Friday, October 10, 2008

RENEWED SUPPORT FOR SRI LANKAN TAMIL CAUSE IN TAMIL NADU

B.RAMAN

There have been signs of renewed support for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils across the political spectrum in Tamil Nadu, except from the Congress (I), which continues to adopt an ambivalent attitude. This support has come not only from the traditional supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but also from other parties such as the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of M.Karunanidhi and J.Jayalalitha of the Anna DMK, the main opposition party. Even the Tamil Nadu branch of the Communist Party of India (CPI) has come out in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

2.Karunanidhi, who is generally not given to using strong or emotional language, has given emotional expression to his anguish over what he perceives as the continuing policy of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa of suppressing the Tamils. He has conveyed his concerns to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and stressed upon him the need to take up the matter strongly with Rajapaksa in order to stress upon him the importance of finding a political solution to the problems of the Tamils. He has convened an all-party meeting in Chennai on October 14,2008, to work out a common political approach to the Government of India.Jayalalitha has expressed her support to the right of self-determination of the Sri Lankan Tamils, but made it clear at the same time that her support to the Tamil cause should not be misconstrued to mean any change in her policy of strong opposition to the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

3. It would be incorrect to view this renewed support as dictated by electoral considerations in view of the elections to the Lok Sabha which are expected in the next few months. Despite the increasing concern in Tamil Nadu over what is perceived as the anti-Tamil policies of the Rajapaksa Government, the Sri Lankan Tamil issue is unlikely to play any role in influencing the voters. Economic and internal security issues are likely to play a predominant role in the elections .

4. It would be equally incorrect for the LTTE leadership to view this as indicating a softening of the hostility to the LTTE after its role in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May,1991. The attitude towards an LTTE led by Prabhakaran continues to be as negative as it has always been since 1991. Any wishful-thinking by Prabhakaran that he and others who were responsible for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi are likely to be rehabilitated in the eyes of vast sections of the people of Tamil Nadu, who are now hostile to them, will be belied. All political leaders except some die-hard supporters of the LTTE, who have taken up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils with the Government of India, have made it clear that their support is for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils and not for the LTTE headed by Prabhakaran.

5. The LTTE has been gratified by this renewed support for the Tamil cause and has been playing it up. However, there is no evidence to show that either the LTTE or its supporters in Tamil Nadu, who are in a small minority, had any role in this renewed support. This support has been triggered off spontaneously by heightened concerns over the policies of the Rajapaksa Government and by the statements of some officials serving under him such as Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka, the Chief of the Sri Lankan Army, Gothbaya Rajapakse, his brother, who is also the Defence Secretary, and Rohitha Bogollagama, the Foreign Minister, as well as by sorrow over what is perceived in Tamil Nadu as the double-faced policy of the Government of India on the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils and over the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in taking up the issue more vigorously with the Rajapaksa Government.

6. The continuing use of indiscriminate air strikes by the Rajapaksa Government against the Tamil civilian population in order to intimidate it into stop supporting the LTTE has come in for strong criticism. The closing of the doors by it for a political solution reached through talks with the LTTE has added to the anger in Tamil Nadu against the Rajapaksa Government. As the Sri Lankan Army presses its offensive to re-capture the territory still under the control of the LTTE in the Northern Province, increasingly disturbing statements have been coming from officials such as Fonseka highlighting the rights of the Sinhalese majority and playing down the legitimate rights of the Tamil minority. All these developments have caused concern in Tamil Nadu that under the pretext of crushing the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, the Rajapaksa Government, whose policies are seen as largely influenced by Sinhalese hawks, is seeking to crush the Tamils as a community by exploiting the favourable ground situation and the lack of interest in the international community in the developments in Sri Lanka. Very few in Tamil Nadu take seriously the assurances of Rajapaksa that after neutralising the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, his Government will initiate political measures for meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people.

7. At the same time, there has been a perceptible disenchantment in Tamil Nadu over what is seen as the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils. He is being compared unfavourably with Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who took a keen interest in the problems of the Tamils and did not hesitate to take up the matter strongly with the Governments then in power in Colombo. This disenchantment has turned into shock following reports of two Indian radar technicians being injured when two planes of the LTTE's air wing bombed on September 9, 2008, a Sri Lankan military base in Vavuniya, which has been co-ordinating the military operations against the LTTE.

8. The Government of India had repeatedly assured the Government of Tamil Nadu that it would give only non-lethal military equipment to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, which could not be used in offensive operations against the LTTE. It had justified its supply of radars to the Sri Lankan Air Force on the ground that these radars were meant for use to protect strategic targets in Colombo against LTTE air strikes. There was initial opposition in Tamil Nadu's political circles to the supply of even the radars, but ultimately they were reconciled to it.

9. The information that the radars supplied by the Government of India were actually being used in the frontline areas and that two Indian technicians were helping the SLAF in their maintenance added to the concerns in Tamil Nadu and created a suspicion that New Delhi was not telling the truth to the Government of Tamil Nadu about the extent of the Indian assistance to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in their operations against the LTTE.

10. The fact that despite the entreaties of Karunanidhi, who has been a loyal supporter of the Manmohan Singh Government, the Prime Minister did not directly take up the concerns of the people and the political leaders of Tamil Nadu with the Rajapaksa Government and that he left it to M.K.Narayanan, his National Security Adviser, to handle the matter has further damaged the image of Manmohan Singh in the eyes of sections of the political class of Tamil Nadu.

11. The revival of support for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils is still largely confined to the political class. This has not yet found vigorous articulation among large sections of the public. It would be unwise to interpret this as indicating that public support for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause remains limited and can be managed.

12. Any fresh humanitarian disaster consequent upon the military offensive in the Northern Province could create in Tamil Nadu a situation similar to what had prevailed in the 1980s when Tamil Nadu became a rear base for supporting the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamils against the Sinhalese. If this happens, any success of the Sri Lankan Army in its current operations to crush the LTTE might see only the end of one phase of the Tamil struggle and the beginning of another.

13. It is important for the Government of India to show a more visible and vigorous interest in working for ending at least the ruthless air strikes against the Tamils and for ensuring that the Tamil cause is not lost sight of. The Sri Lankan Government has every right to press ahead with its counter-insurgency operations in order to restore the Government writ in the areas now under the control of the LTTE, but its use of air strikes and its perceived indifference to the legitimate concerns of India and other members of the international community should not be accepted. (10-10-08)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Thursday, October 9, 2008

PRESIDENT ZARDARI---FORWARD & BACKWARD

B.RAMAN

An ability for fresh thinking on Pakistan's relations with India and an inability to initiate a change of policy in line with the new thinking have been the defining characteristics of Asif Ali Zardari ever since he took over the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27,2007.

2. The first sign of his ability for fresh thinking came in an interview given by him to Karan Thapar, the TV journalist, (reported on March 1,2008), in which he spoke of the need to break with Pakistan's past policy of linking the issue of bilateral trade with India with the Kashmir issue so that the continuing deadlock over the Kashmir issue did not come in the way of the normalisation of the trade relations between the two countries. The business class in Pakistan has long been in favour of delinking the trade issue from the Kashmir issue. During the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister (1993-96), this had also been recommended by a committee of officials of Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce, but it recommendations remained a non-starter due to strong opposition not only from the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif, but also from the Pakistan Foreign Office.

3. Zardari's interview was followed by the usual criticism from the political class. An attempt was made to create an impression as if he was planning to dilute the traditional Pakistani stand on the Kashmir issue. As a result, his remarks on the subject were portrayed by his own party as misinterpreted and any intention to break with the past policy was vehemently denied.

4. The second sign of his ability for fresh thinking came with regard to any role for India on the Afghanistan issue. The policy till now has been to question the legitimacy of any Indian interests in Afghanistan, to project the growing Indian economic and other non-military assistance to Afghanistan as directed against Pakistan, to oppose India's request for rights of transit trade with Afghanistan through Pakistan and to rule out any role for India in any multilateral talks on Afghanistan.

5. In comments made by him before his election as the President, he spoke of the desirability of a regional conference on Afghanistan to restore peace in that country and, in that context, mentioned India as one of the possible participants in such a conference if it materialises. His references to Afghanistan came in the context of what he projects as the need for a multi-pronged policy in the fight against jihadi terrorism of the Taliban-Al Qaeda kind emanating from this region.

6. A careful study of his statements and remarks on Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism would indicate the following nuances:

He agrees on the need for close counter-terrorism co-operation with the US, but wants this co-operation to be recrafted and re-projected in such a manner as not to aggravate the growing wave of jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory---whether by Pakistani or foreign groups.

He understands the need for effective action against jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory, but wants such action to be seen by his people as the outcome of Pakistani initiatives through Pakistani forces and capabilities and not as at the behest of the US with the help of US assistance and with US operational co-operation. He does not want Pakistani action against its own terrorists to be perceived by its people as influenced by the US and as part of any regional initiative. In his perception, the jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory is a Pakistani problem and not a regional or international problem.

At the same time, he views the continuing terrorism of the Taliban and Al Qaeda against the US and other NATO forces in Afghan territory as not just an Afghan problem, but as also a regional and even an international problem. It is also his view that without the restoration of peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan's own counter-terrorism efforts in its territory will not succeed. It is in that context that he talks of a regional conference on Afghanistan to discuss various options and is prepared to consider the participation of India in such a conference.

7. Surprisingly, his remarks on possible Indian participation in a regional conference on Afghanistan did not create in Pakistan the kind of criticism that his remarks on Kashmir did. At the same time, they were not welcomed either. His ideas have remained without a follow-up---either positive or negative.

8. The latest sign of his ability for fresh thinking was seen in a report carried by the "Wall Street Journal" (October 5,2008) on a discussion which he had with one of its journalists. He made a number of positive observations on relations with India during the discussion. To quote from the report carried by the paper:

'India has never been a threat to Pakistan. I, for one, and our democratic government is not scared of Indian influence abroad."

"He spoke of the militant groups operating in Kashmir as 'terrorists'."

"Replying to a question, Zardari said he had no objection to the India-US nuclear cooperation pact so long as Pakistan is treated 'at par'.'Why would we begrudge the largest democracy in the world getting friendly with one of the oldest democracies,' he asked."

"While seeking better ties with New Delhi he noted, 'There is no other economic survival for nations like us. We have to trade with our neighbours first.'He imagines Pakistani cement factories being constructed to provide for India's huge infrastructure needs, Pakistani textile mills meeting Indian demand for blue jeans, Pakistani ports being used to relieve the congestion at Indian ones."

9.In response to criticism from the PML and some sections of the ruling coalition, the Ministry of Information, apparently with his approval, stepped in the next day and ruled out any change in Pakistan's policy towards India on the Kashmir issue. A statement issued by Sherry Rehman, the Minister For Information, said: "Pakistan is committed to the Kashmiri people's right for self-determination. The President had made it very clear that the just cause of Kashmir and its struggle for self-determination has been a consistent central position of the (ruling) Pakistan People's Party for the last 40 years. There has been no change in this policy.The President has never called the legitimate struggle of Kashmiris an expression of terrorism, nor has he downplayed the sufferings of the Kashmiris. All his statements on India should be viewed in the context of Pakistan's current bilateral relations with that country. The Government is firmly committed to extending moral and diplomatic support to the just cause of Kashmiris for their right of self-determination".

10. What to make of this flip-flop? It would be incorrect to interpret it as indicative of his insincerity. What it does indicate is that while his instincts in relation to India seem to be refreshingly different from those of his predecessors----even from those of Benazir who instigated terrorism in Kashmir when she was the Prime Minister---- his grasp of the ground realities in Pakistan is weak. The ground realities are determined by four entrenched mindsets, which have always been opposing any fresh thinking on the relations with India. These entrenched mindsets are those of the Army, the intelligence community, the Foreign Office and sections of the political class with a close nexus to the Army and the intelligence community.

11. Unless these entrenched mindsets are made to change, new thinking alone, however welcome, will remain just loud-thinking without any follow-up action. To be able to translate any new thinking into action, Zardari has tro stabilise his position as the President, acquire a popular image and acquire the ability to enforce his will on these entrenched mindsets. No previous political leader of Pakistan was able to acquire such an ability and had to ultimately bow to pressure from the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office.

12. In India too, we have had such entrenched mindsets in the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office. It goes to the credit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he has gradually been able to bring about a change in these mindsets whether in relation to India's ties with Pakistan or the US----though not yet in relation to China.

13. Zardari has been the President hardly for a month and it is too early to say whether he would be able to bring about such a change in the mindsets. India has to keep patience with him without expecting quick policy changes. At the same time, it should not lower its guard till the ultimate reality emerges---- is it refreshingly new or more of the same as seen in the past?

14. The current position in Pakistan is complicated by the emergence of a fourth important power ---- Al Qaeda. The future of Pakistan is going to be determined by a configuration of four As---Allah, the Army, America and Al Qaeda. The outcome of the fight between the Army and America on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other will determine whether Zardari's tenure will see a change for the better or the worse in Pakistan.(9-10-08)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Sunday, October 5, 2008

INDIANS KILLING INDIANS

B.RAMAN

Indians killing Indians

2.There is no other way of describing the wave of jihadi terrorist strikes spreading death and destruction across India since July,2006, and the wave of anti-Christian violence being seen in Orissa and Karnataka since August, 2008.

3. The wave of jihadi terrorist strikes has affected many States--- ruled by the Congress (I), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and others.

4.Anger against certain aggressive groups of evangelists indulging in a scurrilous campaign against the Hindu religion and converting the impoverished tribals of Central India into Christianty through the allurement of money has been widespread in many States of India, but this anger has been expressed in a civilized manner in most States. Only in the BJP ruled Karnataka and in Orissa ruled by an electoral ally of the BJP has this anger taken an ugly, uncivilized turn in the form of orchestrated attacks on Christians and their places of worship and even the alleged rape of a helpless nun. Large sections of public opinion in India and abroad cannot be blamed if they attribute this to the inaction of the local Governments in the face of the violence and view this as amounting to culpable complicity.

5. These two waves have given rise to antagonistic reflexes which should be of concern to any Indian interested in the unity, prosperity and strength of this nation. There is a disturbing denial mode in sections of both the Muslim and the Hindu communities. Sections of the Muslim community are not prepared to accept that their co-religionists are behind this wave of jihadi terrorism. An attempt is being made by these sections, supported by sections of the so-called secular community, either to deny the involvement of some Muslims in jihadi terrorism or to rationalise their involvement through various arguments. There is a simultaneous attempt to denigrate and demonise the police and other law-enforcing agencies by debunking their version of the terrorist strikes and by coming in the way of their investigation.

6. Sections of the Hindu community owing allegiance to the so-called Hindutva groups are not prepared to accept any blame on their community and tend to project the anti-Christian violence as an outcome of spontaneous tribal anger against Christian missionaries with which, according to them, the Hindutva organizations have nothing to do. The perceived inaction of the law-enforcing agencies in the face of the anti-Christian violence is sought to be rationalized and explained through various arguments such as the lack of road and other means of communications in the affected areas which rendered prompt police action difficult.

7. The history of Islam is replete with thousands of instances of destruction of places of worship of other religions. The Hindus used to be proud of the fact that their religion respected the places of worship of other religions and did not damage or destroy them. But, this is no longer so since 1992 when some Hindutva elements carried out a wanton destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.

8. Hopes entertained by many that this was a one-time aberration caused by historic anger over the alleged demolition of a Ram temple in the same place for the erection of a masjid have been belied by reports of wanton destruction of Christian places of worship in Karnataka and Orissa. India has already been paying a heavy price for the Hindu anger caused by perceptions of the appeasement policies of the so-called secular elements towards the religious minorities and the Muslim anger due to perceptions of the failure of the State to protect them and to be fair to them.

9. To this will now be added pockets of Christian anger over the death, destruction and humiliation inflicted on their community by the Hindutva elements, with the State allegedly remaining a silent spectator. The Christians will be rendered even more angry by the attempts being made by some intellectuals and others close to the Hindutva groups to play down the enormous gravity of the anti-Christian violence.

10.Do the orchestrated acts of violence against the Christians and their places of worship amount to acts of terrorism similar to the ruthless killing of innocent civilians of various communities by the jihadi terrorists of the indigenous as well Pakistani and Bangladeshi kinds? Is the Hindutva Bajrang Dal, which is allegedly behind the attacks on Christians, a terrorist organization similar to the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the so-called Indian Mujahideen? These questions are increasingly occupying the centre of the debate. Instead of maintaining a laser-sharp focus on our fight against jihadi terrorism, we find ourselves spending more and more time in countering and removing suspicions of acts of terrorism against the Christians.

11. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism and what is a terrorist organization, but most definitions in common currency accept that there are some important components of terrorism--- repeated attacks of a pre-meditated nature on innocent civilians and their property to achieve an objective, which may be political, economic, social or religious. Spontaneous and isolated attacks in the heat of the moment, which are not repeated in an orchestrated manner, are crimes not amounting to terrorism.

12. The anti-Christian violence started as spontaneous, isolated attacks in the heat of the moment following the murder of a respected Hindu leader and some of his disciples in Orissa and the circulation of scurilous pamphlets denigrating the Hindu religion by a Christian organization in Karnataka. Law does not excuse even such isolated attacks in the heat of the moment, but views the heat of the moment argument as a mitigating circumstance while deciding the quantum of punishment. But repeated pre-meditated attacks of an orchestrated nature long after the heat of the moment has passed dangerously degenerate into the zone of terrorism.

13. If the Hindutva forces are not able to control the Frankenstein’s Monsters created by them in the form of the Bajrang Dal, it is only a question of time before it comes under the scanner of the terrorism experts of the Western countries. In the early 1990s, a US-based organization called the Jammat-ul-Fuqra, headed by a Pakistani cleric and with a large number of Afro-American Muslims as members, carried out a wave of arson attacks on Hindu and Jewish places of worship in the US and Canada and there were some attacks on the members of these religions too.

14.The Counter-Terrorism Division of the US State Department placed it in the list of terrorist organizations to be watched and included a brief note on its activities in its annual reports to the US Congress. This cleric has since returned to Pakistan and its activities in the US have ceased. It no longer figures in the list of terrorist organizations.

15. If repeated and pre-meditated attacks on Hindu and Jewish places of worship and on Hindus and Jews in the US can be viewed as amounting to terrorism, how can we argue that similar attacks on Christians and their places of worship in India do not amount to terrorism?

16. The Hindutva organizations should read the writing on the wall and mend themselves lest they come to be viewed by the international community as organizations of concern. If the Bajrang Dal comes to be viewed as a suspected terrorist organization, the first to feel the pressure and adverse effect will be the supporters of the organization in the Hindu diaspora abroad. It is in their interest to exercise pressure on the Bajrang Dal and drive some sense into it. (5-10-08)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

US, CHINESE UNHAPPINESS LEADS TO TRANSFER OF ISI CHIEF

B.RAMAN

The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army announced on the night of September 29,2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, theDirector-General of Military Operations (DGMO), has been promoted as Lt.General and posted as the Director-General of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who has been transferred and posted as the Commander of the XXX Corps based atGujranwala.

2. The change at the top of the ISI was part of a reshuffle involving 14 senior officers of the Army initiated by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, theChief of the Army Staff (COAS), after meeting Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, shortly after Kayani's return from a week-long visit toChina. The announcement of the changes, which were projected by a spokesman of the army as routine changes necessitated by theimpending retirement of some senior officers, was made when President Asif Ali Zardari had not yet returned from his visit to the US. Underthe changes introducted by Gen.(retired) Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President and the COAS, the powers for the approval of allpromotions and postings in the ranks of Major-General and above are with the President. The COAS is competent to order all promotions andpostings upto the rank of Brigadier. Even though an impression has been sought to be given that all promotions and postings announced onSeptember 29,2008, were made with the approval of or in consultation with Prime Minister Gilani, it is very likely that Zardari's approval hadbeen obtained either before he left for New York or while he was there.

3. Among other important changes, Lt Gen Yousuf, present Vice-Chief of General Staff, has been appointed as Corps Commander Bahawalpurin place of Lt Gen Raza Khan, who has been shifted as DG Joint Staff Headquarters. Maj-General Javed Iqbal, presently posted as GOCJhelum, has been appointed as Director-General Military Operations (DG MO). Commander 10 Corps (Rawalpindi) Lt Gen Mohsin Kamal hasbeen moved to General Headquarters as Military Secretary (MS) and in his place newly promoted Lt-General Tahir Mehmood has beenappointed as Commander Rawalpindi Corps.

4.Maj-Gen Waheed Arshad has been appointed as the VCGS and the newly promoted Lt General Mustafa Khan has been posted as the Chiefof the General Staff (CGS) in place of Lt Gen Salahuddin Satti, who will retire from the Army next week. The reshuffle involved the promotionof seven Majors-General to the rank of Lieutenants-General. They are Major General Tahir Mahmood (Infantry - present Commander SpecialServices Group), Major-General Shahid Iqbal (Infantry - Chief Instructor National Defence University), Major General Tanvir Tahir (EME - DGC4Is), Major-General Zahid Hussain (Artillery - Commandant Pakistan Military Academy), Major General Ahmad Shuja Pasha (Infantry - DGMilitary Operations), Major-General Mohammad Mustafa Khan (Armoured Corps - ISI), and Major-General Ayyaz Saleem Rana (Armoured Corps- ISI). Major-Generals Nusrat Naeem (ISI), Asif Akhtar (ISI), Khalid Jaffari (Anti-Narcotics Force)), Shoukat Sultan (GOC Lahore) andMohammad Saddique (GHQ - former acting Chairman National Accountability Bureau ) have been superseded. They will, however, continueto serve as Majors-General.

5. Of the five senior officers in the ISI----one of the rank of Lt.General and four of the rank of Maj.Gen---Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj has been movedout, Maj.Gen.Mustafa Khan has been promoted as Lt.Gen. and appointed as the CGS, who acts as the eyes and ears of the COAS in the GHQ,and Maj.Gen.Ayyaz Saleem has been promoted and posted as the Chairman of the heavy industry complex at Taxila.Majs.Gen.NusratNaeem and Asif Akhtar have been superseded. They have been allowed to continue till their superannuation as Majs.Gen., but it is notknown whether they will continue in the ISI or will be shifted out. Among other superseded Majs-Gen is Mohammad Saddique, who used tobe in the National Accountability Bureau and was handling the corruption cases against Benazir Bhutto and Zardari.

6. Gen.Kayani will have in the important posts of the CGS, the DG,ISI, and Corps Commander, Rawalpindi, persons, who owe their promotionas Lts.Gen. to him and not to Musharraf. The CGS, the DG ISI and the Corps Commander Rawalpindi constitute an informal triumviratewithout whom, according to conventional wisdom, no COAS can stage a coup. The persons appointed to these posts as well as to the postof the DGMO are generally viewed as confirmed loyalists of the COAS.

7. Lt.Gen.Nadeen Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG, ISI, on October8, 2007,after his promotion to the rank of Lt.Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy, with the rank ofMaj.Gen.

8. Lt.Gen.Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj.Gen. by Musharraf in January,2003, is due to retire onSeptember 29, 2012.He has commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and has served as theChief Instructor of the Command and Staff College.In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In October,2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, torelieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, inthe UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also madeby the office of the UN Secretary-General.

9. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) coming under the control of theTaliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operationagainst the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, whowas in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January,2008, Pasha announced that his troops had defeatedthe TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, whichhad withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. Fighting there is still going on.In August,2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and asked Pasha toco-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two have beenputting up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps .

10. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29 as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successesand setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continualoperation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is adifferent ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha has had a colourlessrecord. That, despite this, he has been posted as the DG,ISI, shows his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secretmeeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US Aircraft Carrier, on August 26,2008, and notLt.Gen.Nadeem Taj.

11. The removal of Nadeem Taj has come in the wake of reports about US concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in theattempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7,2008, and over leakage of information shared by the US intelligence with the ISI tothe Taliban. President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the lastweek of July as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the current UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from thepost of DG,ISI, Kayani has taken care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps,but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he will not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt.Kayani has removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

12. The removal of Taj from the ISI has also come in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during hisweek-long visit to China from September 21,2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chineseengineers kidnapped by the TTP on August 29. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the NWFP. The TTPkidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP has been demanding the release of over 130Taliban members presently in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.

13. The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad and Chinese engineers working in Pakistan have also been reportedly expressing their unhappinessover the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the Gilani Government as a whole in getting the Chinese engineers released. They have beenpointing out as to how Musharraf always gave the first priority to requests from China for assistance and to the commando action orderedby him on the Lal Masjid of Islamabad when some of the students, including Uighurs, in the madrasas of the masjid, kidnapped someChinese women working in Islamabad, and comparing this to the lethargic response of Gilani and Zardari. They feel that Gilani and Zardarihave been giving a greater importance to US interests and concerns than to those of the Chinese.

14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, saidas follows: " A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the twoyoung engineers freed. He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander AbdullahMahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. "The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't beenresolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now, he said."

15. Before his election as the President, Zardari had stated that his first official visit as the President would be to China to underline theimportance attached by him to Pakistan's relations with China. He did not keep his word and instead went on a private visit to the UnitedArab Emirates and the UK and then on an official visit to New York to attend the UN General Assembly session. Pakistani officials have been explaining this away by claiming that his visit to New York was not a bilateral visit to the US and that his first official bilateral visit wouldstill be to China. (30-9-08)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Sunday, September 28, 2008

TERRIFYING SAMENESS: AN OPEN LETTER TO VINOD MEHTA

B.RAMAN

"The discourse on our 24-hour news channels is even more predictable. The usual suspects are rounded up to provide insight andcorrective action. Experts like B. Raman, Ajit Doval and Julio Ribeiro, alas, provide no cure. Police reform always gets roped into thediscussion and we are reminded of Supreme Court orders which have been studiously ignored. There is an element of farce in the wholeexercise. When the next terrorist outrage happens, as it will, we will go over the rigmarole once more. I don’t have any solutions to a verycomplex problem but I do know that the present strategy is a total failure. Let me correct that because I believe no one in the countryunderstands or is aware that a strategy exists—except to condemn terrorism and terrorists. As the Indian Mujahideen in their e-mailboasted: they can strike anywhere, anytime."
Extract from the "Delhi Diary" of Shri Vinod Mehta, Editor, "Outlook" available at http://www.outlookindia.com/diary.asp?fodname=20081006
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Dear Shri Vinod Mehta,

I read with interest your above-quoted observations in the issue of "Outlook" dated October 6,2008. A major problem one faces in India inpromoting an adequate understanding of the problem of terrorism is that most of us have little time or patience for facts and figures and fordetails. We have our idees fixes and come to conclusions, which are often superficial, on the basis of such idees fixes. That is one of thereasons for the image of helplessness in dealing with terrorism which we project of ourselves to our own people and to the rest of the world.

2. Our record in dealing with terrorism and insurgency is not as negative as it is often projected to be. We have had a successful record inPunjab, Nagaland (partial), Mizoram, Tripura and in Tamil Nadu in dealing with terrorism of Al Umma. Even in Jammu & Kashmir, the groundsituation was showing signs of definite improvement till the recent avoidable controversy over facilities for the Amarnath pilgrims.

3.There are two kinds of terrorism/insurgency where our record has been poor till now---- the jihadi kind, which is essentially an urbanphenomenon outside J&K, and the Maoist (Naxalite) kind, which is essentially a rural phenomenon. If one compares these two kinds ofterrorism with the instances where we were not without success, one would find a striking difference. We have succeeded where theterrorism or insurgency was a regional phenomenon and was confined to a narrow area. We have not succeeded where the threat waspan-Indian in nature with the network extending its presence to many States in the North and the South.

4. A pan-Indian threat requires a co-ordinated pan-Indian response at the political and professional levels. Unfortunastely, we do not have it.The multiplicity of political parties, the era of coalition and the tendency in our country to over-politicise the problem of terrorism come inthe way of a pan-Indian political response. The tendency of the intelligence agencies and the police of different States to keep each other inthe dark about what they know and not to admit to each other as to what they do not know come in the way of a pan-Indian professionalresponse.

5. There has been a plethora of reports and recommendations on the need for better sharing and co-ordination, but without any effect onour agencies and the police. I was talking to a recently-retired Police chief on the present state of co-ordination and sharing. He admittedthat there has been no noticeable improvement. He added:" The agencies and the police show a greater readiness to share theirinformation with Praveen Swami, the journalist of "The Hindu", than with each other. We all wait for his columns in "The Hindu" to know whatinformation other agencies and the police of other States have."

6.The agencies and the Police are largely responsible for the absence of a co-ordinated professional response, but the political leadershipat the Centre and in different States cannot escape their share of responsibility.A determined political leader, who has the national interestsin mind, can use a whip and make the agencies and the police co-operate. We saw it in the case of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi andNarasimha Rao at the Centre and Beant Singh,former Chief Minister, in the case of Punjab, and Sharad Pawar in the case of Maharashtra. Apolitical leader whose policies and actions are motivated by partisan and not national interests will come in the way of professionalco-operation. We saw it in the case of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh.

7. Any cure to the problem of jihadi and Maoist terrorism has to start at the political level. A political leader has to play a dual role. He has tohelp the professionals in taking firm action against the terrorists---whatever be their community and ideology.He has to give them whatevertools they need. At the same time, he has to identify the circumstances and perceptions which drive young Muslims to take to jihaditerrorism and young tribals to take to Maoist terrorism. Anger is one of the common root causes of all terrorism. Unless this anger isaddressed, professional handling of the threat alone, however effective, cannot bring about an enduring end to this threat.

8. An effective political handling has to start with a detailed analysis of the causes of anger and action to deal with them. Our youngMuslims, who are taking to jihadi terrorism, are not bothered by issues such as lack of education and unemployment, reservation forMuslims etc . They are angry at what they consider to be the unfairness to the Muslims, which, according to them, is widely prevalent inIndia. They are angry with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for destroying the Babri Masjid and with the Congress (I) for not preventing it.They are angry with both for not implementing the Sri Krishna Commission report on alleged excesses commited by the Mumbai Police indealing with the riots by some Muslims after the Babri Masjid demolition. They are angry with the BJP for what happened in Gujarat in 2002.They are angry with both the BJP and the Congress (I) for their studied silence on the alleged violations of the human rights of theirco-religionists in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are angry with our political class----particularly the BJP and the Congress (I)--- for not utteringone word of criticism about the special detention centres for Muslim suspects set up by the US in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and in Bagramin Afghanistan. Even Tony Blair, who was widely perceived as an American poodle, criticised the Guantanamo Bay detention centre througha statement by his Attorney-General in 2006 before he left office, but none of our leaders has uttered a word on this subject. ManmohanSingh claims himself to be secular at home, but he profusely praises President George Bush, who is strongly disliked by large sections ofthe Muslims of the world. His unfortunate statement that the people of India like Bush is not shared by the 160 million Muslims of India and many others.

9. Unsatisfactory political handling of the Muslim youth by all political parties is an aggravating cause of the threat from jihadi terrorism. Thepolitical class is not prepared to mend its ways and play its role in dealing with this problem. How can they expect the professional class toproduce a miracle cure?

10. Similarly, it is the absence of meaningful land reforms and perceptions of suppression of the tribals by the so-called upper caste Hindus ,which is an important cause of the tribal anger in Central India. It is the responsibility of the political class and the society as a whole toaddress this. They do not do so and keep nursing an illusion that more and more money, men and equipment for the agencies and the policewill end this problem. It won't.

11. The way we kick around the problem of terrorism like a football blaming everybodyelse except ourselves can be seen in the TV debatesand media columns. The same arguments are repeated without worrying over their validity. The Congress (I) and the analysts supporting itridicule the BJPs demand for the revival of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) by pointing out that despite the introduction of the POTAby the BJP-led Government, major acts of terrorism took place during its tenure. The BJP attributes the increase in jihadi terrorism since the present Government assumed office in 2004 to its abolition of the POTA.

12. Both the arguments are partly correct and partly wrong. Yes, it is correct that despite the POTA major terrorist strikes took place during the BJP regime. So too, in Western countries, despite special powers given to the agencies and the police major incidents ofterrorism took place. The Madrid blasts of March,2004, the London blasts of July,2005, and the Glasgow incident of June 2007, took placeafter special powers were given. Nobody in the West uses these incidents as an argument against special powers.

13. Similarly, an increase in attacks on soft targets has been faced by many countries of the world after the Bali explosion of October,2002.So too India. This is due to the tightening of physical security for hard targets after 9/11. The new focus of the jihadi terrorists on softtargets has meant more terrorist strikes and more casualties. The undoubted fact that casualties due to jihadi terrorism have more thandoubled since the Manmohan Singh Government came to power cannot be solely attributed to its abolition of the POTA.

14.Effective intelligence and physical security and a modern legal architecture are the three essential components of any counter-terrorismstrategy.Intelligence and physical security help in preventing acts of terrorism. Successful investigation and prosecution deter the flow ofnew recruits to terrorist organisations.If only we had a federal agency solely for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases, wewill not be facing the kind of messy situation we are facing today---- with the Gujarat police under a BJP Government giving one version ofthe so-called Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Police in Congress (I) ruled Delhi and Maharashtra giving a different version.

15.Flow of human intelligence about jihadi terrorism is weak because of the post-9/11 phenomenon of global Islamic solidarity and theadversarial relationship between the agencies and the police on the one side and the Muslim community on the other.Feelings of Islamicsolidarity prevent even law-abiding Muslims from volunteering to the agencies and the police information about their co-religionists, whohave taken to terrorism and from assisting the police in their investigation. The adversarial relationship has resulted in mutualdemonisation. How to come out of this syndrome is a matter for serious consideration not only by the police and the agencies, but also bythe political class and the civil society, including the media.

16. Once we allow terrorism and insurgencies of different kinds to make their appearance in our society it takes a long time to deal withthem. We took 19 years to deal with the Naga insurgency, another 19 years to deal with the Mizo insurgency, 14 years to deal withKhalistani terrorism and about 10 years to deal with Al Umma. The French took 19 years to deal with the terrorism of Carlos and his group.Even after 41 years of vigorous implementation of a no-holds-barred counter-terrorism strategy, Israel is still grappling with the terrorism ofthe Palestinians and the Hezbollah. The British took over 20 years to bring the Irish Republican Army under control.

17. The jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory outside J&K is a post-Babri Masjid demolition phenomenon. This has been rendered moredifficult to handle by the post-9/11 emergence of the concept of a global jihad. Our jihadi terrorism is still only a pan-Indian phenomenon, butit has not yet become a part of the global jihadi phenomenon. Preventing it from happening is the responsibility of the political leadershipand containing and rooting it out is the responsibility of the professional class. The two have to work together, with understanding andsupport from the civil society. The attitude of our political class to terrorism is ambivalent. On the one hand, it is worried---rightly---over thisgrowing threat. On the other, it continues to view this as a vote-catcher. Every political party has been firm in demanding action againstterrorism when it is out of power. It becomes soft when it comes to power. That is the bane of our counter-terrorism. Only voter pressure canforce the political class to stop exploiting terrorism as an electoral weapon and to start dealing with it as a major threat to national security,which should unite the political class and the civil society. (29-9-08)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

BALI HINDUS PROTEST AGAINST TALIBANISATION

B.RAMAN

Hundreds of Hindus in the predominantly Hindu island of Bali in Indonesia have demonstrated twice in one week to protest against theefforts of conservative Islamic elements to force through the Indonesian Parliament a Bill, which is ostensibly meant to ban thedissemination and possession of pornographic literature, films, CDs and other material. The Hindus, who have been living in Bali for over athousand years and preserved the pristine traditions of Hinduism, apprehend that the Islamic conservative elements behind the Bill have thehidden objective of imposing on non-Muslims the Islamic dress code and prejudices against music and dancing. They fear that the Islamicconservatives want to ban the use of music and dancing based on Hindu religious themes on religious and social occasions in Bali on theground that they encourage eroticism and remove from temples idols, which are perceived by the conservatives as erotic. They alsosuspect that the Islamic conservatives want to eradicate the influence of Hindu traditions and culture in Indonesia and Arabise the Muslimpopulation in Indonesia as has already been done in Malaysia.

2. The Islamic conservatives have been trying for the last three years to have the Bill passed and implemented, but they have been thwartedin their efforts by strong opposition not only from the Hindus and Christians, but also from liberal sections of the local Muslim society. Theliberals still have a strong presence and voice in the Indonesian Muslim society, but face increasing pressure from the conservatives to letthe Bill go through. This year, the conservatives made a determined bid to have the Bill passed and promulgated into law during the holymonth of Ramadan.

3. Provoked by this, the Hindus of Bali have demonstrated twice against the Bill. Addressing the second demonstration on September23,2008, Made Mangku Pastika, the Governor of Bali, said that the proposed Bill overlapped with existing legislation and trampled localcustoms in a country of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. "The parliament should enforce other laws on the sex industry but don'tendorse a new law on pornography, especially if that law only accommodates a single group's perspective and disrespects others'," he said.
He added that regulations in the media law, the criminal code, the broadcasting law and the child protection law should be enough tocontrol pornography.

4.The Bill is too vague in its definition of pornography and the critics of the Bill fear that it could lead to Taliban-style attacks against thosepreserving Hindu traditions in music and dancing and dressing differently from the Muslims. The conservatives want that women should bebanned from exposing their midriff and navel, which should be made an offence punishable with two years in prison. The Hindus say that theBill would threaten their local religious and cultural traditions, and hurt the lucrative tourism industry, on which they are mainly dependentfor their livelihood.The Bill would criminalise all public acts and material capable of raising sexual desires or violating "community morality,"including dance, music and poetry. The protesting Hindus sang, danced and recited from Hindu epics----- all acts which could be criminalisedif the Bill became law.

5.In the beginning the Bill was supported only by the Islamic conservative parties, but in view of the elections due next year, the secular Golkar has also started supporting it. However, the Christian Peace and Welfare Party and the nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party ofStruggle (PDI-P) have rejected the proposed Bill.The Hindus have threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement similar to themovement launched by Mahatma Gandhi in India if the Bill is enacted and enforced.

5. The discussion on the Bill in the Parliament has reportedly been postponed till the end of this year in view of the protests from the Hindus and the Christians, but it has not been withdrawn. (24-9-08)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Sunday, September 21, 2008

THE MARRIOTT BLAST: WAS DENMARK THE TARGET?

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 449

B.RAMAN

There are some indications that Denmark might have been the target of the massive blast directed at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on thenight of September 20,2008. While no organisation has so far claimed responsibility for the blast, the hand of Al Qaeda is suspected.According to IntelCenter, a US-based group which monitors and analyzes the Internet-based communications of Al Qaeda and itsassociates, a senior Al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had threatened attacks against Western interests in Pakistan in a video disseminated on the recent anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.

2.However, in an investigative report carried by the "News" of September 22, 2008, Amir Mir, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, hasstated that Pakistani investigators suspect that the blast must have been carried out by the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), which is amember of the Al Qaeda-led International Islamic Front (IIF), formed by bin Laden in 1998.

3. Amir Mir has reported as follows: "According to intelligence circles in Islamabad, which are probing the latest suicide attack, the methodof the bombing and the nature of explosives resemble four previous vehicle bomb attacks, carried out by suicide bombers in Lahore,Islamabad and Rawalpindi ---- the March 4, 2008 attack on the Naval War College building in Lahore; the March 11, 2008 suicide bombingstargeting the headquarters of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) in Lahore; the June 3, 2008 attack outside the Danish Embassy inIslamabad; and the December, 25, 2003 twin suicide attacks targeting former President General Pervez Musharraf's cavalcade inRawalpindi. The bombers used different types of vehicles, laden with high-intensity explosives to hit their targets. The investigators sayabout 600 kilograms of explosives were used in the Marriott Hotel attack which created a 25 feet deep and 50 feet wide crater. They have concluded that the material used in Saturday's attack was a mix of cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine or RDX and trinitrotoluene orTNT explosives. RDX is used as a major component in many plastic bonded explosives to increase their intensity while TNT is usually usedto shatter concrete structures and hillocks. The investigators say the similar mix of RDX and TNT explosives had been used in the fourearlier attacks in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore, which were carried out by operatives of the HUJI."

4. While Al Qaeda had claimed the responsibility for the blast outside the Danish Embassy in Islamabad on June 3,2008, it did not in respectof the other strikes mentioned by Amir Mir. Al Qaeda targeted the Danish Embassy in protest against the cartoons on the Holy Prophetcarried by the Danish media. It continues to call for more attacks on Danish targets.

5. After the controversy over the cartoons broke out two years ago, Denmark had drastically reduced the strength of its home-based staff inits Embassy in Islamabad. It was running a truncated mission with the help of either Pakistani recruits or Danish citizens of Pakistani origin.However, it is learnt that it was having a small office in the Marriott Hotel, which was staffed by officers of the Danish intelligence agencyresponsible for counter-terrorism. They were monitoring the developments relating to terrorism in Pakistan and maintaining a liaison withthe Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The information about the presence of a small cell of the Danish intelligence in the hotel seems to haveleaked out to Al Qaeda.

6.The official figures of fatalities in the blast are 53. Of these, one has been described as a Danish citizen. Another Danish citizen is statedto be missing. An Agence France Press (AFP) report from Copenhagen says as follows: " A Danish intelligence agent is missing afterSaturday's devastating suicide bomb attack on the Marriott hotel in Pakistan's capital Islamabad, Denmark's Foreign Minister said onSunday. "We are talking about a member of the intelligence services stationed at the embassy in Islamabad, with no sign of life," Per StigMoeller told TV2 news channel. "What we have heard is that a Dane likely figures among the dead. If that proves to be the case, it would beprofoundly tragic," he added, because he had been sent to Pakistan to improve security for Danish staff there. The Danish intelligenceagency, PET, said in a separate statement that one of its agents, a security advisor, had been posted missing, presumed dead. A secondPET official was unhurt, it said. Earlier, the Foreign Ministry's head of diplomacy Klavs Holm told AFP that teams were scouring the city'shospitals and other places looking for the missing national. "Several other Danes were in the hotel, they have been slightly hurt" in theexplosion, Holm said, adding that these people, three in number, were all employed by the Danish Embassy in Islamabad. Saturday's suicideblast was "an attack on cooperation between Pakistan and the international community, because these Islamists, these fanatics, want tobreak relations between the West and the democratically-elected Pakistani Government," he added.

7. Media reports have quoted Lou Fintor, a spokesman of the US Embassy in Islamabad, as saying that there was no evidence thatAmericans were the target.However, two US Defense Department employees were among the dead and a third American—a StateDepartment contractor—was missing. Three U.S. Embassy employees and an embassy contractor were injured, Fintor said. (22-9-08)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )