SPY VS SPY:THE ANTI-CLIMAX

B.RAMAN

“oh they all openly say they went as spies.. that’s the first thing that takes the imagined glamour away na .”

“what I mean is I'm sure its a commonplace phenomenon across either side.”

“and roop lal before that. Not sure it should come as a shocker though!”

“and so many others like him on both sides. Hardly glamorous intrigue. More like tragedy.”

These are some of the Tweets sent out on  June 28,2012, by Barkha Dutt of NDTV, who has emerged as a widely-followed Tweetizen of the world.

Her Tweets were her disappointing reactions to the statement made by Surjeet Singh, the alleged R&AW spy, who crossed over into India that day after having spent years in a Pakistani prison on a charge of being a spy of the R&AW allegedly sent across  the Indo-Pakistan border by the R&AW to collect intelligence.

When Pakistan announced that it was releasing Surjeet, there was considerable excitement around in the journalists’ community. Also in the general public.

They all expected Surjeet to be one like Smiley’s people crossing the border inconspicuously in the dead of the night as it was raining cats and dogs and disappearing nowhere----never again to be seen and heard.

To die a quiet death away from the glare of publicity.

A typical return of an R&AW man from the cold, which would make all of us proud of the R&AW and give a theme for our movie-makers, who are frantically hunting for heroic R&AW stories.

A question I am often asked is: Why there are no heroic espionage stories and movies in India?

Surjeet was hardly the man from the cold. He walked across the border in bright sunlight relishing all the attention on him from his relatives, young innocents-abroad journos and officials.

“Jasoosi ki thi?”, the excited journos asked him expecting him to deny vehemently.

To their surprise and disappointment, he replied: “bilkul. Jasoosi ki thi.”

All the exciting expectations were gone in a trice.

What? This is not the way Smiley’s people behave. This is not what we had seen in Western movies.

What kind of an intelligence agency we have? Do the R&AW officers read John Le Carre and watch Western movies to learn how they are supposed to behave as spies?

Where is the glamour in the R&AW and its spies? Where is the glamour in the intelligence profession as practised in India?

No glamour in the Indian world of intelligence. Openly admitting before TV cameras that they indulged in espionage in Pakistan.

As we all retired spooks know to our discomfiture, the R&AW’s reputation----particularly in the world of Barkha’s people----had never been high. It reached its nadir on June 28, thanks to Surjeet and his supposed confession before the TV cameras.

At least one thing I can tell you about the R&AW people after having spent nearly three decades in that organisation having been a spy myself and controlled dozens of other spies.

We may not be as glamorous as Smiley’s people, but we are not stupid.

You will see our finger-prints in every success the nation has achieved since 1947--- whether during the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 or 1971 or 1999, whether in our counter-insurgency operations in J&K and the North-East, whether in East Pakistan before 1971.

Just as you will see them in every national security disaster the nation has gone through---whether during the Sino-Indian war of 1962, whether during the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, whether in Sri Lanka against the LTTE or whether against the LET on 26/11 in Mumbai.

Every intelligence organisation has its ups and downs just as every spook has.

In one way we are proud to have been different from Smiley’s people---whether of the British or American or Soviet variety.

We have never led our country into a wrongful adventure---just as the CIA did in Vietnam, the KGB did in Afghanistan and the CIA and the MI 6 did in Iraq.

There are spies and spies and spies living and operating in Pakistan. Some collecting intelligence about Pakistan. Some about the Khalistani terrorists living in Lahore. Some about the jihadi terrorists. Some about the Narco smugglers. And so on.

How many so-called flop  spies Barkha has been able to name?  Three---Roop Lal, Sarabjit Singh, Surjeet Singh. Possibly one or two more.

The glamour is not in a handful of guys who didn’t come up to our exotic expectation as they returned from the cold.

The glamour is in countless others who are heroically living in the cold, evading detection, and protecting Indian nationals and interests to the best of their ability.

The nation will never know of them.

But they are the unsung heroes of the R&AW. (3-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Research & Analysis Wing )

COLLATERAL DEATHS IN ANTI-MAOIST OPERATIONS

B.RAMAN

It is difficult to totally avoid collateral deaths of innocent civilians in counter-insurgency operations, but it is important to take every precaution possible to reduce such deaths.

2. When the security forces do not exercise the  necessary care and caution to avoid collateral deaths of innocent civilians, counter-insurgency operations themselves, instead of putting down the insurgency, become a root cause of more insurgency.

3. The alienation of the people in the affected areas that originally gave rise to the insurgency is further aggravated by the deaths of innocent civilians. It tends to confirm the image of the Government as projected by the insurgents as uncaring and insensitive. The credibility of the Government and the security forces is damaged when the people come to know that the version of an operation as officially put out is wrong---either partially or totally and deliberately so.

4. This drives more people into the folds of the insurgents and strengthens their motivation and determination to keep up the fight against the Government.

5. Collateral deaths of innocent civilians take place due to three reasons----- imprecise intelligence, over-reaction by the security forces caused by exaggerated assessments of the threats posed by the insurgents and deliberate acts of vindictiveness by the security forces to teach a lesson  to sections of  the community perceived to be supporting the insurgents.

6. Whenever the security forces claim to have killed a large number of insurgents in an operation projected by them as successful, the Government should verify their claims instead of immediately praising them  for their success.

7. Verification does not necessarily mean that the Government distrusts the version of the security forces. It only means that the Government wants to satisfy itself that there has been no collateral deaths --- wanton or unavoidable--- of innocent civilians.

8. Such verification adds  to the confidence of the people in the fairness of the Government. The Government has a dual responsibility. To the security forces, to reassure them that their rightful actions will have the total support of the Government. To the people living in the affected area to satisfy them that the Government cares for them and will not blindly support the security forces if they indulge in wrongful actions or unjustified operations.

9. If the Government does not take the precaution of verifying the facts and circumstances of operations resulting in large fatalities and if these prove to be wrong, the resulting embarrassment will damage the future effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations.

10. One is already seeing this in the unfortunate controversy following the claims of the security forces to have killed 20 Maoists in what was projected as an intelligence-driven and successful counter-insurgency operation in Chattisgarh’s Bijapur District on June 29,2012. The initial claims of a remarkably successful operation made by the Security Forces and the Government of Chattisgarh were accepted without due verification by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India, and the security forces complimented for their success.

11. Subsequently, doubts have been raised about the veracity of the facts and circumstances of the operation not only by human rights activists and sections of the local villagers, but also by some members of the Congress Party, who have been quoted by the media as describing the encounter as “completely fake” resulting in the death of many innocent civilians.

12.Our security forces are led by responsible officers and I find it difficult to believe that they would have indulged in a fake operation and tried to mislead not only the State Government, but also the Government of India under which the central para-military forces come.

13. At the same time, from the kind of allegations being made  by sections of the public and non-governmental activists against the security forces, one cannot totally dismiss the possibility of an unacceptable number of collateral fatalities due to reasons yet to be determined.

14. Instead of standing on false prestige and instead of being influenced by considerations of having to maintain the morale of the security forces by supporting them right or wrong, the Government should  hold an independent enquiry to establish facts and make amends to the relatives of any innocent villagers killed if such collateral deaths had taken place as alleged.

15.Since taking over as the Union Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, Shri Chidambaram has taken commendable action to strengthen our counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities and to improve the quality of the operations undertaken by the security forces.

16. At the same time, he has shown an unfortunate tendency to rush to the  media with unverified versions of operations instead of showing the patience to have the facts verified before going public and identifying himself with the initial version which may prove to be wrong on subsequent verification.

17. We saw it in the case of the interrogation of  Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal aka Abu Jindal aka Abu Hamza, an Indian Muslim  suspected to be one of co-conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. We are seeing it again in the case of the operation against the Maoists in Chattisgarh.

18. The Home Minister is the supreme head of the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency machinery of the Government of India. His credibility in the eyes of the people and the international community is of supreme importance. If his versions repeatedly prove to be wrong subsequently, not only his personal credibility, but even the credibility of the Indian State could be weakened.

19. The Home Minister of the Government of India should be the last to brief the media after all facts and circumstances have been verified to his total satisfaction. He should not be the first to rush to the media. ( 2-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

HOTAN HIJACKING BID INDICATES LAX AIRPORT SECURITY IN CHINA

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.753

B.RAMAN

More details have become available of the unsuccessful attempt to hijack a plane flying from Hotan to Urumqi in Xinjiang by six Uighurs last Friday (June 29,2012). These details have been gathered from two official accounts carried  by the Chinese Communist Party owned “Global Times” and from accounts disseminated by Chinese micro-bloggers. One of the micro-bloggers has claimed that one of his relatives was on board the flight and carried pictures of one of the hijackers being overpowered.

2. The details available so far indicate that the hijackers used a crutch, normally used by physically-handicapped persons, and explosives to seize control of the plane 10 minutes after it had taken off from the Hotan airport. It is not clear whether one of the hijackers was really a physically-handicapped person or posed as one in order to carry the crutch on board.

3. It is also not clear how they managed to evade security checks and carry the explosives on board and where they had concealed the explosives. After the attempt, the Ministry of Public Security, which is in charge of internal security, has asked all airport security personnel to make passengers  remove their shoes and belts and check them for explosives.

4. Another point that is not clear is whether the hijackers managed to cause an explosion on board. The “Global Times” account says that two of the hijackers died in hospital and two others. “who reportedly mutilated themselves”, are being treated in hospital. This would indicate that there was probably an attempt to activate an explosive device before the hijackers were overpowered.

5. According to the “Global Times”, the six hijackers, who were between 20 and 36 years of age, were from the city of Kashi, Hou Hanmin. It quoted some passengers as saying that the men were quickly subdued as they tried to break into the airplane's cockpit with a crutch, and their attempt to ignite explosives was foiled. The flight had 92 passengers and nine crew members, 10 of whom were injured. The passengers included six police officers. ( 2-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

THE YOUNGER GENERATION:THEN & NOW

B.RAMAN

My father died when I was hardly five years old. He died young. Didn’t leave much savings for our mother. She had to bring up four young kids---two sons and two daughters. I was the youngest. She had to see we got at least some nutritious food, we were well educated and got a good job in life.

2.We lived in a three-room apartment, with a separate bath room, but with a common toilet which we had to share with two other families. From a young age, we were conscious of our poverty. We were never ashamed of it. We took our poverty in our stride.

3. I started going to school after our father’s death. My mother did not have to spend a single rupee on my primary and secondary education. I studied for nine years in the Ramakrishna Mission School on a merit scholarship.

4. I did not do very well in the school final examination. I got only about 70 per cent of the total marks. Despite this, I managed to get admission in the prestigious Loyola College, but I could not get a merit scholarship. My mother had to spend money from her savings for my college education.

5.To spare extra expenses for her on my college education, I used to walk to college every morning (about five kms).In the evenings, sometimes I used to come back home walking, sometimes by bus. I never spent much money on my clothes. I wore whatever my mother gave me---- which was just three dhotis and three shirts.

6.  I never felt ashamed of having to wear the same kind of dhoti and shirt every day. There were a few rich students in the college with me---- they used to come in their cars or motor-bikes and wear fancy dresses.

7. I never suffered from any complex. I moved on equal terms with them. They moved on equal terms with me. I did not notice their affluence. They did not notice my poverty. They would come to our house without any hesitation and eat with me the austere meals that my mother used to cook for us. I would go to their house without any complexes and eat the kind of food they ate.

8. They never flaunted their riches. I never fought shy of admitting our poverty.

9. I did not do too well in the college. I did a one-year journalism diploma course after leaving college and got a job in “The Indian Express” on a salary of Rs.100 per month. I managed to save enough money to study for the UPSC competitive examinations, sat for them and was selected for the Indian Police Service.

10. I was quite successful in my career and achieved all I wanted to achieve. It was not only because I was a good professional, but also because I was a balanced individual. Our poor mother and our poverty gave all of us a sense of balance and a determination  not to let our poverty come in the way of our achieving whatever we wanted to achieve. All of us did well in life.

11. I compare ourselves with the children of today from both poor and affluent families. What complexes they have! How ashamed they are of their inadequate economic circumstances! How they keep comparing themselves with children of affluent families and hold it against their parents for not being able to afford for them the same quality of life and education that affluent parents are able to afford for their children!

12. It becomes a matter of mental torture for the parents at the time of admission to universities. What drama in the house! What tantrums! What rude words to parents the like of which we never used to our parents!

13.Whose fault is this? Or is it a fault at all? We blame the universities and colleges. Rightly so. I will equally blame the parents and other elder members of the families for not inculcating in the children a realistic attitude to life----devoid of exaggerated expectations---- and a feeling  that not getting what they wanted is not a tragedy.

14. It is good to get admissions to prestigious and glamorous institutions. If they don’t, that will not be the end of the world. They can still move forward in life and achieve whatever they want to achieve with a right sense of balance and the right determination ( 1-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MY TAKE ON SAUDI COUNTER-TERRORISM CO-OPERATION WITH INDIA

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 752

B.RAMAN

One should avoid over-playing  the so-called geo-strategic significance of Saudi counter-terrorism co-operation with India in the wake of the arrest of Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal aka Abu Jindal aka Abu Hamza by the Saudi authorities and his transfer to Indian custody to face interrogation and prosecution in connection with his suspected role as one of the main co-conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).

2. The transfer of Ansari by the Saudi authorities to Indian custody despite his posing as a Pakistani national and despite reported objection from the Pakistani authorities is a significant turning point in Saudi counter-terrorism co-operation with India despite risks of its impact on its relations with Pakistan and unhappiness in the Indian Muslim community.

3. It would be wishful-thinking to attribute this to the self-assumed increasing geo-strategic importance of India and the role that India could play vis-à-vis Iran.

4. Despite the Saudi authorities taking a step that could displease Pakistan, the arrest and transfer to India of Ansari do not mean a dilution of Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan continues to be as important to Saudi Arabia as before.

5. Pakistan holds the Sunni A-bomb which Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Sunni world might need if Iran acquires a Shia bomb. In times of trouble, the Saudi royal family has depended  on the Pakistan Army for its protection. What Pakistan can do to protect Saudi nationals and interests, either against Iran or against terrorism, India can never do. To nurse illusions of a geo-strategic estrangement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would be unwise.

6.What the arrest and transfer of Ansari indicates is a change in the Saudi attitude to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and not to Pakistan as a State. Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the LET, has  maintained good relations with the Saudi royal family. He used to describe Saudi Arabia as the best Islamic State though not an ideal Islamic State. While supporting the activities of Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, he had refrained from supporting its activities in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

7. In return for this, Saudi Arabia had allowed the LET to maintain an office in Saudi territory since the early 1990s. This office used to recruit Indian Muslims  from among the pilgrims going to Saudi Arabia. The members of the Muslim Defence Force of Tamil Nadu unearthed by the Tamil Nadu Police in 2002 had been won over and motivated by a representative of the LET based in Saudi Arabia. The LET had also played an active role in helping the Saudi intelligence in recruiting, training  and sending jihadi volunteers to  Bosnia to fight against the Serb security forces.

8.Till the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the Saudi attitude to the LET was relaxed and co-operative somewhat to the detriment of India. The capability for spectacular acts of mass casualty terrorism demonstrated by the LET in Mumbai and subsequent reports in the US of the LET emerging as a collaborator and clone of Al Qaeda have caused concerns in Saudi Arabia over the dangers of the LET acting as the Trojan Horse of Al Qaeda at a time when the Saudi authorities have succeeded in crushing Al Qaeda in their territory.

9. The welcome Saudi co-operation with India also reflects their concerns over the radicalisation of the Indian and Pakistani communities  working and living in  Saudi Arabia by the LET. The Saudi counter-terrorism co-operation with India indicates their concern over the LET presence in their territory, but this would not have any significant impact on their State-to-State relations with Pakistan, which is the third largest Sunni country of the world.

10. Unless Saudi Arabia develops its own independent nuclear capability, Pakistan’s Sunni bomb would be indispensable for it to deter Iran’s Shia nuclear adventurism. Let there be no wishful-thinking about it in Indian policy-making circles and public opinion.

11. While Saudi Arabia has evidently started marking its distance from the LET, it has not shown any signs of marking its distance from the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which has an independent presence in Saudi territory, reportedly motivated by C.A.M.Basheer, the Muslim from Kerala who was the founding-president of the SIMI. While action against Pakistan-motivated LET cadres might not  cause much unhappiness in the Indian Muslim community, action against SIMI activists with no evidence of links with Pakistan might. This should explain the seeming Saudi ambivalence towards the SIMI.

12. In the Ansari case, one sees the beginning of a convergence of counter-terrorism concerns between the intelligence and security agencies of India and Saudi Arabia with possible US blessing because of the US interest in acting against the LET terrorists who killed six US nationals in Mumbai. New Delhi should welcome and hail this without embarrassing the Saudi authorities and causing them discomfiture in the eyes of the Muslim world and the Indian Muslims.

13. We must understand the Saudi ambivalence towards the SIMI and avoid irritating them on this issue. Let the co-operation develop at the present pace, at a pace that is comfortable to the Saudi authorities. ( 1-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )