DECODING CHINA’S CORE INTERESTS

 

B.RAMAN

The 17^th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which completed its term at Beijing on November  4,2012, did not throw much light on any changes in nuances in the Chinese foreign policy that can be expected  from the new party leadership headed by Mr.Xi Jinping that will be taking over at the 18^th Congress being held from November 8.

2.The first indications of any changes in nuances will be available only after the Party Congress is over and after Mr.Hu Jintao hands over as the State President to Mr.Xi after the session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Parliament, in March next year. There will also be a new Prime Minister from March next when Mr.Wen Jiabao will be handing over to Mr.Le Kequiang. All one say with certainty is there is unlikely to be any major changes in foreign policy objectives at least till next March.

3.Speculation from Beijing regarding the deliberations of the 17^th Central Committee, which worked for a consensus on the composition of the new party organs under Mr.Xi, indicated that the new leadership under Mr.Xi may be more conservative and less political reform minded and more cautious in domestic matters. Will this domestic neo conservatism be reflected in external policy also and, if so, in what manner? Will the new leadership be more assertive in territorial sovereignty matters or more accommodating? Will it be more or less rigid in non-territorial matters having an impact on foreign policy such as charges of currency manipulation, action to reduce trade imbalances, charges of economic espionage emanating from US Congressional circles  etc? Clear-cut answers to these questions should be available only after next March.

4. However, one can study important foreign policy statements  made during the year to understand the thinking of the new leadership and analysts, who write on foreign policy matters in the Government and party-controlled media. The most important statement of the year came from Mr.Xi himself during a visit he made to the US in February last after it became clear that he would be taking over as the Party General Secretary and the State President from Mr.Hu.

5. While addressing  a luncheon hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the U.S.-China Business Council at Washington DC on  Feb. 15, 2012, Mr. Xi  said  that China and the  US should increase strategic trust and respect  the core interests and major concerns of each other. He added:

"Without trust, one can achieve nothing. China and the US have important interwoven interests. Strategic  trust is the foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation, and greater trust will lead to broader cooperation. The two sides should increase mutual understanding and trust, and reduce misunderstanding and suspicion.

“We in China hope to work with the U.S. side to maintain close high-level exchanges. We hope to increase dialogue and exchange of views with the United States by making full use of our channels of communication, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and military-to-military exchanges.

"By doing so, we can better appreciate each other's strategic intentions and development goals, avoid misinterpretation and misjudgement, build up mutual understanding and strategic trust, and on that basis, fully tap our cooperation potential.

“History shows that when we properly handle each other's core and major interests, China-U.S. relations will grow smoothly. Otherwise, they will be in trouble.

“ China hopes the US will adhere to the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiques and the one-China policy, oppose Taiwan independence and support the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Straits with concrete actions.

“China also hopes that the United States will truly honour its commitment of recognizing Tibet as part of China and opposing Tibet independence, and handle Tibet-related issues in a prudent and proper manner.

“It is natural that some differences exist on human rights issues given the differences in national conditions as well as historical and cultural background between the two countries.

“China and the US should continue dialogue and exchanges to implement the consensus reached between Presidents of the two countries on respecting each other's development paths chosen in light of their national conditions, and improve the cause of human rights in both countries.

“China-U.S. relations are now at a new historical starting point in the second decade of the 21st century."

6.It was a conciliatory statement and tried to play down the tensions and suspicions  that had arisen during the last two  years following China’s reported characterisation of its sovereignty claims over the islands of the South China Sea as of core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet. Such a characterisation was not made in any official document or policy statement of Beijing, but during its diplomatic interactions with the US in May 2010.

7. In his speech in Washington DC, Mr.Xi remained silent on this characterisation and reverted to the traditional Chinese position that Taiwan and Tibet are its core interests. It did not refer to Xinjiang as a core interest. Chinese leaders are generally more articulate in the expression of their concerns on the Tibetan issue during their visits to the US than during their visits to India because they are concerned over the support enjoyed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in US Congressional circles and by his access to the US President during his visits to Washington DC. They do worry that an attempt might be made by the US to promote the destabilisation of Tibet after the death of His Holiness.

8.Though Mr.Xi’s formulations on the Tibet issue were made by him in Washington DC and with specific reference to the likely impact of Tibet on China’s bilateral relations with the US, they should be of interest to India too in view of the pending border dispute between India and China which has defied a resolution.

9. Since 1985, the Chinese have stopped expressing themselves in favour of a swap deal with India under which in return for an Indian acceptance of the status quo in the Western sector in the Ladakh area, Beijing will accept the status quo in the Eastern sector by recognising Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory. This package proposal was reportedly first made by the Chinese before the Sino-Indian war of 1962.It continued to be on the table even  the war till 1985.

10. Since 1985, they have been challenging the status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh area, describing it as southern Tibet and as disputed territory over which they continue to have sovereignty claims which need to be accommodated in their border negotiations with India. Details of the border talks are not available, but the speculation is they want a status quo minus solution in the Eastern sector under which India will concede their sovereignty over at least the Tawang area in which one of the previous Dalai Lamas was born, in return for their giving up their sovereignty claims over the rest of Arunachal Pradesh.

11.It is in this context that Mr.Xi’s reference to Tibet and “Tibet-related issues” as of core interest to China is significant. What did he mean by “Tibet-related” issues? Was he referring to China’s sovereignty claims over Arunachal Pradesh? It needs to be noted that in their interactions with India, the Chinese have not referred to their sovereignty claims over Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest for them. The Chinese definition of a core interest is one in which no concessions by them are possible.

12. Their border talks with India are based on the principle of mutual accommodation which means the possibility of some concessions by them. Not to exclude the possibility of such concessions, they have refrained from describing Arunachal Pradesh as a core issue in their interactions with India. Against this background, what did Mr.Xi mean by talking of “Tibet-related issues” as a core interest while speaking in the US? This needs to be  examined by Indian analysts in order  to look for possible  signs of Beijing deviating from its present policy of searching for a solution on the Arunachal Pradesh issue based on mutual accommodation.

13. There were two important statements indicating an inflexible line on territorial sovereignty issues on September 20 and 21,2012. In a despatch from Brussels, the “People’s Daily” quoted Prime Minister Wen Jiabao as stating on the sideline of a China-EU summit that China would make no concession in affairs concerning the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

14. The next day, when  addressing the opening ceremony of the China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit and Forum in Nanning, capital city of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Mr.Xi said: "We are firm in safeguarding China's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and are committed to resolving differences with neighbours concerning territorial land, territorial sea and maritime rights and interests peacefully through friendly negotiations."

15. These two statements indicated that the non-confrontational line projected by Mr.Xi in the US did not apply to China’s sovereignty disputes with some ASEAN countries in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea. While the statements related to China’s territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries and Japan, the formulations clearly showed that the inflexible line applied to all territorial disputes with all neighbours. If China is not prepared to make any concessions in territorial disputes as stated by Mr.Wen, where is the question of mutual accommodation on the Arunachal Pradesh issue? This should be a matter for added concern to India.

16. This hard line was reflected in an article carried by the “People’s Daily” on November 2,2012, a day after the final meeting of the 17th Central Committee started. The article was written by Mr.Wang Yusheng, Executive Director of the Strategic Research Centre of the  China Institute of International Research Foundation. It said: “The parties concerned know clearly that China advocates building a harmonious neighbourhood, but has inviolable “red lines.” If necessary, it will resort to force after trying peaceful means. The United States is just bluffing, and Japan and some other Asian countries are just taking advantage of U.S. influence to serve their own purposes. They may muddy the water in the Pacific, but cannot make big waves.”

17. Interestingly, news agency reports originating from Washington, on October 22,2012,quoting US State Department sources, said:

“ Chinese leaders did not refer to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands as a 'core national interest' during talks with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September in an apparent attempt to avoid a diplomatic clash with Washington, State Department sources have said.  

“While discussing territorial issues with Clinton in China, Premier Wen Jiabao did not make remarks suggesting that the disputed islands are part of its 'core national interests', a term Beijing uses to refer to key territories it is determined to hold onto or ultimately take control of, the sources said.

“The talks with Clinton  followed  a meeting in Beijing with Japan in May in which Jiabao told Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda that his country should respect China's core interests and major concerns, the Japan Times reported.

“According to the report,  the US had made it clear that the islands fall within the scope of the US-Japan security treaty, which would oblige Washington to support Japan if the islands came under attack.

“The uninhabited islands in the East China Sea also were not referred to as a core interest in Clinton's separate meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the sources said.

“While Beijing is not expected to soften its position on the row with Tokyo, it appears to be cautious about challenging Washington on security issues, the report said.”

18. Thus, on the eve of the 18^th Party Congress, the over-all Chinese line seems to be as follows:

 

(a).It looks upon its sovereignty claims over Taiwan, Tibet and “Tibet-related issues”  as of core interest and major concern. It has made this clear in formal official statements and is prepared for a military conflict if its interests are threatened, but it has not clarified what it means by Tibet-related issues.

(b). Since May,2010, it has informally indicated to the US its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea as of core interest, thereby not ruling out the use of force if its interests are threatened. However, there has been no formal declaration on this subject.

(c ). While continuing to reiterate its sovereignty claims in the East China Sea, it has refrained from characterising them as of core interest to avoid a military conflict with Japan which enjoys the protection of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the East China Sea.

19. This over-all core interest doctrine of China which evolved under the outgoing leadership of Mr.Hu is likely to continue after Mr.Xi takes over from Mr.Hu.

20. What impact this will have on the ongoing border talks between India and China? There are so far no indications to show that China might be contemplating to give up its adherence to the principle of mutual accommodation in finding a solution to its border dispute with India. The evolution of the Chinese thinking on this issue needs to be closely monitored. ( 6-11-2012)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

RAHUL GANDHI: SHOCKING ABSURDITY OF QUID PRO QUO IN MATTERS CONCERNING EXTERNAL AGRESSION

 

B.RAMAN

When a country is the victim of an external aggression or is involved in a military conflict with an adversary, all political parties forget their differences and join hands  for supporting the  Government and the Armed Forces in their efforts to defeat the enemy.

2.We saw this in Western Europe and the US  during the second World War. This has been the political tradition in India too since we became independent in 1947. Before the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, there was considerable opposition criticism of the way Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister, and V.K.Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, were handling our differences with China.

3. But once the Chinese troops  invaded India, all the opposition parties stopped their criticism of the Government and supported it and our Armed Forces in a total mark of solidarity.

4. We saw a similar demonstration of all-party solidarity behind the Congress Government when the Pakistani troops marched into the Jammu area in 1965 and after the outbreak of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. All the opposition parties forgot their differences with the Government and the Congress on various issues and supported it.

5. The BJP-led coalition under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was in power when the Pakistani troops intruded into the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir in 1999. Before the military conflict broke out in the Kargil area, the Congress Party, which was then in opposition, was strongly critical of the policies of the Vajpayee Government towards Pakistan and particularly Shri Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in the beginning of the year.

6. But once the conflict broke out, the Congress stopped its criticism of the Vajpayee Government and extended it total support, in keeping with the tradition of national solidarity at the time of an external aggression or during a military conflict with an adversary. If the Congress Party had not done so, it would have been an act of treason and betrayal of our Armed Forces.

7. One was shocked beyond measure by the manner in which Shri Rahul Gandhi , while addressing a Congress rally in New Delhi on November 4,2012, projected his party’s support for the Vajpayee Government and our Armed Forces during the Kargil military conflict with Pakistan, as if it was a political favour shown by the Congress to the BJP-led Government. It was not an act of political favour, but an act of patriotism and solidarity with the jawans of our Armed Forces who fought bravely in the Kargil Heights. (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/rahul-draws-flak-from-bjp-over-kargil-remark/20121104.htm  )

8.Shri Rahul Gandhi has found fault with the BJP for not reciprocating the support extended by the Congress during the external aggression in Kargil by supporting the Congress Party’s move to allow Foreign Direct Investment in the retail sector.

9. There is no question of  a quid pro quo for an act of patriotism and national solidarity in the face of an external enemy invading our country. It is surprising that Shri Rahul Gandhi is not able to see the difference between an act of patriotism and national solidarity and an act of domestic economic decision-making and tries to look for a quid pro quo for extending support against external aggression. ( 4-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

ON EVE OF CPC CONGRESS, CHINA EXAMINES ITS DIGITAL IMAGE

 

 

B.RAMAN

 

What the people think of their leadership and government will be increasingly reflected not in the traditional print and TV media, but in the digital media and in the blogs and micro-blogs of the digital world. The digital image of China in the international net community will increasingly influence governmental and non-governmental perceptions of China. Future prejudices of China will be born not in the columns of the print media and in the radio and TV reports, but in the mushrooming blogs and micro-blogs of the digital world. It is important for leaders and policy-makers to pay attention to what is being discussed in the digital world and to be able to interact with the digital world. Future stability will depend not only on what happens in the real world, but also on what happens in the digital world.

2. These are some of the features of the world of the 18^th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) being highlighted by the analysts of the prelude to the Congress which is starting at Beijing on November 8,2012. An article by Dennis Pamlin of 21st New Frontiers, a consultancy organization in Sweden, carried by the “China Daily” on November 2,2012, says:

“In the coming years China's image will be increasingly shaped in a connected world, a world in which people will not only be passive consumers of information, many of them will be active providers of information through different social media. In a connected world people will trust their social networks more than traditional media, and the social networks with the most trust will create a virtual image of China.

“This digital image of China will be determined by the images, stories, comments, blogs and videos posted online, rather than through the print media, television and radio. So China must pay attention to its "digital twin".

“In a connected world it is no longer enough to do good things and tell people about them, it is also necessary to engage in dialogue with people around the world. If China does not engage in these dialogues, its digital twin will end up distorted.

“We are rapidly moving into a hyper-connected society where transparency and enormous amounts of information are creating new opportunities and new challenges. In order to overcome the challenges and seize the opportunities it is important that China, and those with an understanding of China, explore new ways to encourage dialogue so that its digital twin is not shaped to suit others' agendas.” 

3. According to the “China Daily”, on November 1,2012, many party functionaries opened their own micro-blogs in their real names and started interacting directly with party cadres and people. One of those who has thus started interacting is Yu Zhengsheng, Secretary of the Shanfghai Municipal Committee of the CPC and a member of the CPC Politbureau, who is being tipped to join the new Standing Committee of the Politbureau as one of its seven members.

4. In a message posted on his micro-blog, he said: "It is the responsibility, instead of the power, that the official position gives to us. We're not special. We cannot be above the law. Assuming the responsibility of serving the people is the key of an official's work.” According to the “China Daily”, this is not the first time he is directly interacting through the web with party cadres and  the general public. He has been doing it before.

5.Zhang Qingli, secretary of the Hebei Provincial Committee of the CPC, said in his microblog: "We should provide a chance for people who have a desire to work, a stage for people with working capabilities, and important posts for those who have had achievements before. What we should do is to encourage diligent officials, criticize the ones who can only deliver lip service, and deal with those who create disorder on our team. We cannot arrange idle positions and feed idlers. The key is to implement what we say in conferences and write on documents."

6.Zhang Baoshun, secretary of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the CPC, microblogged:   “Officials at all levels should be modest and close to the public. Our posts and power are not for showing off. We'd better have more closeness to residents and avoid bureaucracy. As for fact-finding trips to grassroots areas, high-level officials should not ask people to accompany them. Instead, we should dispense with all unnecessary formalities, and not burden and disturb local people."

7. The China Daily has quoted Zhou Xiaopeng, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Sina, an online microblogging service, as saying that though many Chinese officials and governmental departments began to use micro blogs to interact with netizens two years ago, "it is only now that so many high-level officials interact with Web users via a popular online platform.”

8. In addition to encouraging the party functionaries and officials to use the social media sites for direct and continuous interactions with party cadres and the public, the Chinese Government has also been closely monitoring the use of these sites by foreign embassies in Beijing for digital interactions with the people in order to influence their perceptions.

9.The “China Daily” reported on November 3,2012:

“ The micro blogs have become an important platform for foreign governments to promote public diplomacy in China and pose an increasing influence on China's Internet, said the first research report on foreign governments' micro blogs in China, which was released on Friday. ( November 2)

“According to the report, the number of foreign government micro blogs surged in 2011, bringing the total by the end of June to 165 on the top four micro-blogging sites - Sina, Tencent, Netease and Sohu. Those of the United States and Britain were the most influential, said the report. "These micro blogs have cast enormous influence on the Chinese public, especially the Chinese netizen. The foreign governments promote not only their culture, education and tourism resources through the micro blogs, but also forge close interaction with Chinese netizens and opinion leaders on ideology," said Zhang Zhi'an, associate professor of the School of Communication and Design under Sun Yat-sen University. "Social media evokes public passion to talk about some serious issues which we don't often talk about in our daily life, and that's the way these foreign governments' micro blogs influence Chinese netizens in a subtle way that they didn't even notice," said Zhang, who led the research.

10.A t\rigidly-controlled State like China has realised the importance of direct interactions between policy-makers and social media users for perception management, for identifying and addressing the grievances of the people and for creating a greater level of trust and comfort between the people and the leadership. Because of our over-cautious and conservative policies relating to the use of social media networks for direct and active interaction with the people, we in India continue to treat them more as a source of danger than as an asset for building public confidence in the leadership and the policy-makers. There is an urgent need for a change in our attitudes and policies. ( 4-11-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

CHINA: NOT THE TIME FOR POLITICAL EXPERIMENTATION

 

 

B.RAMAN

The 18^th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is all set to meet at Beijing from November 8, 2012. Hu Jintao will be handing over as the General Secretary of the Party to Xi Jinping at the Congress and a new Standing Committee of the Politbureau, a new Politbureau and a new Central Committee will be elected at the Congress. They will be in office till the 19^th Congress  in 2017. Normally, a new Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Party should also be elected at the Congress.

2. Normally, the members of the new party organs are chosen through consensus by the outgoing Central Committee and formally elected by the new Congress. The outgoing party organs, which assumed office  at the 17^th Congress in 2007, are presently meeting in Beijing to reach a consensus on the composition of the new party organs to be formally elected next week and to approve the report on the work done by the outgoing organs for submission to the 18^th Congress.

3. Hu Jintao as the outgoing General Secretary and Xi Jinping as his successor should be playing the leading role in finalising the composition of the new party organs. Speculation from Beijing indicates that Jiang Zemin, a strong personality from Shanghai, who was the predecessor of Hu as the Party Secretary and as the Chairman of the Party CMC and who still wields considerable influence in the party circles in Shanghai,  has been playing an important role in the finalisation of the composition of the new party organs and that under his influence, a neo conservative political leadership, which wants to go slow on political reforms, seems to be well-poised to occupy key positions under Xi.

4. The importance of political reforms to sustain the economic reforms, which was the keynote of the policies advocated by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, has been given less importance in the deliberations preceding the new Party Congress. Improving people’s livelihood, incremental political reforms and innovative democracy are the keynotes of the new policy being advocated.

5. Any idea of a multi-party democracy is firmly rejected. The firm leadership of the Communist party, the modernisation of the functioning of the party and the improvement of inner party democracy to provide for greater transparency in its functioning, better choice for the party cadres in the election of the party functionaries and greater accountability of the functionaries to the cadres and the people are now stressed as the new features of innovative democracy.

6. The new party functionaries, who are expected to take over under XI, are projected in the speculation as  advocates of a play safe policy in respect of political reforms. Economic and political stability and not political experimentation will be their objective.

7. In an article published on November 3,2012 , the “People’s Daily”, the party daily, said: “The social unrest caused by Russia’s “shock therapy,” Latin America’s “radical reform,” or certain African countries’ copying of the U.S. political system proves that slavish imitation of Western democracy will lead to turmoil. Democracy takes various forms according to different national condition, and good democracy should first suit a country’s national conditions. China has attached great importance to the people’s livelihood and incremental reform, and pursued suitable democracy through gradual innovation in a pragmatic manner. Democracy is not only a system of government, but also a way of life which meets people’s needs. Admittedly, as public awareness of the rights to know and participate as well as the rule of law increases, democracy in China has not reached the level many people expect. However, the country is making steady progress in improving its democracy.”

8. Thus, the new party leadership, which will be taking over next week, is trying to reduce expectations of a Chinese spring or a brave new world of Chinese democracy. This is not the time for political experimentation. That is the message that has been coming out from Beijing. ( 3-11-12)

 

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

THE PRO-MRS.THAROOR MOBILISATION OF TV ANCHORS

 

B.RAMAN

 

Immediately after I came to know of the shocking remarks made by Shri Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, on Mrs.Sunanda Tharoor, wife of Shri Shashi Tharoor, the re-inducted member of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, I had tweeted that I considered his remarks uncultured for any audience and were unworthy of someone who sees himself as a possible future Prime Minister. I stand by these views.

2.Both Shri Tharoor and his wife had every right to counter the unworthy remarks of Shri Modi in strong language. Shri Tharoor did so the same day and the TV  channels rightly gave due prominence to what he said in their coverage.

3.At the same time, I would be failing in my sense of propriety and rectitude if I did not admit my disgust at the manner in which an unseen influence mobilised some TV anchors of our private channels on October 31 to interview Mrs.Tharoor and to give her an opportunity to project her views relating to the controversy in general and Shri Modi in particular.

4. There were five newsworthy items on October 31--- the brave manner in which the Tamil Nadu people and Administration were facing the Nilam cyclone, the allegations made by Shri Arvind Kejriwal of India Against Corruption (IAC) against Shri Mukesh Ambani and the Government, the aftermath of the Sandy hurricane in the US, the likely impact of Sandy on the US Presidential elections and the anniversary of the assassination of Indira Gandhi. The TV channels correctly gave prominence to their coverage some of these items.

5.The time and prominence that were given to the interview of Mrs.Tharoor were definitely uncalled for and uncouth. One had an impression that more time was devoted to her interview than to the sufferings and fortitude of the people of Tamil Nadu because of the cyclone. The TV channels seemed to consider interviewing Mrs. Tharoor and projecting her views more important than projecting the traumatic moments faced by the people of Tamil Nadu as they awaited the cyclone.

6. Every time you switched on the TV to get the latest on the cyclone, you had visuals of Mrs.Tharoor being interviewed by  obliging and fawning anchors. Some of our TV anchors are known for their propensity to fawn, but I had an impression that I had rarely seen such fawning as I saw during the interview of Mrs.Tharoor on October 31.

7. Where was their professionalism? Where was their sense of dignity? Where was their news sense? Was the orchestrated projection of Mrs. Tharoor that we saw more important than recalling the painful moments after the assassination of Mrs.Indira Gandhi by two of  her security guards?

8. It was a day of infamy for our TV channels. Whose is that unseen and unfelt influence that organised and orchestrated all this? ( 1-11-12)

WILL HU JINTAO EMULATE JIANG & RETAIN CONTROL OF PLA AFTER PARTY TRANSITION?

 

 

B.RAMAN

 

There are two Central Military Commissions (CMC) in China----the Party Central Military Commission and the State Central Military Commission. The party CMC is the more important of the two. It acts as the interface between the Armed Forces and the Communist Party of China CPC) and makes recommendations to the Party leadership in matters such as declaration of war and peace, declaration of an internal emergency or martial law and deployment of the Armed Forces inside and outside the country.

 2. The State CMC exercises professional control over these forces. In China, the Defence Ministry does not exercise this professional control. It is essentially responsible for military diplomacy and handles military-military relationships with other countries.

3. The Party  CMC was created under the first Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1954 after abolishing the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission which had been set up when the formation of the PRC was proclaimed in 1949. The State CMC was created under the fourth Constitution in 1982.

4.The Party CMC reports to the Central Committee and the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The State CMC reports to the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is China’s Parliament.

5.The following have been the Chairmen of the Party CMC since it was created by the first Constitution in 1954:

Mao Zedong, September 1954 - September 1976

 Hua Guofeng, October 1976 - June 1981

 Deng Xiaoping, June 1981 - November 1989

 Jiang Zemin, November 1989 - September 2004

 Hu Jintao, September 2004 – Present.

6. The following have been the Chairmen of the State CMC since it was created by the fourth Constitution in 1982:

Deng Xiaoping, June 1983 - April 1990

 Jiang Zemin, April 1990 - March 2005

Hu Jintao---Since March 2005.

7. There are three important posts in China----the General Secretary of the CPC which gives the incumbent control over the party, the Chairman of the Party CMC which gives the incumbent control over the armed forces and the President of the State which gives control  over the State apparatus. During the period when Deng was considered the paramount ruler of China, it became evident that of these three posts, that of the Chairman of the Party CMC is the most important. Deng never officially held the posts of General Secretary of the CPC and the President of the State, but he held the post of the Chairman Of the Party CMC from  June 28 1981 to November 9,1989.

8.Zhao Ziyang, who was the General Secretary of the CPC from January 16, 1987 to  June 23, 1989, before he was removed  for his perceived softness towards the student demonstrators of the Tienanmen     Square in June 1989, was reported to have told Mikhail Gorbachev during the latter’s visit to Beijing that though he was designated the General Secretary of the CPC, the real power vested in Deng in his capacity as the Chairman of the Party CMC.

9. Jiang Zemin took over as the General Secretary of the CPC on June 24,1989, after the removal of Zhao and continued till November 15,2002, when he handed over to Hu Jintao. He held office as the President of China from March 27,  1993 to   March 15, 2003 when he handed over to Hu. He held office as the Chairman of the Party CMC from November 9, 1989 to  September 19, 2004 when he handed over to Hu. He held office as the Chairman of the State CMC from March 19,1990 to March 8,2005, when he handed over to Hu.

10. Thus, between November 15,2002 ,and September 19,2004, Hu had the control of the Party and the State apparatus, but did not control the Armed Forces, since Jiang continued to hold office as the Chairman of the Party CMC. Was it an unilateral decision by Jiang or was it supported by the CPC? What were the circumstances that led to Jiang continuing to function as the Chairman of the Party CMC? The answers to these questions are not clear. It is however, evident that Hu was not totally trusted to exercise control over the Armed Forces for nearly two years after he had taken over as the CPC General Secretary.

11.A speculation at that time was that the so-called Shanghai clique, including Jiang, which was in a majority in the Standing Committee of the Politbureau, did not trust Hu who is not from Shanghai and preferred that Jiang continued to control the armed forces even after handing over control of the Party to Hu. It was speculated that the  professionals in the PLA found it increasingly odd having to report to Jiang when Hu was the party chief. Ultimately, Jiang was persuaded or pressured to hand over to Hu as the Chairman of the Party CMC. Since September 19,2004, Hu is the effective head of the Party, the Armed Forces and the State apparatus.

12. According to published information, the present composition of the Party CMC is as follows:

Chairman: Hu Jintao  (since September 2004)

Vice Chairmen:

General Guo Boxiong (since November 2002).Age 70.In charge of weapons and logistics

General Xu Caihou (since September 2004).Age 69. Responsible for political and ideological affairs in the Armed Forces.

Xi Jinping (also Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party, Vice President of the People's Republic of China) (since October 2010)

Members:

Minister of National Defense - General Liang Guanglie. Age 72.Due to retire at the 18^th Party Congress starting on November 8,2012. (since November 2002)

Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and Commander of the PLA Army — General Chen Bingde (since September 2004).Age 71

 Director of the General Political Department — General Li Jinai (since November 2002). Age 70

 Director of the General Logistics Department — General Liao Xilong (since November 2002) .Age 72

 Director of the General Armament Department — General Chang Wanquan (since October 2007). Age 63

 Commander of the PLA Navy — Admiral Wu Shengli (since October 2007). Age 67

 Commander of the PLA Air Force — Air Force General Xu Qiliang (since October 2007) .Age 62

Commander of the Second Artillery Corps — General Jing Zhiyuan (since September 2004). Age 68.

13.On the eve of the 18^th Party Congress starting on November 8,2012, the following postings have been announced:

General Zhang Youxia ( Age 62) to replace Gen. Chang Wanquan as Director of the General Armament Department.

General Fang Fenghui  ( Age 61) to replace Gen. Chen Bingde as Director of the General Staff Department.

General Ma Xiaotian (Age 63 ) to replace Gen. Xu Qiliang as Commander of the PLA Air Force.

General Zhang Yang ( Age 61) to replace Gen. Li Jinai as Director of the General Political Department.

Gen.Zhao Keshi ( Age 64) to replace Gen.Liao Xilong as Director of the General Logistics Department.

14.The five new incumbents are expected to take their place as members of the Party CMC. General Chang Wanquan is tipped to be promoted  as a Vice Chairman of the Party CMC and a Member of the 18th Politburo of the CPC.

 15.On October 26,2012, the PLA Daily and the “China Daily News” commented as follows on the key postings announced on the eve of the 18^th CPC Congress:

　“The People's Liberation Army announced key appointments in a major reshuffle that experts and observers said reflects its determination to continue its modernization drive.

“Four generals — Fang Fenghui, Zhang Yang, Zhao Keshi and Zhang Youxia — were named to lead four key PLA departments: general staff, general political, general logistics and general armaments.

“All held leadership positions at major military commands.

“Ma Xiaotian was recently named commander of the Air Force after holding the post of deputy chief of the general staff.

“The reshuffle won't change the country's military strategy as the appointments are not decided by any individual but the top leadership as a whole, said Xiong Guangkai, a retired general who was deputy chief of the general staff in the 1990s.

“It is the Central Military Commission that makes such personnel decisions," Xiong said.

"Like the country, the PLA is under collective leadership. So unlike some other nations, the PLA's strategy and policies are not going to change with changes in personnel."

“Teng Jianqun, research director of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, said the reshuffle reflects the leadership's emphasis on the experience of senior military commanders, especially at a time of regional tension.

“Their careers almost follow the same path," Teng said.

“All four are generals from the PLA ground force and have achieved their rank through merit and worked their way up.

“For example, Fang joined the PLA in 1968 when he was 16. He served more than 34 years in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. Fang became the commander of the Beijing Military Command, which covers part of North China, in 2007.

“Zhang Youxia, who takes over the responsibility of improving the PLA's weaponry and technology, is the son of Zhang Zongxun, one of the first PLA generals who achieved their ranks in 1955. This makes Zhang and his father the second such pair to achieve the rank.

“Li Qinggong, deputy secretary-general of the national security policy commission of the China Association of Policy and Science, said that all of the four newly appointed chiefs are veteran and strategists as they were promoted from major command areas.

“"As the leader of a military command area, it is necessary to think strategically and understand the overall picture," Li said, adding these appointments will also ensure that the top leadership know more about the situation at basic units in the armed forces.

“The appointments follow the steps of Ma Xiaotian, who was recently named commander of the Air Force.

“Education and extensive combat experience are common traits, retired general Xiong said. He cited the example of Ma, who used to attend training lessons with Xiong at a military academy.

“"Ma is an incredible pilot and studied at military academies. He used to be president of the National Defense University."

“Other top military posts were reshuffled recently in a move analysts said injects new blood and enhances the army's leadership.

“Wang Guanzhong, former head of the general office of the Central Military Commission, and Qi Jianguo, who was an assistant to the chief of the general staff and a veteran of the border war between China and Vietnam, was promoted to deputy chief of the general staff. ( My comment: This sentence is not very clear. There is apparently a typo )

“Li, from the China Association of Policy and Science, said that Wang might be the first Chinese military officer at his level with a doctorate.

“"Degrees are a trend in the PLA. At the grassroots there are numerous officers who have a master's or doctoral degree, while many of them even obtained diplomas from overseas institutes, which we could hardly imagine in the past."

“The Takungpao newspaper in Hong Kong said in a commentary on Wednesday that the reshuffle opens a window on the PLA leadership on the eve of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which will start on Nov 8.

“The appointed officers are mostly around the age of 60, which means they have spent about 40 years in the PLA and have extensive experience in various positions.

“That is conductive to the smooth transition of the military leadership ahead of, and after, the 18th CPC National Congress, the paper said.”

16.At the monthly press conference of the Ministry of National Defence held on the afternoon of October 25, a reporter asked  how the Defence Ministry would  comment on the reshuffle  in the PLA high level and whether the reshuffle aimed to strengthen exchanges between the PLA general headquarters/departments and the military area commands of the PLA.

17.Spokesman Yang Yujun, who is also deputy director of the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defence, said that the  reshuffle is normal personnel changes and over-interpretation from the public is not expected.

18. Despite his cautionary advice against over-interpretation of the reshuffle which he projected as a normal rotation of senior officers, it would be seen as  significant from the internal as well as the external points of view.

19. Internally, it would be seen as an attempt by Hu Jintao to retain the Chairmanship of the Party CMC after handing over as General Secretary of the Party and the State President to Xi Jinping till such time as the criminal trial of Bo Xilai, the party leader from Chonquing, is over and he has been convicted. Hu would be seen to have placed in position officers who would support his continuing to hold charge as the Chairman of the Party CMC. It remains to be seen whether the new Party leadership under XI would support this.

20. Externally, it would be seen as an attempt to place officers with extensive command experience, who have been playing a role in the modernisation of the Armed Forces, in key positions in view of the tensions in the South China and East China Seas due to frictions with some ASEAN powers and Japan over territorial sovereignty issues and the increasing role that the USA is seeking to play in the Asia-Pacific region. ( 31-10-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TSUNAMI & HURRICANE SANDY—LEST WE FORGET

 

B.RAMAN

 

Our prayers are with the people on USA’s Eastern Coast who have been living through nightmarish experiences as they are threatened with hurricane Sandy. It has brought life almost to a standstill, but fortunately there has been no humanitarian disaster of the kind that the Tsunami of December 2004 inflicted on the people of Chennai, coastal Tamil Nadu, the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Southern Thailand and some of the islands of Indonesia.

2.Barring Indonesia, the rest of the areas were hit by a Tsunami for the first time in their history. Many of us did not even know what had hit us when we suddenly found huge waves taking away thousands of people who were near the sea shore.

3.As I keep reading the Tweets of Barkha Dutt, Group editor of NDTV, who is presently in the Brown University on the Rhode Island, regarding the progress of the hurricane and its feared aftermath and watching  the brave coverage  of  Sarah Jacob of NDTV from the streets and restaurants of New York, my mind goes back to the hours after the Tsunami struck us.

4.Some brave young journalists and officials were the first to reach the affected areas to assist the disaster-struck people and keep the world informed of the magnitude of the disaster. Sheela Bhatt of Rediff.com and Suhasini Haidar, then working for CNN, New Delhi, rushed to the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, which were practically cut off from the rest of India. Barkha Dutt  rushed to coastal Tamil Nadu where  many villages were swept away by the waves and thousands of poor fishermen were killed by the marauding waves. Lyse Doucet of BBC co-ordinated the coverage from all the affected areas---initially from Tamil Nadu and subsequently from Indonesia.

5. Many young officers of the Governments of Tamil Nadu and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands rose to the occasion in a brilliant manner despite the fact that our Governments had never prepared a crisis management drill for dealing with Tsunamis since we had never experienced a Tsunami before. There was  global recognition of the remarkable work done by them.

6.The Indian and US Navies together mounted a massive humanitarian relief operation in south India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia.

7.When memories of the disaster were still fresh, Governmental and non-Governmental organisations  in the US undertook a systematic documentation of the Tsunami experience so that a data-base of knowledge and experience was available for the future.

8.One would have expected a similar exercise to document our Tsunami experience. Unfortunately, we never did it. In 2005, I was associated as Distinguished Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) of New Delhi. I proposed to the late Shri R.K.Mishra, the then head of the ORF, that we in the ORF undertake such an exercise. He reacted positively, but I found within six monthsiof the Tsunami disaster a total lack of interest and co-operation for the project, which failed to take off.

9. I do not know whether the National Maritime Foundation of  our Navy has undertaken such an exercise for documentation. If not, it is time for it to do so. ( 30-10-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)