Friday, July 27, 2012

“ESCAPE TO NOWHERE”: A MIX OF FACTS & FICTION



B.RAMAN


“Escape To Nowhere”, a gripping spy thriller written by Amar Bhushan, who retired as  Special Secretary (No.3 ) in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) in 2005, has been described by the publishers as a spy fiction “loosely inspired by a true incident that took place in 2004 when a senior intelligence officer suspected of being a spy for decades vanished.”


2. The true incident alluded to is the clandestine  escape of Major (retd) Rabinder Singh, a Joint Secretary of the R&AW, and his wife to the US via Kathmandu with the help of the station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US Embassy in Kathmandu in May,2004. Rabinder Singh escaped while he was under surveillance by the Counter-Intelligence & Security Division (CI&S) of the R&AW because of suspicion that he was working for a foreign intelligence agency.


3.While the R&AW suspected that he must be working for the CIA, the first concrete evidence that he was a mole of the CIA came after he had escaped to the US evading the surveillance mounted on him. Enquiries made in Kathmandu after he gave a slip to the surveillance teams and vanished from Delhi brought out that the CIA station chief in Kathmandu had made arrangements for his clandestine flight to the US in a British Airways flight with US passports issued to him and his wife. They were escorted to the US from Kathmandu by a woman officer of the CIA named Angelien.


4.The Manmohan Singh Government, which assumed office on May 22,2004, had Rabinder dismissed from service under Article 311 (2) ( c ) of the Constitution of India on June 5,2004.This Article enables the dismissal of a public servant on grounds of national security without holding a formal departmental enquiry. The dismissal order was issued after he had taken sanctuary in the US and did not serve much purpose.


5.At the time this embarrassing incident took place, Shri C.D.Sahay was Secretary ( R ), as the head of the R&AW is known. In his capacity as Special Secretary and No 3 to Shri Sahay, Amar wore many hats. One of them was as the head of Counter-Intelligence and Security (CI&S). In that capacity, he was  the Chief Spy Catcher of the R&AW and the Czar of its counter-intelligence.


6.The initial suspicion regarding Rabinder Singh was aroused by the observations of a young directly-recruited officer of the Research & Analysis Service (R&AS), who had noticed that Rabinder exhibited undue curiosity about classified matters of various divisions of the R&AW with which he was not connected and was in the habit of cultivating other officers through expensive entertainment in order to collect details of the happenings in the divisions under their charge.


7. This young officer, as he was expected to do, immediately reported his observations to Amar, who ordered the CI&S Division to mount a surveillance on Rabinder. The surveillance lasted 91 days. It covered his office, car, his residence and a gym visited by him.


8.The surveillance teams collected considerable details confirming the observations of the young R&AS officer. They also found out that Rabinder was in the habit of extensively Xeroxing classified documents passing through his hands and carrying the Xerox copies to his house. While there was thus strong evidence that he was probably working as an agent of a foreign intelligence agency, suspected to be the CIA, there was no provable evidence connecting him to the CIA.


9. Normally such evidence regarding the agency for which Rabinder was working could have come only from clandestinely recorded meetings of Rabinder with his handling officer. During the entire period of surveillance, the surveillance teams did not come across any instance of Rabinder clandestinely meeting his controlling officer in the agency for which he was suspected to be working.


10.In the absence of such concrete evidence regarding the agency for which Rabinder might be working, differences arose between Sahay and Amar as to what should be done. Sahay urged Amar not to allow any more leakage of classified information and documents through Rabinder to the agency controlling him. He advised Amar to  act against Rabinder on the basis of whatever incomplete evidence that he had been able to collect, have him arrested and interrogated and dismissed under Article 311 ( 2 ) ( C ).


11. Amar took a legalistic approach. He advised Sahay against any premature action. He wanted to move against Rabinder only after irrefutable evidence that would facilitate his successful prosecution had been collected and the agency for which he was working had been clearly identified.


12. Such evidence and such identification were not forthcoming from the R&AW surveillance teams. Sahay thereupon urged Amar to officially inform the IB and hand over the responsibility for further surveillance to the IB, which is the principal CI agency of India and has the responsibility for counter-intelligence in all departments of the Government of India, including the R&AW. Amar, who seems to have had a strong distrust of and ingrained prejudice against the IB, was not in favour of this.


13. At this stage, Sahay started getting worried that even Brajesh Mishra, the then Principal Secretary to the PM and the National Security Adviser (NSA), had not been kept informed of the suspicions regarding Rabinder and the surveillance mounted on him. On the 74th day of surveillance, Sahay insisted that the case should be brought to the notice of Brajesh Mishra. Amar opposed this. Sahay put his foot down and asked for a note so that he could brief Brajesh Mishra.


14.After Rabinder Singh escaped from Delhi, the CI&S staff found in his house two laptops. Amar gave them to the young R&AS officer, who was a computer expert, for examination. After examination, the R&AS officer reported that Rabinder had been transmitting the information and documents to his controlling officer through his laptops which had imprints of 23,100 files, some of which were probably Rabinder Singh's correspondence with his children in the US.


15. Enquiries made after Rabinder’s escape to the US brought out that he was being controlled by the CIA from the US Embassy in Kathmandu and not that in Delhi, that he used to transmit his reports and documents through the Internet and that he was making clandestine visits to Kathmandu to meet his controlling officer for instructions.


16. What I have stated above is my reconstruction of the Rabinder Singh case on the basis of my study of the so-called spy fiction and the details given in it. The book is an intelligent and intricate mixture of facts and fiction based on the Rabinder Singh case. It is not a case study or a critical analysis of the Rabinder Singh incident by Amar. Instead, it is his version, in the form of fiction, of why he handled the surveillance in the way he did.


17. After reading his narrative carefully, I have come to the conclusion that it will be uncharitable to describe the book as an attempt  by Amar to deny allegations made by the media and analysts that he was personally responsible for this fiasco. He has not tried to conceal what in retrospect might appear to be his sins of commission and omission in the handling of the enquiry and surveillance. It is more an attempt by him to justify the way he handled it which, in his own admission, was different from the way Sahay wanted it handled . He does not come out as an intellectually dishonest person or a bungler. Instead, he comes out as a sincere operative who believed in certain ways of doing a CI investigation which enabled Rabinder to escape.


18.Sahay comes out very creditably out of this narrative. His was a pragmatic, feet-on-the-ground approach. He had no compulsive distrust of the IB or of Brajesh Mishra. Sahay rightly believed that it was the job of the IB to conduct the surveillance and that Brajesh Mishra had a right to be kept informed. The only reproach I will make against Sahay is that he did not put his feet down and direct Amar to carry out his orders. The fact that Sahay and Amar belonged to the same 1967 batch of the IPS and were close personal friends seemed to have come in the way of his taking a strong line.


19. In contrast to Sahay’s pragmatic approach, Amar’s legalistic approach dictated his view that even in counter-espionage investigations, the law should be scrupulously observed and that nothing should be done on the basis of suspicions alone, however strong.


20. It is an interesting study of the dilemma faced in counter-espionage investigations. Apparently to avoid motivated allegations of violations of the Official Secrets Act (OSA) by his detractors, Amar has chosen a fictional format to present the salient points of the case to the public. He has carefully concealed the identities of all those involved by giving them fictitious names and even fictitious particulars. He has avoided giving any dates and in some places given wrong years of events.


21. Those carefully studying the so-called fiction would notice that he has sought to give the impression that the fiction relates to the period after he retired in 2005.In one of the discussions between Wasan as Sahay is called and Jeevnathan, as Amar calls himself, there is even a reference to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai that took place long after the escape of Rabinder and the retirement of Sahay and Amar. There is similarly a reference to the Times Now TV channel which came into existence long after the Rabinder episode. There is even a well-disguised reference (without naming him) to Arnab Goswami, the anchor of Times Now. Jeev refers to Arnab as “a man who matched the hypocrisy and banality of his panellists with his supercilious eloquence and insufferable interruptions.”


22. The book, which is extremely well written in excellent English, is bound to become a best-seller and could attract our movie producers who are dying for an exciting spook story in Indian colours. It has high literary merits and one shouldn’t be surprised if it also picks up a reward or two for fiction.


23. The fictional format restricts its educative value for analysing and bringing out the state of our counter-intelligence. The Government and the R&AW should resist the petty urge to harass Amar  for writing this. He has not done any harm to national security by writing this book.


24. Applaud Amar for writing an enjoyable book of facts and fiction. Don’t needle him. ( 27-7-12)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

INDIA'S KIM PHILBY


B.RAMAN


( Based on my remarks at the launching of Amar Bhushan’s spy fiction “Escape To Nowhere” at the Press Club, New Delhi, on July 23,2012.  )


The book has already received rave notices. I have no doubt it will be one of the best-sellers of this year. I am sure an exciting movie will follow provided a woman could be introduced into the film script. One misses the presence of a spooky woman in Amar’s narrative. There are woman-spooks in the R&AW---some doing very well. Any spy-fiction has to highlight their role in  Smiley’s World.

2.Amar’s book will have a very high excitement value. I hope it will also have an equally high educative value.  There is an acute shortage of scholarly works on the craft and profession of intelligence in India. There is an even greater shortage of works on the craft and profession of counter-intelligence.

3.Some of us, who had served in the intelligence profession, have come out of the spooky purdah and started sharing with the public our thoughts and insights on the state of our intelligence in the hope of better educating the public , but we still hesitate to write freely and frankly on the state of our counter-intelligence lest we unwittingly play into the hands of foreign intelligence agencies looking for clues as to how our counter-intelligence operates. What are their weak and strong points? What are the techniques employed by our counter-intelligence? It is much more difficult to write carefully on counter-intelligence than on intelligence without weakening our armour.  Amar has sought to do this, but some professionals will doubt the advisability of his discussing the techniques of surveillance employed by the R&AW. A description of the techniques is exciting for a fiction and a movie, but hazardous and weakening for a counter-intelligence set-up.

4.Your intelligence capability helps you to collect information about others that you need for strengthening your national security. Your counter-intelligence capability enables you to prevent others from collecting information about you which they could use against you. You may be able to collect valuable intelligence about others, but if you are not able to prevent others from collecting intelligence about you, your national security will remain weak.

5.The best intelligence comes from human and technical penetration of other governments, intelligence and security agencies, terrorist and other organizations. In  Smiley’s World, there is a demonic competitive bid to penetrate each other. The more capable you are in penetrating others, the better the quality of your intelligence.

6.The highest value is attached to the penetration of foreign intelligence agencies. When you manage to place a mole in a foreign agency, you are not only able to collect high-grade intelligence, but also influence the thinking of the political leadership and policy-makers of the penetrated countries through  intelligence officers who are generally very close to the senior levels of decision-makers. That is why when there is a mole in an intelligence agency, it is difficult to make a damage assessment when the mole is discovered. It is comparatively easy to establish what information was lost through the mole, but it is difficult to establish what wrong decisions were taken by the political leaders and policy-makers as a result of the use of  a mole by a foreign agency to influence thinking at the decision-making levels.

7. The likelihood of the penetration of an intelligence agency by a foreign agency is a constant nightmare for all counter-intelligence set-ups. The ability of an agency to prevent penetration by a mole depends on various factors---the personal and professional integrity of its officers, their security consciousness, their loyalty to the country, their ethical standards, their ability to withstand temptations, their courage to report to their seniors any indications of suspicious conduct of their colleagues and even close friends. When these factors are weak, penetration is facilitated.

8. That is why we as a nation and the R&AW as an intelligence organization ought to have been worried by the ease with which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) penetrated the R&AW twice and managed to evade detection for a long time .The penetration and the ease with which the CIA and its moles managed to evade detection spoke poorly of the state of counter-intelligence in the R&AW.

9. Maj.Rabinder Singh was not only a mole of the CIA carefully planted deep inside the R&AW, but was also the only mole in our intelligence set-up who managed to give the slip to our counter-intelligence and flee to the sanctuary provided by his controlling agency. Rabinder was India’s Kim Philby, the KGB’s mole in the MI 6, the British external intelligence.

10.In the years after the Second World War, the KGB managed to plant in the MI 6 a network of moles believed to have been operated through Kim Philby. When the network came under suspicion, Philby and two others managed to escape to Moscow giving the slip to the MI-5, the security service, which is responsible for counter-intelligence in the UK.

11.After the escape of Kim Philby, there were many years of agonising debate in the British intelligence establishment on how the KGB managed to penetrate the MI-6 and what damage was caused to national security and to the intelligence establishment. The  enquiries brought out shocking instances of ethical permissiveness, lack of integrity and old boys’ network ( I cover you up, you cover me up) that prevailed in the MI 6 that made the penetration possible. Did the KGB’s network consist of only Philby and his two associates who fled to Moscow or were there others who remained undetected? There were some who believed strongly that there was at least one more----the fourth man---who remained undetected and continued to cause damage.

12.The Philby enquiries led to a revamp of the Western counter-intelligence set-ups. Despite this, the KGB managed to penetrate the CIA through Aldrich Ames, who exposed to the KGB the identities of some valuable sources of the CIA in the former USSR and Russia, who were arrested and executed. Weak professional integrity and an old boys’ network in the CIA were among the factors identified for this fiasco. The counter-intelligence set-up in the US has since been further strengthened under the joint leadership of the FBI and the CIA.

13. The Gary Saxena Task Force  on Intelligence Revamp set up by the A.B.Vajpayee Governmet in 2000, of which I was a member, had recommended the strengthening of the Counter-Intelligence set-up under the leadership of the IB.The Rabinder Singh episode indicates shortcomings in the implementation of the recommendations.

14.Amar Bhushan was the chief spy catcher of the R&AW, the Czar of its counter-intelligence. He has first-hand knowledge of the sins of commission and omission that prevented the early exposure of Rabinder and enabled the CIA to whisk him out of India. His book, which is in the fictional format, throws some light on what went wrong, how and why. It provides some answers but not all the answers to questions regarding the state of our counter-intelligence. A fictional format cannot be a scholarly in-depth format. It is hoped his initiative in writing this book will act as a trigger for undertaking a more in-depth analysis of the state of our counter-intelligence. ( 23-7-12)
( The writer is Addiotional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi

Friday, July 20, 2012

RAHUL GANDHI : ASSETS & LIABILITIES, DOs & DON’Ts




B.RAMAN

ASSETS:


1.Youthful image.


2.Belongs to the oldest political party that played a historic role in the fight for India’s independence and that has produced more national and political icons than any other political party in India.


3.Belongs to a party that has a much larger reservoir of GenNext youthful figures and minds than any other party.


4.Belongs to a party that still has a modicum of idealism as a motivating factor. One has to search in vain for the slightest trace of idealism in other political parties, which are largely cynical seekers of power.


5.Belongs to a party that gave two electrifying slogans that brought many of us under its flag in our youth--- “Quit India” under Mahatma Gandhi and “Garibi Hatao” under Indira Gandhi.


6.Belongs to a party that enjoys more the empathy of the minorities than any other political party.


7. Belongs to the only political party  that has a pan-Indian presence, mind-set and impact.


LIABILITIES:

1.His perceived inability to do any original thinking and come out with any original ideas on the problems confronting India and on the issues of concern to the youth.


2.His public image of diffidence and lacking in thoughtful impulses.


3.His political and policy impulses are yet to be demonstrated and felt.


4.His perceived image of a leader lacking in seriousness of thought and action.


5.When one meets Rahul Gandhi face to face, he doesn’t leave a lasting impact on one’s mind.


6.His weaknesses in articulation and his perceived inability to establish thought-provoking vibrations either with the public or the media. No political leader can succeed unless he is able to make an impact on the minds of the public and the media.


7.When Indira Gandhi entered politics under Jawaharlal Nehru and the Government under Lal Bahadur Shastri and when Rajiv Gandhi entered politics under Indira and the Government after her assassination, they did not have to face the kind of intense media scrutiny  that Rahul Gandhi faces today. He cannot expect to make an impact on the media and on the public by continuing to keep away from the media.


8.His inability and that of his party to understand the new Youth Power of the online world and establish a mental equation with it.


9 His couldn’t care less attitude and that of his party towards the old, new and constantly  evolving media is proving counter-productive. The  Media Power to make and unmake images is little understood in the Congress Party.


10.The failure of his selective forays into politics--- whether in UP, Bihar or elsewhere. Nothing succeeds like success and nothing fails like failure.


11.His inability and that of Sonia Gandhi to build up a team of competent political, economic, foreign policy and national security advisers in the party.


DOs


1.Energise the GenNext of the party, give them roles that would excite them and insist on performance.


2.Build up a team of competent advisers and encourage and motivate them to identify issues that need urgent attention and come out with workable ideas as to how to deal with those issues.


3. Give  new goalposts for the party and the people such as “Corruption Hatao”, “Make The Public Places Safe For Women” etc and work sincerely towards achieving them. Mobilise youth and women power for achieving them.


4.Modernise media relations. Be more available for on-the-record interactions with the media. Make yourself accessible to the TV media which plays a more important role in building images and perceptions of clear thinking and energetic leadership than any other section of the media. Pay more attention to the New Youth Power of the online world.


5.Travel more frequently in India and to countries where the Indian diaspora is playing an active role in trying to influence political thought and action in India through the Internet.


6. Improve your style of articulation and public speaking.


7.Pronounce yourself more frequently and more impactfully on issues of national interest in the public and parliament and through the media.


DON’Ts


1. Don’t get obsessed with NaMo. Ignore him. Let others in the party counter him.


2. Don’t take over the leadership for campaigning in the forthcoming State elections as in Gujarat. Designate others in the Party to do that and guide them.( 21-7-12)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

IRAN-SPONSORED TERROR: NEW WARNINGS FROM BULGARIA




INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO 757

B.RAMAN


Iran’s covert war using terror against Israeli and Jewish targets continues. This covert war was started by it some months ago against Israeli and Jewish targets in retaliation for what it looks upon as the covert attempts of the Israeli intelligence to disrupt its nuclear programme through suspected assassinations of important Iranian nuclear scientists and disruption of the computer networks of Iranian nuclear establishments through carefully planted viruses.


2. While Israeli covert actions are confined to Iranian territory, Iran, whose intelligence does not have the capability for operating covertly in Israeli territory, has been striking at Israeli and Jewish targets in other countries where Israel has an active presence and which are the favourite destinations of Israeli tourists.


3. The indications are that Iran has been operating through its own intelligence, mainly of the Revolutionary Guards, as well as through elements of the  Hezbollah operating from the Lebanon. It has been using the services of pro-Iranian elements in the countries where  it wants to operate for the collection of operational information and for providing back-up support to the terrorists chosen and trained by it for carrying out the terrorist strikes against Israeli targets.


4.Since the Iranian intelligence launched its covert war against Israeli and Jewish targets, successful or unsuccessful attempts have been made in Georgia, India, Thailand, Kenya and Cyprus. There was a non-fatal attack against  a woman employee of the Israeli embassy in New Delhi married to an Israeli diplomat in February last by using a magnetised improvised explosive device.


5.During the investigation, an Indian Muslim (probably a Shia) reportedly working for sections of the Iranian media was arrested on suspicion of his having played a role in providing back-up support consciously or unconsciously. The investigation does not appear to have made much progress partly for want of clues and partly due to pressure from pro-Iranian elements in the non-governmental community of New Delhi on the police. As a result, our investigation agencies have not been as proactive as one would have expected them to be in identifying and neutralising  pro-Iranian terrorism-prone elements in Indian territory.


6.The past strikes directed against Israeli and Jewish targets in different countries, including India, did not cause many fatalities and involve suicide terrorism, a speciality of the Hezbollah. A devastating terrorist attack was carried out by a suicide bomber against a group of Israeli tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria on July 18,2012, causing six fatalities. An injured person was reported to have died subsequently. This has been described as the deadliest terrorist attack against Israeli targets in foreign territory since 2004. It has been reported that the suicide bomber had false US identity papers.


7. Israel has already accused Iran of involvement. The Israeli charges have been vehemently denied by Iran. There has been no claim of responsibility by any organisation. Apart from the Iranian intelligence and the Hezbollah, the only other terrorist organisation having the motive to kill Israelis and with the capability for doing so is Al Qaeda which had in 2002 targeted Israelis in Mombasa. One has to await further evidence before one can be definitive whether Iran and its surrogates or Al  Qaeda were involved in the Burgas strike.


8. It is very unlikely that Al Qaeda would have carried out a terrorist strike in support of Iran because there is not much love last between Al Qaeda and Iran and Al Qaeda is greatly concerned over the  likelihood of a Shia A-bomb.


9.The present indications direct the needle of suspicion more at Iran and Hezbollah than at Al Qaeda. After the terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy employee in New Delhi in February last, one thought it might remain a sporadic attack since it would not be in the interest of Iran, which has cordial relations with India, to start a campaign of terrorism against Israeli targets in Indian territory.


10.If the Iranian hand is established in the Burgas attack, it would underline the Iranian determination to continue attacking Israeli and Jewish targets wherever it can, whatever be the political consequences.


11. Even after the February attack in Delhi, I had stressed the importance of our intelligence agencies closely monitoring the  activities of the Iranian intelligence and Hezbollah in Indian territory and vigorously investigating the February strike in order to identify and neutralise any terror network Iran might have set up in India. Complacency in this regard due to our close relations with Iran and due to pressures from pro-Iranian non-governmental elements would be dangerous.


12.In the light of the Burgas attack, security for Israeli nationals and establishments should be reviewed and further strengthened. Tourist spots favoured by Israelis would need special attention. (20-7-12)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )