B.RAMAN
(My reply to a reader's comments)
I have been in receipt of the following E-mail message from a reader:
"In your earlier articles in the past two months when you wrote about peace talks with Pakistan it had this context of cricket diplomacy and it appeared you even pushed for it and I understand it was a valid point and even recently after OBL was killed you mentioned that the new situation shouldn't affect peace talks or affect Indo- Pak relations and it seemed that you were of the opinion that the Mohali momentum should continue. In those articles you were explicit as to the reasons but this article, where you propose to continue the TTHH policy, seems to rake up old wounds which it looked like you were ok to overlook at that time.
"What I mean is in this article, there doesn't appear to be anything new which you and the rest were not knowing about Pakistan that John Kerry revealed so why & what is reason for reassessment? I understand that when you urged for the momentum of recent peace talks to continue you certainly didn't mean to forget TTHH policy but just that you probably meant to keep it aside for the time being. So what is the reason for reassessment when Pakistan hasn't made any anti-India comments (like Kayani's India centric comment or of that nature). If there were to be any new terrorist attack then fall back to TTHH policy was warranted but in the absence of, at least any apparent absence of Pakistan reverting to anti-India terrorist policy, how should your TTHH reassessment be read?
"I have been thinking about asking if in the wake of OBL killing will there be any possibility of Pak Army/ISI snubbing MMS's initiative and encouraging the jihadi terrorists to bleed India - part of its tactic to redeem the lost honor (US violating its sovereignty) and at the same time reassuring the jihadi constituency that ISI hasn't changed its policies?"
MY REPLY
My suggestion has always been to keep the capability for exercising the intermediate option available while even going out of the way to improve relations with Pakistan.Let me explain my policy once again:
1. We have to talk to Pakistan. Engage with Pakistan at different levels---political, military,intelligence, economic, people to people etc
2.With both becoming nuclear powers, the military option is out of the question. The military option should be only as a last resort when national existence is in peril.
3. We should have an intermediate option of covert action available if talks fail to make headway and Pakistan continues to use terrorism.
After 26/11, many think tanks of the world were of the view that another 26/11 cannot be avoided because India has not created for itself an intermediate option between the political and the military. There is no deterrence to more terrorism in the form of an intermediate option. I keep pleading: For God's sake, create that covert deterrence.
Unfortunately, in India, we do not have the culture of strategic analysis. One has to repeat the same point again and again and again.One feels tired.
Thanks for writing. Take care. B.Raman
Sunday, May 15, 2011
PAKISTAN—TALK, TALK, HIT, HIT
B.RAMAN
Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is presently in Afghanistan on his way to Pakistan. His visit to Pakistan has been triggered off by the discovery of Osama bin Laden living for six years in a safehaven at Abbottabad, the cradle of the Pakistan Army, where he was killed by US Naval commandos on May 2,2011. Tensions in the relations between the US and Pakistan, which had already worsened before the clandestine US raid into OBL's hide-out, have been further aggravated by the defiant refusal of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to agree to any independent enquiry into the circumstances under which OBL managed to live undetected for nearly six years.
2. The US suspects, with valid reasons, that OBL could not have lived that long in a garrison town without local support---- official or unofficial or both. Identifying and neutralising the sources of local support would be an important step forward in the fight against jihadi terrorism. The Pakistan Army and the ISI have dismissed suspicions of local support and are stonewalling demands----made in Pakistan as well as in the US--- for an independent enquiry.
3.Kerry, known in the past as a well-wisher of Pakistan and as a strong advocate of long-term aid commitments to Pakistan, has been showing signs of skepticism after May 2. He has been quoted as saying that it was “extraordinarily hard to believe” Osama could have survived in Pakistan for so long without any knowledge.
4. This skepticism seems even stronger now nearly two weeks after the death of OBL. He has been quoted as saying on May 14 at Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, where he had gone on a visit before proceeding to Pakistan : “Washington will consider all its options if it found out that Mullah Omar (Amir of the Afghan Taliban) was living in Pakistan. The United States government will always reserve all of its options to be able to protect our people. Other plots have been conducted and organised and planned out of Pakistan. It is really critical that we talk with the Pakistanis as friends. The United States wanted Pakistan to be a real ally in combating militants inside its borders, but serious questions remain in relations between the countries after Osama’s killing. We obviously want a Pakistan that is prepared to respect the interests of Afghanistan, and to be a real ally in our efforts to combat terrorism. We believe there are things that can be done better. And there are serious questions that need to be answered in that relationship. But we’re not trying to find a way to break the relationship apart, we’re trying to find a way to build it.”
5. Can Pakistan ever be a real ally against terrorism? That is a question that even well-wishers of Pakistan in the US have started posing----not in secret, but in public. Can it be trusted to fight sincerely and genuinely against terrorism? All those, who were talking of a transformational moment in the history of Pakistan in the wake of May2, would have been disappointed by the details of the in camera session of the Pakistan Parliament held on May 13, to discuss the OBL affair. Not the slightest sign of a feeling of shame that Osama was living unmolested in a Pakistani army garrison town for over five years. Not the slightest sign of a determination to find out the truth.
6. The fact that the world’s most dreaded terrorist was found living in an important garrison town did not seem to embarrass the Pakistani leaders and their Army and the ISI. What has embarrassed them is the fact that the US managed to find that out and carry out a clandestine raid to kill him. They have decided to hold a commission of enquiry only into the security failure and not into the intelligence failure. That is, they want to find out how the US carried out the raid. Nothing more.
7. Kerry has referred to other plots conducted, organized and planned out of Pakistan. Many of those plots targeted India and Indian nationals in different cities of India and in Kabul working in the Indian Embassy there. Three of those plots---all in Mumbai—involved mass fatalities---in March 1993, July 2006 and November 2008. No other city in the world has suffered so many acts of mass fatality terrorism. Pakistan has been able to carry on this policy of using terrorism as a strategic weapon because of the reluctance of the US and other members of the international community to act against it.
8. The time has come for sustained action against terrorists and their hide-outs in Pakistan. If Pakistan will not act, the international community has to. Pakistanis talk of a violation of their national sovereignty----whether at Abbottabad or in respect of the Drone strikes in the two Waziristans. Of course, they constitute violations of national sovereignty---- but they are justified violations in exercise of one’s right of self-defence.
9. There are UN resolutions that describe the state-sponsorhip of terrorism as amounting to indirect aggression against the targeted country. This indirect aggression gives one the right to exercise one’s self-defence in the territory of that country if left with no other option. Till now, Pakistan managed to get away without any negative consequences because no country was prepared to take the right of self-defence into its territory.
10. Now that the US has shown the way and taken the lead, it is important for India to follow its lead----not by doing a copy cat of Abbottabad, which would be messy between two neighbours--- but through other means, which would not be spectacular, but effective without involving any civilian casualties in Pakistan and without the use of Indian security or para-military forces or commandos for that purpose.
11. Options, suited to our needs, are available. We have to identify them, acquire the capability to use them and use them. As we acquire the capability, we have to educate the international community, particularly the US, on the serious dimensions of the problems faced by us, on our right of self-defence and on our determination to exercise that right even outside our territory if left with no other option.
12. I have endorsed strongly our Prime Minister’s initiatives for talks with Pakistan. Talks do not mean we renounce our right of self-defence. The two have to go together. I have always advocated a policy of “Talk, Talk, Hit, Hit”----keep talking so long as the talks promise results, but be prepared to hit if the talks prove counter-productive. ( 15-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is presently in Afghanistan on his way to Pakistan. His visit to Pakistan has been triggered off by the discovery of Osama bin Laden living for six years in a safehaven at Abbottabad, the cradle of the Pakistan Army, where he was killed by US Naval commandos on May 2,2011. Tensions in the relations between the US and Pakistan, which had already worsened before the clandestine US raid into OBL's hide-out, have been further aggravated by the defiant refusal of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to agree to any independent enquiry into the circumstances under which OBL managed to live undetected for nearly six years.
2. The US suspects, with valid reasons, that OBL could not have lived that long in a garrison town without local support---- official or unofficial or both. Identifying and neutralising the sources of local support would be an important step forward in the fight against jihadi terrorism. The Pakistan Army and the ISI have dismissed suspicions of local support and are stonewalling demands----made in Pakistan as well as in the US--- for an independent enquiry.
3.Kerry, known in the past as a well-wisher of Pakistan and as a strong advocate of long-term aid commitments to Pakistan, has been showing signs of skepticism after May 2. He has been quoted as saying that it was “extraordinarily hard to believe” Osama could have survived in Pakistan for so long without any knowledge.
4. This skepticism seems even stronger now nearly two weeks after the death of OBL. He has been quoted as saying on May 14 at Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, where he had gone on a visit before proceeding to Pakistan : “Washington will consider all its options if it found out that Mullah Omar (Amir of the Afghan Taliban) was living in Pakistan. The United States government will always reserve all of its options to be able to protect our people. Other plots have been conducted and organised and planned out of Pakistan. It is really critical that we talk with the Pakistanis as friends. The United States wanted Pakistan to be a real ally in combating militants inside its borders, but serious questions remain in relations between the countries after Osama’s killing. We obviously want a Pakistan that is prepared to respect the interests of Afghanistan, and to be a real ally in our efforts to combat terrorism. We believe there are things that can be done better. And there are serious questions that need to be answered in that relationship. But we’re not trying to find a way to break the relationship apart, we’re trying to find a way to build it.”
5. Can Pakistan ever be a real ally against terrorism? That is a question that even well-wishers of Pakistan in the US have started posing----not in secret, but in public. Can it be trusted to fight sincerely and genuinely against terrorism? All those, who were talking of a transformational moment in the history of Pakistan in the wake of May2, would have been disappointed by the details of the in camera session of the Pakistan Parliament held on May 13, to discuss the OBL affair. Not the slightest sign of a feeling of shame that Osama was living unmolested in a Pakistani army garrison town for over five years. Not the slightest sign of a determination to find out the truth.
6. The fact that the world’s most dreaded terrorist was found living in an important garrison town did not seem to embarrass the Pakistani leaders and their Army and the ISI. What has embarrassed them is the fact that the US managed to find that out and carry out a clandestine raid to kill him. They have decided to hold a commission of enquiry only into the security failure and not into the intelligence failure. That is, they want to find out how the US carried out the raid. Nothing more.
7. Kerry has referred to other plots conducted, organized and planned out of Pakistan. Many of those plots targeted India and Indian nationals in different cities of India and in Kabul working in the Indian Embassy there. Three of those plots---all in Mumbai—involved mass fatalities---in March 1993, July 2006 and November 2008. No other city in the world has suffered so many acts of mass fatality terrorism. Pakistan has been able to carry on this policy of using terrorism as a strategic weapon because of the reluctance of the US and other members of the international community to act against it.
8. The time has come for sustained action against terrorists and their hide-outs in Pakistan. If Pakistan will not act, the international community has to. Pakistanis talk of a violation of their national sovereignty----whether at Abbottabad or in respect of the Drone strikes in the two Waziristans. Of course, they constitute violations of national sovereignty---- but they are justified violations in exercise of one’s right of self-defence.
9. There are UN resolutions that describe the state-sponsorhip of terrorism as amounting to indirect aggression against the targeted country. This indirect aggression gives one the right to exercise one’s self-defence in the territory of that country if left with no other option. Till now, Pakistan managed to get away without any negative consequences because no country was prepared to take the right of self-defence into its territory.
10. Now that the US has shown the way and taken the lead, it is important for India to follow its lead----not by doing a copy cat of Abbottabad, which would be messy between two neighbours--- but through other means, which would not be spectacular, but effective without involving any civilian casualties in Pakistan and without the use of Indian security or para-military forces or commandos for that purpose.
11. Options, suited to our needs, are available. We have to identify them, acquire the capability to use them and use them. As we acquire the capability, we have to educate the international community, particularly the US, on the serious dimensions of the problems faced by us, on our right of self-defence and on our determination to exercise that right even outside our territory if left with no other option.
12. I have endorsed strongly our Prime Minister’s initiatives for talks with Pakistan. Talks do not mean we renounce our right of self-defence. The two have to go together. I have always advocated a policy of “Talk, Talk, Hit, Hit”----keep talking so long as the talks promise results, but be prepared to hit if the talks prove counter-productive. ( 15-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, May 13, 2011
OBL: AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE & NOT JUST AN ISI FAILURE, CLAIMS ISI CHIEF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.719
B.RAMAN
The success of Osama bin Laden in evading detection and arrest by the Pakistani security agencies for nearly six years since 2005 when he lived in a house near the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) in Abbottabad was the result of a comprehensive intelligence failure by all agencies responsible for the collection of intelligence inside Pakistan and not the result of a failure by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) alone, which has been sought to be exclusively blamed in the US and Pakistan for the failure.
2. According to reliable sources in Pakistan, this was a point that was vehemently made by Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the DG, ISI, in his secret testimony at an in-camera joint session of the two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament on May 13,2011. While accepting responsibility for any failure of the ISI and offering to resign if so demanded by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, Pasha pointed out that other agencies of the Government such as the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Police and its Special Branch also had a major responsibility for keeping a watch on the suspicious presence of foreigners in the Pakistani territory and their activities and that they seem to have equally failed in making enquiries about the suspicious looking house in which OBL was living and its occupants.
3. The IB, the Police and the SB come under Senator Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister. According to these sources, without mentioning him by name,Pasha seemed to be implying that the Ministry of the Interior was as much responsible as the ISI for the intelligence failure which enabled OBL to live in Abbottabad undetected. Pasha's offer to resign was rejected by Gilani and the in-camera session passed a resolution which, inter alia, recommended the setting up of an independent commission to enquire into the failure. A decision on the composition of the Commission and its terms of reference is expected to be taken by Gilani in consultation with the opposition leaders. The suggestion of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), for the appointment of a judicial commission of enquiry headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, who is not liked by the Army, did not have many takers outside the PML (N).
4.There was an over-all consensus during the in-camera session that Pakistan should not allow its Army and the ISI to be discredited to propitiate the US anger. The focus of the discussions was on two failures--- the intelligence failure which enabled OBL to live undetected at Abbottabad and the security failure which enabled the US naval commandos to carry out their clandestine raid undetected by the Pakistani Army and Air Force. While Pasha testified on the intelligence failure, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations Air Marshal, Muhammad Hassan testified on the security failure. Both Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman were present during the session. Kayani left before the question and answer segment of the session started. The Chief of the Air Staff remained present throughout.
5. According to these sources, there seemed to be greater concern over the implications of the security failure than over the implications of the intelligence failure. Two concerns over the security failure were reflected during the question and answer session---- Will the US be able to mount a similar undetected raid to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? Can there be a repeat of the Abbottabad raid elsewhere? These sources say that while India was not mentioned by name, it was apparent that the concern was over the adequacy and effectiveness of Pakistan's radar cover against Indian air intrusions.
6.The officers of the Air Force, who testified, assured the members that there was no question of the US mounting undetected a raid against Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. They did not go into details. They also claimed that the failure of Pakistani radars to detect the US chopper intrusions was due to the superior stealth technology of the US.
7. The in-camera session also saw demands from all sections of the Parliament for a comprehensive re-examination of Pakistan's relations with the US in general and its counter-terrorism co-operation with the US in particular. These sources say that the Army is also in favour of such a re-examination of relations with the US.
8. In the meanwhile, the US has stepped up pressure on the Pakistan Army to return to the US the undestroyed portion of the US helicopter, which hit the compound wall of OBL's house while coming down and had to be blown up by the Naval commandos. While both Pakistani and Chinese officials have denied that China has shown any interest in examining the undestroyed portion, the US is concerned over the possibility of Chinese experts having access to it. This issue is expected to be taken up by Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations committee, during his forthcoming visit to Islamabad. ( 14-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The success of Osama bin Laden in evading detection and arrest by the Pakistani security agencies for nearly six years since 2005 when he lived in a house near the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) in Abbottabad was the result of a comprehensive intelligence failure by all agencies responsible for the collection of intelligence inside Pakistan and not the result of a failure by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) alone, which has been sought to be exclusively blamed in the US and Pakistan for the failure.
2. According to reliable sources in Pakistan, this was a point that was vehemently made by Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the DG, ISI, in his secret testimony at an in-camera joint session of the two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament on May 13,2011. While accepting responsibility for any failure of the ISI and offering to resign if so demanded by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, Pasha pointed out that other agencies of the Government such as the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Police and its Special Branch also had a major responsibility for keeping a watch on the suspicious presence of foreigners in the Pakistani territory and their activities and that they seem to have equally failed in making enquiries about the suspicious looking house in which OBL was living and its occupants.
3. The IB, the Police and the SB come under Senator Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister. According to these sources, without mentioning him by name,Pasha seemed to be implying that the Ministry of the Interior was as much responsible as the ISI for the intelligence failure which enabled OBL to live in Abbottabad undetected. Pasha's offer to resign was rejected by Gilani and the in-camera session passed a resolution which, inter alia, recommended the setting up of an independent commission to enquire into the failure. A decision on the composition of the Commission and its terms of reference is expected to be taken by Gilani in consultation with the opposition leaders. The suggestion of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), for the appointment of a judicial commission of enquiry headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, who is not liked by the Army, did not have many takers outside the PML (N).
4.There was an over-all consensus during the in-camera session that Pakistan should not allow its Army and the ISI to be discredited to propitiate the US anger. The focus of the discussions was on two failures--- the intelligence failure which enabled OBL to live undetected at Abbottabad and the security failure which enabled the US naval commandos to carry out their clandestine raid undetected by the Pakistani Army and Air Force. While Pasha testified on the intelligence failure, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations Air Marshal, Muhammad Hassan testified on the security failure. Both Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman were present during the session. Kayani left before the question and answer segment of the session started. The Chief of the Air Staff remained present throughout.
5. According to these sources, there seemed to be greater concern over the implications of the security failure than over the implications of the intelligence failure. Two concerns over the security failure were reflected during the question and answer session---- Will the US be able to mount a similar undetected raid to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? Can there be a repeat of the Abbottabad raid elsewhere? These sources say that while India was not mentioned by name, it was apparent that the concern was over the adequacy and effectiveness of Pakistan's radar cover against Indian air intrusions.
6.The officers of the Air Force, who testified, assured the members that there was no question of the US mounting undetected a raid against Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. They did not go into details. They also claimed that the failure of Pakistani radars to detect the US chopper intrusions was due to the superior stealth technology of the US.
7. The in-camera session also saw demands from all sections of the Parliament for a comprehensive re-examination of Pakistan's relations with the US in general and its counter-terrorism co-operation with the US in particular. These sources say that the Army is also in favour of such a re-examination of relations with the US.
8. In the meanwhile, the US has stepped up pressure on the Pakistan Army to return to the US the undestroyed portion of the US helicopter, which hit the compound wall of OBL's house while coming down and had to be blown up by the Naval commandos. While both Pakistani and Chinese officials have denied that China has shown any interest in examining the undestroyed portion, the US is concerned over the possibility of Chinese experts having access to it. This issue is expected to be taken up by Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations committee, during his forthcoming visit to Islamabad. ( 14-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA'S SURFACE WARSHIPS EXPANSION PLANS
B.RAMAN
Xia Ping, head of the Personnel Department of the People's Liberation Army (Navy), is reported to have told a military conference at Beijing on May 9,2011, that the PLA (N) would be recruiting more than 2000 PhDs in the next five years. This statement, coming in the wake of earlier reports of plans to step up the recruitment of technology-savvy cadres and officers to the PLA (N), has given rise to speculation that in addition to inducting an aircraft-carrier, the PLA (N) has embarked on a plan to expand its surface fleet to give it a greater power projection capability. Annexed is a commentary on the subject carried by the Party- controlled “ Global Times” on May 11,2011. ( 13-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com _
ANNEXURE
Navy talent drive fuels carrier buzz
Source: Global Times
May 11 2011
Comments
By Zhu Shanshan
A recent pledge by the navy to find top talents to upgrade its weaponry has led to new speculation that China plans to build its first aircraft carrier, a key move that would pave the way for a blue-water maritime force.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA)Navy is seeking to recruit more than 2,000 PhD degree holders in the next five years, Xia Ping, head of the Navy Personnel Department, said Monday at a military conference.
The military already cultivated more than 1,000 commanders and technical personnel to develop and operate new batches of marine weaponry, including "large surface combat ships," nuclear submarines and new warplanes, between 2005 and 2010, Xia said, without identifying the weapons.
Such plans to build a talent pool for large surface combat ships have served to reinforce widespread assumptions of the launch of an aircraft carrier later in the year, analysts suggested.
Indications of the carrier's development were believed to have begun in 2009 when Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli announced a development plan for large surface warships.
In an interview with the Xinhua News Agency that year ahead of the Chinese Navy's 60th founding anniversary, Wu revealed the army's ambition to accelerate its development of advanced weapons, including large surface warships.
But Wu did not specify if the plan included the development of an aircraft carrier, with media reports only citing him as defining large surface combat ships as those with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons.
Zhang Zhaozhong, a professor at the PLA National Defense University, told China Central Television that a large-scale destroyer already in service definitely falls into such a category, and an aircraft carrier with a displacement ranging from 60,000 tons to 100,000 tons based on US standards could also be included.
No further information was available on Tuesday when the Global Times contacted the Navy to ask if the training of talents has anything to do with the potential development of China's first aircraft carrier.
Li Jie, a researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute, told the Global Times on Tuesday that a large-scale naval surface force mainly refers to heavy-tonnage vessels including cruisers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers and aircraft carriers.
"Dock landing ships are the most common ones in the current navy's fleet," Li said.
"China's future development of an aircraft carrier can't be ruled out," he said.
Liu Yong, from the China Security magazine, told the Global Times that the enhancing of human resources is aimed at paving the way for the future development of an aircraft carrier as part of a systematic project, which requires experienced pilots and commanders.
Chinese military officials have kept a tight lid on information related to the development of an aircraft carrier.
Geng Yansheng, a spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, told reporters in March while unveiling China's military white paper that no relevant information was available on the subject.
In January 2010, the ministry dismissed rumors China was building a carrier.
But reports alleging that China's first aircraft carrier would take to the ocean for its initial sea trial in July have continued to circulate.
Li said the Chinese military is being cautious in revealing information, and recent announcements of a personnel training plan seemed to be another sign that authorities were releasing information updates at a carefully designed pace.
Liu said it is understandable for China to keep cautious on revealing information on its first aircraft carrier.
"An open and explicit timetable for the development of a carrier would put China in a passive position. There has to be some level of flexibility for a huge project involving an aircraft carrier, especially its construction, which if confirmed, would mainly depend on home-grown technology," Liu said.
Citing an anonymous US naval officer, Tokyo-based magazine The Diplomat said on Monday that China's first carrier could become a major symbol of the second phase of the development of China's navy.
The two-step process would see the "PLA Navy evolve from its current, mostly coast-bound status to a true 'blue-water' force capable of controlling distant waters and influencing events in adjacent lands," the magazine said.
The idea was echoed by Li, who said with the country's growing global clout came an urgent need for the navy to protect Chinese offshore interests with activities such as anti-terrorism drills.
However, Li warned that the Chinese navy is still under-staffed as it accounts for less than 10 percent of the military, totaling over 200,000 personnel, which is far less than the average proportion of one-third of other major forces in the world.
Huang Jingjing and Xinhua contributed to this story
Xia Ping, head of the Personnel Department of the People's Liberation Army (Navy), is reported to have told a military conference at Beijing on May 9,2011, that the PLA (N) would be recruiting more than 2000 PhDs in the next five years. This statement, coming in the wake of earlier reports of plans to step up the recruitment of technology-savvy cadres and officers to the PLA (N), has given rise to speculation that in addition to inducting an aircraft-carrier, the PLA (N) has embarked on a plan to expand its surface fleet to give it a greater power projection capability. Annexed is a commentary on the subject carried by the Party- controlled “ Global Times” on May 11,2011. ( 13-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com _
ANNEXURE
Navy talent drive fuels carrier buzz
Source: Global Times
May 11 2011
Comments
By Zhu Shanshan
A recent pledge by the navy to find top talents to upgrade its weaponry has led to new speculation that China plans to build its first aircraft carrier, a key move that would pave the way for a blue-water maritime force.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA)Navy is seeking to recruit more than 2,000 PhD degree holders in the next five years, Xia Ping, head of the Navy Personnel Department, said Monday at a military conference.
The military already cultivated more than 1,000 commanders and technical personnel to develop and operate new batches of marine weaponry, including "large surface combat ships," nuclear submarines and new warplanes, between 2005 and 2010, Xia said, without identifying the weapons.
Such plans to build a talent pool for large surface combat ships have served to reinforce widespread assumptions of the launch of an aircraft carrier later in the year, analysts suggested.
Indications of the carrier's development were believed to have begun in 2009 when Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli announced a development plan for large surface warships.
In an interview with the Xinhua News Agency that year ahead of the Chinese Navy's 60th founding anniversary, Wu revealed the army's ambition to accelerate its development of advanced weapons, including large surface warships.
But Wu did not specify if the plan included the development of an aircraft carrier, with media reports only citing him as defining large surface combat ships as those with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons.
Zhang Zhaozhong, a professor at the PLA National Defense University, told China Central Television that a large-scale destroyer already in service definitely falls into such a category, and an aircraft carrier with a displacement ranging from 60,000 tons to 100,000 tons based on US standards could also be included.
No further information was available on Tuesday when the Global Times contacted the Navy to ask if the training of talents has anything to do with the potential development of China's first aircraft carrier.
Li Jie, a researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute, told the Global Times on Tuesday that a large-scale naval surface force mainly refers to heavy-tonnage vessels including cruisers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers and aircraft carriers.
"Dock landing ships are the most common ones in the current navy's fleet," Li said.
"China's future development of an aircraft carrier can't be ruled out," he said.
Liu Yong, from the China Security magazine, told the Global Times that the enhancing of human resources is aimed at paving the way for the future development of an aircraft carrier as part of a systematic project, which requires experienced pilots and commanders.
Chinese military officials have kept a tight lid on information related to the development of an aircraft carrier.
Geng Yansheng, a spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, told reporters in March while unveiling China's military white paper that no relevant information was available on the subject.
In January 2010, the ministry dismissed rumors China was building a carrier.
But reports alleging that China's first aircraft carrier would take to the ocean for its initial sea trial in July have continued to circulate.
Li said the Chinese military is being cautious in revealing information, and recent announcements of a personnel training plan seemed to be another sign that authorities were releasing information updates at a carefully designed pace.
Liu said it is understandable for China to keep cautious on revealing information on its first aircraft carrier.
"An open and explicit timetable for the development of a carrier would put China in a passive position. There has to be some level of flexibility for a huge project involving an aircraft carrier, especially its construction, which if confirmed, would mainly depend on home-grown technology," Liu said.
Citing an anonymous US naval officer, Tokyo-based magazine The Diplomat said on Monday that China's first carrier could become a major symbol of the second phase of the development of China's navy.
The two-step process would see the "PLA Navy evolve from its current, mostly coast-bound status to a true 'blue-water' force capable of controlling distant waters and influencing events in adjacent lands," the magazine said.
The idea was echoed by Li, who said with the country's growing global clout came an urgent need for the navy to protect Chinese offshore interests with activities such as anti-terrorism drills.
However, Li warned that the Chinese navy is still under-staffed as it accounts for less than 10 percent of the military, totaling over 200,000 personnel, which is far less than the average proportion of one-third of other major forces in the world.
Huang Jingjing and Xinhua contributed to this story
Thursday, May 12, 2011
OBL: SOME SIGNIFICANT POINTERS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.718
B.RAMAN
* 1. It used to be said that Osama bin Laden moved around with a large number of bodyguards to protect him. They had instructions to kill him to prevent his being captured. It would be diificult for him to remain undetected in urban areas because of the presence of a large number of bodyguards with him. So it was said.When his hide-out was raided by the US Navy Seals on the night between May 1 and 2,2011, there were hardly any bodyguards in his house. He was killed with hardly any attempt being made by anybody to protect him.
* 2. He took only trusted Arabs----mainly from his tribe in Yemen and Saudi Arabia--- into his entourage. He did not take non-Arabs. This was to thwart the attempts of the CIA to penetrate his entourage. So it used to be said.At his Abbottabad house, the only Arabs with him were his three wives, a grown-up son and some other children, much younger in age. The two persons most trusted by him in his entourage were not Arabs, but two Kuwaitis of Pakistani origin, who were possibly brothers or cousins. They seemed to have engaged in an exchange of fire with the Navy SEALS to protect OBL. Both of them were killed. In Al Qaeda, next to Arabs, the most trusted members of his entourage used to be Kuwaitis of Pakistani origin and Yemeni Balochs (of mixed Yemeni Baloch parentage). Ramzi Yousef, who co-ordinated the 1993 explosion in the World Trade Centre at New York, was a Kuwaiti of Pakistani origin. So was Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who co-ordinated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US. So were the two brothers or cousins on whom OBL was dependent as couriers and for ensuring his security in his Abbottabad house..
* 3. OBL would put up a brave fight and kill himself instead of letting himself be captured by the Americans. Similar things used to be said of V.Prabakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka. Prabakaran used to ask his followers to commit suicide rather than fall into the hands of the security forces by consuming pottasium cyanide. Prabakaran died a pathetic death at the hands of the SL security forces wihout putting up a fight or without consuming the cyanide. Like Prabakaran, OBL too seems to have died a pathetic death at the hands of the SEALS without putting up a fight.
* 4.OBL used to be described as the ideologicasl head of Al Qaeda, who provided ideological guidance and inspiration to his followers leaving the responsibility for co-ordinating individual operations to his lieutenants such as KSM. The documents and other details recovered so far show that he was mainly concentrating on PSYWAR in the form of audio and video messages and providing ideas for individual operations.His focus was on mass casualty strikes, mainly directed against Americans and American cities. His operational diary and computer records reportedly give more details of past operations than of planned strikes in future. He used to give general instructions regarding the future such as the need for attacks on railway trains in the US, but beyond that, the evidence collected so far does not reportedly give any inkling of what Al Qaeda was planning in terms of individual strikes in future.
* 5. Many terrorist strikes such as the London explosions of July 2005 do not reportedly figure in his records examined so far. This could show that Al Qaeda might not have had a direct hand in these strikes.
* 6. There has so far been no public outburst over the death of OBL----either in Pakistan or in the Arab countries. This would indicate that public support in the Islamic world for OBL might have been over-estimated.It would seem that Al Qaeda was an elitist movement of educated Muslim youth who nursed intense anger against the US and Israel for various reasons, but it was probably not a mass movement enjoying the support of large sections of the Muslims. However, the hard core of motivated and well-trained cadres raised by Al Qaeda and OBL remains largely intact. So long as they remain intact and their motivation and anger remain strong, Al Qaeda and its affiliates would continue to pose the same threat as before the death of OBL. Al Qaeda would not collapse as a result of the death of OBL. It would gradually wither away over a period of five to 10 years. The threat from Al Qaeda remains strong. But, could it reach a new crescendo? It would be difficult to answer this question till more details of the impact of OBL's death on its hard core become available.
* ( 11-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
<>
B.RAMAN
* 1. It used to be said that Osama bin Laden moved around with a large number of bodyguards to protect him. They had instructions to kill him to prevent his being captured. It would be diificult for him to remain undetected in urban areas because of the presence of a large number of bodyguards with him. So it was said.When his hide-out was raided by the US Navy Seals on the night between May 1 and 2,2011, there were hardly any bodyguards in his house. He was killed with hardly any attempt being made by anybody to protect him.
* 2. He took only trusted Arabs----mainly from his tribe in Yemen and Saudi Arabia--- into his entourage. He did not take non-Arabs. This was to thwart the attempts of the CIA to penetrate his entourage. So it used to be said.At his Abbottabad house, the only Arabs with him were his three wives, a grown-up son and some other children, much younger in age. The two persons most trusted by him in his entourage were not Arabs, but two Kuwaitis of Pakistani origin, who were possibly brothers or cousins. They seemed to have engaged in an exchange of fire with the Navy SEALS to protect OBL. Both of them were killed. In Al Qaeda, next to Arabs, the most trusted members of his entourage used to be Kuwaitis of Pakistani origin and Yemeni Balochs (of mixed Yemeni Baloch parentage). Ramzi Yousef, who co-ordinated the 1993 explosion in the World Trade Centre at New York, was a Kuwaiti of Pakistani origin. So was Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who co-ordinated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US. So were the two brothers or cousins on whom OBL was dependent as couriers and for ensuring his security in his Abbottabad house..
* 3. OBL would put up a brave fight and kill himself instead of letting himself be captured by the Americans. Similar things used to be said of V.Prabakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka. Prabakaran used to ask his followers to commit suicide rather than fall into the hands of the security forces by consuming pottasium cyanide. Prabakaran died a pathetic death at the hands of the SL security forces wihout putting up a fight or without consuming the cyanide. Like Prabakaran, OBL too seems to have died a pathetic death at the hands of the SEALS without putting up a fight.
* 4.OBL used to be described as the ideologicasl head of Al Qaeda, who provided ideological guidance and inspiration to his followers leaving the responsibility for co-ordinating individual operations to his lieutenants such as KSM. The documents and other details recovered so far show that he was mainly concentrating on PSYWAR in the form of audio and video messages and providing ideas for individual operations.His focus was on mass casualty strikes, mainly directed against Americans and American cities. His operational diary and computer records reportedly give more details of past operations than of planned strikes in future. He used to give general instructions regarding the future such as the need for attacks on railway trains in the US, but beyond that, the evidence collected so far does not reportedly give any inkling of what Al Qaeda was planning in terms of individual strikes in future.
* 5. Many terrorist strikes such as the London explosions of July 2005 do not reportedly figure in his records examined so far. This could show that Al Qaeda might not have had a direct hand in these strikes.
* 6. There has so far been no public outburst over the death of OBL----either in Pakistan or in the Arab countries. This would indicate that public support in the Islamic world for OBL might have been over-estimated.It would seem that Al Qaeda was an elitist movement of educated Muslim youth who nursed intense anger against the US and Israel for various reasons, but it was probably not a mass movement enjoying the support of large sections of the Muslims. However, the hard core of motivated and well-trained cadres raised by Al Qaeda and OBL remains largely intact. So long as they remain intact and their motivation and anger remain strong, Al Qaeda and its affiliates would continue to pose the same threat as before the death of OBL. Al Qaeda would not collapse as a result of the death of OBL. It would gradually wither away over a period of five to 10 years. The threat from Al Qaeda remains strong. But, could it reach a new crescendo? It would be difficult to answer this question till more details of the impact of OBL's death on its hard core become available.
* ( 11-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
<>
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
ISI-BIN LADEN LINKS: As Seen by the DIA
( I am reproducing below an article written by me in September 2003, which is available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers8%5Cpaper791.html ---B.Raman
On the eve of the second anniversary of Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes in the USA on September 11, 2001, the US Government has declassified 32 documents relating to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Twenty-six of these documents are of the US State Department and the remaining are of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon. This article analyses the contents of three DIA documents only.
2.The first document (15 pages), prepared in September,1999, is based on an analysis of all information received by the DIA till July 1,1999. It is titled "Defence Intelligence Assessment". The subject of the assessment is "Osama bin Laden/Al Qaeda Information Operations". Nearly 90 per cent of the document has been excised before its declassification. Hence, it does not contain anything of value. From a perusal of the unexcised portions, one could guess that the assessment must have been about Al Qaeda's information assets such as its modern communications capability, its use of the internet,. its capability for attacking the information networks of others etc and the defensive and offensive options available to the US. The defensive aspect relates to protecting the networks of the USA against Al Qaeda attacks and the offensive to neutralising or penetrating Al Qaeda's assets.
3. The second document, dated September 24, 2001, is titled "Veteran Afghan Traveller's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban's Exploitable Weaknesses" and carries the following caution: "This is an information report. Not finally evaluated intelligence."
4. It would appear that this document is not the traveller's report, but an analysis prepared by an official of the DIA, either in the US Embassy in Islamabad or in the DIA headquarters in Washington DC, on the basis of the traveller's report. The language used in the portion declassified and released is that of a professional intelligence analyst and not that of an Afghan traveller.
5. The analysis carries the following summary: "Eventually, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will war with each other. The weakness of both is in the minds of the individuals that belong to the groups and in the power that is given to them by their names. Al Qaeda have not integrated with Afghans or the Taliban, leaving them susceptible to exploitation." By this, the analyst means exploitation by the US to play the Taliban/Afghans and Al Qaeda against each other. What wishful-thinking this has proved to be in retrospect!
6.The analysis carries the most damning account of Pakistan's role as the real host of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It says: "Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network was able to expand under the safe santuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan directives. If there is any doubt on that issue, consider the location of bin Laden's camp targeted by US Cruise missiles, Zahawa. Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and protected under the patronage of a local and influential Jadran tribal leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani. However, the real host in that facility was the Pakistani ISI. If this was later to become bin Laden's base, then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan's ISI."
7. It describes Jalaluddin Haqqani as "the Jadran tribal leader most exploited by ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war to facilitate the introduction of Arab mercenaries " and the Taliban as "the handy cloak woven by Pakistan to shroud their progress?" Whose progress---Al Qaeda's or Pakistan's? Most probably, Pakistan's, but this is not clear.
8. The analysis describes the US objective as "the establishment of a more stable coalition Afghan Government free of the Taliban and Pakistani interference" and advocates a cost effective military engagement, with appropriate air support, than the mass deployment of ground forces. It says: "The enemy does not have mass, which makes them harder to engage."
9. The analysis' predictions of differences one day emerging between the Afghans and the Taliban on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other because of Al Qaeda's superiority complex and its perception of itself as an elite force destined to command have not proved correct so far.
10. The analysis projects the then coming war against terrorism in Afghanistan as likely to be fought on two fronts--- a war to destroy the material strength of Al Qaeda---its cadres, training camps, infrastructure etc--- and another for the minds of the people. In the context of the war for the minds of the people, it underlines the importance of right names and right images to influence the minds of the targeted people.
11. It points out the impact on the minds of the Muslims made by the characterisation of the US as "the Great Satan". The constant reference to the US as the "Great Satan" and not as the US serves the double purpose of highlighting the immense power of the US which could be countered only with determination and projecting that power in negative colours to create an aversion for that power. It stresses the importance of a similar characterisation of Al Qaeda by an appropriate name and not by its real name of Al Qaeda. Apparently, US policy-makers and psy-warriors have not been able to determine what that characterisation could be.
12. The third document, also dated September 24,2001, is titled: "Veteran Afghanistan traveller's analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban, military, political and cultural landscape and its weaknesses. " It also carries the same caution as the second. It goes into great detail regarding the Pakistani game in Afghanistan in the following words:
13. "During the Soviet-Afghan war, the West preferred to maintain a policy of deniability and allowed Pakistan to handle the daily administration of the war, cash and arms distribution. It was a task Pakistan carried out with great enthusiasm and they helped themselves to generous portion of cash and arms. The Pakistan Government also had a hidden agenda.
14. "Unlike the West, they (Pakistan) were concerned with what would happen after the war to ensure influence over any Government that came to power in Afghanistan after a Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan decided to directly influence the outcome. Rather than allow the most gifted Afghan commanders and parties to flourish, who would be difficult to control later, Pakistan preferred to groom the incompetent ones for the role of future leaders of Afghanistan. Being incompetent, they would be wholly reliant on Pakistan for support. The principal beneficiary of this policy was Gulbuddin Heckmatyar. His credentials were that of an anti-Western Islamic fundamentalist.
15." In tandem with favouring the incompetent Heckmatyar over more enterprising and gifted commanders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Tadjik commander from Northern Afghanistan, Pakistan also encouraged, facilitated and often escorted Arabs from the Middle East into Afghanistan...... Visitors from the Middle East had been in evidence since the very early part of the Soviet-Afghan war. However, they lacked numbers, confidence, experience or bonding ties sufficient to give them a separate identity from their hosts.
16." This was allowed to evolve over a period of time, which was effectively the incubation of Al Qaeda. For the first time, large numbers of Arabs were observed in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal. One of the key features of the Paktia border province, in which they were first established, was that it had no Russians.....At that point, the Arab visitors were largely linked and reliant on Haqqani's mujahideen in Paktia.
17. "When Kabul finally fell, it was Ahmed Shah Massoud who captured it, not Heckmatyar. Pakistan could not accept this result and the fragile Afghan coalition Government began another civil war, with the Pakistani stooge Heckmatyar being backed to seize total power. He was never able to wrest Kabul from Massoud, despite massive logistical and material ( including manpower) support from Pakistan. Against this failure, it should be noted that Pakistan has lost every war it has ever fought.
18. "After years of futile effort, which effectively saw the Lebanonisation of Afghanistan, Pakistan finally abandoned Heckmatyar. However, not in favour of a more rational policy. Instead, they set about doing the same thing all over again. They created another force they hoped to have better control over than Heckmatyar's rabble. It was called Taliban,the Arabic name "Talib" being literally translated as "Asker" or "Seeker".
19." Taliban means "the Seekers", signifying a student of divinity. This inspired title helped cloak Pakistan's hidden agenda in a new Islamic coat. To lead the Taliban Pakistan chose Mullah Mohammad Omar, who was willing to do as he was told. According to Taliban propaganda, the Mullah was divinely inspired to rid Afghanistan of the troublesome war and warlords. Afghanistan was blighted with both, largely due to years of civil war sponsored by Pakistan and reliant on the stockpile of arms plundered from a covert Western arms pipeline. From the old Soviet-Afghan war days, the Mullah emerged with a fully functioning, fully-armed, conventionally-equipped, fully-trained military force prone to large-scale conventional actions. Omar's emergence is credited to Pakistan ISI's actions.
20."The repeated, pronounced pattern under ISI direction has been to ignore the poorly-trained guerilla nature of the Afghan Mujahideen and press them to conduct conventional-style engagement, the same style Taliban are credited with learning from the Koran. As a result of these actions, the fully-supported by Pakistan Taliban prevailed over the unsupported legitimate government of Afghanistan.
21." The Taliban is not synonymous with Afghanistan. It was created, imposed and recognised by Pakistan in pursuit of its own interests. Playing the Islamic fundamentalist card as a means of securing control over a compliant proxy regime in neighbouring Afghanistan has seriously backfired. Pakistan has also lost control of the Taliban, who are proving to be both unpredictable and ungrateful. Under the shade of the Taliban umbrella, the bin Laden brand of extremism has been able to grow unmolested inside Afghanistan.
22." The Al Qaeda agenda in Afghanistan differs significantly from that of the Taliban. They are not about creating an independent Islamic State. Long term, there can be no room for Taliban in their ambitions. Having been artificially introduced to the region and encouraged in their ambitions so far, they have grown in confidence and stature. Taliban acceptance and approval of fundamentalist non-Afghans as part of their fighting force were merely an extension of the Pakistani policy during the Soviet-Afghan war. It is very important to realise that members of 055 Brigade (Al Qaeda) might serve with Taliban forces, but they are not in any Western sense integrated. They remain rather like an international brigade, different in language, habit and in the interpretation of Islam. Additionally, their vision of the future of Afghanistan differs.
23."Pakistan's goals are simple, the continuance of the policy they have always demonstrated regarding Afghanistan. It is failing with the Taliban and it cannot succeed under any Afghan Giovernment controlled by Al Qaeda. The repercussions from Pakistan's attempt to manipulate the Islamic card are just surfacing.
24." In Islamabad, they have tried to ignore or bury the evidence for some time. It must be a deeply troubling period for General (Musharraf) in Pakistan, who is asked to help hunt down the culprits that he helped to establish and supported. Not to support the US invites trouble and to assist the US to their aims also presents problems to Pakistan. The quandary leaves the Pakistanis confused as to how they might be absolved without permanently shattering their regional aspirations or their Government." (Citation of document ends)
25. The second and third documents are both dated September 24, 2001. The language in the second document is apparently that of a professional intelligence analyst, but the language of the third is not. It appears to be that of a source and not of the DIA. It would seem that the third document is the report of the source and the second is the note of a DIA analyst or analysts who had forwarded it to their superiors giving their assessment and making their recommendations regarding the future course of action.
26. From these documents, it is clear that the DIA knew of the role of the ISI in the sponsorship of not only the Taliban, but also Al Qaeda. And yet, the Bush administration has for over two years chosen to close its eyes to the complicity of Pakistan and to project Musharraf to its own public opinion as well as to the international community as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism. Why? A question to which there has been no convincing answer.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers8%5Cpaper791.html ---B.Raman
On the eve of the second anniversary of Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes in the USA on September 11, 2001, the US Government has declassified 32 documents relating to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Twenty-six of these documents are of the US State Department and the remaining are of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon. This article analyses the contents of three DIA documents only.
2.The first document (15 pages), prepared in September,1999, is based on an analysis of all information received by the DIA till July 1,1999. It is titled "Defence Intelligence Assessment". The subject of the assessment is "Osama bin Laden/Al Qaeda Information Operations". Nearly 90 per cent of the document has been excised before its declassification. Hence, it does not contain anything of value. From a perusal of the unexcised portions, one could guess that the assessment must have been about Al Qaeda's information assets such as its modern communications capability, its use of the internet,. its capability for attacking the information networks of others etc and the defensive and offensive options available to the US. The defensive aspect relates to protecting the networks of the USA against Al Qaeda attacks and the offensive to neutralising or penetrating Al Qaeda's assets.
3. The second document, dated September 24, 2001, is titled "Veteran Afghan Traveller's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban's Exploitable Weaknesses" and carries the following caution: "This is an information report. Not finally evaluated intelligence."
4. It would appear that this document is not the traveller's report, but an analysis prepared by an official of the DIA, either in the US Embassy in Islamabad or in the DIA headquarters in Washington DC, on the basis of the traveller's report. The language used in the portion declassified and released is that of a professional intelligence analyst and not that of an Afghan traveller.
5. The analysis carries the following summary: "Eventually, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will war with each other. The weakness of both is in the minds of the individuals that belong to the groups and in the power that is given to them by their names. Al Qaeda have not integrated with Afghans or the Taliban, leaving them susceptible to exploitation." By this, the analyst means exploitation by the US to play the Taliban/Afghans and Al Qaeda against each other. What wishful-thinking this has proved to be in retrospect!
6.The analysis carries the most damning account of Pakistan's role as the real host of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It says: "Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network was able to expand under the safe santuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan directives. If there is any doubt on that issue, consider the location of bin Laden's camp targeted by US Cruise missiles, Zahawa. Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and protected under the patronage of a local and influential Jadran tribal leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani. However, the real host in that facility was the Pakistani ISI. If this was later to become bin Laden's base, then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan's ISI."
7. It describes Jalaluddin Haqqani as "the Jadran tribal leader most exploited by ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war to facilitate the introduction of Arab mercenaries " and the Taliban as "the handy cloak woven by Pakistan to shroud their progress?" Whose progress---Al Qaeda's or Pakistan's? Most probably, Pakistan's, but this is not clear.
8. The analysis describes the US objective as "the establishment of a more stable coalition Afghan Government free of the Taliban and Pakistani interference" and advocates a cost effective military engagement, with appropriate air support, than the mass deployment of ground forces. It says: "The enemy does not have mass, which makes them harder to engage."
9. The analysis' predictions of differences one day emerging between the Afghans and the Taliban on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other because of Al Qaeda's superiority complex and its perception of itself as an elite force destined to command have not proved correct so far.
10. The analysis projects the then coming war against terrorism in Afghanistan as likely to be fought on two fronts--- a war to destroy the material strength of Al Qaeda---its cadres, training camps, infrastructure etc--- and another for the minds of the people. In the context of the war for the minds of the people, it underlines the importance of right names and right images to influence the minds of the targeted people.
11. It points out the impact on the minds of the Muslims made by the characterisation of the US as "the Great Satan". The constant reference to the US as the "Great Satan" and not as the US serves the double purpose of highlighting the immense power of the US which could be countered only with determination and projecting that power in negative colours to create an aversion for that power. It stresses the importance of a similar characterisation of Al Qaeda by an appropriate name and not by its real name of Al Qaeda. Apparently, US policy-makers and psy-warriors have not been able to determine what that characterisation could be.
12. The third document, also dated September 24,2001, is titled: "Veteran Afghanistan traveller's analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban, military, political and cultural landscape and its weaknesses. " It also carries the same caution as the second. It goes into great detail regarding the Pakistani game in Afghanistan in the following words:
13. "During the Soviet-Afghan war, the West preferred to maintain a policy of deniability and allowed Pakistan to handle the daily administration of the war, cash and arms distribution. It was a task Pakistan carried out with great enthusiasm and they helped themselves to generous portion of cash and arms. The Pakistan Government also had a hidden agenda.
14. "Unlike the West, they (Pakistan) were concerned with what would happen after the war to ensure influence over any Government that came to power in Afghanistan after a Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan decided to directly influence the outcome. Rather than allow the most gifted Afghan commanders and parties to flourish, who would be difficult to control later, Pakistan preferred to groom the incompetent ones for the role of future leaders of Afghanistan. Being incompetent, they would be wholly reliant on Pakistan for support. The principal beneficiary of this policy was Gulbuddin Heckmatyar. His credentials were that of an anti-Western Islamic fundamentalist.
15." In tandem with favouring the incompetent Heckmatyar over more enterprising and gifted commanders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Tadjik commander from Northern Afghanistan, Pakistan also encouraged, facilitated and often escorted Arabs from the Middle East into Afghanistan...... Visitors from the Middle East had been in evidence since the very early part of the Soviet-Afghan war. However, they lacked numbers, confidence, experience or bonding ties sufficient to give them a separate identity from their hosts.
16." This was allowed to evolve over a period of time, which was effectively the incubation of Al Qaeda. For the first time, large numbers of Arabs were observed in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal. One of the key features of the Paktia border province, in which they were first established, was that it had no Russians.....At that point, the Arab visitors were largely linked and reliant on Haqqani's mujahideen in Paktia.
17. "When Kabul finally fell, it was Ahmed Shah Massoud who captured it, not Heckmatyar. Pakistan could not accept this result and the fragile Afghan coalition Government began another civil war, with the Pakistani stooge Heckmatyar being backed to seize total power. He was never able to wrest Kabul from Massoud, despite massive logistical and material ( including manpower) support from Pakistan. Against this failure, it should be noted that Pakistan has lost every war it has ever fought.
18. "After years of futile effort, which effectively saw the Lebanonisation of Afghanistan, Pakistan finally abandoned Heckmatyar. However, not in favour of a more rational policy. Instead, they set about doing the same thing all over again. They created another force they hoped to have better control over than Heckmatyar's rabble. It was called Taliban,the Arabic name "Talib" being literally translated as "Asker" or "Seeker".
19." Taliban means "the Seekers", signifying a student of divinity. This inspired title helped cloak Pakistan's hidden agenda in a new Islamic coat. To lead the Taliban Pakistan chose Mullah Mohammad Omar, who was willing to do as he was told. According to Taliban propaganda, the Mullah was divinely inspired to rid Afghanistan of the troublesome war and warlords. Afghanistan was blighted with both, largely due to years of civil war sponsored by Pakistan and reliant on the stockpile of arms plundered from a covert Western arms pipeline. From the old Soviet-Afghan war days, the Mullah emerged with a fully functioning, fully-armed, conventionally-equipped, fully-trained military force prone to large-scale conventional actions. Omar's emergence is credited to Pakistan ISI's actions.
20."The repeated, pronounced pattern under ISI direction has been to ignore the poorly-trained guerilla nature of the Afghan Mujahideen and press them to conduct conventional-style engagement, the same style Taliban are credited with learning from the Koran. As a result of these actions, the fully-supported by Pakistan Taliban prevailed over the unsupported legitimate government of Afghanistan.
21." The Taliban is not synonymous with Afghanistan. It was created, imposed and recognised by Pakistan in pursuit of its own interests. Playing the Islamic fundamentalist card as a means of securing control over a compliant proxy regime in neighbouring Afghanistan has seriously backfired. Pakistan has also lost control of the Taliban, who are proving to be both unpredictable and ungrateful. Under the shade of the Taliban umbrella, the bin Laden brand of extremism has been able to grow unmolested inside Afghanistan.
22." The Al Qaeda agenda in Afghanistan differs significantly from that of the Taliban. They are not about creating an independent Islamic State. Long term, there can be no room for Taliban in their ambitions. Having been artificially introduced to the region and encouraged in their ambitions so far, they have grown in confidence and stature. Taliban acceptance and approval of fundamentalist non-Afghans as part of their fighting force were merely an extension of the Pakistani policy during the Soviet-Afghan war. It is very important to realise that members of 055 Brigade (Al Qaeda) might serve with Taliban forces, but they are not in any Western sense integrated. They remain rather like an international brigade, different in language, habit and in the interpretation of Islam. Additionally, their vision of the future of Afghanistan differs.
23."Pakistan's goals are simple, the continuance of the policy they have always demonstrated regarding Afghanistan. It is failing with the Taliban and it cannot succeed under any Afghan Giovernment controlled by Al Qaeda. The repercussions from Pakistan's attempt to manipulate the Islamic card are just surfacing.
24." In Islamabad, they have tried to ignore or bury the evidence for some time. It must be a deeply troubling period for General (Musharraf) in Pakistan, who is asked to help hunt down the culprits that he helped to establish and supported. Not to support the US invites trouble and to assist the US to their aims also presents problems to Pakistan. The quandary leaves the Pakistanis confused as to how they might be absolved without permanently shattering their regional aspirations or their Government." (Citation of document ends)
25. The second and third documents are both dated September 24, 2001. The language in the second document is apparently that of a professional intelligence analyst, but the language of the third is not. It appears to be that of a source and not of the DIA. It would seem that the third document is the report of the source and the second is the note of a DIA analyst or analysts who had forwarded it to their superiors giving their assessment and making their recommendations regarding the future course of action.
26. From these documents, it is clear that the DIA knew of the role of the ISI in the sponsorship of not only the Taliban, but also Al Qaeda. And yet, the Bush administration has for over two years chosen to close its eyes to the complicity of Pakistan and to project Musharraf to its own public opinion as well as to the international community as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism. Why? A question to which there has been no convincing answer.
FIRE OF 2005 IN ABBOTTABAD DESTROYED LAND RECORDS
I am reproducing blow an E-Mail received by me from a reader:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/41218604@N00/2393224203/
Environmentalist (38 months ago | reply)
Thank you friends for your visits and for your valuable comments..
These photographs were taken from Sarban Mountain top ( Ht 5500 feet ) and for clarity reasons, it was taken right after the rainfall, as Abbottabad gets very polluted and hazed afterwards..
This photo is showing slums , which were built after Zia's Marshal-Law,..and robbery of national assets became totally out of control during last eight years ,..when Deputy Commissioners were removed ,..
Illegal dictators and monsters need support of pseudo politicians and fake religious people ,..so most of the natural drainage areas, green belts, free lying government lands were grabbed by such people as a black mailing tactic...
If slums were built on private land, even so , Pakistan Environmental Protection Act and Pakistan Antiquities Act , Forest laws, Municipal laws etc..were clearly violated..
Agents in the municipal and local government , either ignored the laws and looked the other way,..or they colluded and took due share in the form of bribes,..
Afghan refugees and migrants from mountains rented such illegal properties and as they had no attachment with the town hence they played havoc with the trees present in those areas,...which they are stealing even today,..and after ten years we will not see even a single tree in this area,.
Ruling elite stayed busy in the developments of their countless posh housing schemes and finally when people realized about this great game, then in 2005 AD, they burnt down the British era land record room in Abbottabad ,.. ( Murree record was burnt few months ago, and Karachi record and maps were burnt down few weeks ago )
Upto 15 feet long hand drawn maps , government confidential papers , survey records,...upto China border,..all kept in neat leather folders ,..disappeared forever with flames on the silent morning of June 6, 2005 ,..Fire engulfed graceful stone and timber structure of Hazara's Mohafiz Khana ,..which was built in 1876 AD..., as usual electric short circuit was blamed, but staff reported that electric main switches were off at the time of fire,..No government agency brought search dogs or investigators after such a big national loss..??
Please note when Army officer's house was robbed in Rawalpindi, then sniffing dogs of Army were called and within minutes culprits were nabbed ,..Ah Pakistan..
http://www.flickr.com/photos/41218604@N00/2393224203/
Environmentalist (38 months ago | reply)
Thank you friends for your visits and for your valuable comments..
These photographs were taken from Sarban Mountain top ( Ht 5500 feet ) and for clarity reasons, it was taken right after the rainfall, as Abbottabad gets very polluted and hazed afterwards..
This photo is showing slums , which were built after Zia's Marshal-Law,..and robbery of national assets became totally out of control during last eight years ,..when Deputy Commissioners were removed ,..
Illegal dictators and monsters need support of pseudo politicians and fake religious people ,..so most of the natural drainage areas, green belts, free lying government lands were grabbed by such people as a black mailing tactic...
If slums were built on private land, even so , Pakistan Environmental Protection Act and Pakistan Antiquities Act , Forest laws, Municipal laws etc..were clearly violated..
Agents in the municipal and local government , either ignored the laws and looked the other way,..or they colluded and took due share in the form of bribes,..
Afghan refugees and migrants from mountains rented such illegal properties and as they had no attachment with the town hence they played havoc with the trees present in those areas,...which they are stealing even today,..and after ten years we will not see even a single tree in this area,.
Ruling elite stayed busy in the developments of their countless posh housing schemes and finally when people realized about this great game, then in 2005 AD, they burnt down the British era land record room in Abbottabad ,.. ( Murree record was burnt few months ago, and Karachi record and maps were burnt down few weeks ago )
Upto 15 feet long hand drawn maps , government confidential papers , survey records,...upto China border,..all kept in neat leather folders ,..disappeared forever with flames on the silent morning of June 6, 2005 ,..Fire engulfed graceful stone and timber structure of Hazara's Mohafiz Khana ,..which was built in 1876 AD..., as usual electric short circuit was blamed, but staff reported that electric main switches were off at the time of fire,..No government agency brought search dogs or investigators after such a big national loss..??
Please note when Army officer's house was robbed in Rawalpindi, then sniffing dogs of Army were called and within minutes culprits were nabbed ,..Ah Pakistan..
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)