ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

B.RAMAN

Intelligence agencies have to be accountable to the Executive. Otherwise, there will be no secrecy in their functioning. Without effective secrecy, there cannot be clandestine collection of intelligence having a bearing on national security. Nowhere in the world ---not even in the much cited US--- is the executive not primarily responsible for the effective functioning  of the clandestine agencies.

2.However, in an increasing number of democracies, the Executive voluntarily shares with the legislature part of the responsibility for monitoring the performance of the secret agencies to ensure their competence to protect national security and to prevent wrong-doings.

3.In the US, the Executive and the Congress negotiate from time to time the ground rules for sharing this responsibility. The ground rules are so designed that in the anxiety to provide for accountability, the capability of the agencies to function as the clandestine arm of the State is not blunted.

4.The US Congress now has the following powers in respect of the agencies of the intelligence community:

·      To satisfy itself regarding the professional suitability of the heads of the agencies. The Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee goes into the suitability of designated heads and has to confirm their appointment.

·      To go into the overall budgetary allocations for different agencies and satisfy itself that correct national security priorities are observed in making the allocations. The Congress does not, however, go into allocations for individual clandestine operations. For example, the Congressional Oversight Committees decide whether allocations made for monitoring nuclear developments in North Korea are adequate and appropriate, but cannot go into how the allocations are utilized on individual operations.

·      To examine the intelligence produced  by the agencies to satisfy itself that they adequately meet the national security needs.

·      To enquire into instances of wrong-doing by the intelligence agencies.

5.The Executive and the two Houses of the Congress decide for themselves as to how they will exercise their shared responsibility without encroaching on each other’s turf. The culture of bipartisanship in the US facilitates decisions relating to intelligence agencies being taken by the Executive and the two Parties in the Congress in continuous  consultation with each other. Congressional leaders exercise their shared responsibility in such a manner as not to weaken national security.

6. The time has come  to consider the introduction in the Indian intelligence community the concept of shared responsibility between the Executive and the Parliament for monitoring the performance of the intelligence agencies. Certain difficulties will arise in this regard which have to be addressed first:

·      In India, we still do not have the concept of an intelligence community functioning as an organic whole. Each agency functions as an autonomous unit.

·      Our intelligence agencies were set up under executive orders and not through an act of Parliament. Unless there is an act of Parliament formalizing the existence and functioning of the agencies, the question of a parliamentary role will remain vague

·      There is no bipartisan culture in India. We have a multiplicity of political parties and coalitions. How to lay the ground rules under which a Parliament with a plethora of parties will play a role in monitoring the performance of the agencies? The more the parties involved in monitoring the performance of the agencies the less will be the secrecy. The concept of a national security culture has not evolved in our political class. Consequently, there will always be attempts by different parties to embarrass each other than to strengthen the intelligence community.

7.While I have always been a strong advocate of giving Parliament a role in monitoring the performance of the agencies, before this can be done the issues mentioned above have to be resolved through multi-party consensus. While the US model may not suit India, the British model can be considered for adoption with suitable changes and safeguards.

8.In the British model, the Prime Minister continues to play the leadership role in deciding the ground rules for joint Executive-Legislature monitoring of the performance of the agencies. Under the British political culture, the political parties do not challenge the primacy of the Prime Minister in matters relating to the intelligence agencies.

9. If we have to introduce the system in India, the political parties have to accept the primacy of the Prime Minister in matters relating to the secret agencies and the Prime Minister and the ruling coalition have to concede that the time has  come to give the Parliament a role in this matter.

10.Once there is a gentlemen’s agreement on this, the nuts and bolts can be decided through joint consultations. ( 13-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi.Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

 

 

AFZAL GURU'S EXECUTION: AN UNFORTUNATE YARDSTICK

B.RAMAN

It will be incorrect to compare the execution of Ajmal Kasab,Pakistani member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for his involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, with that of Afzal Guru, an Indian citizen from Jammu and Kashmir for his involvement in the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13,2001, believed to have been mounted by the Jaish-e-Mohammad.(JEM), a Pakistani jihadi organization.

2. Kasab was a Pakistani citizen who was a member of the LET .He had voluntarily got himself trained by the LET for participating in the execution of the terrorist strike. He was one of the perpetrators who was seen carrying out the killings. The evidence against him was direct and documentary in the form of video recordings. There were no grounds for doubt and no mitigating factors.

3.In the case of Afzal Guru, the evidence produced by the prosecution before the court clearly showed he was a conspirator and an accomplice, who had facilitated the attack on the Parliament by voluntarily providing logistics assistance to the JEM perpetrators who carried out the attack. However, whereas Kasab was a perpetrator, Afzal Guru was an accomplice and facilitator, who did not actively participate in the attack on the ground.

4.The gravity of the JEM attack on the Parliament was as serious as that of the LET attack in Mumbai. Nobody can question the appropriateness of the death penalty awarded to him.

5.However, there were many mitigating factors in the case of Guru. He was an Indian citizen from an alienated province of India. He was not known to have been an active member of any jihadi terrorist organization of India . He had reportedly undergone training in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir as a member of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in the early 1990s, but the JKLF has since dissociated itself from acts of terrorism. He had no previous record of involvement in any act of mass casualty  terrorism in Indian territory. He was an accomplice and not a perpetrator.

6.Political wisdom and foresight demanded that these mitigating factors should have been taken into consideration while deciding whether it was a fit case for carrying out the death penalty or whether ends of justice would be served by commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.

7.In the competitive pre-poll attempt to show who is stronger in dealing with terrorism, the Government  and the BJP seem to have overlooked these mitigating factors and used Afzal Guru’s execution as an unfortunate yardstick to establish their strong counter-terrorism credentials.

8.This is likely to prove counter-productive and aggravate the threat of terrorism instead of helping to bring it under control ( 11-2-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

AFZAL GURU'S EXECUTION:POSSIBLE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

B.RAMAN

 The intelligence agencies would have examined in depth the likely security implications of the execution of Afzal Guru this morning for his involvement in the attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001, and taken necessary precautions not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but also in the rest of India.

2.They would have studied in detail the kind of security problems our agencies faced after the execution of Maqbool Bhatt of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in the Tihar Jail in 1984 for his involvement in terrorism.

3. The circumstances in 1984 were not as complicated as they are today. We had to contend with only dangers of retaliation by the Kashmiri terrorist organisations.

4.In 1984, we were not faced with dangers of possible retaliation by Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. They were busy fighting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the attention of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence was also in Afghanistan.

5.They were not in a position to mount instant retaliation. Their retaliation was delayed till 1989 after the Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan.

6.Today, all these groups, particularly the LET and the JEM which played a principal role in the attack on the Parliament, are well primed against India and are in a position to mount quick retaliatory attacks not only in J&K but also in the rest of India with the help of their accomplices such as the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahideen.

7.Our security focus has to be pan-India. (9-2-13)

 

( The writer is former Additional Secretary , Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

THE CONTINUING TIBETAN TRAGEDY

B.RAMAN

As in previous years, the Tibetans are not celebrating their New Year’s Day this year too which falls this month.

2.Tibetans in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR),Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan as well as the Tibetan diaspora abroad, including in India, are observing their New Year’s Day as a day of mourning and prayers in memory of 99 Tibetans who have so far committed self-immolation ( 80 of them fatal) in the Tibetan areas of China to demand their freedom and the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Lhasa.

3.Their hopes that the advent of a new Chinese leadership headed by Mr.Xi Jinping could mark a relaxation of the suppression in the Tibetan areas and a willingness to address the grievances of the Tibetans have been belied so far.

4.Since Xi took over as the Party General Secretary from Mr.Hu Jintao in November last year, the Party has shown no inclination to re-consider its policies of suppression and forcible integration of the Tibetans which has driven many young Tibetan monks and others to take the desperate step of self-immolation to draw the attention of the international community to their plight.

5.Instead of recognizing the continuing self-immolations as an expression of desperation and anguish, the Chinese have been projecting them as part of a conspiracy against Beijing mounted by His Holiness and the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and other external organizations such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.

6.Instead of sympathising with the relatives and friends of those who committed self-immolation, they have been rounding them up and prosecuting them on a charge of instigating the self-immolations. Eight of them have already been sentenced after sham trials to various terms of imprisonment, including one of suspended death sentence.

7. In the face of this wave of suppression to put down the self-immolations, the Tibetans in India observed five days of solidarity with the Tibetan struggle for freedom. They observed a day of prayers on February 1 at New Delhi that was attended by about 1000 people including many Indian opposition leaders.

8.Lobsang Sangay, Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, has said the convictions  were unfortunate because “repression is the cause” of the self-immolations.

9.Sangay said it was unfortunate that the Chinese government had resorted to “sham” trials that had “no basis or legal process.”

10.He said he had asked Tibetans around the world not to celebrate the Lunar New Year this month out of respect for those who have died from the self-immolations.

11.“As a form of condolences and solidarity to all those Tibetans inside Tibet … I have asked Tibetans not to celebrate, not to organize any festivals, but to wear traditional dress and go to monasteries and pray for all those who have died and continue to suffer in Tibet,” he said.

 12.It was gratifying to note the greater public interest in the Tibetan cause in New Delhi this year, but it has to spread to other parts of India, which are hardly aware of the continuing tragedy in Tibet.( 9-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

 

INDIA-CHINA TIES UNDER NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP

B.RAMAN

China, which already has a new party leadership since the Party Congress in November last, will be having a new State leadership  from next month.

2.Mr.Xi Jinping, who took over as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC) in November last, will be taking over as the State President from Mr.Hu Jintao at the end of the National People’s Congress (NPC) next month. Mr.Li Kekiyang will be taking over as the Prime Minister from Mr.Wen Jiabao.

3. One does not know much about the personal leadership style of Li , but from what one had seen since November, Xi will not be a carbon copy of Hu. He is more smiling and relaxed, more forthcoming, less bureaucratic and less formal in his interactions with his colleagues and juniors.

4. He believes that military strength comes out of economic strength and that further developing the Chinese economy should have the primacy of attention. He also realises that China’s economic gains might be diluted if corruption is not controlled and that corruption among public servants comes not only out of greed, but also out of an unhealthy desire for status.  Austerity in personal and public life is, therefore, stressed by him..

5. During his first visit to Guangdong after taking over, many noticed the conscious lack of ostentation in his travels and interactions. Lack of ostentation is emerging as a defining characteristic of his leadership style. It remains to be seen whether he is able to retain it as the State President.

6.In China, the leadership transition takes different routes in the Centre at Beijing and in the provinces. At Beijing, it takes place first in the party and then in the State. In the provinces, it often takes place first in the provincial administration and then in the Party. As a result, one can err in assessments.

7. In Tibet, for example, hardliners owing loyalty to Hu and his policies, have moved into new leadership positions in the administration. From this, it will be wrong to conclude that the hardline policies of Hu will be followed by Xi too. In the provinces as in Beijing it is the party that exercises the command and control over the administration. We have to wait to see what kind of party leadership emerges in  Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia before assessing whether we might see new minority policies with Xi characteristics.

8. Under the leaderships of Mr.Jiang Zemin and Hu for nearly two decades, one had seen two constants in Chinese foreign policy---- the anxiety to keep in step with the US and the EU in economic matters sans allowing nationalistic urges to distort its economic policies and to keep testing the waters for a more assertive role in the region without needlessly provoking the US. These constants, which are adjudged by the CPC as in its national interests, are likely to continue under Xi too.

9. Four other constants are also likely to continue---- the strengthening of strategic and economic relations with Russia and India, keeping a wary eye on Japan and slowly expanding its interests in Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to be an important factor in China’s South Asia policy and we have to keep a wary eye on it. It will be suicidal to think that China’s interest in Pakistan will ultimately decline. It won’t.

10. The new Party leadership has already made it clear that there will be no dilution of its territorial sovereignty claims vis-à-vis Japan in the East China Sea, some ASEAN countries in the South China Sea and India across the Himalayan border. It will follow nuanced approaches in relation to Japan, the ASEAN countries and India. While it has not hesitated to make vigorous policy moves in relation to its claims in East and South China Sea, it has avoided a confrontational posture towards India.

11. China, under the new leadership, will continue to maintain peace and tranquility across the Sino-Indian border without making any unilateral concessions in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Keeping the issue alive without letting it become a tinder-box will be the policy.

12.China does not have a policy of countering India by developing a foothold in South Asia. Rather South Asian  countries have a policy of countering India by inviting China to their lands. China has no policy of a necklace of pearls in the region, but the countries of the region have separately  and independently been following a policy of putting a Chinese shackle on Indian hegemonistic urges. How are we going to deal with it?

13.It is in our interest to keep the Tibetan heart beating in this region. Decades of suppressive policy from the days Hu was posted  as the party in charge for Tibet have not been able to crush the independent spirit of the Tibetan youth and monks and their desire for the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Lhasa. The self-immolations since 2009, which have reached the figure of 99, are an indication of the total failure of the Chinese suppressive policy in the Tibetan areas. Suppressive policies towards the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province have also failed to produce results. One hears reports of stirrings of ethnic/Buddhist separatism in  Inner Mongolia.

14. Under the leaderships of Jiang and Hu which came to power after Deng Xiao-Ping, China has emerged as a major economic and military power of the region, but the suppressive minority policies inspired and fashioned by Hu with his experience of association with Tibet have made China’s peripheral areas inhabited by ethnic, religious and cultural minorities, despite their economic development, pockets of increasing anti-Han alienation. Hu’s rigid line on talks with  the representatives of His Holiness has led to an indefinite suspension of these talks.

 

15. Without  more liberal and empathetic minority policies China’s periphery will continue to be its Achilles Heel. Now that Hu will no longer be there, can one expect a policy change in a positive direction? Xi has not given an indication on this subject so far either at the November Party Congress or subsequently. He seems to believe like other Han leaders that rapid economic development and integration will weaken separatist sentiments. Tibet has shown that this is unlikely to happen.

16. Without showing an open interest in developments in the Tibetan areas, India has to find ways of quietly working for more empathetic policies by the new Chinese leadership.

17.There have to be two constants in India’s relations with China. We must continue to expand and strengthen the economic bridges with China and the regional co-operation mechanisms with which both countries are associated. Secondly, taking advantage of the more nuanced Chinese attitude to India in relation to the border dispute, which is less contentious as compared to its attitude to its sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas, we should be exploring the possibility of  mutually acceptable border adjustments in the Arunachal Pradesh Sector instead of depending on an eternal status quo.

18.China prefers the status quo presently because its military position in Tibet, while steadily improving, does not give it overwhelming superiority against us. It should be the objective of our military policies that China, either on its own or through its increasing presence in Pakistan, is not able to achieve such overwhelming superiority. China’s interest in the status quo and in peace and tranquility across the Himalayan border will remain only so long as it has no asymmetric advantage over India. To deny it such an asymmetric advantage should be the aim of our quest for new dimensions of strategic relations with the US, Vietnam, Japan,  and Australia. Our head-start over China in the Indian Ocean Region has to be maintained in co-operation with the US and Australia.

19. How to achieve a new web of strategic relationships without weakening the present momentum towards better bilateral relations is the challenge before our diplomacy and military strategists as we seek to engage the new Chinese leadership. (3-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

PAKISTAN INDUCTS CHINA INTO BALOCHISTAN TO COUNTER INDIA

 

B.RAMAN

Despite its continuing concerns over the freedom struggle of the Balochs which shows no signs of letting up, China, which originally constructed the languishing commercial port of Gwadar on the Mekran Coast of Balochistan, is reported to have agreed in principle to take over the responsibility for the operation of the port.

2.The 40-year-old contract awarded by the Pakistan Government in 2007 to Singapore’s PSA international for the operation of the port has been a non-starter due to disputes between the Pakistan Navy and the PSA International over the free transfer of land to the PSA international for the construction of warehouses for containers and other infrastructure facilities and over the failure of the Pakistani authorities to improve the road and rail connectivity of the port as promised in the contract.

3.The Pakistan Government agreed to the request of the PSA International to withdraw from the contract. Islamabad has now approved in principle the signing of a contract with the Chinese Overseas Port Holdings giving it the responsibility for operating the port.

4.The problems created by the Pakistan Navy in the transfer of land for the PSA International indicated a lack of enthusiasm in the Pakistan Navy for the operation of the port by a Singapore  company and its preference for handing it over to the Chinese company.

5.In the eyes of the Pakistan Navy, the Chinese taking over the responsibility for the operation of the port will have two advantages. Firstly, the Chinese, with their reputation for the timely construction of projects, will be able to get the languishing operations revived quickly. Secondly, it could prove to be the first step towards China agreeing to a Pakistani request for upgrading the port into a naval base, available for joint use by the Pakistani and Chinese navies.

6. Taking over the responsibility for the operation of the port, will have strategic advantages for China. It can bring oil and gas from Saudi Arabia and Iran to Gwadar and have them transported to Xinjiang through pipelines. Secondly, it will provide a port of call for ships of China’s Indian Ocean fleet for refitting and other purposes. At present. Beijing has not shown any open interest in helping Pakistan by upgrading the existing Chinese-aided commercial port into a Naval base for joint use by the two navies.

7. The Chinese took nearly two years to make up their mind as to whether they should get involved in the operation of the port due to the deteriorating security situation in Balochistan because of the on-going freedom struggle of the Balochs. The Balochs are opposed to a Chinese presence in Gwadar because they look upon the area as their traditional homeland over which the Pakistan Government has no right to negotiate with any foreign power. Moreover, the Balochs fear that the Chinese taking over the responsibility for the operation of the port would result in an induction of a large number of Punjabis into the Gwadar area to work.

8.The Pakistani authorities are hoping that the Chinese agreement to take over the operation of the port could act as a deterrent to India whom they suspect of helping the Baloch freedom-fighters.

8. Beijing’s agreement in principle to take over the operations of the port speaks of its confidence that they could meet any security threats from the Baloch freedom-fighters. Whether their confidence will be sustained or belied has to be seen. The Pakistan Army will not be able to assure the security of the Chinese working in Gwadar. Unless the PLA decides to post its own security contingents in Gwadar as it has done for the security of its nationals working on the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway in Gilgit-Baltistan, security for the Chinese in Gwadar will be uncertain.

9.What the Pakistan Government announced on January 30, is an agreement in principle for the Chinese company to take over the responsibility from the Singapore company. The details of the final agreement are still to be worked out.

10.There is a case regarding the security situation in Balochistan presently pending before the Pakistan Supreme Court. The Gwadar project is also linked up in the case. The Supreme Court has to agree to the Gwadar agreemen with China being treated as a stand alone issue before the final agreement with China is signed. This should not pose any difficulty

( 1-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

CASES OF HEADLEY & RANA: WHAT NEXT?

B.RAMAN

The Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India has been less than honest with the public by trying to convey an impression that it will continue to try for the extradition of David Coieman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who has been sentenced to 35 years in prison by a Chicago court for his co-operation with the LET of Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the planning and execution of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and his role in the abandoned plans of the LET to blow up the office of a Danish paper which had published caricatures of the Holy Prophet.

2. His extradition is legally out of question since as part of the plea bargain entered into with him, the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has made a commitment to him that he will not be extradited to India. Moreover, since he has been convicted by the US court for his role in the 26/11 strikes, the bar of double jeopardy will come in the way of his being tried in India. This prohibits the conviction of a person twice for the same offence.

3.When the FBI originally informed the court of the plea bargain, I had written that before the plea bargain is accepted by the court, the Government of India and the relatives of the victims of the 26/11 strikes should oppose its acceptance since its acceptance would preclude the death sentence and extradition. No action was taken by the Government of India and the relatives. His plea bargain was accepted by the court and he has now been convicted under it.

4.The MHA must have the honesty to admit that as a result of its bad handling of the case, the extradition door has been closed for ever. But an option of limited utility still remains open. As part of the plea bargain, Headley has made a commitment to the FBI to continue to co-operate with it and with the agencies of other countries having liaison with the FBI in any future investigation. Under this, a team of our National Investigation Agency (NIA) can still visit the US and question Headley in judicial custody in the presence of the FBI. However, it is doubtful whether anything useful would come out of this exercise, but we may still try it to find out about his network in India.

5. In my reading, the extradition door is still open in the case of Tahawur Hussain Rana, Headley’s Chicago-based accomplice. Intriguingly, the FBI did not consider it necessary to enter into a plea bargain with him. Only one logical explanation is possible for the FBI’s double standards in the case of Headley and Rana. The FBI wanted to protect Headley from independent Indian interrogation because he was an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Rana was apparently not an agent of the Agency. The FBI, therefore, did not feel the need to protect him through a plea bargain.

6.Moreover, even though there is considerable evidence regarding Rana’s assistance to Headley and his prior knowledge of the Mumbai terrorist strikes, he has been convicted by the Chicago court only for his role in the Copenhagen case and not in the Mumbai case. The bar of double jeopardy may not apply in his case.

7. From the moment Rana was arrested, I have been pointing out that while extradition may be difficult in the case of Headley, it may not be difficult in the case of Rana and that we should press for it in order to collect details of the Headley-Rana network in India. Again intriguingly, this option has till now not been vigorously pursued by the NIA, which works under the MHA. At least now, we should try for his extradition.

8. There were definite sins of commission and omission by the FBI which came in the way of the prevention of the 26/11 strikes in Mumbai. Firstly, the FBI was aware that David Coleman Headley had originally an American passport under the name Daood Gilani. Before he started frequently travelling to Pakistan and India, he obtained a new US passport under the name David Coleman Headley. In India, when a person obtains a new passport under a different name, we make an endorsement in his new passport that he previously used to travel with another passport under the name----.Many other countries follow this security precaution. Surprisingly, the FBI did not make any such endorsement. As a result, the Indian Consulate in Chicago, which issued a multiple-entry visa to Headley, was not aware that he previously used to travel as Gilani.After the strikes, we became aware of the various travels of Headley to India as Headley. Are we aware of the travels that he might have made to India as Gilani before he changed his name?

9.Secondly, the FBI was aware  that during his travels to Pakistan for the Drug Enforcement Agency, Headley had also been visiting India and going back to Pakistan. He had  even visited India once after the strikes. The FBI did not alert India even once before the strikes. It was apparently afraid that if it informed the Indian agencies, they may detain and question him thereby exposing his being an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency. It chose to keep quiet.

10.Thirdly, immediately after the 26/11 strikes, the “Hindustan Times” had carried a report by Vir Sanghvi, citing an unnamed high-level officer of the R&AW as saying that the CIA had twice alerted the R&AW that the LET was planning a sea-borne terrorist strike in Mumbai and that the R&AW had conveyed the information to the IB. Wherefrom did the CIA get this information, which proved to be correct? Was it from Headley or from one of CIA’s sources in Pakistan or from technical intelligence of the USA’s National Security Agency? No Indian journalist or analyst has gone deeper into this.

11.There have been serious sins of commission and omission by the Indian intelligence too. The processing of Headley’s case for a multiple-entry visa was handled by the Indian Consulate in Chicago in an unsatisfactory manner.

12.Headley was frequently coming to India from Pakistan and going back to Pakistan with the help of the multi-entry visa. Not once did our immigration question him about his frequent visits to Pakistan and keep him under surveillance in India. Even after we became aware of his frequent travels to India after the 26/11 terrorist strikes, we have not made thorough enquiries about his network in India.

13. In 1988, a source of the US Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) had reported that a Palestinian terrorist group was planning to blow up a US flight to Europe around Christmas. The FAA alerted the CIA, the FBI and the US diplomatic missions in Europe, but did not alert the US public of the likely danger of a terrorist strike against a US flight to Europe.

14. A flight of Pan Am was blown up off Lockerbie in Scotland killing all the passengers. The US media reported about the prior intelligence that was available to the US intelligence agencies which was not shared with the public. Some relatives of the victims took the US Government to court. It was from then that the practice of issuing an advisory about likely terrorist strikes started.

15.As reported by Vir Sanghvi, the CIA was aware of the LET’s plans for a sea-borne terrorist strike in Mumbai. Yet, the State Department did not issue an advisory to the US citizens intending to travel to India about the dangers of a strike n Mumbai. If it had gone public with the warning, that itself might have acted as a deterrent on the LET.

16. We still do not have a completely satisfactory reconstruction of the strikes and the roles of Headley and Rana. It is important for the relatives of the Indian, American, Israeli and other foreign victims to take the matter up before courts in India and the US in order to force the two Governments to come out with the truth. (26-1-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies, Twitter : @SORBONNE75  )