B.RAMAN
India has been going through a political and moral crisis of disturbing proportions, with no end to the crisis in sight. Despite undoubted economic growth, one could sense the lack of a feel good feeling right across the society.
2.We have a Prime Minister who had some moral authority, but had no political authority to be able to translate his moral authority into meaningful action against corruption. His perceived inaction or inadequate action against corruption has eroded even the moral authority he had. For nearly seven years, the Government has been headed by a person who is a Prime Minister on sufferance and not by right.
3.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I), has immense political authority, but, in the eyes of large sections of the people, lacks the required moral authority which could enable her to translate her political authority into acceptable policies to deal with the moral crisis confronting the country.
4. There is thus a huge vacuum ---political and moral---in governance. Into that vacuum have sought to move in newly-emerging non-governmental forces in the name of the civil society. The Government, which is helplessly buffeted by these forces, finds itself in a position where it is neither able to satisfy nor resist them.
5. These forces and the electronic media have made action against corruption the yard-stick by which to judge the performance of the Government and the Congress (I). The tendency of the Prime Minister to avoid action, if possible, and to act only when forced by external pressure or circumstances has created a widespread feeling that he is not serious when he talks of the Government’s determination to act against corruption.
6. There is a feeling at the best that he wants to act, but is prevented by the party from doing so and at the worst that neither he nor his party is genuinely interested in dealing with this evil. The consequent loss of what little moral authority was there has added to the strength of the newly-emerging non-governmental forces. They have been able to project themselves in the eyes of large sections of the people as the defenders of the moral fibre of the nation against a Government increasingly bereft of moral authority.
7. Unless and until the Government is able to acquire the required moral authority, the present moral and political crisis will continue to sap the energies and the prestige of the nation. It is doubtful whether a Prime Minister on sufferance will be able to acquire such moral authority, buttressed by political strength.
8. So long as Dr.Manmohan Singh continues to be perceived as a helpless Prime Minister buffeted between the civil society forces pressing for action against corruption and a Congress (I) headed by Sonia Gandhi which sees the civil society forces as a greater evil than corruption itself, there will be no end to the present crisis.
9. The buffeted ship of the nation needs a competent, self-confident and morally sensitive captain who can take it through the troubled waters. Even the most charitable well-wishers of Dr.Manmohan Singh would be doubtful in their mind whether he is the right man of the occasion.
10. However talented and administratively skilful, no Prime Minister on sufferance will be able to take the country out of the present crisis, which has demonstrated the inadvisability of dual authority with the de facto and the de jure centres of power contributing to a political and moral paralysis.
11. The time has come for mid-term polls which could usher in a Government headed by a Prime Minister by right and not on sufferance who could acquire the required moral and political authority and assert it effectively in the interest of the nation. Public opinion should demand early mid-term polls. ( 8-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
Sunday, June 5, 2011
AFTER ILYAS KASHMIRI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 725
B.RAMAN
The USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not allowed the death of Osama bin Laden in a raid by US naval commandos at his hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2,2011,to slow down its hunt for other high-value targets of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan.
2. Its relentless search for them through newly-created human sources and Drone (pilotless plane) strikes has been kept up. The successful commando raid at Abbottabad has added to the already existing disruption in the command and control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Their remaining leaders are on the run re-locating themselves in new sanctuaries due to a fear that their old sanctuaries might already be within the knowledge of the CIA as a result of its scrutiny of the documents and computer material seized from OBL's hide-out.
3. Their hurried efforts towards re-location have provided the CIA and its Drones new opportunities to run them down and eliminate them. Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the so-called 313 Brigade of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), one of the constituent units of Al Qaeda’s International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, appears to have been successfully hunted down and eliminated along with some associates---all Pakistanis--- in a Drone strike near Wana in South Waziristan on the night of June 3,2011.
4. Though their bodies are reported to have been mutilated beyond recognition and quickly buried by the locals thereby making physical or forensic identification impossible, the admission by a self-proclaimed representative of the HUJI in Fax messages sent to the local media of the fact of Ilyas’ death in a Drone strike has added strength to the widely-held belief in the South Waziristan area that Ilyas is no more.
5. While one cannot rule out the possibility of the HUJI or its 313 Brigade deliberately disseminating a false claim of his death in order to protect him from the relentless hunt by the CIA, one has to note that there has been no instance in the past of Al Qaeda or its affiliates disseminating false claims of death in order to protect their leaders.
6. There had been instances in the past of Pakistani agencies claiming to have killed high-value targets, with the claims subsequently proving to be false. A report in September 2009 disseminated by Pakistani sources regarding the death of Ilyas in a Drone strike subsequently proved to be false. At that time, no claim or admission of his death had been made by the 313 Brigade or the HUJI.
7. Thus, one can be reasonably ---though not totally—certain that the CIA has scored another high-value success in eliminating Ilyas. This will further add to the disruption in the command and control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. After Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was reportedly killed in a Drone strike some months ago in the FATA region, Ilyas is the second jihadi terrorist of Kashmiri origin associated with Al Qaeda to have been killed by the CIA. He hailed from the Bhimber area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
8. Ilyas was often compared to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, but he was not of the same class as KSM in conceiving and executing spectacular terrorist strikes.
9. His value to Al Qaeda arose from the fact that he had a wide network of contacts not only in the Pakistani Armed Forces and intelligence agencies, but also in the diaspora of Pakistani origin in the West. This enabled him to find new non-Arab volunteers for Al Qaeda’s operations in foreign soil.
10. However, it has to be noted that his spectacular successes were mostly in the Af-Pak and Indian regions. None of his planned operations in the West---including the plan to blow up the offices of the Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the Holy Prophet in 1995, reached a successful culmination.
11.Ilyas did not have a technical bent of mind like KSM, but he developed an expertise in organising complex swarm attacks using the commando tactics of special forces. The increasing number of such successful swarm attacks by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani network in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan bore his signature and signs of his expertise and training. It remains to be seen whether his death will have any impact on the ability of Al Qaeda and its affiliates to carry out such swarm attacks in future. ( 5-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not allowed the death of Osama bin Laden in a raid by US naval commandos at his hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2,2011,to slow down its hunt for other high-value targets of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan.
2. Its relentless search for them through newly-created human sources and Drone (pilotless plane) strikes has been kept up. The successful commando raid at Abbottabad has added to the already existing disruption in the command and control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Their remaining leaders are on the run re-locating themselves in new sanctuaries due to a fear that their old sanctuaries might already be within the knowledge of the CIA as a result of its scrutiny of the documents and computer material seized from OBL's hide-out.
3. Their hurried efforts towards re-location have provided the CIA and its Drones new opportunities to run them down and eliminate them. Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the so-called 313 Brigade of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), one of the constituent units of Al Qaeda’s International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, appears to have been successfully hunted down and eliminated along with some associates---all Pakistanis--- in a Drone strike near Wana in South Waziristan on the night of June 3,2011.
4. Though their bodies are reported to have been mutilated beyond recognition and quickly buried by the locals thereby making physical or forensic identification impossible, the admission by a self-proclaimed representative of the HUJI in Fax messages sent to the local media of the fact of Ilyas’ death in a Drone strike has added strength to the widely-held belief in the South Waziristan area that Ilyas is no more.
5. While one cannot rule out the possibility of the HUJI or its 313 Brigade deliberately disseminating a false claim of his death in order to protect him from the relentless hunt by the CIA, one has to note that there has been no instance in the past of Al Qaeda or its affiliates disseminating false claims of death in order to protect their leaders.
6. There had been instances in the past of Pakistani agencies claiming to have killed high-value targets, with the claims subsequently proving to be false. A report in September 2009 disseminated by Pakistani sources regarding the death of Ilyas in a Drone strike subsequently proved to be false. At that time, no claim or admission of his death had been made by the 313 Brigade or the HUJI.
7. Thus, one can be reasonably ---though not totally—certain that the CIA has scored another high-value success in eliminating Ilyas. This will further add to the disruption in the command and control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. After Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was reportedly killed in a Drone strike some months ago in the FATA region, Ilyas is the second jihadi terrorist of Kashmiri origin associated with Al Qaeda to have been killed by the CIA. He hailed from the Bhimber area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
8. Ilyas was often compared to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, but he was not of the same class as KSM in conceiving and executing spectacular terrorist strikes.
9. His value to Al Qaeda arose from the fact that he had a wide network of contacts not only in the Pakistani Armed Forces and intelligence agencies, but also in the diaspora of Pakistani origin in the West. This enabled him to find new non-Arab volunteers for Al Qaeda’s operations in foreign soil.
10. However, it has to be noted that his spectacular successes were mostly in the Af-Pak and Indian regions. None of his planned operations in the West---including the plan to blow up the offices of the Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the Holy Prophet in 1995, reached a successful culmination.
11.Ilyas did not have a technical bent of mind like KSM, but he developed an expertise in organising complex swarm attacks using the commando tactics of special forces. The increasing number of such successful swarm attacks by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani network in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan bore his signature and signs of his expertise and training. It remains to be seen whether his death will have any impact on the ability of Al Qaeda and its affiliates to carry out such swarm attacks in future. ( 5-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, June 4, 2011
HAM-HANDED HANDLING OF BABA RAMDEV’S MOVEMENT
B.RAMAN
The ham-handed handling of Baba Ramdev’s movement against foreign bank accounts of Indian nationals by the Government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh does not speak well either of the Government headed by him or of the Congress (I) headed by Mrs.Sonia Gandhi or of the senior bureaucracy advising the PM.
2. Public anger against the perceived lack of action by the Government to detect and proceed legally against the holders of illegal accounts abroad had been building up at least for a year, if not longer. This anger was more faithfully and accurately reflected in the NET than in the print and electronic media.
3.While the electronic media played a commendable role in reflecting public anger over the foot-dragging by the Government in taking action on charges of corruption against certain political leaders, it did not take serious note of the NET anger over Government’s perceived inaction against illegal accounts held abroad by Indian nationals.
4.Repeated examples of cover-up by the Government in the Bofors case where one had useful leads of some illegal accounts held abroad by some of the dramatis personae in the Bofors scandal created strong suspicions in the minds of many that there must be other such instances of cover-up by the Government to prevent the truth from being found out in respect of foreign accounts.
5. The Government did face a genuine difficulty in taking action since the co-operation of foreign Governments was involved. But there have been instances where other Governments such as those of the US and Germany had overcome such difficulties and successfully elicited the co-operation of countries such as Switzerland for action against financial wrong-doers.
6.Adding to these suspicions in the public mind was the evasive reactions of the Government to the leads coming from Wikileaks on this issue. Instead of taking these leads sincerely and seriously and examining how the Government could use them, the Government treated them casually as if the leads found in the Wikileaks disclosures were of no significance or importance.
7.The Government thus failed to follow up vigorously on the few leads that were forthcoming, thereby creating---rightly or wrongly-- an impression in the public mind that the Government is not serious about taking action to detect and prosecute holders of illegal foreign bank accounts.
8. The Government not only failed to act, but it also failed to notice how public anger was building up on this issue in the NET. Since this anger was not reflected by the print and electronic media, the Government thought that it could continue to get away with its inaction, amounting to a cover-up of a serious problem.
9.There are various ways in which the Government could have acted in order to remove this impression in the public mind about studied inaction by the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Congress (I).
10. The PM could have addressed the people and interacted with civil society leaders agitating on this issue in order to convince them about the seriousness of the Government’s plans to deal with this issue. He didn’t. He maintained a sphinx-like silence, which comes naturally to him.
11.The Prime Minister could have visited countries like Switzerland which attract financial wrong-doers in order to seek their co-operation in the matter. He could have made it clear to their leaders that future development of our trade with those countries would depend on their co-operation with India in detecting and prosecuting financial wrong-doers. He didn’t.
12.He could have set up a Task Force consisting of experts in financial intelligence collection and investigation to study how countries such as the US and Germany have dealt with this issue and draw lessons. He didn’t.
13. He could have asked the same Task Force to study the working of our institutions responsible for financial intelligence collection and investigation in order to identify deficiencies and remove them. He didn’t.
14. He could have set up a mechanism for keeping the public continuously informed of the actions being taken by the Government. He didn’t.
15. When he heard that Baba Ramdev was planning to agitate on this issue in a big way, the PM should have asked his emissaries to contact him, explain what the Government has already been doing and what it intended doing in future and advised him not to embark on an agitationl approach which could prove counter-productive.
16. Instead of doing so, the Government mistakenly thought that it could benefit from the support base of the Baba to reduce the support base of Anna Hazare. It was ridiculous to have sent a group of senior Ministers to meet the Baba at the airport on his arrival and negotiate with him there. The negotiations with the Baba should have been before he arrived in New Delhi and not after his arrival at the airport or in a well-known hotel.
17. Through its actions and inactions, the Government unnecessarily and unwisely built up the image of the Baba. When the Government found to its consternation that the Baba was not as malleable as it thought he would be, it swung to the other extreme of midnight action using tear-smoke to put an end to the hunger-strike. The way the Government acted would have recalled to the minds of many how the Indira Gandhi Government used to act during the days of the Emergency between 1975 and 1977. If the Government had wanted to act strongly against the Baba, the right time for his arrest would have been before his arrival in New Delhi or on his arrival at the airport. Instead of sending his senior Ministers to hail him, the Prime Minister could have sent the police to arrest him and take him away from New Delhi.
18. The Government and the Congress (I)) due to their inability to think lucidly and act convincingly and meaningfully have landed themselves in a messy situation with likely negative consequences.
19. The first step for getting out of this mess is to convince the public that they have taken note of its anger and are serious about dealing with this issue. The Prime Minister should address the nation, exercise his personal leadership, keep the Ministers and party spokesmen under control instead of making highly unwise and potentially provocative statements and make it clear to the party and Mrs.Sonia Gandhi that he would not brook any interference in this matter. He should make it clear that he would be prepared to quit as the PM if there was any interference. (5-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The ham-handed handling of Baba Ramdev’s movement against foreign bank accounts of Indian nationals by the Government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh does not speak well either of the Government headed by him or of the Congress (I) headed by Mrs.Sonia Gandhi or of the senior bureaucracy advising the PM.
2. Public anger against the perceived lack of action by the Government to detect and proceed legally against the holders of illegal accounts abroad had been building up at least for a year, if not longer. This anger was more faithfully and accurately reflected in the NET than in the print and electronic media.
3.While the electronic media played a commendable role in reflecting public anger over the foot-dragging by the Government in taking action on charges of corruption against certain political leaders, it did not take serious note of the NET anger over Government’s perceived inaction against illegal accounts held abroad by Indian nationals.
4.Repeated examples of cover-up by the Government in the Bofors case where one had useful leads of some illegal accounts held abroad by some of the dramatis personae in the Bofors scandal created strong suspicions in the minds of many that there must be other such instances of cover-up by the Government to prevent the truth from being found out in respect of foreign accounts.
5. The Government did face a genuine difficulty in taking action since the co-operation of foreign Governments was involved. But there have been instances where other Governments such as those of the US and Germany had overcome such difficulties and successfully elicited the co-operation of countries such as Switzerland for action against financial wrong-doers.
6.Adding to these suspicions in the public mind was the evasive reactions of the Government to the leads coming from Wikileaks on this issue. Instead of taking these leads sincerely and seriously and examining how the Government could use them, the Government treated them casually as if the leads found in the Wikileaks disclosures were of no significance or importance.
7.The Government thus failed to follow up vigorously on the few leads that were forthcoming, thereby creating---rightly or wrongly-- an impression in the public mind that the Government is not serious about taking action to detect and prosecute holders of illegal foreign bank accounts.
8. The Government not only failed to act, but it also failed to notice how public anger was building up on this issue in the NET. Since this anger was not reflected by the print and electronic media, the Government thought that it could continue to get away with its inaction, amounting to a cover-up of a serious problem.
9.There are various ways in which the Government could have acted in order to remove this impression in the public mind about studied inaction by the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Congress (I).
10. The PM could have addressed the people and interacted with civil society leaders agitating on this issue in order to convince them about the seriousness of the Government’s plans to deal with this issue. He didn’t. He maintained a sphinx-like silence, which comes naturally to him.
11.The Prime Minister could have visited countries like Switzerland which attract financial wrong-doers in order to seek their co-operation in the matter. He could have made it clear to their leaders that future development of our trade with those countries would depend on their co-operation with India in detecting and prosecuting financial wrong-doers. He didn’t.
12.He could have set up a Task Force consisting of experts in financial intelligence collection and investigation to study how countries such as the US and Germany have dealt with this issue and draw lessons. He didn’t.
13. He could have asked the same Task Force to study the working of our institutions responsible for financial intelligence collection and investigation in order to identify deficiencies and remove them. He didn’t.
14. He could have set up a mechanism for keeping the public continuously informed of the actions being taken by the Government. He didn’t.
15. When he heard that Baba Ramdev was planning to agitate on this issue in a big way, the PM should have asked his emissaries to contact him, explain what the Government has already been doing and what it intended doing in future and advised him not to embark on an agitationl approach which could prove counter-productive.
16. Instead of doing so, the Government mistakenly thought that it could benefit from the support base of the Baba to reduce the support base of Anna Hazare. It was ridiculous to have sent a group of senior Ministers to meet the Baba at the airport on his arrival and negotiate with him there. The negotiations with the Baba should have been before he arrived in New Delhi and not after his arrival at the airport or in a well-known hotel.
17. Through its actions and inactions, the Government unnecessarily and unwisely built up the image of the Baba. When the Government found to its consternation that the Baba was not as malleable as it thought he would be, it swung to the other extreme of midnight action using tear-smoke to put an end to the hunger-strike. The way the Government acted would have recalled to the minds of many how the Indira Gandhi Government used to act during the days of the Emergency between 1975 and 1977. If the Government had wanted to act strongly against the Baba, the right time for his arrest would have been before his arrival in New Delhi or on his arrival at the airport. Instead of sending his senior Ministers to hail him, the Prime Minister could have sent the police to arrest him and take him away from New Delhi.
18. The Government and the Congress (I)) due to their inability to think lucidly and act convincingly and meaningfully have landed themselves in a messy situation with likely negative consequences.
19. The first step for getting out of this mess is to convince the public that they have taken note of its anger and are serious about dealing with this issue. The Prime Minister should address the nation, exercise his personal leadership, keep the Ministers and party spokesmen under control instead of making highly unwise and potentially provocative statements and make it clear to the party and Mrs.Sonia Gandhi that he would not brook any interference in this matter. He should make it clear that he would be prepared to quit as the PM if there was any interference. (5-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
UNCORROBORATED RUMOURS OF ILYAS KASHMIRI’S DEATH
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 724
B.RAMAN
There have been uncorroborated rumours since the forenoon of June 4,2011, claiming that Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the 313 Brigade, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, was killed in a Drone (pilotless plane) strike by the US in South Waziristan on June 3,2011.
2. The rumours started circulating following a breaking news carried by “Dawn” of Karachi in its web site stating that according to the Urdu service of the BBC radio, Ilyas was among nine persons killed in the Drone strike.
3. According to the BBC report as cited by “Dawn”, officials in South Waziristan told BBC Urdu that a US drone attack targeted a group of armed militants 20 kilometres from the Wana bazaar. The official said the attack killed nine people and injured three others. He added that those killed in the attack were believed to be militants from Punjab. Locals and witnesses told BBC Urdu that Kashmiri had also died in the Drone attack. Witnesses said Kashmiri had arrived in South Waziristan from the Khyber tribal region.
4. The reliable “Long War Journal” of the US, which documents Drone strikes on a day-to-day basis, has reported as follows: “ US Predators attacked terrorists in an area of the Pakistani tribal agency of South Waziristan that is under Taliban control on June 3. Today's strike is the first after a nine-day-long lull. Unmanned Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in the Wana area in South Waziristan today, killing five "militants," according to reports from SAMAA and Xinhua. No senior Taliban, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders or operatives have been reported killed in the airstrike.”
5. In a report datelined Peshawar, the SAMAA news agency of Pakistan has reported as follows: “PESHAWAR: The mastermind of PNS Mehran attack, Ilyas Kashmiri, has been reportedly killed in a missile strike in Miran Shah area of South Waziristan, SAMAA learnt Saturday. Sources told Kashmiri was present when the recent attack took place in the area where five terrorists have been killed including Kashmiri. No official has confirmed Kashmiri’s death in the missile attack.”
6. One does not know what is the source of the Xinhua report. The “Long War Journal’s” observation that “no senior Taliban, Al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders or operatives have been reported killed in the airstrike” appears to be its assessment. It has not cited any source for this.
7. Neither the Pakistani nor the US authorities have corroborated these rumours. A September 2009 report regarding the death of Ilyas in a Drone strike in South Waziristan proved to be false. If Ilyas has been killed, this will be reflected in the electronic chatter on phones and the NET. The US authorities must be closely monitoring it. One has to await their confirmation or a statement from the 313 Brigade or Al Qaeda. ( 4-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
There have been uncorroborated rumours since the forenoon of June 4,2011, claiming that Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the 313 Brigade, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, was killed in a Drone (pilotless plane) strike by the US in South Waziristan on June 3,2011.
2. The rumours started circulating following a breaking news carried by “Dawn” of Karachi in its web site stating that according to the Urdu service of the BBC radio, Ilyas was among nine persons killed in the Drone strike.
3. According to the BBC report as cited by “Dawn”, officials in South Waziristan told BBC Urdu that a US drone attack targeted a group of armed militants 20 kilometres from the Wana bazaar. The official said the attack killed nine people and injured three others. He added that those killed in the attack were believed to be militants from Punjab. Locals and witnesses told BBC Urdu that Kashmiri had also died in the Drone attack. Witnesses said Kashmiri had arrived in South Waziristan from the Khyber tribal region.
4. The reliable “Long War Journal” of the US, which documents Drone strikes on a day-to-day basis, has reported as follows: “ US Predators attacked terrorists in an area of the Pakistani tribal agency of South Waziristan that is under Taliban control on June 3. Today's strike is the first after a nine-day-long lull. Unmanned Predators or the more deadly Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in the Wana area in South Waziristan today, killing five "militants," according to reports from SAMAA and Xinhua. No senior Taliban, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders or operatives have been reported killed in the airstrike.”
5. In a report datelined Peshawar, the SAMAA news agency of Pakistan has reported as follows: “PESHAWAR: The mastermind of PNS Mehran attack, Ilyas Kashmiri, has been reportedly killed in a missile strike in Miran Shah area of South Waziristan, SAMAA learnt Saturday. Sources told Kashmiri was present when the recent attack took place in the area where five terrorists have been killed including Kashmiri. No official has confirmed Kashmiri’s death in the missile attack.”
6. One does not know what is the source of the Xinhua report. The “Long War Journal’s” observation that “no senior Taliban, Al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders or operatives have been reported killed in the airstrike” appears to be its assessment. It has not cited any source for this.
7. Neither the Pakistani nor the US authorities have corroborated these rumours. A September 2009 report regarding the death of Ilyas in a Drone strike in South Waziristan proved to be false. If Ilyas has been killed, this will be reflected in the electronic chatter on phones and the NET. The US authorities must be closely monitoring it. One has to await their confirmation or a statement from the 313 Brigade or Al Qaeda. ( 4-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, June 3, 2011
YEMEN: A COMPLEX STRUGGLE FOR POWER
B.RAMAN
Since January last, Yemen has been going through a complex power struggle with Yemeni characteristics, resulting in an almost civil war situation which has already seen the death of over 350 people.
2.An inter-tribal armed struggle for power and a peaceful struggle of the youth for political reforms and a genuine democracy have been going on side by side with the democratic youth finding themselves increasingly marginalised.
3. Even the interest of the US and other Western countries has been not in helping the pro-democracy forces win their struggle for political reforms, but in helping to bring about an agreement among the tribal leaders that could pave the way for the exit of President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power and the formation of an interim Government which could pave the way for a new political set-up.
4. The six-power Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), with Saudi Arabia in the forefront, is being encouraged by the West to bring about such an inter-tribal agreement. The fact that the pro-democracy youth has no role in the GCC-initiated attempts to reach such an agreement is an indication that the objective of the West is not democracy--- at least not in the immediate future--- but internal stability based on a new inter-tribal equation which would be favourable to Saudi Arabia and the West.
5. In emulation of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, large numbers of youth started a movement for political reforms and genuine democracy. It has since been totally overshadowed by the inter-tribal power struggle, with the pro-democracy youth being increasingly marginalised.
6. It has consequently lost its jasmine flavour and has become a violent struggle for power involving different tribal clans. Hashem Nidal, of the Independent Movement for Change, has said in an interview: "They (the tribal leaders)wanted to push the revolution towards violence and we refuse this completely. All our protests across the country were peaceful and we want it to be away from this violence. We are co-ordinating with many protesters across the country to make sure they don't fall into the trap of violence. After three months of great efforts in raising awareness among people to avoid violence, we managed to reach a level of understanding that refuses violence. We are looking to build our identity and to topple this regime by peaceful means."
7. The dramatis personae involved in the inter-tribal power struggle are the very forces responsible for Yemen remaining a poor Arab country ruled by a ruthless dictatorship. These forces are determined to see that Yemen remains that way with power passing from one tribal group to another. They are making opportunistic use of the youth movement without letting it pose a threat to the tribal domination of power.
8.On the one side of the power struggle are Saleh, a Zaydi Shia in a predominantly Sunni country, who became the President of North Yemen in 1978 and took over leadership of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 following unification with the south and his sons and nephews. His eldest son Ahmed Ali Abdallah Saleh was appointed as the head of the Republican Guard in 2000. Another influential son Ali Saleh al-Ahmar was the Military Attache in the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, and was subsequently Director in the office of the head of the military. Nephews Tarik, Yahya and Amar command elite security and intelligence units, trained and funded by Western Governments .
9.Fighting on the other side for the exit of Saleh from power and for he and his sons going into political exile are Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar, the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, who succeeded his father Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar when he died in 2007. His father was the founder of the Islamist Islah opposition party. He is supported by his brother Hamid al-Ahmar, who is a prominent businessman, and another brother, Sheikh Hussein Bin Abdullah al-Ahmar.
10. The inter-tribal clan conflict has been aggravated by the defection from the ranks of Saleh of one of his kinsmen army commander Gen Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, who commanded the 1st armoured tank division and headed the north-west military region. Gen Mohsin is not related to the al-Ahmar family. Reported personal differences with Saleh’s eldest son Ahmed Ali led to Mohsin’s defection in March. His defection has weakened the President without necessarily adding strength to the opposition tribal camp.
11.The GCC has been exercising pressure on Saleh to hand over power to an interim national unity Government and go into political exile along with his sons and nephews. He is not prepared to do so unless the leaders of the Al-Ahmar clan are also made to leave the country. The pro-democracy youth, on the other hand, want that Saleh should not be allowed to leave the country, but should be arrested and prosecuted on various charges.
12. The violent clashes between the Saleh and Al-Ahmar clans led to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Saleh on June 3. He escaped with injuries ---reportedly to his head—when a shell fell on a mosque inside the Presidential compound during the Friday prayers. The shell explosion killed three officers of the elite Republican Guard. Deputy Prime Minister Gen.Rashad al-Alimi was reportedly seriously injured. Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawar suffered burns to his face. Among others injured were Parliament Speaker Yahya al-Raie, Abdulaziz Abdulghani, head of Yemen's consultative council, Member of Parliament Yasser al-Awadi, and Sanaa Governor Noman Duweik.
13. In an audio message, Saleh has blamed sons of Al-Ahmar for the attempt to kill him. If there is a consequent fight to the finish between the rival clans, the pro-democracy forces may be further handicapped and Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), which operates from the remote areas of Yemen, may be the ultimate beneficiary. Saleh was co-operating with the US in its counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda. This co-operation may be affected by his preoccupation with the internal fighting and consequent instability. Even if he is forced to leave by the West and the GCC, it is doubtful whether the successor interim Government may be able to act effectively against AQAP.( 4-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Since January last, Yemen has been going through a complex power struggle with Yemeni characteristics, resulting in an almost civil war situation which has already seen the death of over 350 people.
2.An inter-tribal armed struggle for power and a peaceful struggle of the youth for political reforms and a genuine democracy have been going on side by side with the democratic youth finding themselves increasingly marginalised.
3. Even the interest of the US and other Western countries has been not in helping the pro-democracy forces win their struggle for political reforms, but in helping to bring about an agreement among the tribal leaders that could pave the way for the exit of President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power and the formation of an interim Government which could pave the way for a new political set-up.
4. The six-power Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), with Saudi Arabia in the forefront, is being encouraged by the West to bring about such an inter-tribal agreement. The fact that the pro-democracy youth has no role in the GCC-initiated attempts to reach such an agreement is an indication that the objective of the West is not democracy--- at least not in the immediate future--- but internal stability based on a new inter-tribal equation which would be favourable to Saudi Arabia and the West.
5. In emulation of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, large numbers of youth started a movement for political reforms and genuine democracy. It has since been totally overshadowed by the inter-tribal power struggle, with the pro-democracy youth being increasingly marginalised.
6. It has consequently lost its jasmine flavour and has become a violent struggle for power involving different tribal clans. Hashem Nidal, of the Independent Movement for Change, has said in an interview: "They (the tribal leaders)wanted to push the revolution towards violence and we refuse this completely. All our protests across the country were peaceful and we want it to be away from this violence. We are co-ordinating with many protesters across the country to make sure they don't fall into the trap of violence. After three months of great efforts in raising awareness among people to avoid violence, we managed to reach a level of understanding that refuses violence. We are looking to build our identity and to topple this regime by peaceful means."
7. The dramatis personae involved in the inter-tribal power struggle are the very forces responsible for Yemen remaining a poor Arab country ruled by a ruthless dictatorship. These forces are determined to see that Yemen remains that way with power passing from one tribal group to another. They are making opportunistic use of the youth movement without letting it pose a threat to the tribal domination of power.
8.On the one side of the power struggle are Saleh, a Zaydi Shia in a predominantly Sunni country, who became the President of North Yemen in 1978 and took over leadership of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 following unification with the south and his sons and nephews. His eldest son Ahmed Ali Abdallah Saleh was appointed as the head of the Republican Guard in 2000. Another influential son Ali Saleh al-Ahmar was the Military Attache in the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, and was subsequently Director in the office of the head of the military. Nephews Tarik, Yahya and Amar command elite security and intelligence units, trained and funded by Western Governments .
9.Fighting on the other side for the exit of Saleh from power and for he and his sons going into political exile are Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar, the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, who succeeded his father Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar when he died in 2007. His father was the founder of the Islamist Islah opposition party. He is supported by his brother Hamid al-Ahmar, who is a prominent businessman, and another brother, Sheikh Hussein Bin Abdullah al-Ahmar.
10. The inter-tribal clan conflict has been aggravated by the defection from the ranks of Saleh of one of his kinsmen army commander Gen Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, who commanded the 1st armoured tank division and headed the north-west military region. Gen Mohsin is not related to the al-Ahmar family. Reported personal differences with Saleh’s eldest son Ahmed Ali led to Mohsin’s defection in March. His defection has weakened the President without necessarily adding strength to the opposition tribal camp.
11.The GCC has been exercising pressure on Saleh to hand over power to an interim national unity Government and go into political exile along with his sons and nephews. He is not prepared to do so unless the leaders of the Al-Ahmar clan are also made to leave the country. The pro-democracy youth, on the other hand, want that Saleh should not be allowed to leave the country, but should be arrested and prosecuted on various charges.
12. The violent clashes between the Saleh and Al-Ahmar clans led to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Saleh on June 3. He escaped with injuries ---reportedly to his head—when a shell fell on a mosque inside the Presidential compound during the Friday prayers. The shell explosion killed three officers of the elite Republican Guard. Deputy Prime Minister Gen.Rashad al-Alimi was reportedly seriously injured. Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawar suffered burns to his face. Among others injured were Parliament Speaker Yahya al-Raie, Abdulaziz Abdulghani, head of Yemen's consultative council, Member of Parliament Yasser al-Awadi, and Sanaa Governor Noman Duweik.
13. In an audio message, Saleh has blamed sons of Al-Ahmar for the attempt to kill him. If there is a consequent fight to the finish between the rival clans, the pro-democracy forces may be further handicapped and Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), which operates from the remote areas of Yemen, may be the ultimate beneficiary. Saleh was co-operating with the US in its counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda. This co-operation may be affected by his preoccupation with the internal fighting and consequent instability. Even if he is forced to leave by the West and the GCC, it is doubtful whether the successor interim Government may be able to act effectively against AQAP.( 4-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, June 2, 2011
PLA LAUNCHES GRIM INTERNET STRUGGLE
B.RAMAN
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has banned the use of blogs, microblogs and other social web sites by Chinese military personnel. It has described the ban as part of its grim Internet struggle.
2. A report on this carried by the Party-owned “People’s Daily” on June 2,2001, is annexed below. ( 3-6-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail” seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China's PLA bans soldiers from social websites
Making online friends could play into the hands of the "enemy", according to China's People's Liberation Army, which has said its roughly 2.3 million soldiers will be banned from using social media.
The world's largest military force has notified service men and women that it will strictly enforce the ban to "safeguard military secrets and the purity and solidarity" of the PLA, state media said this week.
The People's Liberation Daily, the armed forces' official newspaper, said passing on personal details such as a soldier's address, duties or contact details could risk revealing the location of military bases.
It added that particular risks exist in users posting photos of themselves, such as during training, which could divulge military capabilities and equipment.
The ban was included in regulations announced last year that proscribed soldiers from launching websites or writing blogs, the paper added.
But in a sign that the ban was apparently being ignored in a country where social media are wildly popular, the military brass has taken the step of re-emphasizing the restriction, warning of a "grim struggle" on the Internet.
Officers and soldiers must be made to understand the "real dangers" of making friends online and to "strengthen their knowledge of the enemy situation," it said, without elaborating.
China has nearly half a billion online users, according to official figures, and Chinese-language social media sites similar to Facebook and Twitter - which are blocked by the country's censors - count hundreds of millions of users.
Defense News
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has banned the use of blogs, microblogs and other social web sites by Chinese military personnel. It has described the ban as part of its grim Internet struggle.
2. A report on this carried by the Party-owned “People’s Daily” on June 2,2001, is annexed below. ( 3-6-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail” seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China's PLA bans soldiers from social websites
Making online friends could play into the hands of the "enemy", according to China's People's Liberation Army, which has said its roughly 2.3 million soldiers will be banned from using social media.
The world's largest military force has notified service men and women that it will strictly enforce the ban to "safeguard military secrets and the purity and solidarity" of the PLA, state media said this week.
The People's Liberation Daily, the armed forces' official newspaper, said passing on personal details such as a soldier's address, duties or contact details could risk revealing the location of military bases.
It added that particular risks exist in users posting photos of themselves, such as during training, which could divulge military capabilities and equipment.
The ban was included in regulations announced last year that proscribed soldiers from launching websites or writing blogs, the paper added.
But in a sign that the ban was apparently being ignored in a country where social media are wildly popular, the military brass has taken the step of re-emphasizing the restriction, warning of a "grim struggle" on the Internet.
Officers and soldiers must be made to understand the "real dangers" of making friends online and to "strengthen their knowledge of the enemy situation," it said, without elaborating.
China has nearly half a billion online users, according to official figures, and Chinese-language social media sites similar to Facebook and Twitter - which are blocked by the country's censors - count hundreds of millions of users.
Defense News
INSIDE PAKISTANI SECURITY FORCES
( Reproduced from "Friday Times" of Lahore, dated June 3,2011)
Inside the armed forces
Radicals in ranks
Abdullah Malik
Takes a look at incidents of support for terrorists from within the armed forces and police
Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals
During the trial of Raymond Davis, a policeman was proudly wearing a militant organisation's badge. Even after being admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge
Despite Gen Zia’s Islamisation, the promotion of piety in the barracks, and the support for puritanical movements that were allowed to organise sermons, the armed forces have still essentially retained a secular outlook. Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals. Intelligence networks help purge out the radical members of the forces.
But there have been many instances when radical Islamists have penetrated the armed forces and other law-enforcement agencies and threatened the state security mechanism. It is very well known that the lower ranks of the Punjab Police in district of Southern Punjab suffer from an infestation of sympathisers of militant organisation and this hurts the policing ability of the force. That was evident in the 1990s, when the Punjab Police was at the forefront of the war against sectarian terrorism and lower ranking officials had collaborated with the banned outfits on numerous occasions to tip them off or facilitate counter-attacks. An offshoot of the Shia militant organisation Sipah-e-Muhammad was led by a retired major, Ashraf Ali Shah.
In the two assassination attempts on former president Gen Pervez Musharraf, the PAF arrested 57 soldiers (Dawn June 25, 2009), five were awarded death sentences (mostly corporals, junior technicians), one army jawan (from the DSG) was hanged. Others, awarded sentences of varying lengths, included two soldiers of the SSG. Explosives used in the first attempt were in fact stolen from a PAF depot by one of the convicted airmen (Daily Times February 25, 2005). Some of the airmen were sermoned to radicalisation in-house and others “got a one-year leave on the pretext of accompanying the preaching groups, but when they were later arrested, it transpired that they had in fact been training with different militant groups” (The News May 24, 2011). Another three young airmen were sentenced for association with the banned Jaish-e-Muhammad in the arrests that followed (Oct 19, 2005).
The assassination of ex-GOC of SSG Maj Gen Ameer Faisal Alavi was plotted by a retired major, Haroon Ashiq. After joining the Lashkar-e-Tayyba, he moved on to work with Ilyas Kashmiri of the Brigade 313 linked with Al Qaeda. Ashiq’s own brother, Captain (r) Khurram, had retired from the army only to join Taliban and other fighters in Afghanistan. He was killed in 2007 in Helmand province. Various other retired soldiers, many of whom had liasioned with the Taliban during the ‘90s, returned to Afghanistan to fight on voluntary basis too.
Maj (r) Ashiq is not the only officer with links with Al Qaeda. In 2003, Major Adil Qudoos of 45 Signals was arrested and later sentenced for being linked to the militant network. The infamous Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was arrested from the house of his brother in Rawalpindi. Linked to this web of militants were Lt Col Khalid Mahmood Abbasi of Signals, Lt Col Abdul Ghaffar posted at the Army Aviation Command Rawalpindi, Maj Ataullah Khan Mahmood from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch, Major Rohail Sarfraz of HQ II Corps and Capt Dr Usman Zafar. The first three were given various sentences while the latter were dismissed from service.
More recently, retired Maj Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed has been found to be conclusively involved in planning of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks in some way and planning attacks on a Danish newspaper. Connected to the LeT, he was arrested by the authorities, but his current status remains unknown.
Another case of high level militant infiltration involved Col Shahid Bashir, retired Sq Ldr Nadeem Ahmed Shah (a member of the Rawalpindi bar) and a civilian employee of the Air Weapons Complex (AWC). Associated with the proscribed Hizbut Tehrir that is gaining membership amongst private university students across the country in alarming numbers, they are accused of spying on, leaking info about and planning attacks on the Shamsi Air Field. Muhammad Altaf, a civilian employee of the National Development Complex (NDC) that comes under NESCOM and deals with ballistic missile development was similarly arrested for alleged links with a banned outfit. His status remains that of a “missing person” (Dawn News TV “Gumshuda”).
Radicalisation at the highest levels has been witnessed earlier too, in the failed 1995 “Operation Khilafa” coup attempt. Led by DG Infantry at the GHQ, Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, the plan involved taking over the GHQ at the time of the Corps Commander Conference, killing the high ranking officers and then taking over the country to impose a Taliban-esque radical Sunni government. Convicted or dismissed alongwith Maj Gen Abbasi were Brig Mustansar Billah, Col Inayatullah Khan, Col Azad Minhas, Col Abdul Hamid, Col Muhammad Iqbal, Lt Col Shamsul Islam Tahir and Lt Col Liaquat Ali Raja amongst others.
One of the most alarming factors is that the approver for the prosecution, who was the militant given the duty to provide raiders for the attack, was none other than Qari Saifullah Akhtar, an ex Harkatul Jihad Al Islami militant who is now linked to Al Qaeda and was named by Benazir Bhutto as being involved in the attacks on her life.
Radicalization in the lower ranks is equally worrying. Investigation by Dawn in May, 2010 showed that the deadly Jundullah that carried out the assassination attempt on V Corps Commander, later VCOAS Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, was raised by serving and ex-soldiers of the army and the PAF. Jundullah has become famous as a small but deadly force.
Constable Sheikh Muhammad Adil of the Sindh Police Special Branch was convicted in 2002 of being involved in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. A member of the HuJI whilst serving in the police, Adil assisted in the act of kidnapping. More recently, the section in-charge of the Computer Section at the Special Branch of the Punjab Police was found to have militant links. Accused Junior Clerk Zahid Bajwa had been recruited on a fake domicile and had a case pending against him for possession of explosives. Posted at the HQ of the Special Branch, he had access to intelligence reports and security plans, a cause of extreme worry. A constable was arrested in 2004 for being linked to the network of militants that aided Al Qaeda operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Gujrat.
These cases are just the tip of the iceberg. While the armed forces have been somewhat successful in purging militant sympathisers from within their ranks, the case of police has been extremely worrying. The case of Mumtaz Qadri alone is sufficient to become a cause for worry. During the trial of the CIA contractor Raymond Davis, one of the policemen from the escort that brought Davis to court was proudly wearing the badge of a militant organisation on his chest. Even after being furiously admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge from his uniform and nobody was able to do anything. Such cases are a cause for fear and should not be taken lightly.
The author is a free lance contributor based in Illinois, USA.
Inside the armed forces
Radicals in ranks
Abdullah Malik
Takes a look at incidents of support for terrorists from within the armed forces and police
Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals
During the trial of Raymond Davis, a policeman was proudly wearing a militant organisation's badge. Even after being admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge
Despite Gen Zia’s Islamisation, the promotion of piety in the barracks, and the support for puritanical movements that were allowed to organise sermons, the armed forces have still essentially retained a secular outlook. Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals. Intelligence networks help purge out the radical members of the forces.
But there have been many instances when radical Islamists have penetrated the armed forces and other law-enforcement agencies and threatened the state security mechanism. It is very well known that the lower ranks of the Punjab Police in district of Southern Punjab suffer from an infestation of sympathisers of militant organisation and this hurts the policing ability of the force. That was evident in the 1990s, when the Punjab Police was at the forefront of the war against sectarian terrorism and lower ranking officials had collaborated with the banned outfits on numerous occasions to tip them off or facilitate counter-attacks. An offshoot of the Shia militant organisation Sipah-e-Muhammad was led by a retired major, Ashraf Ali Shah.
In the two assassination attempts on former president Gen Pervez Musharraf, the PAF arrested 57 soldiers (Dawn June 25, 2009), five were awarded death sentences (mostly corporals, junior technicians), one army jawan (from the DSG) was hanged. Others, awarded sentences of varying lengths, included two soldiers of the SSG. Explosives used in the first attempt were in fact stolen from a PAF depot by one of the convicted airmen (Daily Times February 25, 2005). Some of the airmen were sermoned to radicalisation in-house and others “got a one-year leave on the pretext of accompanying the preaching groups, but when they were later arrested, it transpired that they had in fact been training with different militant groups” (The News May 24, 2011). Another three young airmen were sentenced for association with the banned Jaish-e-Muhammad in the arrests that followed (Oct 19, 2005).
The assassination of ex-GOC of SSG Maj Gen Ameer Faisal Alavi was plotted by a retired major, Haroon Ashiq. After joining the Lashkar-e-Tayyba, he moved on to work with Ilyas Kashmiri of the Brigade 313 linked with Al Qaeda. Ashiq’s own brother, Captain (r) Khurram, had retired from the army only to join Taliban and other fighters in Afghanistan. He was killed in 2007 in Helmand province. Various other retired soldiers, many of whom had liasioned with the Taliban during the ‘90s, returned to Afghanistan to fight on voluntary basis too.
Maj (r) Ashiq is not the only officer with links with Al Qaeda. In 2003, Major Adil Qudoos of 45 Signals was arrested and later sentenced for being linked to the militant network. The infamous Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was arrested from the house of his brother in Rawalpindi. Linked to this web of militants were Lt Col Khalid Mahmood Abbasi of Signals, Lt Col Abdul Ghaffar posted at the Army Aviation Command Rawalpindi, Maj Ataullah Khan Mahmood from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch, Major Rohail Sarfraz of HQ II Corps and Capt Dr Usman Zafar. The first three were given various sentences while the latter were dismissed from service.
More recently, retired Maj Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed has been found to be conclusively involved in planning of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks in some way and planning attacks on a Danish newspaper. Connected to the LeT, he was arrested by the authorities, but his current status remains unknown.
Another case of high level militant infiltration involved Col Shahid Bashir, retired Sq Ldr Nadeem Ahmed Shah (a member of the Rawalpindi bar) and a civilian employee of the Air Weapons Complex (AWC). Associated with the proscribed Hizbut Tehrir that is gaining membership amongst private university students across the country in alarming numbers, they are accused of spying on, leaking info about and planning attacks on the Shamsi Air Field. Muhammad Altaf, a civilian employee of the National Development Complex (NDC) that comes under NESCOM and deals with ballistic missile development was similarly arrested for alleged links with a banned outfit. His status remains that of a “missing person” (Dawn News TV “Gumshuda”).
Radicalisation at the highest levels has been witnessed earlier too, in the failed 1995 “Operation Khilafa” coup attempt. Led by DG Infantry at the GHQ, Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, the plan involved taking over the GHQ at the time of the Corps Commander Conference, killing the high ranking officers and then taking over the country to impose a Taliban-esque radical Sunni government. Convicted or dismissed alongwith Maj Gen Abbasi were Brig Mustansar Billah, Col Inayatullah Khan, Col Azad Minhas, Col Abdul Hamid, Col Muhammad Iqbal, Lt Col Shamsul Islam Tahir and Lt Col Liaquat Ali Raja amongst others.
One of the most alarming factors is that the approver for the prosecution, who was the militant given the duty to provide raiders for the attack, was none other than Qari Saifullah Akhtar, an ex Harkatul Jihad Al Islami militant who is now linked to Al Qaeda and was named by Benazir Bhutto as being involved in the attacks on her life.
Radicalization in the lower ranks is equally worrying. Investigation by Dawn in May, 2010 showed that the deadly Jundullah that carried out the assassination attempt on V Corps Commander, later VCOAS Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, was raised by serving and ex-soldiers of the army and the PAF. Jundullah has become famous as a small but deadly force.
Constable Sheikh Muhammad Adil of the Sindh Police Special Branch was convicted in 2002 of being involved in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. A member of the HuJI whilst serving in the police, Adil assisted in the act of kidnapping. More recently, the section in-charge of the Computer Section at the Special Branch of the Punjab Police was found to have militant links. Accused Junior Clerk Zahid Bajwa had been recruited on a fake domicile and had a case pending against him for possession of explosives. Posted at the HQ of the Special Branch, he had access to intelligence reports and security plans, a cause of extreme worry. A constable was arrested in 2004 for being linked to the network of militants that aided Al Qaeda operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Gujrat.
These cases are just the tip of the iceberg. While the armed forces have been somewhat successful in purging militant sympathisers from within their ranks, the case of police has been extremely worrying. The case of Mumtaz Qadri alone is sufficient to become a cause for worry. During the trial of the CIA contractor Raymond Davis, one of the policemen from the escort that brought Davis to court was proudly wearing the badge of a militant organisation on his chest. Even after being furiously admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge from his uniform and nobody was able to do anything. Such cases are a cause for fear and should not be taken lightly.
The author is a free lance contributor based in Illinois, USA.
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