Saturday, June 11, 2011

THE CASE AGAINST RANA

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 726


B.RAMAN


US District Judge Harry D Leinenweber was reported to have ruled at Chicago on June 9,2011, that Tahawur Hussain Rana, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), was guilty of supporting the LET and plotting to bomb Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper which had published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in 2005.


2.A 12-member jury reached a split verdict after two days of deliberations and ruled that Rana was not guilty of conspiracy to provide material support to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks which killed 166 people, including six Americans.


3.No date has been set for the sentencing. Rana could face a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison on the two counts combined.


4.The Indian Government has expressed "disappointment" over Rana's acquittal on charges of plotting the Mumbai attacks and said it will soon take a decision on filing a charge sheet against him and his accomplice David Headley in an Indian court.


5. Explaining the verdict, US Justice Department spokesman Randall Samborn said: "A Federal Court jury has convicted defendant Rana on one count of conspiracy to provide material support to the Denmark terrorism plot and one count of providing material support to LeT, and not guilty of conspiracy to provide material support to the Mumbai terrorist attacks."


6. Rana’s lawyers have said they would appeal against the ruling as there was an "error" in the trial. US Attorney Patrick J Fitzgerald has said the acquittal of Rana, who was a co-accused in the Mumbai attacks with Headley, of charges that he was involved in the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai was disappointing. At the same time, he said they were "gratified" that the jury found Rana guilty of involvement in plotting a terror attack in Denmark and providing material support to LeT, designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organisation.


7. When asked what went wrong on the 26/11 charges, Fitzgerald said:"We put our evidence forward and the jury found that we did not meet the burden (of proof) there. But they did find we made our burden proving material support to Lashkar and they found that we met our burden with regard to attack on Denmark."


8. Rana had been cited as a co-accused in respect of two charges "Conspiracy to provide material support to Terrorism in India" and the planned attack in Denmark. In respect of the planned Denmark attack, Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha were also co-accused (in absentia). A supplementary indictment had been filed on April 25,2011, against Sajid Mir,Abu Qahafa, Mazhar Iqbal and Major Iqbal citing them as co-accused along with Rana in respect of the 26/11 strikes.


9.Since the six Pakistanis cited as co-accused along with Rana are in Pakistan, the evidence against them was not considered and referred to the jury, which was called upon only to give its opinion on the charges against Rana. Since Rana had not been found guilty of any involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strikes, the Justice Department is unlikely to move for any action against the six Pakistani nationals absconding in Pakistan, of whom Ilyas Kashmiri was reported to have been killed in a recent Drone strike. The Pakistanis cited in the indictments as the co-conspirators would be the beneficiaries of the acquittal of Rana in respect of the charges relating to the 26/11 terrorist strikes.


10.Since Rana has been found guilty of involvement in the plan to carry out a terrorist strike in Copenhagen, the US Justice Department can still press Pakistan for action against Ilyas (if his death is not confirmed) and Major Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha, both of whom have been cited as co-accused along with Rana in respect of the Copenhagen plot. It remains to be seen whether the Justice Department will do so.


11.It is surprising that the jury found Rana not guilty of involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. There was a wealth of circumstantial evidence to show that he had knowingly allowed Headley to pose as an employee of his Chicago-based immigration consultancy service for his visits to India to assist the LET in its plans, that he had prior knowledge of the impending terrorist strikes and that he had knowledge of the LET’s plans to carry out fresh strikes in 2009 including in the National Defence College in New Delhi. Headley had discussed these plans with Rana.

12.Moreover, Rana was totally in the picture about Headley’s contacts with the LET as well as Ilyas Kashmiri.


13.I am told US laws do not permit an appeal against an acquittal by the jury. This would leave the Government of India with only one option. Try to get Rana extradited to India to face trial before an Indian court on charges different from those for which he was tried in the US. Since Rana was not the beneficiary of any plea bargain, extradition should be possible if the US is prepared to co-operate.

14. Both Headley and Rana are equally important for the Indian and US investigators to reconstruct the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, to identify the entire network set up by them in India and the US and neutralise the members of the network still remaining undetected and to unearth the future plans of the LET and the 313 Brigade. The National Investigation Agency of India and the FBI should set up a joint team of senior officers to collate and review all the evidence on record so far and get a complete picture of the conspiracy.


15.The details of the circumstantial evidence available against Rana in respect of the Mumbai as well as the Copenhagen cases are given in the Annexure. ( 11-6-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

ANNEXURE


DETAILS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AGAINST RANA


David Coleman Headley originally known as Daood Gilani and Tahawwur Hussain Rana, members of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), operated in concert from Chicago. They were in personal, telephonic and E-mail contact with each other. They even took a drive in a car together on September 7, 2009, when they discussed their future operational plans in India and Denmark at the instance of the LET and the 313 Brigade headed by Ilyas Kashmiri .The LET had four future targets in India----the Somnath temple, the National Defence College in New Delhi, and the film world and the Shiv Sena office in Mumbai. The 313 Brigade's target was the Copenhagen office of the Danish newspaper, which published some cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005.



2. Headley undertook his two visits to Denmark and five pre-26/11 visits to India posing as a representative of an immigration consultancy service, which Rana ran from Chicago. He had kept Rana informed of his posing as the representative of the consultancy service and asked him, after a visit to Denmark, to corroborate the statements made by him to his interlocutors in Denmark regarding his links with Rana's service. The fact that Rana agreed to this shows his concurrence to Headley using the cover of being a representative of his service for his operational visits to Denmark and India to collect pre-attack information. Rana booked the air tickets for Headley for his two visits to Denmark.

3. There is no information or evidence to indicate that Headley and Rana travelled to India together or were in India at the same time and were in touch with each other during their stay in India. According to Indian media reports, during a visit to Kerala, Rana had published an advertisement in a local newspaper offering the services of his company for intending Indian applicants for a US visa. Neither Headley nor Rana would seem to have indicated in any way that the immigration consultancy service in Chicago for which they claimed to be working was one and the same.

4. According to the FBI's first affidavit against Rana, on or about September 25, 2009, Rana spoke by telephone with the Consul General at the Pakistani Consulate-General in Chicago in an effort to obtain a 5-year visa for Headley to travel to Pakistan. It was clear from email traffic unrelated to terrorist plotting that the Consul- General knew Rana and Headley personally as all three attended the same high school. However, the Consul General knew Headley as Gilani. He was not aware that Gilani, his old schoolmate, had become Headley since February, 2006. In seeking a visa for Headley, Rana stated that he wished to obtain the visa for a white American named Headley who did not have any Pakistani background at all. When the Consul-General suggested that Rana send this white American to the consulate, Rana explained that he had sent his friend elsewhere to take care of some unspecified business so that someone else would visit the consulate. The FBI told the court in its affidavit that "It is clear from the foregoing conversation that Rana was attempting to deceive the Consul- General into granting a visa for Headley without the Consul- General knowing for whom the visa would be issued."

5. According to the second report against Rana filed by the FBI in the court, he was in India in the third week of November, 2008. He flew from Mumbai to Dubai on a flight of the Emirates Airlines on November 21, 2008. He flew from Dubai to China by the same Airlines on November, 24, 2008, and from there returned to Chicago via Seoul on November 26, 2008, by the Asiana Airlines.

6. There is no reason to believe that Headley was in India during this period. The last of his five pre-26/11 visits to India was in July, 2008. It is not clear when did Rana arrive in India in November, 2008, which places he visited and whom he met. It is also not clear which city he visited in China, what was the purpose of his visit to China and why his visit to China was so short.

7. Rana had admitted to the FBI that during his visit to Dubai from November 21 to 24, 2008, he met Maj. (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha who was in touch with Ilyas Kashmiri on behalf of Headley and that he came to know from Pasha about the impending terrorist attacks by the LET in Mumbai. Rana sought to convey an impression that his visit (or visits?) to India had nothing to do with the 26/11 attacks and that he came to know of the planned attacks only from Pasha in Dubai a few days before the attacks. He did not alert the FBI about the impending terrorist attacks

8. At the same time, it is clear from the papers filed by the FBI in the court that Rana personally knew both the handling officers of Headley in Pakistan---- Maj (retd) Abdur Rehman of the 313 Brigade and Sajjid Mir of the LET. It is also clear that Rana was fully aware at least on September 7, 2009, if not earlier, of the LET's plans for future attacks on four targets in India.

Friday, June 10, 2011

MY SOLITUDE

(By Georges Moustaki—A French singer of Greek origin)

To have so often slept with my loneliness,
She is almost a friend, a sweet habit.
She is like a faithful shadow.
She follows me here and there, to the four corners of the world.


No, I'm never alone with my loneliness.


When she is in my bed, she takes all the space,
And we spend long nights, both face to face.
I really do not know how far this will go on, this complicity


No, I'm never alone with my loneliness.


Through her, I learnt as much as I shed tears.
If sometimes I try to put her away, I can’t.
Should I choose the love of another woman?
Possibly on my last day, my last girlfriend?


But I never feel alone with my loneliness.
No, I'm never alone with my loneliness.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvFLBs9S8FY&feature=share

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

BALOCHISTAN: GREATER REALISM IN CHINA & IRAN

B.RAMAN


Independently of each other, China and Iran seem to be developing doubts in their mind about the ability of the Pakistani Armed Forces to restore normalcy in Balochistan and put down the Baloch freedom struggle.


2. Despite brutal suppression, different Baloch organisations calling for greater autonomy or independence have managed to maintain their freedom struggle. They have been greatly disappointed by the lack of external support---particularly from India—to their freedom struggle, but this has not demoralised them. Nor has it deterred them from keeping the freedom struggle sustained despite a large number of deaths sustained by the Baloch youth at the hands of the Pakistani Armed Forces.


3. Both China and Iran have been paying even greater attention to the ground situation in Balochistan than India.They do not wish well of the Baloch freedom-fighters. In their perception, the secession of Balochistan from Pakistan would not be in their national interest. It could have adverse consequences for China in Chinese-controlled Xinjiang and for Iran in its Baloch areas. Any success of the Baloch freedom struggle in Pakistan could lead to a demand for a Greater Balochistan incorporating the Baloch areas of Iran.


4. While China and Iran do not want the Baloch freedom struggle to succeed, at the same time, they are increasingly skeptic about the ability of the Pakistani Armed Forces to put down the Baloch freedom struggle. In their perception, the Baloch freedom struggle will continue to keep Pakistan bleeding and prevent the restoration of normalcy in Balochistan.They are,therefore, avoiding further commitment of a major nature to assist Pakistan in Balochistan.


5.The Chinese reluctance to take up further commitments in Balochistan came out dramatically during the visit of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan to China last month when Chinese officials, for the first time, openly indicated their lack of enthusiasm for the upgradation of the Gwadar commercial port built and commissioned by them initially into a naval base for use by the Pakistan Navy and subsequently into a base that could be used by the Chinese naval vessels operating in the Indian Ocean and Gulf areas.


6.The entire Gwadar project was a brainchild of Pakistan’s GHQ. Its ostensible commercial purpose of serving the external trade requirements of Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang in China concealed an ultimate military purpose of providing a strategic depth to the Pakistan Navy by reducing its dependence on the Karachi port which could be vulnerable to surprise Indian attacks in case of a military conflict.


7. Gen.Pervez Musharraf, when he was in power, was urging the Chinese Navy too to use the port not only to confront the Indian Navy with a new front, but also to use the Chinese military presence in Gwadar to brow-beat the Baloch freedom-fighters.


8. Till the beginning of 2010, there were indications that the Chinese were going along with the Pakistani ideas and urgings for the upgradation of Gwadar into a modern naval base on par with Karachi. Subsequent developments have poured cold water on the Chinese enthusiasm for the project.


9. Even the commercial port which was commissioned in 2006 has been a non-starter. The failure of the Pakistani authorities to develop roads and other infrastructure and to reach a peace agreement with the Baloch freedom-fighters have resulted in a situation where not only international shipping companies, but even those of Pakistan are reluctant to use it. Musharraf’s grandiose ideas of Gwadar becoming the port to serve the external trade of Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics have remained a pipe-dream. They are more interested in a port being developed by Iran with Indian assistance than in Gwadar.


10. By the middle of 2010, it became apparent that the Chinese interest in Gwadar was diminishing. In an assessment on the high-profile visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China in July last year, I had written as follows: “ Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan. Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.” ( Please see my article titled PAKISTAN AS CHINA'S FORCE-MULTIPLIER AGAINST INDIA at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/07/pakistan-as-chinas-force-multiplier.html )


11. The Pakistanis were hoping that the openly-expressed Chinese backing for Pakistan in the wake of the widespread criticism in the US of the suspected complicity of elements in Pakistan with Al Qaeda which enabled Osama bin Laden to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad might be translated into other benefits for Pakistan during Gilani’s visit to China last month. They were particularly interested in two benefits--- a Chinese agreement to expedite the supply of military aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force to strengthen its capability to prevent any surprise raids by the Indian Air Force in emulation of the US commando raid on Abbottabad to kill OBL and Chinese acceptance of the Pakistani proposals for the urgent upgradation of Gwadar into a naval base.


12. While the Chinese did oblige the Pakistani request for the expeditious supply of more planes to the PAF, they continue to fight shy of more involvement in Gwadar. They took the extraordinary step of contradicting motivated briefings by members of Gilani’s entourage who sought to convey an impression that the Chinese had reacted more positively this time.


13. In a despatch of May 24 from Beijing, the Reuters news agency reported as follows: “On Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said she had no knowledge beforehand of the naval port proposal and it had not been discussed during Gilani's visit. China and Pakistan are friendly neighbours. Regarding the specific China-Pakistan cooperative project that you raised, I have not heard of it," Jiang told a regular news conference in Beijing.”


14. Simultaneously with the Chinese reiteration of their continued lack of interest in the Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of Gwadar into a naval base with a possible Chinese presence there, reports have been coming in that Iran has started dragging its feet on the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran into Pakistani Punjab through Balochistan because of the continuing freedom struggle of the Balochs.


15. The scepticism of China and Iran regarding the ability of the Pakistani Armed Forces to put down the Baloch freedom struggle should act as a morale-booster to the Balochs and encourage them to further step up their freedom struggle. Unfortunately, the continuing lack of unity among different Baloch nationalist organisations and the consequent in-fighting are coming in the way of a successful culmination of the Baloch freedom struggle.


16. Lack of unity and in-fighting had led to the collapse of the Baloch freedom-struggles in the past. Instead of uniting to succeed, if the Baloch leaders let history repeat itself because of their inability to unite, history will not forgive them. Since the days of Zia-ul-Haq the geopolitical circumstances in the region had never been more favourable for the Balochs. If they miss this opportunity, they may not get another like this again. Unite to succeed---that is the slogan that should be reverberating across Balochistan.( 9-6-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

THE SORRY STATE OF THE NATION

B.RAMAN

India has been going through a political and moral crisis of disturbing proportions, with no end to the crisis in sight. Despite undoubted economic growth, one could sense the lack of a feel good feeling right across the society.

2.We have a Prime Minister who had some moral authority, but had no political authority to be able to translate his moral authority into meaningful action against corruption. His perceived inaction or inadequate action against corruption has eroded even the moral authority he had. For nearly seven years, the Government has been headed by a person who is a Prime Minister on sufferance and not by right.

3.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I), has immense political authority, but, in the eyes of large sections of the people, lacks the required moral authority which could enable her to translate her political authority into acceptable policies to deal with the moral crisis confronting the country.

4. There is thus a huge vacuum ---political and moral---in governance. Into that vacuum have sought to move in newly-emerging non-governmental forces in the name of the civil society. The Government, which is helplessly buffeted by these forces, finds itself in a position where it is neither able to satisfy nor resist them.

5. These forces and the electronic media have made action against corruption the yard-stick by which to judge the performance of the Government and the Congress (I). The tendency of the Prime Minister to avoid action, if possible, and to act only when forced by external pressure or circumstances has created a widespread feeling that he is not serious when he talks of the Government’s determination to act against corruption.

6. There is a feeling at the best that he wants to act, but is prevented by the party from doing so and at the worst that neither he nor his party is genuinely interested in dealing with this evil. The consequent loss of what little moral authority was there has added to the strength of the newly-emerging non-governmental forces. They have been able to project themselves in the eyes of large sections of the people as the defenders of the moral fibre of the nation against a Government increasingly bereft of moral authority.

7. Unless and until the Government is able to acquire the required moral authority, the present moral and political crisis will continue to sap the energies and the prestige of the nation. It is doubtful whether a Prime Minister on sufferance will be able to acquire such moral authority, buttressed by political strength.

8. So long as Dr.Manmohan Singh continues to be perceived as a helpless Prime Minister buffeted between the civil society forces pressing for action against corruption and a Congress (I) headed by Sonia Gandhi which sees the civil society forces as a greater evil than corruption itself, there will be no end to the present crisis.

9. The buffeted ship of the nation needs a competent, self-confident and morally sensitive captain who can take it through the troubled waters. Even the most charitable well-wishers of Dr.Manmohan Singh would be doubtful in their mind whether he is the right man of the occasion.

10. However talented and administratively skilful, no Prime Minister on sufferance will be able to take the country out of the present crisis, which has demonstrated the inadvisability of dual authority with the de facto and the de jure centres of power contributing to a political and moral paralysis.

11. The time has come for mid-term polls which could usher in a Government headed by a Prime Minister by right and not on sufferance who could acquire the required moral and political authority and assert it effectively in the interest of the nation. Public opinion should demand early mid-term polls. ( 8-6-11)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )

Sunday, June 5, 2011

AFTER ILYAS KASHMIRI

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 725


B.RAMAN


The USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not allowed the death of Osama bin Laden in a raid by US naval commandos at his hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2,2011,to slow down its hunt for other high-value targets of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan.


2. Its relentless search for them through newly-created human sources and Drone (pilotless plane) strikes has been kept up. The successful commando raid at Abbottabad has added to the already existing disruption in the command and control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Their remaining leaders are on the run re-locating themselves in new sanctuaries due to a fear that their old sanctuaries might already be within the knowledge of the CIA as a result of its scrutiny of the documents and computer material seized from OBL's hide-out.


3. Their hurried efforts towards re-location have provided the CIA and its Drones new opportunities to run them down and eliminate them. Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the so-called 313 Brigade of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), one of the constituent units of Al Qaeda’s International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, appears to have been successfully hunted down and eliminated along with some associates---all Pakistanis--- in a Drone strike near Wana in South Waziristan on the night of June 3,2011.


4. Though their bodies are reported to have been mutilated beyond recognition and quickly buried by the locals thereby making physical or forensic identification impossible, the admission by a self-proclaimed representative of the HUJI in Fax messages sent to the local media of the fact of Ilyas’ death in a Drone strike has added strength to the widely-held belief in the South Waziristan area that Ilyas is no more.


5. While one cannot rule out the possibility of the HUJI or its 313 Brigade deliberately disseminating a false claim of his death in order to protect him from the relentless hunt by the CIA, one has to note that there has been no instance in the past of Al Qaeda or its affiliates disseminating false claims of death in order to protect their leaders.


6. There had been instances in the past of Pakistani agencies claiming to have killed high-value targets, with the claims subsequently proving to be false. A report in September 2009 disseminated by Pakistani sources regarding the death of Ilyas in a Drone strike subsequently proved to be false. At that time, no claim or admission of his death had been made by the 313 Brigade or the HUJI.


7. Thus, one can be reasonably ---though not totally—certain that the CIA has scored another high-value success in eliminating Ilyas. This will further add to the disruption in the command and control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. After Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was reportedly killed in a Drone strike some months ago in the FATA region, Ilyas is the second jihadi terrorist of Kashmiri origin associated with Al Qaeda to have been killed by the CIA. He hailed from the Bhimber area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.


8. Ilyas was often compared to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, but he was not of the same class as KSM in conceiving and executing spectacular terrorist strikes.


9. His value to Al Qaeda arose from the fact that he had a wide network of contacts not only in the Pakistani Armed Forces and intelligence agencies, but also in the diaspora of Pakistani origin in the West. This enabled him to find new non-Arab volunteers for Al Qaeda’s operations in foreign soil.


10. However, it has to be noted that his spectacular successes were mostly in the Af-Pak and Indian regions. None of his planned operations in the West---including the plan to blow up the offices of the Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the Holy Prophet in 1995, reached a successful culmination.


11.Ilyas did not have a technical bent of mind like KSM, but he developed an expertise in organising complex swarm attacks using the commando tactics of special forces. The increasing number of such successful swarm attacks by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani network in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan bore his signature and signs of his expertise and training. It remains to be seen whether his death will have any impact on the ability of Al Qaeda and its affiliates to carry out such swarm attacks in future. ( 5-6-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Saturday, June 4, 2011

HAM-HANDED HANDLING OF BABA RAMDEV’S MOVEMENT

B.RAMAN


The ham-handed handling of Baba Ramdev’s movement against foreign bank accounts of Indian nationals by the Government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh does not speak well either of the Government headed by him or of the Congress (I) headed by Mrs.Sonia Gandhi or of the senior bureaucracy advising the PM.


2. Public anger against the perceived lack of action by the Government to detect and proceed legally against the holders of illegal accounts abroad had been building up at least for a year, if not longer. This anger was more faithfully and accurately reflected in the NET than in the print and electronic media.


3.While the electronic media played a commendable role in reflecting public anger over the foot-dragging by the Government in taking action on charges of corruption against certain political leaders, it did not take serious note of the NET anger over Government’s perceived inaction against illegal accounts held abroad by Indian nationals.


4.Repeated examples of cover-up by the Government in the Bofors case where one had useful leads of some illegal accounts held abroad by some of the dramatis personae in the Bofors scandal created strong suspicions in the minds of many that there must be other such instances of cover-up by the Government to prevent the truth from being found out in respect of foreign accounts.


5. The Government did face a genuine difficulty in taking action since the co-operation of foreign Governments was involved. But there have been instances where other Governments such as those of the US and Germany had overcome such difficulties and successfully elicited the co-operation of countries such as Switzerland for action against financial wrong-doers.


6.Adding to these suspicions in the public mind was the evasive reactions of the Government to the leads coming from Wikileaks on this issue. Instead of taking these leads sincerely and seriously and examining how the Government could use them, the Government treated them casually as if the leads found in the Wikileaks disclosures were of no significance or importance.


7.The Government thus failed to follow up vigorously on the few leads that were forthcoming, thereby creating---rightly or wrongly-- an impression in the public mind that the Government is not serious about taking action to detect and prosecute holders of illegal foreign bank accounts.


8. The Government not only failed to act, but it also failed to notice how public anger was building up on this issue in the NET. Since this anger was not reflected by the print and electronic media, the Government thought that it could continue to get away with its inaction, amounting to a cover-up of a serious problem.


9.There are various ways in which the Government could have acted in order to remove this impression in the public mind about studied inaction by the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Congress (I).


10. The PM could have addressed the people and interacted with civil society leaders agitating on this issue in order to convince them about the seriousness of the Government’s plans to deal with this issue. He didn’t. He maintained a sphinx-like silence, which comes naturally to him.


11.The Prime Minister could have visited countries like Switzerland which attract financial wrong-doers in order to seek their co-operation in the matter. He could have made it clear to their leaders that future development of our trade with those countries would depend on their co-operation with India in detecting and prosecuting financial wrong-doers. He didn’t.


12.He could have set up a Task Force consisting of experts in financial intelligence collection and investigation to study how countries such as the US and Germany have dealt with this issue and draw lessons. He didn’t.


13. He could have asked the same Task Force to study the working of our institutions responsible for financial intelligence collection and investigation in order to identify deficiencies and remove them. He didn’t.


14. He could have set up a mechanism for keeping the public continuously informed of the actions being taken by the Government. He didn’t.


15. When he heard that Baba Ramdev was planning to agitate on this issue in a big way, the PM should have asked his emissaries to contact him, explain what the Government has already been doing and what it intended doing in future and advised him not to embark on an agitationl approach which could prove counter-productive.


16. Instead of doing so, the Government mistakenly thought that it could benefit from the support base of the Baba to reduce the support base of Anna Hazare. It was ridiculous to have sent a group of senior Ministers to meet the Baba at the airport on his arrival and negotiate with him there. The negotiations with the Baba should have been before he arrived in New Delhi and not after his arrival at the airport or in a well-known hotel.


17. Through its actions and inactions, the Government unnecessarily and unwisely built up the image of the Baba. When the Government found to its consternation that the Baba was not as malleable as it thought he would be, it swung to the other extreme of midnight action using tear-smoke to put an end to the hunger-strike. The way the Government acted would have recalled to the minds of many how the Indira Gandhi Government used to act during the days of the Emergency between 1975 and 1977. If the Government had wanted to act strongly against the Baba, the right time for his arrest would have been before his arrival in New Delhi or on his arrival at the airport. Instead of sending his senior Ministers to hail him, the Prime Minister could have sent the police to arrest him and take him away from New Delhi.


18. The Government and the Congress (I)) due to their inability to think lucidly and act convincingly and meaningfully have landed themselves in a messy situation with likely negative consequences.


19. The first step for getting out of this mess is to convince the public that they have taken note of its anger and are serious about dealing with this issue. The Prime Minister should address the nation, exercise his personal leadership, keep the Ministers and party spokesmen under control instead of making highly unwise and potentially provocative statements and make it clear to the party and Mrs.Sonia Gandhi that he would not brook any interference in this matter. He should make it clear that he would be prepared to quit as the PM if there was any interference. (5-6-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

UNCORROBORATED RUMOURS OF ILYAS KASHMIRI’S DEATH

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 724


B.RAMAN


There have been uncorroborated rumours since the forenoon of June 4,2011, claiming that Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the 313 Brigade, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, was killed in a Drone (pilotless plane) strike by the US in South Waziristan on June 3,2011.


2. The rumours started circulating following a breaking news carried by “Dawn” of Karachi in its web site stating that according to the Urdu service of the BBC radio, Ilyas was among nine persons killed in the Drone strike.


3. According to the BBC report as cited by “Dawn”, officials in South Waziristan told BBC Urdu that a US drone attack targeted a group of armed militants 20 kilometres from the Wana bazaar. The official said the attack killed nine people and injured three others. He added that those killed in the attack were believed to be militants from Punjab. Locals and witnesses told BBC Urdu that Kashmiri had also died in the Drone attack. Witnesses said Kashmiri had arrived in South Waziristan from the Khyber tribal region.


4. The reliable “Long War Journal” of the US, which documents Drone strikes on a day-to-day basis, has reported as follows: “ US Predators attacked terrorists in an area of the Pakistani tribal agency of South Waziristan that is under Taliban control on June 3. Today's strike is the first after a nine-day-long lull. Unmanned Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in the Wana area in South Waziristan today, killing five "militants," according to reports from SAMAA and Xinhua. No senior Taliban, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders or operatives have been reported killed in the airstrike.”


5. In a report datelined Peshawar, the SAMAA news agency of Pakistan has reported as follows: “PESHAWAR: The mastermind of PNS Mehran attack, Ilyas Kashmiri, has been reportedly killed in a missile strike in Miran Shah area of South Waziristan, SAMAA learnt Saturday. Sources told Kashmiri was present when the recent attack took place in the area where five terrorists have been killed including Kashmiri. No official has confirmed Kashmiri’s death in the missile attack.”


6. One does not know what is the source of the Xinhua report. The “Long War Journal’s” observation that “no senior Taliban, Al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders or operatives have been reported killed in the airstrike” appears to be its assessment. It has not cited any source for this.


7. Neither the Pakistani nor the US authorities have corroborated these rumours. A September 2009 report regarding the death of Ilyas in a Drone strike in South Waziristan proved to be false. If Ilyas has been killed, this will be reflected in the electronic chatter on phones and the NET. The US authorities must be closely monitoring it. One has to await their confirmation or a statement from the 313 Brigade or Al Qaeda. ( 4-6-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )