite all the preventive patrolling, more and more venturesome coming closer and closer to our waters and more and more difficult to handle with neither prevention nor cure in sight in the near and medium-term future.
2.Any comprehensive strategy to deal with the menace has to have the following dimensions:
(a).Preventive through naval patrolling in the waters where the pirates operate.
(b).Protective by strengthening our coastal defence to prevent their venturing out towards our coast.
( c ).Pre-emptive by identifying their rear bases in Somalia and neutralising them.
(d).Tactical for dealing with hostage situations where they succeed in hijacking ships with Indian crew despite our preventive measures.
(e ).Investigative for investigating and prosecuting pirates involved in the hijacking of ships.
(f). Co-operative for co-ordinating our actions with those of other States equally affected by the menace.
3. What are the ground or sea realities more than two years after we realised that the evil confronting us in the waters to the West of us was more serious than that in the waters to the East of us? The preventive patrolling by navies of different countries has not denied the pirates the availability of pockets where they can still pounce on unsuspecting ships and hijack them. This is because of a lack of co-ordination in patrolling. As a result, the entire sea stretch is not covered effectively. I had pointed out in the past the importance of co-ordination among the navies of India, China, Japan, Singapore,Pakistan and South Korea to remove such pockets and cover gaps. Nothing has been done in this direction. Partly due to our own reluctance to give any role to the navies of China and Pakistan. We have to get over this mental reservation. Otherwise, the preventive measures will remain only partially effective
4.The protective measures seem to be producing results as seen by the success of our Coast Guard in intercepting Somali pirates moving towards our waters and detaining them. It is the effectiveness of our protective measures that has added to the anti-Indian anger of the pirates and the hardening of their stand during negotiations for the release of captured Indian sailors. If we want our Coast Guard to be tough in preventing the pirates from approaching our coastal waters, we must be prepared to face difficulties in securing the release of our sailors captured and held hostage in distant waters. Pakistan does not face this difficulty because its Navy does not arrest, detain and seek to prosecute Somali pirates. We do. It is unfair to project our Navy and Coast Guard in negative colours without understanding the constraints under which they operate.
5. Pre-emption has been a non-starter because the international community---not even the US---is in a position now to undertake this. The position has been rendered more difficult by the influence and activities of Al Qaeda in Somalia.
6.Our tactical response to hostage situations is still unsatisfactory. This is not surprising. It took the international community five years or even more to find an effective tactical response to hostage situations on the ground or on board hijacked aircraft. It could take us even longer to find a workable tactical response to hostage situations on the high seas. Tiring out hostage-takers will be more difficult and will take a much longer time when the hostages are held on board a ship on the high seas than on board an aircraft parked in an airport or in a building. Successful commando action to free the hostages would be more difficult on the high seas than on the ground. The delay in the rescue of the six Indian seamen who were caught up on board a hijacked Egyptian ship MV Suez, captained by a Pakistani officer, which has led to an unfortunate war of words between India and Pakistan, could be partly attributed to the dilemma faced by India due to its action in detaining some suspected Somali pirates found in waters near our shore. Their detention has generally hardened the attitude of the Somali pirates as a whole to India and has created difficulties in our negotiations with pirates holding Indian hostages. While the Pakistani authorities have to be generously thanked for their help in getting the Indian hostages released through the intermediary of a Pakistani humanitarian relief organisation, any criticism of the failure of the Indian Navy to get them released would be uncalled for. Without co-operation among the navies of affected countries any tactical response is bound to remain unsatisfactory.
7. The investigative dimension is being tried out by us only for the last few months after the detention of some Somali pirates. The media had recently reported that due to the hardening of the attitude of the Somali pirates towards India, the Government of India was re-examining its policy of detaining and prosecuting Somali pirates caught in the vicinity of our waters. Such a re-examination will be unwise and will convey a wrong message to the pirates that India is amenable to pressure.
8.In the light of the criticism of the delay in securing the release of the Indian seamen held hostage on board MV Suez and the unfortunate war of words between India and Pakistan, the time has come to re-visit out counter-piracy strategy from two angles. The first is our national capability for dealing with hostage situations----whether in near or far-away waters--- and our ability for commando action if negotiations fail. Not only India, but other countries too have been facing difficulties in dealing with hostage situations where the ship belongs to another country. If the ship flies the Indian flag, there is no problem. If it flies the flag of another country, we have to seek the consent of the Government of that country before we can act.
9. The Pakistan Navy faces some advantages in dealing with the Somali pirates. The influence of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan is very strong in Somalia. They can seek the assistance of the TJ and other organisations close to it for establishing contact with the pirates and seeking the release of the hostages. We do not have this advantage. It is very difficult for us to initiate negotiations with the pirates. How do we get over this difficulty?
10. The second angle relates to setting up a structured co-operative mechanism involving the navies of India, China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Pakistan for strengthening preventive patrolling and for evolving a mechanism for mutual assistance in dealing with hostage situations. India should take the initiative for bringing together senior officers of the navies and Coast Guards of these countries for a brain-storming on setting up a regional counter-piracy organisation. We should not allow our unsatisfactory over-all relations with Pakistan to stand in the way of such an initiative. This subject can be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan in Islamabad.(19-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
(To be read in continuation of my article of April 19,2011, titled “Somali Pirates Say They Are At War With India” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers45/paper4432.html )
We are still groping in the dark in matters relating to action against the Somali pirates, who are more and more active despite all the preventive patrolling, more and more venturesome coming closer and closer to our waters and more and more difficult to handle with neither prevention nor cure in sight in the near and medium-term future.
2.Any comprehensive strategy to deal with the menace has to have the following dimensions:
(a).Preventive through naval patrolling in the waters where the pirates operate.
(b).Protective by strengthening our coastal defence to prevent their venturing out towards our coast.
( c ).Pre-emptive by identifying their rear bases in Somalia and neutralising them.
(d).Tactical for dealing with hostage situations where they succeed in hijacking ships with Indian crew despite our preventive measures.
(e ).Investigative for investigating and prosecuting pirates involved in the hijacking of ships.
(f). Co-operative for co-ordinating our actions with those of other States equally affected by the menace.
3. What are the ground or sea realities more than two years after we realised that the evil confronting us in the waters to the West of us was more serious than that in the waters to the East of us? The preventive patrolling by navies of different countries has not denied the pirates the availability of pockets where they can still pounce on unsuspecting ships and hijack them. This is because of a lack of co-ordination in patrolling. As a result, the entire sea stretch is not covered effectively. I had pointed out in the past the importance of co-ordination among the navies of India, China, Japan, Singapore,Pakistan and South Korea to remove such pockets and cover gaps. Nothing has been done in this direction. Partly due to our own reluctance to give any role to the navies of China and Pakistan. We have to get over this mental reservation. Otherwise, the preventive measures will remain only partially effective
4.The protective measures seem to be producing results as seen by the success of our Coast Guard in intercepting Somali pirates moving towards our waters and detaining them. It is the effectiveness of our protective measures that has added to the anti-Indian anger of the pirates and the hardening of their stand during negotiations for the release of captured Indian sailors. If we want our Coast Guard to be tough in preventing the pirates from approaching our coastal waters, we must be prepared to face difficulties in securing the release of our sailors captured and held hostage in distant waters. Pakistan does not face this difficulty because its Navy does not arrest, detain and seek to prosecute Somali pirates. We do. It is unfair to project our Navy and Coast Guard in negative colours without understanding the constraints under which they operate.
5. Pre-emption has been a non-starter because the international community---not even the US---is in a position now to undertake this. The position has been rendered more difficult by the influence and activities of Al Qaeda in Somalia.
6.Our tactical response to hostage situations is still unsatisfactory. This is not surprising. It took the international community five years or even more to find an effective tactical response to hostage situations on the ground or on board hijacked aircraft. It could take us even longer to find a workable tactical response to hostage situations on the high seas. Tiring out hostage-takers will be more difficult and will take a much longer time when the hostages are held on board a ship on the high seas than on board an aircraft parked in an airport or in a building. Successful commando action to free the hostages would be more difficult on the high seas than on the ground. The delay in the rescue of the six Indian seamen who were caught up on board a hijacked Egyptian ship MV Suez, captained by a Pakistani officer, which has led to an unfortunate war of words between India and Pakistan, could be partly attributed to the dilemma faced by India due to its action in detaining some suspected Somali pirates found in waters near our shore. Their detention has generally hardened the attitude of the Somali pirates as a whole to India and has created difficulties in our negotiations with pirates holding Indian hostages. While the Pakistani authorities have to be generously thanked for their help in getting the Indian hostages released through the intermediary of a Pakistani humanitarian relief organisation, any criticism of the failure of the Indian Navy to get them released would be uncalled for. Without co-operation among the navies of affected countries any tactical response is bound to remain unsatisfactory.
7. The investigative dimension is being tried out by us only for the last few months after the detention of some Somali pirates. The media had recently reported that due to the hardening of the attitude of the Somali pirates towards India, the Government of India was re-examining its policy of detaining and prosecuting Somali pirates caught in the vicinity of our waters. Such a re-examination will be unwise and will convey a wrong message to the pirates that India is amenable to pressure.
8.In the light of the criticism of the delay in securing the release of the Indian seamen held hostage on board MV Suez and the unfortunate war of words between India and Pakistan, the time has come to re-visit out counter-piracy strategy from two angles. The first is our national capability for dealing with hostage situations----whether in near or far-away waters--- and our ability for commando action if negotiations fail. Not only India, but other countries too have been facing difficulties in dealing with hostage situations where the ship belongs to another country. If the ship flies the Indian flag, there is no problem. If it flies the flag of another country, we have to seek the consent of the Government of that country before we can act.
9. The Pakistan Navy faces some advantages in dealing with the Somali pirates. The influence of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan is very strong in Somalia. They can seek the assistance of the TJ and other organisations close to it for establishing contact with the pirates and seeking the release of the hostages. We do not have this advantage. It is very difficult for us to initiate negotiations with the pirates. How do we get over this difficulty?
10. The second angle relates to setting up a structured co-operative mechanism involving the navies of India, China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Pakistan for strengthening preventive patrolling and for evolving a mechanism for mutual assistance in dealing with hostage situations. India should take the initiative for bringing together senior officers of the navies and Coast Guards of these countries for a brain-storming on setting up a regional counter-piracy organisation. We should not allow our unsatisfactory over-all relations with Pakistan to stand in the way of such an initiative. This subject can be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan in Islamabad.(19-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, June 17, 2011
CAN THERE BE A REVOLT AGAINST GEN KAYANI?
B.RAMAN
Can there be a revolt against Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), either by the subalterns or by senior officers due to their unhappiness over his perceived/alleged amenability to US pressure?
2. There has been an interesting and exciting debate on this question in the wake of the publication of a report by the “New York Times” (June 15,2011) bearing on this subject.
3. Anti-US anger in Pakistan---in the streets as well as in the barracks---is nothing new. It has always been there right from the 1950s when it enthusiastically joined the US-sponsored regional military pacts.
4. Pakistani leaders---civil as well as military--- had given a free play to this anger in order to extract more assistance from the US without letting this anger become uncontrollable. Using anti-US anger without letting themselves be burnt by it--this has become a fine art in Pakistan.
5.The anti-US anger being seen in Pakistan since the beginning of this year due to the surge in the US drone strikes in the tribal areas, the increase in the presence of US intelligence officers and Special Forces commandos in Pakistani territory and the unilateral and clandestine raid by the US Naval commandos at the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 is not a new phenomenon. It is a re-enactment of an old phenomenon.
6. The only thing new this time is that this anger has been accompanied by feelings of humiliation in the public as well as in the barracks over the perceived disregard by the US of Pakistani sensitivities relating to the repeated violations of its sovereignty.
7. Pakistani leaders have never had any qualms over letting themselves be used by the US in a manner designed to serve US interests provided the payment for such use was adequate. They had let themselves be used by the US for its U-2 flights over the USSR. They had let themselves be used by the US for monitoring Chinese nuclear tests in Lop Nor. They had let themselves be used by the US against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. They are letting themselves be used by the US in the post-9/11 war against terrorism emanating from the Af-Pak region.
8.Fears of public anger never inhibited the actions of the Pakistani military leadership in entering into a quid pro quo relationship with the US provided the compensation and benefit to Pakistan were adequate.
9. What is worrying the Pakistani military leadership this time are the feelings of national humiliation caused partly by the unilateral nature of some of the US decisions and operations. The frequency of such unilateral decisions and actions by the US has been dictated by the growing distrust of Pakistan’s sincerity in counter-terrorism.
10.Gen.Pervez Musharraf was more sensitive to the US interests and more accommodating to US demands than Kayani. He readily agreed ---without ever dragging his feet--- to many of the requests that emanated from the George Bush Administration. He shifted senior Lt.Gens and a chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence because the US viewed them with suspicion as close to the Afghan Taliban, he allowed the US Air Force to use Pakistani bases in Balochistan for mounting rescue operations in Afghanistan, he permitted an immense increase in the US intelligence presence in Pakistani territory, he agreed to US intelligence and investigating officers accompanying joint teams of the ISI and the police when they raided suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda operatives in places such as Faislabad, Karachi and Rawalpindi, he enforced restrictions on the admission of foreign students in the madrasas, he allowed the movement of logistic supplies to the NATO troops in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory, he facilitated the interrogation of two retired senior Pakistani nuclear scientists by the US, he placed A.Q.Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, under house arrest after the discovery of his proliferation activities by the US and he ordered his intelligence and investigating agencies to informally hand over hundreds of terrorism suspects to the US for rendition and interrogation in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre and other places without following the due process of the law.
11. These actions of Musharraf caused anger at the lower levels of the Pakistani Armed Forces which triggered off three unsuccessful attempts to kill him---once in Karachi through an explosive device which malfunctioned and twice in Rawalpindi through commando-style ambushes that failed. But the anger at the lower levels in the barracks was kept under control by the commissioned officers and core commanders who remained loyal to Musharraf despite whatever misgivings they might have had in their mind about the wisdom of his unreserved co-operation with the US. Even senior Lts-General whose promotion chances were stymied by Musharraf’s continuing to hold the post of the Chief of the Army Staff, never wavered in their loyalty to him.
12. A chief is a chief right or wrong for most in the Pakistan Army. There have been plots in the past, but these plots failed because of the failure of the plotters to enlist widespread support against the chief. Have things become different under Kayani? I find it difficult to accept this on the basis of the currently available information.
13. Yes, Kayani co-operated with the US, but not as extensively as Musharraf did. Yes, there is anger against Kayani at the lower levels, but he has never been the target of a serious assassination attempt as Musharraf repeatedly was. Yes, there is a feeling of humiliation in the Army as there never was when Musharraf was the chief, but there are no signs that this humiliation has reached a critical point or could do so.
14. Yes, Kayani could face threats of assassination, but could he face the threat of being overthrown by his own officers? I am doubtful in my mind for the present. We should resist the urge to over-assess Pakistan—positively or negatively. (18-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Can there be a revolt against Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), either by the subalterns or by senior officers due to their unhappiness over his perceived/alleged amenability to US pressure?
2. There has been an interesting and exciting debate on this question in the wake of the publication of a report by the “New York Times” (June 15,2011) bearing on this subject.
3. Anti-US anger in Pakistan---in the streets as well as in the barracks---is nothing new. It has always been there right from the 1950s when it enthusiastically joined the US-sponsored regional military pacts.
4. Pakistani leaders---civil as well as military--- had given a free play to this anger in order to extract more assistance from the US without letting this anger become uncontrollable. Using anti-US anger without letting themselves be burnt by it--this has become a fine art in Pakistan.
5.The anti-US anger being seen in Pakistan since the beginning of this year due to the surge in the US drone strikes in the tribal areas, the increase in the presence of US intelligence officers and Special Forces commandos in Pakistani territory and the unilateral and clandestine raid by the US Naval commandos at the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 is not a new phenomenon. It is a re-enactment of an old phenomenon.
6. The only thing new this time is that this anger has been accompanied by feelings of humiliation in the public as well as in the barracks over the perceived disregard by the US of Pakistani sensitivities relating to the repeated violations of its sovereignty.
7. Pakistani leaders have never had any qualms over letting themselves be used by the US in a manner designed to serve US interests provided the payment for such use was adequate. They had let themselves be used by the US for its U-2 flights over the USSR. They had let themselves be used by the US for monitoring Chinese nuclear tests in Lop Nor. They had let themselves be used by the US against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. They are letting themselves be used by the US in the post-9/11 war against terrorism emanating from the Af-Pak region.
8.Fears of public anger never inhibited the actions of the Pakistani military leadership in entering into a quid pro quo relationship with the US provided the compensation and benefit to Pakistan were adequate.
9. What is worrying the Pakistani military leadership this time are the feelings of national humiliation caused partly by the unilateral nature of some of the US decisions and operations. The frequency of such unilateral decisions and actions by the US has been dictated by the growing distrust of Pakistan’s sincerity in counter-terrorism.
10.Gen.Pervez Musharraf was more sensitive to the US interests and more accommodating to US demands than Kayani. He readily agreed ---without ever dragging his feet--- to many of the requests that emanated from the George Bush Administration. He shifted senior Lt.Gens and a chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence because the US viewed them with suspicion as close to the Afghan Taliban, he allowed the US Air Force to use Pakistani bases in Balochistan for mounting rescue operations in Afghanistan, he permitted an immense increase in the US intelligence presence in Pakistani territory, he agreed to US intelligence and investigating officers accompanying joint teams of the ISI and the police when they raided suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda operatives in places such as Faislabad, Karachi and Rawalpindi, he enforced restrictions on the admission of foreign students in the madrasas, he allowed the movement of logistic supplies to the NATO troops in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory, he facilitated the interrogation of two retired senior Pakistani nuclear scientists by the US, he placed A.Q.Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, under house arrest after the discovery of his proliferation activities by the US and he ordered his intelligence and investigating agencies to informally hand over hundreds of terrorism suspects to the US for rendition and interrogation in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre and other places without following the due process of the law.
11. These actions of Musharraf caused anger at the lower levels of the Pakistani Armed Forces which triggered off three unsuccessful attempts to kill him---once in Karachi through an explosive device which malfunctioned and twice in Rawalpindi through commando-style ambushes that failed. But the anger at the lower levels in the barracks was kept under control by the commissioned officers and core commanders who remained loyal to Musharraf despite whatever misgivings they might have had in their mind about the wisdom of his unreserved co-operation with the US. Even senior Lts-General whose promotion chances were stymied by Musharraf’s continuing to hold the post of the Chief of the Army Staff, never wavered in their loyalty to him.
12. A chief is a chief right or wrong for most in the Pakistan Army. There have been plots in the past, but these plots failed because of the failure of the plotters to enlist widespread support against the chief. Have things become different under Kayani? I find it difficult to accept this on the basis of the currently available information.
13. Yes, Kayani co-operated with the US, but not as extensively as Musharraf did. Yes, there is anger against Kayani at the lower levels, but he has never been the target of a serious assassination attempt as Musharraf repeatedly was. Yes, there is a feeling of humiliation in the Army as there never was when Musharraf was the chief, but there are no signs that this humiliation has reached a critical point or could do so.
14. Yes, Kayani could face threats of assassination, but could he face the threat of being overthrown by his own officers? I am doubtful in my mind for the present. We should resist the urge to over-assess Pakistan—positively or negatively. (18-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, June 16, 2011
SRI LANKAN TAMILS: A DISCONCERTING SITUATION FOR INDIA
B.RAMAN
My attention has been drawn to a disturbing documentary titled “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” produced by Mr.Jon Snow of the Channel4 TV channel of the UK.
2.The documentary highlights the results of a forensic investigation into the bloody culmination phase of the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Security Forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in April-May,2009. It alleges that the culmination phase, which physically wiped out the leadership of the LTTE for which no right-thinking person opposed to terrorism need shed tears, was also marked by executions, shelling of civilians and other atrocities carried out by the Security Forces. The documentary is available at http://bit.ly/mDpkez .
3. In the culmination phase, the Sri Lankan Security Forces did face a cruel dilemma because the ruthless leadership of the LTTE headed by Prabakaran was making a last-ditch effort to save itself from capture or killing by taking shelter in the midst of civilian refugees. It was not an opportunistic tactic in the face of the mounting pressure from the Security Forces. It was a consciously-planned tactic of Prabakaran to force the international community to intervene by creating a situation in which hundreds of civilians were used as cannon fodder in a futile attempt to save the LTTE leadership from extinction.
4.After the operation ended with the elimination of the LTTE leadership and the collapse of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, there was a spate of allegations from well-reputed international human rights organisations, humanitarian workers, representatives of Western Governments and UN officials ---many of whom often levelled the allegations independently of each other and not in a concerted campaign--- that the Sri Lankan Security Forces could not escape their share of the blame for the large-scale violations of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamil civilians living in the operational area under the control of the LTTE.
5.Two kinds of violations were alleged. Firstly, that the leaders of the LTTE, including Prabakaran, wanted to surrender but were not given an opportunity to do so, but instead were physically eliminated. Secondly, that the Security Forces consciously used disproportionate force with light, medium and heavy weapons knowing fully well that such use could kill many civilians. Protecting the civilians caught was not on the agenda of either the LTTE or the Security Forces.
6. These allegations have been accompanied by demands for an independent international enquiry under the auspices of the UN to determine the truth and for action against the officers of the Security Forces and others found responsible for the violations --- in a manner satisfactory to the international community. It has been alleged that some of the atrocities amounted to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
7. The Sri Lankan Government headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa has strongly and consistently denied these allegations. While it admits the possibility that there might have been some violations to determine which it has been holding its own enquiry, it has indignantly refuted the allegations that the violations were of such a serious nature as to call for international intervention and action.
8. Unfortunately, human rights violations are rarely avoided in counter-insurgency situations however much the Security Forces try to do so. Terrorist and insurgent organisations train themselves well in creating situations where human rights violations do occur in order to seek the intervention of the international community.
9. What distinguishes a civilised and responsible Government sensitive to the rights of its civilians from a Government which is totally insensitive to the human rights dimensions of counter-insurgency operations is that the former takes cognisance of the allegations instead of summarily rejecting them, enquires into them and takes the follow-up action warranted by the results of the enquiry.
10. That is what the Sri Lankan Government has promised to do. Should it be trusted to do justice to the Sri Lankan Tamils or should it be distrusted and pressured to let the enquiry and follow-up action be handled by an international mechanism set up under the auspices of the UN?
11. While there were obviously serious violations, evidence available till now do not bear out the stand of those who accuse the Rajapaksa Government of violations amounting to crimes against humanity or war crimes.
12. In our anxiety and sympathy for the legitimate rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils, we should not exaggerate or over-state our arguments in support of or against an international enquiry. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora which has been active in demanding an international enquiry has stepped up its pressure on Governments and non-Governmental personalities, including reputed journalists of India and other countries, to take cognisance of the forensic evidence collected by the documentary and support the demand for an international enquiry.
13. The Government of India should pay serious attention to the alleged evidence produced by the documentary and have it examined by our legal and humanitarian experts in order to see whether the documentary needs to be taken up officially and at the bilateral level with the Government of Sri Lanka and, if so, in what manner and for what objective.
14. The objective should be to ensure that justice is done to the relatives of the victims and that the honour of the victims is respected even if it be posthumously. It should not be to use the documentary as a stick to beat the SL Government with.
15. The Rajapaksa Government will facilitate a more meaningful Indian role in calming the feelings of indignation and concern of the Sri Lankan Tamils if it handles the documentary with the seriousness it deserves. Inaction is not an option for the Government of India. But action should be within acceptable limits of our bilateral relations with Sri Lanka and should not be overdone.(20-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
My attention has been drawn to a disturbing documentary titled “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” produced by Mr.Jon Snow of the Channel4 TV channel of the UK.
2.The documentary highlights the results of a forensic investigation into the bloody culmination phase of the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Security Forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in April-May,2009. It alleges that the culmination phase, which physically wiped out the leadership of the LTTE for which no right-thinking person opposed to terrorism need shed tears, was also marked by executions, shelling of civilians and other atrocities carried out by the Security Forces. The documentary is available at http://bit.ly/mDpkez .
3. In the culmination phase, the Sri Lankan Security Forces did face a cruel dilemma because the ruthless leadership of the LTTE headed by Prabakaran was making a last-ditch effort to save itself from capture or killing by taking shelter in the midst of civilian refugees. It was not an opportunistic tactic in the face of the mounting pressure from the Security Forces. It was a consciously-planned tactic of Prabakaran to force the international community to intervene by creating a situation in which hundreds of civilians were used as cannon fodder in a futile attempt to save the LTTE leadership from extinction.
4.After the operation ended with the elimination of the LTTE leadership and the collapse of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, there was a spate of allegations from well-reputed international human rights organisations, humanitarian workers, representatives of Western Governments and UN officials ---many of whom often levelled the allegations independently of each other and not in a concerted campaign--- that the Sri Lankan Security Forces could not escape their share of the blame for the large-scale violations of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamil civilians living in the operational area under the control of the LTTE.
5.Two kinds of violations were alleged. Firstly, that the leaders of the LTTE, including Prabakaran, wanted to surrender but were not given an opportunity to do so, but instead were physically eliminated. Secondly, that the Security Forces consciously used disproportionate force with light, medium and heavy weapons knowing fully well that such use could kill many civilians. Protecting the civilians caught was not on the agenda of either the LTTE or the Security Forces.
6. These allegations have been accompanied by demands for an independent international enquiry under the auspices of the UN to determine the truth and for action against the officers of the Security Forces and others found responsible for the violations --- in a manner satisfactory to the international community. It has been alleged that some of the atrocities amounted to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
7. The Sri Lankan Government headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa has strongly and consistently denied these allegations. While it admits the possibility that there might have been some violations to determine which it has been holding its own enquiry, it has indignantly refuted the allegations that the violations were of such a serious nature as to call for international intervention and action.
8. Unfortunately, human rights violations are rarely avoided in counter-insurgency situations however much the Security Forces try to do so. Terrorist and insurgent organisations train themselves well in creating situations where human rights violations do occur in order to seek the intervention of the international community.
9. What distinguishes a civilised and responsible Government sensitive to the rights of its civilians from a Government which is totally insensitive to the human rights dimensions of counter-insurgency operations is that the former takes cognisance of the allegations instead of summarily rejecting them, enquires into them and takes the follow-up action warranted by the results of the enquiry.
10. That is what the Sri Lankan Government has promised to do. Should it be trusted to do justice to the Sri Lankan Tamils or should it be distrusted and pressured to let the enquiry and follow-up action be handled by an international mechanism set up under the auspices of the UN?
11. While there were obviously serious violations, evidence available till now do not bear out the stand of those who accuse the Rajapaksa Government of violations amounting to crimes against humanity or war crimes.
12. In our anxiety and sympathy for the legitimate rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils, we should not exaggerate or over-state our arguments in support of or against an international enquiry. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora which has been active in demanding an international enquiry has stepped up its pressure on Governments and non-Governmental personalities, including reputed journalists of India and other countries, to take cognisance of the forensic evidence collected by the documentary and support the demand for an international enquiry.
13. The Government of India should pay serious attention to the alleged evidence produced by the documentary and have it examined by our legal and humanitarian experts in order to see whether the documentary needs to be taken up officially and at the bilateral level with the Government of Sri Lanka and, if so, in what manner and for what objective.
14. The objective should be to ensure that justice is done to the relatives of the victims and that the honour of the victims is respected even if it be posthumously. It should not be to use the documentary as a stick to beat the SL Government with.
15. The Rajapaksa Government will facilitate a more meaningful Indian role in calming the feelings of indignation and concern of the Sri Lankan Tamils if it handles the documentary with the seriousness it deserves. Inaction is not an option for the Government of India. But action should be within acceptable limits of our bilateral relations with Sri Lanka and should not be overdone.(20-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
AL-ZAWAHIRI: ADVOCATE OF GLOBAL JIHADI INTIFADA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO. 728
B. Raman
Six weeks after the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2,2011, Al Qaeda’s General Command has announced the appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri, of Egypt, who was OBL’s No.2, as the new head of Al Qaeda. A statement announcing his appointment was posted on a website associated with Al Qaeda. It was attributed to the General Command. It said: "Sheikh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, may God guide him, assumed responsibility as the group's Amir [leader]". It vowed that under Zawahiri, Al Qaeda would pursue jihad against the US and Israel "until all invading armies leave the land of Islam".
2. Earlier, on May 18,2011, quoting Pakistani security sources, Al Jazeera had reported that Al Qaeda had appointed Saif al-Adel, formerly of the Egyptian Army, as its interim leader and Mohammed Mustafa al-Yemeni as its operations chief .Al Jazeera had said: "According to the sources, the decision (on the appointments) was made at a meeting on May 10 on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border."
3.According to Al Jazeera, Adnan al-Khairi al-Masri was named as Al Qaeda's general command head, Mohammed Nasser al-Wahshi as its Africa chief, Mohammed Adam Khan, an Afghan, as in charge in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Fahd al-Iraqi as in charge of the Afghan-Pakistani border region.
4. Since the earlier report had emanated from Pakistani sources there was some doubt about its reliability. The latest statement regarding the appointment of Zawahiri as the head was posted in one of the web sites used by Al Qaeda for such announcements and hence appears to be more authentic.
5. Saif al-Adel was said to have been a critic of OBL’s arbitrary ways of taking important operational decisions and had reportedly questioned the wisdom of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland since those strikes, according to him, enabled the US to mobilise the international community against Al Qaeda.
6. The latest statement of Al Qaeda regarding the appointment of Zawahiri is silent on the earlier appointments as announced by Al Jazeera on the basis of information provided by Pakistani sources.
7.Zawahiri has been advocating since February 12,2007, a global jihadi Intifada, which would cover all lands in the world, which rightfully belong to Islam.
8.However, he specifies certain areas, which he thinks should receive special attention first. Of these, he gives the topmost priority to Afghanistan and Iraq. He says the future of Islam and of the global Intifada itself will be decided in those countries. If they can defeat the Americans there, the jihadis' victory in the rest of the lands will be assured. After mentioning these two countries, he mentions certain other areas specifically. He believes that the victory of the jihadis in these areas would also be crucial for the ultimate victory of Islam. These areas are Palestine, including Gaza, the Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria and Chechnya in Russia. He describes Somalia as the Southern garrison of Islam and Algeria as its Western garrison.
9. His past statements had included Jammu and Kashmir as among historic Muslim lands under occupation by non-Muslims and hence to be “liberated”. He had drawn the attention of the Pakistani people to the danger of Gen.Pervez Musharraf colluding with the Hindus if he was not removed from power. However, he had not spoken of the Muslims living in other parts of India outside J&K.
10.By Jihadi Intifada, he means a kind of struggle in which the role of motivated individual Muslims will become more important than that of organisations so that the weakening or collapse of an organisation does not result in a collapse of the Intifada. He wants the Intifada to acquire a momentum of its own as a result of the sacrifices of individual Muslims.
11.He said in his message of January 22, 2007: "Every Muslim today is directly responsible for defending Islam, Islam’s homeland and the Islamic Ummah and he is responsible for the efforts to liberate the Muslim captives foremost of whom is Sheikh Omar Abdl al-Rahman from the prisons of the crusaders and their helpers and we reaffirm to the families of the Guantanamo captives who are demonstrating these days in Cuba, that we –with God’s permission-- have not and will not forget our captives and that their liberation is a debt on our necks and that the Americans must expect to pay the price for everything they have done to them."
12. In his past statements, he downplayed the importance of a central command and control in keeping the Intifada going. The motivation of individual Muslims was more important than any centralised command and control.
13.He also projects the Intifada as a mix of military and non-military struggles. He says in his message of December 20, 2006: "We must bear arms. And if we are unable to bear them, then we must support those who carry them. This support comes in many forms and guises, so we must exploit all Da’wah, student and union activities to back the Jihadi resistance....... The Muslim Ummah must exploit all methods of popular protest, like demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing to provide the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who supply the Crusader forces, boycotting Crusader and Jewish products, and other ways of popular protest."
14. The importance of the role of individual Muslims has been re-emphasised in a video circulated by the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda on June 8,2011.This video is a collation of messages issued by Zawahiri, Adam Gadahn, the American convert to Islam, who heads the propaganda wing, Atiya Abdel Rahman (Libyan operations chief of Al Qaeda, who was allegedly a key aide to bin Laden when he was hiding in Abbottabad)and Abu Laith Al-Libi.
15. In his message, Adam Gadahn , who spoke in English, said: “Muslims living in the US are perfectly placed to play an important and decisive part in the jihad against the Zionists and Crusaders.” He told them how easy it was to buy automatic assault weapons at gun shows without any identification.
16. Hinting at a policy of targeted individual assassinations of important Governmental and non-Governmental leaders, he said: “It’s important that we weaken our cowardly enemies’ will to fight by targeting influential public figures in Crusader and Zionist government, industry and media.”
17.Zawahiri’s past statements highlighted his disenchantment with the PLO, Al Fatah and the Hamas. He asked the Palestinians to take over the responsibility for the Intifada in their own hands. He said in his message of February 12, 2007: "The Muslims in the area should work for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, instead of supporting an individual faction or political party. I'm not asking them to join HAMAS, Islamic Jihad or al-Qaida, but rather, I'm asking them to return to Islam, in order to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state over all of Palestine, and not for the establishment of a secularist state which will please America on crumbs of Palestine."
18.He wanted the Palestinians as well as the Muslims of the Lebanon to categorically reject all UN Resolutions and international agreements relating to these lands of Islam. He told the Lebanese people: "I ask my brothers in Islam and Jihad in Lebanon not to give in to Resolution 1701, nor accept the pushing back of the Lebanese border 30 kilometers, nor accept the presence of the international Crusader forces in the south as a barrier between them and Occupied Palestine, even if that resolution is agreed to by all official political forces licensed by the Lebanese government, on the basis of international balances and foreign connections."
19.In a message of December 20, 2006, Zawahiri said: "Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other god, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
20.He also said: "I also send my greetings and those of my brothers to our steadfast brothers in Algeria in the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, the guards of Islam’s western garrison. I ask Allah to accept their sacrifices, perseverance and resoluteness, to send down on them His victory which He promised His believing worshippers, and to conquer with them His enemies, the Crusaders and secularist sons of France. And I give them the good news that the winds of victory are blowing, that the Ummah has risen up, and that the era of humiliation has come to a close. So stand firm."
21.His increased interest in Algeria could be attributed to his desire partly to bring about the rule of the Sharia in Algeria and partly to use Algeria as a rear base for spreading the Intifada to France, Spain and Portugal. Al Qaeda and its International Islamic Front have been using the Afghanistan-Pakistan region as a rear base for their Jihadi Intifada against the US and the UK. It has not been possible to use it as a rear base against France, Spain and Portugal. They are hoping that an active Jihadi Intifada in Algeria will help in overcoming this deficiency.
22. In a reference to Chechnya, Zawahiri said in his message of December 20, 2006: "And I send my greetings and those of my brothers to the Chechen people, in Jihad against the Russian Crusade for 400 years. O sons of Imam Shamil, know that you are not alone in confronting the Crusade against Islam. You are at the throats of the Russians and their helpers, and we are at the throats of the Americans and Jews and their followers. So stand firm."
23. Under the ideological guidance of Zawahiri, Al Qaeda had also been calling upon the Muslims of the world to follow the command of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban. It was part of his efforts to remove the impression that Wahabi Arabs were in the forefront of the Jihadi Intifada. He has been trying to emphasis that all Muslims are in the Intifada irrespective of their ethnic origin or nationality. He said in a message of 2007: "Nationalists split the Muslim Ummah into Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Turks, Afghans and others, then split the Arabs into Egyptians, Moroccans, Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Saudis, Yemenis and others and thus provided the best possible service to the crusade invading the Islamic world and instead of the Ummah uniting to confront the colonialist campaign, as it previously united to face the crusade and Mongol invasions, the Ummah fell apart and fought itself." There was an attempt by Zawahiri to give Mulla Omar an iconic status as a non-Arab commander of the Jihadi Intifada. (16-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B. Raman
Six weeks after the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2,2011, Al Qaeda’s General Command has announced the appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri, of Egypt, who was OBL’s No.2, as the new head of Al Qaeda. A statement announcing his appointment was posted on a website associated with Al Qaeda. It was attributed to the General Command. It said: "Sheikh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, may God guide him, assumed responsibility as the group's Amir [leader]". It vowed that under Zawahiri, Al Qaeda would pursue jihad against the US and Israel "until all invading armies leave the land of Islam".
2. Earlier, on May 18,2011, quoting Pakistani security sources, Al Jazeera had reported that Al Qaeda had appointed Saif al-Adel, formerly of the Egyptian Army, as its interim leader and Mohammed Mustafa al-Yemeni as its operations chief .Al Jazeera had said: "According to the sources, the decision (on the appointments) was made at a meeting on May 10 on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border."
3.According to Al Jazeera, Adnan al-Khairi al-Masri was named as Al Qaeda's general command head, Mohammed Nasser al-Wahshi as its Africa chief, Mohammed Adam Khan, an Afghan, as in charge in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Fahd al-Iraqi as in charge of the Afghan-Pakistani border region.
4. Since the earlier report had emanated from Pakistani sources there was some doubt about its reliability. The latest statement regarding the appointment of Zawahiri as the head was posted in one of the web sites used by Al Qaeda for such announcements and hence appears to be more authentic.
5. Saif al-Adel was said to have been a critic of OBL’s arbitrary ways of taking important operational decisions and had reportedly questioned the wisdom of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland since those strikes, according to him, enabled the US to mobilise the international community against Al Qaeda.
6. The latest statement of Al Qaeda regarding the appointment of Zawahiri is silent on the earlier appointments as announced by Al Jazeera on the basis of information provided by Pakistani sources.
7.Zawahiri has been advocating since February 12,2007, a global jihadi Intifada, which would cover all lands in the world, which rightfully belong to Islam.
8.However, he specifies certain areas, which he thinks should receive special attention first. Of these, he gives the topmost priority to Afghanistan and Iraq. He says the future of Islam and of the global Intifada itself will be decided in those countries. If they can defeat the Americans there, the jihadis' victory in the rest of the lands will be assured. After mentioning these two countries, he mentions certain other areas specifically. He believes that the victory of the jihadis in these areas would also be crucial for the ultimate victory of Islam. These areas are Palestine, including Gaza, the Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria and Chechnya in Russia. He describes Somalia as the Southern garrison of Islam and Algeria as its Western garrison.
9. His past statements had included Jammu and Kashmir as among historic Muslim lands under occupation by non-Muslims and hence to be “liberated”. He had drawn the attention of the Pakistani people to the danger of Gen.Pervez Musharraf colluding with the Hindus if he was not removed from power. However, he had not spoken of the Muslims living in other parts of India outside J&K.
10.By Jihadi Intifada, he means a kind of struggle in which the role of motivated individual Muslims will become more important than that of organisations so that the weakening or collapse of an organisation does not result in a collapse of the Intifada. He wants the Intifada to acquire a momentum of its own as a result of the sacrifices of individual Muslims.
11.He said in his message of January 22, 2007: "Every Muslim today is directly responsible for defending Islam, Islam’s homeland and the Islamic Ummah and he is responsible for the efforts to liberate the Muslim captives foremost of whom is Sheikh Omar Abdl al-Rahman from the prisons of the crusaders and their helpers and we reaffirm to the families of the Guantanamo captives who are demonstrating these days in Cuba, that we –with God’s permission-- have not and will not forget our captives and that their liberation is a debt on our necks and that the Americans must expect to pay the price for everything they have done to them."
12. In his past statements, he downplayed the importance of a central command and control in keeping the Intifada going. The motivation of individual Muslims was more important than any centralised command and control.
13.He also projects the Intifada as a mix of military and non-military struggles. He says in his message of December 20, 2006: "We must bear arms. And if we are unable to bear them, then we must support those who carry them. This support comes in many forms and guises, so we must exploit all Da’wah, student and union activities to back the Jihadi resistance....... The Muslim Ummah must exploit all methods of popular protest, like demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing to provide the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who supply the Crusader forces, boycotting Crusader and Jewish products, and other ways of popular protest."
14. The importance of the role of individual Muslims has been re-emphasised in a video circulated by the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda on June 8,2011.This video is a collation of messages issued by Zawahiri, Adam Gadahn, the American convert to Islam, who heads the propaganda wing, Atiya Abdel Rahman (Libyan operations chief of Al Qaeda, who was allegedly a key aide to bin Laden when he was hiding in Abbottabad)and Abu Laith Al-Libi.
15. In his message, Adam Gadahn , who spoke in English, said: “Muslims living in the US are perfectly placed to play an important and decisive part in the jihad against the Zionists and Crusaders.” He told them how easy it was to buy automatic assault weapons at gun shows without any identification.
16. Hinting at a policy of targeted individual assassinations of important Governmental and non-Governmental leaders, he said: “It’s important that we weaken our cowardly enemies’ will to fight by targeting influential public figures in Crusader and Zionist government, industry and media.”
17.Zawahiri’s past statements highlighted his disenchantment with the PLO, Al Fatah and the Hamas. He asked the Palestinians to take over the responsibility for the Intifada in their own hands. He said in his message of February 12, 2007: "The Muslims in the area should work for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, instead of supporting an individual faction or political party. I'm not asking them to join HAMAS, Islamic Jihad or al-Qaida, but rather, I'm asking them to return to Islam, in order to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state over all of Palestine, and not for the establishment of a secularist state which will please America on crumbs of Palestine."
18.He wanted the Palestinians as well as the Muslims of the Lebanon to categorically reject all UN Resolutions and international agreements relating to these lands of Islam. He told the Lebanese people: "I ask my brothers in Islam and Jihad in Lebanon not to give in to Resolution 1701, nor accept the pushing back of the Lebanese border 30 kilometers, nor accept the presence of the international Crusader forces in the south as a barrier between them and Occupied Palestine, even if that resolution is agreed to by all official political forces licensed by the Lebanese government, on the basis of international balances and foreign connections."
19.In a message of December 20, 2006, Zawahiri said: "Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other god, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
20.He also said: "I also send my greetings and those of my brothers to our steadfast brothers in Algeria in the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, the guards of Islam’s western garrison. I ask Allah to accept their sacrifices, perseverance and resoluteness, to send down on them His victory which He promised His believing worshippers, and to conquer with them His enemies, the Crusaders and secularist sons of France. And I give them the good news that the winds of victory are blowing, that the Ummah has risen up, and that the era of humiliation has come to a close. So stand firm."
21.His increased interest in Algeria could be attributed to his desire partly to bring about the rule of the Sharia in Algeria and partly to use Algeria as a rear base for spreading the Intifada to France, Spain and Portugal. Al Qaeda and its International Islamic Front have been using the Afghanistan-Pakistan region as a rear base for their Jihadi Intifada against the US and the UK. It has not been possible to use it as a rear base against France, Spain and Portugal. They are hoping that an active Jihadi Intifada in Algeria will help in overcoming this deficiency.
22. In a reference to Chechnya, Zawahiri said in his message of December 20, 2006: "And I send my greetings and those of my brothers to the Chechen people, in Jihad against the Russian Crusade for 400 years. O sons of Imam Shamil, know that you are not alone in confronting the Crusade against Islam. You are at the throats of the Russians and their helpers, and we are at the throats of the Americans and Jews and their followers. So stand firm."
23. Under the ideological guidance of Zawahiri, Al Qaeda had also been calling upon the Muslims of the world to follow the command of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban. It was part of his efforts to remove the impression that Wahabi Arabs were in the forefront of the Jihadi Intifada. He has been trying to emphasis that all Muslims are in the Intifada irrespective of their ethnic origin or nationality. He said in a message of 2007: "Nationalists split the Muslim Ummah into Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Turks, Afghans and others, then split the Arabs into Egyptians, Moroccans, Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Saudis, Yemenis and others and thus provided the best possible service to the crusade invading the Islamic world and instead of the Ummah uniting to confront the colonialist campaign, as it previously united to face the crusade and Mongol invasions, the Ummah fell apart and fought itself." There was an attempt by Zawahiri to give Mulla Omar an iconic status as a non-Arab commander of the Jihadi Intifada. (16-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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