B.RAMAN
Asif Ali Zardari, the co-Chairperson of the Pakistan People's Party and the leader of the ruling coalition, which came into existence after the elections of February 18,2008, can be as tricky and as insincere as Pervez Musharraf, who resigned as the President on August 18,2008, in order to avoid humiliating impeachment proceedings against him by the Parliament.
2. There is no other way of interpreting his going back on the solemn commitments in writing made by him to Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), within a few hours of his signing those commitments. The first of these commitments related to the reinstatement of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other judges sacked by Musharraf within 24 hours of the resignation of Musharraf through an executive order. The second commiment related to choosing a non-political candidate in consulatation with the PML (N) to succeed Musharraf as the President and to work for the removal of the powers of the President to dismiss the elected Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly.
3. After forcing Musharraf to resign by mounting pressure on him with the co-operation of the PML (N), Zardari has gone back on his commitment once again and has been dragging his feet on the reinstatement of the sacked Chief Justice due to a fear that, if reinstated, he may set aside the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) under which all criminal cases pending against him and Benazir Bhutto were withdrawn by Musharraf.
4. Zardari has also gone back on his commitment to choose a non-political candidate through consensus for the post of President and decided to contest the post himself, ostensibly under pressure from his party and its electoral allies. After having announced his decision to seek office as the President, he has started dragging his feet on his commitment to work for the abolition of the powers of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. It is also apparent that he wants to chair the powerful National Security Council (NSC) set up by Musharraf. Thus, Zardari has made clear his intention----kept concealed so far---- to be the successor to Muasharraf with the same powers as Musharraf.
5. What has shocked the PML (N) is not only his shamelessly going back on his solemn commitments, but also justifying it with the cynical argument that agreements are not holy like the Holy Koran and hence subject to change depending on the change in trhe circumstances. The shocked PML (N) has decided to withdraw from the ruling coalition and sit in the opposition. It has also decided to nominate former Chief justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, who refused to take a fresh oath after Musharraf seized power in October,1999, and resigned office, as its candidate for President. The PML (Qaide Azam) headed by Shujjat Hussain, which was created by Musharraf in 2002 and which has remained loyal to him, has decided to nominate its own candidate ( Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed). Even if such a three-cornered contest materialises, Zardari should have no difficulty in getting elected with the support of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Altaf Hussain, living in exile in the UK, the Awami National Party (ANP) of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Jamiat-ul-Islam Pakistan of Maulana Fazlur Rahman and pro-PPP Independents.
6. The US and Musharraf, in their own ways, have been trying to ensure that Zardari is elected and Nawaz is marginalised. Like Zardari, the US does not want the reinstatement of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury since he was keen to enquire into the cases of missing Pakistanis, many of whom were informally and illegally handed over by Musharraf to the US intelligence on suspicion that they were having contacts with Al Qaeda. The US feels uncomfortable with Nawaz for the reason that he has been calling for major changes in the policy of co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban followed by Musharraf.
7. Even though the US does not rate highly Zardari's leadership qualities, it prefers him to Nawaz because of his willingness to maintain Musharraf's policy of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in Afghanistan and his perceived amenability to pressure by the US because of its role in persuading Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the NRO. The US is also hopeful that, unlike Nawaz, Zardari will avoid any humiliation of Musharraf and will let him continue to live in Pakistan without fearing any harassment by the Government.
8. Musharraf has not been inactive since his resignation. According to well-informed MQM sources, he played a role in persuading Altaf Hussain to support Zardari as the President. Musharraf has similarly been trying to persuade the PML (QA) to withdraw its candidate and support Zardari.
9. Well-informed PPP sources say that the entire scenario has been proceeding according to a tacit understanding reached with US officials during the visit of Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, and Rehman Malik, his Advisor on Internal Security, to Washington DC, in the last week of July,2008. According to these sources, this understanding provided for: launching of a special land-cum-air operation by the Pakistan military against Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in the Bajaur Agency, permission to be accorded by the Gilani Government for continuing unmanned Predator strikes by the US intelligence agencies on terrorist hide-outs in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and US pressure on Musharraf to resign thus paving the way for the election of Zardari. The object of the entire exercise was to keep Nawaz out of power, marginalise him and keep up the present level of US-Pakistan co-operation against terrorism.
10. If Zardari gets elected as the President, how sincere will he be in keeping up his commitment to extend full co-operation to the US in the war against terrorism? As proof of his good intention, he has already got banned the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 25,2008.This is a move meant to placate the US and convince it that Zardari is as keen to fight against terrorism as Musharraf was. The ban itself will make no difference to the activities of the TTP just as the bans imposed by Musharraf on the Lashkar-e-Toiba and other organisations on January 15,2002, did not make any difference They just changed their names and started operating under different names. The TTP would not even change its name. Musharraf in the past and Zardari now try to create an impression of co-operating with the US without actually doing so. They try to create a cosmetic effect through seemingly bold statements, formal bans etc. If they are really sincere about their co-operation, their sincerity has to be reflected in the action takem by them on the ground against the TTP through measures such as locating and arresting or killing their leaders, destroying their training infrastructure etc. One sees very little sign of such action.
11. After 9/11, the US tried to project Musharraf as its frontline ally in the war against terrorism. He did co-operate, but not whole-heartedly. It is now hoping that if elected as the President, Zardari will co-operate with it without reservations. Zardari is giving the impression that he will. It is most likely that he will turn out to be as insincere as Musharraf. He will give the impression of co-operating while avoiding it in effect. (26-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Monday, August 25, 2008
NEED TO DEFEAT DEFEATISM
Defeatist campaign to run down security forces seen http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/25/stories/2008082559640800.htm
Special Correspondent
Former RAW official says Arundhati Roy is to blame
.
HYDERABAD: B. Raman, former head, Counter Terrorism Division of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has regretted that a campaign was being run to create a feeling of defeatism in the minds of security forces fighting terrorists and felt this was as pernicious a trend as the ideology of jihad.
The defeatist campaign which was started by writer Arundhati Roy should be resisted before the “virus” spreads, he told a meeting on ‘Tackling jihadi terrorism’ organised by an NGO, Social Cause here on Sunday. Mr. Raman said the security forces had never shown signs of fatigue so far and this was the strength of the country.
Of late, however, people were falling for arguments questioning the utility of fighting terrorists. This was as dangerous as terrorism itself.
The former RAW official said it was unfortunate that not many studies were done about jihadi terrorists in India although extensive knowledge about the mindset of Army personnel belonging to Pakistan was gathered and incorporated in the training programmes for security forces here.
Understanding the mindset and ideology of jihadis was important to control the problem, he said. Some of the components of the ideology were – loyalty to a particular religion, religious solidarity taking precedence over cultural solidarity and religious beliefs have no national frontiers, he added.
Former Director General of Police T.S. Rao sought a stringent law to cut off support to terrorists. Andhra Bhoomi Editor M.V.R. Sastry said political support is leveraging terrorist activity.
Special Correspondent
Former RAW official says Arundhati Roy is to blame
.
HYDERABAD: B. Raman, former head, Counter Terrorism Division of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has regretted that a campaign was being run to create a feeling of defeatism in the minds of security forces fighting terrorists and felt this was as pernicious a trend as the ideology of jihad.
The defeatist campaign which was started by writer Arundhati Roy should be resisted before the “virus” spreads, he told a meeting on ‘Tackling jihadi terrorism’ organised by an NGO, Social Cause here on Sunday. Mr. Raman said the security forces had never shown signs of fatigue so far and this was the strength of the country.
Of late, however, people were falling for arguments questioning the utility of fighting terrorists. This was as dangerous as terrorism itself.
The former RAW official said it was unfortunate that not many studies were done about jihadi terrorists in India although extensive knowledge about the mindset of Army personnel belonging to Pakistan was gathered and incorporated in the training programmes for security forces here.
Understanding the mindset and ideology of jihadis was important to control the problem, he said. Some of the components of the ideology were – loyalty to a particular religion, religious solidarity taking precedence over cultural solidarity and religious beliefs have no national frontiers, he added.
Former Director General of Police T.S. Rao sought a stringent law to cut off support to terrorists. Andhra Bhoomi Editor M.V.R. Sastry said political support is leveraging terrorist activity.
Friday, August 22, 2008
PAKISTAN'S FALLUJA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.432
B.RAMAN
(To be read in continuation of my paper of 14-8-08 titled "Taliban Fights Fiercely to Protect Zawahiri", which is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2807.html )
-------------------------
At least 64 persons, most of them civilian workers in a cluster of arms production factories located in the heavily-protected cantonment area of Wah, about 30 kms from Islamabad, were reported to have been killed on the afternoon of August 21,2008, when two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside different gates of the factories during shift change. The ease with which they penetrated into this high security area would indicate either that they had accomplices in the security staff or that they were workers of one of the factories, who had no difficulty in entering the complex. If suicide bombers could penetrate into such a high-security area with so much ease, it should be equally easy for other terrorists to penetrate one day into Pakistan's nuclear establishments. The expression high security has ceased to have any meaning in Pakistan's sensitive establishments because of the penetration by the jihadi elements.
2. This is the third suicide attack in the non-tribal areas since the elected coalition Government headed by Yousef Raza Gilani came to office on March 18,2008. The previous two targeted the Danish Embassy in Islamabad (June 2,2008) in protest against the publication by some Danish newspapers of caricatures of the Holy Prophet and policemen, who were returning to their police stations after performing duty at the Lal Masjid in which a meeting was held (July 6,2008) in memory of those killed during the Commando raid in July last year.
3. The blasts in Wah came in the wake of the threat issued by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to resume terrorist attacks in the non-tribal areas if the Government did not stop the on-going military operations in the Bajaur Agency, where many leaders and cadres of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban have reportedly taken shelter.Since the threat was issued by the TTP, the Pakistan Army has not been much active on the ground in the Bajaur Agency either by itself or through the para-military Frontier Corps. However, helicopter gunships of the Army and the planes of the Air Force have stepped up their air strikes in response to the US pressure to neutralise the terrorist infrastructure in the area, which was making the NATO forces in Afghanistan bleed.
4.Making a statement in the NWFP provincial Assembly on August 21, Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti said that thousands of foreign militants were present in the Bajaur Agency and claimed that they would have captured the area if the military operation had been delayed for a couple of days.According to him, in the past, the two traditional pillars of power in the tribal belt were the political administration and the Malik (tribal chief) system. He said that a third pillar, inducted into the area during the 1980s, had emerged stronger than the traditional pillars. He added that some called this third pillar the Mujahideen, some others called it the Taliban and yet some others termed it Al Qaeda. It was this third pillar which was now dominating the tribal belt. According to him, there cannot be peace in the NWFP without peace in the FATA and there cannot be peace in the FATA without peace in Afghanistan. The ground situation in Afghanistan, the FATA and the NWFP was closely inter-connected. He said that before launching the military operation in the Bajaur Agency,the Government had sent a delegation for talks with the local tribals, but there were thousands of Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens in the area, who are unaware of the Pashtun traditions and customs and came in the way of peace.
5. In retaliation for the air strikes, the TTP blew up an Air Force bus on the Kohat Road in the NWFP on August 12 killing 13 persons, including seven administrative personnel of the PAF, and followed this up on August 19 with an explosion outside the District headquarters hospital of Dera Ismail Kahan in the NWFP, in which 32 persons, many of them Shia outdoor patients, were killed. The TTP claimed responsibility for both these attacks and projected them as in retaliation for the continuing air strikes in the Bajaur Agency.
6. While the targeting of the PAF bus is explained by the anger of the TTP over the air strikes, its targeting of Shia outdoor patients is attributed by well-informed police sources to its strong suspicion that the Shias of the NWFP and the Kurram Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been collaborating with the Pakistan Army in its operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Over 100 persons--- more Shias than Sunnis--- have been killed in continuing Shia-Sunni clashes in the Kurram Agency for the last 10 days.
7. While the attacks of August 12 and 19 were in the tribal areas, the attacks in Wah on August 21 were in a non-tribal area. The TTP has already admitted responsibility for the suicide attacks in Wah and warned of similar attacks on military installations in other cities, including Lahore, Karachi,Islamabad and Rawalpindi if the Government does not stop the air strikes in the Bajaur Agency and withdraw the Army from the Agency and the Swat Valley of the NWFP.The Government has to take these threats seriously in view of the repeatedly demonstrated capability of the TTP to strike at military targets in non-tribal areas since the commando action in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad from July 10 to 13,2007.
8. The anger of the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda against the Pakistan Army has not subsided as a result of the resignation of Pervez Musharraf from the post of President on August 18,2008. They hold Musharraf as well as the Army responsible for the commando action in the Lal Masjid and for the military operations in the tribal belt, which they view as undertaken to protect Western lives and in support of the NATO operations in Afghanistan. They are demanding not only the stoppage of all air strikes in the tribal belt and the withdrawal of the Army from there, but also the stoppage of any co-operation with the US and other NATO forces against the Afghan Taliban. It is only a question of time before the anti-Musharraf and anti-Army anger for their co-operation with the US broadens to include anti-Asif Zardari anger for the continuing co-operation with the US. The terrorists view Zardari as no different from Musharraf and as much an apostate as Musharraf. They are convinced that the air strikes and ground operations in the Bajaur Agency have been agreed to by Zardari and Gilani as a quid pro quo for the role of the US and the UK in persuading Musharraf to quit as the President.
9. The FATA is emerging as Pakistan's Falluja. After the US occupatiion of Iraq, Falluja became the launching pad of terrorist strikes in the rest of Iraq---- whether by Al Qaeda or by ex-Baathist resistance fighters. Only after the US ruthlessly pacified Falluja and destroyed the terrorist launching pads there, did it start making progress in its counter-insurgency operations in the rest of the Sunni areas of Iraq. The NATO forces will continue to bleed in Afghanistan and the jihadi virus will continue to spread in Pakistan unless and until the FATA is similarly pacified through ruthless application of force. The Pakistan Army has not demonstrated either the will or the capability to do so.A more active role by the NATO forces under US leadership is necessary----either covertly or openly. A strategy for a Falluja-style pacification of the FATA is called for----with the co-operation of the Pakistan Army if possible and without it, if necessary.
10. The USSR was defeated by the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s because of the reluctance of the Soviet troops to attack their sanctuaries in the FATA and the NWFP. India has been unable to prevail over cross-border jihadi terrorism because of the reluctance of its leadership to attack their sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. The US is unlikely to prevail over the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan unless it is prepared to destroy their infrastructure in the FATA. Deniable Predator air strikes by the US intelligence agencies on suspected terrorist hide-outs in the FATA have been increasing and some of them have been effective in neutralising well-known Al Qaeda operatives. But air strikes alone will not be able to turn the tide against the jihadis. Effective hit and withdraw raids into the FATA in the form of hot pursuit should be the next step. The longer it is delayed the more will be the bleeding. (22-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institte For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
(To be read in continuation of my paper of 14-8-08 titled "Taliban Fights Fiercely to Protect Zawahiri", which is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2807.html )
-------------------------
At least 64 persons, most of them civilian workers in a cluster of arms production factories located in the heavily-protected cantonment area of Wah, about 30 kms from Islamabad, were reported to have been killed on the afternoon of August 21,2008, when two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside different gates of the factories during shift change. The ease with which they penetrated into this high security area would indicate either that they had accomplices in the security staff or that they were workers of one of the factories, who had no difficulty in entering the complex. If suicide bombers could penetrate into such a high-security area with so much ease, it should be equally easy for other terrorists to penetrate one day into Pakistan's nuclear establishments. The expression high security has ceased to have any meaning in Pakistan's sensitive establishments because of the penetration by the jihadi elements.
2. This is the third suicide attack in the non-tribal areas since the elected coalition Government headed by Yousef Raza Gilani came to office on March 18,2008. The previous two targeted the Danish Embassy in Islamabad (June 2,2008) in protest against the publication by some Danish newspapers of caricatures of the Holy Prophet and policemen, who were returning to their police stations after performing duty at the Lal Masjid in which a meeting was held (July 6,2008) in memory of those killed during the Commando raid in July last year.
3. The blasts in Wah came in the wake of the threat issued by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to resume terrorist attacks in the non-tribal areas if the Government did not stop the on-going military operations in the Bajaur Agency, where many leaders and cadres of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban have reportedly taken shelter.Since the threat was issued by the TTP, the Pakistan Army has not been much active on the ground in the Bajaur Agency either by itself or through the para-military Frontier Corps. However, helicopter gunships of the Army and the planes of the Air Force have stepped up their air strikes in response to the US pressure to neutralise the terrorist infrastructure in the area, which was making the NATO forces in Afghanistan bleed.
4.Making a statement in the NWFP provincial Assembly on August 21, Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti said that thousands of foreign militants were present in the Bajaur Agency and claimed that they would have captured the area if the military operation had been delayed for a couple of days.According to him, in the past, the two traditional pillars of power in the tribal belt were the political administration and the Malik (tribal chief) system. He said that a third pillar, inducted into the area during the 1980s, had emerged stronger than the traditional pillars. He added that some called this third pillar the Mujahideen, some others called it the Taliban and yet some others termed it Al Qaeda. It was this third pillar which was now dominating the tribal belt. According to him, there cannot be peace in the NWFP without peace in the FATA and there cannot be peace in the FATA without peace in Afghanistan. The ground situation in Afghanistan, the FATA and the NWFP was closely inter-connected. He said that before launching the military operation in the Bajaur Agency,the Government had sent a delegation for talks with the local tribals, but there were thousands of Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens in the area, who are unaware of the Pashtun traditions and customs and came in the way of peace.
5. In retaliation for the air strikes, the TTP blew up an Air Force bus on the Kohat Road in the NWFP on August 12 killing 13 persons, including seven administrative personnel of the PAF, and followed this up on August 19 with an explosion outside the District headquarters hospital of Dera Ismail Kahan in the NWFP, in which 32 persons, many of them Shia outdoor patients, were killed. The TTP claimed responsibility for both these attacks and projected them as in retaliation for the continuing air strikes in the Bajaur Agency.
6. While the targeting of the PAF bus is explained by the anger of the TTP over the air strikes, its targeting of Shia outdoor patients is attributed by well-informed police sources to its strong suspicion that the Shias of the NWFP and the Kurram Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been collaborating with the Pakistan Army in its operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Over 100 persons--- more Shias than Sunnis--- have been killed in continuing Shia-Sunni clashes in the Kurram Agency for the last 10 days.
7. While the attacks of August 12 and 19 were in the tribal areas, the attacks in Wah on August 21 were in a non-tribal area. The TTP has already admitted responsibility for the suicide attacks in Wah and warned of similar attacks on military installations in other cities, including Lahore, Karachi,Islamabad and Rawalpindi if the Government does not stop the air strikes in the Bajaur Agency and withdraw the Army from the Agency and the Swat Valley of the NWFP.The Government has to take these threats seriously in view of the repeatedly demonstrated capability of the TTP to strike at military targets in non-tribal areas since the commando action in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad from July 10 to 13,2007.
8. The anger of the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda against the Pakistan Army has not subsided as a result of the resignation of Pervez Musharraf from the post of President on August 18,2008. They hold Musharraf as well as the Army responsible for the commando action in the Lal Masjid and for the military operations in the tribal belt, which they view as undertaken to protect Western lives and in support of the NATO operations in Afghanistan. They are demanding not only the stoppage of all air strikes in the tribal belt and the withdrawal of the Army from there, but also the stoppage of any co-operation with the US and other NATO forces against the Afghan Taliban. It is only a question of time before the anti-Musharraf and anti-Army anger for their co-operation with the US broadens to include anti-Asif Zardari anger for the continuing co-operation with the US. The terrorists view Zardari as no different from Musharraf and as much an apostate as Musharraf. They are convinced that the air strikes and ground operations in the Bajaur Agency have been agreed to by Zardari and Gilani as a quid pro quo for the role of the US and the UK in persuading Musharraf to quit as the President.
9. The FATA is emerging as Pakistan's Falluja. After the US occupatiion of Iraq, Falluja became the launching pad of terrorist strikes in the rest of Iraq---- whether by Al Qaeda or by ex-Baathist resistance fighters. Only after the US ruthlessly pacified Falluja and destroyed the terrorist launching pads there, did it start making progress in its counter-insurgency operations in the rest of the Sunni areas of Iraq. The NATO forces will continue to bleed in Afghanistan and the jihadi virus will continue to spread in Pakistan unless and until the FATA is similarly pacified through ruthless application of force. The Pakistan Army has not demonstrated either the will or the capability to do so.A more active role by the NATO forces under US leadership is necessary----either covertly or openly. A strategy for a Falluja-style pacification of the FATA is called for----with the co-operation of the Pakistan Army if possible and without it, if necessary.
10. The USSR was defeated by the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s because of the reluctance of the Soviet troops to attack their sanctuaries in the FATA and the NWFP. India has been unable to prevail over cross-border jihadi terrorism because of the reluctance of its leadership to attack their sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. The US is unlikely to prevail over the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan unless it is prepared to destroy their infrastructure in the FATA. Deniable Predator air strikes by the US intelligence agencies on suspected terrorist hide-outs in the FATA have been increasing and some of them have been effective in neutralising well-known Al Qaeda operatives. But air strikes alone will not be able to turn the tide against the jihadis. Effective hit and withdraw raids into the FATA in the form of hot pursuit should be the next step. The longer it is delayed the more will be the bleeding. (22-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institte For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
THE WAR AGAINST TERROR---AFTER MUSHARRAF
(An article written for the forthcoming issue of ‘India Abroad” of the US)
B.RAMAN
" O Allah, Pervez, his ministers, his 'Ulama and his soldiers have been hostile to your friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur and Lal Masjid: O Allah, break their backs, split them up and destroy their unity; O Allah, afflict them with the loss of their dear ones as they have afflicted us with the loss of our dear ones; O Allah, we seek refuge in You from their evilness and we place You at their throats; O Allah, make their plotting their destruction; O Allah, suffice for us against them with whatever You wish; O Allah, destroy them, for they cannot escape You; O Allah, count them, kill them, and leave not even one of them."
Extract from Osama bin Laden’s fatwa of September 20,2007 against Musharraf & the Pakistani Army. My analysis of the fatwa is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2388.html
-----------------------------------------
Gen. (retd) Pervez Musharraf played a double-game in the war against terrorism. He pretended to condemn terrorism and religious extremism. In his televised address to his people on January 12,2002, he described terrorism as an absolute evil, whatever be the cause, but, in practice, he made a distinction between terrorism directed against India and Afghanistan and terrorism directed against the US.
2. He was more active against Al Qaeda, which threatened the US, than against the Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, which threatened India, and against the Taliban, which threatened Afghanistan. He helped the US through limited operations against Al Qaeda infrastructure in Pakistani territory, but refrained from even such limited operations against the jihadi infrastructure directed against India and Afghanistan.
3. He knew how to manipulate political opinion in the US in his favour. Periodic high-profile arrests of Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistani territory, whose presence was detected by the US intelligence, thereby leaving him with no choice but to act, was one of his ways of impressing US political opinion. Among such arrests were those of Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Punjab,Ramzi Binalshibh in Karachi, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi and Abu Faraj al-Libi in Mardan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
4. Another way was periodically sending the Army and the para-military forces into the tribal areas for operations against Al Qaeda and its allies such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) etc, but these operations were half-hearted and subject to periodic ceasefires whenever the security forces were unable to counter the terrorists effectively.
5. The third way was reiterating often to Western interlocutors his determination to reform the madrasas and free them from the control of the jihadis, but not acting on his promises. He managed to project himself to Western policy-makers as a courageous and determined fighter against jihadi terrorism, not through action on the ground, but through impressive words on the TV. It took the US some time to realise that he was “bravely” countering terrorism not on the ground, but on the TV screen through words and phrases which were not followed up by action.
6. He did little to help the US in its hunt for bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2. According to the US, they were operating from the Pakistani tribal belt, but he avoided acting against them due to fear of violent repercussions in Pakistani territory. Criticism of his double-talk and half-hearted action should not obscure the fact that he did try to help the US in its war against terrorism through a number of other ways such as the following:
Post-9/11, for some months, he placed two bases of the Pakistani Air Force in Balochistan at the disposal of the US for mounting search and rescue operations in Afghan territory.
He placed the Karachi port at the disposal of the US navy for bringing logistic supplies for the NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan and allowed their transportation by road to Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
He allowed Pakistani naval ships to join the NATO’s naval task force patrolling the seas in the Gulf to prevent sea-borne operations of Al Qaeda.
He directed his intelligence agencies to pick up informally Pakistani nationals and Pakistani visitors from the US suspected by the US to be Al Qaeda sympathizers and secretly hand them over to the US agencies for interrogation at detention centres in places such as the Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Diego Garcia, Bagram in Afghanistan and Morocco. The due process of law was not followed in these cases such as informing their relatives, producing them before courts etc. According to allegations in Pakistan, about 200 such Pakistanis were rounded up and illegally handed over to the US. The whereabouts of many of them are not known till today. It was the action of dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in initiating enquiries into these cases which initially annoyed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Musharraf against him. It led to the conflict between Musharraf and Chaudhury.
He secretly allowed a large increase in the US intelligence personnel based in Pakistani territory. It was said that during Musharraf’s tenure more US intelligence operatives were operating from Pakistani territory than during the US-sponsored proxy war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. He even allowed them to run secret operations for recruiting Pakistani and Afghan nationals as human sources.
He secretly released a number of notorious heroin smugglers, who were in jail in Pakistan, so that the US intelligence could use them in its hunt for bin Laden and Zawahiri.
While openly opposing trans-border operations by the Afghanistan-based US troops and unmanned US Predator aircraft in the Pakistani tribal belt, he closed his eyes to air strikes by the Predator aircraft on suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda and its allies in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While some of these air strikes killed genuine terrorists, some others killed innocent civilians, including young children studying in madrasas due to wrong information.
He informally detained Sultan Bashiruddin Mohammad Chaudhury and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists, whom the US suspected of having contacts with Al Qaeda and allowed the US intelligence to interrogate them in Pakistani territory.
He gave the US a role in monitoring the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal in order to prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of Al Qaeda or other terrorists.
7. Since the US forces went into action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghan territory on October 11,2001, there was considerable anger against Musharraf among the people----particularly the Pashtun tribals--- for co-operating with the US. This anger was aggravated by the deaths of a number of tribal children during the Predator air strikes in the tribal areas and by the commando raid ordered by him into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13,2007. A large number of Pashtun girls from the FATA studying in a madrasa attached to the Masjid were allegedly killed during the raid. Anti-US and anti-Musharraf anger reinforced each other leading to a wave of suicide terrorism, mainly by the tribals, since July last year in the tribal and non-tribal areas and the spread of the virus of Talibanisation across the tribal belt.
8. Of all the leaders of Pakistan, only Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto were articulate in expressing their concern over the threat posed to Pakistan by the increasing extremism and terrorism and in showing an inclination to co-operate with the US in some form or the other. When Musharraf ordered the commando action in the Lal Masjid, Benazir refrained from criticizing him. Before her assassination on December 27,2007, she had even stated that, if elected, she might permit the US troops to enter Pakistani territory to arrest or kill bin Laden if the US had precise information about his location. It is her statements, which were viewed by the jihadis as anti-Islam, which led to her assassination at Rawalpindi.
9. There is a serious threat to the life of Musharraf, which would continue despite his resignation as the President. When in office, he escaped three attempts by Al Qaeda to kill him---one in Karachi and two in Rawalpindi. It will make redoubled efforts now to eliminate him. If it succeeds, it could make other leaders of Pakistan even more reluctant to co-operate with the US.
10. There is not yet much convergence of views between Zardari and Nawaz over the co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism. Nawaz wants major modifications, if not a complete break, with the policies followed by Musharraf. He does not regard the Taliban as a terrorist organisation. He looks upon it as a national resistance movement like the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s. He is, therefore, against any association of Pakistan with the NATO operations in Afghanistan. He wants the use of the Karachi port and Pakistani territory by the NATO forces for the transport of logistic supplies to Afghanistan to be re-considered. He favours continued co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda in the form of intelligence sharing and Pakistani operations in the Pakistani territory on the basis of intelligence given by the US. He is against any joint operations with the US or any unilateral operations by the US in Pakistani territory. He wants a review of the reported presence of a large number of US intelligence personnel in Pakistani territory for collecting intelligence. He is of the view that intelligence collection in Pakistani territory should be done by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. As regards action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Pakistani jihadi organisations in the tribal belt, he holds the view that the nature of these operations should be decided by Pakistan in accordance with its national interests and that there should be no dictation by the US on this issue. Like Musharraf, he does not accept US allegations that Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are based in Pakistani territory. He is totally against the practice of Pakistani agencies informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US agencies without following the due process of law. Zardari favours the continuance of the mechanism for co-operation laid down by Musharraf. However, he agrees with Nawaz that the practice of informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US should stop. Ultimately, the advice of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the COAS, as to the co-operation mechanism with the US, which would suit Pakistan's national interests ,will have considerable impact on the changes, if any, to be introduced in the policies inherited from Musharraf.
11. The US and the international community will have more reasons to be concerned if Nawaz Sharif comes to office as the Prime Minister. His attitude to terrorism has always been ambivalent. During his first tenure as the Prime Minister (1990 to 93), he appointed Lt.Gen. (retd) Javed Nasir, a member of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), as the Director-General of the ISI. He had to remove him under pressure from the Clinton Administration in 1993. During his second tenure (1996 to 99), he had Mohammad Rafique Tarar, another member of the TJ, elected as the President of Pakistan. Nawaz’s father was also closely associated with the TJ. The TJ of Pakistan has had a long history of association with the jihadi organizations, while projecting itself outwardly as a purely missionary organization to help Muslims become better Muslims. bin Laden shifted from Khartoum in the Sudan to Afghanistan during the last weeks of Benazir’s second tenure in 1996, but he flourished during Nawaz’s second tenure. Nawaz repeatedly evaded US pressure to allow its special forces to mount an operation from Pakistani territory into Kandahar to kill or capture bin Laden. If he had permitted the US and if the US had succeeded, there might have been no 9/11. His ambivalence has not changed.
12. The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be of even greater concern now than it was under Musharraf. It is doubtful whether Nawaz would allow the US the kind of role in ensuring its security that Musharraf had allowed.
13. Apart from the war against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, a matter of equal concern will be the capability of the post-Musharraf dispensation to prevail over the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP headed by Baitullah Mehsud has strengthened its hold in the FATA and in the Swat Valley of the NWFP and has been spreading its activities to other parts of the NWFP. If it manages to acquire control of the NWFP, it is only a matter of time before it spreads its influence to the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, thereby aggravating India’s problems in Jammu & Kashmir.
14. The lack of a consistent policy towards the TTP displayed by the Pakistan People’s Party led Government since it came to office on March 18 last does not bode well for the future. While the post-Musharraf dispensation could be expected to extend at least some co-operation to the US---- though not on the same scale as under Musharraf--- it will follow Musharraf’s policy of not acting against the anti-India and anti-Afghanistan terrorist infrastructure. India cannot expect any relief from the problem of the ISI-sponsored cross-border terrorism.
15. It is important for India to revive its covert action capability against Pakistan-based terrorism, which was wound up in 1997 under the so-called Gujral Doctrine of unilateral gestures to our neighbours. Even if we do not use this capability now, it should be available for use, if the situation warrants it. Knowledge that India has such a capability at its disposal and may use it, if left with no other option, may itself act as a deterrent.
16. Pakistan is not yet another Afghanistan, but it could become one if the Government there and its security forces are unable to prevail over the jihadi hordes operating from the tribal belt. The medium and long-term implications of such a development for India need to be clearly analysed, anticipated and pre-empted. We continue to pay a price for our failure to do so in respect of the success of the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the 1990s.
17. The new vintage of jihadi elements coming to the forefront across India such as the so-called Indian Mujahideen are already projecting their jihad as part of the global jihad being waged by the Muslims of the Ummah and not as a localized jihad for purely local reasons. If they join hands with Al Qaeda and other global jihadi terrorists, our internal security problems will be magnified. It is important to identify deficiencies in our preventive capabilities and remove them quickly.
18. If we continue to close our eyes to the developing situation in India and around us and remain in a denial mode, fondly hoping that this cannot happen to us, it is only a question of time before we find that India has become another web of jihadi terrorism. It can happen to us too as it happened in Afghanistan and has been happening in Pakistan. (20-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
" O Allah, Pervez, his ministers, his 'Ulama and his soldiers have been hostile to your friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur and Lal Masjid: O Allah, break their backs, split them up and destroy their unity; O Allah, afflict them with the loss of their dear ones as they have afflicted us with the loss of our dear ones; O Allah, we seek refuge in You from their evilness and we place You at their throats; O Allah, make their plotting their destruction; O Allah, suffice for us against them with whatever You wish; O Allah, destroy them, for they cannot escape You; O Allah, count them, kill them, and leave not even one of them."
Extract from Osama bin Laden’s fatwa of September 20,2007 against Musharraf & the Pakistani Army. My analysis of the fatwa is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2388.html
-----------------------------------------
Gen. (retd) Pervez Musharraf played a double-game in the war against terrorism. He pretended to condemn terrorism and religious extremism. In his televised address to his people on January 12,2002, he described terrorism as an absolute evil, whatever be the cause, but, in practice, he made a distinction between terrorism directed against India and Afghanistan and terrorism directed against the US.
2. He was more active against Al Qaeda, which threatened the US, than against the Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, which threatened India, and against the Taliban, which threatened Afghanistan. He helped the US through limited operations against Al Qaeda infrastructure in Pakistani territory, but refrained from even such limited operations against the jihadi infrastructure directed against India and Afghanistan.
3. He knew how to manipulate political opinion in the US in his favour. Periodic high-profile arrests of Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistani territory, whose presence was detected by the US intelligence, thereby leaving him with no choice but to act, was one of his ways of impressing US political opinion. Among such arrests were those of Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Punjab,Ramzi Binalshibh in Karachi, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi and Abu Faraj al-Libi in Mardan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
4. Another way was periodically sending the Army and the para-military forces into the tribal areas for operations against Al Qaeda and its allies such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) etc, but these operations were half-hearted and subject to periodic ceasefires whenever the security forces were unable to counter the terrorists effectively.
5. The third way was reiterating often to Western interlocutors his determination to reform the madrasas and free them from the control of the jihadis, but not acting on his promises. He managed to project himself to Western policy-makers as a courageous and determined fighter against jihadi terrorism, not through action on the ground, but through impressive words on the TV. It took the US some time to realise that he was “bravely” countering terrorism not on the ground, but on the TV screen through words and phrases which were not followed up by action.
6. He did little to help the US in its hunt for bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2. According to the US, they were operating from the Pakistani tribal belt, but he avoided acting against them due to fear of violent repercussions in Pakistani territory. Criticism of his double-talk and half-hearted action should not obscure the fact that he did try to help the US in its war against terrorism through a number of other ways such as the following:
Post-9/11, for some months, he placed two bases of the Pakistani Air Force in Balochistan at the disposal of the US for mounting search and rescue operations in Afghan territory.
He placed the Karachi port at the disposal of the US navy for bringing logistic supplies for the NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan and allowed their transportation by road to Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
He allowed Pakistani naval ships to join the NATO’s naval task force patrolling the seas in the Gulf to prevent sea-borne operations of Al Qaeda.
He directed his intelligence agencies to pick up informally Pakistani nationals and Pakistani visitors from the US suspected by the US to be Al Qaeda sympathizers and secretly hand them over to the US agencies for interrogation at detention centres in places such as the Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Diego Garcia, Bagram in Afghanistan and Morocco. The due process of law was not followed in these cases such as informing their relatives, producing them before courts etc. According to allegations in Pakistan, about 200 such Pakistanis were rounded up and illegally handed over to the US. The whereabouts of many of them are not known till today. It was the action of dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in initiating enquiries into these cases which initially annoyed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Musharraf against him. It led to the conflict between Musharraf and Chaudhury.
He secretly allowed a large increase in the US intelligence personnel based in Pakistani territory. It was said that during Musharraf’s tenure more US intelligence operatives were operating from Pakistani territory than during the US-sponsored proxy war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. He even allowed them to run secret operations for recruiting Pakistani and Afghan nationals as human sources.
He secretly released a number of notorious heroin smugglers, who were in jail in Pakistan, so that the US intelligence could use them in its hunt for bin Laden and Zawahiri.
While openly opposing trans-border operations by the Afghanistan-based US troops and unmanned US Predator aircraft in the Pakistani tribal belt, he closed his eyes to air strikes by the Predator aircraft on suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda and its allies in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While some of these air strikes killed genuine terrorists, some others killed innocent civilians, including young children studying in madrasas due to wrong information.
He informally detained Sultan Bashiruddin Mohammad Chaudhury and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists, whom the US suspected of having contacts with Al Qaeda and allowed the US intelligence to interrogate them in Pakistani territory.
He gave the US a role in monitoring the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal in order to prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of Al Qaeda or other terrorists.
7. Since the US forces went into action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghan territory on October 11,2001, there was considerable anger against Musharraf among the people----particularly the Pashtun tribals--- for co-operating with the US. This anger was aggravated by the deaths of a number of tribal children during the Predator air strikes in the tribal areas and by the commando raid ordered by him into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13,2007. A large number of Pashtun girls from the FATA studying in a madrasa attached to the Masjid were allegedly killed during the raid. Anti-US and anti-Musharraf anger reinforced each other leading to a wave of suicide terrorism, mainly by the tribals, since July last year in the tribal and non-tribal areas and the spread of the virus of Talibanisation across the tribal belt.
8. Of all the leaders of Pakistan, only Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto were articulate in expressing their concern over the threat posed to Pakistan by the increasing extremism and terrorism and in showing an inclination to co-operate with the US in some form or the other. When Musharraf ordered the commando action in the Lal Masjid, Benazir refrained from criticizing him. Before her assassination on December 27,2007, she had even stated that, if elected, she might permit the US troops to enter Pakistani territory to arrest or kill bin Laden if the US had precise information about his location. It is her statements, which were viewed by the jihadis as anti-Islam, which led to her assassination at Rawalpindi.
9. There is a serious threat to the life of Musharraf, which would continue despite his resignation as the President. When in office, he escaped three attempts by Al Qaeda to kill him---one in Karachi and two in Rawalpindi. It will make redoubled efforts now to eliminate him. If it succeeds, it could make other leaders of Pakistan even more reluctant to co-operate with the US.
10. There is not yet much convergence of views between Zardari and Nawaz over the co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism. Nawaz wants major modifications, if not a complete break, with the policies followed by Musharraf. He does not regard the Taliban as a terrorist organisation. He looks upon it as a national resistance movement like the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s. He is, therefore, against any association of Pakistan with the NATO operations in Afghanistan. He wants the use of the Karachi port and Pakistani territory by the NATO forces for the transport of logistic supplies to Afghanistan to be re-considered. He favours continued co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda in the form of intelligence sharing and Pakistani operations in the Pakistani territory on the basis of intelligence given by the US. He is against any joint operations with the US or any unilateral operations by the US in Pakistani territory. He wants a review of the reported presence of a large number of US intelligence personnel in Pakistani territory for collecting intelligence. He is of the view that intelligence collection in Pakistani territory should be done by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. As regards action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Pakistani jihadi organisations in the tribal belt, he holds the view that the nature of these operations should be decided by Pakistan in accordance with its national interests and that there should be no dictation by the US on this issue. Like Musharraf, he does not accept US allegations that Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are based in Pakistani territory. He is totally against the practice of Pakistani agencies informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US agencies without following the due process of law. Zardari favours the continuance of the mechanism for co-operation laid down by Musharraf. However, he agrees with Nawaz that the practice of informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US should stop. Ultimately, the advice of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the COAS, as to the co-operation mechanism with the US, which would suit Pakistan's national interests ,will have considerable impact on the changes, if any, to be introduced in the policies inherited from Musharraf.
11. The US and the international community will have more reasons to be concerned if Nawaz Sharif comes to office as the Prime Minister. His attitude to terrorism has always been ambivalent. During his first tenure as the Prime Minister (1990 to 93), he appointed Lt.Gen. (retd) Javed Nasir, a member of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), as the Director-General of the ISI. He had to remove him under pressure from the Clinton Administration in 1993. During his second tenure (1996 to 99), he had Mohammad Rafique Tarar, another member of the TJ, elected as the President of Pakistan. Nawaz’s father was also closely associated with the TJ. The TJ of Pakistan has had a long history of association with the jihadi organizations, while projecting itself outwardly as a purely missionary organization to help Muslims become better Muslims. bin Laden shifted from Khartoum in the Sudan to Afghanistan during the last weeks of Benazir’s second tenure in 1996, but he flourished during Nawaz’s second tenure. Nawaz repeatedly evaded US pressure to allow its special forces to mount an operation from Pakistani territory into Kandahar to kill or capture bin Laden. If he had permitted the US and if the US had succeeded, there might have been no 9/11. His ambivalence has not changed.
12. The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be of even greater concern now than it was under Musharraf. It is doubtful whether Nawaz would allow the US the kind of role in ensuring its security that Musharraf had allowed.
13. Apart from the war against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, a matter of equal concern will be the capability of the post-Musharraf dispensation to prevail over the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP headed by Baitullah Mehsud has strengthened its hold in the FATA and in the Swat Valley of the NWFP and has been spreading its activities to other parts of the NWFP. If it manages to acquire control of the NWFP, it is only a matter of time before it spreads its influence to the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, thereby aggravating India’s problems in Jammu & Kashmir.
14. The lack of a consistent policy towards the TTP displayed by the Pakistan People’s Party led Government since it came to office on March 18 last does not bode well for the future. While the post-Musharraf dispensation could be expected to extend at least some co-operation to the US---- though not on the same scale as under Musharraf--- it will follow Musharraf’s policy of not acting against the anti-India and anti-Afghanistan terrorist infrastructure. India cannot expect any relief from the problem of the ISI-sponsored cross-border terrorism.
15. It is important for India to revive its covert action capability against Pakistan-based terrorism, which was wound up in 1997 under the so-called Gujral Doctrine of unilateral gestures to our neighbours. Even if we do not use this capability now, it should be available for use, if the situation warrants it. Knowledge that India has such a capability at its disposal and may use it, if left with no other option, may itself act as a deterrent.
16. Pakistan is not yet another Afghanistan, but it could become one if the Government there and its security forces are unable to prevail over the jihadi hordes operating from the tribal belt. The medium and long-term implications of such a development for India need to be clearly analysed, anticipated and pre-empted. We continue to pay a price for our failure to do so in respect of the success of the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the 1990s.
17. The new vintage of jihadi elements coming to the forefront across India such as the so-called Indian Mujahideen are already projecting their jihad as part of the global jihad being waged by the Muslims of the Ummah and not as a localized jihad for purely local reasons. If they join hands with Al Qaeda and other global jihadi terrorists, our internal security problems will be magnified. It is important to identify deficiencies in our preventive capabilities and remove them quickly.
18. If we continue to close our eyes to the developing situation in India and around us and remain in a denial mode, fondly hoping that this cannot happen to us, it is only a question of time before we find that India has become another web of jihadi terrorism. It can happen to us too as it happened in Afghanistan and has been happening in Pakistan. (20-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
PAKISTAN: POSSIBLE POST-MUSHARRAF SCENARIOS
B.RAMAN
The resignation of Gen.(retd) Pervez Musharraf's from the post of the President of Pakistan became effective on the evening of August 18,2008. As per the Constitution, Mohammedmian Soomroo, the Chairman of the Senate, the upper House of the Parliament, will be acting as the President till the new President is elected. The election has to take place within 30 days of Musharraf's resignation.
2. All eyes will now be on the members of the National Assembly, the lower House, who were considered the loyalists of Musharraf. Will they continue to maintain their independent identity or will they go back to their mother parties from which the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) engineered their split before the elections of 2002?
3. The present composition of the National Assembly is as follows:
The Pakistan People's Party of Asif Zardari --- 121 seats.
The Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Nawaz Sharif-- 91
The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam), who were Musharraf loyalists--- 54 The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which supported Zardari's Party in the Sindh provincial Assembly, but Musharraf in the National Assembly--- 25 The Awami National Party--- 13
The Jamiat-ul- Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman---6
The Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) of the Pir of Pagaro-- 5 The Pakistan People's Party of Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao --1
The National People's Party --- 1
The Balochistan National Party (Awami)--- 1
Independents---18
4. If the PML (QA) goes back to the PML (N) from which it was split by the ISI in 2002, the two PMLs together will have a total of 145 seats. They may also be able to count on the support of the five members from the PML (F), thus making a total of 150 seats in the Assembly with a total strength of 336 seats. If Zardari, who already enjoys the support of the Awami National Party and Fazlur Rahman's party and other one-seat parties, manages to win the support of the MQM and all the 18 independents, he will have the support of 186 members. Thus numerically, Zardari and his PPP will continue to be in a strong position. However, this could change if the MQM takes an independent position and all the independents do not support him.
5. The question of the reinstatement of the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other Judges sacked by Musharraf last year for refusing to take a new oath after he imposed a State of Emergency will be tricky. Previously, Nawaz Sharif was insisting on the reinstatement of all of them through an executive order whereas Zardari wanted the Constitution to be amended to achieve this objective.He wanted the amendment for two reasons. Firstly, he did not want the Chief Justice and other Judges appointed by Musharraf after sacking Chaudhury and others to lose their jobs. Second, he wanted to re-fix the tenure of the Chief Justice in such a manner that shortly after being reinstated as the Chief Justice to vindicate his honour, Chaudhury will retire. Neither Benazir nor Zardari liked Chaudhury because they felt he might overthrow the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) issued by Musharraf under which the criminal cases pending against them were withdrawn to enable them to return to Pakistan and resume their political activities.
6. When he was the Chief Justice before being sacked by Musharraf for the first time in March,2007, Chaudhury had started emulating the Indian judiciary by encouraging what in India has come to be known as public interest litigation---- that is entertainment of petitions from private individuals on matters of public interest and enquiring into them. It was his entertainment of a petition on the large number of missing persons picked up by the intelligence agencies as Al Qaeda suspects and handed over to the US informally for interrogation without following the due process of the law, which caused the initial break between him and Musharraf and uneasiness in the US. Fears that he might set aside the re-election of Musharraf as the President while holding charge as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) made Musharraf impose the State of Emergency and sack him for a second time after having reinstated him under the pressure of the lawyers' community. Zardari's fears that Chaudhury might entrtain a petition against the NRO is responsible for his lack of enthusiam for his reinstatement. Even today, neither Zardari nor the US is comfortable with the idea of his reinstatement.
7. Nawaz was insisting on his immediate reinstatement through an executive order in the hope that he would entertain a petition on the re-election of Musharraf and declare it unconstitutional. Till a few weeks ago, Nawaz was not confident that an impeachment motion against Musharraf would get the required two-thirds majority. Hence, his repeated insistence on the reinstatement. To delay his reinstatement, Zardari managed to win two-thirds support for the impeachment proposal and forced Musharraf to resign. He will now be hoping that with the resignation of Musharraf ,Nawaz will not attach the same urgency to the reinstatement of Chaudhury.If Nawaz continues to insist on it, fresh friction could arise.
8. Both Zardari and Nawaz have releatedly expressed themselves in favour of abolishing all constitutional amendments introduced by Musharraf through executive orders and restoring the 1973 Constitution introduced under Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. Under the 1973 Constitution, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto had made the President a figurehead with all powers concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. Gen.Zia-ul-Haq amended the Constitution through an executive order and inserted a provision enabling the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the elected National Assembly. Zia used this provision in 1988 to dismiss Mohammed Khan Junejo, his Prime Minister, and dissolve the National Assembly when Junejo developed differences with Zia over the Afghanistan peace talks then under way in Geneva and over the enquiry into the explosion at the arms storage depot at Ojehri near Islamabad in which the arms and ammunition given by the US for issue to the Afghan Mujahideen were kept. There were allegations that the Army deliberately caused the explosion to destroy the records before the visit of an US inspection team. It was alleged to have done this in order to conceal the issue by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of some of these arms and ammunition meant for use against Afghan and Soviet troops to Khalistani and other terrorists in India.
9. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who succeeded Zia as the President, used this provision to dismiss Benazir in August 1990 and dissolve the National Assembly. In 1996, Nawaz Sharif, then the leader of the opposition, instigated Farooq Leghari, the then President, to dismiss Benazir and dissolve the Assembly. Leghari, once a close confidante of Benazir, had developed differences with her and Zardari and obliged Nawaz. The PML of Nawaz won a two-thirds majority in the elections that followed. Nawaz used this majority to remove from the Constitution the provision for dismissal. He then forced Leghari to quit and had Mohammad Rafique Tarar, an associate of his father and a member of the Tablighi Jamaat, elected as the President. Musharraf re-introduced the provision in the Constitution.
10. Another amendment introduced by Musharraf, which added to the powers of the President, related to the appointment of a National Security Council (NSC), to be chaired by the President, to discuss and approve national security policies and decisions. He also laid down that the power for the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of the Assembly could be exercised by the President only on the recommendation of the NSC. The suggestion for an NSC was first made in a public speech by Gen.Jehangir Karamat, Musharraf's predecessor as the COAS. Nawaz strongly disapproved of his speech and disagreed with the idea. Following this, Karamat took premature retirement and Musharraf succeeded him.
11. Nawaz has been critical of Musharraf's action in introducing the NSC. He has been of the view that all such decisions should be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by the Prime Minister and that there was no need for an NSC for this purpose. While Zardari and Nawaz agree on the need to abolish the power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly, there are differences on their approach to the NSC. Zardari wants the NSC mechanism to continue, but under the supervision of the Prime Minister, but Nawaz wants it to be abolished. However, this should not pose an insurmountable obstacle. If the powers of the President over the NSC are transferred to the Prime Minister, Nawaz might reconcile himself to its continued existence.
12. The abolition of the power of the President to dismiss and the removal of the NSC from his control will once again make the Prime Minister the most powerful part of the Executive and reduce the President to being a mere figurehead. Neither Zardari nor Nawaz would like to be just a figurehead. They would be interested more in the powerful post of the Prime Minister.
13. Zardari seems to be contemplating two options----make Yousef Raza Gilani, the present Prime Minister, as the figurehead President and himself (Zardari) take over as the Prime Minister after getting himself elected to the National Assembly or propose one of his nominees as the President. Nawaz is opposed to this and wants that the PPP nominees should not hold both the posts of the President and the Prime Minister.He would have no objection to Gilani taking over as the President, provided he (Nawaz) is made the Prime Minister. To enable him to contest the election to the Assembly, his conviction in 2000 by an anti-terrorism court appointed by Musharraf on a charge of terrorism has to be set aside. For this purpose, he would need the assistance of a reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhury. If he is reinstated, there would thus be the danger of his facilitating the election of Nawaz by setting aside his conviction and coming in the way of Zardari's election by entertaining a petition against the NRO and staying it. If there are irreconcilable differences between Zardari and Nawaz on this issue, there could be a deadlock.
14. The other issue on which there is not yet much convergence between Zardari and Nawaz is over the co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism. Nawaz wants major modifications, if not a complete break, with the policies followed by Musharraf. He does not regard the Taliban as a terrorist organisation. He looks upon it as a national resistance movement like the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s. He is, therefore, against any association of Pakistan with the NATO operations in Afghanistan. He wants the use of the Karachi port and Pakistani territory by the NATO forces for the transport of logistic supplies to Afghanistan to be re-considered. He favours continued co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda in the form of intelligence sharing and Pakistani operations in the Pakistani territory on the basis of intelligence given by the US. He is against any joint operations with the US or any unilateral operations by the US in Pakistani territory. He wants a review of the reported presence of a large number of US intelligence personnel in Pakistani territory for collecting intelligence. He is of the view that intelligence collection in Pakistani territory should be done by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. As regards action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Pakistani organisations in the tribal belt, he holds the view that the nature of these operations should be decided by Pakistan in accordance with its national interests and that there should be no dictation by the US on this issue. Like Musharraf, he does not accept US allegations that Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are based in Pakistani territory. He is totally against the practice of Pakistani agencies informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US agencies without following the due process of law. Zardari favours the continuance of the mechanism for co-operation laid down by Musharraf. However, he agrees with Nawaz that the practice of informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US should stop. Ultimately, the advice of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the COAS, as to the co-operation mechanism with the US, which would suit Pakistan's national interests ,will have considerable impact on the changes, if any, to be introduced in the policies inherited from Musharraf.
15. As regards India, both Zardari and Nawaz are agreed on the desirability of gradually delinking th question of promoting bilateral trade from the Kashmir issue. They are also in favour of pushing ahead with the project for the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. They are unlikely to act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory Terrorist activities in Indian territory, backed by the Inter-Services Intelligence, will continue at the present level. So too the ISI operations against Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan. Though not immediately, the civilian Government may be amenable to having a second look at Pakistan's present policy of not allowing transit trade to Afghanistan from India through Pakistani territory. A re-organisation of the ISI will be undertaken in order to reduce its role in internal security matters without damaging its capability in external security matters. A greater role for the Intelligence Bureau in internal security matters is likely. The policy of militarisation of the IB introduced by Musharraf will be reversed. A reversion to the past practice of the ISI remaining a largely military organisation and the IB a largely police organisation is likely.
16. This is the second time that Pakistan will be reverting from military to civilian rule since it became a nuclear power. When the first transition took place in 1988 after the election of Benazir, the US Embassy in Islamabad had played an active role in deciding the lines of responsibility in nuclear matters. Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the then COAS, agreed to her taking over as the Prime Minister only after she agreed that she would have no role in nuclear decision-making which will be totally in the hands of the COAS. Zia was not driven out by a revolt against him. He was killed in a plane crash. The Army was in a strong position then. It was able to dictate matters. Now, the Army will be on the defensive vis-a-vis the political class after the humiliating exit of Musharraf. Will it be able to impose its will in nuclear matters and deny any responsibility to the civilian Prime Minister as Beg did in 1988? What role will the US play? There was no Al Qaeda in 1988. There is now an Al Qaeda looking for nuclear material. The question of effective control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has assumed greater importance.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The resignation of Gen.(retd) Pervez Musharraf's from the post of the President of Pakistan became effective on the evening of August 18,2008. As per the Constitution, Mohammedmian Soomroo, the Chairman of the Senate, the upper House of the Parliament, will be acting as the President till the new President is elected. The election has to take place within 30 days of Musharraf's resignation.
2. All eyes will now be on the members of the National Assembly, the lower House, who were considered the loyalists of Musharraf. Will they continue to maintain their independent identity or will they go back to their mother parties from which the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) engineered their split before the elections of 2002?
3. The present composition of the National Assembly is as follows:
The Pakistan People's Party of Asif Zardari --- 121 seats.
The Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Nawaz Sharif-- 91
The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam), who were Musharraf loyalists--- 54 The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which supported Zardari's Party in the Sindh provincial Assembly, but Musharraf in the National Assembly--- 25 The Awami National Party--- 13
The Jamiat-ul- Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman---6
The Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) of the Pir of Pagaro-- 5 The Pakistan People's Party of Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao --1
The National People's Party --- 1
The Balochistan National Party (Awami)--- 1
Independents---18
4. If the PML (QA) goes back to the PML (N) from which it was split by the ISI in 2002, the two PMLs together will have a total of 145 seats. They may also be able to count on the support of the five members from the PML (F), thus making a total of 150 seats in the Assembly with a total strength of 336 seats. If Zardari, who already enjoys the support of the Awami National Party and Fazlur Rahman's party and other one-seat parties, manages to win the support of the MQM and all the 18 independents, he will have the support of 186 members. Thus numerically, Zardari and his PPP will continue to be in a strong position. However, this could change if the MQM takes an independent position and all the independents do not support him.
5. The question of the reinstatement of the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other Judges sacked by Musharraf last year for refusing to take a new oath after he imposed a State of Emergency will be tricky. Previously, Nawaz Sharif was insisting on the reinstatement of all of them through an executive order whereas Zardari wanted the Constitution to be amended to achieve this objective.He wanted the amendment for two reasons. Firstly, he did not want the Chief Justice and other Judges appointed by Musharraf after sacking Chaudhury and others to lose their jobs. Second, he wanted to re-fix the tenure of the Chief Justice in such a manner that shortly after being reinstated as the Chief Justice to vindicate his honour, Chaudhury will retire. Neither Benazir nor Zardari liked Chaudhury because they felt he might overthrow the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) issued by Musharraf under which the criminal cases pending against them were withdrawn to enable them to return to Pakistan and resume their political activities.
6. When he was the Chief Justice before being sacked by Musharraf for the first time in March,2007, Chaudhury had started emulating the Indian judiciary by encouraging what in India has come to be known as public interest litigation---- that is entertainment of petitions from private individuals on matters of public interest and enquiring into them. It was his entertainment of a petition on the large number of missing persons picked up by the intelligence agencies as Al Qaeda suspects and handed over to the US informally for interrogation without following the due process of the law, which caused the initial break between him and Musharraf and uneasiness in the US. Fears that he might set aside the re-election of Musharraf as the President while holding charge as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) made Musharraf impose the State of Emergency and sack him for a second time after having reinstated him under the pressure of the lawyers' community. Zardari's fears that Chaudhury might entrtain a petition against the NRO is responsible for his lack of enthusiam for his reinstatement. Even today, neither Zardari nor the US is comfortable with the idea of his reinstatement.
7. Nawaz was insisting on his immediate reinstatement through an executive order in the hope that he would entertain a petition on the re-election of Musharraf and declare it unconstitutional. Till a few weeks ago, Nawaz was not confident that an impeachment motion against Musharraf would get the required two-thirds majority. Hence, his repeated insistence on the reinstatement. To delay his reinstatement, Zardari managed to win two-thirds support for the impeachment proposal and forced Musharraf to resign. He will now be hoping that with the resignation of Musharraf ,Nawaz will not attach the same urgency to the reinstatement of Chaudhury.If Nawaz continues to insist on it, fresh friction could arise.
8. Both Zardari and Nawaz have releatedly expressed themselves in favour of abolishing all constitutional amendments introduced by Musharraf through executive orders and restoring the 1973 Constitution introduced under Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. Under the 1973 Constitution, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto had made the President a figurehead with all powers concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. Gen.Zia-ul-Haq amended the Constitution through an executive order and inserted a provision enabling the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the elected National Assembly. Zia used this provision in 1988 to dismiss Mohammed Khan Junejo, his Prime Minister, and dissolve the National Assembly when Junejo developed differences with Zia over the Afghanistan peace talks then under way in Geneva and over the enquiry into the explosion at the arms storage depot at Ojehri near Islamabad in which the arms and ammunition given by the US for issue to the Afghan Mujahideen were kept. There were allegations that the Army deliberately caused the explosion to destroy the records before the visit of an US inspection team. It was alleged to have done this in order to conceal the issue by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of some of these arms and ammunition meant for use against Afghan and Soviet troops to Khalistani and other terrorists in India.
9. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who succeeded Zia as the President, used this provision to dismiss Benazir in August 1990 and dissolve the National Assembly. In 1996, Nawaz Sharif, then the leader of the opposition, instigated Farooq Leghari, the then President, to dismiss Benazir and dissolve the Assembly. Leghari, once a close confidante of Benazir, had developed differences with her and Zardari and obliged Nawaz. The PML of Nawaz won a two-thirds majority in the elections that followed. Nawaz used this majority to remove from the Constitution the provision for dismissal. He then forced Leghari to quit and had Mohammad Rafique Tarar, an associate of his father and a member of the Tablighi Jamaat, elected as the President. Musharraf re-introduced the provision in the Constitution.
10. Another amendment introduced by Musharraf, which added to the powers of the President, related to the appointment of a National Security Council (NSC), to be chaired by the President, to discuss and approve national security policies and decisions. He also laid down that the power for the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of the Assembly could be exercised by the President only on the recommendation of the NSC. The suggestion for an NSC was first made in a public speech by Gen.Jehangir Karamat, Musharraf's predecessor as the COAS. Nawaz strongly disapproved of his speech and disagreed with the idea. Following this, Karamat took premature retirement and Musharraf succeeded him.
11. Nawaz has been critical of Musharraf's action in introducing the NSC. He has been of the view that all such decisions should be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by the Prime Minister and that there was no need for an NSC for this purpose. While Zardari and Nawaz agree on the need to abolish the power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly, there are differences on their approach to the NSC. Zardari wants the NSC mechanism to continue, but under the supervision of the Prime Minister, but Nawaz wants it to be abolished. However, this should not pose an insurmountable obstacle. If the powers of the President over the NSC are transferred to the Prime Minister, Nawaz might reconcile himself to its continued existence.
12. The abolition of the power of the President to dismiss and the removal of the NSC from his control will once again make the Prime Minister the most powerful part of the Executive and reduce the President to being a mere figurehead. Neither Zardari nor Nawaz would like to be just a figurehead. They would be interested more in the powerful post of the Prime Minister.
13. Zardari seems to be contemplating two options----make Yousef Raza Gilani, the present Prime Minister, as the figurehead President and himself (Zardari) take over as the Prime Minister after getting himself elected to the National Assembly or propose one of his nominees as the President. Nawaz is opposed to this and wants that the PPP nominees should not hold both the posts of the President and the Prime Minister.He would have no objection to Gilani taking over as the President, provided he (Nawaz) is made the Prime Minister. To enable him to contest the election to the Assembly, his conviction in 2000 by an anti-terrorism court appointed by Musharraf on a charge of terrorism has to be set aside. For this purpose, he would need the assistance of a reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhury. If he is reinstated, there would thus be the danger of his facilitating the election of Nawaz by setting aside his conviction and coming in the way of Zardari's election by entertaining a petition against the NRO and staying it. If there are irreconcilable differences between Zardari and Nawaz on this issue, there could be a deadlock.
14. The other issue on which there is not yet much convergence between Zardari and Nawaz is over the co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism. Nawaz wants major modifications, if not a complete break, with the policies followed by Musharraf. He does not regard the Taliban as a terrorist organisation. He looks upon it as a national resistance movement like the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s. He is, therefore, against any association of Pakistan with the NATO operations in Afghanistan. He wants the use of the Karachi port and Pakistani territory by the NATO forces for the transport of logistic supplies to Afghanistan to be re-considered. He favours continued co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda in the form of intelligence sharing and Pakistani operations in the Pakistani territory on the basis of intelligence given by the US. He is against any joint operations with the US or any unilateral operations by the US in Pakistani territory. He wants a review of the reported presence of a large number of US intelligence personnel in Pakistani territory for collecting intelligence. He is of the view that intelligence collection in Pakistani territory should be done by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. As regards action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Pakistani organisations in the tribal belt, he holds the view that the nature of these operations should be decided by Pakistan in accordance with its national interests and that there should be no dictation by the US on this issue. Like Musharraf, he does not accept US allegations that Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are based in Pakistani territory. He is totally against the practice of Pakistani agencies informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US agencies without following the due process of law. Zardari favours the continuance of the mechanism for co-operation laid down by Musharraf. However, he agrees with Nawaz that the practice of informally picking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US should stop. Ultimately, the advice of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the COAS, as to the co-operation mechanism with the US, which would suit Pakistan's national interests ,will have considerable impact on the changes, if any, to be introduced in the policies inherited from Musharraf.
15. As regards India, both Zardari and Nawaz are agreed on the desirability of gradually delinking th question of promoting bilateral trade from the Kashmir issue. They are also in favour of pushing ahead with the project for the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. They are unlikely to act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory Terrorist activities in Indian territory, backed by the Inter-Services Intelligence, will continue at the present level. So too the ISI operations against Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan. Though not immediately, the civilian Government may be amenable to having a second look at Pakistan's present policy of not allowing transit trade to Afghanistan from India through Pakistani territory. A re-organisation of the ISI will be undertaken in order to reduce its role in internal security matters without damaging its capability in external security matters. A greater role for the Intelligence Bureau in internal security matters is likely. The policy of militarisation of the IB introduced by Musharraf will be reversed. A reversion to the past practice of the ISI remaining a largely military organisation and the IB a largely police organisation is likely.
16. This is the second time that Pakistan will be reverting from military to civilian rule since it became a nuclear power. When the first transition took place in 1988 after the election of Benazir, the US Embassy in Islamabad had played an active role in deciding the lines of responsibility in nuclear matters. Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the then COAS, agreed to her taking over as the Prime Minister only after she agreed that she would have no role in nuclear decision-making which will be totally in the hands of the COAS. Zia was not driven out by a revolt against him. He was killed in a plane crash. The Army was in a strong position then. It was able to dictate matters. Now, the Army will be on the defensive vis-a-vis the political class after the humiliating exit of Musharraf. Will it be able to impose its will in nuclear matters and deny any responsibility to the civilian Prime Minister as Beg did in 1988? What role will the US play? There was no Al Qaeda in 1988. There is now an Al Qaeda looking for nuclear material. The question of effective control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has assumed greater importance.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, August 18, 2008
PAKISTAN: THE MORNING AFTER
B.RAMAN
"Whatever be his past attitudes, Gen. Musharraf would be keen to improve his image in the US and to remove perceptions of his proximity to the religious extremists, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Though he accused Mr.Sharif of being amenable to US pressure, he may not be as insensitive to US concerns over various issues as one would be led to believe from his past record. India needs to wait and watch the evolving situation, while avoiding any open expression of anti-Musharraf views and concerns. Maintain a rational and healthy watchfulness, but avoid irrational fears and reactions, which could prove self-fulfilling. That should be our policy for the present."
--- Extract from my article of 16-10-1999 titled MUSHARRAF: THE MORNING AFTER available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes/note38.html
-------------------------------------------------------
Remember how the people of Pakistan sang and danced in the streets on October 12,1999, when the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Pervez Musharraf, took over as the Chief Executive after overthrowing Nawaz Sharif, the elected Prime Minister?
2.They did so not because they liked Musharraf, but because they were fed up with their political class in general and with Benazir Bhutto,Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif in particular. Corruption,misgovernance and arbitrary rule became the leitmotif of 11 years of political rule under Benazir and then Nawaz.
3.Today, the people of Pakistan are singing and dancing in the streets not because they are elated over the prospect of being ruled by Zardari and Nawaz, but because they are fed up with nine years of military rule under Musharraf. Misgovernance and arbitrary rule were as rampant under Musharraf as they were under Benazir and Nawaz though corruption was not.
4.To add to Musharraf’s woes, his co-operation with the US in the so-called war against terrorism proved a kiss of death. It was unpopular not only with the religious fundamentalists, but also with large sections of the liberals, who attributed Pakistan’s growing instability to the public anger over his perceived closeness to the US.
5.Singing and dancing cannot go on for ever. They have to come to an end and the process of facing the ground realities has to start the morning after. What are the ground realities confronting them?
The economy in serious difficulties with the Exchequer unable to cope with the rising oil prices and meet the basic needs of the people even in respect of necessities such as wheat and flour.
The relentless spread of the virus of Talibanisation across its tribal belt and the dangers of its infecting the non-tribal areas too.
A country caught in the fatal embrace of the US. It will be as suicidal to continue to be in its embrace as it will be to get out of it. Continuing the embrace of the US would mean more terrorism of the Al Qaeda kind and more Talibanisation. Freeing itself of its embrace would mean a collapse of its economy and a weakening of the potential of its armed forces.
6.The realities are grim enough to demand a statesman of clarity and vision at the helm of affairs. There is none on the horizon. Zardari and Nawaz are not statesmen. They are no-holds barred politicians.
7.Till now, they presented a façade of unity lest any discord between them should redound to be benefit of Musharraf. Now that Musharraf is gone, more and more discord and less and less unity will be the order of the day.
8.Discord is likely on the following issues: Who should be the President----from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) or the Pakistan Muslim League, from Sindh or Punjab? Should the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, who is perceived to be closer to Nawaz than to Zardari, be reinstated? What changes are necessary in the policy of co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism followed by Musharraf? Nawaz would like a total break with the policy, but Zardari wants only modifications and not a total break.
9.The political equilibrium in Pakistan could change if the loyalists of Musharraf in the PML (Qaide Azam) flock back to the PML of Nawaz Sharif. Zardari’s position could be weakened, making new elections unavoidable.
10.The Army’s anti-India reflexes were kept under check by Musharraf. It is doubtful whether either Zardari or Nawaz will be able to do so as effectively as Musharraf did. The temptation to profit from the fresh difficulties of India in Jammu &Kashmir will be difficult for the Army and the Inter-services Intelligence to resist.
11.In Pakistan, the Army has always been in the driving seat of policy- making on Kashmir. Musharraf, in the driving seat of power, brought in a certain measure of moderation after his bitter experience during the Kargil conflict. With a politician in the driving seat, there will be greater uncertainties for India in Kashmir since his control over the Army will be less than that of Musharraf.
12.India should continue with the peace process with Pakistan. It should build bridges with all sides of the political spectrum there. It should co-operate closely, but discreetly with the US and Afghanistan in monitoring the situation and avoiding nasty surprises. The US still has the capability to exercise moderation on the Pakistani policies through its contacts in the Army. India should encourage the US to keep using that capability in the common interests of India, the US and Afghanistan. Greater vigilance on our border with Pakistan and on the internal security situation is necessary. (18-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"Whatever be his past attitudes, Gen. Musharraf would be keen to improve his image in the US and to remove perceptions of his proximity to the religious extremists, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Though he accused Mr.Sharif of being amenable to US pressure, he may not be as insensitive to US concerns over various issues as one would be led to believe from his past record. India needs to wait and watch the evolving situation, while avoiding any open expression of anti-Musharraf views and concerns. Maintain a rational and healthy watchfulness, but avoid irrational fears and reactions, which could prove self-fulfilling. That should be our policy for the present."
--- Extract from my article of 16-10-1999 titled MUSHARRAF: THE MORNING AFTER available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes/note38.html
-------------------------------------------------------
Remember how the people of Pakistan sang and danced in the streets on October 12,1999, when the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Pervez Musharraf, took over as the Chief Executive after overthrowing Nawaz Sharif, the elected Prime Minister?
2.They did so not because they liked Musharraf, but because they were fed up with their political class in general and with Benazir Bhutto,Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif in particular. Corruption,misgovernance and arbitrary rule became the leitmotif of 11 years of political rule under Benazir and then Nawaz.
3.Today, the people of Pakistan are singing and dancing in the streets not because they are elated over the prospect of being ruled by Zardari and Nawaz, but because they are fed up with nine years of military rule under Musharraf. Misgovernance and arbitrary rule were as rampant under Musharraf as they were under Benazir and Nawaz though corruption was not.
4.To add to Musharraf’s woes, his co-operation with the US in the so-called war against terrorism proved a kiss of death. It was unpopular not only with the religious fundamentalists, but also with large sections of the liberals, who attributed Pakistan’s growing instability to the public anger over his perceived closeness to the US.
5.Singing and dancing cannot go on for ever. They have to come to an end and the process of facing the ground realities has to start the morning after. What are the ground realities confronting them?
The economy in serious difficulties with the Exchequer unable to cope with the rising oil prices and meet the basic needs of the people even in respect of necessities such as wheat and flour.
The relentless spread of the virus of Talibanisation across its tribal belt and the dangers of its infecting the non-tribal areas too.
A country caught in the fatal embrace of the US. It will be as suicidal to continue to be in its embrace as it will be to get out of it. Continuing the embrace of the US would mean more terrorism of the Al Qaeda kind and more Talibanisation. Freeing itself of its embrace would mean a collapse of its economy and a weakening of the potential of its armed forces.
6.The realities are grim enough to demand a statesman of clarity and vision at the helm of affairs. There is none on the horizon. Zardari and Nawaz are not statesmen. They are no-holds barred politicians.
7.Till now, they presented a façade of unity lest any discord between them should redound to be benefit of Musharraf. Now that Musharraf is gone, more and more discord and less and less unity will be the order of the day.
8.Discord is likely on the following issues: Who should be the President----from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) or the Pakistan Muslim League, from Sindh or Punjab? Should the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, who is perceived to be closer to Nawaz than to Zardari, be reinstated? What changes are necessary in the policy of co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism followed by Musharraf? Nawaz would like a total break with the policy, but Zardari wants only modifications and not a total break.
9.The political equilibrium in Pakistan could change if the loyalists of Musharraf in the PML (Qaide Azam) flock back to the PML of Nawaz Sharif. Zardari’s position could be weakened, making new elections unavoidable.
10.The Army’s anti-India reflexes were kept under check by Musharraf. It is doubtful whether either Zardari or Nawaz will be able to do so as effectively as Musharraf did. The temptation to profit from the fresh difficulties of India in Jammu &Kashmir will be difficult for the Army and the Inter-services Intelligence to resist.
11.In Pakistan, the Army has always been in the driving seat of policy- making on Kashmir. Musharraf, in the driving seat of power, brought in a certain measure of moderation after his bitter experience during the Kargil conflict. With a politician in the driving seat, there will be greater uncertainties for India in Kashmir since his control over the Army will be less than that of Musharraf.
12.India should continue with the peace process with Pakistan. It should build bridges with all sides of the political spectrum there. It should co-operate closely, but discreetly with the US and Afghanistan in monitoring the situation and avoiding nasty surprises. The US still has the capability to exercise moderation on the Pakistani policies through its contacts in the Army. India should encourage the US to keep using that capability in the common interests of India, the US and Afghanistan. Greater vigilance on our border with Pakistan and on the internal security situation is necessary. (18-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, August 16, 2008
RICHARD NIXON & PERVEZ MUSHARRAF
RICHARD NIXON & PERVEZ MUSHARRAF
B.RAMAN
The present political and public atmosphere in Pakistan reminds one of the atmosphere that prevailed in Washington DC in August,1974, before the then President Richard Nixon was persuaded with great difficulty by his friends and advisers to resign as the President instead of facing the ignominy of impeachment by the Congress on charges which derived from the enquiries into the Watergate scandal. The evidence against him was so strong that there was not an iota of doubt that the impeachment proceedings, if held, would have resulted in his removal from office.
2. Almost everyone was convinced of the need to initiate impeachment proceedings against him. It would have been justified morally and legally. At the same time, even his worst critics wanted to avoid the impeachment proceedings because they felt that it could turn out to be a traumatic experience for the nation and could result in the weakening of the office of the President of the US in the eyes of its citizens.
3.Ultimately, Nixon saw reason and resigned on August 8,1974. In a brief address to the nation from his office, he said he was resigning in order to set in motion a healing process in the nation. He said: “I have never been a quitter. To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interest of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad. To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home.”
4.Gerald Ford, his Vice-President, who succeeded him, issued an order under his powers as the President exempting Nixon from any legal proceedings relating to the Watergate scandal. The high dignity of the office of the President of the US was preserved, justice was served by forcing a wrong-doer to resign without the traumatic spectacle of an impeachment and a leader, who had served the US well till he got involved in the Watergate scandal, was spared the humiliation of a trial by the Congress, which could have caused undesirable strains in the relations between the Executive and the Congress.
5. Nixon and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, who is under tremendous pressure to resign or face impeachment proceedings, had certain traits in common. As public leaders, both had positive qualities, but as individuals they were perceived as men without scruples, who would be prepared to do anything to serve their personal interests and to keep themselves in office.
6. Even before Nixon was elected as the President in 1968, he used to be referred to by his critics as Tricky Dick. In an article in June 2002 titled TRICKY MUSH: CAUGHT WITH HIS PANTS DOWN (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers5/paper470.html)
I had stated as follows: “ It is said that you can fool some people for all time, all people for some time, but not all people for all time. Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, whom the late Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) during the first tenure of Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister, used to describe as "Tricky Mush", had always believed that he could fool all people for all time.”
7. His time of reckoning has come. It is also the time of reckoning for Pakistan. The future of Pakistan and its fight for genuine democracy will be determined how Musharraf and the military and political leaders of Pakistan conduct themselves at this juncture.
8. It is not in the interest of Musharraf himself or of Pakistan that he continues in office. His deviousness and repeated misuse of his powers have discredited him beyond repair and damaged the cause of democracy in Pakistan.
9. Unlike Nixon, Musharraf is not a popularly elected President. He is a self-appointed President, who manipulated the Constitutional process in order to have himself appointed as the President. One does not, therefore, have to worry about any negative impact on the public mind.
10. But, he was also the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) till the end of last year. His exit has to be brought about in a manner which would not be perceived by large sections of the Armed Forces as a humiliation inflicted on their former chief by the political class. Just as people in the US were worried about the impact on the relations between the Executive and the Congress, in Pakistan, given the important role of the Army even in the political field, one will have to worry about any impact on the relations between the Army and the political class.
11. It is incumbent on all those, who have remained loyal to him, to convince him that he should take the lead in setting in motion a healing process by resigning as the President and keeping himself out of the country for some time till the painful memories of his misrule have faded away.
12. It is equally incumbent on the political class to take the initiative in having a resolution passed by both Houses of the Parliament exempting him from all legal action arising from his constitutional and political misrule, if he resigned, and assuring all those who had let themselves be used by him for repeatedly violating the Constitution and the laws that no action would be taken against them if he quits.
13. A bane of democracy in Pakistan has always been the vindictive streak in their people and leaders. It is time to rid themselves of this streak. (16-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. Of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The present political and public atmosphere in Pakistan reminds one of the atmosphere that prevailed in Washington DC in August,1974, before the then President Richard Nixon was persuaded with great difficulty by his friends and advisers to resign as the President instead of facing the ignominy of impeachment by the Congress on charges which derived from the enquiries into the Watergate scandal. The evidence against him was so strong that there was not an iota of doubt that the impeachment proceedings, if held, would have resulted in his removal from office.
2. Almost everyone was convinced of the need to initiate impeachment proceedings against him. It would have been justified morally and legally. At the same time, even his worst critics wanted to avoid the impeachment proceedings because they felt that it could turn out to be a traumatic experience for the nation and could result in the weakening of the office of the President of the US in the eyes of its citizens.
3.Ultimately, Nixon saw reason and resigned on August 8,1974. In a brief address to the nation from his office, he said he was resigning in order to set in motion a healing process in the nation. He said: “I have never been a quitter. To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interest of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad. To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home.”
4.Gerald Ford, his Vice-President, who succeeded him, issued an order under his powers as the President exempting Nixon from any legal proceedings relating to the Watergate scandal. The high dignity of the office of the President of the US was preserved, justice was served by forcing a wrong-doer to resign without the traumatic spectacle of an impeachment and a leader, who had served the US well till he got involved in the Watergate scandal, was spared the humiliation of a trial by the Congress, which could have caused undesirable strains in the relations between the Executive and the Congress.
5. Nixon and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, who is under tremendous pressure to resign or face impeachment proceedings, had certain traits in common. As public leaders, both had positive qualities, but as individuals they were perceived as men without scruples, who would be prepared to do anything to serve their personal interests and to keep themselves in office.
6. Even before Nixon was elected as the President in 1968, he used to be referred to by his critics as Tricky Dick. In an article in June 2002 titled TRICKY MUSH: CAUGHT WITH HIS PANTS DOWN (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers5/paper470.html)
I had stated as follows: “ It is said that you can fool some people for all time, all people for some time, but not all people for all time. Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, whom the late Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) during the first tenure of Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister, used to describe as "Tricky Mush", had always believed that he could fool all people for all time.”
7. His time of reckoning has come. It is also the time of reckoning for Pakistan. The future of Pakistan and its fight for genuine democracy will be determined how Musharraf and the military and political leaders of Pakistan conduct themselves at this juncture.
8. It is not in the interest of Musharraf himself or of Pakistan that he continues in office. His deviousness and repeated misuse of his powers have discredited him beyond repair and damaged the cause of democracy in Pakistan.
9. Unlike Nixon, Musharraf is not a popularly elected President. He is a self-appointed President, who manipulated the Constitutional process in order to have himself appointed as the President. One does not, therefore, have to worry about any negative impact on the public mind.
10. But, he was also the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) till the end of last year. His exit has to be brought about in a manner which would not be perceived by large sections of the Armed Forces as a humiliation inflicted on their former chief by the political class. Just as people in the US were worried about the impact on the relations between the Executive and the Congress, in Pakistan, given the important role of the Army even in the political field, one will have to worry about any impact on the relations between the Army and the political class.
11. It is incumbent on all those, who have remained loyal to him, to convince him that he should take the lead in setting in motion a healing process by resigning as the President and keeping himself out of the country for some time till the painful memories of his misrule have faded away.
12. It is equally incumbent on the political class to take the initiative in having a resolution passed by both Houses of the Parliament exempting him from all legal action arising from his constitutional and political misrule, if he resigned, and assuring all those who had let themselves be used by him for repeatedly violating the Constitution and the laws that no action would be taken against them if he quits.
13. A bane of democracy in Pakistan has always been the vindictive streak in their people and leaders. It is time to rid themselves of this streak. (16-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. Of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)