B.RAMAN
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China visited Pakistan from December 17 to 19,2010, after having completed a three-day visit to India from December 15 to 17. During his stay in Pakistan, he inaugurated a one-year celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Wen and his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani jointly inaugurated on December 18 the Pakistan-China Friendship Center, which is a Chinese-aided cultural complex built in Islamabad by China to promote exchanges among students, media and academic circles from the two countries. Wen had laid the foundation for the center during his earlier visit to Pakistan in April 2005.
2.There were three important events during the visit. The first in order of significance was a joint courtesy call on him on December 18 by Gen.Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, Admiral Noman Bashir, the Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman, the Chief of the Air Staff. According to the Xinhua news agency, during his meeting with the heads of the Pakistani Armed Forces, Wen called for enhanced military exchanges and cooperation between China and Pakistan so as to cement the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation. He said: “The Pakistani military is a steadfast supporter and vindicator of the China-Pakistan friendship, and has played an important role in consolidating and developing their strategic partnership of cooperation."He applauded the close exchanges between the two militaries in the areas of anti-terrorism and disaster relief, and hoped to further enhance the military links to contribute to the development of bilateral ties.
3. According to the Xinhua, the Pakistani military chiefs described China as an all-weather strategic partner of Pakistan and said the bilateral friendship had withstood severe challenges. The Pakistani military was ready to work jointly with China to play a positive role in developing their strategic partnership of cooperation. According to well-informed Pakistani sources, the initiative for the joint courtesy call came from the Pakistani military leaders. The meeting underlined the important role which the Pakistani Armed Forces have been playing in the development of Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China. Reports from Islamabad indicate that no Chinese military officer of comparable seniority and importance was present with Wen when he received the heads of the Pakistani Armed Forces to reassure them of China’s continued support for Pakistan.
4. The second in order of significance was Wen’s discussions with President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani. Xinhua quoted Wen as telling Gilani on December 17 as follows: "China and Pakistan were, are and will always be good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers. China appreciates the strong support Pakistan has long been offering on issues concerning China's core interests, and will continue backing Pakistan's efforts in defending national sovereignty, maintaining social stability and achieving independent and sustainable economic development.” Noting that Pakistan has made huge sacrifices for and important contributions to the global counterterrorism campaign, Wen said his country is ready to work together with Pakistan to promote regional peace and stability. Speaking at a banquet hosted by Zardari, Wen said: “For decades, the two countries have been treating each other with sincerity and supporting each other on all international fora. Our friendship is a valuable asset.”
5.The third in order of significance was Wen’s address to a joint session of the two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament on December 19 before he left for China. In his address, Wen underlined the importance of China’s relations with Pakistan in the context of China’s policies in the region. He said inter alia: “To cement and advance the all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Pakistan is our common strategic choice. It serves the fundamental interests of both countries and peoples and contributes to peace, stability and development of the region and beyond. The two neighboring countries are brothers for ever. China-Pakistan friendship is full of vigor and vitality, like a lush tree with deep roots and thick foliage. China-Pakistan relationship is strong and solid, like a rock standing firm despite the passage of time. Pakistan has sacrificed greatly and made great efforts in the fight against terrorism. It is a reality ... and the international community should respect Pakistan’s efforts.” Recalling Pakistan's consistent and full support to China in the past at some crucial junctures and on various issues, including issues concerning Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, Wen said that China received valuable help from Pakistan.
6. Talking to the media after Wen’s address to the Parliament, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik described it as a strong message to the enemies of Pakistan. He said that Wen’s address reflected the emotional attachment of the people and Government of China with the Government and the people of Pakistan and added: “The Premier’s speech must have rung alarm bells to the enemies of Pakistan, which cast covetous eyes on its peace, stability, progress and prosperity. It’s a strong message to the enemies (of Pakistan).”
7. Following are the salient points of the joint statement issued by Gilani and Wen at the end of their talks:
* “China-Pakistan relationship has gone beyond the bilateral scope, with broader regional and international influence.”
* “The Pakistani side stressed that the friendship with China is the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy.”
* “The Chinese side reiterated its respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The Pakistan side reiterated its adherence to the one-China policy.”
* “The two sides agreed to focus on strengthening infrastructure, energy and agricultural cooperation. The Chinese side is willing to upgrade the Karakoram Highway. An energy cooperation mechanism has been established to promote co-operation in the development of conventional energy, renewable energy and civilian nuclear cooperation.”
* The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has decided to open branches in Islamabad and Karachi.
* The two sides have decided to strengthen the implementation of the framework agreement on co-operation between the China National Space Administration and the Pakistan Space and Atmosphere Research Commission.
* “China believes that in the fight against terrorism, Pakistan has made great efforts and sacrifices. It reaffirmed its respect for Pakistan’s efforts to develop and implement its own national conditions under its anti-terrorism strategy. Pakistan reiterated its firm determination to combat terrorism.”
* “China believes that Pakistan is an important country in the region, which should play an important role for the maintenance of regional peace, security and stability. The two countries support the unity and the territorial integrity of Afghanistan. “
8. Wen’s visit came at a time when the Pakistani economy is going through a difficult period due to the recent floods and when Pakistan has been under increasing criticism from the US for not doing enough in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Apart from highlighting the growing strategic partnership between the two countries and their military-military relationship, Wen missed no opportunity to underline China’s economic solidarity with Pakistan and its appreciation of Islamabad’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. He was reported to have promised to Pakistan low-interest loans amounting to US $ one billion for various projects and export credits amounting to US $ 300 million.
9. There has been some confusion regarding the total economic benefits to Pakistan as a result of the Wen visit. The “Global Times” of China estimated the total value of the various agreements signed as about US $ 10 billion, but the Pakistani media, briefed by Pakistani officials, has given the figure as US $ 35 billion. After going through the welter of confusing reports from Pakistan on the economic benefits to Pakistan, one can assess as follows:
* Immediately after the floods, China had pledged US $ 250 million as grants as flood relief. Wen has pledged another US $ 400 million as low-interest loans for the reconstruction of the flood-ravaged infrastructure.
* Among the infrastructure reconstruction projects to be given priority is the repair, upgradation and recommissioning of the Karakoram Highway from Xinjiang. The National Highway Authority (NHA) of Pakistan and the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) signed an agreement for the reconstruction/rehabilitation of a portion of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) which had been damaged at a cost of $275 million. NHA Chairman Altaf Ahmed Chaudhry and CRBC President Wen Gang signed the agreement on behalf of their respective organisations. While talking to reporters, Chaudhry said that heavy landsliding at Attaabad on the Karakoram Highway had blocked the flow of the River Hunza, which resulted in the formation of a lake at the site. The lake submerged a 25 kilometre-long section of KKH, resulting in suspension of traffic and all other activities in the area. The CRBC was already engaged in widening and rehabilitation of the Raikot-Khunjerab section of the KKH. Following a survey, the CRBC has said that a section of the road could be reclaimed by bringing down the water level in the lake by 30 metres. A new alignment will have to be made for the rest of the portion. Chaudhry said that a 17-kilometer-long road will be constructed on a new alignment while a 7 kilometre-long section will be rehabilitated. The project will be completed in two years. He said the project includes construction of two tunnels having a length of 4,485 metres and 1,225 metres. He added that seven large and two bridges and 70 culverts will also be built. ( From the “Daily Times” of Lahore)
* According to a list of Chinese-aided projects handed out to journalists by Pakistani officials, the biggest deal to receive Chinese assistance would be worth $6.5 billion to develop wind and solar power. There was no specific reference to the Chinese assistance for the construction of three more nuclear power stations. The Chinese proposal in this regard is still to be approved by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. Despite this, the Chinese suppliers of the new power stations are going ahead with their preparatory work such as preparation of designs.
* Pakistani officials told their media that Pakistan and China have agreed in principle to constitute a consortium for seeking a soft loan from international institutions for laying a railway line between the two countries through the Khunjerab Pass. It is not clear why China is not providing the funds for this as it has done in the case of the railway lines being constructed by it in Myanmar. China had strongly opposed in the Asian Development Bank a proposal for a soft loan for some Indian hydel power stations in Arunachal Pradesh. India should strongly oppose any proposal for financial assistance to the proposed railway line from any international or regional institution.
* There was no reference during Wen’s visit to the Pakistani proposal for the construction of oil/gas pipelines from the Chinese-constructed Gwadar port to Xinjiang. The Chinese continue to be hesitant to make fresh commitments in Balochistan due to the security problems in the area.
10. The relatives of 350 Pakistani nationals languishing in jails in China held a demonstration in Peshawar on December 18 to demand the release of their relatives by the Chinese authorities. They have been arrested and jailed by the Chinese authorities for illegally entering Xinjiang and for indulging in narcotics smuggling. Many of those arrested for narcotics smuggling have been sentenced to death by Chinese courts. (21-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 20, 2010
Sunday, December 19, 2010
TALKS ON WESTERN SECTOR OF BORDER: CHINA SEEKS TO BRING IN PAKISTAN AS AN INTERESTED PARTY
B.RAMAN
In an article of August 28,2010, titled "Dealing with Chinese Machinations on J & K" (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html ), I had stated as follows: “By questioning the legitimacy of India's sovereignty over J&K, the Chinese may be creating a future option for themselves of questioning India's locus standi to negotiate with them on the future of the Indian territory in the Ladakh area occupied by them in the past. They could use this option in future if their relations with India deteriorate.” The text of the article is annexed for easy reference.
2.Since January, 2010, there have been references by Chinese officials and media to the length of the Sino-Indian border as about 2000 kms. The People's Daily had reported on January 7: "China and India share a nearly 2,000-km border and disputed areas cover about 125,000 sq km on both sides."The "2000-km-long" boundary was mentioned in the “China Daily” in August 2009 in a report on the 13th round of boundary talks between the two sides. After the 14th round of the border talks held at Beijing on November 29 and 30,2010, by Shiv Shankar Menon, India’s National Security Adviser, and Dai Bingguo, the Chinese State Councillor,there were three important commentaries on the talks in the Chinese media----by the Party-controlled “Global Times”, by Zhou Gang, a former Chinese Ambassador to India, in the “Beijing Review” and by Cheng Ruisheng, another former Chinese Ambassador to India, in an interview to the Chinese TV (CCTV).
3. “The Global Times” commentary said that the Chinese Government’s position was that both countries “will take into consideration each other’s concerns, and work toward an equitable and justified settlement of border issues that is acceptable to both sides.” However, it quoted Zhao Gancheng, a leading Chinese strategist, as saying “Indian activities near the border” and “remarks made by senior Indian officials who played up the China threat” had “harmed the chances” of reaching a quick resolution. It did not make any reference to the length of the Sino-Indian border.
4. However, the comments of the two former Chinese Ambassadors to India made specific references to the length of the border. Zhou Gang was quoted as saying: “The Sino-Indian border stretches for about 2,000 km, and the two countries have never officially mapped it out. For a long time, the two sides abided by a traditional customary line based on their respective administrative regions.” Cheng Ruisheng was quoted as saying: “China and India share roughly a 2,000 kilometer border which has never been formally delineated.”
5. In subsequent reports as curtain raisers to the just concluded visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to New Delhi from December 15 to 17,2010, sections of the Chinese media specified the approximate length of the Sino-Indian border as about 2000 kms. A Xinhua report from Beijing disseminated before the departure of Wen to India described the Sino-Indian border as nearly 2,000-km long. Xinhua’s reference was reportedly based on an official briefing by the Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Hu Zhengyue to the Beijing press corps on December 13. On December 14, in an interview with the Indian Ambassador to China, S. Jaishankar, the “Global Times” asked about the reported tensions on the border. In response, Jaishankar said, “The reality contradicts any alarmist depiction of the situation on the border, whether in India or in China. We have a long common border of 3,488 km.” In publishing the interview the “Global Times” chose to add the following comments: “There is no settled length of the common border. The Chinese Government often refers to the border length as being ‘about 2,000 km.”
6. India has always been estimating the approximate length of the Sino-Indian border as about 3,500 kms in all the three sectors---Eastern, middle and Western--- taken together. While it is about 2000 kms in the Eastern and the middle sectors taken together, it is another about 1500 kms long in the Western sector in Jammu & Kashmir. China, which had never openly questioned the Indian estimate of the length of the common border before, is now unilaterally seeking to exclude from consideration during the border talks the dispute between India and China over the Chinese occupation of a large territory in the Ladakh sector of J&K. In fact, it is seeking to question India’s locus standi to discuss with China the border in the J&K area in view of Pakistan’s claims to this area. It is trying to bring in Pakistan as an interested party in so far as the border talks regarding the Western sector are concerned. It wants to change the format of the border talks in order to keep it confined bilaterally to the Eastern and middle sectors and expand it to a trilateral issue involving India, China and Pakistan in the Western sector. The exclusion of the border in the J&K sector from its estimate of the total length of the border is another indication that it does not recognize India’s claims of sovereignty over J&K.
7. This has come in the wake of its decision to stop issuing regular visas to Indian citizens residing in J&K and to issue them only stapled visas. It is apparent that this is part of a well thought-out policy of unilaterally changing the ground rules of the border talks. It had earlier allegedly changed the ground rules in the Eastern sector by going back on a prior understanding with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the border should be demarcated in such a manner as not to affect populated areas. It is now going back on its previous stand in the Western sector by seeking to challenge India’s locus standi in view of its dispute with Pakistan.
8. Even at the risk of a further delay in the exercise to solve the border dispute, India should not agree to any change in the ground rules which would restrict the border talks only to the Eastern and middle sectors and exclude the Western sector on the ground that India has a dispute over this area with Pakistan. ( 20-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and, Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
(MY ARTICLE OF AUGUST 28,2010)
Dealing with Chinese Machinations on J & K
By B. Raman
The international community treats Jammu & Kashmir as a de facto----but not de jure --- part of India. Similarly, it treats Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) as de facto---- but not de jure---parts of Pakistan. In pursuance of this policy, other countries honour the Indian passports held by the residents of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and issue them normal visas on those passports when they want to travel. Similarly, they honour the Pakistani passports held by the residents of POK and GB and issue them visas on those passports.
2. China used to follow a similar policy till last year. It has now modified that policy in a significant manner. While it does not question the validity of the Indian passports held by the residents of J&K, it has stopped issuing visas on those passports.It has not debarred them from traveling to China, but they are allowed to travel only on the basis of a plain paper visa which is stapled to their Indian passport. The entry and exit stamps of the Chinese immigration are affixed on the plan paper visa and not on their Indian passport.
3. While doing so, Beijing has not changed its visa issue policy in respect of Pakistani residents of POK and GB. It is believed they are still issued visas on their Pakistani passports. Moreover, ignoring Indian protests, it is going ahead with its project to assist Pakistan in the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway which runs across GB and in the construction of hydel power and irrigation projects in GB. It has also agreed to participate in a feasibility study for the construction of a railway line to Xinjiang through GB. It has not yet agreed to assist Pakistan in the construction of an oil/gas pipeline from Gwadar to Xinjiang through GB.
4.The modifications in the Chinese policy have the following implications:
* Firstly, China has started treating POK and GB as de facto and de jure parts of Pakistan. It does not recognise Indian claims to these territories.
* Secondly, it has diluted its past acceptance of J&K as a de facto part of India. This would give satisfaction to Pakistan, which projects J&K as Pakistani territory under the illegal occupation of India. This would also lend support to the Pakistani contention that it has a political, diplomatic and moral right to support the so-called freedom struggle in J&K.
* Thirdly, by questioning the legitimacy of India's sovereignty over J&K, the Chinese may be creating a future option for themselves of questioning India's locus standi to negotiate with them on the future of the Indian territory in the Ladakh area occupied by them in the past. They could use this option in future if their relations with India deteriorate.\
5. The modification in the Chinese position on J & K and its active involvement in infrastructure and other development projects in POK and GB have coincided with indicators of active Pakistani assistance to China in quelling the revolt of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region which has a common border with GB. These indicators include an increase in the number of Chinese intelligence officers posted in Pakistan to keep a watch on the Uighur community living in Pakistan, Pakistani intensification of the surveillance of the members of the Uighur community and restrictions on their travel in Pakistan, rounding up of members of the Uighur community living in Pakistan who are accused by the Chinese of being members of the Eastern Turkestan lslamic Movement and their being handed over to the Chinese authorities without following the due process of law, intensification of the intelligence exchange and the recent joint counter-terrorism exercise, which was, in effect, a joint counter-Uighur exercise.
6. In the Chinese perception, their ability to pacify Xinjiang would depend on continued co-operation from Pakistan and strengthening Pakistan's control over POK and GB. Their modification of their policy relating to J&K is as a quid pro quo to Pakistan playing the role of their frontline ally in the fight against the Uighur freedom fighters represented by the Munich-based World Uighur Congress and Uighur jihadis belonging to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement. The Chinese decision to modify their policy even at the risk of its coming in the way of their developing relations with India is indicative of their serious concerns relating to Xinjiang. The need to pacify Xinjiang has assumed primacy in Chinese policy-making over the importance of misunderstanding-free relations with India.
7.India woke up to the changes in the Chinese policy last year when it noticed that the Chinese had stopped issuing regular visas to residents of J&K and have started issuing plain paper visas. There has been a further jolt to the Government of India in this matter by the reported disinclination of the Chinese to issue a visa to Lt. Gen. R. S. Jaswal, chief of the Northern Command of the Indian Army, to make an official visit to China as part of the high-level military exchanges agreed to by the two countries. The reasons for which they expressed their disinclination are not clear. Some reports say that it was because the Northern Command is responsible for external security in the J&K area along the Line of Control and the international border and they consider J&K to be a disputed territory. Some other reports attribute the Chinese disinclination to the fact that Lt. Gen. Jaswal was perceived to be a hawk who believed that China posed a military threat to India. There are still other reports claiming that Lt. Gen. Jaswal is actually a Kashmiri native and hence the Chinese objection to him. One does not know whether this is factually correct.
8. Whatever be the reason, the Chinese disinclination to issue a visa to him has to be strongly opposed by the Government of India. New Delhi has done well to suspend military-military exchanges till this issue is settled to the satisfaction of India without allowing it to affect the other aspects of the developing relations with China and come in the way of the on-going border talks. India's response has been limited to the military-military relationship.
9. The issue has tactical and strategic aspects. The tactical aspect relates to our response to the non-issue of a visa to Lt. Gen. Jaswal. We have reacted in adequate measure.
10. The strategic aspect relates to the following:
* How are we going to counter the Chinese attempts to question the legitimacy of our sovereignty over J&K and to re-open the entire issue?
* How are we going to counter the repeated Chinese actions in ignoring our protests and concerns relating to their involvement in the POK and GB?
11. Our response at the strategic level cannot remain confined to the suspension of military exchanges. It has to go beyond that. We had recognised Tibet as an integral part of China. We have shown good faith in adhering to that position. China has not shown good faith on the issue of J&K being an integral part of India. The time has come for us to re-examine our position in matters relating to Tibet. We have to make it clear to Beijing that our continued adherence to our present position on Tibet would depend on its respecting our sensitivities in matters relating to J&K, POK and GB. If it does not respect our core interests in relation to J &K, POK and GB, it cannot expect us to continue to respect its core interests relating to Tibet.
12. As a starter in the re-examination of our Tibetan policy, we should make evident the seriousness of our unhappiness with Beijing on this issue by immediately associating His Holiness the Dalai Lama with the project for the revival of the Nalanda University.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In an article of August 28,2010, titled "Dealing with Chinese Machinations on J & K" (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html ), I had stated as follows: “By questioning the legitimacy of India's sovereignty over J&K, the Chinese may be creating a future option for themselves of questioning India's locus standi to negotiate with them on the future of the Indian territory in the Ladakh area occupied by them in the past. They could use this option in future if their relations with India deteriorate.” The text of the article is annexed for easy reference.
2.Since January, 2010, there have been references by Chinese officials and media to the length of the Sino-Indian border as about 2000 kms. The People's Daily had reported on January 7: "China and India share a nearly 2,000-km border and disputed areas cover about 125,000 sq km on both sides."The "2000-km-long" boundary was mentioned in the “China Daily” in August 2009 in a report on the 13th round of boundary talks between the two sides. After the 14th round of the border talks held at Beijing on November 29 and 30,2010, by Shiv Shankar Menon, India’s National Security Adviser, and Dai Bingguo, the Chinese State Councillor,there were three important commentaries on the talks in the Chinese media----by the Party-controlled “Global Times”, by Zhou Gang, a former Chinese Ambassador to India, in the “Beijing Review” and by Cheng Ruisheng, another former Chinese Ambassador to India, in an interview to the Chinese TV (CCTV).
3. “The Global Times” commentary said that the Chinese Government’s position was that both countries “will take into consideration each other’s concerns, and work toward an equitable and justified settlement of border issues that is acceptable to both sides.” However, it quoted Zhao Gancheng, a leading Chinese strategist, as saying “Indian activities near the border” and “remarks made by senior Indian officials who played up the China threat” had “harmed the chances” of reaching a quick resolution. It did not make any reference to the length of the Sino-Indian border.
4. However, the comments of the two former Chinese Ambassadors to India made specific references to the length of the border. Zhou Gang was quoted as saying: “The Sino-Indian border stretches for about 2,000 km, and the two countries have never officially mapped it out. For a long time, the two sides abided by a traditional customary line based on their respective administrative regions.” Cheng Ruisheng was quoted as saying: “China and India share roughly a 2,000 kilometer border which has never been formally delineated.”
5. In subsequent reports as curtain raisers to the just concluded visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to New Delhi from December 15 to 17,2010, sections of the Chinese media specified the approximate length of the Sino-Indian border as about 2000 kms. A Xinhua report from Beijing disseminated before the departure of Wen to India described the Sino-Indian border as nearly 2,000-km long. Xinhua’s reference was reportedly based on an official briefing by the Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Hu Zhengyue to the Beijing press corps on December 13. On December 14, in an interview with the Indian Ambassador to China, S. Jaishankar, the “Global Times” asked about the reported tensions on the border. In response, Jaishankar said, “The reality contradicts any alarmist depiction of the situation on the border, whether in India or in China. We have a long common border of 3,488 km.” In publishing the interview the “Global Times” chose to add the following comments: “There is no settled length of the common border. The Chinese Government often refers to the border length as being ‘about 2,000 km.”
6. India has always been estimating the approximate length of the Sino-Indian border as about 3,500 kms in all the three sectors---Eastern, middle and Western--- taken together. While it is about 2000 kms in the Eastern and the middle sectors taken together, it is another about 1500 kms long in the Western sector in Jammu & Kashmir. China, which had never openly questioned the Indian estimate of the length of the common border before, is now unilaterally seeking to exclude from consideration during the border talks the dispute between India and China over the Chinese occupation of a large territory in the Ladakh sector of J&K. In fact, it is seeking to question India’s locus standi to discuss with China the border in the J&K area in view of Pakistan’s claims to this area. It is trying to bring in Pakistan as an interested party in so far as the border talks regarding the Western sector are concerned. It wants to change the format of the border talks in order to keep it confined bilaterally to the Eastern and middle sectors and expand it to a trilateral issue involving India, China and Pakistan in the Western sector. The exclusion of the border in the J&K sector from its estimate of the total length of the border is another indication that it does not recognize India’s claims of sovereignty over J&K.
7. This has come in the wake of its decision to stop issuing regular visas to Indian citizens residing in J&K and to issue them only stapled visas. It is apparent that this is part of a well thought-out policy of unilaterally changing the ground rules of the border talks. It had earlier allegedly changed the ground rules in the Eastern sector by going back on a prior understanding with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the border should be demarcated in such a manner as not to affect populated areas. It is now going back on its previous stand in the Western sector by seeking to challenge India’s locus standi in view of its dispute with Pakistan.
8. Even at the risk of a further delay in the exercise to solve the border dispute, India should not agree to any change in the ground rules which would restrict the border talks only to the Eastern and middle sectors and exclude the Western sector on the ground that India has a dispute over this area with Pakistan. ( 20-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and, Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
(MY ARTICLE OF AUGUST 28,2010)
Dealing with Chinese Machinations on J & K
By B. Raman
The international community treats Jammu & Kashmir as a de facto----but not de jure --- part of India. Similarly, it treats Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) as de facto---- but not de jure---parts of Pakistan. In pursuance of this policy, other countries honour the Indian passports held by the residents of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and issue them normal visas on those passports when they want to travel. Similarly, they honour the Pakistani passports held by the residents of POK and GB and issue them visas on those passports.
2. China used to follow a similar policy till last year. It has now modified that policy in a significant manner. While it does not question the validity of the Indian passports held by the residents of J&K, it has stopped issuing visas on those passports.It has not debarred them from traveling to China, but they are allowed to travel only on the basis of a plain paper visa which is stapled to their Indian passport. The entry and exit stamps of the Chinese immigration are affixed on the plan paper visa and not on their Indian passport.
3. While doing so, Beijing has not changed its visa issue policy in respect of Pakistani residents of POK and GB. It is believed they are still issued visas on their Pakistani passports. Moreover, ignoring Indian protests, it is going ahead with its project to assist Pakistan in the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway which runs across GB and in the construction of hydel power and irrigation projects in GB. It has also agreed to participate in a feasibility study for the construction of a railway line to Xinjiang through GB. It has not yet agreed to assist Pakistan in the construction of an oil/gas pipeline from Gwadar to Xinjiang through GB.
4.The modifications in the Chinese policy have the following implications:
* Firstly, China has started treating POK and GB as de facto and de jure parts of Pakistan. It does not recognise Indian claims to these territories.
* Secondly, it has diluted its past acceptance of J&K as a de facto part of India. This would give satisfaction to Pakistan, which projects J&K as Pakistani territory under the illegal occupation of India. This would also lend support to the Pakistani contention that it has a political, diplomatic and moral right to support the so-called freedom struggle in J&K.
* Thirdly, by questioning the legitimacy of India's sovereignty over J&K, the Chinese may be creating a future option for themselves of questioning India's locus standi to negotiate with them on the future of the Indian territory in the Ladakh area occupied by them in the past. They could use this option in future if their relations with India deteriorate.\
5. The modification in the Chinese position on J & K and its active involvement in infrastructure and other development projects in POK and GB have coincided with indicators of active Pakistani assistance to China in quelling the revolt of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region which has a common border with GB. These indicators include an increase in the number of Chinese intelligence officers posted in Pakistan to keep a watch on the Uighur community living in Pakistan, Pakistani intensification of the surveillance of the members of the Uighur community and restrictions on their travel in Pakistan, rounding up of members of the Uighur community living in Pakistan who are accused by the Chinese of being members of the Eastern Turkestan lslamic Movement and their being handed over to the Chinese authorities without following the due process of law, intensification of the intelligence exchange and the recent joint counter-terrorism exercise, which was, in effect, a joint counter-Uighur exercise.
6. In the Chinese perception, their ability to pacify Xinjiang would depend on continued co-operation from Pakistan and strengthening Pakistan's control over POK and GB. Their modification of their policy relating to J&K is as a quid pro quo to Pakistan playing the role of their frontline ally in the fight against the Uighur freedom fighters represented by the Munich-based World Uighur Congress and Uighur jihadis belonging to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement. The Chinese decision to modify their policy even at the risk of its coming in the way of their developing relations with India is indicative of their serious concerns relating to Xinjiang. The need to pacify Xinjiang has assumed primacy in Chinese policy-making over the importance of misunderstanding-free relations with India.
7.India woke up to the changes in the Chinese policy last year when it noticed that the Chinese had stopped issuing regular visas to residents of J&K and have started issuing plain paper visas. There has been a further jolt to the Government of India in this matter by the reported disinclination of the Chinese to issue a visa to Lt. Gen. R. S. Jaswal, chief of the Northern Command of the Indian Army, to make an official visit to China as part of the high-level military exchanges agreed to by the two countries. The reasons for which they expressed their disinclination are not clear. Some reports say that it was because the Northern Command is responsible for external security in the J&K area along the Line of Control and the international border and they consider J&K to be a disputed territory. Some other reports attribute the Chinese disinclination to the fact that Lt. Gen. Jaswal was perceived to be a hawk who believed that China posed a military threat to India. There are still other reports claiming that Lt. Gen. Jaswal is actually a Kashmiri native and hence the Chinese objection to him. One does not know whether this is factually correct.
8. Whatever be the reason, the Chinese disinclination to issue a visa to him has to be strongly opposed by the Government of India. New Delhi has done well to suspend military-military exchanges till this issue is settled to the satisfaction of India without allowing it to affect the other aspects of the developing relations with China and come in the way of the on-going border talks. India's response has been limited to the military-military relationship.
9. The issue has tactical and strategic aspects. The tactical aspect relates to our response to the non-issue of a visa to Lt. Gen. Jaswal. We have reacted in adequate measure.
10. The strategic aspect relates to the following:
* How are we going to counter the Chinese attempts to question the legitimacy of our sovereignty over J&K and to re-open the entire issue?
* How are we going to counter the repeated Chinese actions in ignoring our protests and concerns relating to their involvement in the POK and GB?
11. Our response at the strategic level cannot remain confined to the suspension of military exchanges. It has to go beyond that. We had recognised Tibet as an integral part of China. We have shown good faith in adhering to that position. China has not shown good faith on the issue of J&K being an integral part of India. The time has come for us to re-examine our position in matters relating to Tibet. We have to make it clear to Beijing that our continued adherence to our present position on Tibet would depend on its respecting our sensitivities in matters relating to J&K, POK and GB. If it does not respect our core interests in relation to J &K, POK and GB, it cannot expect us to continue to respect its core interests relating to Tibet.
12. As a starter in the re-examination of our Tibetan policy, we should make evident the seriousness of our unhappiness with Beijing on this issue by immediately associating His Holiness the Dalai Lama with the project for the revival of the Nalanda University.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, December 18, 2010
WEN: FOCUS ON PAKISTAN & CHINA AS MILITARY ALLIES
B.RAMAN
During the current visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China to Pakistan, the focus has been on projecting China and Pakistan as military allies helping each other in defending their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2.The Chinese Government controlled Xinhua news agency quoted Wen as telling Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani on December 17 as follows: "China and Pakistan were, are and will always be good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers.China appreciates the strong support Pakistan has long been offering on issues concerning China's core interests, and will continue backing Pakistan's efforts in defending national sovereignty, maintaining social stability and achieving independent and sustainable economic development.” Noting that Pakistan has made huge sacrifice for and important contributions to the global counterterrorism campaign, Wen said his country is ready to work together with Pakistan to promote regional peace and stability.
3. During a meeting with Gen.Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Chief of the Army Staff, Admiral Noman Bashir, Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman, Chief of the Air Staff, at Islamabad on December 18, Wen , according to the Xinhua, called for enhanced military exchanges and cooperation between China and Pakistan so as to cement the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation. He said: " The Pakistani military is a steadfast supporter and vindicator of the China-Pakistan friendship, and has played an important role in consolidating and developing their strategic partnership of cooperation."He applauded the close exchanges between the two militaries in the areas of anti-terrorism and disaster relief, and hoped to further enhance the military links to contribute to the development of bilateral ties.
4. According to the Xinhua, the Pakistani military chiefs who called on Wen described China as an all-weather strategic partner of Pakistan and said the bilateral friendship had withstood severe challenges. The Pakistani military was ready to work jointly with China to play a positive role in developing their strategic partnership of cooperation. ( 19-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
During the current visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China to Pakistan, the focus has been on projecting China and Pakistan as military allies helping each other in defending their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2.The Chinese Government controlled Xinhua news agency quoted Wen as telling Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani on December 17 as follows: "China and Pakistan were, are and will always be good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers.China appreciates the strong support Pakistan has long been offering on issues concerning China's core interests, and will continue backing Pakistan's efforts in defending national sovereignty, maintaining social stability and achieving independent and sustainable economic development.” Noting that Pakistan has made huge sacrifice for and important contributions to the global counterterrorism campaign, Wen said his country is ready to work together with Pakistan to promote regional peace and stability.
3. During a meeting with Gen.Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Chief of the Army Staff, Admiral Noman Bashir, Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman, Chief of the Air Staff, at Islamabad on December 18, Wen , according to the Xinhua, called for enhanced military exchanges and cooperation between China and Pakistan so as to cement the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation. He said: " The Pakistani military is a steadfast supporter and vindicator of the China-Pakistan friendship, and has played an important role in consolidating and developing their strategic partnership of cooperation."He applauded the close exchanges between the two militaries in the areas of anti-terrorism and disaster relief, and hoped to further enhance the military links to contribute to the development of bilateral ties.
4. According to the Xinhua, the Pakistani military chiefs who called on Wen described China as an all-weather strategic partner of Pakistan and said the bilateral friendship had withstood severe challenges. The Pakistani military was ready to work jointly with China to play a positive role in developing their strategic partnership of cooperation. ( 19-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
RAHUL GANDHI & WIKILEAKS
B.RAMAN
An unnecessary political controversy has been created over a diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in New Delhi to the US State Department in Washington DC summarising, inter alia, a discussion on terrorism in India which the US Ambassador Timothy Roemer reportedly had with Rahul Gandhi, the General Secretary of the Congress (I), at a lunch hosted by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July last year. It is one of the cables leaked out by WikiLeaks.
2. A careful reading and analysis of Rahul Gandhi's observations as reported in the cable would indicate that the theme of the discussions was about the relative threat faced by India from the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a Pakistani organisation, and indigenous extremist elements belonging to the Hindu as well as Muslim communities. My reading is that Rahul Gandhi had said that the indigenous elements----whether the Indian Muslims who have taken to terrorism or some Hindu elements taking to terrorism--- cause him greater concern than the LET.
3. This is what I have been saying since the Indian Mujahideen (IM) made its appearance in 2007 and since some Hindu elements, angered by what they perceived as the soft policy of the Congress(I) controlled Governments towards Muslim terrorists, took to reprisal terrorism against the Muslims and their places of worship. I have been saying that while we can be ruthless without any qualms of conscience against the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organisations, we cannot be so against our own citizens who take to terrorism---whether they are Hindus or Muslims. We have to be more nuanced in dealing with our indigenous terrorist elements without adding to the anger in the two communities against each other. The LET has been active in India for over 17 years. We are used to dealing with it with no holds barred. The new indigenous elements----Indian Muslims and Hindus--- are of recent origin and it is going to be more difficult to deal with them--- unless we pay attention to the anger in the two communities----- the anger in the Muslim community over perceptions of unfair policies towards their community and the anger in the Hindu community over perceptions of softness towards the Muslim terrorists.
4. I, therefore, do not take serious objection to the views of Rahul Gandhi. However, I wonder whether it was wise on his part to have discussed this with the US Ambassador lest his views be misinterpreted as has happened now following the leak of the cable. (19-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
An unnecessary political controversy has been created over a diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in New Delhi to the US State Department in Washington DC summarising, inter alia, a discussion on terrorism in India which the US Ambassador Timothy Roemer reportedly had with Rahul Gandhi, the General Secretary of the Congress (I), at a lunch hosted by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July last year. It is one of the cables leaked out by WikiLeaks.
2. A careful reading and analysis of Rahul Gandhi's observations as reported in the cable would indicate that the theme of the discussions was about the relative threat faced by India from the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a Pakistani organisation, and indigenous extremist elements belonging to the Hindu as well as Muslim communities. My reading is that Rahul Gandhi had said that the indigenous elements----whether the Indian Muslims who have taken to terrorism or some Hindu elements taking to terrorism--- cause him greater concern than the LET.
3. This is what I have been saying since the Indian Mujahideen (IM) made its appearance in 2007 and since some Hindu elements, angered by what they perceived as the soft policy of the Congress(I) controlled Governments towards Muslim terrorists, took to reprisal terrorism against the Muslims and their places of worship. I have been saying that while we can be ruthless without any qualms of conscience against the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organisations, we cannot be so against our own citizens who take to terrorism---whether they are Hindus or Muslims. We have to be more nuanced in dealing with our indigenous terrorist elements without adding to the anger in the two communities against each other. The LET has been active in India for over 17 years. We are used to dealing with it with no holds barred. The new indigenous elements----Indian Muslims and Hindus--- are of recent origin and it is going to be more difficult to deal with them--- unless we pay attention to the anger in the two communities----- the anger in the Muslim community over perceptions of unfair policies towards their community and the anger in the Hindu community over perceptions of softness towards the Muslim terrorists.
4. I, therefore, do not take serious objection to the views of Rahul Gandhi. However, I wonder whether it was wise on his part to have discussed this with the US Ambassador lest his views be misinterpreted as has happened now following the leak of the cable. (19-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA: INDIA MORE ASSERTIVE, BUT NOT YET ADEQUATELY---MY REPLY TO A READER'S QUESTION
B.RAMAN
QUESTION:In your article with which I substantially agree, you have said:
>>At the same time, the lack of progress in solving the border dispute in this area has come in the way of the economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India. <<.
Could you tell me why India cannot go ahead and economically integrate Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India in any manner she thinks appropriate? Why should it depend on any action on China's part?
MY ANSWER:Our policy of economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh has still been half-hearted and hesitant. We have been developing the transport infrastructure, which could add to our defence capabilities. I understand we have also been constructing small-scale hydel stations which could benefit the people. At the same time, we seem to be avoiding projects of a strategic significance such as the exploitation of the oil, gas and other natural resources of the area lest such projects prove provocative and confrontational.Before we go to that stage, we have to further strengthen our defence capabilities in that area.
QUESTION:In your article with which I substantially agree, you have said:
>>At the same time, the lack of progress in solving the border dispute in this area has come in the way of the economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India. <<.
Could you tell me why India cannot go ahead and economically integrate Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India in any manner she thinks appropriate? Why should it depend on any action on China's part?
MY ANSWER:Our policy of economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh has still been half-hearted and hesitant. We have been developing the transport infrastructure, which could add to our defence capabilities. I understand we have also been constructing small-scale hydel stations which could benefit the people. At the same time, we seem to be avoiding projects of a strategic significance such as the exploitation of the oil, gas and other natural resources of the area lest such projects prove provocative and confrontational.Before we go to that stage, we have to further strengthen our defence capabilities in that area.
Friday, December 17, 2010
INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA
An edited compilation of articles contributed by eminent scholars in India covering key aspects relating to China's economy, politics, military and strategy, with focus, wherever appropriate, on their impact on Sino-Indian relations. Brought out by the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Edited by D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies , with a Foreword by C.V.Ranganathan, Indian Foreign Service (retd), former Indian Ambassador to China.
Price: Rs.425
Available at :T.R.Publications Pvt.Ltd., A-32, 3rd Floor, B-Block, Gulmohar Apartments,, 35, South Boag Road, T.Nagar, Chennai--600017
Price: Rs.425
Available at :T.R.Publications Pvt.Ltd., A-32, 3rd Floor, B-Block, Gulmohar Apartments,, 35, South Boag Road, T.Nagar, Chennai--600017
Thursday, December 16, 2010
CHINA: INDIA MORE ASSERTIVE, BUT NOT YET ADEQUATELY
B.RAMAN
India has begun being more assertive against China than it was till the end of last year, but not yet in an adequate measure so as to be able to make an impact on Chinese policy-making towards India. That is the conclusion emerging from a study of the Joint statement issued at the end of the talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at New Delhi on December 16,2010.
2. In my earlier articles before the visit of Wen, I had drawn attention to two instances of welcome Indian assertiveness against China----firstly, ignoring Beijing’s unhappiness over the visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in India’s Arunachal Pradesh earlier this year and secondly, attending the ceremony held in Oslo on December 10 to award in absentia the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights activist now in jail in China, ignoring Chinese entreaties and pressure tactics not to do so.
3. A third instance of welcome Indian assertiveness could be read between the lines while analyzing the joint statement of December 16. The standard formulation that India adheres to the one China policy and recognizes Tibet as an integral part of China has been absent. The statement issued during Wen’s previous visit to Delhi in April 2005 had said: “The Indian side reiterated that it recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions.”
4. The latest statement does not incorporate any such assurances to China. This is an expression of Indian unhappiness over the Chinese coming out in recent months in indirect support of Pakistani claims of sovereignty over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan, while diluting its post-1999 support to Indian claims of sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir. China’s reluctance to support us on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is a fleabite. We need not lose sleep over it. But, its abandoning the neutral policy followed by it after 1999 on Indian and Pakistani claims of sovereignty over J&K has been a serious development with likely long-term consequences and it is time we made it clear that if China does not respect India’s territorial integrity, India is no longer bound to respect China’s. That is the hint that India has hopefully conveyed to Beijing by not agreeing to incorporate the usual formulations on the so-called One China policy and Tibet.
5. We should not stop with this. We should move further forward by having a second look at our Tibetan policy, including our interactions at the official level with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. There was a welcome surge in Tibetan demonstrations in Delhi during the visit of Wen. This is a hopeful indicator that in future Indian attention to Chinese sensitivities will be in direct proportion to Chinese attention to Indian sensitivities.
6. The bilateral economic relations continue to move forward. Contracts worth US & 16 billion were signed during the visit. It was decided to try to increase the value of bilateral trade from US $ 60 billion expected by the end of this year to US $ 100 billion by 2015. Unfortunately, the economic relations have been moving forward in a direction more favourable to Chinese than Indian interests. The adverse balance of trade in India’s disfavour ( US $ 19 billion) continues to increase despite repeated Chinese assurances to redress it.
7. China has benefited enormously from the bilateral economic relations. Expectations that this could render Beijing more amenable to solving the border dispute and more sensitive to India’s major concerns over the growing China-Pakistan axis continue to be belied. The China advocated policy of keeping the border dispute in cold storage while paying more attention to the economic relations is proving to be detrimental to India. Due to the uncertainties caused by Beijing in the Arunachal Pradesh sector by further developing its infrastructure in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region and by holding two exercises by the People’s Liberation Army (Air Force) in Tibet this year----one of them involving the suspected movement of missiles by the Qinghai-Lhasa railway and the other involving air-ground exercises with live ammunition at high altitudes by combined units of the Air Force and the Artillery--- India has been forced to spend more on the development of the infrastructure in the North-East. At the same time, the lack of progress in solving the border dispute in this area has come in the way of the economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India.
8. By increasing its presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, China has added to the strategic threats in our Leh-Kargil sector, which would necessitate greater attention to the development of infrastructure in this sector at a time when we still seem to be struggling to develop the infrastructure and our defence capabilities in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Our reviewing our Tibetan policy could help us in the Arunachal Pradesh sector, but not in the Kargil-Leh sector facing Gilgit-Baltistan. A review of our interactions with the nationalist elements in Xinjiang in China and in Gilgit-Baltistan is necessary in this regard.
9. A sustained Indian policy of paying more attention to developments in China’s peripheral areas has to be an important component of our policy of assertiveness. In an article of September 9,2010, titled “ One India and One China”, I wrote as follows: “Our recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China and our acceptance of the one China policy of Beijing without a quid pro quo from Beijing in the form of acceptance of J&K as an integral part of India and of the One India policy have proved counter-productive. In our anxiety to avoid adding to the tensions and distrust between the two countries, we have let Beijing dictate what should be the nature of our interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees. We avoid open interactions with His Holiness and are not even prepared to associate him with the project to revive the Nalanda University. Better relations with China on mutually and equally advantageous terms and not on terms which favour China alone, but not India should be our policy. A clear message in non-provocative language has to go to Beijing that India has been disillusioned by the self-centred policies of Beijing and its lack of reciprocity in respecting our core interests. Strategic relations have to be a two-way traffic and based on quid pro quo. For China, they are a one-way traffic benefiting only its core interests. We should no longer accept this.” (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4026.html
10. Those observations still remain valid. That is the inevitable conclusion from the Wen visit.( 17-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
India has begun being more assertive against China than it was till the end of last year, but not yet in an adequate measure so as to be able to make an impact on Chinese policy-making towards India. That is the conclusion emerging from a study of the Joint statement issued at the end of the talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at New Delhi on December 16,2010.
2. In my earlier articles before the visit of Wen, I had drawn attention to two instances of welcome Indian assertiveness against China----firstly, ignoring Beijing’s unhappiness over the visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in India’s Arunachal Pradesh earlier this year and secondly, attending the ceremony held in Oslo on December 10 to award in absentia the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights activist now in jail in China, ignoring Chinese entreaties and pressure tactics not to do so.
3. A third instance of welcome Indian assertiveness could be read between the lines while analyzing the joint statement of December 16. The standard formulation that India adheres to the one China policy and recognizes Tibet as an integral part of China has been absent. The statement issued during Wen’s previous visit to Delhi in April 2005 had said: “The Indian side reiterated that it recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions.”
4. The latest statement does not incorporate any such assurances to China. This is an expression of Indian unhappiness over the Chinese coming out in recent months in indirect support of Pakistani claims of sovereignty over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan, while diluting its post-1999 support to Indian claims of sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir. China’s reluctance to support us on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is a fleabite. We need not lose sleep over it. But, its abandoning the neutral policy followed by it after 1999 on Indian and Pakistani claims of sovereignty over J&K has been a serious development with likely long-term consequences and it is time we made it clear that if China does not respect India’s territorial integrity, India is no longer bound to respect China’s. That is the hint that India has hopefully conveyed to Beijing by not agreeing to incorporate the usual formulations on the so-called One China policy and Tibet.
5. We should not stop with this. We should move further forward by having a second look at our Tibetan policy, including our interactions at the official level with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. There was a welcome surge in Tibetan demonstrations in Delhi during the visit of Wen. This is a hopeful indicator that in future Indian attention to Chinese sensitivities will be in direct proportion to Chinese attention to Indian sensitivities.
6. The bilateral economic relations continue to move forward. Contracts worth US & 16 billion were signed during the visit. It was decided to try to increase the value of bilateral trade from US $ 60 billion expected by the end of this year to US $ 100 billion by 2015. Unfortunately, the economic relations have been moving forward in a direction more favourable to Chinese than Indian interests. The adverse balance of trade in India’s disfavour ( US $ 19 billion) continues to increase despite repeated Chinese assurances to redress it.
7. China has benefited enormously from the bilateral economic relations. Expectations that this could render Beijing more amenable to solving the border dispute and more sensitive to India’s major concerns over the growing China-Pakistan axis continue to be belied. The China advocated policy of keeping the border dispute in cold storage while paying more attention to the economic relations is proving to be detrimental to India. Due to the uncertainties caused by Beijing in the Arunachal Pradesh sector by further developing its infrastructure in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region and by holding two exercises by the People’s Liberation Army (Air Force) in Tibet this year----one of them involving the suspected movement of missiles by the Qinghai-Lhasa railway and the other involving air-ground exercises with live ammunition at high altitudes by combined units of the Air Force and the Artillery--- India has been forced to spend more on the development of the infrastructure in the North-East. At the same time, the lack of progress in solving the border dispute in this area has come in the way of the economic integration of Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India.
8. By increasing its presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, China has added to the strategic threats in our Leh-Kargil sector, which would necessitate greater attention to the development of infrastructure in this sector at a time when we still seem to be struggling to develop the infrastructure and our defence capabilities in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Our reviewing our Tibetan policy could help us in the Arunachal Pradesh sector, but not in the Kargil-Leh sector facing Gilgit-Baltistan. A review of our interactions with the nationalist elements in Xinjiang in China and in Gilgit-Baltistan is necessary in this regard.
9. A sustained Indian policy of paying more attention to developments in China’s peripheral areas has to be an important component of our policy of assertiveness. In an article of September 9,2010, titled “ One India and One China”, I wrote as follows: “Our recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China and our acceptance of the one China policy of Beijing without a quid pro quo from Beijing in the form of acceptance of J&K as an integral part of India and of the One India policy have proved counter-productive. In our anxiety to avoid adding to the tensions and distrust between the two countries, we have let Beijing dictate what should be the nature of our interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees. We avoid open interactions with His Holiness and are not even prepared to associate him with the project to revive the Nalanda University. Better relations with China on mutually and equally advantageous terms and not on terms which favour China alone, but not India should be our policy. A clear message in non-provocative language has to go to Beijing that India has been disillusioned by the self-centred policies of Beijing and its lack of reciprocity in respecting our core interests. Strategic relations have to be a two-way traffic and based on quid pro quo. For China, they are a one-way traffic benefiting only its core interests. We should no longer accept this.” (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4026.html
10. Those observations still remain valid. That is the inevitable conclusion from the Wen visit.( 17-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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