BENAZIR'S ASSASSINATION: THE AFTERMATH
B.RAMAN
The assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto on December 27,2007, has considerably embarrassed President Pervez Musharraf. This was because the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, had the over-all responsibility for her security and it was headed by Brig (retd).Ijaz Shah, a close associate of Musharraf, against whom she and her husband Mr.Asif Zardari had been repeatedly complaining ever since the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October 18,2007. Musharraf's perceived failure to address her concerns and to respond to her requests for better security have created a widespread perception of wilful negligence in protecting her.
2. There was definitely negligence in protecting her, but it is difficult to say at what level of the intelligence and security establishment. In the short term, Musharraf should be able to get over this embarrassment provided the street reaction to the assassination does not become widespread and uncontrollable. There have been violent street protests---particularly in Sindh, as expected, and in pockets of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)--- resulting in the deaths of over 30 persons and extensive damage to publioc and private property. But, surprisingly, the street protests have thus far remained controllable and have been no more serious in Karachi than those witnessed earlier this year over the suspension of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Supreme Court.
3. One had expected the whole of Sindh to blow up and rise against Musharraf after the assassination. Surprisingly, this has not happened so far---not even after the funeral of Benazir in her native village. The absence so far of uncontrollable street anger probably indicates a certain disenchantment with her attempts to make a deal with the Army before she returned from exile on October 18,2007, and with her pro-US policies. Her strongly pro-US statements did not apparently go down well even in Sindh and this is reflected in the absence of massive protests so far.
4. The support for Musharraf from the Army is unlikely to be weakened as a result of the assassination unless the street protests become massive in the days to come, thereby making his position increasingly untenable. If the protests remain at the present level and show signs of losing steam in the days to come, he may be tempted to go ahead with the elections even in the face of a boycott by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif. The long-suppressed differences inside the PPP between the Zardari loyalists and the traditional loyalists are likely to sharpen. Sindhi leaders such as Makhdoom Amin Fahim have always had their own secret personal ambitions, though they remained loyal to her till the last. Now that she is no more, personal ambitions would increasingly play a more important role than party loyalty in influencing their behaviour and Musharraf should be able to exploit this to draw them into a coalition with the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) engineered by him in 2002.
5. The removal of Benazir from the scene is unlikely to redound to the benefit of Nawaz Sharif in any substantial measure. Thus, the short-term political beneficiary of the removal of Benazir from the scene would be Musharraf and the PML (QA). Musharraf would find it hard to resist the temptation to exploit the situation to strengthen the political backing for him by going ahead with the elections.
6. The US is in a dilemma. It realises the folly of uncritical dependence on Musharraf. Had Benazir been there and done well in the elections, she would have provided it with another card. With her gone, the US is back to its pre-October 18 position of having only the Musharraf card. It would not like to throw away this card for the present. The US has reasons to be alarmed by indications of the spread of Al Qaeda's tentacles to Rawalpindi. Countering Al Qaeda is more important in its eyes than really nurturing democracy. Pro forma support for a transition to democracy and carrying along with Musharraf despite all that has happened till an acceptable alternative is on the horizon will be its policy. For this purpose, it would want Musharraf to go ahead with the elections even if their credibility had been weakened. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Friday, December 28, 2007
Thursday, December 27, 2007
AL QAEDA IN GHQ,RAWALPINDI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.335
B.RAMAN
Since 9/11, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike anywhere in the world in which there was no Pakistani connection.
2. Since 2002, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike in Pakistani territory in which there was no connection of the GeneralHeadquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army. By GHQ, one does not mean the entire army. One means some elements in the GHQ.
3. The first wake-up call about the possible presence of one or more sleeper cells of Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March,2003, whenKhalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who allegedly orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was found living in the house of a woman'swing office-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. She had relatives in the army, including an officer of a Signal Regiment.
4. The second wake-up call came after the two attempts to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December,2003.ThePakistani authorities have not so far taken their public into confidence regarding the details of the two plots.All that they admitted wasthat four junior officers of the Army and six of the Air Force were allegedly involved. One of the army officers named Islamuddin wascourt-martialed and sentenced to death even before the investigation was complete. Another army officer named Havaldar Younis wassentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Much to the discomfiture of the authorities, one of the Air Force officers, a civilian,who wasbeing held in custody in an Air Force station, managed to escape.
5.There are still many unanswered questions about the conspiracy to kill Musharraf. Who took the initiative in planning this conspiracy? Thearrested junior officers of the Army and the Air Force or the leaders of the suspected jihadi organisations? When was the conspiracyhatched? How did Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army and the Air Force remainunaware of this conspiracy despite the fact that the conspirators had allegedly held some of their preparatory meetings in their livingquarters in military cantonments and Air Force stations? Was there a complicity of some in the intelligence establishment itself? If so, atwhat level? Why was the Government unable to identify those in the intelligence establishment involved in the conspiracy? Was there aninvolvement of the Hizbut Tehrir?
6.These questions re-surfaced in the wake of the arrest of Abu Faraj al-Libi of Al Qaeda and the re-arrest of the civilian employee of the AirForce involved in the conspiracy, who had managed to escape from custody in November,2004, while under interrogation. That there wereapprehensions in the minds of those close to Musharraf over the role of sections of the intelligence establishment in the entire conspiracyand over the failure of the investigating agencies to unravel the entire conspiracy became evident from an interview given by Dr.AamirLiaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, to the "Daily Times" on May 5,2005.
7.The Minister warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said thatthere were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack PresidentMusharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI,which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to hisown life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the textsof sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
8.Well-informed sources in Pakistan said that apart from the failure of the intelligence establishment to identify and weed out the pro-jihadielements in the Armed Forces and the intelligence establishment, another cause for serious concern was the continuing failure of theintelligence establishment to identify all the Pakistani leaders of the highly secretive Hizbut Tehrir (HT) and its supporters in the ArmedForces and arrest them.The HT ideology and operational methods were imported into Pakistan from the UK by its supporters in thePakistani community in the UK in 2000. It was said that within five years it was able to make considerable progress not only in setting up itsorganisational infrastructure, but also in recruiting dedicated members in the civil society as well as the Armed Forces. It was also reportedthat no other jihadi organisation had been able to attract as many young and educated members and as many supporters in the ArmedForces as the HT.
9.Physical security regulations in an office of the ISI at Rawalpindi exempt officers of the rank of Brigadier and above coming in their ownvehicle from frisking at the outer gate. They undergo a frisking only after they have entered the premises, parked their car in the spaceallotted to them in the garage and then enter the building in which their office is located. Officers below the rank of Brigadier undergofrisking twice, whether they are in their own vehicle or in a bus ----at the outer gate and again inside before they enter the building. At theouter gate, they have to get out of their vehicle, undergo frisking and then get into their vehicle and drive in.
10. Since all officers travel in civilian clothes in unmarked vehicles, which cannot be identified with the Army or the ISI, there is a special hand signalling system for Brigadiers and above by which the security staff at the outer gate can recognise their rank and let them drive inwithout undergoing frisking. This hand signalling is changed frequently.
11. On the morning of November 24, 2007, a car reached the outer gate and the man inside showed a hand signal, which was in use till theprevious day. It had been changed on November 23 and a new signal was in force from the morning of November 24, 2007. He was notaware of it. The security staff got suspicious and did not allow the car to drive in. They asked the man driving it to get out for questioningand frisking. He blew himself up.
12. As he did so, an unmarked chartered bus carrying over 40 civilian and junior military employees of the ISI reached the outer gate andstopped so that those inside can get out for frisking. The bus bore the brunt of the explosion, which caused the death of about 35persons---- from among those inside the bus as well as the security staff. The Pakistani authorities admitted the death of only 18 persons.
13. Around the same time, a man driving a vehicle towards the premises of the GHQ in another part of Rawalpindi was stopped by thesecurity staff at a physical security barrier. He blew himself up killing two of the security staff. These two well-synchronised suicide strikesin Rawalpindi, the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment, came about six weeks after a similar attacktargeting the ISI and the Army at Rawalpindi at the same time. On September 4, 2007. a suicide attacker blew himself up after boarding abus carrying ISI employees. A roadside bomb went off near a commercial area in Rawalpindi, while a car carrying an unidentified seniorArmy officer to the GHQ was passing. Twenty-five persons died in the two attacks. The Army officer escaped unhurt. On October 30, 2007, asuicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint several hundred yards from the GHQ killing seven persons, most of the from the securitystaff.
14.The two attacks directed at the ISI and another at a Pakistan Air Force bus at Sargodha were based on inside information. In the case ofthe explosion at the outer gate of the ISI complex on November 24, 2007, the suicide bomber was aware of the hand signalling code forBrigadiers and above. However, he was not aware that the signal code had been changed the previous day. Since these codes arecommunicated personally to Brigadiers and above, their existence is supposed to be known only to Brigadiers and above and the physicalsecurity staff. The suicide bomber's inside accomplice was either an ISI officer of the rank of Brigadier or above or a member of the physicalsecurity staff.
15. There are two alarming aspects of the security situation in Pakistan. The first is the upsurge in acts of suicide terrorism directed againstsecurity and intelligence personnel and their establishments. These give clear evidence of the penetration of pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elementsinside the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies and the Police. The second is the inability or unwillingness of the Police to vigorouslyinvestigate these incidents, including the attempt to kill Mrs. Benazir Bhutto in Karachi on October 18,2007. Nobody knows definitively tilltoday who are responsible for these suicide attacks---- tribal followers of Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan or those of Maulana Fazlullahof the Swat Valley or the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia sectarian organisation, or Al Qaeda and its Uzbek associates or the angrystudents of the two madrasas run by the Lal Masjid in Islamabad?
16. The Rawalpindi cantonment where the headquarters of the Army and other sensitive units of the Pakistan Army and the ISI are located,and the adjoining Islamabad, the capital, where the headquarters of the federal Government and the National Assembly are located, hadseen terrorist strikes even in the past. Amongst them, one could mention the 1989 explosion in the Rawalpindi office of Dr. Farooq Haider,the then President of one of the factions of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was attributed to a rival faction led byAmanullah Khan; the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy at Islamabad in the 1990s, which was attributed to some Egyptian opponentsof President Hosni Mubarak; the grenade attack inside an Islamabad church frequented by the diplomatic community in March 2002 inwhich the wife of a US diplomat and their daughter were killed; the unsolved assassination of Maulana Azam Tariq, the Amir of theSipah-eSahaba, Pakistan, the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, at Islamabad in 2003, the terrorist attack on a a group of workers ofthe Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad earlier this year, the alleged firing of a rocket on Musharraf's plane fromthe terrace of a house in Islamabad again earlier this year and the alleged firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park inIslamabad last year.
17. If one leaves aside the JKLF factional politics, the only terrorist organisations which had operated in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area inthe past (before July 2007) were the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which was blamed for the church grenade attack; the Sipah Mohammad, theShia terrorist organisation, which was suspected in the murder of Azam Tariq; and Al Qaeda. Many Pakistani and Kashmiri jihadiorganisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) etc have their offices in Rawalpindi, butdo not indulge in terrorist activities there.
18. There was no evidence to show that the Egyptians responsible for the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy were then the followersof Osama bin Laden. The first indication of some local support for Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March, 2003, when Khalid SheikhMohammad (KSM), supposedly the man who co-ordinated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested from the house of a women's wingleader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI).
19. KSM was living in Karachi till September, 2002, when he fled from there to Quetta in Balochistan following the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh,another Al Qaeda operative there. From Quetta, he shifted to Rawalpindi in the beginning of 2003, fearing betrayal by the Shias of Quetta. After his arrest, no thorough enquiries would appear to have been made either by the ISI or the Police to determine why he took shelter inRawalpindi, a highly guarded military cantonment. Did he and/or Al Qaeda have any other accomplices in Rawalpindi, in addition to the JEIleader and the members of her family, who included one junior Army officer belonging to a signals battalion, who was also detained forinterrogation? Did Al Qaeda or the Pakistani organisations allied to it in the International Islamic Front (IIF) have a sleeper cell or cells in thecantonment? If they had, the sleeper cells could have functioned undetected only with the complicity of at least some in the Armed Forces.
20. After the arrest and the handing-over of KSM to the US, anti-Musharraf and pro-jihadi pamphlets typed on the official letter-head used inthe army offices in the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi started circulating in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The ISI and the Policewere unable to determine who was circulating these pamphlets and no arrests were made in this connection. Instead, a leader of the NawazSharif-led faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, who drew the attention of the Parliament and the public to these pamphlets, was orderedto be arrested by Musharraf on a charge of treason.
21. After the April, 2003, arrest in Karachi of Waleed bin Attash of Al Qaeda, one of the suspects in the case relating to the Al Qaeda attackon the US naval ship USS Cole at Aden in October, 2000, many of the Al Qaeda members living in Karachi were reported to have shifted tothe North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan , the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Rawalpindi.
22. Their shifting to Rawalpindi and taking shelter there would not have been possible without the complicity of not only the Pakistani jihadigroups, but also supporters in the Armed Forces and the police. The Pakistani security agencies have not been able to identify anddismantle Al Qaeda and IIF cells in the Rawalpindi cantonment. The fact that the perpetrators of the two attacks of December,2003, onMusharraf , whether they belonged to Al Qaeda or to any of the Pakistani components of the IIF, chose to act on both the occasions fromRawalpindi instead of Karachi where Musharraf was before the first attack on December 14 showed their confidence in being able tooperate undetected from Rawalpindi rather than from Karachi.
23. I do not believe Musharraf had prior knowledge of the plot to kill Benazir in Rawalpindi. But he has to be held responsible for failing toprovide effective physical security to her. He and his officers kept disregarding her growing fears about threats to her security. He failed toensure a vigorous investigation of the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October,18,2007.
24. The infiltration of traditional fundamentalist political parties into the GHQ started under the late Zia-ul-Haq. Since Musharraf took over,there has been an infiltration of Al Qaeda into the Pakistani Armed Forces and into their sactum sanctorum in Rawalpindi. These elementsare against Musharraf too, but they were much more against Benazir because of the fact that she was a woman and she had been sayingopenly that she would allow the US to hunt for bin Laden in Pakistani territory and the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna tointerrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist. Al Qaeda and the pro-Al Qaeda jihadis wanted to eliminate both Musharraf and her because theywere seen as apostate and as collaborators of the US.
25. They have succeeded in killing her. They will now step up their efforts to eliminate Musharraf. Whoever was responsible for killing hercould not have done it without inside complicity. If Al Qaeda is already having sleeper cells in the GHQ, there is an equal danger that italready has sleeper cells inside Pakistan's nuclear establishment too.
26. Musharraf is either knowingly dishonest or is living in a make-believe world of his own, unaware of the ground realities. Only a few daysbefore Benazir's assassination, he was bragging to officer trainees in the Defence Services Staff College in Quetta that he had defeated theterrorists outside the tribal belt and would soon be defeating them in the tribal belt too. His reluctance to order an enquiry into the extent ofinfiltration of Al Qaeda into the GHQ is disturbing. He has convinced himself that not only he is the most popular leader of Pakistan, but alsothat the entire Armed Forces are devoted to him. Anybody who says otherwise is treated by him as a traitor, arrested and harassed.
27. It is high time he and the US realise that Al Qaeda is not just in the tribal belt. It is right under their nose in Rawalpindi. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.335
B.RAMAN
Since 9/11, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike anywhere in the world in which there was no Pakistani connection.
2. Since 2002, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike in Pakistani territory in which there was no connection of the GeneralHeadquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army. By GHQ, one does not mean the entire army. One means some elements in the GHQ.
3. The first wake-up call about the possible presence of one or more sleeper cells of Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March,2003, whenKhalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who allegedly orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was found living in the house of a woman'swing office-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. She had relatives in the army, including an officer of a Signal Regiment.
4. The second wake-up call came after the two attempts to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December,2003.ThePakistani authorities have not so far taken their public into confidence regarding the details of the two plots.All that they admitted wasthat four junior officers of the Army and six of the Air Force were allegedly involved. One of the army officers named Islamuddin wascourt-martialed and sentenced to death even before the investigation was complete. Another army officer named Havaldar Younis wassentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Much to the discomfiture of the authorities, one of the Air Force officers, a civilian,who wasbeing held in custody in an Air Force station, managed to escape.
5.There are still many unanswered questions about the conspiracy to kill Musharraf. Who took the initiative in planning this conspiracy? Thearrested junior officers of the Army and the Air Force or the leaders of the suspected jihadi organisations? When was the conspiracyhatched? How did Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army and the Air Force remainunaware of this conspiracy despite the fact that the conspirators had allegedly held some of their preparatory meetings in their livingquarters in military cantonments and Air Force stations? Was there a complicity of some in the intelligence establishment itself? If so, atwhat level? Why was the Government unable to identify those in the intelligence establishment involved in the conspiracy? Was there aninvolvement of the Hizbut Tehrir?
6.These questions re-surfaced in the wake of the arrest of Abu Faraj al-Libi of Al Qaeda and the re-arrest of the civilian employee of the AirForce involved in the conspiracy, who had managed to escape from custody in November,2004, while under interrogation. That there wereapprehensions in the minds of those close to Musharraf over the role of sections of the intelligence establishment in the entire conspiracyand over the failure of the investigating agencies to unravel the entire conspiracy became evident from an interview given by Dr.AamirLiaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, to the "Daily Times" on May 5,2005.
7.The Minister warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said thatthere were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack PresidentMusharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI,which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to hisown life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the textsof sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
8.Well-informed sources in Pakistan said that apart from the failure of the intelligence establishment to identify and weed out the pro-jihadielements in the Armed Forces and the intelligence establishment, another cause for serious concern was the continuing failure of theintelligence establishment to identify all the Pakistani leaders of the highly secretive Hizbut Tehrir (HT) and its supporters in the ArmedForces and arrest them.The HT ideology and operational methods were imported into Pakistan from the UK by its supporters in thePakistani community in the UK in 2000. It was said that within five years it was able to make considerable progress not only in setting up itsorganisational infrastructure, but also in recruiting dedicated members in the civil society as well as the Armed Forces. It was also reportedthat no other jihadi organisation had been able to attract as many young and educated members and as many supporters in the ArmedForces as the HT.
9.Physical security regulations in an office of the ISI at Rawalpindi exempt officers of the rank of Brigadier and above coming in their ownvehicle from frisking at the outer gate. They undergo a frisking only after they have entered the premises, parked their car in the spaceallotted to them in the garage and then enter the building in which their office is located. Officers below the rank of Brigadier undergofrisking twice, whether they are in their own vehicle or in a bus ----at the outer gate and again inside before they enter the building. At theouter gate, they have to get out of their vehicle, undergo frisking and then get into their vehicle and drive in.
10. Since all officers travel in civilian clothes in unmarked vehicles, which cannot be identified with the Army or the ISI, there is a special hand signalling system for Brigadiers and above by which the security staff at the outer gate can recognise their rank and let them drive inwithout undergoing frisking. This hand signalling is changed frequently.
11. On the morning of November 24, 2007, a car reached the outer gate and the man inside showed a hand signal, which was in use till theprevious day. It had been changed on November 23 and a new signal was in force from the morning of November 24, 2007. He was notaware of it. The security staff got suspicious and did not allow the car to drive in. They asked the man driving it to get out for questioningand frisking. He blew himself up.
12. As he did so, an unmarked chartered bus carrying over 40 civilian and junior military employees of the ISI reached the outer gate andstopped so that those inside can get out for frisking. The bus bore the brunt of the explosion, which caused the death of about 35persons---- from among those inside the bus as well as the security staff. The Pakistani authorities admitted the death of only 18 persons.
13. Around the same time, a man driving a vehicle towards the premises of the GHQ in another part of Rawalpindi was stopped by thesecurity staff at a physical security barrier. He blew himself up killing two of the security staff. These two well-synchronised suicide strikesin Rawalpindi, the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment, came about six weeks after a similar attacktargeting the ISI and the Army at Rawalpindi at the same time. On September 4, 2007. a suicide attacker blew himself up after boarding abus carrying ISI employees. A roadside bomb went off near a commercial area in Rawalpindi, while a car carrying an unidentified seniorArmy officer to the GHQ was passing. Twenty-five persons died in the two attacks. The Army officer escaped unhurt. On October 30, 2007, asuicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint several hundred yards from the GHQ killing seven persons, most of the from the securitystaff.
14.The two attacks directed at the ISI and another at a Pakistan Air Force bus at Sargodha were based on inside information. In the case ofthe explosion at the outer gate of the ISI complex on November 24, 2007, the suicide bomber was aware of the hand signalling code forBrigadiers and above. However, he was not aware that the signal code had been changed the previous day. Since these codes arecommunicated personally to Brigadiers and above, their existence is supposed to be known only to Brigadiers and above and the physicalsecurity staff. The suicide bomber's inside accomplice was either an ISI officer of the rank of Brigadier or above or a member of the physicalsecurity staff.
15. There are two alarming aspects of the security situation in Pakistan. The first is the upsurge in acts of suicide terrorism directed againstsecurity and intelligence personnel and their establishments. These give clear evidence of the penetration of pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elementsinside the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies and the Police. The second is the inability or unwillingness of the Police to vigorouslyinvestigate these incidents, including the attempt to kill Mrs. Benazir Bhutto in Karachi on October 18,2007. Nobody knows definitively tilltoday who are responsible for these suicide attacks---- tribal followers of Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan or those of Maulana Fazlullahof the Swat Valley or the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia sectarian organisation, or Al Qaeda and its Uzbek associates or the angrystudents of the two madrasas run by the Lal Masjid in Islamabad?
16. The Rawalpindi cantonment where the headquarters of the Army and other sensitive units of the Pakistan Army and the ISI are located,and the adjoining Islamabad, the capital, where the headquarters of the federal Government and the National Assembly are located, hadseen terrorist strikes even in the past. Amongst them, one could mention the 1989 explosion in the Rawalpindi office of Dr. Farooq Haider,the then President of one of the factions of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was attributed to a rival faction led byAmanullah Khan; the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy at Islamabad in the 1990s, which was attributed to some Egyptian opponentsof President Hosni Mubarak; the grenade attack inside an Islamabad church frequented by the diplomatic community in March 2002 inwhich the wife of a US diplomat and their daughter were killed; the unsolved assassination of Maulana Azam Tariq, the Amir of theSipah-eSahaba, Pakistan, the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, at Islamabad in 2003, the terrorist attack on a a group of workers ofthe Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad earlier this year, the alleged firing of a rocket on Musharraf's plane fromthe terrace of a house in Islamabad again earlier this year and the alleged firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park inIslamabad last year.
17. If one leaves aside the JKLF factional politics, the only terrorist organisations which had operated in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area inthe past (before July 2007) were the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which was blamed for the church grenade attack; the Sipah Mohammad, theShia terrorist organisation, which was suspected in the murder of Azam Tariq; and Al Qaeda. Many Pakistani and Kashmiri jihadiorganisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) etc have their offices in Rawalpindi, butdo not indulge in terrorist activities there.
18. There was no evidence to show that the Egyptians responsible for the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy were then the followersof Osama bin Laden. The first indication of some local support for Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March, 2003, when Khalid SheikhMohammad (KSM), supposedly the man who co-ordinated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested from the house of a women's wingleader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI).
19. KSM was living in Karachi till September, 2002, when he fled from there to Quetta in Balochistan following the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh,another Al Qaeda operative there. From Quetta, he shifted to Rawalpindi in the beginning of 2003, fearing betrayal by the Shias of Quetta. After his arrest, no thorough enquiries would appear to have been made either by the ISI or the Police to determine why he took shelter inRawalpindi, a highly guarded military cantonment. Did he and/or Al Qaeda have any other accomplices in Rawalpindi, in addition to the JEIleader and the members of her family, who included one junior Army officer belonging to a signals battalion, who was also detained forinterrogation? Did Al Qaeda or the Pakistani organisations allied to it in the International Islamic Front (IIF) have a sleeper cell or cells in thecantonment? If they had, the sleeper cells could have functioned undetected only with the complicity of at least some in the Armed Forces.
20. After the arrest and the handing-over of KSM to the US, anti-Musharraf and pro-jihadi pamphlets typed on the official letter-head used inthe army offices in the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi started circulating in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The ISI and the Policewere unable to determine who was circulating these pamphlets and no arrests were made in this connection. Instead, a leader of the NawazSharif-led faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, who drew the attention of the Parliament and the public to these pamphlets, was orderedto be arrested by Musharraf on a charge of treason.
21. After the April, 2003, arrest in Karachi of Waleed bin Attash of Al Qaeda, one of the suspects in the case relating to the Al Qaeda attackon the US naval ship USS Cole at Aden in October, 2000, many of the Al Qaeda members living in Karachi were reported to have shifted tothe North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan , the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Rawalpindi.
22. Their shifting to Rawalpindi and taking shelter there would not have been possible without the complicity of not only the Pakistani jihadigroups, but also supporters in the Armed Forces and the police. The Pakistani security agencies have not been able to identify anddismantle Al Qaeda and IIF cells in the Rawalpindi cantonment. The fact that the perpetrators of the two attacks of December,2003, onMusharraf , whether they belonged to Al Qaeda or to any of the Pakistani components of the IIF, chose to act on both the occasions fromRawalpindi instead of Karachi where Musharraf was before the first attack on December 14 showed their confidence in being able tooperate undetected from Rawalpindi rather than from Karachi.
23. I do not believe Musharraf had prior knowledge of the plot to kill Benazir in Rawalpindi. But he has to be held responsible for failing toprovide effective physical security to her. He and his officers kept disregarding her growing fears about threats to her security. He failed toensure a vigorous investigation of the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October,18,2007.
24. The infiltration of traditional fundamentalist political parties into the GHQ started under the late Zia-ul-Haq. Since Musharraf took over,there has been an infiltration of Al Qaeda into the Pakistani Armed Forces and into their sactum sanctorum in Rawalpindi. These elementsare against Musharraf too, but they were much more against Benazir because of the fact that she was a woman and she had been sayingopenly that she would allow the US to hunt for bin Laden in Pakistani territory and the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna tointerrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist. Al Qaeda and the pro-Al Qaeda jihadis wanted to eliminate both Musharraf and her because theywere seen as apostate and as collaborators of the US.
25. They have succeeded in killing her. They will now step up their efforts to eliminate Musharraf. Whoever was responsible for killing hercould not have done it without inside complicity. If Al Qaeda is already having sleeper cells in the GHQ, there is an equal danger that italready has sleeper cells inside Pakistan's nuclear establishment too.
26. Musharraf is either knowingly dishonest or is living in a make-believe world of his own, unaware of the ground realities. Only a few daysbefore Benazir's assassination, he was bragging to officer trainees in the Defence Services Staff College in Quetta that he had defeated theterrorists outside the tribal belt and would soon be defeating them in the tribal belt too. His reluctance to order an enquiry into the extent ofinfiltration of Al Qaeda into the GHQ is disturbing. He has convinced himself that not only he is the most popular leader of Pakistan, but alsothat the entire Armed Forces are devoted to him. Anybody who says otherwise is treated by him as a traitor, arrested and harassed.
27. It is high time he and the US realise that Al Qaeda is not just in the tribal belt. It is right under their nose in Rawalpindi. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
US Paradrop Lands Benazir in the Midst of Jihadis
International Terrorism Monitor--- Paper No. 289 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers25/paper2419.html
By B. Raman
(This article was written by me after the first attempt to kill Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Karachi on October 18,2007)
"The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq." So I wrote in my article of September 2, 2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR", which is available at http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2353.html.
2. The US paradrop seems to have landed her right in the midst of jihadis of various hues. It was due to God's grace ----and not due to the skills of Pakistan's police and intelligence agencies---- that she escaped the two explosions on the night of October 18, 2007, which were meant to kill her, but killed instead over 130 persons---members of her party, police personnel and innocent civilians The world only saw on the TV the huge crowds, mobilised by her party, which greeted her after she arrived in Karachi ending eight years of political exile with the blessings of the US. It could not have seen the thousands of invisible enemies she has. No other political leader of Pakistan has as many personal enemies as Mrs. Benazir. Her support is confined to Sindh and to the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab. In the rest of the country, she has as many enemies as she has friends. Even in Sindh, the Mohajirs and the Sindhi nationalists dislike her. Even in her own Pakistan People's Party (PPP), she is strongly disliked by the supporters of her brothers Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was allegedly poisoned by the Inter-Services Intelligence in Southern France in 1985, and Murtaza Bhutto, who was allegedly killed by the Karachi Police in a staged encounter in September, 1996, when she was the Prime Minister.
3. There are many in Pakistan----not just Al Qaeda--- who would be happy to see her killed. She was lucky on October 18. She has to be lucky every time a plot is hatched to kill her by some group or the other, by some individual or the other. Many commentators---including some in India---have described her as a brave woman, who dared to return to Pakistan as scheduled on October 18 without worrying about the threats held out against her. Brave, she was, but wise, definitely not.
4. Any wise leader would have noticed the widespread anti-Americanism in Pakistan and realised the importance of not projecting himself or herself as a leader blessed by the US and as the US choice to facilitate the transition of Pakistan back to democracy. He or she would have also realised the importance of keeping one's thoughts to oneself at a time when widespread anger against the US and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the wake of the commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13, 2007, has let loose a wave of suicide terrorist attacks, many of them directed against the security forces and other public servants.
5. Many of her statements were like the red rag to the jihadi bulls---- that she would hand over A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for interrogation, that she would co-operate with the US in the war on terrorism, that she would hand over Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader living in Karachi, to India etc etc.
6. Benazir and Musharraf have many things in common. One of them is an inability to keep their mouth shut. The second is a weakness for the TV cameras. The third is an eagerness to be liked by the Americans. The result: All anti-American groups in Pakistan were waiting for an opportunity to kill her.
7. The Karachi blast highlights once again the poor state of Pakistan's counter-terrorism and security apparatus. It also shows the extent of the penetration of terrorist elements into all parts of Pakistan---tribal as well as non-tribal, urban as well as rural. Pakistan is a society inextricably caught in the clutches of the jihadis. The jihadis are not yet in a position to capture power, but they are in a position to keep the country bleeding and targeting its leaders and public servants.
8. Extricating Pakistan from their clutches and defeating them will be a long drawn-out process. It can be done only by a leader, who is genuinely convinced of the need to defeat them and tries to do it on his or her own instead of seeming to do so to please the US. What Pakistan needs at this critical hour in its history is a leader, who is widely perceived as independent and not an American stooge. Neither Musharraf nor Mrs. Benazir is such a leader. Mr. Nawaz Sharif, if he is able to come back to power, could turn out to be such a leader. He has maintained a distance from the US. He does not fawn on the US like Mrs. Benazir does. Pakistan needs Mr. Nawaz Sharif more than it needs Musharraf or Benazir.
9. If the US really wants to save Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal from the clutches of the terrorists, it would be wise enough to encourage a genuine transition to democracy without any favourites. Let the people of Pakistan ----and not the US policy-makers and academics---decide whom they want to be their leader in free and fair elections. Let the leader so chosen deal with the terrorists in his own independent manner.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
International Terrorism Monitor--- Paper No. 289 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers25/paper2419.html
By B. Raman
(This article was written by me after the first attempt to kill Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Karachi on October 18,2007)
"The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq." So I wrote in my article of September 2, 2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR", which is available at http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2353.html.
2. The US paradrop seems to have landed her right in the midst of jihadis of various hues. It was due to God's grace ----and not due to the skills of Pakistan's police and intelligence agencies---- that she escaped the two explosions on the night of October 18, 2007, which were meant to kill her, but killed instead over 130 persons---members of her party, police personnel and innocent civilians The world only saw on the TV the huge crowds, mobilised by her party, which greeted her after she arrived in Karachi ending eight years of political exile with the blessings of the US. It could not have seen the thousands of invisible enemies she has. No other political leader of Pakistan has as many personal enemies as Mrs. Benazir. Her support is confined to Sindh and to the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab. In the rest of the country, she has as many enemies as she has friends. Even in Sindh, the Mohajirs and the Sindhi nationalists dislike her. Even in her own Pakistan People's Party (PPP), she is strongly disliked by the supporters of her brothers Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was allegedly poisoned by the Inter-Services Intelligence in Southern France in 1985, and Murtaza Bhutto, who was allegedly killed by the Karachi Police in a staged encounter in September, 1996, when she was the Prime Minister.
3. There are many in Pakistan----not just Al Qaeda--- who would be happy to see her killed. She was lucky on October 18. She has to be lucky every time a plot is hatched to kill her by some group or the other, by some individual or the other. Many commentators---including some in India---have described her as a brave woman, who dared to return to Pakistan as scheduled on October 18 without worrying about the threats held out against her. Brave, she was, but wise, definitely not.
4. Any wise leader would have noticed the widespread anti-Americanism in Pakistan and realised the importance of not projecting himself or herself as a leader blessed by the US and as the US choice to facilitate the transition of Pakistan back to democracy. He or she would have also realised the importance of keeping one's thoughts to oneself at a time when widespread anger against the US and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the wake of the commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13, 2007, has let loose a wave of suicide terrorist attacks, many of them directed against the security forces and other public servants.
5. Many of her statements were like the red rag to the jihadi bulls---- that she would hand over A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for interrogation, that she would co-operate with the US in the war on terrorism, that she would hand over Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader living in Karachi, to India etc etc.
6. Benazir and Musharraf have many things in common. One of them is an inability to keep their mouth shut. The second is a weakness for the TV cameras. The third is an eagerness to be liked by the Americans. The result: All anti-American groups in Pakistan were waiting for an opportunity to kill her.
7. The Karachi blast highlights once again the poor state of Pakistan's counter-terrorism and security apparatus. It also shows the extent of the penetration of terrorist elements into all parts of Pakistan---tribal as well as non-tribal, urban as well as rural. Pakistan is a society inextricably caught in the clutches of the jihadis. The jihadis are not yet in a position to capture power, but they are in a position to keep the country bleeding and targeting its leaders and public servants.
8. Extricating Pakistan from their clutches and defeating them will be a long drawn-out process. It can be done only by a leader, who is genuinely convinced of the need to defeat them and tries to do it on his or her own instead of seeming to do so to please the US. What Pakistan needs at this critical hour in its history is a leader, who is widely perceived as independent and not an American stooge. Neither Musharraf nor Mrs. Benazir is such a leader. Mr. Nawaz Sharif, if he is able to come back to power, could turn out to be such a leader. He has maintained a distance from the US. He does not fawn on the US like Mrs. Benazir does. Pakistan needs Mr. Nawaz Sharif more than it needs Musharraf or Benazir.
9. If the US really wants to save Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal from the clutches of the terrorists, it would be wise enough to encourage a genuine transition to democracy without any favourites. Let the people of Pakistan ----and not the US policy-makers and academics---decide whom they want to be their leader in free and fair elections. Let the leader so chosen deal with the terrorists in his own independent manner.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
BENAZIR'S ASSASSINATION
B.RAMAN
The shocking assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, is likely to have been the outcome of a conspiracyinvolving anti-US, pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elements, the Zia-ul-haq loyalists and junior members of the Army and possibly the Air Force.
2. Since 2003, there have been a number of terrorist incidents in Rawalpindi----including the two attempts to kill President Pervez Musharrafin December,2003, the firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park last year, the attempt to fire at Musharraf's plane with ananti-aircraft gun earlier this year from the terrace of a building, two suicide attacks at the Army's General Headquarters and two outside theoffices of the Inter-Services Intelligence after the commando raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007. The two attempts to killMusharraf were found to have been the result of a conspiracy involving Al Qaeda (Abu Faraj al-Libi, now in the Guantanamo Bay detentioncentre), the Jaish-e-Mohammad and junior officers of the Army and Air Force. In the other incidents also, involvement of junior officers of theArmy and Air Force was suspected. In connection with the rocket attacks, the son of a retired Brigadier was arrested.
3. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested in the Rawalpindi house of a womanoffice-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami, having a relative in a Signals regiment of the Army, who was arrested. All these incidents indicated astrong penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations into the lower and middle levels of the armed forces personnel stationed inRawalpindi. Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri resident of the UK, who was a prime suspect in the case involving an Al Qaeda attempt to blow up 10-USbound planes in the UK last year, escaped last week while being taken from a court in Rawalpindi to his jail. Complicity of security personnelin his escape was suspected.
4. Neither the ISI nor the IB nor the Police had been able to thoroughly investigate these cases and establish the identities of thoseinvolved. Only the identities of the junior officials involved in the attempts to kill Musharraf were established. They were arrested andcourt-martialled. But the authorities were not able to establish the extent of the penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements into theArmed Forces.
5. Since Benazir returned ftrom exile on October 18,2007, the Zia loyalists in the Government and among the retired officers of the army andthe ISI were carrying on a bitter campaign against her. They were determined to see that she did not return to power in the elections ofJanuary 8,2008. Benazir herself was worried that Brig. (retd) Ijaz Shah, the Director of the IB, was ill-disposed towards her and hadrepeatedly complained in public that there could be a threat to her security from the IB.
6. All the jihadi organisations were opposed to her coming to power firstly, because she was a woman and secondly, because of herstatements that she would allow US troops to hunt for Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory and let the International Atomic EnergyAgency interrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist.
7. Only on December 26,2007, after her visit to Peshawar, where there were some explosions coinciding with her visit, she had expressedher dissatisfaction with the security arrangements for her. She complained that the electronic jammers issued to her staff for protectionagainst remote-control devices were faulty.
8. Her repeated pleas to seek the help of Western intelligence agencies for the investigation into the blast at Karachi on October 18,2007,from which she narrowly escaped and to let her hire private security guards from the West were turned down by Musharraf.
9.There is likely to be widespread anti-Musharraf and anti-Army disturbances in Sindh and possibly southern Punjab, her traditionalstrongholds, which may make it difficult to hold the elections and for Musharraf to continue in power for long.
B.RAMAN
The shocking assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, is likely to have been the outcome of a conspiracyinvolving anti-US, pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elements, the Zia-ul-haq loyalists and junior members of the Army and possibly the Air Force.
2. Since 2003, there have been a number of terrorist incidents in Rawalpindi----including the two attempts to kill President Pervez Musharrafin December,2003, the firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park last year, the attempt to fire at Musharraf's plane with ananti-aircraft gun earlier this year from the terrace of a building, two suicide attacks at the Army's General Headquarters and two outside theoffices of the Inter-Services Intelligence after the commando raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007. The two attempts to killMusharraf were found to have been the result of a conspiracy involving Al Qaeda (Abu Faraj al-Libi, now in the Guantanamo Bay detentioncentre), the Jaish-e-Mohammad and junior officers of the Army and Air Force. In the other incidents also, involvement of junior officers of theArmy and Air Force was suspected. In connection with the rocket attacks, the son of a retired Brigadier was arrested.
3. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested in the Rawalpindi house of a womanoffice-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami, having a relative in a Signals regiment of the Army, who was arrested. All these incidents indicated astrong penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations into the lower and middle levels of the armed forces personnel stationed inRawalpindi. Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri resident of the UK, who was a prime suspect in the case involving an Al Qaeda attempt to blow up 10-USbound planes in the UK last year, escaped last week while being taken from a court in Rawalpindi to his jail. Complicity of security personnelin his escape was suspected.
4. Neither the ISI nor the IB nor the Police had been able to thoroughly investigate these cases and establish the identities of thoseinvolved. Only the identities of the junior officials involved in the attempts to kill Musharraf were established. They were arrested andcourt-martialled. But the authorities were not able to establish the extent of the penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements into theArmed Forces.
5. Since Benazir returned ftrom exile on October 18,2007, the Zia loyalists in the Government and among the retired officers of the army andthe ISI were carrying on a bitter campaign against her. They were determined to see that she did not return to power in the elections ofJanuary 8,2008. Benazir herself was worried that Brig. (retd) Ijaz Shah, the Director of the IB, was ill-disposed towards her and hadrepeatedly complained in public that there could be a threat to her security from the IB.
6. All the jihadi organisations were opposed to her coming to power firstly, because she was a woman and secondly, because of herstatements that she would allow US troops to hunt for Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory and let the International Atomic EnergyAgency interrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist.
7. Only on December 26,2007, after her visit to Peshawar, where there were some explosions coinciding with her visit, she had expressedher dissatisfaction with the security arrangements for her. She complained that the electronic jammers issued to her staff for protectionagainst remote-control devices were faulty.
8. Her repeated pleas to seek the help of Western intelligence agencies for the investigation into the blast at Karachi on October 18,2007,from which she narrowly escaped and to let her hire private security guards from the West were turned down by Musharraf.
9.There is likely to be widespread anti-Musharraf and anti-Army disturbances in Sindh and possibly southern Punjab, her traditionalstrongholds, which may make it difficult to hold the elections and for Musharraf to continue in power for long.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
INDIA-CHINA JOINT ANTI-TERROR EXERCISE: AN ASSESSMENT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER No.333
B.RAMAN
The Chinese Armed Forces have been holding joint anti-terrorism exercises with the armed forces of different countries since 2002. TillAugust,2007, they had held the following anti-terror exercises :
Oct. 10-11, 2002: The Chinese and the Kyrgyzstan armies held a joint anti-terror military exercise code-named " Exercise-01" on the border of the two countries.
Aug. 6-12, 2003: Armed Forces from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part in a joint anti-terror exercise code-named "Coalition-2003" in Kazakhstan's border city of Ucharal and Ili and in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It was a multilateral exercise under the auspices of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). About 1,300 troops participated in the exercise.
Aug. 6, 2004: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their first-ever joint anti-terrorism exercise code-named "Friendship-2004" in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, which is located on the Pamirs at over 4,000 meters, bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 border troops from both sides participated.
Aug. 18-25, 2005:China and Russia held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2005". The one-week exercise , which involved 10,000 troops from the two countries, started in Vladivostok in Russia's Far East and later moved to east China's Shandong Peninsula.
Sept. 22-23, 2006:China and Tajikistan held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Coordination-2006" in Kulyab, Tajikistan. More than 300 Tajik troops from the artillery, infantry and airborne divisions and about 150 Chinese troops participated.
Dec.11-18, 2006: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their second joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Friendship-2006" in the hilly area of northern Pakistan's Abbottabad. More than 400 troops from both armies took part.
July 16-29, 2007:China and Thailand held their first-ever combined anti-terror training of special troops code-named "Strike-2007" in Guangzhou, capital of south China's Guangdong Province. The two-week exercise involved 30 soldiers from the special commando forces of the two countries.
Aug. 9-17, 2007, Under the auspices of the SCO, a second joint anti-terrorism military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2007" was held in Chelyabinsk in Russia's Ural mountainous region and Urumqi, capital of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. More than 4,000 troops from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participated in the exercise, the largest of its kind within the framework of the SCO since the organization was founded on June 15, 2001.
2. Thus, till August,2007, China had participated in eight anti-terror military exercises. Of these, two were multilateral under the SCO and theremaining six bilateral---- two with Pakistan and one each with Russia,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Thailand. The smallest in terms of troopparticipation was with Thailand and the largest with Russia. The bilateral exercise with Russia was even larger than the multilateralexercises under the SCO.
3. The following were the defining characteristics of these exercises:
Totally confined to the Armed Forces.
No participation by civilian counter-terrorism agencies either as observers or in any other capacity.
The focus was on the military (commando) approach to counter-terrorism in certain situations such as cross-border terrorism, hostage-taking in urban areas and aircraft hijacking.
The objective of the exercises was to familiarise each other with their respective capabilities for countering terrorism, with their training methods and methods of action; to demonstrate separately each other's methods of action and to have a joint exercise at the end in which the two sides can test their ability to act jointly.
There was no brain-storming on the experiences and insights of the participants in dealing with specific situations in the past and the lessons drawn.
4. The limited scope of these exercises did not permit them to be trend-setters in the joint fight against terrorism. Their main achievementwas in enabling military officers of the participating countries to get to know each other and in increasing their comfort level towards eachother.
5. The first India-China joint anti-terror military exercise ("Hand-in-Hand,2007") held at Kunming in the Yunnan province of China fromDecember 19 to 25,2007, which involved 103 troops each from the two armies,was no different in its scope and limited significance fromthe eight exercises held earlier with other countries. This was admitted by the Chinese themselves in a round-up of the exercise carried bythe "People's Daily" on December 26,2007. It said: "Although some military and diplomatic observers said that the joint training is moresymbolic than substantial, many acknowledged that the point is not the scale of the joint training or what specific anti-terrorism skills areinvolved. The point is that the soldiers on both sides are moving toward each other in a friendly way."
6. The comments of Chinese officials and non-governmental analysts too stressed the significance of the exercise in the larger context of State-to-State and military-military relations and not in the specific context of their political willingness to fight against terrorism jointly. Toquote some of these comments:
Mr. Ye Hailin, of the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: "It is great progress. It demonstrates that the military mutual-trust has markedly improved, which is beneficial to regional security".
Mr.Ma Jiali, a research fellow of the Academy of China Contemporary International Relations:"The military relationship between China and India is like half a glass of water. Optimists will say we're lucky to have half a glass of water, while pessimists will sigh and say we have only half a glass.In any case, the first-ever military training between the two armies will help boost the bilateral relations of China and India."
Lt.Gen.Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, who headed the Chinese military observer delegation to the joint exercise: "There are border issues yet to be resolved, because the two sides have different stances and take different approaches to problems.China insists on solving problems through negotiation, which requires communication and understanding between the two sides.The joint exercises will play an active role in enhancing understanding and trust and deepening defense exchanges and cooperation. China will continue to push forward military exchanges and cooperation with India in an effort to safeguard regional security and stability.Military ties are an important part of bilateral relations. Military cooperation will be carried on in the spirit of mutual respect, equal consultation and mutual benefits to contribute to the building of a harmonious region with long-lasting peace and common prosperity.Promoting military communication and cooperation will play an important role in developing strategic partnership of the two neighbors, also the leading developing nations in the world.A number of bilateral military exchanges in recent years, including official visits, meetings on defense and safety issues, and searching and rescue manoeuver on the sea, reflected the common efforts and desire of both sides in deepening cooperation."
Mr.Qin Gang,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman: "The military training was intended to enhance mutual understanding and trust and strengthen bilateral exchanges in the field of anti-terrorism, deter the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and promote the development of the bilateral strategic partnership."
7. The exercise, which was held at a hilly terrain near Kunming, had the following theme:" 56 "terrorists" from "an international terroristorganization" have entered the border area of China and India. They have "established" a training base and intend to attack a trading poston the border between the two countries.The two armies establish a joint command post and joint battle decision-making and carry outan anti-terrorism operation before wiping out the group of "terrorists" and rescuing the hostages."
8. The theme reflected more Chinese concerns over the possibility of alleged Tibetan extremists from the diaspora staging cross-borderraids into Tibet in the event of instability in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama. This theme would be of little relevance to India since wehave no reason to fear any cross-border terrorism against India originating from Chinese territory unless one day Al Qaeda seizes control ofXinjiang in China and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) of Pakistan. Such a possibility is remote.
9. A more useful theme would have been to visualise different terrorist scenarios during and before next year's Beijing Olympics and seehow the intelligence,counter-terrorism agencies and the armed forces of the two countries could co-operate with each other to deal withthe situation.
10. Even though there is no convergence of assessments between India and China on what is terrorism and which are the terroristorganisations, which should be of common concern to the two countries, certain kinds of scenarios should be of common concern---such asa Munich-1972 like scenario during the Beijing Olympics; aircraft hijacking; threats to the Embassies of the two countries etc. Neither sidewill allow the other to join in any counter-terrorist operations inside its territory, but there can be an exchange of ideas and expertise as tohow deal with such situations.
11. That should be the objective of future co-operation between the two countries against terrorism. Far-fetched scenarios such as the twoarmies mounting a joint operation against a large group of terrorists across the Sino-Indian border will serve little purpose professionally.(26-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER No.333
B.RAMAN
The Chinese Armed Forces have been holding joint anti-terrorism exercises with the armed forces of different countries since 2002. TillAugust,2007, they had held the following anti-terror exercises :
Oct. 10-11, 2002: The Chinese and the Kyrgyzstan armies held a joint anti-terror military exercise code-named " Exercise-01" on the border of the two countries.
Aug. 6-12, 2003: Armed Forces from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part in a joint anti-terror exercise code-named "Coalition-2003" in Kazakhstan's border city of Ucharal and Ili and in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It was a multilateral exercise under the auspices of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). About 1,300 troops participated in the exercise.
Aug. 6, 2004: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their first-ever joint anti-terrorism exercise code-named "Friendship-2004" in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, which is located on the Pamirs at over 4,000 meters, bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 border troops from both sides participated.
Aug. 18-25, 2005:China and Russia held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2005". The one-week exercise , which involved 10,000 troops from the two countries, started in Vladivostok in Russia's Far East and later moved to east China's Shandong Peninsula.
Sept. 22-23, 2006:China and Tajikistan held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Coordination-2006" in Kulyab, Tajikistan. More than 300 Tajik troops from the artillery, infantry and airborne divisions and about 150 Chinese troops participated.
Dec.11-18, 2006: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their second joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Friendship-2006" in the hilly area of northern Pakistan's Abbottabad. More than 400 troops from both armies took part.
July 16-29, 2007:China and Thailand held their first-ever combined anti-terror training of special troops code-named "Strike-2007" in Guangzhou, capital of south China's Guangdong Province. The two-week exercise involved 30 soldiers from the special commando forces of the two countries.
Aug. 9-17, 2007, Under the auspices of the SCO, a second joint anti-terrorism military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2007" was held in Chelyabinsk in Russia's Ural mountainous region and Urumqi, capital of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. More than 4,000 troops from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participated in the exercise, the largest of its kind within the framework of the SCO since the organization was founded on June 15, 2001.
2. Thus, till August,2007, China had participated in eight anti-terror military exercises. Of these, two were multilateral under the SCO and theremaining six bilateral---- two with Pakistan and one each with Russia,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Thailand. The smallest in terms of troopparticipation was with Thailand and the largest with Russia. The bilateral exercise with Russia was even larger than the multilateralexercises under the SCO.
3. The following were the defining characteristics of these exercises:
Totally confined to the Armed Forces.
No participation by civilian counter-terrorism agencies either as observers or in any other capacity.
The focus was on the military (commando) approach to counter-terrorism in certain situations such as cross-border terrorism, hostage-taking in urban areas and aircraft hijacking.
The objective of the exercises was to familiarise each other with their respective capabilities for countering terrorism, with their training methods and methods of action; to demonstrate separately each other's methods of action and to have a joint exercise at the end in which the two sides can test their ability to act jointly.
There was no brain-storming on the experiences and insights of the participants in dealing with specific situations in the past and the lessons drawn.
4. The limited scope of these exercises did not permit them to be trend-setters in the joint fight against terrorism. Their main achievementwas in enabling military officers of the participating countries to get to know each other and in increasing their comfort level towards eachother.
5. The first India-China joint anti-terror military exercise ("Hand-in-Hand,2007") held at Kunming in the Yunnan province of China fromDecember 19 to 25,2007, which involved 103 troops each from the two armies,was no different in its scope and limited significance fromthe eight exercises held earlier with other countries. This was admitted by the Chinese themselves in a round-up of the exercise carried bythe "People's Daily" on December 26,2007. It said: "Although some military and diplomatic observers said that the joint training is moresymbolic than substantial, many acknowledged that the point is not the scale of the joint training or what specific anti-terrorism skills areinvolved. The point is that the soldiers on both sides are moving toward each other in a friendly way."
6. The comments of Chinese officials and non-governmental analysts too stressed the significance of the exercise in the larger context of State-to-State and military-military relations and not in the specific context of their political willingness to fight against terrorism jointly. Toquote some of these comments:
Mr. Ye Hailin, of the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: "It is great progress. It demonstrates that the military mutual-trust has markedly improved, which is beneficial to regional security".
Mr.Ma Jiali, a research fellow of the Academy of China Contemporary International Relations:"The military relationship between China and India is like half a glass of water. Optimists will say we're lucky to have half a glass of water, while pessimists will sigh and say we have only half a glass.In any case, the first-ever military training between the two armies will help boost the bilateral relations of China and India."
Lt.Gen.Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, who headed the Chinese military observer delegation to the joint exercise: "There are border issues yet to be resolved, because the two sides have different stances and take different approaches to problems.China insists on solving problems through negotiation, which requires communication and understanding between the two sides.The joint exercises will play an active role in enhancing understanding and trust and deepening defense exchanges and cooperation. China will continue to push forward military exchanges and cooperation with India in an effort to safeguard regional security and stability.Military ties are an important part of bilateral relations. Military cooperation will be carried on in the spirit of mutual respect, equal consultation and mutual benefits to contribute to the building of a harmonious region with long-lasting peace and common prosperity.Promoting military communication and cooperation will play an important role in developing strategic partnership of the two neighbors, also the leading developing nations in the world.A number of bilateral military exchanges in recent years, including official visits, meetings on defense and safety issues, and searching and rescue manoeuver on the sea, reflected the common efforts and desire of both sides in deepening cooperation."
Mr.Qin Gang,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman: "The military training was intended to enhance mutual understanding and trust and strengthen bilateral exchanges in the field of anti-terrorism, deter the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and promote the development of the bilateral strategic partnership."
7. The exercise, which was held at a hilly terrain near Kunming, had the following theme:" 56 "terrorists" from "an international terroristorganization" have entered the border area of China and India. They have "established" a training base and intend to attack a trading poston the border between the two countries.The two armies establish a joint command post and joint battle decision-making and carry outan anti-terrorism operation before wiping out the group of "terrorists" and rescuing the hostages."
8. The theme reflected more Chinese concerns over the possibility of alleged Tibetan extremists from the diaspora staging cross-borderraids into Tibet in the event of instability in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama. This theme would be of little relevance to India since wehave no reason to fear any cross-border terrorism against India originating from Chinese territory unless one day Al Qaeda seizes control ofXinjiang in China and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) of Pakistan. Such a possibility is remote.
9. A more useful theme would have been to visualise different terrorist scenarios during and before next year's Beijing Olympics and seehow the intelligence,counter-terrorism agencies and the armed forces of the two countries could co-operate with each other to deal withthe situation.
10. Even though there is no convergence of assessments between India and China on what is terrorism and which are the terroristorganisations, which should be of common concern to the two countries, certain kinds of scenarios should be of common concern---such asa Munich-1972 like scenario during the Beijing Olympics; aircraft hijacking; threats to the Embassies of the two countries etc. Neither sidewill allow the other to join in any counter-terrorist operations inside its territory, but there can be an exchange of ideas and expertise as tohow deal with such situations.
11. That should be the objective of future co-operation between the two countries against terrorism. Far-fetched scenarios such as the twoarmies mounting a joint operation against a large group of terrorists across the Sino-Indian border will serve little purpose professionally.(26-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 24, 2007
SAY YOU ARE A HINDU, HOLD YOUR HEAD HIGH
B.RAMAN
"Maut ka Saudagar", 'Liar", "the Ugly Indian" etc etc etc.
All the kind of epithets, the like of which till now used to come easily out of the mouth of President George Bush of the US and the pens of his Neo Conservative supporters.
Mr.Bush should be worried that he has now a growing number of competitors in the coining of demonising epithets in the community of the self-styled secularists of India .
What epithets they did not use against Shri Narendra Modi for the last five years and particularly in the weeks before the recent elections to the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, in which the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a spectacular victory despite the best (or worst) efforts of these self-styled secularists to demonise him day in and day out!
The pathological dislike----even hatred--- that some of our journalists----particularly in the electronic media--- have for Modi could be seen or sensed as one watched the TV coverage of the counting of votes on December 23,2007. Initially, as it appeared that the BJP might not do well in the final tally, there was excitement among many of the TV anchors. They thought they have tasted blood. After an hour, the BJP candidates started racing ahead and it became clear the the Congress (I) was in for a drubbing.
The disappointment on the faces of some of the anchors was to be seen to be believed. A five-star lady anchor could not help remarking: "Modi might be able to win the elections in Gujarat, but he still can't get a visa to go to the US and other Western countries." Some consolation!
Instead of spending their time searching for abusive expressions in the dictionary and in their copy-book of such expressions, if these self-styled secularists had only visited the web sites, discussion groups and blogspots of members of the Hindu community not only in India, but also in other countries of the world----particularly in the US--- they would have noticed something, which might have given them cause for introspection.
They would have noticed that Modi is becoming the icon of a growing number of Hindus not only in India, but also in the Hindu diaspora spread across the world. The support for him is not confined only to the Gujarati-speaking Hindus of the world. It is spread right across the Hindu spectrum---- whatever be the language or ethnicity or place of origin of the Hindus concerned.
They would have noticed that in the Hindu diaspora in the West, more young people admire Modi than grown-ups. Many of his young admirers in the US were born and brought up there and had the benefit of the best of secular education. In spite of this, there is a sense of pride in them that the Hindu community has at long last produced a leader of the calibre of Modi.
What is it they see in him?
His simple and austere living of the kind associated with the late Kamaraj of Tamil Nadu, but not seen in the leaders of today?
His reputation as an incorruptible politician, the like of which is not found anywhere in India----not even in his own party?
His style of development-oriented governance, which even his detractors on other grounds do not hesitate to praise?
The fruits of his policy, which Gujarat and its people are already enjoying?
His tough stance on terrorism?
His lucid-thinking on matters concerning our national security?
His defiance in the face of the greatest campaign of demonisation mounted against him, the like of which only Indira Gandhi had faced from her political opponents and sections of the media in the 1970s?
All these are factors, which influence their favourable perception of him, and which have already been highlighted and analysed in the articles on his impressive election victory.
But there is one factor, which is more important than these and which has not found mention in the analyses.
That is, for large sections of the Hindus----young and old, even more among the young than among the old--- he gave them a sense of pride in their identity as Hindus.
They feel that he removed from their minds long habits of defensiveness as Hindus carefully nurtured by the self-styled secularists.
As if to proclaim one's Hindu identity and to assert one's rights as Hindus in their own homeland in which they are in a vast majority (80 per cent of the population) is to be communal, is to become an ugly Indian.
For these self-styled secularists, a pretty Indian is a Hindu, who is all the time on the defensive, fights shy of proclaiming his Hindu personality and asserting his rights as a member of the majority community.
These self-styled secularists would not address their sermons of secularism to the Islamic countries, where for a Muslim to convert a non-Muslim into Islam is an act blessed by Allah, but for a non-Muslim to convert a Muslim into his religion is a crime calling for the death penalty.
For them, secularism is a virtue which a Hindu should practise towards others, but not others towards him.
It is Modi's rejection of this hypocrisy of the self-styled secularists, which makes him stand apart as a Hindu leader with a difference in the eyes of his admirers.
Bharathiyar, the Tamil poet who inspired millions of Tamil youth to join the independence struggle under Mahatma Gandhi, wrote: "Tamizhanenru Chollada, Talai Nimirndhu Nillada"
"Say You Are a Tamil, Hold Your Head High."
The growing legion of Modi's admirers in the Hindu community all over the world are saying: "Hindu Enru Chollada, Talai Nimirndu Nillada."
"Say You Are A Hindu, Hold Your Head High."
They are no longer prepared to be defensive in proclaiming their Hindu idenity, in asserting their rights as Hindus.
They are secular in the genuine sense of the word, but for them secularism does not mean developing a guilt complex about being a Hindu and all the time conceding the rights of others. They do not accept the argument that a Hindu, who asserts his rights, ceases to be a secularist. (24-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
"Maut ka Saudagar", 'Liar", "the Ugly Indian" etc etc etc.
All the kind of epithets, the like of which till now used to come easily out of the mouth of President George Bush of the US and the pens of his Neo Conservative supporters.
Mr.Bush should be worried that he has now a growing number of competitors in the coining of demonising epithets in the community of the self-styled secularists of India .
What epithets they did not use against Shri Narendra Modi for the last five years and particularly in the weeks before the recent elections to the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, in which the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a spectacular victory despite the best (or worst) efforts of these self-styled secularists to demonise him day in and day out!
The pathological dislike----even hatred--- that some of our journalists----particularly in the electronic media--- have for Modi could be seen or sensed as one watched the TV coverage of the counting of votes on December 23,2007. Initially, as it appeared that the BJP might not do well in the final tally, there was excitement among many of the TV anchors. They thought they have tasted blood. After an hour, the BJP candidates started racing ahead and it became clear the the Congress (I) was in for a drubbing.
The disappointment on the faces of some of the anchors was to be seen to be believed. A five-star lady anchor could not help remarking: "Modi might be able to win the elections in Gujarat, but he still can't get a visa to go to the US and other Western countries." Some consolation!
Instead of spending their time searching for abusive expressions in the dictionary and in their copy-book of such expressions, if these self-styled secularists had only visited the web sites, discussion groups and blogspots of members of the Hindu community not only in India, but also in other countries of the world----particularly in the US--- they would have noticed something, which might have given them cause for introspection.
They would have noticed that Modi is becoming the icon of a growing number of Hindus not only in India, but also in the Hindu diaspora spread across the world. The support for him is not confined only to the Gujarati-speaking Hindus of the world. It is spread right across the Hindu spectrum---- whatever be the language or ethnicity or place of origin of the Hindus concerned.
They would have noticed that in the Hindu diaspora in the West, more young people admire Modi than grown-ups. Many of his young admirers in the US were born and brought up there and had the benefit of the best of secular education. In spite of this, there is a sense of pride in them that the Hindu community has at long last produced a leader of the calibre of Modi.
What is it they see in him?
His simple and austere living of the kind associated with the late Kamaraj of Tamil Nadu, but not seen in the leaders of today?
His reputation as an incorruptible politician, the like of which is not found anywhere in India----not even in his own party?
His style of development-oriented governance, which even his detractors on other grounds do not hesitate to praise?
The fruits of his policy, which Gujarat and its people are already enjoying?
His tough stance on terrorism?
His lucid-thinking on matters concerning our national security?
His defiance in the face of the greatest campaign of demonisation mounted against him, the like of which only Indira Gandhi had faced from her political opponents and sections of the media in the 1970s?
All these are factors, which influence their favourable perception of him, and which have already been highlighted and analysed in the articles on his impressive election victory.
But there is one factor, which is more important than these and which has not found mention in the analyses.
That is, for large sections of the Hindus----young and old, even more among the young than among the old--- he gave them a sense of pride in their identity as Hindus.
They feel that he removed from their minds long habits of defensiveness as Hindus carefully nurtured by the self-styled secularists.
As if to proclaim one's Hindu identity and to assert one's rights as Hindus in their own homeland in which they are in a vast majority (80 per cent of the population) is to be communal, is to become an ugly Indian.
For these self-styled secularists, a pretty Indian is a Hindu, who is all the time on the defensive, fights shy of proclaiming his Hindu personality and asserting his rights as a member of the majority community.
These self-styled secularists would not address their sermons of secularism to the Islamic countries, where for a Muslim to convert a non-Muslim into Islam is an act blessed by Allah, but for a non-Muslim to convert a Muslim into his religion is a crime calling for the death penalty.
For them, secularism is a virtue which a Hindu should practise towards others, but not others towards him.
It is Modi's rejection of this hypocrisy of the self-styled secularists, which makes him stand apart as a Hindu leader with a difference in the eyes of his admirers.
Bharathiyar, the Tamil poet who inspired millions of Tamil youth to join the independence struggle under Mahatma Gandhi, wrote: "Tamizhanenru Chollada, Talai Nimirndhu Nillada"
"Say You Are a Tamil, Hold Your Head High."
The growing legion of Modi's admirers in the Hindu community all over the world are saying: "Hindu Enru Chollada, Talai Nimirndu Nillada."
"Say You Are A Hindu, Hold Your Head High."
They are no longer prepared to be defensive in proclaiming their Hindu idenity, in asserting their rights as Hindus.
They are secular in the genuine sense of the word, but for them secularism does not mean developing a guilt complex about being a Hindu and all the time conceding the rights of others. They do not accept the argument that a Hindu, who asserts his rights, ceases to be a secularist. (24-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 17, 2007
INDIA, CHINA TO STRENGTHEN MYANMAR'S IT CAPABILITY
B.RAMAN
India and China have been competing with each other not only in helping Myanmar's military junta in the exploitation of its vast gas reserves in the Arakan area, but also in strengthening its IT capability. The Junta, which is keen to develop an IT capability, which will not be dependent on Western companies and which it can strictly control without letting it be exploited by pro-democracy elements, has sought the help of India and China. Both have responded positively.
2. On December 12,2007, during the visit of U Kyaw Thu,Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister, to New Delhi, India and Myanmar were reported to have signed a Memorandum of Understandg (MOU) under which India will help Myanmar to establish an India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) in Yangon (Rangoon).
3. On December 14,2007, the Junta inaugurated at a place near Pyin Oo Lwin town in the Mandalay area, Myanmar's second IT park called the Yadanabon Cyber City. Myanmar's first IT park, which is called the Myanmar Information and Communication Technology (MICT) Park, is located in Yangon.
4.To start with, the Yadanabon Cyber City has a cross border fiber ink from China, which is already functional. The Junta is reportedly proposing to have a similar link from India and Thailand. Initially, the Cyber City will focus on the production of software, but will ultimately undertake the production of hardware too. The Junta is hoping to get the co-operation of Indian software companies for developing its software capability.
5.In the meanwhile, reports emanating from Washington DC indicate that President George Bush is likely to drop plans for an US-ASEAN summit in his Texan ranch.During the summit conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) at Sydney in September,2007, Mr.Bush was reported to have invited the leaders of the ASEAN countries to his ranch for a summit to discuss US-ASEAN relations. The US is since reported to have indicated to the ASEAN countries that in view of the recent brutal suppression of an agitation by students and monks in Myanmar by the Junta in August-September,2007, the US may have difficulty in organising this summit. Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN and the US would find it difficult to invite Myanmar at any level. (18-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
India and China have been competing with each other not only in helping Myanmar's military junta in the exploitation of its vast gas reserves in the Arakan area, but also in strengthening its IT capability. The Junta, which is keen to develop an IT capability, which will not be dependent on Western companies and which it can strictly control without letting it be exploited by pro-democracy elements, has sought the help of India and China. Both have responded positively.
2. On December 12,2007, during the visit of U Kyaw Thu,Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister, to New Delhi, India and Myanmar were reported to have signed a Memorandum of Understandg (MOU) under which India will help Myanmar to establish an India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) in Yangon (Rangoon).
3. On December 14,2007, the Junta inaugurated at a place near Pyin Oo Lwin town in the Mandalay area, Myanmar's second IT park called the Yadanabon Cyber City. Myanmar's first IT park, which is called the Myanmar Information and Communication Technology (MICT) Park, is located in Yangon.
4.To start with, the Yadanabon Cyber City has a cross border fiber ink from China, which is already functional. The Junta is reportedly proposing to have a similar link from India and Thailand. Initially, the Cyber City will focus on the production of software, but will ultimately undertake the production of hardware too. The Junta is hoping to get the co-operation of Indian software companies for developing its software capability.
5.In the meanwhile, reports emanating from Washington DC indicate that President George Bush is likely to drop plans for an US-ASEAN summit in his Texan ranch.During the summit conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) at Sydney in September,2007, Mr.Bush was reported to have invited the leaders of the ASEAN countries to his ranch for a summit to discuss US-ASEAN relations. The US is since reported to have indicated to the ASEAN countries that in view of the recent brutal suppression of an agitation by students and monks in Myanmar by the Junta in August-September,2007, the US may have difficulty in organising this summit. Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN and the US would find it difficult to invite Myanmar at any level. (18-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
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