PM: NEED TO PROJECT A NEW LEADERSHIP STYLE

 

B.RAMAN

During the eight years that the Congress-led coalition has been in office, the country has moved forward in many directions. It enjoys a greater stature in the international community than ever before. For the first time, India came to be looked upon as a budding equal of China. Many started talking of the phenomenon of Chindia--- China and India rising together to occupy their due place in the international community.

2.The positive “We Can” feeling generated by the achievements of the Manmohan Singh Government in its first term in office has since given way to a negative atmosphere. This has been due to leadership inadequacies, the weakening of the image and authority of the Prime Minister, moral and administrative permissiveness in the name of coalition compulsions giving rise to widespread perceptions of corruption galore and stalling in the introduction of  the much-needed economic reforms.

3. The Prime Minister’s televised address to the nation on September 21,2012, clearly indicated that he has realised the need for changing this negative atmosphere and projecting an “ I Can and I will” image of himself to the people of the country. A brief address like this could not have been comprehensive. He focussed himself largely on the economic issues and did not touch upon other burning issues of the day like action to deal with corruption and improve governance through administrative reforms. Such reforms would have to be in the functioning of our anti-corruption and national security apparatus.

4. It is important for him to interact with the people again on the issues of action against corruption and administrative reforms. He could do so either through another address to the nation devoted only to these two subjects or through a televised live chat with distinguished journalists.------ either individually or with all  of them in a group. The journalists should be given the freedom to decide the format of the chat and the issues that will be discussed. The Prime Minister’s Office should resist the temptation to steer the chat in a direction favourable to the Government.

5. I would not say that the Prime Minister’s address to the nation has made public perceptions more favourable to him, but it has at least placed before the people his view of the state of the nation and what he intends doing about it. Till now, the public was exposed only to the constant negative campaign of the opposition, particularly the BJP.

6. The failure of the Prime Minister and  his party to realise the importance of an appropriate media strategy that could take advantage of the new technologies and new techniques of perception management has been exploited by the BJP and its NRI followers to assume their dominance over the new media in the virtual world and add to the negative image of the Prime Minister and his Government.

7. It is important for the Congress to break this dominance and establish a level playing field. The image of a Government which is all the time reticent, over-cautious and over-defensive has to be changed quickly. We need the image of a Government that is self-confident, self-assertive and forward-moving.

8. Policies and actions are important for achieving an image transformation, but a style of more accessible, more articulate, more responsive, more spontaneous and more forthcoming approach to interactions with the public and the media is equally important. We live in a world where style is as important as substance, but the Prime Minister and his Government have for too long neglected paying attention to the style of leadership.

9. There is a need for an urgent mid-course correction in the way the Prime Minister projects himself to public opinion and makes himself available for explaining the thinking and policies of his Government. He should not think that with his televised address to the nation he has done his job. He has only begun his new task. He has to press forward and transform the negative atmosphere into a positive one. (24-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE BASE IN COLOMBO

 

 

B.RAMAN

In an article written on June 12,2004, I had inter alia stated as follows:

“ For its intelligence-collection and covert action operations directed against India, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) uses four external bases - Kathmandu, Dubai, Bangkok and Colombo.

“While Kathmandu and Dubai are used by the ISI for intelligence collection as well as covert actions, Bangkok is used as an alternate sanctuary and as a clandestine meeting place to brief and debrief its agents in India. After the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, the ISI had the perpetrators of the terrorist attack shifted to Bangkok from Karachi and kept them there for some time in different hotels in order to prevent the detection of their links with the ISI by the US diplomatic missions in Pakistan, which were enquiring into Indian allegations in this regard.

“Past evidence indicated that the main interest of the ISI in using Colombo as a base was to collect intelligence about developments in sensitive Indian nuclear and missile establishments, many of which are located in South India, particularly in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

 

“For collecting intelligence about these establishments, the ISI generally uses Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking Muslims visiting India as well as South Indians visiting Colombo. Colombo also serves as a convenient transit point for arranging clandestine visits of Indians co-operating with the ISI to Karachi by the flights of the Pakistan International Airlines without any entry of their visits in their passports.

“There has been no evidence so far of the ISI using Colombo as a base for covert actions directed against India. However, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has been showing increasing interest in taking jihad to the Muslims of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. There have been persistent reports of the beginning of a radicalisation of small sections of the Tamil-speaking Muslim youth of the Eastern Province. During the riots in the Eastern Province in the middle of 2002, pamphlets in the name of a so-called Osama Brigade came to notice. The Chennai media had reported subsequently that some members of an organisation called the Muslim Defence Force (MDF) arrested by the Chennai Police had been in touch with one Abu Hamza of the LET based in the Gulf and that they were to meet him clandestinely in Sri Lanka. However, the meeting did not materialise as Abu Hamza did not come.

“The LET is very close to the ISI and it would not have taken its initial moves to explore the possibility of using Sri Lanka as a clandestine base for its activities and for creating sleeper cells there without the knowledge and prior clearance of the ISI.

 

“The recent investigations into the clandestine nuclear proliferation activities of A.Q.Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistan atom bomb, have revealed that Bukhary Seyed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan Tamil Muslim of Indian origin, married in Malaysia and with business interests in Kuala Lumpur and Dubai, was one of the external kingpins of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear procurement network. In a speech at the National Defence University of Washington DC in February last, President Bush had described this Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking Muslim as the "chief financial officer and money-launderer" of A.Q.Khan's clandestine operations.

“In the past, the ISI had posted its officers in junior and middle level clerical posts as well as in diplomatic posts in the Pakistani High Commission in Colombo. While it had never posted its officers as the head of the Pakistani diplomatic mission, Hussain Haqqani, a journalist who was then allegedly close to the ISI, was posted as the Pakistani High Commissioner to Sri Lanka during the first tenure of Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister (1990-93).

“The "Jang", the Urdu daily of Pakistan, has now reported that the Pervez Musharraf regime has decided to post Col (retd) Bashir Wali, former Director of the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau (IB), as the new High Commissioner to Sri Lanka. It is not clear at what stage is the proposal. Has his name been already sent to the Sri Lankan Government for agrement? If so, has the Sri Lankan Government given its consent?

 

“The IB is part of Pakistan's Ministry of the Interior. Like its Indian counterpart, it used to be a largely Police organisation, but since the days of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq, there has been a gradual militarisation of the organisation. Musharraf has made it for all practical purposes a wing of the ISI, with Lt.Gen.Ehsan-ul-Haq, the Director-General of the ISI, exercising powers of supervision and co-ordination over it.

“It was reported in the Pakistani media last year that Musharraf had tried to send Brig. (retd) Ejaz Shah, who used to handle Omar Sheikh, the accused in the kidnapping and murder case of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist,in the ISI as the Pakistani High Commissioner to Australia, but the Australian Government did not reportedly give its agrement. He then tried to send him as Ambassador to Indonesia, which also did not give its agrement. It has recently been reported that he has since been posted to the IB to supervise operations relating to India.

“If the "Jang" report is correct, the posting of a former Director of the IB to Colombo as High Commissioner could have serious implications for India's national security. The Government of India should immediately express its concerns to the Sri Lankan Government and oppose his being based in Colombo. “

2. Subsequently, on June 18,2004, I wrote as follows:

 

"The Island", a daily of Sri Lanka, has reported as follows on June 17,2004: "Pakistan with the concurrence of Sri Lanka has appointed Colonel (retd) Bashir Wali as Islamabad's top envoy here, Sri Lankan and Pakistan High Commission officials said. "He is expected to take over the mission before end of this month," an official said. "We don't see any reason to disagree with Pakistan's choice," the official said, dismissing concerns over the planned appointment among a section of political analysts in India."

“For Col. Wali, this would be the second posting in the Pakistani High Commission in Colombo. He had earlier served as the head of the Pakistani intelligence set-up in the High Commission in the 1990s and then as an intelligence officer in the Pakistani High Commission in London.

“It was during his previous stay in Colombo that  Al Ummah, the terrorist organisation of Tamil Nadu, expanded its activities in Tamil Nadu and Kerala and , during his stay in London, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) set up secret cells in the UK to recruit volunteers for its jihadi terrorist operations from amongst the members of the Muslim community in the UK. This ultimately led to a ban on the LET by the British Government.

“It is reported that Col. Wali was and still is an active member of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), which acts as the cover organisation of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the LET, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and helps them in their recruitment of cadres not only in Pakistan, but also in other countries of the world. During his earlier stay in Colombo, he had reportedly sent a number of Tamil Muslims from the Eastern Province to Karachi to study in the Binori madrasa on scholarships provided by the TJ. Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of this madrasa, who was considered the mentor and god father of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and the Pakistani jihadi and anti-Shia organisations, was assassinated by unidentified elements in Karachi on May 30,2004.

“While in Pakistan, Col. Wali used to attend regularly the annual conventions of the LET at Muridke, near Lahore, and was also attached to the Taliban as an adviser for some months in the 1990s. He was considered a protege of Brig (retd).Imtiaz, who headed the political division of the ISI during the tenure of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq, and had helped Imtiaz in running the ISI operations for training the terrorists from India's Punjab in Pakistani territory and arming them.

“When Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1988, she sacked Imtiaz, who was taken by Nawaz, the then Chief Minister of Pakistani Punjab, as his intelligence adviser. After the sacking of Benazir by the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990, Nawaz, on taking over as the Prime Minister, appointed Imtiaz as the Director of the IB, a post which has since been upgraded as Director-General. Imtiaz took Wali into the IB and made him responsible for assisting the terrorists in Punjab and J&K. The training of the terrorists from Mumbai, responsible for  the  blasts of March,1993, was allegedly organisded by him on behalf of the ISI in association with Dawood Ibrahim, the mafia leader, who was designated by the US in October last year as an international terrorist because of his linkages with Al Qaeda and the LET.

“ Now that the Sri Lankan Government seems to have confronted India with a fait accompli by agreeing to the appointment of a die-hard anti- Indian sponsor of terrorism against India as the head of the Pakistani diplomatic mission in Colombo, India has to carefully analyse the implications of his presence in Colombo and take the necessary follow-up action. His presence in Colombo will pose a threat not only to India's national security, but also to stability and law and order in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province. “

3.On August 14,2006,seven persons, including four special commandos of the Special Diplomatic Security Unit, providing VVIP escort to the vehicle of Col.(retd) Bashir Wali  were killed in a three-wheeler explosion that targeted the military convoy that was escorting the diplomatic vehicle of Col.Bashir Wali  in the heart of Colombo city, on Flower Road in Kolpity. Col. Wali escaped unhurt and was subsequently withdrawn to Pakistan.

4.Commenting on the incident, I wrote as follows:

“Since taking over as the Pakistani High Commissioner in Colombo, he ( Col.Wali) has been very active in promoting military-military relationship between Sri Lanka and Pakistan and liaison between the intelligence agencies of the two countries. “ It was suspected that the LTTE targeted him because of this.

5.The Indian media has reported last week the arrest of a suspected spy of an ISI officer posted in Colombo by the Tamil Nadu Police. Our media has stated as follows:  “The arrest of Dhameem Anzari, the alleged spy nabbed while attempting to pass on sensitive information to the ISI in Colombo, has reportedly exposed an increase in the activities of the Pakistan intelligence agency in Sri Lanka. Anzari had reportedly confessed to Q Branch police during initial interrogation that the ISI, which operated out of the Pakistani Embassy in Colombo, had increased its activities of monitoring the southern states of India. Police said Anzari (35), son of Abdul Rahman of Thanjavur, went to the Pakistan consulate (High Commission in Colombo) and met Boss alias Ameer Subbiah Siddique, said to be the man in charge of the TN unit of the ISI at the Consulate. Ameer reportedly had asked Anzari to get him security details of installations in India, especially TN, and promised a hefty sum in return. He tried to send the information online but it failed to reach Ameer. So, he was waiting to hand it over to Ameer personally. Anzari took footage and photos of security installations in South India and reportedly told several acquaintances that he was making a movie to portray how secure India was.”

6.While the activities of the ISI and the Pakistani IB from the Pakistani High Commission in Colombo have been well known in the past, this is possibly the first time a suspected Tamil agent of the ISI operated from Colombo has been caught. He needs to be thoroughly interrogated to establish whether he was operating alone or was part of a network.

7.In the light of the details ascertained from him, our counter-intelligence capability for monitoring the activities of the Pakistani intelligence from their station in Colombo needs to be reviewed to remove any loopholes.

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

 

 

A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE:STATESMANLIKE, NON-PARTISAN & NON-APOLOGETIC

 

B.RAMAN

The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, whose Government is left with less than two years in office addressed the nation on the night of September 21,2012.

2. He has been addressing the people from the Red Fort on the Independence Day every year. He had also briefly addressed the people on the TV after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.

3. His televised address of September 21, 2012, had a different context and a different purpose. The context was the growing negative atmosphere in the country partly as a result of his own sins of commission and omission in providing effective and inspiring leadership to the country during his second tenure as the Prime Minister that started in  2009.The negative atmosphere was also partly the result of the concerted efforts of the opposition led by the BJP to exploit the economic and other difficulties faced by the country to destroy the credibility of his Government and of him as a leader.

4. The BJP and other Hindutva elements have been constantly trying to project him as a non-leader, who has neither the stature nor the will  nor the ability nor the powers to govern. They have been projecting him as a Prime Minister on sufferance kept in office by Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress Party, in order to enjoy the powers of office  without the accountability for its record.

5. The purpose was to explain to the people the state of the national economy against the background of the global economic meltdown and the rationale for some unpopular economic decisions taken by his Government last week to reverse the slow-down in the economy. These decisions, inter alia, related to the increase in diesel prices to reduce the fiscal deficit in the short term and to permit foreign direct investment  in multi-brand retail and civil aviation in order to revive the interest of the foreign businessmen in investing in India. The purpose was also to convey a clear message to the foreign investors that India is still a vigorously on-going story and not a story that has petered out.

6. Thus, his message was simultaneously addressed to two audiences---Indian and global. His message to the Indian audience was that “I am the Prime Minister of India, I started the Indian economic miracle between 1991 and 96,I have a responsibility to take the miracle forward despite the temporary difficulties, I am determined to do so and my ability to do so would depend on your support.”

7. He explained the rationale for the recent economic decisions in lucid terms, admitted that these are hard and unpopular decisions and sought the people’s understanding and support. His message for understanding and co-operation was not addressed to the political class---neither in his own party nor in the opposition. It was directly addressed to the people in his capacity as the Prime Minister responsible for the governance of the country.

8.His message to the global audience sought to highlight his determination to give a fresh momentum to the economic reforms of which he was the architect between 1991 and 1996 and to make India investor-friendly once again.

9. While the purpose of his message to both the audiences was loud and clear, his ability to translate that message into action is not. That ability would depend upon to what extent he has been able to convince his own party on the need for hard decisions and to what extent he can depend on its backing for mobilising the support of the people.

10. The country has been passing through not only severe economic difficulties, but also a crisis of confidence and national self-esteem caused by widespread allegations of corruption, nepotism and malgovernance. Large sections of the people, rightly or wrongly, share the views of the detractors of the Prime Minister that he and his party have brought the country to the present  pass.

11.He is the leader of the Government, but not the leader of the party. His word is not law in the party. It is Mrs.Sonia Gandhi’s word that prevails in the party and not his. That is the public perception. Not unjustified.

12. It was a statesmanlike address, dignified, non-partisan, non-polemic and non-apologetic. To deliver  an address of such high quality marked by determination is easy, but to translate it into action is not. Translating it into action would depend on his determination to assert himself as the Prime Minister in the remaining months of his office and to function as he ought to function. Till now the public perception has been that he has been the most non-assertive Prime Minister the country has had.

13. To reverse that perception, he has to convey a clear message to Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and the party----thus far and no further. His message needed to be addressed to a third audience---Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and  the Congress Party.  That he could not have done in a televised address to the nation. He has to convey his message separately to Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and the Party. He has already made it clear to them that there can be no roll-back on the hard economic decisions already taken. He has to make it clear now that more hard decisions are required and he is determined to take them.

14.He has also to convey a clear message to the other political parties in the opposition as well as in his own ruling coalition. He must make it clear to them  that if they do not co-operate he and the Congress will not hesitate to seek a fresh mandate of the people by going for premature elections, if necessary.

15. If the Prime Minister has to translate his message into action, he and his party should rid themselves of the fear of premature elections. If they win and come back with a renewed mandate, well and good. If they do not, let whoever wins take over the responsibility for pulling the country out of its difficulties. (22-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

ANTI-US MUSLIM ANGER IN CHENNAI: YOUTH & CLERGY JOIN HANDS

 

B.RAMAN

 

The obnoxious anti-Muslim film produced by someone in the US and disseminated through the Internet has already caused five days of daily ant-US demonstrations in Chennai.

2.Muslim youth of Chennai did not react in such a vigorous manner over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, during the visit of former US President George Bush to India in 2006 and against the cartoons published by a Danish journal in September 2005 projecting the Holy Prophet of Islam in negative colours.

3.The surprisingly angry reaction of the Muslim youth this time could be attributed partly to  the fact that the film is much,much more obnoxious than the Danish cartoons and partly to the feeling that the Government of India has not reacted against the film as vehemently as it should have. The anger in sections of the Muslim youth of Chennai also reflects the growth of religious activism among the Muslim youth in educational institutions and the dilution of the control of the elders of the community over the angry youth.

4. There are over 20 Muslim organisations in Tamil Nadu with different political agendas and objectives. The Muslim political consciousness movement in Tamil Nadu has been widely splintered. It continues to be so. However, whereas the elders constituting the leadership of these organisations are still splintered, the youth of these organisations have shown a readiness to come  together and work jointly for common Islamic causes.

5. The anger of the youth belonging to different organisations ( their number is estimated at around 5000 ) has had certain characteristics that need attention. Initially, the expression of anger started in the colleges and subsequently it spread to schools. The protests attracted a  number of Muslim women from colleges and schools who took to the streets in solidarity with the boys. On the fifth day on September 18,2012, some of the clergy in charge of prayers in  some of the main mosques of the city were also reported to have joined.

6.On the evening of September 18, when the elders tried to persuade the youth to go back to their mosques for their evening prayers, many of them in a spontaneous gesture of Islamic solidarity prayed in the middle of the Anna Salai (road) totally disrupting traffic. An incident like this has not happened  before.  Details of the protests on all the five days underline the difficulties increasingly faced by the elders of the community in persuading the youth not to violate the law in expressing their anger.

7. The youth disregarding the appeals of the elders violated the law in various ways --- like acts of vandalism in and around the US Consulate-General on the first day, burning in the streets US flags and pictures of President Barack Obama on all the days and clashes with the police when they tried to prevent them from marching to the Consulate. The Chennai Police seemed to have been taken by surprise by the intensity of the anger and by the orchestrated manner in which attempts were made to give expression to it.

8. While there was apparently an attempt at competitive instigation of the anger by different organisations and youth groups from different educational institutions, the anger was kept directed against the US Government and President Obama without letting it degenerate into anger against US nationals living and working in Chennai. The anger was directed against the US Consulate as representing the US government, but not against other US establishments such as business houses.

9. The youth leaders also saw to it that the anger did not assume a communal dimension. There seems to be an anxiety among some leaders of the Muslim community that the anger could assume a communal dimension in the coming days as the Vinayak Chaturthi is observed. They have appealed to the youth to discontinue their protests and return to their classes. It remains to be seen whether the youth heed their appeals.

10. The Chennai Police has been doing well under tremendous pressure. They should step up their intelligence collection efforts and intensify their interactions with the influential members of the Muslim community---young and old—in order to seek their cooperation in mitigating the anger. The central intelligence agencies should pay more attention to the phenomenon of Muslim youth activism in Chennai.

11. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled  “Anti-US Protests By Some Muslims In Chennai” at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2012/09/anti-us-protests-by-some-muslims-in.html

(19-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

INDIA-CHINA: NEED TO REVISIT OUR WISHFUL THOUGHTS

 

B.RAMAN

Our national trait for wishful-thinking often  worries me.

2. A rationally argued assumption is an important part of strategic thinking, a wishful thought with no rational basis is not. I had pointed out in some of my articles in the past how we often confuse wishful-thinking for strategic analysis. Some, if not many of those, who have made a name in our country as strategic analysts, are actually wishful-thinkers. There are many wishful-thinkers even in our security bureaucracy.

3. These observations have been triggered by some E-Mailed comments received by me on my article of September 17,2012, asking whether our humiliation of 1962 by China can repeat itself. The majority of those who have argued that the question of another 1962 does not arise have given two reasons, both of which appear to me to be nothing but wishful thoughts.

4.The first is that the Chinese are no longer in a position to spring a trans-Himalayan surprise on us as they did in 1962.The second is that the strong Navy that we have built up since 1962 will act as a deterrent to any more trans-Himalayan adventurism by the PLA. According to them, our Navy is in a position to disrupt Chinese energy supplies across the Indian Ocean and without assured energy supplies the Chinese would not be able to indulge in any adventurism across the Himalayas.

5. I feel uncomfortable with both these wishful-thoughts. Before October 1962, our political leaders had so convinced themselves about the superiority of our Army over the PLA that they thought that all they had to do was to order our Army to thrown out the illegal Chinese posts in our territory in the North-East and it would do so without any problems. Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K.Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, were living in a world of wishful-thinking.

6. Nehru openly went around saying that he had asked the Army to throw out the Chinese. The Chinese took note of his statements, which proved to have been irresponsible in retrospect, and launched a pre-emptive act of retaliation to neutralise our Army’s capability for throwing out the Chinese posts and inflict a humiliation on our Army.

7. That kind of wishful-thinking about the relative strengths of the two Armies and Air Forces is fortunately not there now. We take each other’s trans-Himalayan capabilities with a lot of realism. Realistic thinking and analysis is the foundation of good strategic thinking.

8.But I notice a new wishful thought clouding our strategic thinking presently and that is about the perceived superiority of our Navy over the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean area. I am confident that the Chinese Navy will not be able to disrupt our energy supplies across the Indian Ocean , but I do not share the confidence of those who have commented on my article that our Navy would be able to disrupt Chinese energy supplies and that the realisation of this will deter any trans-Himalayan adventure by the Chinese.

9. The Chinese are realistic geostrategic thinkers and planners. They know energy adequacy could turn out to be their weak point in any future military confrontation with any external power. They have been trying to build up their strategic reserves, diversifying their sources of supply and means of having the supplies reached to them. Their energy security diversification plan speaks well of their strategic foresight. I wish we have similar foresight.

10.So, to think and argue that our Navy has become a deterrent to Chinese designs and intentions would be unwise. Moreover, in our thinking, we should try to visualise what role the Pakistani Navy will seek to play in the event of another military conflict between India and China. We should be prepared with contingency planning for the eventuality that the Pakistani Navy will try to keep some of our ships bottled up near the Western ports so that we can’t use them against the Chinese.

11.If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a copy-cat of 1962.The PLA is not going to move into our territory on foot and motor vehicles and occupy territory after over-powering our posts as they did in 1962. In my view, the most likely scenario is that copter-borne, specially trained units of the PLA will take our Armed Forces by surprise by undertaking a lightning occupation of Tawang and Itahnagar in Arunachal Pradesh. They will then try to force us to concede Chinese sovereignty over Tawang in return for their conceding our sovereignty over Itahnagar and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh. I also expect that the copter-borne PLA forces will come not from the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), but from Qinghai, Gansu or Sichuan.

12. We are now in a better position than we were in 1962 to detect  Chinese preparations for a classical military strike from the TAR. Are we in a position to detect and neutralise a copter-borne invasion from bases outside the TAR? What are the other scenarios possible? What would be the options available to us?

13. Those are the questions that we in governmental and non-Governmental circles should examine with our feet firmly on the ground and without any wishful-thinking.

14.My two articles on the forthcoming 50^th anniversary of the 1962 humiliation should not be misinterpreted to mean that I have probably lost faith in the possibility of a negotiated solution of the border dispute with China. I have not. I greatly respect the pragmatism of the Chinese political and military leadership.

15. When they initiated the military conflict with India in 1962, they were a poor country with a primitive economy. They did not have to worry about the likely impact of a military conflict on their economy and on the livelihood of their people.

16.Today, China is a major and influential economic and military power itching to catch up with the US. Any military conflict with India could have worrisome impact on their economy. Their interest in keeping their economy sustained and flourishing has made them a cautious power----more cautious than they were in 1962. They would avoid a military confrontation as far as possible.

17. At the same time, I am disturbed to notice the doggedness with which they have been pursuing their territorial sovereignty claims---whether  with us in Arunachal Pradesh or  with some ASEAN powers in respect of the South China Sea islands or  with Japan in respect of the East China Sea Islands.

18. This doggedness should forewarn us that  if an opportunity presented  itself they may not hesitate to seek a military solution to the border dispute.

19. Chinese strategic thinking is marked by a mix of pragmatism and opportunism. We should not create unwittingly a tempting opportunity for them by our military unpreparedness. ( 18-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

INDIA-CHINA: CAN THE HUMILIATION OF 1962 REPEAT ITSELF?

 

 

Can the history of our humiliation at the hands of China in 1962 repeat itself?

2.As we approach the 50^th anniversary of the humiliation next month, we have to analyse this question in depth in our governmental national security community as well as outside. It is important for the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) to organise a series of brainstorming on this subject with the participation of experts on China from the Government and outside.

3. The starting-point of such a brainstorming has to be a presumption that the present efforts to solve our border dispute with China through talks may not succeed and  that we may be confronted with a fresh military confrontation in the future.

4.Should such a confrontation arise, are we better prepared  to face it today than we were in 1962? If not, what are the deficiencies still existing and how to remove them?

5.It is important for us to objectively  identify the factors that led to the 1962 humiliation and examine to what extent they have been removed. It is also important to foresee what kind of new factors not seen in 1962 could arise and what implications they could have for our capabilities.

6. It is my view that our ability to prevent another humiliation in future would depend upon our trans-Himalayan military strategy and capability as it did in 1962. The roles of the Army and the Air Force in such a strategy will be pre-eminent. The role of the Navy will be marginal. It will be our trans-Himalayan strategic mindset and tactical thinking that will determine the future course of any new military confrontation with China as it did in 1962.

7. I would identify the following as the basic causes of our humiliation  of 1962:

( a ). Though our civilian and military intelligence agencies had a satisfactory capability for the collection of infrastructure intelligence from Tibet, their capability for the collection of war indicators from Tibet was very poor. They detected in time the clandestine Chinese construction of roads such as the Aksai Chin road in the Western sector, but they missed the Chinese preparations for a military foray into our territory. The Chinese attack on our positions must have been preceded by weeks, if not months, of preparations on the ground in Tibet. The war indicators caused by such preparations were missed by our intelligence agencies.

( b ).Our capability for the analysis and assessment of China-related  intelligence was inadequate. Even the limited intelligence flowing from Tibet from human and technical sources was not subjected to vigorous analysis and assessment. Our knowledge and assessment of the Chinese military thinking and mindset were poor. We hardly knew anything about the India expertise in the PLA and the Chinese intelligence. As a result, we seriously underestimated the Chinese political and military will to assert their ground interests across the Himalayas and over-assessed and over-projected our capability to anticipate and neutralise any Chinese assertion of their will.

( c ). Inadequate professionalism in our Armed Forces and their inability to foresee different scenarios that could arise and identify the available options. This lack of professionalism was seen right across the board --- from the failure to procure the military stores that would be required for a trans-Himalayan war to readapting the training of our officers. The Army went into war with very little training and experience in mountain warfare and with very few equipment for such a warfare.

( d ). The inexperience of our political leadership in military-related decision-making and in enforcing the implementation of the decisions taken.

8. My assessment of the present position regarding these factors is as follows:

( a ).Our intelligence collection capability in Tibet has improved. Our intelligence agencies are unlikely to miss war indicators in Tibet as badly as they did in 1962.

( b ). Our analysis and assessment capability has improved over what it was in 1962, but continues to be inadequate. The Chinese language capability of our national security community is worse than what it was in 1962 and in the years immediately thereafter. Our ability to understand and analyse the Chinese military mind-set and thinking continues to be poor. Whatever capability we have built up in this regard has been largely influenced by Western thinking and analysis without an independent application of our mind. Our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of China-related intelligence lags behind our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of Pakistan-related intelligence. We can anticipate, analyse and counter Pakistan better than we can China. There are wild swings in our assessments on China----- from alarmism on the one side to total complacency on the other.

( C ).The professionalism of our Armed Forces has improved. They are better equipped, better trained and better led for a trans-Himalayan warfare today. But, there is a lack of convergence of thinking between the Army and the Air Force on the one side and the Navy on the other as to what China implies for our national security and Armed Forces. There is inadequate integrated joint staff thinking  in the Armed Forces as a whole on China. There is a newly-acquired fascination for naval power and an inadequate  appreciation of the continuing importance of military (Army related) and air power.

( d ). The understanding of our political class in matters relating to strategic decision-making on China is inadequate though it is better than what it was in 1962 and the years before. There is a clear understanding in our political class of China as a political and economic competitor, but inadequate comprehension of China as a military factor.

9.Two new factors that have made their appearance since 1962 have not received adequate attention in our national security community:

( a ). The Chinese search for alternate means of taking India by surprise. In 1962, they took us by surprise because our intelligence agencies had little capability for collecting war indictors from the ground in Tibet. The Chinese no longer enjoy this advantage. The increasing Chinese emphasis on the role of the helicopter-borne operations of their Army has to be seen in the context of their search for new means of taking India by surprise--- particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. The equipping and training of the copter wing of their Army is receiving increasing attention with some major exercises already noticed.

( b ). The Chinese testing and fine-tuning of integrated techniques of an Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet  from external threats and in asserting their will trans Himalayas. There has been an increase in the number of Air Force exercises in Tibet. Not adequate knowledge of Chinese Air Force exercises in Yunnan is available, but my surmise is that in any future military confrontation with India, the Chinese will use their Air Force defensively  from Tibet and offensively from Yunnan.

10.In 1962, the entire North Myanmar was a political, administrative and military vacuum. The Myanmar Government presence has since improved in the Rakhine (old Arakan) and Chin areas bordering Bangladesh, but remains the same in the Kachin State bordering Yunnan. The Kachin State and Yunnan are very important in any trans-Himalayan military strategy. We continue to neglect these two important regions from the point of view of our intelligence coverage as we were doing before 1962. The  Kachin State is important for defending our North East in any new confrontation with China. The Rakhine State is important for our Indian Ocean objectives and our energy security.

11. I do not consider it necessary to touch upon the nuclear aspect in this analysis. It has to be discussed in camera. ( 17-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

AL QAEDA’S FIRST COMMENT ON BENGHAZI ATTACK COMES FROM YEMEN

 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER  NO 767

B.RAMAN

Al Qaeda’s first comment on the commando-style attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi in Libya has not come from its command and control in North Waziristan in Pakistan headed by its Amir Ayman al-Zawahiri, but from its Yemen branch called Ai Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), also referred to as Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Sharia)

2. Of course, Zawahiri had issued a video message on September 10,2012, one day before the Benghazi attack confirming the death of his No.2 Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan cleric, in a US Drone strike in the Waziristan area on June 4,2012.The message called President Barack Obama a liar, who was trying to mislead the Muslims..

3. The presumption among many analysts was that the Benghazi attack was to avenge the death of al-Libi and that it had been planned before the Islamic world came to know of the film Innocence of Islam  which has sparked off violent anti-US protests in many countries.

4. One expected that the first comment of Al Qaeda on the Benghazi attack would come from Zawahiri or from  Al Qaeda headquarters in North Waziristan. It has not. It has come from Yemen, indicating a possible co-ordination of the anti-US protests by AQAP.

5. The AQAP’s comment is not in the form of claim of responsibility for the Benghazi attack. It is in the form of a justification for the attack.

6. According to SITE, an intelligence group in the US which, inter alia, monitors the web statements of Al Qaeda, the AQAP said: “The killing of Sheikh Abu Yahya only increased the enthusiasm and determination of the sons of (Libyan independence hero) Omar al-Mukhtar to take revenge upon those who attack our Prophet. The uprising of our people in Libya, Egypt and Yemen against America and its embassies is a sign to notify the United States that its war is not directed against groups and organisations... but against the Islamic nation that has rebelled against injustice." It called for more violent demonstrations against US embassies in the Middle East and Africa, and urged Muslims in the West to attack American interests in their countries of residence. "May the expulsion of embassies and consulates lead to the liberation of Arab lands from the American hegemony and the arrogance," said the statement. The AQAP is led by Nasser al-Wahishi. 

7. On September 15,2012, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known called upon Muslim youth in Pakistan and other countries to protest against the movie. While one violent incident attributed to the Afghan Taliban has been reported from Southern Afghanistan, reportedly resulting in the death of two US Marines, there have so far been no violent incidents in Pakistan, but anti-US demonstrations have been held in different cities of Pakistan.

8.The wave of protests till now has been against the film itself and the US for allowing it to be produced and clips to be disseminated from the US, but clerics in different countries, while calling for the protests to be peaceful, have been demanding a UN ban on any insult to sacred symbols of Islam and other religions. They have been saying that insults to Islam and its Holy Prophet cannot be justified under the pretext of freedom of expression. Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, grand imam of Cairo's Al-Azhar, the highest seat of Sunni Muslim learning, underlined the need for an international resolution to "criminalise attacks on Islamic symbols and on those of other religions”. In the days to come, this could become a major issue in the protest campaign of the Muslims .

9.The protests are not showing any signs of subsiding. Our intelligence agencies and police should closely monitor the dissemination of provocative anti-US statements through the Internet and maintain a high level of security for US missions  in New Delhi and other cities. They should be alert to the possibility of copy-cats of the ugly demonstration outside the US Consulate-General in Chennai on September 14,2012. ( 16-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)