BALOCH FREEDOM-STRUGGLE: TIME FOR NEW STRATEGY

B.RAMAN

Against great odds, the Baloch freedom-fighters, who started their second war of independence in 2005, have managed to keep up their valiant struggle for the independence of their homeland.

2.Despite repression and torture by the Pakistani Army, its Frontier Corps and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the freedom-fighters, operating in different groups under different names, have managed to steadily weaken the hold of the Pakistani security forces and intelligence in their homeland and challenge the attempts of the Pakistani authorities to deprive the Balochs of their natural resources such as the Sui gas which were being diverted for the benefit of the Punjabis.

3. Despite repeated expressions of their interest in finding a political solution to the grievances of the Balochs ranging from greater and genuine autonomy to independence, the mainstream political parties of Pakistan such as the Pakistan People’s Party of President Asif Ali Zardari and the two factions of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Mr.Nawaz Sharif and Chaudhury Shujat Hussain have not taken any action to withdraw the security forces from Balochistan, release all political prisoners and put an end to the obnoxious practice of missing persons.

4. Under this practice, Baloch youth perceived as hostile to the Army and the ISI are kidnapped by the intelligence agencies for illegal detention. They are projected by the police as having joined the militancy and hence missing from their homes. Weeks and months later, their mutilated bodies are found thrown in remote areas of the province.

5.The Pakistani Supreme Court as well as Pakistani human rights organisations and activists have increasingly drawn attention to the serious violations of the human rights of the Balochs and to the continuing obnoxious practice of missing persons. The Baloch grievances now receive greater attention from enlightened sections of the Pakistani society as well as political elements and human rights activists in the US and the European Union countries. In recent months, there was greater sympathy for Baloch rights in some sections of the US Congress.

6. The Baloch freedom-fighters operating from Balochistan and Baloch political activists in the Baloch diaspora in the US and Europe have for the first time succeeded in creating a growing understanding of the Baloch cause and the Baloch political and economic grievances.

7. The deterioration in the relations between Washington DC and Islamabad after the Abbottabad raid of May 2 last year by the US Navy Seals to kill Osama bin Laden also created for the first time greater empathy for the Baloch cause in sections of the US political circles. There was greater interest in what was happening in Balochistan and a greater dissemination of correct information regarding the real state of affairs in Balochistan. This was a positive gain for the Baloch freedom-struggle and a  significant strategic step forward. From a war of tactics, the freedom-struggle seemed to be moving towards a strategic war with greater thinking and debate on a Baloch vision of the future.

8. No country in the world was officially prepared to support the Baloch freedom struggle. No State could have supported the freedom struggle and the objective of an independent Balochistan. That could have been projected by Islamabad as amounting to interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. But there was growing sympathy for the Baloch cause and vision in sections of the civil societies of different countries.

9. Despite these strategic gains of recent months, the Baloch freedom-fighters are still far from their ultimate objective of an independent Balochistan. Lack of unity among different organisations in Balochistan itself and among different diaspora groups abroad continue to stand in the way of unity of action to give a final decisive push forward to the independence struggle. Unless the persisting factionalism and ego clashes among different Baloch leaders is put an end to and a unified leadership starts guiding the movement, the enormous sacrifices being made by Balochistan’s GenNext may prove to be in vain. This is an issue that needs attention from all Baloch leaders and activists.

10. They don’t have the luxury of time. They already seem to have missed the window of opportunity provided by the intense distrust of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence in the US political and administrative circles after the Abbottabad raid and the US discovery that the Pakistan Army and its ISI, while pretending to fight against Al Qaeda and its associates, have actually been acting in collusion with them.

11. As the US Presidential elections approach in November next, the US itself as well as other NATO countries seem to be in a hurry to start the process of disengagement from Afghanistan. The recent  decision by the US to mend fences with Pakistan at least tactically if not strategically to facilitate the on-coming process of disengagement is likely to have unfortunate consequences for the Baloch freedom struggle. Those in the US, who had started evincing increasing interest in the Baloch cause and struggle, may start developing second thoughts about the wisdom of continuing to show empathy for the Balochs at a time when the US might need the co-operation of the Pakistani State to disengage from Afghanistan. At this time, when greater Baloch unity is needed, if the different groups continue to indulge in ego clashes, the State of Pakistan might be the beneficiary.

12. Since the beginning of this year, the Pakistani Army and ISI have been following an insidious new policy in Balochistan in an attempt to discredit the Baloch freedom-fighters in the eyes of Western public opinion as terrorists. There has been a wave of massacres of Shias in Balochistan---some settlers from Punjab and many members of the Hazara tribal community. Over 80 Shia fatalities have been reported in the last six months as a result of the targeted attacks on the Shias.

13. The Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) of Pakistan, which had helped the Afghan Taliban in carrying out massacres of the Hazara Shias of Afghanistan before the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, has claimed responsibility for some of these massacres in Balochistan. The Pakistan Army and ISI have not taken any action against the LEJ and to protect the Shias. Instead, one could discern the beginning of an insidious campaign by the ISI to project these massacres as carried out by sections of the Baloch freedom fighters because many of the Shias had migrated from Punjab. This insidious campaign needs to be effectively countered by the Baloch activists.

14. As the NATO powers start the process of disengaging from Afghanistan and seek the co-operation of the Pakistan Army and ISI for this purpose, support for the Baloch cause in sections of Western societies may freeze and even start declining. How to prevent this is a question that needs the serious attention of the strategists of the Baloch freedom struggle. The Baloch vision will remain the same, but there is going to be a need for a new Baloch strategy to give shape to this vision at a time of unpredictable transition in Afghanistan.

15.The previous Baloch freedom struggle petered out after the Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan post-1988.History could repeat itself after the forthcoming NATO disengagement, unless the Baloch leaders unite and evolve a new strategy to meet the newly-developing situation. It has to be an indigenous strategy and not one spoon-fed from outside. (8-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MY TAKE ON INDO-PAK FOREIGN SECRETARIES’ TALKS

B.RAMAN

As expected, the two-day talks between our Foreign Secretary Shri  Ranjan Mathai and his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Jalil Abbas Jilani concluded at New Delhi on July 5,2012, with an aggravation of the slanging match between the two countries on the question  of Pakistani inaction against those involved from Pakistani territory in the planning and execution of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.

2. We already had a large volume of irrefutable evidence against elements in Pakistan which were involved in these strikes. These elements consisted of the leadership of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), one Indian  Muslim ( Abu Jundal) who had joined the LET in Pakistan, and some officers of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who had directly or indirectly helped the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes.

3. Fresh additions to this evidence have now come from the interrogation of Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal aka Abu Jindal aka Abu Hamza, the Indian Muslim who was one of the fellow-conspirators along with the LET leaders and the ISI officers. After the terrorist strikes, Abu Jundal had taken up residence in Saudi Arabia posing as a Pakistani national by name Riasat Ali holding a Pakistani passport and a Pakistani national identity card.

4. He was arrested by the Saudi authorities from his hide-out in Saudi Arabia last year and was handed over to the Indian police last month after India had established on the basis of DNA tests that Riasat Ali, the so-called Pakistani national, was none other than Zabiuddin Ansari, the Indian national, who had joined the LET and participated in the 26/11 strikes.

5. The details of the conspiracy given by him have strengthened the case against seven leading cadres of the LET whom the Pakistani authorities had claimed to have arrested in a statement made by their then Interior Minister, Mr.Rehman Malik on February 12,2009, for their involvement in the strikes.

6. Pakistan’s tactics in this case has been three-fold. Firstly, to admit that the conspiracy was hatched by some members of the LET based in Pakistan and carried out with a promise to prosecute  them. Secondly, to deny that Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamatt-ud-Dawa (JUD), had any role in the conspiracy. They dispute India’s contention that the JUD is the political wing of the LET and insist that the JUD has nothing to do with the LET. Thirdly, to deny the involvement of the ISI as an institution or any of its officers in the conspiracy.

7. In the wake of their admission of the role of seven members of the LET in the conspiracy, they have filed a charge-sheet against them before an Ant-Terrorism Court in Pakistan. It is almost three years now since the charge-sheet was filed, but the trial has not even started. The case is being delayed due to frequent transfers of the Judge and frequent adjournments given by the Judge in disregard of the provisions of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism laws which lay down that no adjournments should be given in terrorism cases and that the trial should be held on a day-t-day basis in order to complete it quickly.

8. This has not been done by the Pakistani authorities who have been dragging their feet, under some pretext or the other, and avoiding a trial. In the meanwhile, there have been source reports that the arrested cadres of the LET have been active in guiding the activities of the LET in Jammu & Kashmir from their jail. The Pakistani authorities have not given a satisfactory explanation to the question as to how Abu Jundal aka Abu Hamza, whom they had arrested and charge-sheeted, managed to go to Saudi Arabia with a Pakistani passport and resume his activities on behalf of the LET even while the trial is on.

9. On the basis of the additional evidence obtained from Abu Jundal, the Government of India has renewed pressure on Pakistan to expedite the trial of the LET cadres in their custody. They have been showing no seriousness in the matter and continue to drag their feet.

10. India should not allow the matter to rest there. It should continue to step up pressure on Pakistan for an early conclusion of the trial. In the terrorist strikes of 26/11, not only many Indian nationals, but also nationals of other countries, including the US and Israel, were killed. They too have a strong interest in ensuring that the trial was quickly completed and sentence pronounced.

11. India should share with those countries the details of the disclosures of Abu Jundal and find ways of associating their investigators with the interrogation. We should also draw the attention of the UN Security Council Monitoring Committee to the non-compliance by Pakistan of the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution No 1373 passed by the UNSC immediately after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US calling on the member-countries, inter alia, not to allow terrorists to operate from safehaven in their territory.

12. Thus, India’s follow-up action on the Abu Jundal disclosures has to be bilateral by way of stepped-up pressure on Pakistan as well as multilateral by way of pressure on the international community and action in the Minitoring Committee of the UNSC

13. Pakistan continues to deny the involvement of Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed. He was initially detained for some weeks, but ordered to be released by a court on the ground that there was no evidence against him. The US has recently announced a heavy cash reward for anyone who provides evidence that could lead to the arrest and prosecution of Sayeed. Abu Jundal must be made aware of this reward offer and told that his family in India could be eligible for this if he co-operates in the collection of evidence regarding the personal involvement of Sayeed in the 26/11 strikes.US investigators should also be encouraged to join in the interrogation of Abu Jundal on the role of Sayeed. The pressure for action against Sayeed should be kept up bilaterally as well as in association with the US Government and the relatives of the US nationals killed by the LET.

14. The problem arises with regard to the involvement of the ISI as an institution and some ISI officers in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes. Except the US, no other country of the world has any law providing for action against State-sponsors of international terrorism. When the A.B.Vajpayee-led NDA Governmenmt came to office in 1998, it had promised to issue a White Paper on Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism against India and to enact necessary laws in this matter. As Shri Vajpayee got interested in peace talks---initially with Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister in 1999, and subsequently with Gen.Pervez Musharraf--- the NDA Government played down this promise, which was never implemented. Even a White Paper was not issued even though the intelligence agencies had prepared a draft.

15. There were occasions in the past---as after the March 1993 strikes in Mumbai--- when we were able to get very strong evidence against the ISI. Despite this, we were not able to act against Pakistan on this issue since the US and other members of the international community were not prepared to treat Pakistan on par with East Germany, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Sudan and North Korea in respect of action for the involvement of their intelligence agencies in acts of terrorism.

16.It would be naïve on our part to think that the State of Pakistan would incriminate itself and its intelligence agencies by accepting the correctness of the disclosures of Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET and now Abu Jundal in this matter.

17. Countries which are the targets of terrorism sponsored by the intelligence agencies of other countries have the diplomatic and operational options. Only the US and France were able to use the diplomatic option against Libya in response to the role of the Libyan intelligence in the blowing-up of their civilian aircraft. No other country in the world has ever succeeded in dealing with the problem of State-sponsored terrorism through the diplomatic option alone. India does not have the diplomatic clout either with Pakistan or with the international community. Hence, it is unlikely to succeed.

18. Israel too is repeatedly the target of State-sponsored terrorism. It too does not have the diplomatic option. It, therefore, relies on the operational option provided by its intelligence agencies. It uses the covert action capability of its intelligence agencies as a deniable deterrent power to deter acts of terrorism mounted against Israel from other countries. This deniable deterrent power consists of the ability to carry out  decapitation strikes against anti-Israeli foreign terrorists operating from sanctuaries in foreign countries.

19.We had a deniable deterrent power in the form of a limited covert action capability till 1997.This capability was used with some effectiveness by Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Chandrasekhar and Narasimha Rao.It has not been used after Narasimha Rao and was discarded by I.K.Gujral. Subsequent Prime Ministers did not have the stomach to revive  and use it. Unless we do so, we will continue to project a pathetic picture of ourselves in our helplessness in the face of the continued use of terrorism by Pakistan against India.

20. No dossier, no Headley, no Abu Jundal and no amount of dramatic TV debates will help in countering Pakistan’s use of terrorism against India. Only an effective and deniable deterrent power in the form of our capability to carry out deniable covert actions against terrorists based in Pakistani territory can help. It would be a justified act of self-defence for which there is considerable support in international law.( 6-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MYANMAR: “RUSH IS OK, BUT NOT GOLD RUSH"

B.RAMAN

The elected MsP belonging to Aung San Suu Kyi’s NationaL League for Democracy (NLD) took their seats as newly elected members of the lower House of the Myanmar Parliament when its session began at Naypyidaw on July 4,2012. Suu Kyi, who was also to take the oath the same day, could not do so due to reported exhaustion after her 18-day, five-nation tour of Europe which ended on   June 29. She is expected to get going later this week.

2. One saw a self-confident, but cautious Suu Kyi during her triumphant tour of  Europe during which she accepted the Nobel Prize for Peace at a function at Oslo and was honoured wherever she went. She was given the honours due to a head of State. The Western Governments and people made no secret of their admiration for her.

3. At the same time, one could discern a feeling of anxiety ---particularly in London and Paris---- that the lionisation of Suu Kyi by the Western world could create difficulties for her in her relations with the Government and the Army in Myanmar. Suspicion of Western motives in backing her is believed to be high in the Myanmar Army.

4.That was why during her visit to the UK and France, the local Governments announced their intention to invite Myanmar President Thein Sein to pay an official visit to their countries. Suu Kyi too lauded their plans to do so and stressed the importance of their interacting not only with her and her party but also with the Government over which the Army still has a strong influence.

5. Some of the key themes of her speeches were the need to strengthen national reconciliation in Myanmar, her faith in the policies and good intentions of Thein Sein , her cautious optimism that the policy of reforms initiated by Thein Sein will continue though she was hesitant to say that the reforms are irreversible. For nearly 50 years, the Army has been the strongest and most assertive segment of the society and administration in Myanmar. Keeping this in view, it would be premature and unwise to talk of the irreversibility of reforms.

6. She gave the impression of being confident, though, that Thein Sein is firmly in the saddle and will be able to keep ahead with his policy of reforms. Significantly, shortly after her return, there was speculation in Myanmar that four of the hardliners in the Cabinet, known as supporters of hardliner Than Shwe, the predecessor of Thein Sein, were being eased out. The resignation of one of these four, Vice-President  Tin Aung Myint Oo, has already been announced on July 4.

7.Suu Kyi’s admiration for the Western world and her hopes and expectations that the Western investors would play a more important role in the economic development of Myanmar were repeatedly echoed in her speeches and comments during her tour of Europe. She stressed the importance of human rights and democracy friendly foreign investments.

8. She did not clarify, though, whether she considered the foreign investments from China, the largest foreign investor in Myanmar till now, to be human rights and democracy friendly and, if not, whether she would welcome Chinese investments in future.

9. It was significant that during her stay in London she received on June 19 at her place of stay His Holiness the Dalai Lama who wanted to wish her on her 67^th birthday. His Holiness was on a separate visit to London to promote Buddhist teachings and he availed of her stay to call on her and greet her. The fact that she readily agreed to receive him without worrying about any adverse reactions from her Government and from Beijing indicated her readiness to take an independent stand without worrying about adverse reactions from Beijing.

10. China will have reasons to be concerned over her interactions with His Holiness and over her repeated emphasis on human rights and democracy friendly foreign investment, but it has not openly articulated its concerns.

11. Beijing, which is a major investor in the oil and gas sector in Myanmar, particularly  in the Rakhine State, would not have failed to note with concern the expression of interest, particularly in Paris, in the possible flow of Western investment in the oil and gas sector. If this materialises, this could be to the detriment of both China and India, which have been assisting the Myanmar Government in this field.

12. In response to questions from Western journalists regarding the scope for increased investment flows as a result of the opening-up of Myanmar, U Soe Thane , the Myanmar Industry Minister, who attended the Nobel Peace Prize function at Oslo, said: “ A rush is OK, but not a gold rush.”

13. It is obvious that Western business houses, particularly in the oil and gas sector, are expecting a gold rush as a result of their consistent backing for the democracy movement of Suu Kyi.

14. Will their expectations materialise? Will China and the pro-Beijing officers in the Myanmar Army watch quietly as the Western business houses try hard to be the main beneficiaries of the rise of Suu Kyi in Myanmar’s future politics? These are issues that need to be closely monitored . ( 5-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

US AND PAKISTAN: COMING TO TERMS WITH STRATEGIC REALITIES

B.RAMAN

        

 “All indications are that the civilian leadership is keen to mend fences with the US. Zahir-ul-Islam could be the right man for the job because he was never very close to the US and, at the same time, was never suspected by the US of being mixed up with the jihadi terrorists.”

--An extract from my article of March 9,2012, on the appointment of Lt.Gen.Mohammad Zahir-ul-Islam as the new Director-General of the ISI

The three-point face saver announced from Washington DC and Islamabad on July 3,2012, marks a recognition by the US and Pakistan of the strategic reality that the continuing frictions in the bilateral relations are proving counter-productive and detrimental to their interests in Afghanistan.

2. The face-saver consisted of a  statement by Mrs. Hillary Clinton expressing US regrets for an air raid over a Pakistani border post at Salala on the Afghan border on November 26 last in which 24 members of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps were reportedly killed and a Pakistani decision to allow the resumption of the movement of logistic supplies between the Karachi port and Afghanistan  through Pakistani territory without insisting on an enhancement of the transit fee paid by the NATO to Pakistan.

3. Separately, a US official indicated that as part of the deal, Washington would release about $1.1 billion to the Pakistani military from a US "coalition support fund" designed to reimburse Pakistan for the cost of counter-insurgency operations.

4. Mrs. Clinton said in her statement:" (Pakistani) Foreign Minister (Hina Rabbani) Khar and I acknowledged the mistakes that resulted in the loss of Pakistani military lives. We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military. We are committed to working closely with Pakistan and Afghanistan to prevent this from ever happening again."

5.Qamar Zaman Kaira, Pakistan’s Information Minister, announced as follows in Islamabad: "The meeting of Pakistan's defense committee (DCC) of the cabinet has decided to reopen the NATO supplies."

6.Pakistan's new Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, who chaired the meeting,  said it was time to end the blockade. He reportedly told the Committee: “The continued closure of supply lines not only impinge on our relationship with the US, but also on our relations with the 49 other member states of NATO."

7. While a face-saving formula has thus been found to end the post-November 26 frictions arising from the death of Pakistani para-military personnel in the US air raid, a face-saving formula has not yet been found to the frictions  that arose after the US Navy Seals raid on the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011.

8. Two frictions arose from the Abbottabad raid. The first related to Pakistani complaints of violation of its sovereignty by the US undertaking an unilateral raid in Abbottabad without its permission. The second related to the US complaints of Pakistani harassment of some Pakistani nationals who had helped the CIA in establishing the identity of OBL The US has been particularly concerned over the Pakistani arrest and jailing of a Pashtun doctor (Shakil Afridi) who had helped the CIA in covertly collecting blood samples of  the inmates of the Abbottabad hide-out of OBL for DNA tests.

9. The pending issues relating to the Abbottabad raid are still under negotiation between the two Governments. A face-saver should not prove very difficult since no Pakistani military and para-military personnel were killed during the Abbottabad raid. There were no Pakistani civilian deaths either, except some living with OBL in his hide-out. It is understood that attempts are being made to find a save-saver under which Pakistan would allow the Pashtun doctor to settle down in the US after a token sentence.

10. The belated  US decision, after dragging its feet for seven months, to reach a face-saver with Pakistan is an indicator of its coming to terms with the ground reality that an invading power would need Pakistan’s support for disengaging from Afghanistan without humiliation. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan post-1988 was facilitated by the pressure exercised by Pakistan on the Afghan Mujahideen not to attack the withdrawing Soviet troops.

11.Similarly, the US is hoping that Pakistan would facilitate the thinning out of the NATO presence in Afghanistan by pressuring the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network not to attack the withdrawing NATO forces.

12. Moreover, as admitted by US officials, the continued closure of the logistic movements through Pakistani territory would have  made the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan time-consuming and expensive if the NATO forces were to use only the Northern route through the Central Asian Republics.

13. Will the face-savers work? Will the tensions be over once and for all? Will the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and the withdrawal of heavy military equipment through Karachi be smooth?

14. The answers to these questions will depend on the sincerity of the Pakistani political and military leadership and the kind of control that the Pakistani Army and ISI are able to exercise on the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network.

15. During the Soviet withdrawal, the Pakistan Army and ISI had effective control over the different Afghan Mujahideen groups and were able to ensure that they did not attack the  withdrawing Soviet troops.

16.The Pakistani Army and ISI do not definitely have effective control over the Tehrik-w-Taliban Pakistan as the Pakistani Taliban is called. Their ability to pressure the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network not to attack the withdrawing NATO forces is yet to be demonstrated.

17. Moreover, the continuing presence and activities of the remnants of Al Qaeda from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan would be an additional complicating factor which was not there during the Soviet withdrawal. The US will have to maintain a high level of Drone strikes to disrupt the activities of Al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network and the TTP operating from FATA. This could create  fresh friction.

18. In return for the Pakistani removal of the ban on the movement of equipment from Afghanistan to Karachi during the withdrawal phase, Pakistan might not be satisfied with an expression of the US regret for the Salala raid.It would expect the US to be favourable to its interests in Afghanistan and vis-à-vis India.

19. That could mean fresh Pakistani expectations of US support for limiting the Indian presence in Afghanistan and dilution of the pressure on Pakistan to act against the anti-India terrorist groups.

20. The mending of US-Pakistan fences, if it proves durable, could create problems for us in our relations with Afghanistan and in our counter-terrorism efforts. Our policy-makers have to anticipate the kind of problems that India is likely face and identify the options that would be available to us in future.

21. As the NATO withdrawal gathers pace, it will be a dynamic situation with oft-changing power play. We have to have a dynamic mind-set to be able to limit damages to our interests and to counter new threats to our security.

22. I had stated on many occasions in the past that we should not count on a permanent estrangement between the US and Pakistan. Our policy-makers should not similarly count on permanent US support for our concerns relating to Pakistani backing to anti-Indian jihadi terrorists and threats to Indian interests in Afghanistan. (4-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )