B.RAMAN
The 17th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (CPC), which completed its term at Beijing on
November 4,2012, did not throw much
light on any changes in nuances in the Chinese foreign policy that can be
expected from the new party leadership
headed by Mr.Xi Jinping that will be taking over at the 18th
Congress being held from November 8.
2.The first indications of any changes in nuances
will be available only after the Party Congress is over and after Mr.Hu Jintao
hands over as the State President to Mr.Xi after the session of the National People’s
Congress (NPC), the Parliament, in March next year. There will also be a new
Prime Minister from March next when Mr.Wen Jiabao will be handing over to Mr.Le
Kequiang. All one say with certainty is there is unlikely to be any major
changes in foreign policy objectives at least till next March.
3.Speculation from Beijing regarding the
deliberations of the 17th Central Committee, which worked for a
consensus on the composition of the new party organs under Mr.Xi, indicated
that the new leadership under Mr.Xi may be more conservative and less political
reform minded and more cautious in domestic matters. Will this domestic neo
conservatism be reflected in external policy also and, if so, in what manner?
Will the new leadership be more assertive in territorial sovereignty matters or
more accommodating? Will it be more or less rigid in non-territorial matters
having an impact on foreign policy such as charges of currency manipulation,
action to reduce trade imbalances, charges of economic espionage emanating from
US Congressional circles etc? Clear-cut
answers to these questions should be available only after next March.
4. However, one can study important foreign policy
statements made during the year to
understand the thinking of the new leadership and analysts, who write on
foreign policy matters in the Government and party-controlled media. The most
important statement of the year came from Mr.Xi himself during a visit he made
to the US in February last after it became clear that he would be taking over
as the Party General Secretary and the State President from Mr.Hu.
5. While addressing a luncheon hosted by the National Committee
on U.S.-China Relations and the U.S.-China Business Council at Washington DC
on Feb. 15, 2012, Mr. Xi said
that China and the US should
increase strategic trust and respect the
core interests and major concerns of each other. He added:
"Without trust, one can achieve nothing. China
and the US have important interwoven interests. Strategic trust is the foundation for mutually
beneficial cooperation, and greater trust will lead to broader cooperation. The
two sides should increase mutual understanding and trust, and reduce
misunderstanding and suspicion.
“We in China hope to work with the U.S. side to
maintain close high-level exchanges. We hope to increase dialogue and exchange
of views with the United States by making full use of our channels of
communication, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, cultural and
people-to-people exchanges, and military-to-military exchanges.
"By doing so, we can better appreciate each
other's strategic intentions and development goals, avoid misinterpretation and
misjudgement, build up mutual understanding and strategic trust, and on that
basis, fully tap our cooperation potential.
“History shows that when we properly handle each
other's core and major interests, China-U.S. relations will grow smoothly.
Otherwise, they will be in trouble.
“ China hopes the US will adhere to the three
Sino-U.S. Joint Communiques and the one-China policy, oppose Taiwan
independence and support the peaceful development of relations across the
Taiwan Straits with concrete actions.
“China also hopes that the United States will truly
honour its commitment of recognizing Tibet as part of China and opposing Tibet
independence, and handle Tibet-related issues in a prudent and proper manner.
“It is natural that some differences exist on human
rights issues given the differences in national conditions as well as
historical and cultural background between the two countries.
“China and the US should continue dialogue and
exchanges to implement the consensus reached between Presidents of the two
countries on respecting each other's development paths chosen in light of their
national conditions, and improve the cause of human rights in both countries.
“China-U.S. relations are now at a new historical
starting point in the second decade of the 21st century."
6.It was a conciliatory statement and tried to play
down the tensions and suspicions that
had arisen during the last two years
following China’s reported characterisation of its sovereignty claims over the
islands of the South China Sea as of core interest in addition to Taiwan and
Tibet. Such a characterisation was not made in any official document or policy
statement of Beijing, but during its diplomatic interactions with the US in May
2010.
7. In his speech in Washington DC, Mr.Xi remained
silent on this characterisation and reverted to the traditional Chinese
position that Taiwan and Tibet are its core interests. It did not refer to
Xinjiang as a core interest. Chinese leaders are generally more articulate in the
expression of their concerns on the Tibetan issue during their visits to the US
than during their visits to India because they are concerned over the support
enjoyed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in US Congressional circles and by his
access to the US President during his visits to Washington DC. They do worry
that an attempt might be made by the US to promote the destabilisation of Tibet
after the death of His Holiness.
8.Though Mr.Xi’s formulations on the Tibet issue
were made by him in Washington DC and with specific reference to the likely
impact of Tibet on China’s bilateral relations with the US, they should be of
interest to India too in view of the pending border dispute between India and
China which has defied a resolution.
9. Since 1985, the Chinese have stopped expressing
themselves in favour of a swap deal with India under which in return for an
Indian acceptance of the status quo in the Western sector in the Ladakh area,
Beijing will accept the status quo in the Eastern sector by recognising Arunachal
Pradesh as Indian territory. This package proposal was reportedly first made by
the Chinese before the Sino-Indian war of 1962.It continued to be on the table
even the war till 1985.
10. Since 1985, they have been challenging the
status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh area, describing it as southern Tibet and
as disputed territory over which they continue to have sovereignty claims which
need to be accommodated in their border negotiations with India. Details of the
border talks are not available, but the speculation is they want a status quo
minus solution in the Eastern sector under which India will concede their
sovereignty over at least the Tawang area in which one of the previous Dalai
Lamas was born, in return for their giving up their sovereignty claims over the
rest of Arunachal Pradesh.
11.It is in this context that Mr.Xi’s reference to
Tibet and “Tibet-related issues” as of core interest to China is significant. What
did he mean by “Tibet-related” issues? Was he referring to China’s sovereignty
claims over Arunachal Pradesh? It needs to be noted that in their interactions
with India, the Chinese have not referred to their sovereignty claims over
Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest for them. The Chinese definition of a core
interest is one in which no concessions by them are possible.
12. Their border talks with India are based on the
principle of mutual accommodation which means the possibility of some
concessions by them. Not to exclude the possibility of such concessions, they
have refrained from describing Arunachal Pradesh as a core issue in their
interactions with India. Against this background, what did Mr.Xi mean by talking
of “Tibet-related issues” as a core interest while speaking in the US? This
needs to be examined by Indian analysts
in order to look for possible signs of Beijing deviating from its present
policy of searching for a solution on the Arunachal Pradesh issue based on
mutual accommodation.
13. There were two
important statements indicating an inflexible line on territorial sovereignty
issues on September 20 and 21,2012. In a despatch from Brussels, the “People’s
Daily” quoted Prime Minister Wen Jiabao as stating on the sideline of a
China-EU summit that China would make no concession in affairs concerning the country's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
14. The next day, when addressing the opening ceremony of the
China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit and Forum in Nanning, capital city
of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Mr.Xi said: "We are firm in
safeguarding China's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and are
committed to resolving differences with neighbours concerning territorial land,
territorial sea and maritime rights and interests peacefully through friendly
negotiations."
15. These two statements indicated that the
non-confrontational line projected by Mr.Xi in the US did not apply to China’s
sovereignty disputes with some ASEAN countries in the South China Sea and with
Japan in the East China Sea. While the statements related to China’s
territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries and Japan, the formulations
clearly showed that the inflexible line applied to all territorial disputes with
all neighbours. If China is not prepared to make any concessions in territorial
disputes as stated by Mr.Wen, where is the question of mutual accommodation on
the Arunachal Pradesh issue? This should be a matter for added concern to
India.
16. This hard line was reflected in an article
carried by the “People’s Daily” on November 2,2012, a day after the final
meeting of the 17th Central Committee started. The article was written by
Mr.Wang Yusheng, Executive Director of the Strategic Research Centre of
the China Institute of International
Research Foundation. It said: “The parties concerned know clearly that China
advocates building a harmonious neighbourhood, but has inviolable “red lines.”
If necessary, it will resort to force after trying peaceful means. The United
States is just bluffing, and Japan and some other Asian countries are just
taking advantage of U.S. influence to serve their own purposes. They may muddy
the water in the Pacific, but cannot make big waves.”
17. Interestingly, news
agency reports originating from Washington, on October 22,2012,quoting US State
Department sources, said:
“ Chinese leaders did not refer to the
Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands as a 'core national interest' during talks
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September in an apparent attempt to
avoid a diplomatic clash with Washington, State Department sources have
said.
“While discussing territorial issues with Clinton
in China, Premier Wen Jiabao did not make remarks suggesting that the disputed
islands are part of its 'core national interests', a term Beijing uses to refer
to key territories it is determined to hold onto or ultimately take control of,
the sources said.
“The talks with Clinton followed
a meeting in Beijing with Japan in May in which Jiabao told Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda that his country should respect China's core interests
and major concerns, the Japan Times reported.
“According to the report, the US had made it clear that the islands
fall within the scope of the US-Japan security treaty, which would oblige
Washington to support Japan if the islands came under attack.
“The uninhabited islands in the East China Sea also
were not referred to as a core interest in Clinton's separate meetings with
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the sources said.
“While Beijing is not expected to soften its
position on the row with Tokyo, it appears to be cautious about challenging
Washington on security issues, the report said.”
18. Thus, on the eve of the 18th Party
Congress, the over-all Chinese line seems to be as follows:
(a).It looks upon its sovereignty claims over
Taiwan, Tibet and “Tibet-related issues”
as of core interest and major concern. It has made this clear in formal
official statements and is prepared for a military conflict if its interests
are threatened, but it has not clarified what it means by Tibet-related issues.
(b). Since May,2010, it has informally indicated to
the US its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea as of core interest,
thereby not ruling out the use of force if its interests are threatened. However,
there has been no formal declaration on this subject.
(c ). While continuing to reiterate its sovereignty
claims in the East China Sea, it has refrained from characterising them as of
core interest to avoid a military conflict with Japan which enjoys the
protection of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the East China Sea.
19. This over-all core interest doctrine of China
which evolved under the outgoing leadership of Mr.Hu is likely to continue
after Mr.Xi takes over from Mr.Hu.
20. What impact this will have on the ongoing
border talks between India and China? There are so far no indications to show
that China might be contemplating to give up its adherence to the principle of
mutual accommodation in finding a solution to its border dispute with India. The
evolution of the Chinese thinking on this issue needs to be closely monitored.
( 6-11-2012)
(The writer
is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate
of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter @SORBONNE75)
