B.RAMAN
What is the US up to in North Korea and Vietnam? That is the most worrying question for Beijing today and not the question, what is the US up to in India. There is very little excitement and there are very few signs of concern in political and military circles in Beijing and in the community of Chinese analysts over the forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to India in November. In contrast, every US move relating to North Korea and Vietnam and even the visits of junior US officials to Vietnam are being closely monitored and analysed.
2.Is the US trying to use North Korea and Vietnam not only to counter the emergence of China as a major military power in the Pacific, but also to weaken China politically in the same way as the US used China against the USSR? Are the US and South Korea acting jointly to bring about a regime change in North Korea and encourage the emergence of a new leadership that would be favourable to the US interests? Can China count on the loyalty to China of a new regime in Pyongyang if Kim Jong-il is succeeded --- as he is expected to be---by his youngest son Kim Jong-Un ? What would be the attitude of the North Korean military leadership if a new regime in Pyongyang wants to move closer to the US? Its attitude would be very important because in the early stages of a new leadership, the North Korean Army's role in policy-making would be important.
3. These are the questions worrying Beijing in an increasing measure. The Chinese concerns over the question"What next, after Kim Jong-il?" are reflected in the fact that Kim Jong-il, who had visited China only a few weeks ago, is reportedly again on an unpublicised visit----this time with his youngest son and expected successor--- to China. Is the visit meant to reassure Beijing that it has nothing to fear from his son?
4. The increasing bonhomie between Washington and Hanoi is another issue of immediate concern to China.How should China counter this---- by increasing pressure on Hanoi or by making overtures to it? How to counter the openly-proclaimed US assertiveness in the South China Sea? What to make of the lack of concern in the South-East Asian countries over the US assertiveness? Is there already a secret understanding between the US on the one side and Vietnam and the Philippines on the other to counter Chinese designs in the area?
5. The way Beijing has been trying to bully Manila over its mishandling of the bus hijacking incident in which eight Chinese tourists from Hong Kong died on August 23,2010, stands in sharp contrast to China's refraining from any criticism of Pakistan after the attacks on some Chinese nationals by the Pakistani Taliban after the raid by the Pakistan Army into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007. In Pakistan too, there have been instances of Chinese engineers being taken hostages by different terrorist groups. The Chinese showed understanding of the difficulties faced by the Pakistani security forces and avoided any open criticism.
6. In Manila, it was not an act of terrorism. It was an irrational act of a dismissed police officer, who wanted his job back. The situation was definitely mishandled by the police. The Chinese over-reaction to the incident should be of concern to Manila. Whereas Beijing never issued an advisory to its nationals not to visit Pakistan, it has advised its nationals not to visit the Philippines. The Chinese never claimed a right to monitor the Pakistani enquiries into the incidents, but they are claiming a right to monitor the investigation in Manila.
7. Is the evident Chinese bullying of Manila an outcome of its unhappiness over the assertive policy of the Filippino Government in the South China Sea and its perceived support of the US assertiveness?
8. These are questions which need to be closely studied in the coming weeks and months. Two significant writings having a bearing on Chinese concerns over North Korea and Vietnam carried by the Party controlled "Global Times" are annexed. ( 27-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi , and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
US-S.Korea drill aimed at fall of North
Editorial carried by the "Global Times" on August 26,2010
Signs of the ongoing US-South Korea military drill show that the joint war game is not simply a warning or a show of force after the sinking of the Cheonan, nor is it a deliberate attempt to provoke China in the Yellow Sea.
China has to be careful of the two allies' strategic goal, which is to create turmoil in North Korea in the face of a pending political power transition.
China must also be wary of the US putting the entire Korean Peninsula under its influence.
The two Koreas have been deadlocked for nearly six decades. Not many people believe the situation can last forever.
Any change will mean a massive strategic change of power in Northeast Asia, as well as a change in the global balance of power.
Washington has made plans in the event of various scenarios, and has long been trying to push the situation in the direction that favors a US global strategy.
To put it simply, the US has never changed its basic policy toward North Korea, which is to ensue a regime change.
Although Washington is not openly talking about the policy, its goal remains to overthrow the current North Korean government.
The US-South Korean joint military exercises are a move to accelerate this momentum. It is a strategy to push and prepare for change, and take the initiative if the regime change really happens.
The controversial sinking of the South Korean battleship, in retrospect, is more like a convenient excuse for the US to conduct a long-planned drill that envisions the occupation of the North, rather than a single reaction toward an emergency.
US military leaders have been drawing up such plans since the end of last year.
The South's unification ministry has also admitted that the South was practicing a "stabilization" program aimed at turning North Koreans into South Korean citizens.
The Korean Peninsula is too important to ignore in the realm of global geopolitics. US control of the peninsula will pose a realistic threat to China and Russia.
North Korean leadership is expected to change hands soon. The world is watching the change closely, as North Korea is still not back to the Six-Party Talks that aim to persuade it to drop its nuclear weapon program.
A smooth transition of power in the North is vital for the stability of Northeast Asia.
China needs to clearly realize this, and try to play an active role in preserving the peace on the Korean Peninsula, as well as look after its own interests.
Shifting Vietnam remains a partner, not a rival, to China
An article carried by the "Global Times" on August 25,2010
By Su Hao
Vietnam has been moving closer to the US recently, and conflicts between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea are moving from potential problems into serious ones.
As it grows its economy, Vietnam is looking for maritime interests for future development.
In order to strengthen its role in South China Sea and gain the power to bargain with China, Vietnam is in dire need of an external power that can offer support. The US is the best source. By chance, the US has been adjusting its strategy to strengthen the containment of China in Asia.
But we cannot simply define Vietnam as a nation that is confronting China due to its current pro-US tilt in foreign policy. As neighboring countries, China and Vietnam have built a strategic partnership and the bilateral relation is running on a sound base.
We should make full use of this sound foundation to enhance and promote the bilateral relations within a framework of friendly cooperation.
Facing a Vietnam leaning toward the US, we should try our best to rebalance its position. A Vietnam balanced between China and the US would be in China's ultimate interests.
In the past, we assumed that China and Vietnam could stand together to handle issues with the US because of our similar political systems. However, the reality contradicts with the assumption.
Although the US often criticizes Vietnam over problems of political democracy and human rights, it is not a big obstacle in US-Vietnam relations, and cannot prevent strategic coordination and cooperation between the two countries.
Vietnam has close economic ties with China. However, business conflicts go along with cooperation. In trade between China and Vietnam, one serious problem is that Vietnam has the unfavorable trade balance.
Vietnam attributes its slow economic recovery and development to the abundant cheap goods imported from China, and criticizes China for dumping goods into its market. In order to cater to increasing public demand and support construction, it has to import consumer and capital goods from aboard. And the best supplier is China.
There are structural contradictions between China and Vietnam. We should try our best to mitigate them and emphasize mutual needs.
One of the key issues in the national strategy of Vietnam is to gain the leadership of ASEAN by promoting regional integration within the organization. This is a basic strategic choice of it.
From the perspective of regional cooperation, Vietnam needs China, since China plays a prominent role in the process of ASEAN regional integration, and without China's support and coordination, the integration process will be very difficult to implement.
And from a security perspective, in addition to the traditional maritime sovereignty dispute, there are many other complex security issues that concern both China and Vietnam, such as non-traditional security issues.
Although the US is conducting military exercises with Vietnam in the name of maritime disaster relief at present, if there were a disaster at sea, the real and urgent help provided to Vietnam would be from China, not the US.
What's more, Vietnam faces the same challenges of drought and flood as China does. We could spare our attention to aid it at the same time solving our own problems.
Vietnam is an agricultural country and the second largest rice exporter in the world. Nevertheless, its agriculture is relatively underdeveloped.
As another agricultural country, China could provide valuable expertise in intensive cultivation to Vietnam. Cooperation with Vietnam in this aspect could be strengthened.
Vietnam's strategic thinking is based on challenging China, but has to depend on China out of real demands, which resulted in its ambiguous and contorted diplomatic attitude toward China. We should try to weaken the confrontation from other aspects.
The South China Sea dispute between China and the Vietnam is still manageable, and unlikely to lead to the breakdown of bilateral relations.
As the largest interested party and the most influential country in the dispute, as long as China keep calm, take the initiative and stick to the established policies to deal with the issue, the dispute will not grow beyond our control.
Global Times reporter Yu Jincui compiled this article, based on an interview with Su Hao, a professor of diplomacy in China Foreign Affair University. forum@globaltimes.com.cn
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
SAFFRON TERROR: DEBATE ON BARKHA DUTT'S SHOW ON NDTV
B.RAMAN
"The Buck Stops Here " talk show of NDTV anchored by Ms.Barkha Dutt had an interesting discussion on August 25,2010, on the passing reference to the recently noticed phenomenon of "Saffron Terror" made by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, while inaugurating a conference of Directors-General of Police at New Delhi the same day.
2.The discussion was balanced and free of accusations and counter-accusations. It was refreshing to note that all the participants, including Shri Swapan Dasgupta, shared the concern of Shri Chidambaram over this phenomenon. There was no attempt to deny the fact that some Hindu elements, known to be close to the ideology of the Hindu nationalist group, are suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism against members of our Muslim community and that there was a need for a thorough investigation into this.
3.The debate, while refreshingly balanced and free of ideological polemic, was incomplete in some important respects. I myself , in my writings and speeches, have refrained from naming this phenomenon "Saffron" or "Hindutva" or Hindu terror since I felt that such characterisations could politicise the investigation and prosecution and aggravate the divide between the Hindus and the Muslims. I , therefore, prefer calling the phenomenon "Hindu reprisal terrorism".
4. In the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims, there have always been acts of reprisal during communal riots in different parts of the country, but those were acts of reprisal committed in the heat of the moment at the height of the riots.What we have been seeing since the Malegaon blasts on September 8,2006, are some pre-meditated acts of reprisal by some members of the Hindu community against Muslim soft targets. These are deliberate acts meant to punish Indian Muslims for the acts committed by some Pakistani terrorist organisations sponsored by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)----- with or without the help of Indian Muslims belonging to the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).
5.The Malegaon blasts of September 8,2006, constituted in my view the first act of reprisal terrorism by some Hindus against innocent Muslims. While almost everybody was blaming the ISI and its Pakistani surrogates for the blasts, in an article written on September 10,2006---two days after the blasts--- I said inter alia: " While one should not be surprised if the Malegon blasts also turn out to be the work of jihadi terrorists, one should not rule out at this stage the possibility of the involvement of non-Muslims, keeping in view the long history of tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus in Malegaon.....It also needs to be underlined that any ill-advised actions by angry elements of the Hindu community to give vent to their anger over the continuing acts of terrorism, by indulging in reprisal attacks against innocent members of the Muslim community would be detrimental to our national interests and could contribute to an unbridgeable divide between the two communities. The Government should act with equal firmness against whoever indulges in acts of terrorism/, irrespective of the community---Muslim or Hindu--to which he or she belongs. There cannot be one law for the Muslims and another for non-Muslims ."
( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1945.html )
6. Subsequently, I wrote as follows in my book titled "Terrorism---Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow" published in June 2008: "The conventional wisdom was that the Muslims were now being deliberately targeted by the jihadi organizations in order to provoke them against the Government and the Hindus. I do not subscribe to this wisdom. It is important to keep an open mind while investigating these targeted attacks on Indian Muslims and one should not jump to the conclusion that the LET or the HUJI must have been involved. We owe it to our Muslims, most of whom have kept away from Al Qaeda and other pan-Islamic organizations, to see that these cases of targeted attacks on Muslims are thoroughly investigated instead of coming to a facile conclusion that jihadi organizations must be behind them."
7. Two aspects of the phenomenon of Hindu reprisal terrorism worry me. The first is the attempt of the Hindus allegedly involved to punish the Indian Muslims for the acts of the ISI and its jihadi surrogates. The second is the alleged involvement of some ideologically motivated members of the security forces in these reprisal attacks. One saw a worrisome combination of religious and military elements coming together to hit out at our Muslim community. This showed the beginning of a possible ideological penetration of sections of our security forces by Hindu nationalist elements.
8. There are many---including myself--- who have long been saying that we will not be able to deal with jihadi terrorism unless we hit out at Pakistan, but , at the same time, we have been strongly advising against any retaliatory action in our own territory against our own people who are perceived as being sympathetic to the ISI-sponsored jihadis from Pakistan. The investigations into the Malegaon blasts and some other incidents have brought out that there are possibly elements in our security bureacracy who seem to believe that acts of reprisal against our own Muslims would be as justified as retaliatory attacks against Pakistan. This is a dangerous idea that needs to be eradicated ruthlessly.
9. As I had pointed out in a recent article, US investigators seem to believe that jihadi organizations from Pakistan were involved in the terrorist attacks in the Mecca Masjid of Hyderabad and on the Samjotha Express. If they are correct, the contention of our investigators that some of the arrested Hindus were involved in the Mecca Masjid blast stands disproved. Our investigators are still to make a headway in the Samjotha express case. The contradictions in the conclusions of the US and Indian investigators show that while there may be prima facie evidence against the arrested Hindus in some of the cases, there are others in which the evidence is not strong enough.
10.There is a need for a three-pronged action by the Government----- firstly, a thorough investigation of the pending cases against the arrested Hindus and their prosecution, if warranted; secondly, reconciliation of the differences in the Mecca Masjid case and , thirdly, action against serving and retired members of the security bureaucracy who encourage openly or covertly acts of reprisal against our Muslim co-citizens. ( 26-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"The Buck Stops Here " talk show of NDTV anchored by Ms.Barkha Dutt had an interesting discussion on August 25,2010, on the passing reference to the recently noticed phenomenon of "Saffron Terror" made by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, while inaugurating a conference of Directors-General of Police at New Delhi the same day.
2.The discussion was balanced and free of accusations and counter-accusations. It was refreshing to note that all the participants, including Shri Swapan Dasgupta, shared the concern of Shri Chidambaram over this phenomenon. There was no attempt to deny the fact that some Hindu elements, known to be close to the ideology of the Hindu nationalist group, are suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism against members of our Muslim community and that there was a need for a thorough investigation into this.
3.The debate, while refreshingly balanced and free of ideological polemic, was incomplete in some important respects. I myself , in my writings and speeches, have refrained from naming this phenomenon "Saffron" or "Hindutva" or Hindu terror since I felt that such characterisations could politicise the investigation and prosecution and aggravate the divide between the Hindus and the Muslims. I , therefore, prefer calling the phenomenon "Hindu reprisal terrorism".
4. In the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims, there have always been acts of reprisal during communal riots in different parts of the country, but those were acts of reprisal committed in the heat of the moment at the height of the riots.What we have been seeing since the Malegaon blasts on September 8,2006, are some pre-meditated acts of reprisal by some members of the Hindu community against Muslim soft targets. These are deliberate acts meant to punish Indian Muslims for the acts committed by some Pakistani terrorist organisations sponsored by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)----- with or without the help of Indian Muslims belonging to the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).
5.The Malegaon blasts of September 8,2006, constituted in my view the first act of reprisal terrorism by some Hindus against innocent Muslims. While almost everybody was blaming the ISI and its Pakistani surrogates for the blasts, in an article written on September 10,2006---two days after the blasts--- I said inter alia: " While one should not be surprised if the Malegon blasts also turn out to be the work of jihadi terrorists, one should not rule out at this stage the possibility of the involvement of non-Muslims, keeping in view the long history of tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus in Malegaon.....It also needs to be underlined that any ill-advised actions by angry elements of the Hindu community to give vent to their anger over the continuing acts of terrorism, by indulging in reprisal attacks against innocent members of the Muslim community would be detrimental to our national interests and could contribute to an unbridgeable divide between the two communities. The Government should act with equal firmness against whoever indulges in acts of terrorism/, irrespective of the community---Muslim or Hindu--to which he or she belongs. There cannot be one law for the Muslims and another for non-Muslims ."
( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1945.html )
6. Subsequently, I wrote as follows in my book titled "Terrorism---Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow" published in June 2008: "The conventional wisdom was that the Muslims were now being deliberately targeted by the jihadi organizations in order to provoke them against the Government and the Hindus. I do not subscribe to this wisdom. It is important to keep an open mind while investigating these targeted attacks on Indian Muslims and one should not jump to the conclusion that the LET or the HUJI must have been involved. We owe it to our Muslims, most of whom have kept away from Al Qaeda and other pan-Islamic organizations, to see that these cases of targeted attacks on Muslims are thoroughly investigated instead of coming to a facile conclusion that jihadi organizations must be behind them."
7. Two aspects of the phenomenon of Hindu reprisal terrorism worry me. The first is the attempt of the Hindus allegedly involved to punish the Indian Muslims for the acts of the ISI and its jihadi surrogates. The second is the alleged involvement of some ideologically motivated members of the security forces in these reprisal attacks. One saw a worrisome combination of religious and military elements coming together to hit out at our Muslim community. This showed the beginning of a possible ideological penetration of sections of our security forces by Hindu nationalist elements.
8. There are many---including myself--- who have long been saying that we will not be able to deal with jihadi terrorism unless we hit out at Pakistan, but , at the same time, we have been strongly advising against any retaliatory action in our own territory against our own people who are perceived as being sympathetic to the ISI-sponsored jihadis from Pakistan. The investigations into the Malegaon blasts and some other incidents have brought out that there are possibly elements in our security bureacracy who seem to believe that acts of reprisal against our own Muslims would be as justified as retaliatory attacks against Pakistan. This is a dangerous idea that needs to be eradicated ruthlessly.
9. As I had pointed out in a recent article, US investigators seem to believe that jihadi organizations from Pakistan were involved in the terrorist attacks in the Mecca Masjid of Hyderabad and on the Samjotha Express. If they are correct, the contention of our investigators that some of the arrested Hindus were involved in the Mecca Masjid blast stands disproved. Our investigators are still to make a headway in the Samjotha express case. The contradictions in the conclusions of the US and Indian investigators show that while there may be prima facie evidence against the arrested Hindus in some of the cases, there are others in which the evidence is not strong enough.
10.There is a need for a three-pronged action by the Government----- firstly, a thorough investigation of the pending cases against the arrested Hindus and their prosecution, if warranted; secondly, reconciliation of the differences in the Mecca Masjid case and , thirdly, action against serving and retired members of the security bureaucracy who encourage openly or covertly acts of reprisal against our Muslim co-citizens. ( 26-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
SOS FROM KHYBER PAKHTUNKWA, BALOCHISTAN & GILGIT-BALTISTAN
B.RAMAN
The secular Awami National Party (ANP) led Government of Khyber Pakhtunkwa and the nationalist organizations of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan have issued separate appeals to the international community for assisting them to meet the tremendous loss of lives and economic damages suffered by them due to the current floods in Pakistan.
2. Their direct appeals to the international community were triggered off by their fears that the bulk of the assistance amounting to US $ 800 million pledged by the international community at the special session of the UN General Assembly on August 19,2010, would be utilized by the Pakistan Government to assist the flood victims in Punjab and Sindh to the detriment of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan.
3. There are already indications of discrimination against the people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. While the Federal Government in Islamabad has been liberally issuing visas to volunteers of Western humanitarian relief organizations to do flood relief work in Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunwa, severe restrictions have been imposed on the issue of visas to foreign relief workers wanting to work in Balochistan and Gilgit- Baltistan. The presence of a large number of foreign relief workers on the ground will ensure that an independent estimate of the damages suffered by the people and the assistance required by them will reach Western Governments and audiences so that they can ensure that the needs of these areas are not ignored by the Federal Government. In the absence of independent foreign humanitarian workers in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, the international community will not be able to correctly assess their requirements and assist them.
4. While there is some understanding in the international community of the need to monitor the utilization of the aid being given to ensure that all the affected areas get their due share, no proper mechanism has been laid down for this purpose. The Western preoccupation has been on three pre-requisites. Firstly, to ensure that there is no corruption in the handling of the aid amounts. Secondly, to prevent the flow of any part of the assistance into the coffers of the terrorist organizations. And, thirdly, to pay adequate attention to the needs of Khyber Pakhtunkwa and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which constitute the Pashtun belt, in the hope of thereby weaning the local people away from Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. Aware of the interest of the West in assisting the affected people of the Pashtun belt, the Federal Government has so far not imposed any curbs on foreign humanitarian workers enjoying the confidence of their Governments going to these areas.
5. Despite this favourable attention to the Pashtun areas from the West---particularly from the US--- there are strong fears even in Khyber Pakhtunkwa that the Federal Government might divert the bulk of the assistance to Punjab and Sindh. It is for this reason that the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkwa has made a direct appeal to the international community to take note of its requirement and to directly assist the people of the State. The “Dawn” of Karachi wrote on August 21: “It is the first time after the adoption of the 18th Amendment that a provincial government totally bypassed the Federal government in seeking direct foreign assistance. The move also exposed differences between the centre and the province over the rehabilitation plans.”
6. As part of this exercise to seek direct assistance from the international community over the head of the Federal Government, the ANP-led Government of the province convened on August 20 a conference at Peshawar attended by representatives of many foreign diplomatic missions in Islamabad and non-Governmental humanitarian relief organizations. The “Dawn” has quoted Mian Iftikhar Hussain, the provincial Information Minister, as saying as follows: “It is our prerogative as the 18th Amendment has given us constitutional powers to undertake this initiative.” The paper has quoted another ANP representative, who has not been named, as saying: “The provincial government has been pushing federal authorities to hold this conference immediately, but they appeared reluctant.”
7.Taking advantage of the interest of the West in assisting the Pashtun victims, the Government of the province has directly contacted the representatives of the Western Governments and non-governmental organizations and sought relief and reconstruction assistance worth US $ three billion.
8. The affected people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan find themselves ignored by the international community. The Western non-governmental workers have been kept away from these areas by the Federal Government. Since the Balochs and the people of Gilgit- Baltistan, who are largely Shias, have kept away from Al Qaeda and its affiliates, their plight has not evoked much interest in the international community.
9. In a direct appeal to the international community, Mr.Abdul Hamid Khan of the Balawaristan National Front of Gilgit-Baltistan has stated as follows: “ 52 people have died and 160 rendered homeless in the village Qamrah of occupied Gilgit Baltistan region, and 22 have died, 40 rendered homeless in village Talas, 45 died and 70 injured in Giyes of Diamar. Similarly, in Talas 22 people were killed and 40 houses destroyed while in Hotoo, Rondu, Darel, Tangir, Botogah, Khinar, Thor, Hoodoor,Babusar, Gini, Hunza Nagir, Chhamoogardh Colony of Konodas and Skarkooi, Gilgit, Ghowadi Baltistan, Yasen, Gulaper, Isshqaman, Damas, Ginday, Sandhi, Hondoor, Dahrkoot, Mastuj, Booni, Garam Chashma, Yarkhoon in Chitral, and Koli and Pattan in Kohistan over 500 people have lost their lives whereas, more than half a million have become homeless and nearly 50,000 families have completely lost everything, including land, shelter, livestock and all means of living".
10. The Army, which maintains an iron hold over Balochistan despite the supposed presence of an elected Government there, has seen to it that Balochistan would not be a beneficiary of the assistance funds and that the real extent of the damages in Balochistan would not be known to the outside world. It thus wants to punish the Balochs for waging their freedom struggle.
11. It is important for the Government of India to take the following steps:
* Participate actively in UN and other international conferences to mobilize assistance for Pakistan in order to highlight the damages suffered by the people of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan and stress the importance of assisting them adequately.
* Interact with non-Governmental organizations from these areas and assist them.
* Establish contact with the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkwa and offer to make a contribution to their flood relief fund.
* Encourage non-Governmental humanitarian relief organizations of India and the Indian diaspora abroad to assist the people of these areas and make suitable contributions to these organizations . ( 25-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The secular Awami National Party (ANP) led Government of Khyber Pakhtunkwa and the nationalist organizations of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan have issued separate appeals to the international community for assisting them to meet the tremendous loss of lives and economic damages suffered by them due to the current floods in Pakistan.
2. Their direct appeals to the international community were triggered off by their fears that the bulk of the assistance amounting to US $ 800 million pledged by the international community at the special session of the UN General Assembly on August 19,2010, would be utilized by the Pakistan Government to assist the flood victims in Punjab and Sindh to the detriment of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan.
3. There are already indications of discrimination against the people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. While the Federal Government in Islamabad has been liberally issuing visas to volunteers of Western humanitarian relief organizations to do flood relief work in Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunwa, severe restrictions have been imposed on the issue of visas to foreign relief workers wanting to work in Balochistan and Gilgit- Baltistan. The presence of a large number of foreign relief workers on the ground will ensure that an independent estimate of the damages suffered by the people and the assistance required by them will reach Western Governments and audiences so that they can ensure that the needs of these areas are not ignored by the Federal Government. In the absence of independent foreign humanitarian workers in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, the international community will not be able to correctly assess their requirements and assist them.
4. While there is some understanding in the international community of the need to monitor the utilization of the aid being given to ensure that all the affected areas get their due share, no proper mechanism has been laid down for this purpose. The Western preoccupation has been on three pre-requisites. Firstly, to ensure that there is no corruption in the handling of the aid amounts. Secondly, to prevent the flow of any part of the assistance into the coffers of the terrorist organizations. And, thirdly, to pay adequate attention to the needs of Khyber Pakhtunkwa and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which constitute the Pashtun belt, in the hope of thereby weaning the local people away from Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. Aware of the interest of the West in assisting the affected people of the Pashtun belt, the Federal Government has so far not imposed any curbs on foreign humanitarian workers enjoying the confidence of their Governments going to these areas.
5. Despite this favourable attention to the Pashtun areas from the West---particularly from the US--- there are strong fears even in Khyber Pakhtunkwa that the Federal Government might divert the bulk of the assistance to Punjab and Sindh. It is for this reason that the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkwa has made a direct appeal to the international community to take note of its requirement and to directly assist the people of the State. The “Dawn” of Karachi wrote on August 21: “It is the first time after the adoption of the 18th Amendment that a provincial government totally bypassed the Federal government in seeking direct foreign assistance. The move also exposed differences between the centre and the province over the rehabilitation plans.”
6. As part of this exercise to seek direct assistance from the international community over the head of the Federal Government, the ANP-led Government of the province convened on August 20 a conference at Peshawar attended by representatives of many foreign diplomatic missions in Islamabad and non-Governmental humanitarian relief organizations. The “Dawn” has quoted Mian Iftikhar Hussain, the provincial Information Minister, as saying as follows: “It is our prerogative as the 18th Amendment has given us constitutional powers to undertake this initiative.” The paper has quoted another ANP representative, who has not been named, as saying: “The provincial government has been pushing federal authorities to hold this conference immediately, but they appeared reluctant.”
7.Taking advantage of the interest of the West in assisting the Pashtun victims, the Government of the province has directly contacted the representatives of the Western Governments and non-governmental organizations and sought relief and reconstruction assistance worth US $ three billion.
8. The affected people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan find themselves ignored by the international community. The Western non-governmental workers have been kept away from these areas by the Federal Government. Since the Balochs and the people of Gilgit- Baltistan, who are largely Shias, have kept away from Al Qaeda and its affiliates, their plight has not evoked much interest in the international community.
9. In a direct appeal to the international community, Mr.Abdul Hamid Khan of the Balawaristan National Front of Gilgit-Baltistan has stated as follows: “ 52 people have died and 160 rendered homeless in the village Qamrah of occupied Gilgit Baltistan region, and 22 have died, 40 rendered homeless in village Talas, 45 died and 70 injured in Giyes of Diamar. Similarly, in Talas 22 people were killed and 40 houses destroyed while in Hotoo, Rondu, Darel, Tangir, Botogah, Khinar, Thor, Hoodoor,Babusar, Gini, Hunza Nagir, Chhamoogardh Colony of Konodas and Skarkooi, Gilgit, Ghowadi Baltistan, Yasen, Gulaper, Isshqaman, Damas, Ginday, Sandhi, Hondoor, Dahrkoot, Mastuj, Booni, Garam Chashma, Yarkhoon in Chitral, and Koli and Pattan in Kohistan over 500 people have lost their lives whereas, more than half a million have become homeless and nearly 50,000 families have completely lost everything, including land, shelter, livestock and all means of living".
10. The Army, which maintains an iron hold over Balochistan despite the supposed presence of an elected Government there, has seen to it that Balochistan would not be a beneficiary of the assistance funds and that the real extent of the damages in Balochistan would not be known to the outside world. It thus wants to punish the Balochs for waging their freedom struggle.
11. It is important for the Government of India to take the following steps:
* Participate actively in UN and other international conferences to mobilize assistance for Pakistan in order to highlight the damages suffered by the people of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan and stress the importance of assisting them adequately.
* Interact with non-Governmental organizations from these areas and assist them.
* Establish contact with the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkwa and offer to make a contribution to their flood relief fund.
* Encourage non-Governmental humanitarian relief organizations of India and the Indian diaspora abroad to assist the people of these areas and make suitable contributions to these organizations . ( 25-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
BEIJING TIGHTENS UP CONTROL OVER MONASTERIES AND MOSQUES
B.RAMAN
Acting jointly, China's Ministry of Public Security and the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China have tightened up their control over the Buddhist monasteries in the Tibetan areas of China and over the mosques in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. While the tightened supervisory measures over the mosques in Xinjiang have preceded the onset of the holy fasting period of the Muslims, the measures in the Tibetan areas have followed the recent high-profile visit of the Party/Government designated Panchen Lama to Lhasa and other areas in Tibet. A note recorded by me on June 17,2010, on the Panchen Lama's visit to Tibet under the title "Bringing up their Panchen Lama" is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3864.html .
2. To discuss the tightening of supervision over the monasteries, the United Front Work Department, which, inter alia, is responsible for organising the periodic talks between the party and senior representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, organised a meeting on August 14 and 15, 2010, at Shigatse. Heads of all Buddhist monasteries in the Tibetan-inhabited provinces were required to attend the meeting. An official of the United Front Work Department has been quoted as saying in connection with the responsibility of his Department to ensure better supervision over the monasteries: "Competent Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns who are politically reliable, extraordinarily learned and widely respected should be selected to monastery management committees through thorough democratic consultation." There has, however, been no reference to the envisaged role of the Panchen Lama in this regard.
3. Subsequently. the Ministry of Public Security held a conference of senior officials of the branches of the Ministry in the Tibetan-inhabited provinces. These branches are called Public Security Bureaus. This was held at Lhasa on August 18 and 19,2010.The objective of this conference was described as "to assess the results and experiences of upholding public security, struggle against the current separatist movement, and identified current challenges facing stability in Tibetan areas.” It was reported by local Chinese officials that the conference discussed future action plans “to step up the fight against separatists; build bodies to protect social security; increase border security; and improve communication infrastructure, uniform and skills of the public security bureaus”. An official of the United Front Work Department briefed the conference on the deliberations of the meeting held by his Department.
4.The tightening of supervision over the Buddhist monasteries by the Party as well as the Government indicates their continuing nervousness over the loyalty of the local monks to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and their reluctance to support the Panchen Lama nominated by the Government and the Party. The Ministry of Public Security and the United Front Work Department were even earlier holding so-called re-education classes for the monks to stress the importance of patriotism and loyalty to the party and the Panchen Lama. Such re-education is likely to be stepped up in the wake of these two conferences.
5. A project for the re-education of the Muslim clerics in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region has simultaneously been undertaken. Its object is to underline the importance of patriotism and party loyalty as in the case of the monks. It has the additional objective of ridding Islam as practised in China of any vestiges of extra-territorial loyalty. Encouraging Islam in Chinese colours is the main objective. This drive has created some resentment among the Muslims because some of the meetings under this drive were held in the premises of local mosques and these were attended by non-Muslim officials and party cadres. While the Buddhist monks have not objected to non-Buddhist functionaries holding party meetings in their places of worship, the Uighur Muslims have strongly resented such practices.
6. Local Uighurs and members of the Uighur diaspora have strongly protested against a meeting organized by the Party’s Peyziwat (population 330,000) County Committee at a village mosque in the Kashgar prefecture on July 24 to hold a speech contest on the topic “Love the Country, Promote the Homeland” in the presence of 35 religious leaders.
7. Mrs.Rebiya Kadeer,President of the Munich-based World Uighur Congress, who lives in the US, has stated in an interview that she was shocked by the pictures of the party meeting held in the mosque.Mr. Abdukadir Asim, an Uighur cleric based in Turkey, has said: “It is a common principle among all religions that the privacy of the place of worship is fundamental. It is a strange and abhorrent event that communist propaganda was conducted in a mosque. I don’t believe it has ever happened before, anywhere else in the world.” He has criticized the General Secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mr.Ekmelledin Ihsanoglu, who visited China recently for not raising with the Chinese authorities the question of the violation of the religious rights of the Uighurs in China. He added:“The action of holding a communist activity in a mosque ridicules not only Uighurs but also the whole Islamic world. The international community should speak out about this event.”
8. Addressing a meeting of Muslim clerics at Hetian in Xinjiang on August 21, Mr. Jia Qinglin , Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), called for greater efforts by local religious circles to contribute to the long-term stability and development of Xinjiang. He praised the contribution of patriotic religious personalities and claimed that the Government and the party attached great importance to the education and cultivation of religious believers, showed care for their lives and work, and supported their religious activities. He appealed to the clerics to help consolidate national unity and harmonious religious relations and to resist and eliminate the influence of religious extremism.
9. Simultaneously with action to tighten control over the mosques, the Government has initiated a programme for the demolition of exclusively Uighur residential areas in Urumqi, the capital, and forcing the displaced Uighurs to re-settle in apartments built for them in the residential areas of the Han Chinese. This has also been resented by the leaders of the Uighur community who look upon it as an attempt to destroy the ethnic identity of the Uighurs. In this connection, please see my article dated June 23, 2010, titled “China to De-Emphasise Uighur Identity of Xinjiang” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3886.html
10. There is considerable unhappiness among the Uighurs of Xinjiang over the fact that the Islamic world, which never misses an opportunity to protest over the violation of the human rights of the Muslims in other countries, remains silent on this issue in China. (25-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Acting jointly, China's Ministry of Public Security and the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China have tightened up their control over the Buddhist monasteries in the Tibetan areas of China and over the mosques in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. While the tightened supervisory measures over the mosques in Xinjiang have preceded the onset of the holy fasting period of the Muslims, the measures in the Tibetan areas have followed the recent high-profile visit of the Party/Government designated Panchen Lama to Lhasa and other areas in Tibet. A note recorded by me on June 17,2010, on the Panchen Lama's visit to Tibet under the title "Bringing up their Panchen Lama" is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3864.html .
2. To discuss the tightening of supervision over the monasteries, the United Front Work Department, which, inter alia, is responsible for organising the periodic talks between the party and senior representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, organised a meeting on August 14 and 15, 2010, at Shigatse. Heads of all Buddhist monasteries in the Tibetan-inhabited provinces were required to attend the meeting. An official of the United Front Work Department has been quoted as saying in connection with the responsibility of his Department to ensure better supervision over the monasteries: "Competent Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns who are politically reliable, extraordinarily learned and widely respected should be selected to monastery management committees through thorough democratic consultation." There has, however, been no reference to the envisaged role of the Panchen Lama in this regard.
3. Subsequently. the Ministry of Public Security held a conference of senior officials of the branches of the Ministry in the Tibetan-inhabited provinces. These branches are called Public Security Bureaus. This was held at Lhasa on August 18 and 19,2010.The objective of this conference was described as "to assess the results and experiences of upholding public security, struggle against the current separatist movement, and identified current challenges facing stability in Tibetan areas.” It was reported by local Chinese officials that the conference discussed future action plans “to step up the fight against separatists; build bodies to protect social security; increase border security; and improve communication infrastructure, uniform and skills of the public security bureaus”. An official of the United Front Work Department briefed the conference on the deliberations of the meeting held by his Department.
4.The tightening of supervision over the Buddhist monasteries by the Party as well as the Government indicates their continuing nervousness over the loyalty of the local monks to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and their reluctance to support the Panchen Lama nominated by the Government and the Party. The Ministry of Public Security and the United Front Work Department were even earlier holding so-called re-education classes for the monks to stress the importance of patriotism and loyalty to the party and the Panchen Lama. Such re-education is likely to be stepped up in the wake of these two conferences.
5. A project for the re-education of the Muslim clerics in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region has simultaneously been undertaken. Its object is to underline the importance of patriotism and party loyalty as in the case of the monks. It has the additional objective of ridding Islam as practised in China of any vestiges of extra-territorial loyalty. Encouraging Islam in Chinese colours is the main objective. This drive has created some resentment among the Muslims because some of the meetings under this drive were held in the premises of local mosques and these were attended by non-Muslim officials and party cadres. While the Buddhist monks have not objected to non-Buddhist functionaries holding party meetings in their places of worship, the Uighur Muslims have strongly resented such practices.
6. Local Uighurs and members of the Uighur diaspora have strongly protested against a meeting organized by the Party’s Peyziwat (population 330,000) County Committee at a village mosque in the Kashgar prefecture on July 24 to hold a speech contest on the topic “Love the Country, Promote the Homeland” in the presence of 35 religious leaders.
7. Mrs.Rebiya Kadeer,President of the Munich-based World Uighur Congress, who lives in the US, has stated in an interview that she was shocked by the pictures of the party meeting held in the mosque.Mr. Abdukadir Asim, an Uighur cleric based in Turkey, has said: “It is a common principle among all religions that the privacy of the place of worship is fundamental. It is a strange and abhorrent event that communist propaganda was conducted in a mosque. I don’t believe it has ever happened before, anywhere else in the world.” He has criticized the General Secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mr.Ekmelledin Ihsanoglu, who visited China recently for not raising with the Chinese authorities the question of the violation of the religious rights of the Uighurs in China. He added:“The action of holding a communist activity in a mosque ridicules not only Uighurs but also the whole Islamic world. The international community should speak out about this event.”
8. Addressing a meeting of Muslim clerics at Hetian in Xinjiang on August 21, Mr. Jia Qinglin , Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), called for greater efforts by local religious circles to contribute to the long-term stability and development of Xinjiang. He praised the contribution of patriotic religious personalities and claimed that the Government and the party attached great importance to the education and cultivation of religious believers, showed care for their lives and work, and supported their religious activities. He appealed to the clerics to help consolidate national unity and harmonious religious relations and to resist and eliminate the influence of religious extremism.
9. Simultaneously with action to tighten control over the mosques, the Government has initiated a programme for the demolition of exclusively Uighur residential areas in Urumqi, the capital, and forcing the displaced Uighurs to re-settle in apartments built for them in the residential areas of the Han Chinese. This has also been resented by the leaders of the Uighur community who look upon it as an attempt to destroy the ethnic identity of the Uighurs. In this connection, please see my article dated June 23, 2010, titled “China to De-Emphasise Uighur Identity of Xinjiang” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3886.html
10. There is considerable unhappiness among the Uighurs of Xinjiang over the fact that the Islamic world, which never misses an opportunity to protest over the violation of the human rights of the Muslims in other countries, remains silent on this issue in China. (25-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
MANILA HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT: WHAT DO THE PROFESSIONALS SAY
B.RAMAN
The following comments of President Benigno Aquino, the Manila Police Commander and some non-governmental security experts on the way the Manila Police handled the hostage-taking crisis on August 23,2010, have been extracted from despatches of the Agence France Press (AFP) :
* President Aquino: The tragedy highlighted many flaws in the ability of Philippine security forces to handle hostage situations. "There are a lot of things (that) resulted in a tragedy. Obviously we should be improving." One of the problems was the way the crisis played out through the media, with the gunman being allowed to speak on radio and watch events live on the bus's television, giving him insights into police actions. Waiting more than 10 hours before storming the bus was the right course of action, because police believed until that point they could convince the gunman to stand down.
* Mr.Leocadio Santiago, Manila Police Commander: "We saw some obvious shortcomings in terms of capability and tactics used, or the procedure employed and we are now going to investigate this."
* Mr.John Harrison, Assistant Professor and homeland security analyst at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore:"The fact that there was essentially live video was mistake number one." There should have been a media blackout to deny the hijacker feedback on what was going on around him. Instead, he was able to follow events -- including frenzied speculation by serving and former police chiefs appearing on Philippine networks -- via the bus' internal TV.
* Mr.Dennis Wong Sing Wing, an Associate Professor of applied social studies at the City University in Hong Kong:The police operation was "really shocking" to watch as it unfolded live on TV. "I am very angry about their unprofessional performance.They are indirectly responsible for the deaths of the Hong Kong people." The policemen assigned to end the hostage-taking appeared to lack modern weapons and communication equipment, and as a result were hesitant to attack the gunman, who was armed with an M-16 assault rifle. The Police failed to calm the hostage-taker down and hear him out.
* An unnamed retired Philippine military official who wrote a counter-terrorism manual and now runs a security consultancy:The police had enough expertise and equipment to deal with such an incident, but they were not put to use. "We have everything, except the execution was poorly done." He was critical of the stop-go negotiations and "tentative" assault launched after gunshots rang out from inside the bus, adding that the police should have disabled the TV monitor early on."Contact (by negotiators) should have been constant. It's the talking that does a lot.When you order an assault, it has to be an assault. There is no such thing as a tentative assault.If 10 policemen have to die, they have to die in that assault." Many of the policemen on the scene, some of them seen crouching without any body armour behind patrol cars, did not appear to be fully trained Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) personnel. "They just put helmets on certain people."
* Trial judge Jaime Santiago, a former SWAT officer:The police failed to impose crowd control in the hostage site and panicked after hearing gunshots from the bus. "They should have put a tactical force, SWAT snipers and an assault team on standby during the negotiation so that if the hostage-taker started harming people, they would act."
* Mr.Lionel de Souza, a former officer of Singapore's Criminal Investigation Department, recalled a similar hijacking of a bus in Singapore.
"I think that was in 1978 in Seng Poh Road in Tiong Bahru. The police were chasing some robbers and they jumped onto an SBS bus which was (carrying) passengers. (The robbers) sort of held them hostage. At that time, hostage negotiation was not well known. Nevertheless, the retired assistant commissioner - Tan Kah Wan - I think he did a good job. There was no loss of lives but there was the arrest of the hostage takers." In the Manila hostage tragedy, one image that left many doubting was the action of armed police who had crept up around the bus."They started smashing the windows with the sledgehammer, trying to wrench open the door with a rope. That by itself is a provocation to the criminal, and because he is already agitated, adding more pressure to his already troubled mind would entail him to sort of do things that a person with a proper frame of mind would not do. He may be a decorated police officer, he may know the law, but these tensions were building within him." Negotiations could have gone on longer as it was important to wear down the hijacker in such a crisis. Singapore is well-poised to handle a similar crisis, with hostage negotiators being well-trained. (24-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt, of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The following comments of President Benigno Aquino, the Manila Police Commander and some non-governmental security experts on the way the Manila Police handled the hostage-taking crisis on August 23,2010, have been extracted from despatches of the Agence France Press (AFP) :
* President Aquino: The tragedy highlighted many flaws in the ability of Philippine security forces to handle hostage situations. "There are a lot of things (that) resulted in a tragedy. Obviously we should be improving." One of the problems was the way the crisis played out through the media, with the gunman being allowed to speak on radio and watch events live on the bus's television, giving him insights into police actions. Waiting more than 10 hours before storming the bus was the right course of action, because police believed until that point they could convince the gunman to stand down.
* Mr.Leocadio Santiago, Manila Police Commander: "We saw some obvious shortcomings in terms of capability and tactics used, or the procedure employed and we are now going to investigate this."
* Mr.John Harrison, Assistant Professor and homeland security analyst at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore:"The fact that there was essentially live video was mistake number one." There should have been a media blackout to deny the hijacker feedback on what was going on around him. Instead, he was able to follow events -- including frenzied speculation by serving and former police chiefs appearing on Philippine networks -- via the bus' internal TV.
* Mr.Dennis Wong Sing Wing, an Associate Professor of applied social studies at the City University in Hong Kong:The police operation was "really shocking" to watch as it unfolded live on TV. "I am very angry about their unprofessional performance.They are indirectly responsible for the deaths of the Hong Kong people." The policemen assigned to end the hostage-taking appeared to lack modern weapons and communication equipment, and as a result were hesitant to attack the gunman, who was armed with an M-16 assault rifle. The Police failed to calm the hostage-taker down and hear him out.
* An unnamed retired Philippine military official who wrote a counter-terrorism manual and now runs a security consultancy:The police had enough expertise and equipment to deal with such an incident, but they were not put to use. "We have everything, except the execution was poorly done." He was critical of the stop-go negotiations and "tentative" assault launched after gunshots rang out from inside the bus, adding that the police should have disabled the TV monitor early on."Contact (by negotiators) should have been constant. It's the talking that does a lot.When you order an assault, it has to be an assault. There is no such thing as a tentative assault.If 10 policemen have to die, they have to die in that assault." Many of the policemen on the scene, some of them seen crouching without any body armour behind patrol cars, did not appear to be fully trained Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) personnel. "They just put helmets on certain people."
* Trial judge Jaime Santiago, a former SWAT officer:The police failed to impose crowd control in the hostage site and panicked after hearing gunshots from the bus. "They should have put a tactical force, SWAT snipers and an assault team on standby during the negotiation so that if the hostage-taker started harming people, they would act."
* Mr.Lionel de Souza, a former officer of Singapore's Criminal Investigation Department, recalled a similar hijacking of a bus in Singapore.
"I think that was in 1978 in Seng Poh Road in Tiong Bahru. The police were chasing some robbers and they jumped onto an SBS bus which was (carrying) passengers. (The robbers) sort of held them hostage. At that time, hostage negotiation was not well known. Nevertheless, the retired assistant commissioner - Tan Kah Wan - I think he did a good job. There was no loss of lives but there was the arrest of the hostage takers." In the Manila hostage tragedy, one image that left many doubting was the action of armed police who had crept up around the bus."They started smashing the windows with the sledgehammer, trying to wrench open the door with a rope. That by itself is a provocation to the criminal, and because he is already agitated, adding more pressure to his already troubled mind would entail him to sort of do things that a person with a proper frame of mind would not do. He may be a decorated police officer, he may know the law, but these tensions were building within him." Negotiations could have gone on longer as it was important to wear down the hijacker in such a crisis. Singapore is well-poised to handle a similar crisis, with hostage negotiators being well-trained. (24-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt, of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, August 23, 2010
MUNICH--1972; MUMBAI--26/11 AND MANILA--23/8
B.RAMAN
The facts of the tragedy in Manila on August 23,2010, which led to the death of eight tourists from Hong Kong due to the irrational behaviour of a dismissed Manila police officer as reported by the Agence France Presse (AFP) are as follows: Eight Hong Kong tourists were killed when police stormed a bus that had been commandeered 12 hours earlier by a disgraced ex-police officer demanding he get his job back. Seven other Hong Kong tourists were injured. One of them is still in a critical condition more than 12 hours after the bloody rescue attempt while the others sustained only slight injuries.The ordeal began when the suspect, armed with an M-16 assault rifle and dressed in combat pants, hijacked the bus with 25 people aboard in Manila's tourist district. He later freed seven Hong Kong tourists and two Filipinos. But negotiations broke down after nightfall when the gunman, former senior police inspector Rolando Mendoza, began shooting and commandos were forced to storm the bus, firing dozens of bullets of their own into the vehicle. The Filipino driver escaped just before the shooting.
2. The incident was telecast live by many TV channels of the world. We were thus able to see what was happening.Certain important points about the incident need to be underlined:
* First, it was not an act of terrorism. It was a criminal act committed by a recently dismissed police officer who had been rendered irrational by the dismissal. He was acting alone.
* Second, his grievances were purely personal. He just wanted his job back.
* Third, he took his victims hostage in a bus which was halted in the middle of the road.He was in a position to see all that was happening around the bus through the bus windows. As a result, the advantage of stealth in operational planning and execution was denied to the police. A similar thing happened during the Munich massacre of 1972 by some Palestinian terrorists and during the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai. In Munich and Mumbai, the live telecasting of the security movements by TV channels enabled the hostage-takers to see what the police and other security agencies were doing. In Manila, his location inside a bus enabled the hostage-taker to see what was happening around him. The most important requisite in an operation against hostage-taking is operational stealth. This requirement was denied to the police and other security agencies in Munich, Mumbai and Manila by circumstances beyond their control.As a result, all these three incidents resulted in tragedies of various proportions.
* Four, the fact that the hostage-taker was writing out his demands on pieces of paper and pasting them on the windows for the police outside to read indicates that the communication set of the bus driver with his control station or the mobile hand-sets of the police and the hostage-taker were not being used throghout the incident. It is not known why. When the negotiators communicate with a hostage-taker orally it has a better impact than when they communicate with written notes. Persuasion is possible. It was reported that the brother of the hostage-taker and other relatives did try to persuade him----unsuccessfully--- to surrender. One does not know how they did so--- orally throgh mobile handsets or in writing,.
* Five, it has been reported that as a result of the negotiations, the hostage-taker did release nine passengers because of their age and health. This might have enabled the police to make a forcible entry into the bus by taking advantage of the opening of the door to allow these persons come out. Why they could not use this opportunity? It is not clear.
* Six, the bus was so air tight that the police had difficulty in making an opening through a sledge-hammer. After plane hijackings started, aircraft are so designed as to enable forcible and stealth entry by the special intervention forces. Buses are not so designed.The police have no way of making a forcible entry except by breaking the glasses in the full view of the hostage-taker.
* Seven, the police apparently prolonged the negotiations till nighfall hoping this would make some stealth movement possible. But, unforunately, the bus under the control of the hostage-taker was in a brightly-lit area of Manila and the police had not got the electricity to that area switched off before launching their attack on the bus.
* Eight, a basic principle in dealing with hostage-taking situations is, do not concede the demand of the hostage-taker. This could create more such incidents. In this case, some flexibility in the adherence to this principle was called for. The police could have tactically conceded the demand of the hostage-taker by agreeing to reinstate him and then sacked him again after he had released the passengers. A rigid adherence to the principle was unwise. Why the police did not consider this alternative?
3. The Filipino authorities would be making a detailed enquiry into the deficiencies, if any, in the handling of the situation and drawing lessons for the future. To prevent such incidents during the forthcoming Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, the Government of India should immediately send a joint team consisting of senior officers of the Intelligence Bureau, the Research & Analysis Wing, the National Security Guards and the Delhi Police to Manila for detailed discussions with their Filipino counterparts so that the lessons drawn by them could be incorporated into the security planning for the Delhi games. One can envisage two kinds of situations:
* Firstly, hijacking a normal bus or vehicle used by the public. It will be difficult to make anti-hijacking changes in them.
* Secondly, hijacking of buses used by the participants in the Games. Would it be possible at this late stage to provide them with remote control mrchanism for opening the doors from outside?
4. The Chinese authorities, who would be organising the Asian Games in November,2010, should also draw appropriate lessons and incorporate them in their security planning. We should also have an exchange of notes with the Chinese security agencies on how to prevent such incidents during the Commonwealth and Asian Games. (24-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The facts of the tragedy in Manila on August 23,2010, which led to the death of eight tourists from Hong Kong due to the irrational behaviour of a dismissed Manila police officer as reported by the Agence France Presse (AFP) are as follows: Eight Hong Kong tourists were killed when police stormed a bus that had been commandeered 12 hours earlier by a disgraced ex-police officer demanding he get his job back. Seven other Hong Kong tourists were injured. One of them is still in a critical condition more than 12 hours after the bloody rescue attempt while the others sustained only slight injuries.The ordeal began when the suspect, armed with an M-16 assault rifle and dressed in combat pants, hijacked the bus with 25 people aboard in Manila's tourist district. He later freed seven Hong Kong tourists and two Filipinos. But negotiations broke down after nightfall when the gunman, former senior police inspector Rolando Mendoza, began shooting and commandos were forced to storm the bus, firing dozens of bullets of their own into the vehicle. The Filipino driver escaped just before the shooting.
2. The incident was telecast live by many TV channels of the world. We were thus able to see what was happening.Certain important points about the incident need to be underlined:
* First, it was not an act of terrorism. It was a criminal act committed by a recently dismissed police officer who had been rendered irrational by the dismissal. He was acting alone.
* Second, his grievances were purely personal. He just wanted his job back.
* Third, he took his victims hostage in a bus which was halted in the middle of the road.He was in a position to see all that was happening around the bus through the bus windows. As a result, the advantage of stealth in operational planning and execution was denied to the police. A similar thing happened during the Munich massacre of 1972 by some Palestinian terrorists and during the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai. In Munich and Mumbai, the live telecasting of the security movements by TV channels enabled the hostage-takers to see what the police and other security agencies were doing. In Manila, his location inside a bus enabled the hostage-taker to see what was happening around him. The most important requisite in an operation against hostage-taking is operational stealth. This requirement was denied to the police and other security agencies in Munich, Mumbai and Manila by circumstances beyond their control.As a result, all these three incidents resulted in tragedies of various proportions.
* Four, the fact that the hostage-taker was writing out his demands on pieces of paper and pasting them on the windows for the police outside to read indicates that the communication set of the bus driver with his control station or the mobile hand-sets of the police and the hostage-taker were not being used throghout the incident. It is not known why. When the negotiators communicate with a hostage-taker orally it has a better impact than when they communicate with written notes. Persuasion is possible. It was reported that the brother of the hostage-taker and other relatives did try to persuade him----unsuccessfully--- to surrender. One does not know how they did so--- orally throgh mobile handsets or in writing,.
* Five, it has been reported that as a result of the negotiations, the hostage-taker did release nine passengers because of their age and health. This might have enabled the police to make a forcible entry into the bus by taking advantage of the opening of the door to allow these persons come out. Why they could not use this opportunity? It is not clear.
* Six, the bus was so air tight that the police had difficulty in making an opening through a sledge-hammer. After plane hijackings started, aircraft are so designed as to enable forcible and stealth entry by the special intervention forces. Buses are not so designed.The police have no way of making a forcible entry except by breaking the glasses in the full view of the hostage-taker.
* Seven, the police apparently prolonged the negotiations till nighfall hoping this would make some stealth movement possible. But, unforunately, the bus under the control of the hostage-taker was in a brightly-lit area of Manila and the police had not got the electricity to that area switched off before launching their attack on the bus.
* Eight, a basic principle in dealing with hostage-taking situations is, do not concede the demand of the hostage-taker. This could create more such incidents. In this case, some flexibility in the adherence to this principle was called for. The police could have tactically conceded the demand of the hostage-taker by agreeing to reinstate him and then sacked him again after he had released the passengers. A rigid adherence to the principle was unwise. Why the police did not consider this alternative?
3. The Filipino authorities would be making a detailed enquiry into the deficiencies, if any, in the handling of the situation and drawing lessons for the future. To prevent such incidents during the forthcoming Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, the Government of India should immediately send a joint team consisting of senior officers of the Intelligence Bureau, the Research & Analysis Wing, the National Security Guards and the Delhi Police to Manila for detailed discussions with their Filipino counterparts so that the lessons drawn by them could be incorporated into the security planning for the Delhi games. One can envisage two kinds of situations:
* Firstly, hijacking a normal bus or vehicle used by the public. It will be difficult to make anti-hijacking changes in them.
* Secondly, hijacking of buses used by the participants in the Games. Would it be possible at this late stage to provide them with remote control mrchanism for opening the doors from outside?
4. The Chinese authorities, who would be organising the Asian Games in November,2010, should also draw appropriate lessons and incorporate them in their security planning. We should also have an exchange of notes with the Chinese security agencies on how to prevent such incidents during the Commonwealth and Asian Games. (24-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INDIAN MUSLIMS IN AL QAEDA'S SOMALI AFFILIATE?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.672
B.RAMAN
According to Garowe Online, a Somali news web site, some members of Al-Shabaab, the Somali associate of Al Qaeda, were killed during an accidental explosion on August 20,2010, in a house in the Hawl-Wadaag district of Mogadishu, where members of Al-Shabaab were preparing two explosive-laden vehicles for use as car bombs. The news web site claimed that the house belonged to Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansoor, the deputy leader of Al-Shabaab.It was not clear whether he was present in the house at the time of the explosion and, if so, what happened to him. It did not give details of those killed except to say that there were both foreigners and Somalis.
2. Citing “security sources”, the local Ministry of Information and Radio Mogadishu reported on August 21 that at least 10 persons were killed in the accidental explosion-----three Pakistanis, two Indians, one Afghan, one Algerian, and two Somalis including a cleric who was in charge of praying for suicide bombers before they were dispatched. They did not indicate the nationality of the 10th person.Nor did they identify the Indians and Pakistanis killed or say as to how the security sources established that they were Indians and Pakistanis. Al- Shabaab has not so far admitted that the killed persons belonged to it. The local authorities claim to have established that the cleric killed in the explosion was Awais Abu Yusuf, a local Imam.
3.The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has been quite active in Somalia since the early 1990s. Despite a local ban on its activities, persons recruited by it in Pakistan have been visiting Somalia for religious preaching. The Somali authorities suspected that the TJ was in touch with local Wahabi/fundamentalist elements and that Pakistani jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul—Mujahideen (HUM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) were active in the local Muslim community under the cover of TJ volunteers. Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the JEM, had spent some months in Somalia in the 1990s when he was a member of the HUM. Al-Shabaab is believed to have a small component of Pakistani volunteers.
4. No Indian Muslim component of the organization had come to notice in the past. Till 2003, there were about 200 Bohra Muslims from India working in Somalia in the business of textiles dyeing. Many of them have since re-settled in Mombasa in Kenya. They had not come to notice for any association with extremist elements. If it is established that Al-Shabaab has a component of Indian origin, its members are likely to have been recruited either from the Indian Muslim diaspora in East Africa or the UK. In the past, there were instances of individual Indian Muslims from the diaspora in the UK either gravitating towards Al Qaeda or its associates or being influenced by its ideology. So far, there has been no confirmed instance of India-based Muslims joining Al Qaeda or pro-Al Qaeda organizations such as Al-Shabaab.
5. Indian intelligence and investigative agencies should seek more information from the local authorities in Mogadishu. This may please be read in continuation of my article dated July 13,2010, titled "KAMPALA BLASTS: Indian Casualties?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3922.html and article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. (23-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
According to Garowe Online, a Somali news web site, some members of Al-Shabaab, the Somali associate of Al Qaeda, were killed during an accidental explosion on August 20,2010, in a house in the Hawl-Wadaag district of Mogadishu, where members of Al-Shabaab were preparing two explosive-laden vehicles for use as car bombs. The news web site claimed that the house belonged to Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansoor, the deputy leader of Al-Shabaab.It was not clear whether he was present in the house at the time of the explosion and, if so, what happened to him. It did not give details of those killed except to say that there were both foreigners and Somalis.
2. Citing “security sources”, the local Ministry of Information and Radio Mogadishu reported on August 21 that at least 10 persons were killed in the accidental explosion-----three Pakistanis, two Indians, one Afghan, one Algerian, and two Somalis including a cleric who was in charge of praying for suicide bombers before they were dispatched. They did not indicate the nationality of the 10th person.Nor did they identify the Indians and Pakistanis killed or say as to how the security sources established that they were Indians and Pakistanis. Al- Shabaab has not so far admitted that the killed persons belonged to it. The local authorities claim to have established that the cleric killed in the explosion was Awais Abu Yusuf, a local Imam.
3.The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has been quite active in Somalia since the early 1990s. Despite a local ban on its activities, persons recruited by it in Pakistan have been visiting Somalia for religious preaching. The Somali authorities suspected that the TJ was in touch with local Wahabi/fundamentalist elements and that Pakistani jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul—Mujahideen (HUM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) were active in the local Muslim community under the cover of TJ volunteers. Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the JEM, had spent some months in Somalia in the 1990s when he was a member of the HUM. Al-Shabaab is believed to have a small component of Pakistani volunteers.
4. No Indian Muslim component of the organization had come to notice in the past. Till 2003, there were about 200 Bohra Muslims from India working in Somalia in the business of textiles dyeing. Many of them have since re-settled in Mombasa in Kenya. They had not come to notice for any association with extremist elements. If it is established that Al-Shabaab has a component of Indian origin, its members are likely to have been recruited either from the Indian Muslim diaspora in East Africa or the UK. In the past, there were instances of individual Indian Muslims from the diaspora in the UK either gravitating towards Al Qaeda or its associates or being influenced by its ideology. So far, there has been no confirmed instance of India-based Muslims joining Al Qaeda or pro-Al Qaeda organizations such as Al-Shabaab.
5. Indian intelligence and investigative agencies should seek more information from the local authorities in Mogadishu. This may please be read in continuation of my article dated July 13,2010, titled "KAMPALA BLASTS: Indian Casualties?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3922.html and article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. (23-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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