LIKELY NEW CPC LEADERSHIP

 

B.RAMAN

The 18^th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) will end on November 14,2012, after approving the new General Secretary (Mr.Xi Jinping), the new seven-member Standing Committee of the Politbureau, the new Politbureau and the new 18^th Central Committee.

2.All these organs will look after the affairs of the Party till the 19^th Party Congress in 2017. The official announcements regarding the new party organs will be made at a press conference on November 15 at which the new Standing Committee of the Politbureau will be introduced to the public for the first time.

3.The bio-data of the likely new members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau as taken from Chinese Internet Databases are given below. This is still a speculative list and is not yet confirmed.

4.Of the seven names figuring in the speculative list, only Mr.Xi is  member of the outgoing Standing Committee of the Politbureau. The remaining six were members of the outgoing Politbureau, but not of its Standing Committee. Of these six, who are tipped to be the new members of the Standing Committee of the new Politbureau, one is an economic expert, one a historian-cum-banking expert, one is a missile engineer, one an expert in petroleum refining, one an expert on Inner Mongolia and one an expert on North Korea.

1.Xi Jinping, ethnic Han, native of Fuping, Shaanxi Province, born in June 1953. Joined the CPC in January 1974 and began working in January 1969. Graduated from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University, majoring in Marxist theory and ideological education. With an on-the-job postgraduate education. LLD.

Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, and secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.

1969-1975: Worked as an educated youth sent to the countryside at Liangjiahe Brigade, Wen'anyi Commune, Yanchuan County, Shaanxi Province, and served as Party branch secretary.

1975-1979: Student of basic organic synthesis at the Chemical Engineering Department of Tsinghua University.

1979-1982: Secretary at the General Office of the State Council and the General Office of the Central Military Commission (as an officer in active service).

1982-1983: Deputy secretary of the CPC Zhengding County Committee, Hebei Province.

1983-1985: Secretary of the CPC Zhengding County Committee, Hebei Province.

1985-1988: Member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee and vice mayor of Xiamen, Fujian Province.

1988-1990: Secretary of the CPC Ningde Prefectural Committee, Fujian Province.

1990-1993: Secretary of the CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress, Fujian Province.

1993-1995: Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee, secretary of the CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress.

1995-1996: Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee, secretary of the CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress.

1996-1999: Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee.

1999-2000: Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee and acting governor of Fujian Province.

2000-2002:  Studied Marxist theory and ideological education in an on-the-job postgraduate program at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University and graduated with an LLD degree.

2002-2002: Deputy secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province.

2002-2003: Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province.

2003-2007: Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress.

2007-2007: Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.

2007-2008: Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, and president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee.

 

 

2008-2010: Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice president of PRC and president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee.

2010- : Vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.

Alternate member of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee, and member of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee. Member of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and member of the Secretariat of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee.

2.Li Keqiang, ethnic Han, native of Dingyuan, Anhui Province, born in July 1955. Joined the CPC in May 1976 and began working in March 1974. Graduated from the School of Economics of Peking University, majoring in economics. With on-the-job postgraduate education. Doctor of Economics.

Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial People's Congress.

1974-1976: Secondary school graduate sent to work at Dongling Brigade, Damiao Commune, Fengyang County, Anhui Province.

1976-1978: Party branch secretary of Damiao Brigade, Damiao Commune, Fengyang County, Anhui Province.

1978-1982: Student of the Department of Law and leading member of the Student Union of Peking University.

1982-1983: Secretary of the CYLC committee of Peking University.

1983-1985: Director general of the School Department of the CYLC Central Committee and concurrently secretary general of the All-China Students' Federation, Alternate member of the Secretariat of the CYLC Central Committee.

1985-1993: Member of the Secretariat of the CYLC Central Committee and vice chairman of the All-China Youth Federation (September-November 1991: studied at the Party School of CPC Central Committee).

1993-1998: First secretary of the Secretariat of the CYLC Central Committee and concurrently president of the China Youth Political College (1988-1994: obtained MA and doctorate of Economics after attending the on-the-job postgraduate program on Economics at the School of Economics of Peking University).

1998-1999: Deputy secretary of the CPC Henan Provincial Committee and acting governor of Henan Province.

1999-2002: Deputy secretary of the CPC Henan Provincial Committee and governor of Henan Province.

2002-2003: Secretary of the CPC Henan Provincial Committee and governor of Henan Province.

2003-2004: Secretary of the CPC Henan Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Henan Provincial People's Congress.

2004-2005: Secretary of the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee.

2005-2007: Secretary of the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial People's Congress.

2007- Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial People's Congress.

Member of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth CPC Central Committees. Member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee. Member of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress.

3.Zhang Dejiang, ethnic Han, native of Tai'an, Liaoning Province, born in November 1946. Joined the CPC in January 1971 and began working in November 1968. Graduated from the Department of Economics, Kim Il Sung University, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). With a university education.

Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee.

1968-1970: Worked as an educated youth sent to the countryside at Taiping Brigade, Luozigou Commune, Wangqing County, Jilin Province.

1970-1972: Member of the Publicity Group of Wangqing County Revolutionary Committee, Jilin Province, and secretary of its Communist Youth League branch.

1972-1975: Student of Yanbian University majoring in the Korean language.

1975-1978: Deputy secretary of the general Party branch committee of the Department of the Korean Language, Yanbian University, member of the standing committee of its Party Committee and vice chairman of its Revolutionary Committee.

1978-1980: Student of the Department of Economics of Kim Il Sung University, DPRK and secretary of the CPC branch committee of Chinese students studying at the university.

1980-1983: Member of the standing committee of the Party Committee and president of Yanbian University.

1983-1985: Deputy secretary of the CPC Committee of Yanji, and concurrently member of the standing committee of the CPC Committee of Yanbian Prefecture, Jilin Province.

1985-1986: Deputy secretary of the CPC Committee of Yanbian Prefecture, Jilin Province.

1986-1990: Vice Minister of Civil Affairs and deputy secretary of the Leading Party Members' Group of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

1990-1995: Deputy secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee and concurrently secretary of the CPC Committee of Yanbian Prefecture.

1995-1998: Secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial People's Congress.

1998-2002: Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee.

2002-: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee.

Alternate member of the Fourteenth CPC Central Committee, member of the Fifteenth through Seventeenth CPC Central Committees, and Political Bureau member of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth CPC Central Committees.

4.Yu Zhengsheng, ethnic Han, native of Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, born in April 1945. Joined the CPC in November 1964 and began working in August 1963. Graduated from the Department of Missile Engineering, Harbin Military Engineering Institute, majoring in automatic control of ballistic missiles. With a university education. Engineer.

Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee.

1963-1968: Student majoring in automatic control of ballistic missiles at the Department of Missile Engineering, Harbin Military Engineering Institute.

1968-1971: Technician of Zhangjiakou No. 6 Radio Factory, Hebei Province.

1971-1975: Technician and director of Qiaoxi Radio Factory, Zhangjiakou, Hebei Province.

1975-1981: Technician and engineer of Research Institute for Promotion and Application of Electronic Technology under the Fourth Ministry of Machine-Building Industry.

1981-1982: Assistant chief engineer of Research Institute for Promotion and Application of Electronic Technology under the Fourth Ministry of Machine-Building Industry.

1982-1984: Deputy director of Research Institute for Promotion and Application of Electronic Technology under the Ministry of Electronics Industry; chief of Second Systems Division, assistant chief engineer and head of Department of Microcomputer Management of the Administration for Computer Industry, the Ministry of Electronics Industry; and deputy director of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Electronics Industry.

1984-1985: President, vice chairman of the board and member of the Leading Party Members' Group of the China Welfare Fund for the Disabled (equal to bureau-chief as from December 1984; and acting general manager of China Kanghua Industrial Company Ltd., January-March 1985).

1985-1987: Deputy secretary of the CPC Yantai Municipal Committee, Shandong Province.

1987-1989: Deputy secretary of the CPC Yantai Municipal Committee and mayor of Yantai, Shandong Province.

1989-1992: Deputy secretary of the CPC Qingdao Municipal Committee and deputy mayor and major of Qingdao, Shandong Province .

1992-1994: Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Shandong Provincial Committee, secretary of the CPC Qingdao Municipal Committee, and mayor of Qingdao.

1994-1997: Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Shandong Provincial Committee and secretary of the CPC Qingdao Municipal Committee.

1997-1998: Secretary of the Leading Party Members' Group of the Ministry of Construction and vice-minister of Construction.

1998-2001: Minister of Construction and secretary of the Leading Party Members' Group of the Ministry of Construction 2001-2002 Secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee.

2002-2003: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial People's Congress.

2003- 2007: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee.

2007-: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.

Alternate member of the Fourteenth CPC Central Committee, member of the Fifteenth through Seventeenth CPC Central Committees, and Political Bureau member of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth CPC Central Committees.

5.Liu Yunshan, ethnic Han, native of Xinzhou, Shanxi Province, born in July 1947. Joined the CPC in April 1971 and began working in September 1966. Graduated from the Party School of the CPC Central Committee. With a university education.

Member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee.

1964-1968: Student at Jining Normal School, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

1968-1969: Teacher of Bashi School of Tumd Left Banner and sent to do manual labor in Sobugai People's Commune of Tumd Right Banner, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

1969-1975: Clerk of the Publicity Department of the CPC Tumd Right Banner Committee, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

 

1975-1982: Reporter, deputy section chief and member of the Leading Party Members' Group of Inner Mongolia Bureau of Xinhua News Agency (studied at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee from March to August 1981)

1982-1984: Deputy secretary of the Communist Youth League Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee and its Leading Party Members' Group

1984-1986: Deputy head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee

1986-1987: Member of the Standing Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee

1987-1991: Member of the Standing Committee and secretary general of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee and concurrently secretary of Working Committee of the Organs Under CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee

1991-1992: Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee and secretary of the CPC Chifeng Municipal Committee

1992-1993: Deputy secretary of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee and concurrently secretary of the CPC Chifeng Municipal Committee (1989-1992: took a correspondence course of the Central Party School, majoring in Party and government administration)

 

1993-1997: Deputy head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee

1997-2002: Deputy head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee (confirmed as ministerial-level official in October 1997), head of the Office of the Spiritual Civilization Steering Committee of the CPC Central Committee

2002-: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee Alternate member of the Twelfth and Fourteenth CPC Central Committees, and member of the Fifteenth through Seventeenth CPC Central Committees. Member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth CPC Central Committees.

6.Zhang Gaoli, ethnic Han, native of Jinjiang, Fujian Province, born in November 1946. Joined the CPC in December 1973 and began working in August 1970. Graduated from the Department of Economics, Xiamen University, majoring in planning and statistics. With a university education.

Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Tianjin Municipal Committee.

1965-1970: Student majoring in planning and statistics in the Department of Economics, Xiamen University.

1970-1977: Worker of the Guangdong Maoming Petroleum Company under the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, secretary of its production headquarters office, secretary of the CYLC general branch of its political department, and deputy secretary of its CYLC committee.

1977-1980: Secretary of the general branch of the CPC committee and political instructor of the first workshop of the refinery of the Guangdong Maoming Petroleum Company under the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, deputy secretary and secretary of the refinery Party committee.

1980-1984: Standing committee member of the Party committee of the Maoming Petroleum Industrial Company under the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, director of its planning division, and deputy manager of the company.

1984-1985 Deputy secretary of the CPC committee of Maoming City, Guangdong Province, and manager of the Maoming Petroleum Industrial Company under SINOPEC

1985-1988: Director of the Guangdong Provincial Economic Commission and secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

1988-1992: Deputy governor of Guangdong Province (April-July 1990: participated in the training program for provincial and ministerial level cadres at the Central Party School).

1992-1993: Deputy governor of Guangdong Province and concurrently director of the provincial planning commission and secretary of the commission's Leading Party Members' Group.

1993-1994: Standing committee member of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee, deputy governor of Guangdong Province and concurrently director of the provincial planning commission and secretary of the commission's Leading Party Members' Group.

1994-1997: Standing committee member of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee and deputy governor of Guangdong Province.

1997-1998: Standing committee member of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee and secretary of the CPC Shenzhen Municipal Committee.

1998-2000: Deputy secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee and secretary of the CPC Shenzhen City Committee.

2000-2001: Deputy secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee, secretary of the CPC Shenzhen Municipal Committee, and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress.

2001-2002: Deputy secretary of the CPC Shandong Provincial Committee, acting governor and governor of Shandong Province.

2002-2003: Secretary of the CPC Shandong Provincial Committee and governor of Shandong Province.

2003-2007: Secretary of the CPC Shandong Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of Shandong Provincial People's Congress.

2007-: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Tianjin Municipal Committee.

Alternate member of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committees, member of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth CPC Central Committees, and member of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee.

7.Wang Qishan, ethnic Han, native of Tianzhen, Shanxi Province, born in July 1948. Joined the CPC in February 1983 and began working in January 1969. Graduated from the Department of History of Northwest University, majoring in history. With a university education. Senior economist.

Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, deputy secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, mayor of Beijing, executive chairman of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the XXIX Olympiad and deputy secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

1969-1971: Worked as an educated youth sent to the countryside at Fengzhuang People's Commune in Yan'an County, Shaanxi Province.

1971-1973: Worked in Shaanxi Provincial Museum.

1973-1976: Student majoring in history of the Department of History of Northwest University.

1976-1979: Worked in Shaanxi Provincial Museum.

1979-1982: Intern researcher at the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

1982-1986: Division chief, researcher (at the deputy department chief level) and deputy director of the Liaison Office, at the Rural Policy Research Office of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and the Rural Development Research Center under the State Council.

1986-1988: Researcher (at the department chief level) of the Rural Policy Research Office of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, director of the Liaison Office of the Rural Development Research Center under the State Council and concurrently director of the National Office for Pilot Areas of Rural Reform, and acting director and director of the Development Institute of the Rural Development Research Center under the State Council.

1988-1989: General manager and secretary of the Party committee of China Rural Trust and Investment Corporation.

1989-1993: Vice governor of the People's Construction Bank of China and member of its Leading Party Members' Group (attended a workshop run by the Party School of the CPC Central Committee for cadres at the provincial and ministerial level from September to November 1992).

1993-1994: Vice governor of the People's Bank of China and member of its Leading Party Members' Group.

1994-1996: Governor of the People's Construction Bank of China and secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

1996-1997: Governor of the Construction Bank of China and secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

1997-1998: Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee.

1998-2000: Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee and vice-governor of Guangdong Province.

2000-2002: Director of the Office for Economic Restructuring under the State Council and secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

2002-2003: Secretary of the CPC Hainan Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of Hainan Provincial People's Congress.

2003-2004: Deputy secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, acting mayor of Beijing, executive chairman of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the XXIX Olympiad and deputy secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

2004-2007: Deputy secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, mayor of Beijing, executive chairman of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the XXIX Olympiad and deputy secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

2007-: Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, deputy secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, mayor of Beijing, executive chairman of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the XXIX Olympiad and deputy secretary of its Leading Party Members' Group.

Alternate member of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee. Member of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Central Committees. Member of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

COMPLEXITIES OF DEALING WITH CHINA

 

B.RAMAN

 

(Based on my intervention during a Panel discussion on November 9,2012, on the book titled “ India’s Foreign Policy--- Coping With the Changing World” written by Shri Muchkund Dubey, our former Foreign Secretary. The book has been published by PEARSON. Other Panellists were Shri Dubey and Shri C.V.Ranganathan, former Indian Ambassador to China and France. The discussion was jointly organised by the Chennai Centre For China Studies and the Rajaji Centre For Public Affairs, Chennai )

Just as one used to talk of comprehensive national strength and comprehensive national security, one now talks of comprehensive diplomacy. From a uni-dimensional concept, diplomacy has become a multi-dimensional concept dealing with various dimensions such as political, economic, commercial, military, technological etc. Shri Dubey is one of the distinguished practitioners of  comprehensive diplomacy that we have . He has handled creditably bilateral as well multilateral diplomacy and the various aspects of comprehensive diplomacy. He was associated for many years with economic and commercial diplomacy and had overseen the transition from the era of the GATT to that of the World Trade Organisation ( WTO). His observations in the book should be of tremendous benefit to political leaders, professionals and the sections of the general public interested in the evolution of our foreign policy and in the exercise of our diplomacy.

2. Normally, when retired public servants and policy-makers write, they tend to bat for their service and department. A refreshing aspect of Shri Dubey’s book is that he refrains from batting for the Indian Foreign Service and the Ministry of External Affairs. He bats for the nation and its interests and does not hesitate to admit deficiencies in the exercise of our diplomacy, analyse the reasons for them and suggest correctives.

3. I was struck by his admitting how our defeat by Japan in 1995-96 in the election to the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) was a wake-up call and showed that India had no stature in the international community. He rightly attributes this lack of stature to India’s poor economic strength and its inconsequential role in global economy.

4. Economic strength is the basic component of the comprehensive national strength of any country. Without economic strength no country can make its presence felt and make itself respected in the international community. We have since paid more attention to building our economic strength. We are more consequential than we were till 1995-96, but still not as consequential as China is.

5. This became cruelly obvious during the recent Presidential campaign in the US. Whereas there were frequent references to China in the context of the global economy and the USA’s economic problems, there were few specific references to India, which still does not count. If India wants to be taken more seriously in the world of diplomacy and as an emerging power, it has to pay more attention to building its economic strength.

6. The book is not a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of our foreign policy. It is an updated collection of essays written by Shri Dubey on India’s relations with the US, Russia, China and Bangladesh and certain other aspects of which he has first hand knowledge. There is no detailed discussion of India’s relations with Pakistan and the Arab world. Pakistan does figure in his discussion of India’s relations with the US and China.

7. I would draw attention to three chapters devoted by Shri Dubey to a discussion of India’s relations with China and underline my views on this subject even at the risk of my views not being in consonance with those of Shri Dubey.

8. In my writings and speeches, I have been repeatedly drawing attention to our obsession with Pakistan and to our relative neglect of the importance of building up our knowledge and expertise on China despite our humiliation at the hands of China in 1962. We still do not understand the complexities of our relations with China adequately and what impact these complexities will have on our future stature as an emerging Asian power.

9. These complexities have three dimensions----our pending border dispute with China, the Tibetan question which will have an impact on the border dispute and the Damocles Sword of  the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile axis hanging over our head.

10. I am confident that given time and patience, our diplomats are capable of finding a mutually satisfactory solution to the border dispute and the Tibetan question. But, I am worried that not adequate attention has been paid to analysing the implications of the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile axis. Is there a way of weaning China away from Pakistan and what are the options and incentives and disincentives that we have  or that we ought to have in this regard? This is a matter that requires constant study by our governmental and non-governmental analysts and policy-makers.

11. We talk of the Pakistani mind-set and the mind-set of the Pakistani army relating to India. We cannot understand Pakistan and deal with Pakistan effectively unless we have a clear comprehension of those mind-sets.

12. Is there a Chinese mind-set towards India and what impact it has on its policies towards India? In my view, there is a Chinese mind-set which is predominant not in its Army, but in its Party leadership and cadres which strongly influences its determination to keep adding to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile strength.

13. Why does the Chinese Party leadership want to maintain the nuclear and missile axis with Pakistan? To confront India with the spectre of a two-front nuclear threat? To undermine India’s efforts to emerge as an Asian power on par with China? How to deal with this axis strategically and tactically?

14. We still do not have satisfactory answers to these questions. I do hope that Shri Dubey himself and other experts will pay greater attention to these questions in future and contribute to a comprehensive understanding of China and to the evolution of a comprehensive strategy for  addressing the complexities of our relations with China.

15. Dealing with China satisfactorily is the most difficult aspect of our comprehensive diplomacy. This question has not received the attention it deserves. ( 12-11-2012)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

OBAMA’S TRICKY VISIT TO MYANMAR

 

B.RAMAN

In his first foreign visit  after being re-elected, President Barack Obama will be in Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand from November 17 to 20, 2012. His visit to Cambodia is to attend the East Asia summit. The brief  visits to Myanmar  and Thailand will be bilateral.

2. He will be in Yangon (Rangoon) where Aung San Suu Kyi lives for a few hours on November 19,2012. He will have talks with President Thein Sein also at Yangon and not in the capital. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, for whom this will be the second visit to Myanmar.

3. The proposed visit has been projected in warm terms both by the US and Myanmar. A spokesman for President Thein Sein said on November 9: “His visit is warmly welcomed. It will strengthen the resolve of Thein Sein to move forward with reforms. Obama's visit shows concrete support for the democratisation process of President U Thein Sein, Daw  Aung San Suu Kyi, Members of Parliament and the Myanmar people. President Thein Sein fully believes that the trip of President Obama will push the momentum of the process of democratic reform."

4. The proposed visit underlines the US confidence in the stability of the Government of President Thein Sein and its belief that there is no opposition in the senior levels of the Myanmar Armed Forces to the policy of political and economic reforms and opening-up to the West undertaken by Mr.Thein Sein and his c-operation with Suu Kyi.

5. While there has been no comment so far from the Chinese Foreign Office, Qin Guangrong, Secretary of the Communist  Party of China in Yunnan, who is presently attending the 18th Congress of the CPC in Beijing, said that China saw no threat to its interests from Mr.Obama's visit. He added: "We understand and support the wish of the Myanmar authorities wanting to open up and become part of the world."

6. Mr.Obama’s proposed visit will be coming less than a month after a new spell of violence between the native Buddhists of the Rakhine (Arakan) State and the Rohingya Muslims, who are projected by the Myanmar authorities as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, not entitled to full citizenship rights.

7. The violence, which led to over 80 fatalities and added to the number of internally displaced persons living in camps, was triggered by the opposition of the Buddhists to a proposal to permit the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to open a permanent office in Yangon to monitor the human rights of the Rohingya Muslims and the distribution of humanitarian relief to the internally displaced refugees from both the communities living in camps in the Rakhine State.

8. While the violence has since subsided, a Commission appointed by the Government of President Thein Sein to enquire into an earlier spell of deadly violence in June has not been able to make much progress in its enquiry due to non-cooperation from the Buddhists.

9. US officials dealing with the visit have maintained a discreet silence on the recent violence in the Rakhine State and sought to project the visit as meant to encourage the Thein Sein Government to keep moving on the democratic path. However, there will be expectations from the Muslims of the ASEAN region, who nurse feelings of solidarity with the Rohingya Muslims, that Mr.Obama will exercise pressure on President Thein Sein as well as Aung San Suu Kyi to pay attention to the human rights of the Rohingya Muslims and grant them full citizenship rights.

10. The Buddhists are watching the visit with apprehension that President Thein Sein and Suu Kyi may soften their opposition to the grant of citizenship rights to the Rohingya Muslims under pressure from Mr.Obama. Any impression of a US pressure in this regard during Mr.Obama’s visit could trigger off fresh violence in the Rakhine State weakening the ability of the Thein Sein Government to restore law and order and to re-settle the displaced persons in their home villages.

11.Non-Governmental human rights organisations such as the Amnesty International have expressed their misgivings over the wisdom of Mr.Obama’s decision to visit Myanmar at this delicate time. They are worried it could prove counter-productive.

 

12.In a report on the situation in the Rakhine State due for release on November 12, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) has been quoted by the media as saying as follows:

“The flare-up in Rakhine State represents a deeply disturbing backward step from Myanmar’s reforms. This is a time when political leaders must rise to the challenge of shaping public opinion rather than just following it. A failure to do so will be to the detriment of the country. There is a  threat of rising identity politics in Myanmar as reforms give new found freedoms to interest groups. The situation needs decisive moral leadership... by both President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi to prevent it spreading and contribute towards long-term solutions.” The ICG urged the Government to ensure camps for the displaced do not become a precursor to the “segregation” of Rakhine and Rohingya.

13. Mr.Obama’s tricky visit is coming at a time when sections of the Rakhine Buddhists are demanding a policy of separate development for the Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, with separate educational institutions, hostels and buses for Rohingya Muslim students. ( 12-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

MY TAKE ON L’AFFAIRE PETRAEUS

 

B.RAMAN

In the history of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there have been three instances of Directors coming to grief because of their perceived wrong-doings.

2.Richard M.Helms (1966-73) was removed by President Richard Nixon from office because of his alleged disloyalty to the President during the Watergate enquiry.

3. James Woolsey (1993-95) had to resign following Congressional unhappiness over his reluctance to act against officers who were considered guilty of slack supervision in the case relating to Aldrich Ames, a Soviet/Russian mole in the CIA.

4.John Deutch ( 1995-96) had to resign following suspicions/allegations of breach of security against him. He was allegedly casual in handling classified information.

5.The resignation of Gen. David Petraeus reported on November 10,2012, following the alleged discovery of an improper personal relationship between him and his biographer Paula Broadwell, who was also from the Army like Petraeus, is the first instance of a Director quitting because of suspected moral turpitude. Both of them were married with  children.

6.American society tolerates personal relationships between unmarried individuals, but looks askance at relationships between married persons from whom high standards of  loyalty and faithfulness to the spouse are expected. Both Petraeus and Paula deviated from these standards and he has had to pay a price for this.

7. When such relationships between married persons come to light they go down in the esteem of their near and dear ones, friends and colleagues. They can no longer exercise effective leadership of the organisation headed by them. Bill Clinton’s was a remarkable instance of a President continuing and flourishing in office after his relationship with a young girl was discovered and he had to face the humiliation of impeachment proceedings, which were not successful. His was an exception to the rule.

8.The media has projected Petraeus’ resignation as voluntary. It is quite possible that the FBI brought his relationship with Paula to the notice of  President Barack Obama who advised him to resign. The resignation was called for.

9. Gen.Petraeus was a highly distinguished officer of the US Army who had done well in Iraq and Afghanistan before he was selected by Mr.Obama to head the CIA in June 2011 when he decided to appoint  Mr.Leon Panetta, the highly successful Director of the CIA who co-ordinated the covert action for the elimination of Osama bin Laden, as Defence Secretary in place of Mr.Robert Gates.

10. The Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees confirmed his posting after examining his credentials for the post and he took over in September last year. He had such a brilliant record and reputation as an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan that his credentials appeared to have been assumed by the Congressional committees and his case was cleared.

11. Normally, the FBI does a detailed background check before the Congressional confirmation hearings, but nothing negative about him that could have made him unsuitable for the post of Director, CIA, appeared to have been discovered by the FBI.

12. It is now reported that during his posting in Kabul as an Army officer, Paula was also in Kabul to interview him for her biography and the two used to spend a lot of time together, often jogging together. It did not appear to have struck either the counter-intelligence division of the CIA or the FBI to question him about his relationship with Paula and bring it to the notice of the Congressional committees. They seemed to have assumed that it was purely a relationship between a biographer and the object of her study and that there was nothing personal about it.

13. It was only after he started functioning as the Director that the FBI realised that there was more than met the eye in his relationship with Paula and started checking his E-mails. The personal nature of the relationship then came to notice.

14. The case brings out continuing deficiencies in the functioning of the counter-intelligence divisions of the CIA and the FBI. The Congressional Oversight Committees may now revisit the checks that were made before he was confirmed in order to see how the personal nature of the relationship was missed by both the CIA and the FBI.

15. The FBI will also go deeper into the background of Paula to determine whether she has had any illegitimate contacts with foreign intelligence agencies, how long she was having a personal relationship with Petraeus and whether there could have been any breach of security.

16. Despite the unfortunate circumstances of his resignation, Petraeus will go down in history as an outstanding Army officer and counter-insurgency expert. However, he headed the CIA hardly for 13 months and did not have the time to impart his stamp on the organisation.

17. Before him, another outstanding military officer---Admiral Stansfield Turner of the Navy---had headed the CIA under President Jimmy Carter. His tenure proved controversial because of his packing senior staff positions in the CIA with his confidantes from the US Navy. This caused demoralisation in the CIA and had a negative impact on the CIA.

18. It was reported that keeping this in view, Mr.Obama’s aides advised Petraeus, at the time of his appointment, to resist the temptation to pack the senior posts in the CIA with his Army buddies. He had to rely on senior career professionals of the CIA and he took time to get to know them.

19.Between 9/11 and September 2011, for nearly a decade, the CIA’s focus was turned to improving its HUMINT and covert action capabilities required for security and counter-terrorism related tasks. The time, efforts and resources required for improving its area expertise were not forthcoming.

20. Petraeus was required to re-focus the CIA’s HUMINT and covert action attention on acquiring area expertise in respect of countries such as North Korea, China, Iran and the Arab countries. A new operational strategy for this purpose was required. Before he could formulate and implement such a strategy, his personal affection for and relationship with Paula brought him down. He failed to distinguish himself in Libya and Syria and he was unable to impart his stamp to the operations of the CIA. He will not be remembered as a great intelligence officer. ( 11-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

MESSAGE OF DEFIANCE FROM TIBET TO CPC CONGRESS

 

B.RAMAN

“We shall not give up our struggle for preserving our ethnic, religious and cultural identity. We shall not give up our reverence for His Holiness the Dalai Lama. We will not lose hopes of his returning to our homeland one day and guiding us again. We are Tibetans and we shall prevail.”

2. That is the message of defiance that the Tibetans living in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan have been sending loud and clear to Mr.Hu Jintao, the outgoing General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and his successor  Mr.Xi Jinping, who will be taking over next week at the end of the 18^th Congress of the CPC being held at Beijing from November 8,2012.

3. The Tibetan people have reasons to be bitter against Mr.Hu. He made his name as a party functionary in the TAR where he was posted. His ruthless suppression of the Tibetans caught the eyes of Deng Xiao-ping who had him brought to Beijing and groomed to be the General Secretary of the CPC one day.

4. Hu Jintao was appointed Party Secretary of the TAR on December 9, 1988, in replacement of comparatively liberal-minded  Wu Jinghua, belonging to the Yi nationality, who was a protégé of Hu Yaobang.  The next day, there was a huge demonstration in Lhasa. People’s Armed Police Units opened fire on the demonstrators killing many of them.

 

5. Hu arrived in Lhasa in mid-January 1989 and took over as the Party Secretary.  On January 23, 1989, Hu went to Shigatse, the seat of the Panchen Lama, to make a courtesy call on him.Hu reportedly told the Panchen Lama that he "considered himself a member of the Tibetan people" and "would share a common fate with the Tibetan people and work wholeheartedly for their benefit." In his reply, the Panchen Lama reportedly criticised in strong language the Chinese rule of Tibet. A few days after the meeting, the Panchen Lama died under mysterious circumstances in his Shigatse monastery. The cause of his death was not established.

6.In March,1989, there were huge demonstrations against the Chinese rule in Lhasa, which lasted three days. Over 40 Tibetans were allegedly killed when People’s Armed Police Units repeatedly fired on the demonstrators. On March 7,1989, Hu imposed Martial Law in Lhasa and had a large number of Tibetans arrested. In a broadcast over Radio Lhasa on April 20,1989, Hu referred to the March demonstrations as a "major event"  and  compared  their significance with the March 1959 Tibetan uprising  and the 1962 Indo-China war. In the summer of 1989 when martial law was imposed in Beijing in the wake of violence in the Tiananmen Square, it had already been in effect in Lhasa for weeks. Hu Jintao reportedly sent a telegram from Tibet to Prime Minister Li Peng and Deng expressing his support for the crackdown  in Beijing. In October 1990, after a visit by Jiang Zemin, who had replaced Zhao Ziyang as the CPC General Secretary, to Lhasa, Hu was transferred to Beijing to work under Jiang. Till 1992, he continued to be designated as the Party Secretary in the TAR, but he was working from Beijing. In October 1992, Hu handed over as the Secretary of the TAR to Chen Kuiyuan.

7. Tibetan hopes that despite his ruthless record in Lhasa, Hu, as the No.2 to Jiang and subsequently as the CPC General Secretary from 2002, would follow a reconciliatory policy towards the Tibetans were belied. He pushed forward the policy of Han colonisation of Tibet and stepped up the economic development of the TAR hoping that rapid economic development would reduce the alienation of the Tibetans.

8. This did not happen. On the contrary, the CPC’s arrest of the successor to the Panchen Lama designated by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in accordance with the Buddhist traditions and the imposition of a Panchen Lama selected by the CPC aggravated the alienation. The situation became worse following the refusal of the CPC under Hu’s leadership to negotiate with the Dalai Lama on the grant of greater autonomy to the Tibetan people and the unification of all the Tibetan areas of China spread across the TAR, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. The CPC under Hu repeatedly made it clear that any talks with His Holiness will be only on his future and not on the future of Tibet. It also repeatedly rejected the demand for the re-unification of all the Tibetan areas.

9. This added to the alienation of the Tibetan people and a movement for the independence of Tibet started under the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). There was a fresh outbreak of violence in the TAR and other Tibetan areas in March 2008, before the Beijing Olympics to draw the attention of the international community to the continued suppression of the Tibetans. The uprising was ruthlessly put down by the Chinese security forces.

10. The crushing of the uprising led to a reconsideration of the strategy by the Tibetan youth and monks who embarked on a peaceful protest movement based on the satyagraha movement of Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. This was a two-pronged movement based on self-immolations by monks and others in protest against the Chinese rule and peaceful gatherings to preach the message  “Be Tibetan, Speak Tibetan, Eat Tibetan and Live Tibetan.”

11. The self-immolation movement that started in the Kirti monastery of the Sichuan province in March last year was initially concentrated in the Sichuan province. It has since been spreading to Qinghai, Gansu and the TAR. Only the Tibetan areas of Yunnan have remained unaffected so far. The Tibetans project the self-immolations as voluntary and spontaneous due to resentment over the Chinese rule, but the Chinese authorities suspect that the self-immolations are being orchestrated with the blessings of His Holiness by a hitherto unidentified organisation. They have announced a reward for anyone who will help in identifying the organisation.

12. As the CPC Congress approached, the self-immolations have picked up momentum to draw the attention of the international media who have gathered in Beijing for the CPC Congress to the plight of the Tibetans. Since November 7, there have been six more self-immolation attempts, with at least two of them turning fatal. The self-immolations, which were initially started by the Tibetan monks, are now being resorted to by young Tibetan youth. The simultaneous Tibetan identity movement based on the concept of Gandhiji’s satyagraha has also been spreading.

13. The Chinese were able to suppress the violent uprising of March 2008, within a few days, but they have not been able to suppress the self-immolation and satyagraha movements for over 18 months. The talks between the representatives  of His Holiness and the CPC are in  a state of suspension.

14. The Tibetans are hoping that Xi Jinping, who comes from a liberal-minded family and who had not served in the Tibetan areas in his career, might adopt a more conciliatory policy towards them. Xi, who takes over as the CPC General Secretary next week, will be taking over as the  State President only next March. There are expectations that even after handing over as the State President, Hu will try to continue as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CPC) of the party for some more months thereby retaining control of the PLA and other Chinese security forces.

15. Even if Xi wants to follow a more nuanced policy towards the Tibetans, he may not be able to do so as Hu retains control of the PLA through his chairmanship of the Party CMC.

16. This may please be read in continuation of my article of October 28,2012, titled “Tibetan Self-Immolations mount, spread geographically as CPC Congress Nears” at  http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1030 ( 10-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

PLA GENERALS & CMC VICE-CHAIRMEN BACK HU’S REPORT

 

 

 

B.RAMAN

Senior PLA Generals and the Vice-Chairmen of the newly-expanded Party Central Military Commission (CMC) have in panel discussions praised the record of Mr.Hu Jintao, the outgoing General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and his report to the 18^th Party Congress submitted on November 8,2012, and underlined the CPC’s absolute leadership over the Armed Forces.

2. The PLA and the CMC’s panel discussions on Hu’s report were attended by the following:

·        Gen.Guo Boxiong, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

·        Gen.Xu Caihou, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and vice chairman of the CMC.

·        Gen.Fan Changlong, vice chairman of the CMC.

·        Gen.Xu Qiliang, vice chairman of the CMC.

·        Gen.Liang Guanglie, member of the CMC, state councilor and minister of national defense.

·        Gen.Chen Bingde, member of the CMC.

·        Gen.Li Jinai, member of the CMC.

·        Gen.Liao Xilong, member of the CMC.

·        Gen.Chang Wanquan, member of the CMC.

·        Gen.Jing Zhiyuan, member of the CMC.

·        Gen. Wu Shengli, member of the CMC and commander of the Navy.

·        Gen.Fang Fenghui, chief of general staff of the PLA.

·        Gen.Zhang Yang, director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA.

·        Gen.Zhao Keshi, director of the General Logistics Department (GLD) of the PLA, and

·        Gen.Zhang Youxia, director of the General Armaments Department (GAD) of the PLA.

3.The “PLA Daily” has reported as follows on the panel discussions:

“Senior generals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) supported the keynote report by Hu Jintao at the opening of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Thursday, saying that the principle of the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces must be unwaveringly adhered to.

“Hu's report is a great achievement of the Party's theoretical innovations and serves as a guide to action for completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects, said Gen. Guo Boxiong .

“The military should intensively study and apply Hu's thinking on the development of national defense and the armed forces under new conditions, adhere to the principle of Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces more voluntarily and push forward military preparedness more effectively, Guo said.

 

“Gen. Xu Caihou called the 18th CPC National Congress a" milestone," noting Hu's inspiring report demonstrates the Party's political confidence and determination, and the Scientific Outlook on Development supplies the armed forces with "a powerful theoretical weapon."

“The PLA and the armed police force should carefully study the report and more firmly follow the Party's leadership in united ideology and action to accelerate the modernization of the national defense and the armed forces, Xu said.

“Gen. Fan Changlong said the 18th CPC National Congress is an important meeting being held when China enters a decisive stage of completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and Hu's report serves as a guiding document for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

“Fan said the armed forces should understand the report's core requirement on the military and unswervingly stick to the Party's absolute leadership and give high priority to military preparedness.

“Gen. Xu Qiliang said in the discussion that Hu's report serves as a guidance to action of winning new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics.

“The armed forces must study and implement the decisions of the 18th CPC National Congress and take it as the top political task at present and a strategic mission for the long term, he added.

 

 

“In their discussion on the report of the 18th CPC National Congress, all the PLA delegates agreed that the report delivered by Comrade Hu Jintao scientifically reviewed international and domestic development trends, profoundly summed up the historical experience, systematically expounded a series of major theoretical and practical issues on upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, clearly specified the new goal of building a moderately prosperous society and the new requirements of comprehensively deepening reform and opening up, fully planned the economic, political, cultural, social and ecological civilization construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics and put forward new tasks and new requirements in comprehensively improving the scientific level of the Party building.”

4. The reports on the PLA/CMC panel discussions carried by the “PLA Daily” do not indicate whether  Mr.Hu will continue as the Chairman of the CMC after handing over as the General Secretary of the Party to Mr. Xi Jinping next week.

5.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1037  titled “Will Hu Jintao Emulate Jiang and Retain Control of PLA after Party Transition?” ( 10-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

MAO’S THOUGHTS HAUNT CPC CONGRESS

 

B.RAMAN

The 18^th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) began at Beijing on November 8,2012, with the traditional inaugural statement by the  outgoing Party General Secretary, Mr.Hu Jintao.

2. After the inaugural statement, delegates from different provinces and regions take it up for detailed discussion before approving it. These detailed panel discussions are more important than the statement by the outgoing General Secretary because often the new party leaders who will be in office for the next 10 years initiate these panel discussions in important panels and draw attention to the important themes of the inaugural statement.

3.On November 8,2012, after Mr.Hu had read out his statement, Mr.Xi Jinping, who is tipped to take over from Mr.Hu as the next General Secretary before the Congress concludes, initiated the panel discussion before the delegates from Shanghai, who play a prominent and powerful role in the party affairs.

4. The details of his briefing have so far been carried by the “PLA Daily”, but not yet by the “People’s Daily” or the English edition of the “Global Times” or the “China Daily”. Based on a Xinhua summary, the “PLA Daily” stated as follows:

“The theme of the ongoing 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) explicitly defines the path and goal of the Party, Xi Jinping said on Thursday.

“ The underlying theme of the congress is "to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development, free up the mind, implement the policy of reform and opening up, pool our strength, overcome all difficulties, firmly march on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects.”

“The theme of the congress, in a simple and explicit way, explains four major issues concerning the overall work of the Party and the country to people within and outside the Party, and to China and the rest of the world, Xi said.

“The issues are what banner the CPC will hold, what path it will take, what ideological state it will keep, and what goal it is trying to achieve.

“Putting forward such a theme is of crucial importance for the CPC to unite and lead people of all ethnic groups in the new historic journey to make greater achievements and keep up with the times.

“The theme of the congress is based on the full comprehension of current conditions of the world, the nation and the Party, the new requirements of the nation's development and new expectations of the people. It is closely interlinked with the overall plan for promoting economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi said.

“To thoroughly understand the theme of the congress, one must understand the historical background and soberly realize that the Party is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges, while the key lies in whether the Party can grasp the opportunities and tackle the challenges in a cool-headed way.

“The Party shall continue to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, maintain an ideological state to free up the mind, implement the policy of reform and opening up, pool the strength and overcome all difficulties, promote economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress and Party building in an all-around way.

“The Party shall unswervingly advance along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and unite to forge ahead with tenacity and resolve, Xi said.

“The report delivered by Hu Jintao on behalf of the 17th CPC Central Committee pools the whole Party's wisdom by giving full play of democracy, Xi said.

“The report is clear-cut, profound, pragmatic and comprehensive, and will become the political manifesto and program of action to make new victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics under new circumstances.”

5. The most significant part of Mr.Xi’s remarks during the Shanghai Panel discussion was that while he specifically referred to Deng’s Theory as one of the guiding themes of the Party, he did not make a similar specific reference to Mao Zedong’s Thoughts.

6. There has been speculation for some weeks now that the Congress might amend the Party Constitution and that the proposed amendments might dilute the importance of Mao’s Thoughts as a guiding principle of the Party. This speculation had not been corroborated till now. The Panel remarks of Mr.Li could indicate the beginning of a Party exercise to ease out Mao from history without dishonouring him.

7.It may be recalled that one of the allegations against Bo Xilai, the discredited Party strongman from Chongquing now facing a criminal trial on various charges, was that he advocated the restoration of the purity of Mao’s Thoughts to strengthen the ideological basis of the party.

8. There were also reports of differences between President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao----with  Mr.Hu opposing Mr.Wen’s efforts to link the dismissal of Bo  to his advocacy of Mao’s Thoughts. It was reported that Mr.Hu wanted that Bo’s trial should be projected purely as a criminal case and not linked to ideological issues relating to Mao.

9. On May 28,2012, a report attributed to the Reuters’ news agency had stated as follows:

“Chinese premier Wen Jiabao was recently criticized by fellow Communist Party officials for comments made in March that linked the radical policies of fallen political heavyweight Bo Xilai to Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution.

 

“President Hu Jintao refused to link Bo’s downfall to his neo-Maoist political ideology, and declared the scandal that led to the latter’s ouster an “isolated case” at a meeting of 200 officials earlier this month in Beijing, Reuters reported on Friday, citing three inside sources. The report appears to confirm speculation that China’s leaders are concerned that Bo’s case is being regarded as a political struggle between divergent party factions, rather than a genuine criminal case.

“Two of Reuters’ sources also claimed that the recent meetings saw Premier Wen — known for his progressive views on reform — chided by party comrades for earlier comments hinting that Bo’s ouster was related to his left-leaning ideology.

“At the close of two key political conferences on March 14, Wen said China risked a repeat of the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution unless the country implemented “urgent” political reforms. The disastrous socialist movement instigated by Chairman Mao, which took place between 1966 and 1976, saw millions of people persecuted in violent factional struggles and thousands of historical relics and artifacts destroyed.

“If the “new problems that have cropped up in China’s society” are not resolved, the “historical tragedy” of the Cultural Revolution may happen again, Wen said, adding that the “mistake” of the revolution is “yet to be fully eliminated.” Most believe the comments were directly targeted at Bo.”

10. Mr.Xi’s silence on Mao’s Thoughts as a guiding theme of the party and the earlier speculation about the likelihood of  references to Mao’s Thoughts being removed from the Party constitution would indicate that the debate on the relevance of Mao’s Thoughts triggered off by Bo continues even after his humiliation. ( 9-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)