Friday, October 23, 2009
HI ALL
The cystoscopy on October 22,2009, actually showed two growths---one in the urinary bladder and the other in the prostrate.Both were removed by the doctors and sent for biopsy.I am being discharged on October 25.The biopsy report will be received on October 27. The biopsy report will indicate the staging of the malignancy and whether it started in the bladder and then spread to to the prostrate or vice versa.The doctor will discuss with me on October 28,the course of treatment.Regards.B.Raman 24-10-09
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
HI ALL
I am entering the Hospital tomorrow (October 21,2009) for cistoscopy followed by biopsy. Yesterday and today, I had a series of tests---stress test, ECG, Echo etc--- to enable the doctors satisfy themselves that I will be able to withstand the procedure. According to the doctors,my heart condition is superb for my age (73). My energy level is very high. The biopsy will enable the doctors to grade my urinary bladder cancer---superficial affecting the bladder lining only in which case the treatment will be simple or deeper affecting the bladder muscle in which case it could be life-threatening calling for an aggressive treatment. According to my doctors, 85 per cent of the urinary bladder cancers are a nuisance, but not life-threatening. Fifteen per cent are life-threatening. They are hoping that the biopsy will show that I fall in the 85 per cent group. I expect to be out of hospital on Oct. 25. Thereafter, I will be in my brother's house awaiting the biopsy result. Regards. B.Raman. 20-10-09
Sunday, October 18, 2009
SUICIDE BLASTS IN IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN KILL 6 SENIOR OFFICERS OF RG
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 570
According to the Iranian State TV, General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the national Deputy Commander of the ground force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards (RG), the Guards' chief provincial commander, Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, and four other senior officers of the RG were among 31 persons killed in a suicide attack in the Pishin region of Iranian Balochistan known as Sistan-Balochistan on October 18,2009. The RG officers had gone to the area on a routine inspection tour during which they were having a discussion with representatives of the local Baloch community when a suicide bomber struck. Some reports speak of two suicide bombers.One reportedly managed to get into the
venue of the meeting. The other blew himself up at a vehicle carrying some Revolutionasry Guards outside the venue.
2.Thirty persons were killed and over 180 injured on May 28, 2009, in a suspected suicide bomb blast at the Amir-al Momenin Shia mosque in Zahidan, the capital of Iranian Balochistan. It is the second largest Shia mosque in Zahidan. Mainly Shia Government servants and members of the security forces pray there. Three persons were injured on May 29, 2009, when unidentified gunmen attacked the election
office of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Zahidan. On May 31, 2009, there was an exchange of fire between groups of Shias and Sunnis in different parts of Zahidan following an unsuccessful attempt by unidentified persons to kill Mulla Abdol Hamid, a senior Sunni leader. While he survived the attack, many of his body guards were reportedly injured.
3.Following these incidents, the Iranian authorities announced the execution of three Balochs on a charge of involvement in the explosion of May 28. Baloch sources, however, maintained that these persons were already in police custody and had been arrested before the explosion. Hence, they contended, these persons could not have participated in the explosion as alleged by the Iranian authorities.
4.The province of Sistan-Balochistan has around 3.5 million Balochs, the majority of them Sunnis. The province has been the scene of frequent incidents of violence unconnected with the liberation struggle being waged by the Balochs in Pakistan's Balochistan province for over three years now. There are close ethnic and religious links between the two Baloch communities on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border. Iranian Balochistan also has a common border with Afghanistan.
5. The responsibility for the violent incidents in Iranian Balochistan in the past as well as for the latest one on October 18,2009, has been claimed by an organisation called Jondollah (Soldiers of Allah), which projects itself as the People's Resistance Movement of Iran and not as the People's Resistance Movement of Sistan-Balochistan. It has no links with any of the Baloch nationalist organisations in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. In the past, there were reports of its having links with the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi of Pakistan.
In the 1990s, there were reports that a major explosion in the province was organised by Ramzi Yousef, who is now undergoing imprisonment in the US for his involvement in the attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre in New York in February, 1993. The Jondollah seems to be more a Sunni extremist than a Baloch nationalist organisation.
6. The Jondollah had claimed that 130 members of the Iranian security forces were actually killed in the Zahidan attack of May 28,2009. A statement attributed to Jondollah after the May 28 attack said: "This incident has been organised in response to one week of Omar Denunciation Ceremonies which the fanatic Shias and security forces organised to curse Omar, the second Caliph, whom they blame for
killing Fatema, the daughter of Prophet Mohammad. The false and fabricated narrative has been officially recognized in Iran as a fact and therefore, Iranian authorities have initiated a large number of denunciation ceremonies in which the second Caiph is cursed by the speakers and audience; even though Ayatollah Khamenaei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, announced three weeks ago that any action that may generate divisions among Moslems is treason. The Shia leaders and followers are famous for what they call Taghiya, which means lying for the sake of Islam but now it has been turned in Iran as an official way of misleading and deceiving the public and opponents, saying something in the public and doing something else. If the supreme leader really believed in what he said, organising such incidents should have been prohibited by law and if anybody acted against the law, should have been arrested and tried for generating severe divisions among Moslems. The authorities have blamed the US for hiring terrorists who carried out the suicide bombing. Jondollah categorically rejects this claim. It does not have any kind of relationship or any kind of support from the US or any other country. This action was in response to systematic and regular insults to the beliefs of Sunni Muslims in Iran and wide discrimination against the Baloch people. We reject the Government’s claim that we are a terrorist organization. We are a defensive organization and act according to international law of self-defence by the same strategy and equipments the Iranian governments are using against us. Several religious leaders and hundreds of Baloch youth have been killed or hanged by the Islamic Republic of Iran just for their beliefs after severe and long torture. The Islamic Republic of Iran has destroyed several Sunni mosques and has hanged several top religious leaders of Sunni people in Iran."
7.A statement of July 23,2009, attributed to the Jondollah said: "The Islamic regime hanged 13 young Baluch political activists on 14 July to create a sense of fear among the public. The Baluch people have been in the vanguard of the political campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran that conducted the biggest fraud in election in the history of Iran and the world. The resistance of Baluch people became a great source of inspiration for other people of Iran to express their discontent about the fraudulent elections and other injustices in the form of demonstrations and huge marches......At the same time, the Government of Pakistan extradited one Baluch who was in prison for some time to the Iranian regime, knowing that he will be tortured and executed. The Pakistan Government under Musharaf extradited a group of Baluch opposition to the Government of Iran and all of them were tortured and executed later. The Baluch people are Sunnis and
they have been subjected to discriminatory policies. Baluchistan has the highest poverty rate and according to all international and United Nations research, is the poorest province of Iran. According to official figures, poverty rate in Baluchistan is over 76 per cent. The Baluch students are not admitted into universities on an equal basis and on merit. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has given more than a million scholarships to Iranian students to study abroad or in the top Iranian universities, only three Baluch students have been awarded
scholarships. The Baluch people are under daily threat and a security environment has been imposed in Baluchistan. Everybody is a suspect and the security guards shoot the Baluch people with total impunity. Although hundreds of Baluch people have been killed in the streets of Iran, not even one single agent has been tried in the court. Baluchistan is in the vanguard of the freedom seeking people of Iran
and will never stop its campaigning until a democratic regime is established in Iran."
8.In an earlier statement of July 14,2009, the Jondollah said: "The young Baluchs (executed on July 14) have been forced to accept that they have been agents of CIA. They were campaigning for the legitimate rights of the Baluch people who are Sunnis in a majority Shia country. The Baluch people have been systematically oppressed since the beginning of the revolution for seeking equality of rights and
opportunities with other Iranians. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic and other laws that have been passed by Iranian parliament, the Sunnis are prohibited from becoming supreme leader, president, minister, deputy minister, army general, ambassador, or any other high official. The official religion of the state has been declared Shiism which is a radical opponent of the Sunni people."
9. The Iranian authorities have been projecting the Jondollah as a surrogate of the US intelligence operating from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. They have been alleging that the periodic terrorist strikes in Iranian Balochistan are being mounted from Pakistani territory. While they accuse the Pakistani authorities of inaction against the anti-Iranian Sunni elements operating from Pakistani territory, they have never accused the Baloch nationalist organisations of Pakistani Balochistan of backing the Jondollah. They have been suspecting the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia organisation of Pakistan which is allied with Al Qaeda, to be training the suicide bombers of the Jondollah. However, they have never accused Al Qaeda of involvement in Iranian Balochistan.
10. According to the Iranian authorities, the leader of the Jondollah is Abdul Malik Rigi, who lives in Pakistan. His elder brother Abdul Hamid Rigi, who was also based in Pakistan, was arrested by the Musharraf regime and handed over to the Iranian authorities. Reports received in July had indicated that he was among those to be executed on July 14. He made a self-confession before local TV channels. But, latest reports say that the Iranian authorities decided not to execute him to avoid creating any embarrassment for Islamabad. Some of the statements attributed to the Jondollah are disseminated from London. This has created some suspicion in the minds of the Iranian authorities that the UK is also probably backing the Jondollah in its anti-Teheran activities. ( 19-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
According to the Iranian State TV, General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the national Deputy Commander of the ground force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards (RG), the Guards' chief provincial commander, Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, and four other senior officers of the RG were among 31 persons killed in a suicide attack in the Pishin region of Iranian Balochistan known as Sistan-Balochistan on October 18,2009. The RG officers had gone to the area on a routine inspection tour during which they were having a discussion with representatives of the local Baloch community when a suicide bomber struck. Some reports speak of two suicide bombers.One reportedly managed to get into the
venue of the meeting. The other blew himself up at a vehicle carrying some Revolutionasry Guards outside the venue.
2.Thirty persons were killed and over 180 injured on May 28, 2009, in a suspected suicide bomb blast at the Amir-al Momenin Shia mosque in Zahidan, the capital of Iranian Balochistan. It is the second largest Shia mosque in Zahidan. Mainly Shia Government servants and members of the security forces pray there. Three persons were injured on May 29, 2009, when unidentified gunmen attacked the election
office of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Zahidan. On May 31, 2009, there was an exchange of fire between groups of Shias and Sunnis in different parts of Zahidan following an unsuccessful attempt by unidentified persons to kill Mulla Abdol Hamid, a senior Sunni leader. While he survived the attack, many of his body guards were reportedly injured.
3.Following these incidents, the Iranian authorities announced the execution of three Balochs on a charge of involvement in the explosion of May 28. Baloch sources, however, maintained that these persons were already in police custody and had been arrested before the explosion. Hence, they contended, these persons could not have participated in the explosion as alleged by the Iranian authorities.
4.The province of Sistan-Balochistan has around 3.5 million Balochs, the majority of them Sunnis. The province has been the scene of frequent incidents of violence unconnected with the liberation struggle being waged by the Balochs in Pakistan's Balochistan province for over three years now. There are close ethnic and religious links between the two Baloch communities on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border. Iranian Balochistan also has a common border with Afghanistan.
5. The responsibility for the violent incidents in Iranian Balochistan in the past as well as for the latest one on October 18,2009, has been claimed by an organisation called Jondollah (Soldiers of Allah), which projects itself as the People's Resistance Movement of Iran and not as the People's Resistance Movement of Sistan-Balochistan. It has no links with any of the Baloch nationalist organisations in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. In the past, there were reports of its having links with the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi of Pakistan.
In the 1990s, there were reports that a major explosion in the province was organised by Ramzi Yousef, who is now undergoing imprisonment in the US for his involvement in the attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre in New York in February, 1993. The Jondollah seems to be more a Sunni extremist than a Baloch nationalist organisation.
6. The Jondollah had claimed that 130 members of the Iranian security forces were actually killed in the Zahidan attack of May 28,2009. A statement attributed to Jondollah after the May 28 attack said: "This incident has been organised in response to one week of Omar Denunciation Ceremonies which the fanatic Shias and security forces organised to curse Omar, the second Caliph, whom they blame for
killing Fatema, the daughter of Prophet Mohammad. The false and fabricated narrative has been officially recognized in Iran as a fact and therefore, Iranian authorities have initiated a large number of denunciation ceremonies in which the second Caiph is cursed by the speakers and audience; even though Ayatollah Khamenaei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, announced three weeks ago that any action that may generate divisions among Moslems is treason. The Shia leaders and followers are famous for what they call Taghiya, which means lying for the sake of Islam but now it has been turned in Iran as an official way of misleading and deceiving the public and opponents, saying something in the public and doing something else. If the supreme leader really believed in what he said, organising such incidents should have been prohibited by law and if anybody acted against the law, should have been arrested and tried for generating severe divisions among Moslems. The authorities have blamed the US for hiring terrorists who carried out the suicide bombing. Jondollah categorically rejects this claim. It does not have any kind of relationship or any kind of support from the US or any other country. This action was in response to systematic and regular insults to the beliefs of Sunni Muslims in Iran and wide discrimination against the Baloch people. We reject the Government’s claim that we are a terrorist organization. We are a defensive organization and act according to international law of self-defence by the same strategy and equipments the Iranian governments are using against us. Several religious leaders and hundreds of Baloch youth have been killed or hanged by the Islamic Republic of Iran just for their beliefs after severe and long torture. The Islamic Republic of Iran has destroyed several Sunni mosques and has hanged several top religious leaders of Sunni people in Iran."
7.A statement of July 23,2009, attributed to the Jondollah said: "The Islamic regime hanged 13 young Baluch political activists on 14 July to create a sense of fear among the public. The Baluch people have been in the vanguard of the political campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran that conducted the biggest fraud in election in the history of Iran and the world. The resistance of Baluch people became a great source of inspiration for other people of Iran to express their discontent about the fraudulent elections and other injustices in the form of demonstrations and huge marches......At the same time, the Government of Pakistan extradited one Baluch who was in prison for some time to the Iranian regime, knowing that he will be tortured and executed. The Pakistan Government under Musharaf extradited a group of Baluch opposition to the Government of Iran and all of them were tortured and executed later. The Baluch people are Sunnis and
they have been subjected to discriminatory policies. Baluchistan has the highest poverty rate and according to all international and United Nations research, is the poorest province of Iran. According to official figures, poverty rate in Baluchistan is over 76 per cent. The Baluch students are not admitted into universities on an equal basis and on merit. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has given more than a million scholarships to Iranian students to study abroad or in the top Iranian universities, only three Baluch students have been awarded
scholarships. The Baluch people are under daily threat and a security environment has been imposed in Baluchistan. Everybody is a suspect and the security guards shoot the Baluch people with total impunity. Although hundreds of Baluch people have been killed in the streets of Iran, not even one single agent has been tried in the court. Baluchistan is in the vanguard of the freedom seeking people of Iran
and will never stop its campaigning until a democratic regime is established in Iran."
8.In an earlier statement of July 14,2009, the Jondollah said: "The young Baluchs (executed on July 14) have been forced to accept that they have been agents of CIA. They were campaigning for the legitimate rights of the Baluch people who are Sunnis in a majority Shia country. The Baluch people have been systematically oppressed since the beginning of the revolution for seeking equality of rights and
opportunities with other Iranians. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic and other laws that have been passed by Iranian parliament, the Sunnis are prohibited from becoming supreme leader, president, minister, deputy minister, army general, ambassador, or any other high official. The official religion of the state has been declared Shiism which is a radical opponent of the Sunni people."
9. The Iranian authorities have been projecting the Jondollah as a surrogate of the US intelligence operating from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. They have been alleging that the periodic terrorist strikes in Iranian Balochistan are being mounted from Pakistani territory. While they accuse the Pakistani authorities of inaction against the anti-Iranian Sunni elements operating from Pakistani territory, they have never accused the Baloch nationalist organisations of Pakistani Balochistan of backing the Jondollah. They have been suspecting the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia organisation of Pakistan which is allied with Al Qaeda, to be training the suicide bombers of the Jondollah. However, they have never accused Al Qaeda of involvement in Iranian Balochistan.
10. According to the Iranian authorities, the leader of the Jondollah is Abdul Malik Rigi, who lives in Pakistan. His elder brother Abdul Hamid Rigi, who was also based in Pakistan, was arrested by the Musharraf regime and handed over to the Iranian authorities. Reports received in July had indicated that he was among those to be executed on July 14. He made a self-confession before local TV channels. But, latest reports say that the Iranian authorities decided not to execute him to avoid creating any embarrassment for Islamabad. Some of the statements attributed to the Jondollah are disseminated from London. This has created some suspicion in the minds of the Iranian authorities that the UK is also probably backing the Jondollah in its anti-Teheran activities. ( 19-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, October 17, 2009
THE PAK ARMY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 569
B.RAMAN
Reports from Pakistan indicate that about 30,000 troops of the Pakistan army and Frontier Corps launched on the morning of October 17,2009, the long heralded offensive against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan. The ground offensive was preceded by sustained air strikes against the suspected hide-outs of the TTP in the area.
2. The TTP is a hotch-potch of the myriad Pakistani insurgent and terrorist groups, which were trained and armed in the past by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Special Services Group (SSG) for use against India and for supporting the Afghan Taliban headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar, its Amir, now sheltered in the Quetta area of Balochistan. Most of these groups have since turned against the Pakistani State, which they look upon as apostate because of its co-operation with the US. The fighting capabilities imparted to them in the past by the ISI and the SSG have since been supplemented by the capabilities imparted to them by Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union, another Uzbek group, and by small numbers of Chechens and Uighurs.
3. The element of surprise, which is important in any such ground offensive, has been lost by the long time taken by the political and military leadership of Pakistan to launch the offensive. It is a face-saving offensive forced on the Pakistan Army by the series of spectacular attacks launched by the Pashtun and Punjabi components of the TTP on the General Headquarters of the Army in Rawalpindi and on prestigious police establishments in Lahore, Peshawar and Kohat. It is an offensive , which seems to focus only on the Mehsud component of the TTP based in South Waziristan.
4.The Mehsuds are the sons of the South Waziristan soil, but have repeatedly demonstrated a capability for action outside South Waziristan in areas such as the Orakzai agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan areas of the North-West Frontier Province. Hakeemullah Mehsud, who was chosen as the Amir of the TTP after the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a US Drone strike on August 5,2009, is reportedly still based in the Orakzai agency, where he has been supervising operations against the NATO's logistic convoys to Afghanistan while at the same time co-ordinating operations in Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan.
5. Waliur Rehman, a confidante of Baitullah, who is in charge of the Mehsuds based in South Waziristan, will be organising the resistance against the Pakistani forces in South Waziristan with the help of the forces of Serjuddin Haqqani of the so-called Haqqani network. The Pakistan Army seems to have launched the offensive without factoring into its planning the lessons from the recent attacks in Rawalpindi,Lahore. Peshawar and Kohat. While the attacks in Rawalpindi and Lahore were spearheaded by the Punjabi component of the TTP, which calls itself the Amjad Farooqi group and has shown a capability for SSG-style commando operations, the attacks in Peshawar and Kohat were carried out by the suicide bombers of the suicide squad trained and motivated by Qari Hussain Mehsud.
6. The TTP will seek to counter the offensive on three fronts---- insurgency style operations against the advancing troops in South Waziristan similar to the operations of the Afghan Taliban in Afghan territory, more suicide attacks by Pashtun suicide bombers of Qari Hussain Mehsud in Peshawar and Kohat and more terrorist attacks---some of them of a complex nature in Punjab, including Rawalpindi as well as in Islamabad. While the Pakistan Army has prepared itself well for the counter-insurgency style operations in South Waziristan, its ability to prevent attacks behind its back in the NWFP and Punjab is doubtful. Despite the spurt in suicide and commando-style terrorism in the NWFP and Punjab and even in supposedly well-guarded cantonments since the Lal Masjid raid in July,2007, the Pakistani
counter-terrorism machinery has not re-fashioned and re-tooled itself to meet this threat.
7. In South Waziristan, the Mehsuds will follow the same tactics that the Pashtuns have been following for centuries against invaders of their territory---- avoid a frontal confrontation, split into small groups and harass the strangers to a terrain which the Mehsuds know well. Their tactics will be not territorial domination, but dispersal of their presence and operational focus. They will try to deny to the Pakistan Army the advantages of a well-focused assault, by harassing it here, there and everywhere, without allowing it to get its bearings in a hostile terrain.
8. As the Army carries forward its offensive, US Predators will be looking for Serajuddin Haqqani, Waliur Rehman, Hakeemullah and Qari Hussain Mehsud.If they succeed in eliminating one or some or all of them, it could be a morale-booster to the Pakistani troops. Otherwise,their difficulties could increase.
9. Pakistan's counter-terrorism mechanism is in a shambles. It does not know who is a friend and who is a foe in Punjab. It does not know who is a terrorist and who is a serving or retired serviceman. It does not know who is an ally against India and who is an adversary of the State of Pakistan. There is a danger of the NWFP and Punjab becoming the failed provinces of Pakistan if the Army's offensive does not
succeed. (17-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Reports from Pakistan indicate that about 30,000 troops of the Pakistan army and Frontier Corps launched on the morning of October 17,2009, the long heralded offensive against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan. The ground offensive was preceded by sustained air strikes against the suspected hide-outs of the TTP in the area.
2. The TTP is a hotch-potch of the myriad Pakistani insurgent and terrorist groups, which were trained and armed in the past by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Special Services Group (SSG) for use against India and for supporting the Afghan Taliban headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar, its Amir, now sheltered in the Quetta area of Balochistan. Most of these groups have since turned against the Pakistani State, which they look upon as apostate because of its co-operation with the US. The fighting capabilities imparted to them in the past by the ISI and the SSG have since been supplemented by the capabilities imparted to them by Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union, another Uzbek group, and by small numbers of Chechens and Uighurs.
3. The element of surprise, which is important in any such ground offensive, has been lost by the long time taken by the political and military leadership of Pakistan to launch the offensive. It is a face-saving offensive forced on the Pakistan Army by the series of spectacular attacks launched by the Pashtun and Punjabi components of the TTP on the General Headquarters of the Army in Rawalpindi and on prestigious police establishments in Lahore, Peshawar and Kohat. It is an offensive , which seems to focus only on the Mehsud component of the TTP based in South Waziristan.
4.The Mehsuds are the sons of the South Waziristan soil, but have repeatedly demonstrated a capability for action outside South Waziristan in areas such as the Orakzai agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan areas of the North-West Frontier Province. Hakeemullah Mehsud, who was chosen as the Amir of the TTP after the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a US Drone strike on August 5,2009, is reportedly still based in the Orakzai agency, where he has been supervising operations against the NATO's logistic convoys to Afghanistan while at the same time co-ordinating operations in Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan.
5. Waliur Rehman, a confidante of Baitullah, who is in charge of the Mehsuds based in South Waziristan, will be organising the resistance against the Pakistani forces in South Waziristan with the help of the forces of Serjuddin Haqqani of the so-called Haqqani network. The Pakistan Army seems to have launched the offensive without factoring into its planning the lessons from the recent attacks in Rawalpindi,Lahore. Peshawar and Kohat. While the attacks in Rawalpindi and Lahore were spearheaded by the Punjabi component of the TTP, which calls itself the Amjad Farooqi group and has shown a capability for SSG-style commando operations, the attacks in Peshawar and Kohat were carried out by the suicide bombers of the suicide squad trained and motivated by Qari Hussain Mehsud.
6. The TTP will seek to counter the offensive on three fronts---- insurgency style operations against the advancing troops in South Waziristan similar to the operations of the Afghan Taliban in Afghan territory, more suicide attacks by Pashtun suicide bombers of Qari Hussain Mehsud in Peshawar and Kohat and more terrorist attacks---some of them of a complex nature in Punjab, including Rawalpindi as well as in Islamabad. While the Pakistan Army has prepared itself well for the counter-insurgency style operations in South Waziristan, its ability to prevent attacks behind its back in the NWFP and Punjab is doubtful. Despite the spurt in suicide and commando-style terrorism in the NWFP and Punjab and even in supposedly well-guarded cantonments since the Lal Masjid raid in July,2007, the Pakistani
counter-terrorism machinery has not re-fashioned and re-tooled itself to meet this threat.
7. In South Waziristan, the Mehsuds will follow the same tactics that the Pashtuns have been following for centuries against invaders of their territory---- avoid a frontal confrontation, split into small groups and harass the strangers to a terrain which the Mehsuds know well. Their tactics will be not territorial domination, but dispersal of their presence and operational focus. They will try to deny to the Pakistan Army the advantages of a well-focused assault, by harassing it here, there and everywhere, without allowing it to get its bearings in a hostile terrain.
8. As the Army carries forward its offensive, US Predators will be looking for Serajuddin Haqqani, Waliur Rehman, Hakeemullah and Qari Hussain Mehsud.If they succeed in eliminating one or some or all of them, it could be a morale-booster to the Pakistani troops. Otherwise,their difficulties could increase.
9. Pakistan's counter-terrorism mechanism is in a shambles. It does not know who is a friend and who is a foe in Punjab. It does not know who is a terrorist and who is a serving or retired serviceman. It does not know who is an ally against India and who is an adversary of the State of Pakistan. There is a danger of the NWFP and Punjab becoming the failed provinces of Pakistan if the Army's offensive does not
succeed. (17-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, October 16, 2009
INDIA-CHINA: NEED FOR FRESH THINKING
B.RAMAN
There are welcome indicators of some fresh-thinking in New Delhi on India's relations with China. This fresh-thinking has been reflected in the decision of the Goverment of India to bring on record its unhappiness and concern over the Chinese involvement in the construction or upgradation of some infrastructure projects in the disputed territory of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including the Northern Areas of Jammu & Kashmir (Gilgit & Baltistan). The Chinese, who had earlier helped Pakistan in the construction of the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan's Punjab with the Xinjiang province of China through Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan, are now helping it in its upgradation. They have also agreed to help Pakistan in the construction of a hydel project in the Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan.A
feasibility study has been undertaken by Pakistan for the construction of a railway line, with Chinese assistance, to connect the Chinese-constructed port of Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Balochistan with Xinjiang through Pakistan-occupied Kashmiri territory.
2. The Chinese action in helping Pakistan in integrating with Pakistan, territory which does not legally belong to Pakistan, amounts to an unfriendly act to India and is detrimental to India's territorial integrity. India was within its rights to have protested and expressed its unhappiness over the Chinese actions, which are contrary to its professions of friendship and goodwill for India. Our past hesitation to bring on record our protests over such Chinese actions has encouraged the Chinese into thinking that they could do anything vis-a-vis India,without provoking any protest from New Delhi. Our protests may not make the Chinese stop their participation in these projects, but it has to be made clear to Beijing that such Chinese actions in disregard of Indian sensitivities could come in the way of further development of the bilateral relations. Beijing should be made to realise that it cannot be business as usual between the two countries if it continues to
disregard Indian interests and sensitivities.
3. Another welcome indicator of re-thinking relates to Chinese construction companies, which have won contracts in India and which have been bringing a large number of Chinese workers---skilled and unskilled--- to work in their projects in India without employing Indian workers and engineers. This is a practice which Chinese companies have been following in African countries where there is a severe shortage of manpower, but there is no such shortage in India. It has been reported that the Government of India has taken a decision or is about to take a decision not to issue work visas to unskilled Chinese workers. Even in respect of skilled workers, the issue of work visas should be more an exception than the rule. Work visas should be issued only in those cases where the Chinese companies can demonstrate that recruits in certain skills are not available in India. There are hundreds of Western, Japanese, South Korean and South-East Asian companies which win
contracts in India. They don't bring their own labour from their countries. They employ local labour. If the Chinese executives are not able to manage with Indian labour because of their inability to communicate with the Indians in English, they should not bid for contracts in India.
4. There is also a need for a fresh look into our past decisions to allow Chinese companies in sensitive fields such as telecommunications to operate in India as collaborators of Indian companies for expanding our telecommunications network. In view of the increasingly hostile attitude being taken by the Government and party-controlled media in China towards India, the time has come to re-consider these
decisions. It would be unwise to allow a Chinese presence in sensitive fields such as telecommunications at a time when Chinese media such as the "Global Times" (October 14), which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, has started threatening India with "dangerous consequences" if it does not concede the Chinese point of view on Arunachal Pradesh. India should not accept threatening language from
China---whether it be from the Government or from the Government and party-controlled media.
5.The Government of India should also re-consider its attitude towards His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He and thousands of his Tibetan followers have been our honoured guests for fifty years. We respect him as a Buddhist leader. Their welfare is our responsibility. Till now, in deference to Chinese sensitivities, successive Prime Ministers have been avoiding meeting His Holiness even on occasions such as the
Indian festival of Diwali. We do not give him an opportunity to meet Indian leaders to discuss the problems and welfare of the Tibetan refugees. A couple of years ago,a function was held in New Delhi to facilitate His Holiness on the award to him of the US Congressional Medal of Honour. At that time, in an unwise and unwarranted move, the then Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India was reported to have advised the Cabinet members to keep away from the function. This policy has to change. The Prime Minister should meet His Holiness from time to time in New Delhi as well as Dharamsala to discuss about the welfare of the Tibetan refugees.
6.Sino-Indian relations have steadily improved since the visit of the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiao-ping. Credit should go to Deng for laying the foundation for this improvement despite the pending border dispute. This improvement continued under President Jiang Zemin. India reciprocated the Chinese desire for better bilateral relations in spite of its
unhappiness and concern over the Chinese actions in giving military nuclear and missile capabilities to Pakistan, which wanted them for possible use against India.
7. Ever since Hu Jintao, who won his spurs as a political leader in Tibet, assumed charge as the President the policies of Deng and Jiang have been slowly sought to be reversed---- under pressure from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the hawkish elements in the party. The recent anti-India editorials in the party-controlled " Global Times" and " People's Daily" on October 14 are indicators of anti- India and
pro-Pakistan hawks in the party once again influencing the Chinese policy towards India and seeking to reverse the progress made under Deng and Jiang. We have to take note of this and re-fashion our policies accordingly.
8.India and China cannot afford a military conflict or confrontation or even sporadic trans-border incidents. It will damage their aspirations of a better life for their people and a more important role for their countries in the international stage.Misperceptions and misunderstandings over the border issue need to be handled delicately and sought to be removed by continuing the policy of engagement at the official and political levels. A war of words and hysteria and a tendency to demonise each other should be avoided. The gains made so far should be preserved. At the same time, we should not hesitate to articulate our core interests and adhere to them firmly even while trying to strengthen the bilateral relations. ( 17-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There are welcome indicators of some fresh-thinking in New Delhi on India's relations with China. This fresh-thinking has been reflected in the decision of the Goverment of India to bring on record its unhappiness and concern over the Chinese involvement in the construction or upgradation of some infrastructure projects in the disputed territory of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including the Northern Areas of Jammu & Kashmir (Gilgit & Baltistan). The Chinese, who had earlier helped Pakistan in the construction of the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan's Punjab with the Xinjiang province of China through Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan, are now helping it in its upgradation. They have also agreed to help Pakistan in the construction of a hydel project in the Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan.A
feasibility study has been undertaken by Pakistan for the construction of a railway line, with Chinese assistance, to connect the Chinese-constructed port of Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Balochistan with Xinjiang through Pakistan-occupied Kashmiri territory.
2. The Chinese action in helping Pakistan in integrating with Pakistan, territory which does not legally belong to Pakistan, amounts to an unfriendly act to India and is detrimental to India's territorial integrity. India was within its rights to have protested and expressed its unhappiness over the Chinese actions, which are contrary to its professions of friendship and goodwill for India. Our past hesitation to bring on record our protests over such Chinese actions has encouraged the Chinese into thinking that they could do anything vis-a-vis India,without provoking any protest from New Delhi. Our protests may not make the Chinese stop their participation in these projects, but it has to be made clear to Beijing that such Chinese actions in disregard of Indian sensitivities could come in the way of further development of the bilateral relations. Beijing should be made to realise that it cannot be business as usual between the two countries if it continues to
disregard Indian interests and sensitivities.
3. Another welcome indicator of re-thinking relates to Chinese construction companies, which have won contracts in India and which have been bringing a large number of Chinese workers---skilled and unskilled--- to work in their projects in India without employing Indian workers and engineers. This is a practice which Chinese companies have been following in African countries where there is a severe shortage of manpower, but there is no such shortage in India. It has been reported that the Government of India has taken a decision or is about to take a decision not to issue work visas to unskilled Chinese workers. Even in respect of skilled workers, the issue of work visas should be more an exception than the rule. Work visas should be issued only in those cases where the Chinese companies can demonstrate that recruits in certain skills are not available in India. There are hundreds of Western, Japanese, South Korean and South-East Asian companies which win
contracts in India. They don't bring their own labour from their countries. They employ local labour. If the Chinese executives are not able to manage with Indian labour because of their inability to communicate with the Indians in English, they should not bid for contracts in India.
4. There is also a need for a fresh look into our past decisions to allow Chinese companies in sensitive fields such as telecommunications to operate in India as collaborators of Indian companies for expanding our telecommunications network. In view of the increasingly hostile attitude being taken by the Government and party-controlled media in China towards India, the time has come to re-consider these
decisions. It would be unwise to allow a Chinese presence in sensitive fields such as telecommunications at a time when Chinese media such as the "Global Times" (October 14), which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, has started threatening India with "dangerous consequences" if it does not concede the Chinese point of view on Arunachal Pradesh. India should not accept threatening language from
China---whether it be from the Government or from the Government and party-controlled media.
5.The Government of India should also re-consider its attitude towards His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He and thousands of his Tibetan followers have been our honoured guests for fifty years. We respect him as a Buddhist leader. Their welfare is our responsibility. Till now, in deference to Chinese sensitivities, successive Prime Ministers have been avoiding meeting His Holiness even on occasions such as the
Indian festival of Diwali. We do not give him an opportunity to meet Indian leaders to discuss the problems and welfare of the Tibetan refugees. A couple of years ago,a function was held in New Delhi to facilitate His Holiness on the award to him of the US Congressional Medal of Honour. At that time, in an unwise and unwarranted move, the then Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India was reported to have advised the Cabinet members to keep away from the function. This policy has to change. The Prime Minister should meet His Holiness from time to time in New Delhi as well as Dharamsala to discuss about the welfare of the Tibetan refugees.
6.Sino-Indian relations have steadily improved since the visit of the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiao-ping. Credit should go to Deng for laying the foundation for this improvement despite the pending border dispute. This improvement continued under President Jiang Zemin. India reciprocated the Chinese desire for better bilateral relations in spite of its
unhappiness and concern over the Chinese actions in giving military nuclear and missile capabilities to Pakistan, which wanted them for possible use against India.
7. Ever since Hu Jintao, who won his spurs as a political leader in Tibet, assumed charge as the President the policies of Deng and Jiang have been slowly sought to be reversed---- under pressure from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the hawkish elements in the party. The recent anti-India editorials in the party-controlled " Global Times" and " People's Daily" on October 14 are indicators of anti- India and
pro-Pakistan hawks in the party once again influencing the Chinese policy towards India and seeking to reverse the progress made under Deng and Jiang. We have to take note of this and re-fashion our policies accordingly.
8.India and China cannot afford a military conflict or confrontation or even sporadic trans-border incidents. It will damage their aspirations of a better life for their people and a more important role for their countries in the international stage.Misperceptions and misunderstandings over the border issue need to be handled delicately and sought to be removed by continuing the policy of engagement at the official and political levels. A war of words and hysteria and a tendency to demonise each other should be avoided. The gains made so far should be preserved. At the same time, we should not hesitate to articulate our core interests and adhere to them firmly even while trying to strengthen the bilateral relations. ( 17-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, October 15, 2009
PAKISTAN REELS UNDER A JIHADI GUERILLA WAR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.568
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the four well-orchestrated commando-style attacks launched by different terrorist groups against security establishments on October 15,2009---- three in Lahore and one in the North-West Frontier Province--- Rehman Mallick, Pakistan's Interior Minister, is reported to have aptly described the increasingly uncontrollable situation faced by Pakistan in the Pashtun tribal belt and in Punjab as a guerilla warfare launched against the State of Pakistan.
2. 149 fatalities---security forces personnel and civilians as well as terrorists--- have been reported in a relentless series of fedayeen attacks launched by different groups since October 5,2009. Among the targets of the terrorists were the highly-guarded but easily penetrated General Headquarters (GHQ)_ of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, a Lahore office of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is
responsible for the investigation of terrorism-related cases, two training institutions in Lahore and a police station in the NWFP. Rehman Mallick used to be a senior officer of the FIA when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister from 1993 to 96.
3. The attacks are more and more fedayeen (suicidal) than suicide and have involved a mix of modus operandi---use of hand-held weapons and explosives. Suicide attacks involving explosives-laden vehicles continue to take places against convoys of security forces, but commando-style attacks against well-fortified and supposedly well-guarded fixed establishments of the Army and the police are taking place with increasing frequency----to demonstrate the ability of the terrorists to attack with ferocity despite supposedly enhanced physical security.
4.Of the four attacks reported on October 15, two were against targets which were attacked earlier----the FIA office office in Lahore and the police training academy at Manawan, a Lahore suburb. They had both been attacked in March last, following which physical security was reportedly enhanced. This could not prevent the terrorists from attacking them again. About 20 terrorists split into three groups are
reported to have participated in the three attacks in the Lahore area on October 15---against the FIA office, the Manawan Police Academy and a commando school at Bedian on the outskirts of Lahore. It is not yet clear whether the Bedian commando school is of the police or of the army's Special Services Group (SSG). It is, however, noticed that the security forces personnel who participated in the fighting against
the attackers at Bedian, which reportedly lasted about four hours, were mainly from the Army and not from the police.
5. At least 10 of the attackers in Lahore perished---some were killed by the security forces and some blew themselves up. The fourth attack of the day on a police station at Kohat in the NWFP was carried out by a lone vehicle-borne suicide bomber. There were 32 fatalities in the four attacks---of security forces personnel as well as civilians caught in the firing or explosion.
6. Poor intelligence, poor investigation, poor physical security in establishments of the security forces, including in the army's GHQ, poor access control, poor road security and poor morale and motivation as seen from the failure or reluctance of the security forces personnel to give a chase to the surviving terrorists and capture them continue to be the bane of Pakistan's counter-terrorism mechanism. One saw this after the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team earlier this year when the terrorists just sauntered away after the attack without being stopped or chased and caught by the security forces.
7. While the morale, motivation, training and resilience of the terrorists belonging to different Taliban affiliates have been steadily increasing, there are worrisome signs of poor morale and motivation among the security forces. One notices also an alarming casualness and a lack of professionalism in performing their counter-terrorism tasks There is a tendency, even in the army, to avoid coming to terms with the ground reality, which is that the situation, which has already deteriorated in the Pashtun tribal belt, has now started deteriorating in the non-tribal areas of Punjab. Senior political leaders and military officers continue to behave with a certain nonchalance as if they are the masters of the situation despite the repeated attacks. Seriousness and determination in dealing with the situation are totally lacking.
8. There are more and more reasons to be worried about the security of Pakistan's nuclear establishments---if not of its nuclear arsenal. If the terrorists can lay hands on Pakistan's nuclear waste, which is stored in the NWFP, they could threaten the international community with the use of dirty bombs.Even if one feels that the fatalities due to the use of nuclear waste may not be much, the psychological effect on the general population could be high. ( 15-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the four well-orchestrated commando-style attacks launched by different terrorist groups against security establishments on October 15,2009---- three in Lahore and one in the North-West Frontier Province--- Rehman Mallick, Pakistan's Interior Minister, is reported to have aptly described the increasingly uncontrollable situation faced by Pakistan in the Pashtun tribal belt and in Punjab as a guerilla warfare launched against the State of Pakistan.
2. 149 fatalities---security forces personnel and civilians as well as terrorists--- have been reported in a relentless series of fedayeen attacks launched by different groups since October 5,2009. Among the targets of the terrorists were the highly-guarded but easily penetrated General Headquarters (GHQ)_ of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, a Lahore office of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is
responsible for the investigation of terrorism-related cases, two training institutions in Lahore and a police station in the NWFP. Rehman Mallick used to be a senior officer of the FIA when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister from 1993 to 96.
3. The attacks are more and more fedayeen (suicidal) than suicide and have involved a mix of modus operandi---use of hand-held weapons and explosives. Suicide attacks involving explosives-laden vehicles continue to take places against convoys of security forces, but commando-style attacks against well-fortified and supposedly well-guarded fixed establishments of the Army and the police are taking place with increasing frequency----to demonstrate the ability of the terrorists to attack with ferocity despite supposedly enhanced physical security.
4.Of the four attacks reported on October 15, two were against targets which were attacked earlier----the FIA office office in Lahore and the police training academy at Manawan, a Lahore suburb. They had both been attacked in March last, following which physical security was reportedly enhanced. This could not prevent the terrorists from attacking them again. About 20 terrorists split into three groups are
reported to have participated in the three attacks in the Lahore area on October 15---against the FIA office, the Manawan Police Academy and a commando school at Bedian on the outskirts of Lahore. It is not yet clear whether the Bedian commando school is of the police or of the army's Special Services Group (SSG). It is, however, noticed that the security forces personnel who participated in the fighting against
the attackers at Bedian, which reportedly lasted about four hours, were mainly from the Army and not from the police.
5. At least 10 of the attackers in Lahore perished---some were killed by the security forces and some blew themselves up. The fourth attack of the day on a police station at Kohat in the NWFP was carried out by a lone vehicle-borne suicide bomber. There were 32 fatalities in the four attacks---of security forces personnel as well as civilians caught in the firing or explosion.
6. Poor intelligence, poor investigation, poor physical security in establishments of the security forces, including in the army's GHQ, poor access control, poor road security and poor morale and motivation as seen from the failure or reluctance of the security forces personnel to give a chase to the surviving terrorists and capture them continue to be the bane of Pakistan's counter-terrorism mechanism. One saw this after the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team earlier this year when the terrorists just sauntered away after the attack without being stopped or chased and caught by the security forces.
7. While the morale, motivation, training and resilience of the terrorists belonging to different Taliban affiliates have been steadily increasing, there are worrisome signs of poor morale and motivation among the security forces. One notices also an alarming casualness and a lack of professionalism in performing their counter-terrorism tasks There is a tendency, even in the army, to avoid coming to terms with the ground reality, which is that the situation, which has already deteriorated in the Pashtun tribal belt, has now started deteriorating in the non-tribal areas of Punjab. Senior political leaders and military officers continue to behave with a certain nonchalance as if they are the masters of the situation despite the repeated attacks. Seriousness and determination in dealing with the situation are totally lacking.
8. There are more and more reasons to be worried about the security of Pakistan's nuclear establishments---if not of its nuclear arsenal. If the terrorists can lay hands on Pakistan's nuclear waste, which is stored in the NWFP, they could threaten the international community with the use of dirty bombs.Even if one feels that the fatalities due to the use of nuclear waste may not be much, the psychological effect on the general population could be high. ( 15-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
PAKISTAN'S HAFEEZ MOHAMMAD SAYEED CHARADE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 567
B.RAMAN
One should not be surprised by the Lahore High Court's dismissal on October 12,2009, of the two cases under the Anti-Terrorism Act registered against Hafeez Mohammed Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET ), by the Faislabad Police in the Pakistani province of Punjab. The cases were registered following two inflammatory speeches delivered by him glorifying jihad and for collecting funds for a supposedly banned terrorist organisation. His speeches were interpreted as amounting to incitement to terrorism.
2. The dismissal of the cases was ordered by the Lahore High Court after it was admitted by the prosecution that the JUD was not a banned organisation. While there is a notified ban on the LET as a terrorist organisation since January 2002, there is no notified ban on the JUD.Sayeed and his aides have been maintaining since the JUD was formed after the January 2002 ban on the LET that the JUD had nothing
to do with the LET. This argument has not been successfully challenged in any Pakistani court.
3. Ever since the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008, Pakistani authorities have been repeatedly saying that whatever action they took or sought to take against Sayeed and the JUD such as arresting some of their cadres, seizing their funds etc was in pursuance of the decision of the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council calling for action against the JUD and Sayeed and not based
on their own evidence.
4.The lawyers for Sayeed have been repeatedly arguing before different courts---with some success--- that no action can be taken against Sayeed and the JUD purely on the basis of a resolution of the UN Committee without any independent evidence supporting such action collected by the Pakistani investigation agencies. The Pakistani authorities have shown no interest in collecting such evidence.
5.Two actions by the Pakistani authorities are required in the wake of the involvement of the LET in the Mumbai terrorist attack. The first is action against the JUD and Hafeez for orchestrating the attack as has come out during the investigation by the Mumbai Police. The second is prosecution of those members of the LET in Pakistan involved in planning the attack and having it carried out.
6. The Pakistani authorities have shown some interest---one does not know how sincere they are--- only in the second action. They have been repeatedly dragging their feet in respect of the first. They are encouraged by the fact that the international pressure ---including US pressure--- on them is only in respect of the second. There is only seeming pressure in respect of the first --- even from the US.
7. A careful reading of the observations by judges of different courts----even by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court--- before which the lawyers of Sayeed had challenged on different occasions the action sought to be taken against Sayeed clearly shows that there is considerable judicial sympathy for Sayeed ---if not for the JUD. These observations have mainly related to two points. Firstly, that the action against him is being taken purely on the basis of a resolution of the UN committee, which has no relevance for the judicial proceedings against him. Secondly, that the action was also under Indian pressure.
8.Instead of reacting to the goings-on in Pakistani courts on a day-to-day basis through the media, the Government of India should carefully examine the various observations made by the Pakistani courts, decide how to counter them and then pressure Pakistan in a low-profile manner instead of through the media to pursue the cases against him. The high-profile campaign through the media against Sayeed seems
to be proving counter-productive. It is being exploited by his lawyers to contend that the Indian pressure--- and not legal evidence--- is making the Pakistan Govt. act against him. ( 15-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
One should not be surprised by the Lahore High Court's dismissal on October 12,2009, of the two cases under the Anti-Terrorism Act registered against Hafeez Mohammed Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET ), by the Faislabad Police in the Pakistani province of Punjab. The cases were registered following two inflammatory speeches delivered by him glorifying jihad and for collecting funds for a supposedly banned terrorist organisation. His speeches were interpreted as amounting to incitement to terrorism.
2. The dismissal of the cases was ordered by the Lahore High Court after it was admitted by the prosecution that the JUD was not a banned organisation. While there is a notified ban on the LET as a terrorist organisation since January 2002, there is no notified ban on the JUD.Sayeed and his aides have been maintaining since the JUD was formed after the January 2002 ban on the LET that the JUD had nothing
to do with the LET. This argument has not been successfully challenged in any Pakistani court.
3. Ever since the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008, Pakistani authorities have been repeatedly saying that whatever action they took or sought to take against Sayeed and the JUD such as arresting some of their cadres, seizing their funds etc was in pursuance of the decision of the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council calling for action against the JUD and Sayeed and not based
on their own evidence.
4.The lawyers for Sayeed have been repeatedly arguing before different courts---with some success--- that no action can be taken against Sayeed and the JUD purely on the basis of a resolution of the UN Committee without any independent evidence supporting such action collected by the Pakistani investigation agencies. The Pakistani authorities have shown no interest in collecting such evidence.
5.Two actions by the Pakistani authorities are required in the wake of the involvement of the LET in the Mumbai terrorist attack. The first is action against the JUD and Hafeez for orchestrating the attack as has come out during the investigation by the Mumbai Police. The second is prosecution of those members of the LET in Pakistan involved in planning the attack and having it carried out.
6. The Pakistani authorities have shown some interest---one does not know how sincere they are--- only in the second action. They have been repeatedly dragging their feet in respect of the first. They are encouraged by the fact that the international pressure ---including US pressure--- on them is only in respect of the second. There is only seeming pressure in respect of the first --- even from the US.
7. A careful reading of the observations by judges of different courts----even by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court--- before which the lawyers of Sayeed had challenged on different occasions the action sought to be taken against Sayeed clearly shows that there is considerable judicial sympathy for Sayeed ---if not for the JUD. These observations have mainly related to two points. Firstly, that the action against him is being taken purely on the basis of a resolution of the UN committee, which has no relevance for the judicial proceedings against him. Secondly, that the action was also under Indian pressure.
8.Instead of reacting to the goings-on in Pakistani courts on a day-to-day basis through the media, the Government of India should carefully examine the various observations made by the Pakistani courts, decide how to counter them and then pressure Pakistan in a low-profile manner instead of through the media to pursue the cases against him. The high-profile campaign through the media against Sayeed seems
to be proving counter-productive. It is being exploited by his lawyers to contend that the Indian pressure--- and not legal evidence--- is making the Pakistan Govt. act against him. ( 15-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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