MALDIVES:KEEPING NASHEED ALIVE

B.RAMAN

India has a moral obligation to see that former President Mohammad Nasheed, who was arrested by Maldivian Commandoes on March 5,2013, in alleged response to a court order to face trial in a case pending against him, remains alive and is not shown by the Maldivian Government of President Mohammad Waheed as killed in an encounter while trying to escape from custody.

2. Even though he might have been arrested ostensibly in pursuance of a court order, his arrest is a breach of faith on the part of the Waheed Government. He left the Indian High Commission, where he had taken sanctuary, in response to assurances regarding his safety and security. India, which played a role in the negotiations that led to his leaving his safe sanctuary  in the High Commission, is a guarantor of the assurances given by the Waheed Government regarding his safety and security.

3. India should immediately make it clear to former President Abdul Gayoom, who has allegedly been playing an active behind-the-scene role in advising the Government of Waheed, that it will hold him and Waheed personally and morally responsible for the safety and security of Nasheed and that should anything untoward happen to him while in custody India would act in the appropriate manner to ensure that solemn assurances given to India by the Government are not violated with impunity.

4. To underline the seriousness of the Government of India’s concerns, some ships of our Navy should take up position near the Maldivian capital so that they can mount an economic blockade should anything happen to Nasheed . (5-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

PAKISTAN, AN EVOLVING STATE

 

B.RAMAN

In our preoccupation with the anti-India activities of the Pakistani jihadi organisations,  we should not overlook the positive factors that have brought a ray of hope not only to Pakistan, but to the region as a whole.

2. The most positive factor is the fact that the mainstream political class in Pakistan---with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif in the forefront--- have been showing for the last five years since the last elections were held a greater sense of political balance and maturity than ever before in the history of Pakistan.

3. The past habit of political leaders of running to the Army as an institution or to individual Army officers for help in countering the activities of their political opponents is slowly fading away. There is a welcome realization in the mainstream political class that it cannot escape its share of responsibility for the Army acquiring the role of an arbiter in political matters.

4.All mainstream political parties now realize that to curb the political role of the Army and to promote genuine democracy,  it is important that the political parties fight out their differences in the legislatures and town halls and should not take them to the army for arbitration.

5. It is this balance, maturity and self-restraint that contributed to the present PPP-led coalition being able to complete its normal tenure of five years. The credit for the remarkable fact that the elected National Assembly and the civilian Government have been able to complete their tenure of five years should go not only to the mainstream political parties but also to the senior Army leadership headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, who resisted the temptation to intervene on occasions when they could have done so without creating a public outcry.

6. The controversy over the role of Mr.Hussain Haqqani as the Pakistani Ambassador to the US was one such occasion when the Army leadership was under considerable provocation to act to express its indignation over the back-channel assurances allegedly conveyed to the US by Haqqani regarding the steps which the Asif Zardari Government would be prepared to take in return for the US support to the civilian leadership.

7. The fact that Kayani resisted the temptation and urge to intervene reflected well on him and the senior officers under him. By exercising self-restraint, the Army under Kayani contributed to the continuance of the elected civilian leadership for its normal term of five years.

8. The Army still claims for itself the primacy of decision-making in matters concerning national security in general and relations with India in particular. It is still not prepared to allow the civilian leadership a role in monitoring and supervising the functioning of the Armed Forces. But, it is now prepared to keep away from politics if its primacy in decision-making in these matters is respected by the elected leadership.

9.This unwritten code of compromise between the political and military leadership can be an important first step towards the evolution of Pakistan as a genuine democracy.

10. Despite sectarian and jihadi violence, Pakistan is not a failed State. Despite its economic difficulties, Pakistan is not a failing State. The last five years have shown that Pakistan is an evolving State. It is still an ideological State. It is still attached to the ideology of its founding fathers. But it is an ideology tempered by political maturity, balance and pragmatism. It is in the interest of all of us to encourage this evolution. ( 3-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director. Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )

 

INDER GUJRAL & INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

B.RAMAN

‘The Hindu” of February 26,2013, has carried an article  titled “ No Solace In This Quantum of Accountability” written by Samir Saran, Vice-President, and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, Programme Co-Ordinstor of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF).It is about the accountability of the intelligence agencies.

2. My views on accountability are well known and I do not feel the need to repeat them. I wanted to comment on the following observation by the two writers: “ If folklore has it right, if R&AW had a charter, it would have legally pre-empted a former Prime Minister’s order to abandon operations in Pakistan. It cost India 30 years worth of accumulated ground assets and priceless reach.”

3. The reference is apparently to former Prime Minister Inder Gujral. It is not correct that Gujral ordered the R&AW operations in Pakistan to be abandoned. The R&AW had two kinds of operations in Pakistan---- for intelligence collection and covert action.

4.He ordered only the operations for covert action to be closed since he felt that such a gesture might facilitate his efforts to improve relations with Pakistan under the so-called Gujral Doctrine. He did not order the intelligence collection operations to be discontinued. It would have been stupid on his part  to have done so. He, like all our Prime Ministers before and after him, understood the importance of a good intelligence collection capability in Pakistan. What he ordered to be closed accounted for only about 15 per cent of the R&AW’s operations in Pakistan. He encouraged the remaining 85 per cent to continue.

5. There was a debate in the intelligence community over the wisdom of his order to wind up the covert action operations. Many senior officers met him and explained to him that building a covert action capability took a long time. If one day the Government felt the need for resuming covert actions, there would be no trained and experienced assets on the ground. It was suggested to him that if he felt strongly on the subject, the covert action operations should be suspended, but not discontinued. He could not be convinced.

6. When the NDA Government under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee came to office, the intelligence community was hoping that he would cancel Gujral’s decision and order  the resumption of covert action operations in Pakistan. To their surprise, they found that Vajpayee too, like Gujral, wanted the R&AW to focus on intelligence collection in Pakistan and avoid operations for covert action.

7. Some serving officers, who felt disappointed by the reluctance of Vajpayee to  resume covert actions, arranged a meeting for me with Brajesh Mishra, the then National Security Adviser. I met him in his office in New Delhi, and explained to him the importance of resuming our covert action operations in Pakistan.

8. He gave me a patient hearing and said: “ I am already convinced. You don’t have to convince me. But the Prime Minister (Vajpayee) thinks otherwise. We have to carry out his wishes.”

9.There the matter ended. Even if the R&AW had a charter, there was no question of its being able to pre-empt Gujral’s orders. As R.N.Kao used to say, the R&AW and the IB are the two clandestine swords of the Prime Minister. It is upto him to decide how they will be used. His desires and orders have to be observed. No intelligence chief can overlook them---charter or no charter. (26-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India)

DECLINE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM LEADERSHIP

B.RAMAN

( Written at the request of the Economic Times, New Delhi, and carried by it on February 23,2013)

The two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad on February 21,2013, in which 14 persons are reported to have died, cannot be categorized as mass fatality terrorism. The blasts were directed at soft targets in a crowded area. Details available so far do not indicate what could have been the motive or who might have been the perpetrators. The police as well as the public should refrain from speculation that could mislead and distort the investigation.

2. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) did not have any unique signature. The explosive used does not appear to have been of a sophisticated kind . Fertiliser-based ammonium nitrate, which is easy to procure and which can be lethal when mixed with certain chemicals, is the main suspect for the present. For many years now, terrorists in many countries have been using ammonium nitrate-based IEDs, for their acts of terrorism.

3. Expertise in the fabrication of IEDS using ammonium nitrate as the core material is available in many web sites run by terrorist organisations. No special training is required in the matter. In Western countries, the counter-terrorism agencies have been able to reduce the use of ammonium nitrate by terrorists by imposing strict regulations on their storage and sale to persons who are not genuine farmers. We are yet to impose and enforce similar regulations in India.

4. If it turns out that ammonium nitrate has been used once again for an act of terror, priority should be given to measures for imposing such regulations in India.

5. Our counter-terrorism agencies continue to face the threat of sporadic acts of terrorism carried out by individuals or groups wanting to give vent to their anger against the State or other communities. While our police and intelligence agencies are able to collect intelligence regarding sustained acts of terrorism by groups with known objectives, targets and modus operandi, they face difficulty in monitoring the activities of individuals and groups indulging in sporadic acts of terrorism triggered by anger of the moment due to some reason or the other.

6.While sustained domestic terrorism of the kind witnessed before 2008 is by and large under control, sporadic attacks of the kind witnessed in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad pose a problem for our intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies.

7. The State Police have to play a more active role in preventing sporadic acts of terrorism and they have to be assisted by the central agencies. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which has remained a non-starter due to reservations from some States ruled by non-Congress parties, might have strengthened the joint capability of the Centre and the States for preventing sporadic terrorism. The absence of a political consensus on the NCTC leaves a big gap in our counter-terrorism architecture.

8. We face three kinds of terrorism--- state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Pakistan, domestic terrorism of a sustained nature  and domestic terrorism of a sporadic kind. While the threat of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan continues, it has not repeated itself after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Domestic terrorism of a sustained nature of the kind that we witnessed in 2007 and 2008 due to the activities of the Indian Mujahideen has been disrupted by the action taken by our central agencies and the State police to identify and disrupt their sleeper cells. Terrorism of the sporadic kind continues as seen in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad

9. Shri P.Chidambaram, who took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes, managed to strengthen our capabilities against all the three kinds of terrorism. His drive, though sometimes controversial as in the case of the NCTC, kept our agencies on their toes. The kind of vigorous leadership that he provided to our counter-terrorism efforts, has been missing since Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde took over from him last year. Counter-terrorism leadership is once again in a state of  decline as it was before 26/11.

10. Terrorists---whether the Pakistan State-sponsored or the domestic kind---- are looking for weaknesses in our counter-terrorism architecture which they can exploit to step up their activities. Incidents like those of Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad and our inability to detect them and identify the perpetrators definitively, will enable them as well as Pakistan to take advantage of the weaknesses that seem to be re-emerging in our counter-terrorism capabilities.

11. Without effective and dynamic leadership, even the best of counter-terrorism machinery will fail to deliver. Such leadership and drive have been missing under Shri Shinde’s stewardship of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

12. The Prime Minister, assisted by his National Security Adviser and the National Security Council Secretariat, which is part of the PMO, has to play a more active role for reversing this decline. Otherwise, we may be in for another nasty surprise as we faced on 26/11.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India. )

COUNTER-TERRORISM:NOTHING TO LEARN, NOTHING TO FORGET

B.RAMAN

It is less than 48 hours since the two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad on the evening of February 21,2013, resulted in the death of 16 innocent civilians.

2. The police and the intelligence agencies are still in the preliminary stages of the investigation. They have not yet done a reconstruction of the act of terrorism. The collection and examination of the forensic evidence have not yet been completed .No arrests and interrogation have been made yet.

3. Instead of waiting till the investigation makes substantial progress, the police and the agencies, with the help of sensation-hungry media, have already started pointing the finger at the Muslim community, the Indian Mujahideen and Pakistan.

4. If there is terror, it has to be a Muslim. If he is a Muslim, he has to be from the IM. If it is the IM, it must have acted at the instance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). That seems to be the thinking reflex of the police and the agencies.

5. In October last, according to the Delhi Police, a Muslim suspect belonging to the IM told them during his interrogation that the IM had recced the Dilsukhnagar area as a possible target. From this, one could have reasonable suspicion that the IM might have carried out the attack. To strengthen the suspicion, one must have additional evidence which has not been forthcoming till now. Despite this, the police and the agencies in their mind have already  turned the suspicion into certainty. Almost the entire investigation is now focused on the IM, overlooking other possibilities.

6. One cannot think of a more unprofessional way of dealing with terrorism. Very often, our initial hasty conclusions remain unproved or uncorroborated. That is why the investigation of so many of our terrorism cases  has reached a dead end. Many of the cases  remain undetected or unprosecuted or unsuccessful even if prosecuted.

7. After every few months, we are taken by surprise by a new act of terrorism because we didn’t investigate professionally the previous acts of terrorism. Our track record has been one of hurtling from one hasty conclusion to another.

8. Instead of learning lessons from the past, we continue repeating the same mistakes. Imprecise intelligence, alerts not followed up by ground action to strengthen physical security, lack of beat patrolling by the police despite our talking about it for years, absence of professional reconstruction of an act of terrorism to determine how the terrorists managed to succeed, cover-up of the sins of commission and omission of our police and agencies----- that has been our track record. Unless we get out of this unprofessional rut, terrorists will continue to strike with impunity and innocent civilians will continue to die. ( 23-2-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

MY TAKE ON HYDERABAD BLASTS

B.RAMAN

Eleven persons are reported to have been killed and over 20 injured in two well-timed explosions in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad around 7  PM on February 21,2013.

2. Initial reports indicated that one of the improvised explosive devices had been placed in a cycle or motor-bike and the other inside a tiffin box.These reports are yet to be confirmed. The two blasts appear to have been well-timed and not remote-controlled.

3.I do not so far see any sign of sophistication in the assembly of the IEDs and the synchronization of the blasts. There are no reports of any crater on the ground.If a powerful explosive material had been used, there would have been craters at the place where the IEDs had been placed.

4.The deaths and injuries seem to have been caused by the power of the blasts and not by the use of any projectiles such as nails, bicycle ball-bearings etc.When an IED is placed in a cycle or motor-bike, there would naturally be projectiles in the form of the splinters, but no other projectile has been discovered.

5.Reports of damages to nearby buildings also do not indicate the use of any powerful explosive material. The timer might have been of a conventional nature in the form of a mechanical ( with a clock attachment) or chemical device.

6.Two timed IEDs of this nature could have been easily assembled and planted by one or two terrorists. The involvement of a large team is unlikely.

7.The limited geographical area of the blasts also rules out the involvement of a large team of terrorists.The objective of the perpetrators was obviously to cause fatalities as an act of reprisal.

8.The indications till now are that the two blasts are the handiwork of locals who were in a position to assemble the devices quickly and use them.

9.Till more evidence is forthcoming, it would be advisable not to speculate on the motive and the possible identity of the perpetrators. (21-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )

MY TAKE ON THE COPTER SCAM

B.RAMAN

The 12 AgustaWestland helicopters ordered for the Air Force for VVIP duties were meant for use by the Special Protection Group (SPG) for the transport of SPG protectees and also for the transport of other VVIPs not entitled to SPG protection. While the Air Force was responsible for the procurement of the best copters available and for their maintenance and for providing the crew for manning them, the SPG was responsible for indicating to the Air Force before the procurement the minimum safety and comfort requirements that must be met by the copters.

2. All that the late Shri Brajesh Mishra, the then National Security Adviser, reportedly did in 2003 was to point out in file that the inputs from the SPG had not been adequately reflected in working out the minimum requirements that the copters should meet. He did the right thing in doing so and it would be absurd on the part of anyone to contend that his action contributed the first step in the chain of wrong-doing relating to the final procurement that came about in 2010.

3.The wrong-doing came about during the subsequent action on the contract for finalizing the financial and other details. It would seem that someone in India as well as abroad claimed credit for bringing about the changes in the minimum requirements consequent upon the action of Shri Mishra and made illegal financial gains.

4.The copter scam brings to mind the Bofors scam of the 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister. When the first details of the Bofors scam emerged in 1987,it became apparent that a small group of persons close to Rajiv Gandhi in India and Europe had financially benefitted from the contract.

5.Instead of ascertaining the truth, the Government of Rajiv Gandhi entered into a huge charade to prevent the truth from coming out. While making a huge pretense of having the matter investigated through the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and enquired into by a Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Government actually tried to have the illegalities covered up.

6.The truth of the illegal dealings ultimately emerged despite the cover-up exercise mounted by the Government due to some independent enquiries made by some brilliant journalists of the print media, with “The Hindu” being in the forefront. Despite the brilliant investigative reporting by the print media, the wrong-doers in India and Europe managed to escape prosecution due to the cover-up by the Government and its complicity in protecting the wrong-doers.

7. The CBI under Rajiv Gandhi came in for criticism for acting as a cover-up and not an investigating agency. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the CBI’s reputation hit the mud. It let itself be used by the Government as a willing tool for ensuring the cover-up.

8. It needs to be underlined that the huge web of corruption surrounding the Bofors contract did not vitiate the original decision of the Army to go for the Bofors, which played an important role in defeating the Pakistani intruders during the Kargil conflict of 1999.

9. It is important to keep this in mind because there have been demands for the cancellation of the contract for the delivery of the Westland copters. We should take a professional and not a self-righteous decision in the matter based on our evaluation of the performance of the three copters already delivered and their suitability for VVIP duties. We have already delayed by more than a decade the procurement process and a further delay as a result of any cancellation may  not be advisable.

10. At the same time, public and political opinion should ensure that a Bofors-like cover-up is not repeated by using the CBI as a tool for a diversionary exercise to prevent the truth from coming  out. India Against Corruption of Anna Hazare and the Aam Admi Party of Arvind Kejriwal as well as our media should play an active role in this matter.

11.One cannot expect a thorough-going investigation by the CBI so long as it acts under the supervision of the Government in the investigation. The CBI team investigating the copter scam should be placed under the day-to-day supervision of a special team of legal luminaries to be constituted by the Supreme Court. In the Bofors scam, the CBI team was placed under the supervision of the JPC which was dominated by the Congress and it saw to it that the CBI did not go after the truth.

12. There are three sets of wrong-doers in the copter scam. The first are the Indian nationals involved. The names of some close relatives of a former Air Force Chief have come up in this connection. Possibly, there are others. In the Bofors scam, the Indians in India and the diaspora managed to escape prosecution due to the protection extended to them by the then Government. We should see that this does not happen now.

13. The other two sets are intermediaries in Europe who played a role in the scam and senior officials of the Italian mother company (Finmecannica). The success of the CBI in establishing the truth about their role would depend on the co-operation extended by the Italian, Swiss and other European Governments. Here, the pressure of our diplomacy would be important.

14. In the Bofors scam, the Swiss and Swedish authorities were willing to co-operate, but it was the Rajiv Gandhi Government which avoided taking their co-operation lest the truth come out. Public and political opinion should see that this charade is not repeated by the present Government. (16-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter:@SORBONNE75  )