THE THREAT OF JIHADI TERRORISM CONTINUES

 

B.RAMAN

( Written at the request of the Editor, Economic Times)

 

 

Public satisfaction over the execution of Ajmal Kasab, the Pakistani terrorist belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), in a Pune jail on the morning of November 21,2012, should not make us forget that no action has been taken so far by the State of Pakistan against  the master-minds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.

2. Seven of them have supposedly been arrested and are being tried before a special court in Rawalpindi, but their trial is being frequently adjourned. No action has been taken by the Pakistani State against the LET, the terrorist organisation associated with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, which planned and carried out the terrorist strikes.

3. Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the LET and its political wing called the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, who was the principal conspirator of the terrorist strikes in Mumbai, is still a free man and his anti-India terrorist infrastructure remains unimpaired.       The officers of the ISI, who played a role in helping the LET in the planning and execution of the terrorist strikes, have escaped any consequences of their involvement.

4.The execution of Kasab has brought to a closure the  involvement of one  individual in the terrorist strikes. There is no closure as yet relating to the entire conspiracy and the State and the non-State actors and their organisations involved in it. Unless they are brought to final justice, the Government cannot claim success in its efforts to ensure that the law takes its course in the conspiracy.

5. We were a soft State before 26/11 and we continue to be a soft State after 26/11 and the execution of Kasab. The failure of the Indian public and voters to exercise adequate pressure on our Government to act effectively against the sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan against our citizens in our territory is responsible for the continuing softness of our State in dealing with Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism.

6. Now that Kasab has been executed, efforts will be made to draw electoral mileage out of it during the next election by projecting it as an indicator of the Government’s determination to deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The voters should not let themselves be misled by the Government claims and insist on more substantial results.

7. Kasab is no more, but the jihadi terrorist threat posed by the State of Pakistan and its non-State creations remain as serious as before. We need a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy to deal this. We do not see any signs of it so far. It must be made clear to our Government that it will be held accountable for its sins of commission and omission if it does not take its actions to their logical conclusion against the Pakistani perpetrators operating from Pakistani territory.

8. We should not be under any illusion that the execution of Kasab would have any deterrent effect on the jihadi terrorists operating from Pakistani territory and their State sponsors. Deaths will not deter them from carrying on their irrational jihad. Only the neutralisation of their ground capability once and for all will bring us respite. How to neutralise their capability and infrastructure is a question that should engage our continuous attention.

9. There will be attempts to avenge the execution of Kasab. We should be prepared for retaliatory strikes in India, including Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other foreign countries. Our ability to prevent retaliatory attacks would depend on the capabilities of our intelligence and physical security agencies.

10. Much has been done to strengthen their capabilities and reflexes after 26/11. There will be a need for a review of these capabilities in the wake of the execution of Kasab in order to identify continuing deficiencies and take action to fill them.

11. Terrorist strikes in Pune, Mumbai and Delhi after 26/11 and their unsatisfactory investigation have underlined the deficiencies. We still have undetected sleeper cells in these places and elsewhere constituted by the Indian Mujahideen. Since we have not been able to arrest and interrogate all of them, we do not have a clear idea of the continuing Pakistani involvement with the remnants of the IM. These remnants are likely to play an active role in retaliatory action sought to be mounted  by the LET with the complicity of the IM.

12. If the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) had been set up in time and had it started functioning as it was supposed to, we might have been in a better position to detect and neutralise preparations for retaliatory action. The exercise to set up the NCTC has come to a halt due to political mishandling. This exercise needs to be resumed and completed vigorously.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India )

KASAB’S EXECUTION: WHERE CAN THERE BE RETALIATION BY JIHADI TERRORISTS?

 

B.RAMAN

Before the execution of Ajmal Kasab, the Pakistani terrorist of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who had participated in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, at Pune on the morning of November  21,2012, our security agencies must have examined the likelihood of retaliation by jihdi terrorists in Pakistan and India and strengthened security precautions to prevent retaliatory attacks.

2. The LET and the organisations associated with it would want a quick retaliation. A retaliation without at least some preparation may be difficult in Indian territory outside Jammu and Kashmir . Quick retaliation might be possible in J&K and in Afghanistan. Terrorist elements in J&K, on their own or at the instance of the LET, may try to retaliate quickly . In Afghanistan, the LET, the Haqqani Network, the Taliban and the Hizbe Islami (HEI) of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar have the necessary ground capability for quick retaliation against the Indian Embassy in Kabul and Consulates elsewhere and against Indian nationals working in construction projects. Strengthening physical security in J&K and Afghanistan should receive the highest priority.

3. The other area requiring attention would be the Indian High Commission in Islamabad which could become the target of attack by the LET, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other organisations.

4. In Indian territory outside J&K, it is my present assessment that immediate attention has to be to the Indian Mujahideen and the remnants of the LET and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), including the Rohingya Muslims who are members of the HUJI. Immediate retaliatory attacks could be in the form of random explosions, wherever explosive materials are available.

5. The execution of Kasab was reportedly carried out in a Pune jail. We have had a number of terrorist attacks in Pune since 2010 which have remained unsatisfactorily detected. Pune still has sleeper cells unneutralised. Quick retaliation should, therefore, be possible for them in Pune.

6. The security for our Embassies abroad also need to be strengthened.

7.I have been in receipt of requests from some TV channels for appearing  on their shows to give my views. I have decided not to  respond to their requests in protest against the  recent lionisation of Pervez Musharraf  by the channels.Preparations for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Pakistan  by the ISI started when he was still the President of Pakistan, though he had left office by the time the attacks were carried out. 

8. Moreover, all our TV channels conspired to cover up the adverse observations of the Supreme Court on the irresponsible way they covered the 26/11 terrorist strikes without any discussion on them. The Supreme Court passed these strictures while confirming the death sentence on Kasab. ( 21-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

OBAMA IN MYANMAR: THE REALITY & THE MIRAGE

 

B.RAMAN

US President Barack Obama has just completed an eight-hour flying visit to Yangon (Rangoon), the former capital of Myanmar, from Thailand and flown to Phnom-Penh, the Cambodian capital, to attend the East Asia summit before flying back home. He was accompanied by Mrs. Hillary Clinton, his Secretary of State, who had visited Myanmar last year. This is the second visit by a US President to Myanmar since it became independent. The first was by President Richard Nixon in 1973.

2. In a carefully programmed visit, Mr. Obama visited only Yangon, the former capital from the British colonial days, where Aung San Suu Kyi generally lives. President Thein Sein, who lives and works in the new capital Nay Pyi Taw, flew to Yangon from Phnom-Penh, where he had gone to attend the ASEAN summit, to meet Mr.Obama.

3.Mr.Obama met Mr.Thein Sein and Daw Suu Kyi separately----Mr.Thein Sein in his official Yangon residence and Suu Kyi in her private residence. He did not meet the two together.

4. One may recall that when our Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, visited Myanmar earlier this year, he did not call on Suu Kyi at her residence. Suu Kyi called on Dr. Manmohan Singh at the place where he was staying in Yangon.

5. The only other public engagement of Mr.Obama in Yangon was an address to the students of the Rangoon University , whose predecessors were in the forefront of the pro-democracy struggle since 1988. Many of them were mowed down by the Army and their movement was crushed.

6. Before the visit of Mr.Obama, there were two important indications from Myanmar Government circles. The first was that the Myanmar Government had assured the UN Secretary-General that it would address the human rights concerns of the Rohingya Muslims living in the Rakhine State, including their demand for citizenship rights. Till now, the Government was reluctant to accept their demand for citizenship rights on the ground that they were illegal migrants from Bangladesh and not sons and daughters of the Myanmar soil. This is the first time the Government has indicated it will have an open mind on this issue.

7. The second was that Myanmar will accept full scope safeguards and  inspection of all its nuclear establishments by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. This would remove US suspicions and fears regarding nuclear co-operation between North Korea and Myanmar in the past.

8.These two were important issues of concern to the US and the Government of Thein Sein apparently wanted to act to address those concerns without giving an impression it was doing so under US pressure. An impression was sought to be created as if these were independent steps taken by the Government on its own and not under US pressure.

9. While the official circles in the White House and the State Department viewed the significant visit in very positive terms, their enthusiasm for the visit was not shared by many non-governmental human rights organisations, which felt that the visit was premature and should have followed the release of all political prisoners and an improvement in the human rights situation in the Rakhine State.

10. There was a certain hype in the circle of Mr.Obama’s advisers over the steps taken by President Thein Sein for over a year now to start the process of democratisation of the political set-up in Myanmar and to open up the country for foreign investments. At the same time, there was an anxiety over the unhappiness in the Islamic world on the tardy action taken by the Government to address the human rights concerns of the Rohingya Muslims.

11.How to address both these issues in public during the visit without ringing alarms bells in the minds of ultra-nationalist elements in the Buddhist clergy and the Armed Forces which are even now not prepared to consider the demand of the Rohingya Muslims for citizenship rights?

12.Mr.Obama sought to do this by acknowledging but not endorsing the record of the Thein Sein Government towards democratisation and external opening-up and by highlighting the sensitive issue of the human rights of the ethnic minorities, without giving the impression of pressuring  the Government to act on these issues too. He said: “ The purpose of my visit is to sustain the momentum for democratisation. That includes building credible government institutions, establishing rule of law, ending ethnic conflicts and ensuring that the people of this country have access to greater education, health care and economic opportunity.” In the advanced extracts from his address to the students released by US officials, he said in an indirect reference to the situation in the Rakhine State: “ I will urge Myanmar to draw on diversity as a strength, not a weakness".

13. The statements made by Mr.Obama and Suu Kyi during the visit highlighted the differing perceptions of the two over the sustainability and durability of the actions taken by the Thein Sein Government. The statements of Mr.Obama underline his conviction  in the sincerity of Mr.Thein Sein and his ability to overcome any opposition from the Armed Forces to his policies.

14. Suu Kyi’s attitude has been a little more cautious. While she is convinced of the sincerity and good faith of Mr.Thein Sein, she still has some misgivings in her mind about other officers. During her visit to the US in September last, she had hinted that while she knew Mr.Thein Sein well, she did not know other officers that well. When she came to India last week,  she cautioned in public  about over-optimism.

15. The need for caution in assessment was again emphasised by her during the visit of Mr.Obama. She reportedly said: “The most difficult time in any transition is when we think that success is in sight. We have to be very careful that we're not lured by the mirage of success." ( 19-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GAZA & ISRAEL : TIME FOR WISDOM

 

B.RAMAN

 

What we are seeing in Israel and Gaza is not just a war.

It is not just a ruthless exchange of fire.

It is not just missiles, air strikes and naval barrages.

People are dying on both sides.

It is a struggle for survival.

One is dying in order to assert one’s right to live.

One is dying in order to assert one’s right to land.

It may be just a piece of graveyard.

Or just a place of worship.

One is prepared to die for that.

To assert one’s right to live,

One is prepared to kill,

With missiles, air strikes and naval barrages.

To assert one’s right to land, one is prepared to destroy,

Anything and everything.

With missiles, air strikes and naval barrages.

It is a struggle sans victory.

One had seen such struggles before.

One is seeing one more now.

More ferocious than in the past.

It is not going to be the end of ferocity.

It is never-ending ferocity.

To assert one’s right to live.

To assert one’s right to land.

If more ferocity could establish the right to live and the right to land,

It should have been there by now.

Has the time to think not arrived?

Can both live together----the Israelis and the Palestinians?

Can both live together---the Muslims and the Jewish people?

The time for escalating ferocity is over.

It is time for dawning wisdom.

One sees no sign of it, though.

The need for wisdom---that is what one has to address.

Not the need for more missiles, more air strikes, more naval barrages.

Let us search for wisdom and admire it.

The time for admiring Israelis’ prowess and the Palestinians’ courage and resistance is over.

It is time to look for wisdom in both. (18-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

THAKSIN SHINAWATRA, PERVEZ MUSHARRAF & HT LEADERSHIP SUMMIT

 

 

 

B.RAMAN

 

After the March 1993 serial explosions in Mumbai organised by Dawood Ibrahim, who was then living in Dubai, the Memon brothers and others trained by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who had allegedly carried out the conspiracy, escaped to Karachi via Kathmandu. They were given shelter in Karachi by the ISI.

2. On coming to know of this, the Narasimha Rao Government then in office in the Government of India brought this to the notice of the US and sought its help for tracing them. The US Consulate in Karachi started making enquiries about their presence there.

3. The ISI thereupon had them flown to Bangkok where the perpetrators were kept in a hotel arranged by the Pakistani Embassy in Bangkok. After some months, the US Consulate in Karachi stopped making enquiries about their presence in Karachi. The ISI shifted them back to Karachi.

4. One of the perpetrators went to Kathmandu from Karachi and clandestinely entered India to meet a family friend. He was arrested by the Police and interrogated. During the interrogation, it came out that the perpetrators of the 1993 terrorist strikes organised by Dawood Ibrahim had been kept in Bangkok for some time by the ISI. In August 1994, Shri Padmanabiah, the then Home Secretary of the Government of India, held a press conference to announce the details of what the suspect had told the Police about the perpetrators of the 1993 terrorist strikes organised by Dawood Ibrahim being kept in a Bangkok hotel by the ISI after the commission of the terrorist strikes.

5. Around the same time, the “Far Eastern Economic Review”, then published from Hongkong, had carried a report alleging that Mr.Thaksin Shinawatra, who had won a telecom contract in Cambodia by bribing local Army officers, had tried to instigate a coup in Cambodia with the help of Cambodian Army officers in the pay of his company.

6. It also came out in India that the telecom company of Mr.Thaksin Shinawatra had been given a contract in Kolkata. The issue figured in the Lok Sabha. Our intelligence community drew the attention of Narasimha Rao to the allegations made against Mr.Thaksin Shinawatra’s telecom company in Cambodia by the “Far Eastern Economic Review”.

7. Narasimha Rao had it checked up whether background  enquiries regarding Mr.Thaksin Shinawatra had been made before his company was given the Kolkata contract. It was found that no such enquiries had been made.

8.Some years later, Mr.Thaksin Shinawatra entered politics and became the Prime Minister of Thailand from 2001 to 2006. He was very well disposed towards India during his Prime Ministership and even earlier when he was a Deputy Prime Minister. He helped India in becoming a full dialogue partner of the ASEAN and was always positive in his attitude towards India. We were happy with him as a political leader, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister.

9. It came to notice during his Prime Ministership that he was maintaining equally close relationship with Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who was then in power in Pakistan. He had allegedly come to know Musharraf through Mr.Shaukat Aziz, a Pakistani businessman living in the Gulf, who became the Finance Minister of Musharraf and subsequently his Prime Minister in 2005. When Mr.Shaukat Aziz was the Prime Minister of Pakistan and Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra was the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin had worked hard to bring Pakistan and the ASEAN closer together.

10. As Prime Minister, Mr.Shaukat Aziz visited Bangkok from May 8 to 10,2005. Thaksin spent most of the time with him, drove him around and accompanied him for his courtesy call on the King of Thailand who was then staying in the interior. The close relations of Thaksin with Mr.Shaukat Aziz and through him with Gen.Pervez Musharraf came to notice during this period.

11. After leaving office, Musharraf against whom there is allegedly a non-bailable warrant in Pakistan in connection with the pending investigation into the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, has been living in London allegedly as a guest of Shaukat Aziz, the close friend of Thaksin.

12. It is intriguing that  despite this past history, Pervez Musharraf and Thaksin should have figured as honoured guests in the leadership summit of the “Hindustan Times” held at New Delhi on November 16 and 17 and should have been lionised by the CNN-IBN TV channel which was associated with the summit.

13. I had myself in the past spoken well of the helpful attitude of Thaksin to India, but at the same time I had been concerned over his closeness to Aziz.

14. I don’t know what is the objective of the so-called leadership summits and whether any purpose is served by issuing invitations that could become controversial and embarrassing. ( 17-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

PRAGMATISM WILL CONTINUE TO GUIDE CPC

 

B.RAMAN

Pragmatism will continue to guide the policies of the new leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) headed by Mr.Xi Jinping which took over from the outgoing leadership headed by Mr.Hu Jintao on November 15,2012.

2. The seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, who will lead the party and the country till the 19^th Party Congress in 2017,belong to a transition generation which was born just before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 or in the early years thereafter.

3. Mr.Xi, who took over as the Party General Secretary on November 15 and will be taking over as the State President next March, and Mr.Li Keqiang, the No. 2 in the Standing Committee, who will be taking over as the Prime Minister next March, were both born in the early 1950s after the proclamation of the PRC. They will both be eligible for one more term in 2017 and  hence should continue till 2022.

4. The other five members of the Standing Committee were born in the late 1940s just before communism triumphed in China and the PRC was proclaimed. They were young kids when the PRC was formed.

5. All the seven members of the Standing Committee are children of the participants in the Long March and the peasants’ revolution, but they themselves had not participated in the revolution under Mao Zedong. They grew up in Communist China under the leadership of Mao and they and their parents had seen the abject poverty and the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and its Red Guards.

6. It is a generation that had suffered the years of misery under the Cultural Revolution. It had also seen and benefited from the beginnings of  affluence after the death of Mao and the opening-up of the economy by Deng Xiaoping. The children of this generation were the initial beneficiaries of the affluence brought in by Deng’s opening-up.

7. China is going to be ruled for the next 10 years by a leadership belonging to a generation that had seen the worst of poverty and disorder during the Cultural Revolution and enjoyed the benefits of affluence arising from the pragmatic economic policies of Deng.

8. The new leadership and its princelings will have a vested interest in the continuance of this affluence. It realises that this affluence has been made possible not only by the pragmatic economic policies, but also by long years of political stability in the Han areas except in some pockets.

9. This affluence has also been made possible by pragmatic foreign policies, which have avoided unnecessary rhetoric and foreign adventurism despite sticking to China’s territorial sovereignty claims.

10. One can, therefore, say with reasonable confidence that the new leadership will follow a policy mix of economic pragmatism, avoidance of liberal political experimentation while continuing to pay lip service to the need for political reforms to keep pace with the economic reforms and non-provocation of external military conflicts while continuing to adhere to territorial sovereignty claims.

11. The world is aware of the tremendous prosperity that China has achieved in large parts of the country. It is not equally aware of the continuing poverty and inequalities in the interior parts and in the peripheral non-Han areas. These are the faultlines of China which can make it come unstuck if the leadership is not wise enough to address them imaginatively and with innovation.

12. We will see 10 more years of cautious and pragmatic rule that doesn’t aggravate the faultlines. The Chinese civil society today has three classes---- the aging remnants of the participants in the Long March and the peasants revolution, the middle-age remnants of the days of the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards and the new class of the Internet generation, which has been rapidly growing.

13. While exhortations of caution and pragmatism are accepted by the aging and the middle-aged classes, the new class of the Internet Generation---the Internet Revolutionaries---- are tending to be more and more idealistic and challengers of the status quo.

14. The new leadership under Mr.Xi that took over on November 15 has the ability and experience to carry along with it the ageing and the middle-aged classes and ensure that they do not rock the boat. But will it be able to handle with equal dexterity the new Internet generation? The answer to this question will decide the continuing economic prosperity and political stability of China. ( 16-11-12)

 

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

TIME TO AVOID ROMANTICISATION OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI

 

B.RAMAN

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is presently on a visit to India where she grew up and studied as a teen-ager. Her widowed mother was posted as the Myanmar Ambassador to India. She delivered the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture  at New Delhi on November 14,2012. She was interviewed on November 15 by Barkha Dutt of NDTV and Karan Thapar of CNN-IBN. Before her arrival, she gave a detailed interview to Nirupama Subramanian of “The Hindu”.

2.Her lecture and three interviews have made a positive impact on public mind and highlighted her affection for India and her understated regret that during the long years she was under house arrest, India avoided taking up vigorously  the cause of the human rights of the Myanmar people. India’s security and power considerations and not our concerns over the rights of her people influenced our policy priorities and options. In her reply to one of Barkha’s questions, she stated that she understood that Indian interests influenced Indian decisions towards her country and its military Government.

3. There is no need for us to have a guilt complex for having allowed realpolitik considerations to influence our priorities and decisions when she was under house arrest. Suu Kyi herself is a practitioner par excellence of realpolitik.

4. After she was released  following an agreement with President Thein Sein and got elected to her Parliament, her priorities  in respect of foreign visits have been Thailand, European Union, the USA and India. She intends going to China last. As between India and China, her priority is to India. As between the West and India, her priority has been to the West. Recent reports from Myanmar speak of a certain disillusionment in sections of the Myanmar  political class over her perceived preferences for the  West as against Myanmar’s Asian neighbours.

5.Since she became politically active, she has been focussing on two issues---- keeping up the pressure on President Thein Sein and his Government to keep moving on the road to internal democratisation and external opening-up and keeping up the pressure on the West to remove the remaining economic sanctions  and the curbs on Western investments in Myanmar.

6. One can’t help forming an impression that in the matter of investments, she prefers investment flows from the West. She has no objection to investment flows from India but is concerned that this could lead to pressure from China for more Chinese investments.

7. In matters of interest and concern to India, her policies and pronouncements have been marked more by discreet silence than clear articulation. She has avoided  a clear articulation of her views regarding the human rights of the Rohingya Muslims. This is an issue that in the medium and long term could  have an impact on our Muslim community in the North-East. She has not uttered a word on the question of compensation for Indian businessmen who were driven out of Myanmar in the late 1950s and 1960s after seizing their property.

8. What I have enumerated above would show how she has had no qualms over taking decisions and advocating policies on the basis of her perceptions of Myanmar’s national interests and the interests of herself and her party.

9. If we had taken realpolitik decisions in the past on the basis of our perceptions of our national interests, there is no reason to let a gnawing feeling of guilt affect our future policies. Myanmar is an important buffer state between India and the Yunnan Province of China. If there is another military conflict with China due to the pending border dispute, the policies and attitudes of the Myanmar Government will have an impact on our ability to counter the Chinese designs.

10. We have two important national interests in Myanmar---- the security-related interests arising from the counter-insurgency situation in the North-East and our border dispute with China and our economic interests arising from the need for connectivity with Bangladesh and the ASEAN countries.

11. We have to identify those sections of the Myanmar society and administration which will be favourably inclined towards paying attention to these interests and strengthen our links with them. At present, only the Myanmar Armed Forces and the Government dominated by them have a positive comprehension of our interests and have been inclined to take notice of them.

12. Suu Kyi and her National League For Democracy have not shown such comprehension and such inclination. It will be unwise on our part to dilute the links that we had built up with the Armed Forces and the Government dominated by them just because of our affection for Suu Kyi and our tendency to romanticise her.

13. We must strengthen our relations with her and her party and build on the emotional links of the past without allowing the realpolitik links with the Armed Forces to rust.  (15-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)