B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist strikes led to five important decisions by the Government of India--- to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) by setting up regional hubs, to set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorist incidents of a pan-Indian nature, to strengthen coastal security, to create a national intelligence grid to serve as a data-base accessible to all agencies---- at the central and State levels--- dealing with counter-terrorism, and to set up a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), to take co-ordinated follow-up action on all terrorism-related inputs flowing from the intelligence agencies and the police.
2. The NSG has already been decentralised and regional hubs have come into existence. This has been done because of the delayed deployment of the NSG during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The then totally Delhi-based NSG was slow to move and equally slow to react and its ability to co-ordinate with the local police and other security agencies in Mumbai was found wanting.
3. With the deployment of units of the NSG in big metro centres now, there is an expectation that the deficiencies witnessed on 26/11 will not recur now. If this is really so will become evident only when there is another act of mass fatality terrorism. Fortunately, we have not had one since 26/11. As a result, the proclaimed ability of the NSG to move faster and with greater effectiveness now is yet to be tested. It is important that the NSG’s training pays attention to the need to sharpen its institutional reflexes and that it keeps constantly interacting and rehearsing with the local police and other security agencies.
4. The NIA, which is already functioning, has had a lethargic and confused start. It is not clear to objective counter-terrorism analysts as to when and how it will be called into action. One has reasons to suspect and fear that like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) the NIA is tending to become a partly professional and partly politicised agency, which is sought to be used by the Government of India as a stick to beat the opponents with. It has shown greater alacrity and enthusiasm in looking into terrorist incidents in which some Hindus were suspected than in investigating cases where jihadi terrorists---indigenous or externally-sponsored---were suspected. Its record till now in successful investigation has been disappointing due to excessive political control over its functioning. It was expected to be an independent agency which will move on its own after a major terrorist strike. The expectation has been belied so far.
5. The steps already taken to strengthen coastal security have not yet contributed to an increase of our alertness to possible sea-borne threats. The shocking lack of reflexes on the part of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the intelligence agencies and the Police during a recent incident when an abandoned foreign ship managed to drift into our coastal waters without being noticed by any of these agencies speaks disturbingly of the continuing poor state of our coastal defence. Our capabilities for maritime counter-terrorism---whether by way of improved intelligence collection or physical security or alert mechanism---- seem to be as poor as they were before 26/11.
6. The decisions to set up a National Intelligence Grid and the NCTC have not yet been implemented---reportedly due to a lack of convergence of views among the various agencies and Ministries that would be involved in the implementation of these decisions as to how to go about it. The implementation process has been lethargic and glacial.
7. Fortunately, we have not had any major act of mass fatality terrorism ( with fatalities of more than 100) since 26/11. However, despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive and investigative capabilities since 26/11, we have had five acts of low or medium fatality terrorism after 26/11 in Pune, Mumbai, Delhi and Varanasi. Despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive capability, none of them could be prevented and despite the proclaimed strengthening of our investigative capabilities none of them could be successfully detected.
8. We are clueless as to who committed them, how many undetected cells are operating, are they indigenous or Pakistani, wherefrom are they getting their explosives, detonators and triggering mechanism etc. While our preventive capability has generally been below par, our investigative capability used to be good. This too seems to have deteriorated now due to politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process.
9. An equally worrisome aspect is the seeming deterioration in our TECHINT capability. While our HUMINT capability was not satisfactory, our good TECHINT capability made up for our HUMINT deficiencies------ contributing to successful neutralisation of new cells and successful investigation of terrorist strikes. The detection of the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects has become weaker after 26/11. As a result, good TECHINT is no longer compensating for the poor HUMINT. My assessment is that our terrorism-related intelligence collection capability today is weaker than it was before 26/11.
10. A reason given for our failures to detect the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects after 26/11 is that the terrorists now have access to better communication technology and gadgets and have better evasive capability and that, consequently, they have become smarter. I do not buy this explanation. I have not seen any evidence to support this. Our poor performance after 26/11 is not because the terrorists have become smarter, but it is because our agencies have become less smart than the terrorists.
11. We are yet to find an effective way of dealing with the sanctuaries of the terrorists in Pakistan. While our peace initiatives are welcome, they are not going to induce Pakistan to act against these sanctuaries. The peace process has to go hand in hand with a counter sanctuary process through deniable covert actions. Peace does not mean surrender or resignation. Peace means willingness to talk without letting it dent our courage and readiness to act against the sanctuaries. Action to create a counter-sanctuary capability continues to be totally neglected.
12. The continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism thinking and reflexes is due to a disinterested approach on the part of the Congress as well as the BJP. Both are equally guilty of politicising and communalising counter-terrorism. Both are equally guilty of failures to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities. The public is equally disinterested. There is hardly any meaningful debate on the issue either in the parliament or in our media or in public fora. The beneficiaries are the terrorists.
13. The public has to sit up and exercise pressure on the political class. The voters have to make it clear to the political class that their counter-terrorism record will be an important factor in influencing voter preference. Unless the public stirs itself up and moves, the political class is not going to move. (26-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, November 25, 2011
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
GUJARAT POLICE: TAKING LIBERTIES WITH LEGALITY
B.RAMAN
A three-member Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by Rajiv Ranjan Verma, a senior officer of the Bihar IPS cadre, has concluded that Ishrat Jahan, a 19-year-old girl from Maharashtra, and three others, who had been projected by some officers of the Ahmedabad Police as belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), killed by the Police during an encounter on June 15,2004, were in fact the victims of a case fabricated against them by the Ahmedabad Police. According to the original version of the Ahmedabad police, which now stands discredited by the SIT , the four were planning to kill Chief Minister Narendra Modi, when they were intercepted resulting in the alleged encounter.
2.The SIT has concluded that they were killed in cold blood and subsequently shown as having died during an encounter with the Police. Since the text of the SIT report has not yet been released, one does not know under what circumstances they were taken into custody by the Police and why they were killed. It would appear that they did not belong to the LET and that the police version of their being LET members conspiring to kill Modi might have been cooked up to justify their killing.
3. The Gujarat High Court has ordered the registration of a fresh FIR on the basis of the finding of the SIT and a fresh investigation. The court is yet to decide who will investigate the case---the Gujarat Police itself or the SIT or a central investigation agency. Sections of the media have reported that 21 policemen, four of them IPS officers, may face investigation as suspects in the alleged murder of these innocent persons.
4. While the legal aspects of the case will be taken care of by the agency which would be doing the fresh investigation, the administrative and professional aspects have to be dealt with separately. These relate to setting right the rot that seems to have set in in sections of the Gujarat Police that has led to as many as 21 officers, four of them from the IPS, conspiring to project the deaths of four apparently innocent persons in police custody as deaths of terrorists in an encounter.
5.Rogue actions by individual police officers,including from the IPS, are not unknown in the history of the Indian Police, but as many as 21 officers conspiring together to commit an illegal act of a heinous nature which led to the death of four innocent persons at the hands of the Police should disturb all right-thinking police officers who value the reputation of the force. The Ishrat Jahan case is not one of individual aberration, but of collective aberration by a large section of the force without any qualms of conscience. They let themselves become a law unto themselves.
6. The fact that the enormity of their misconduct in deliberate violation of the law and the code of police conduct had not been brought to light till the SIT investigation by the senior police officers and the political leadership of Gujarat would indicate that an unethically permissive atmosphere has been prevailing in sections of the police force under the pretext of counter-terrorism.
7. Serious wrong-doings by sections of the police officers in the name of counter-terrorism have remained unchecked,unrebuked and unpunished. Terrorism, whether indigenous or externally-sponsored, needs firm handling, including the use of force legally permitted, but the firmness has to be tempered with a strict adherence to legality in criminal administration and justice. There are grounds to suspect that adherence to legality may not be the rule in dealing with terrorism in Gujarat.
8. It is important for the National Human Rights Commission to go into this and lay down a special code of conduct by the police while dealing with counter-terrorism to prevent a recurrence of such serious incidents. Such a code of conduct in counter-terrorism could be drafted in such a manner as to have pan-Indian applicability. (22-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
A three-member Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by Rajiv Ranjan Verma, a senior officer of the Bihar IPS cadre, has concluded that Ishrat Jahan, a 19-year-old girl from Maharashtra, and three others, who had been projected by some officers of the Ahmedabad Police as belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), killed by the Police during an encounter on June 15,2004, were in fact the victims of a case fabricated against them by the Ahmedabad Police. According to the original version of the Ahmedabad police, which now stands discredited by the SIT , the four were planning to kill Chief Minister Narendra Modi, when they were intercepted resulting in the alleged encounter.
2.The SIT has concluded that they were killed in cold blood and subsequently shown as having died during an encounter with the Police. Since the text of the SIT report has not yet been released, one does not know under what circumstances they were taken into custody by the Police and why they were killed. It would appear that they did not belong to the LET and that the police version of their being LET members conspiring to kill Modi might have been cooked up to justify their killing.
3. The Gujarat High Court has ordered the registration of a fresh FIR on the basis of the finding of the SIT and a fresh investigation. The court is yet to decide who will investigate the case---the Gujarat Police itself or the SIT or a central investigation agency. Sections of the media have reported that 21 policemen, four of them IPS officers, may face investigation as suspects in the alleged murder of these innocent persons.
4. While the legal aspects of the case will be taken care of by the agency which would be doing the fresh investigation, the administrative and professional aspects have to be dealt with separately. These relate to setting right the rot that seems to have set in in sections of the Gujarat Police that has led to as many as 21 officers, four of them from the IPS, conspiring to project the deaths of four apparently innocent persons in police custody as deaths of terrorists in an encounter.
5.Rogue actions by individual police officers,including from the IPS, are not unknown in the history of the Indian Police, but as many as 21 officers conspiring together to commit an illegal act of a heinous nature which led to the death of four innocent persons at the hands of the Police should disturb all right-thinking police officers who value the reputation of the force. The Ishrat Jahan case is not one of individual aberration, but of collective aberration by a large section of the force without any qualms of conscience. They let themselves become a law unto themselves.
6. The fact that the enormity of their misconduct in deliberate violation of the law and the code of police conduct had not been brought to light till the SIT investigation by the senior police officers and the political leadership of Gujarat would indicate that an unethically permissive atmosphere has been prevailing in sections of the police force under the pretext of counter-terrorism.
7. Serious wrong-doings by sections of the police officers in the name of counter-terrorism have remained unchecked,unrebuked and unpunished. Terrorism, whether indigenous or externally-sponsored, needs firm handling, including the use of force legally permitted, but the firmness has to be tempered with a strict adherence to legality in criminal administration and justice. There are grounds to suspect that adherence to legality may not be the rule in dealing with terrorism in Gujarat.
8. It is important for the National Human Rights Commission to go into this and lay down a special code of conduct by the police while dealing with counter-terrorism to prevent a recurrence of such serious incidents. Such a code of conduct in counter-terrorism could be drafted in such a manner as to have pan-Indian applicability. (22-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, November 20, 2011
INDIA &PAKISTAN’S L’AFFAIRE IJAZ
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the allegations levelled by Mansoor Ijaz, the controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, against Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, two separate bouts of boxing are going on simultaneously in Pakistan---- Ijaz vs Haqqani and President Asif Ali Zardari vs Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
2.As I had mentioned in my previous article on this subject, there has so far been no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung. Ijaz, who has made a series of claims regarding his contacts with Haqqani on May 9,2011, in a London Hotel and subsequently, has carefully built up an electronic trail that could support his claims and allegations and handed it over to Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during a meeting in London on October 22,2011.
3. The electronic trail would have been in the Blackberry (BB) of both Haqqani and Ijaz. Whereas Ijaz would seem to have saved the trail and given it to the ISI, it is not clear whether Haqqani has saved or erased it. He has offered to hand over his BB for forensic examination to any enquiry committee set up by the Government or the National Assembly. If it turns out during the forensic examination that there is no electronic trail in Haqqani’s BB, he would have difficulty in explaining it and the Army’s suspicion against him would be further strengthened.
4. If the National Assembly decides to hold an enquiry, it will have to depend on the Ministry of the Interior headed by Rehman Malik for a forensic examination of Haqqani’s BB. Thus, there could be two forensic examinations---one by the ISI of the material handed over by Ijaz, which must have been already done, and another by the Ministry of the Interior of the material handed over by Haqqani. Reconciling any contradictions between the two forensic examinations of materials of different origin could further exacerbate the suspicions of the Army against Haqqani and even Zardari himself.
5. There is a third possibility. Sections of the Pakistani media have reported that a public interest petition has been filed before Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhamed Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court, requesting that he should monitor the investigation into the case. He has not so far reacted to it. If he decides to do so, the ISI may have to suspend its enquiry and the National Assembly may not order its own enquiry.
6. The matter could get prolonged and the question would arise as to what to do with Haqqani in the meanwhile--- replace him honourably without waiting for the results of the enquiries or allow him to continue in office and fight it out. Will the Army agree to his continuing in office?
7.The boxing bout between Zardari and Kayani is unlikely to lead to any military coup against him. The Army may not be able to get any coup validated by the judiciary. Moreover, when the enquiries are still on, the Army would have no grounds for intervening. The Army would most probably wait and watch while keeping up the pressure for removing Haqqani from office. To build up the pressure, Kayani might refer the matter to his Corps Commanders and get their support for removing Haqqani.
8.So long as L’Affaire Ijaz is not settled in a manner mutually satisfactory to the civilian and Army leaderships, the uneasy vibrations between the elected civilian leadership and the Army would add to the already existing suspicions between Zardari and Kayani. The civilian leadership might find itself reduced to a lame-duck administration till the next elections due in the beginning of 2013.
9. L’Affaire Ijaz is Pakistan’s internal affair. However, the re-surfacing of Ijaz from oblivion could uncomfortably remind us of the naivete of the NDA Government which lionised him in 2000-01 and amazingly without verification accepted his claims that he could help in bringing peace to Jammu & Kashmir. The then NDA Government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee extended to him extraordinary courtesies to facilitate his visits to Srinagar without any paper trail as an interlocutor supposedly blessed by the US. The details of what happened are too well known to need any recapitulation.
10. Since the middle 1990s, Ijaz has repeatedly taken many personalities in the US, India and Pakistan for a ride by projecting himself as a man of iconic influence and web of contacts in the corridors of power in Washington DC, Islamabad and New Delhi. Despite this, eminent sub-continental personalities have been walking into his parlour again and again. This shows that naivete is perennial.
11. India has put its peace eggs in the basket of the elected Pakistani civilian leadership. It was already weak, but, despite this, had been able to carry the Army’s GHQ along with it in some of its peace initiatives. It is likely to be further weakened now if it doesn’t handle intelligently the sequel to L’Affaire Ijaz. What could be the impact of the civilian-military boxing bout on Indo-Pakistan relations and the peace process? This question would attract the attention of our policy-makers. Discreet silence combined with a discreet watch on the goings-on in Islamabad and Rawalpindi should be our policy till the dust settles down. ( 21-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
In the wake of the allegations levelled by Mansoor Ijaz, the controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, against Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, two separate bouts of boxing are going on simultaneously in Pakistan---- Ijaz vs Haqqani and President Asif Ali Zardari vs Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
2.As I had mentioned in my previous article on this subject, there has so far been no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung. Ijaz, who has made a series of claims regarding his contacts with Haqqani on May 9,2011, in a London Hotel and subsequently, has carefully built up an electronic trail that could support his claims and allegations and handed it over to Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during a meeting in London on October 22,2011.
3. The electronic trail would have been in the Blackberry (BB) of both Haqqani and Ijaz. Whereas Ijaz would seem to have saved the trail and given it to the ISI, it is not clear whether Haqqani has saved or erased it. He has offered to hand over his BB for forensic examination to any enquiry committee set up by the Government or the National Assembly. If it turns out during the forensic examination that there is no electronic trail in Haqqani’s BB, he would have difficulty in explaining it and the Army’s suspicion against him would be further strengthened.
4. If the National Assembly decides to hold an enquiry, it will have to depend on the Ministry of the Interior headed by Rehman Malik for a forensic examination of Haqqani’s BB. Thus, there could be two forensic examinations---one by the ISI of the material handed over by Ijaz, which must have been already done, and another by the Ministry of the Interior of the material handed over by Haqqani. Reconciling any contradictions between the two forensic examinations of materials of different origin could further exacerbate the suspicions of the Army against Haqqani and even Zardari himself.
5. There is a third possibility. Sections of the Pakistani media have reported that a public interest petition has been filed before Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhamed Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court, requesting that he should monitor the investigation into the case. He has not so far reacted to it. If he decides to do so, the ISI may have to suspend its enquiry and the National Assembly may not order its own enquiry.
6. The matter could get prolonged and the question would arise as to what to do with Haqqani in the meanwhile--- replace him honourably without waiting for the results of the enquiries or allow him to continue in office and fight it out. Will the Army agree to his continuing in office?
7.The boxing bout between Zardari and Kayani is unlikely to lead to any military coup against him. The Army may not be able to get any coup validated by the judiciary. Moreover, when the enquiries are still on, the Army would have no grounds for intervening. The Army would most probably wait and watch while keeping up the pressure for removing Haqqani from office. To build up the pressure, Kayani might refer the matter to his Corps Commanders and get their support for removing Haqqani.
8.So long as L’Affaire Ijaz is not settled in a manner mutually satisfactory to the civilian and Army leaderships, the uneasy vibrations between the elected civilian leadership and the Army would add to the already existing suspicions between Zardari and Kayani. The civilian leadership might find itself reduced to a lame-duck administration till the next elections due in the beginning of 2013.
9. L’Affaire Ijaz is Pakistan’s internal affair. However, the re-surfacing of Ijaz from oblivion could uncomfortably remind us of the naivete of the NDA Government which lionised him in 2000-01 and amazingly without verification accepted his claims that he could help in bringing peace to Jammu & Kashmir. The then NDA Government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee extended to him extraordinary courtesies to facilitate his visits to Srinagar without any paper trail as an interlocutor supposedly blessed by the US. The details of what happened are too well known to need any recapitulation.
10. Since the middle 1990s, Ijaz has repeatedly taken many personalities in the US, India and Pakistan for a ride by projecting himself as a man of iconic influence and web of contacts in the corridors of power in Washington DC, Islamabad and New Delhi. Despite this, eminent sub-continental personalities have been walking into his parlour again and again. This shows that naivete is perennial.
11. India has put its peace eggs in the basket of the elected Pakistani civilian leadership. It was already weak, but, despite this, had been able to carry the Army’s GHQ along with it in some of its peace initiatives. It is likely to be further weakened now if it doesn’t handle intelligently the sequel to L’Affaire Ijaz. What could be the impact of the civilian-military boxing bout on Indo-Pakistan relations and the peace process? This question would attract the attention of our policy-makers. Discreet silence combined with a discreet watch on the goings-on in Islamabad and Rawalpindi should be our policy till the dust settles down. ( 21-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, November 19, 2011
ZARDARI SHOULD JETTISON HUSSAIN HAQQANI
B.RAMAN
If Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari is intelligent, he would realise the damage that has been caused to the credibility of the state of Pakistan by Mr.Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, by his naivete in trying to use the services of Mansoor Ijaz, a controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, for conveying to Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, a request to rein in Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, in return for some quid pro quos promised by Haqqani on behalf of “his boss”.
2. In this highly murky case, we have only claims and denials----with most of the claims coming from Ijaz and most of the denials coming from the Pakistani side. Apart from a belated admission that the Admiral did receive a memo relating to Pakistan, US Government sources have refrained from any comments in the matter.
3. There is as yet no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung ----not even Ambassador Haqqani--- but there are enough indicators regarding the utter naivete of the Ambassador which could ultimately burn the credibility of Zardari himself and drive a further wedge between him and the Army.
4. The entire L’Affaire Ijaz originated in the days after the US commando raid in Abbottabad on May 2,2011, that led to the death of Osama bin Laden. There was apparent nervousness among those close to Zardari that an Army humiliated and enraged by the success of the US raid, might turn its wrath against Zardari, who was generally perceived to be soft and sympathetic to the US interests in matters relating to the campaign against Al Qaeda.
5. Rightly or wrongly, there was an apprehension that Kayani might try to have Zardari removed. It was against this background that the Ambassador, who was then ( May 9,2011) on a visit to London, contacted Ijaz, who was then on a visit to Monaco, and sought a meeting with him in London. The rest of the sordid affair followed from there.
6.Ijaz prepared the memo or non-paper in his hand-writing on the basis of what Haqqani dictated to him and had it delivered to Mullen through an American intermediary. In his statements and interviews, Ijaz has clearly admitted that he never knew or had never met Mullen, that he had used an American intermediary to have the memo reached to him, that the memo is in his (Ijaz’s) handwriting and that the contents were dictated by Haqqani.
7. Ijaz has not said anywhere that he knew that the contents had the approval of Zardari. He only says that Haqqani gave him to understand that the contents had the approval of “his boss”.
8. One could understand the fears in the Pakistani civilian leadership--- particularly at the level of Zardari--- regarding a possible threat from Kayani in the wake of the Abbottabad raid. One could also understand their anxiety to seek the intervention of Admiral Mullen to have any threat from Kayani neutralised before it materialised.
9. There were various diplomatic and tactful ways of doing this----by directly taking up the matter secretly and informally with their contacts in the US Administration. It was amazing that instead of doing so, the matter was taken up through the intermediary of a Pakistani origin businessman with dubious credentials without paying any attention to the need for deniability. When you put down anything in writing---whether it is signed or not---you damage the deniability.
10. The only saving grace in the entire episode is that there is no evidence to implicate Zardari himself, but there is enough evidence to implicate the Ambassador. After carefully reading all the available evidence in the matter, my own conclusion is that it was a rogue initiative by an over-anxious or over-enthusiastic Haqqani, which has gone horribly wrong.
11. The Pakistani Army would be justified in feeling enraged against the Ambassador and in expecting that action would be taken against him. By failing to act against him and by trying to cover up the matter, Zardari would be further damaging his credibility in the eyes of not only his Army, but also large sections of the Pakistani public. It would create serious suspicions about the soundness of Zardari’s judgement in sensitive matters such as this.
12. Could there be a coup staged against Zardari by Kayani on this issue? Pakistan of today is not the Pakistan of 1999 when a small group of Amy officers loyal to Pervez Musharraf then out of the country staged a coup against Nawaz Sharif. They were confident that the judiciary would validate their coup. Today’s judiciary in Pakistan is more independent than that of 1999. Kayani can’t be confident that it would support him.
13. Moreover, Kayani would know that a coup or even an attempted one would create instability and damage his reputation as a General who wants to avoid politicisation of the Army. He will exercise pressure on Zardari to get rid of the Ambassador, but would not go beyond that.
14. Even the Americans would be embarrassed by the present controversy which shows the civilian political leadership and bureaucracy and its judgement in poor light. (20-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
If Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari is intelligent, he would realise the damage that has been caused to the credibility of the state of Pakistan by Mr.Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, by his naivete in trying to use the services of Mansoor Ijaz, a controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, for conveying to Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, a request to rein in Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, in return for some quid pro quos promised by Haqqani on behalf of “his boss”.
2. In this highly murky case, we have only claims and denials----with most of the claims coming from Ijaz and most of the denials coming from the Pakistani side. Apart from a belated admission that the Admiral did receive a memo relating to Pakistan, US Government sources have refrained from any comments in the matter.
3. There is as yet no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung ----not even Ambassador Haqqani--- but there are enough indicators regarding the utter naivete of the Ambassador which could ultimately burn the credibility of Zardari himself and drive a further wedge between him and the Army.
4. The entire L’Affaire Ijaz originated in the days after the US commando raid in Abbottabad on May 2,2011, that led to the death of Osama bin Laden. There was apparent nervousness among those close to Zardari that an Army humiliated and enraged by the success of the US raid, might turn its wrath against Zardari, who was generally perceived to be soft and sympathetic to the US interests in matters relating to the campaign against Al Qaeda.
5. Rightly or wrongly, there was an apprehension that Kayani might try to have Zardari removed. It was against this background that the Ambassador, who was then ( May 9,2011) on a visit to London, contacted Ijaz, who was then on a visit to Monaco, and sought a meeting with him in London. The rest of the sordid affair followed from there.
6.Ijaz prepared the memo or non-paper in his hand-writing on the basis of what Haqqani dictated to him and had it delivered to Mullen through an American intermediary. In his statements and interviews, Ijaz has clearly admitted that he never knew or had never met Mullen, that he had used an American intermediary to have the memo reached to him, that the memo is in his (Ijaz’s) handwriting and that the contents were dictated by Haqqani.
7. Ijaz has not said anywhere that he knew that the contents had the approval of Zardari. He only says that Haqqani gave him to understand that the contents had the approval of “his boss”.
8. One could understand the fears in the Pakistani civilian leadership--- particularly at the level of Zardari--- regarding a possible threat from Kayani in the wake of the Abbottabad raid. One could also understand their anxiety to seek the intervention of Admiral Mullen to have any threat from Kayani neutralised before it materialised.
9. There were various diplomatic and tactful ways of doing this----by directly taking up the matter secretly and informally with their contacts in the US Administration. It was amazing that instead of doing so, the matter was taken up through the intermediary of a Pakistani origin businessman with dubious credentials without paying any attention to the need for deniability. When you put down anything in writing---whether it is signed or not---you damage the deniability.
10. The only saving grace in the entire episode is that there is no evidence to implicate Zardari himself, but there is enough evidence to implicate the Ambassador. After carefully reading all the available evidence in the matter, my own conclusion is that it was a rogue initiative by an over-anxious or over-enthusiastic Haqqani, which has gone horribly wrong.
11. The Pakistani Army would be justified in feeling enraged against the Ambassador and in expecting that action would be taken against him. By failing to act against him and by trying to cover up the matter, Zardari would be further damaging his credibility in the eyes of not only his Army, but also large sections of the Pakistani public. It would create serious suspicions about the soundness of Zardari’s judgement in sensitive matters such as this.
12. Could there be a coup staged against Zardari by Kayani on this issue? Pakistan of today is not the Pakistan of 1999 when a small group of Amy officers loyal to Pervez Musharraf then out of the country staged a coup against Nawaz Sharif. They were confident that the judiciary would validate their coup. Today’s judiciary in Pakistan is more independent than that of 1999. Kayani can’t be confident that it would support him.
13. Moreover, Kayani would know that a coup or even an attempted one would create instability and damage his reputation as a General who wants to avoid politicisation of the Army. He will exercise pressure on Zardari to get rid of the Ambassador, but would not go beyond that.
14. Even the Americans would be embarrassed by the present controversy which shows the civilian political leadership and bureaucracy and its judgement in poor light. (20-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
Wednesday, November 16, 2011
MALEGAON: POLITICISATION & COMMUNALISATION OF INVESTIGATION
B.RAMAN
The politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process since 2006 in terrorism-related cases has led to a paralysis of the investigation machinery in the States and the Government of India.
2. The result: Barring the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai which were successfully investigated and prosecuted, our investigating agencies have not been able to detect any of the post-26/11 terrorist strikes in Pune, Mumbai, Benares and New Delhi and they have not been able to successfully prosecute any of the major terrorist incidents that had taken place before 26/11.
3. The beneficiaries---the terrorists involved in these strikes, who continue to be at large, possibly planning more strikes. We do not even know who were the people involved in the post-26/11 terrorist incidents and whether the suspects who were arrested and prosecuted for their alleged role in the pre-26/11 incidents were really the perpetrators.
4. Nothing illustrates the confusion that prevails in our investigation machinery more disturbingly than the confusion worse confounded in the case relating to the September 8, 2006 blasts in the textile town of Malegaon in Maharashtra which killed 31 people, many of them Muslims. Please see my initial analysis of these blasts written two days after the incident at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1945.html
5. The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) of the Maharashtra Police completed the investigation in record time and filed a charge sheet on December 20,2006, against nine Muslims, who were accused of having links with the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).
6. Despite the filing of the charge sheet, the Maharashtra Government handed over the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) following complaints regarding the investigation made by the ATS received from minority representatives and political parties.
7. The investigation has taken a different turn since then. It has been made out by the Central investigation agencies---initially by the CBI and later by the post-26/11 National Investigation Agency (NIA)--- that the Malegaon blasts of 2006 as well as some other terrorist strikes in Hyderabad, Malegaon (2008), Ajmer Sharif and on board the Samjotha Express were actually carried out by some Hindus who wanted to start a campaign of reprisal terrorism against Muslims for their role in jihadi terrorism.
8. The original charges of the ATS against the arrested Muslims and the subsequent charges of the CBI and the NIA against the arrested Hindus relied largely on uncorroborated confessions. There was no scientific investigation with painstaking collection of circumstantial and forensic evidence either by the State Police or by the central agencies.
9. As it always happens in such cases, those who confessed subsequently retracted . In the absence of substantial circumstantial and forensic evidence to back up the charges, the Malegaon case of 2006 has been hanging in mid-air. There has been no scientific forward movement in the investigation against either the arrested Muslims or Hindus. The result has been that neither the State Police nor the central investigation agencies have had the moral courage to admit that the investigations against the arrested Muslims by the State Police and against the arrested Hindus by the Central agencies have been very badly botched up and now there is no possibility of the truth being found out.
10. What we have against the Muslims arrested by the State Police and against the Hindus under investigation by the Central agencies is a series of allegations, insinuations and conjectures, but no legal evidence which will stand scrutiny in a court of law.
11. We have had the intriguing spectacle of the NIA not opposing bail applications from the nine Muslims originally arrested by the Maharashtra ATS, but at the same time refraining from ordering a closure of the investigation against them by submitting a Final Report in the case. The FR would have ended the investigation once and for all unless some fresh evidence was found, warranting a re-opening of the investigation. The Muslims released on bail would have been deemed innocent---neither accused nor suspects. By not opposing bail to them and at the same time, by not submitting a Final Report in the case, the NIA has kept them under the status of no longer accused, but still suspects. This doesn’t re-establish their honour in the eyes of the society.
12. In the case of the Hindus arrested in connection with some cases of reprisal terrorism, the facts and circumstances are exactly the same as in the case of the nine Muslims arrested in connection with the Malegaon 2006 blasts----that is, apart from the retracted confession of Swami Assemanand, there is hardly any circumstantial and forensic evidence against them. And yet they have been treated as suspects as well as accused. The mitigatory yardstick followed in the case of the Muslims has not been followed in the case of the Hindu suspects, one of whom is a religious lady. In the eyes of the Government of India, it is all right to be harsh with the Hindus, but not with the Muslims. Deplorable double standards adopted in the case of the two communities.
13. The result of the blatantly differential handling of Muslims and Hindus in the application of the same laws of criminal procedure would be to add to their anger against each other and against the Government. We will be playing into the hands of the jihadi terrorists and their Pakistani sponsors by aggravating the polarisation between the two communities and facilitating the Pakistani objective of creating a wedge between them.
14. The differential handling brings out clearly the political calculations of the Government in view of next year’s elections in Uttar Pradesh. Increasing the Muslim vote bank even at the risk of losing some Hindu votes has become the driving force of the investigation process. Seven of the Muslims will be out today and rejoin their families, but the Hindus will continue to languish in custody till the UP elections are over.
15. This is not the way to fight any terrorism---jihadi or Hindu reprisal. By politicising and communalising the investigation process, the Government will be further vitiating the relationship between the two communities and paving the way for more acts of terrorism in future. (16-11-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process since 2006 in terrorism-related cases has led to a paralysis of the investigation machinery in the States and the Government of India.
2. The result: Barring the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai which were successfully investigated and prosecuted, our investigating agencies have not been able to detect any of the post-26/11 terrorist strikes in Pune, Mumbai, Benares and New Delhi and they have not been able to successfully prosecute any of the major terrorist incidents that had taken place before 26/11.
3. The beneficiaries---the terrorists involved in these strikes, who continue to be at large, possibly planning more strikes. We do not even know who were the people involved in the post-26/11 terrorist incidents and whether the suspects who were arrested and prosecuted for their alleged role in the pre-26/11 incidents were really the perpetrators.
4. Nothing illustrates the confusion that prevails in our investigation machinery more disturbingly than the confusion worse confounded in the case relating to the September 8, 2006 blasts in the textile town of Malegaon in Maharashtra which killed 31 people, many of them Muslims. Please see my initial analysis of these blasts written two days after the incident at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1945.html
5. The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) of the Maharashtra Police completed the investigation in record time and filed a charge sheet on December 20,2006, against nine Muslims, who were accused of having links with the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).
6. Despite the filing of the charge sheet, the Maharashtra Government handed over the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) following complaints regarding the investigation made by the ATS received from minority representatives and political parties.
7. The investigation has taken a different turn since then. It has been made out by the Central investigation agencies---initially by the CBI and later by the post-26/11 National Investigation Agency (NIA)--- that the Malegaon blasts of 2006 as well as some other terrorist strikes in Hyderabad, Malegaon (2008), Ajmer Sharif and on board the Samjotha Express were actually carried out by some Hindus who wanted to start a campaign of reprisal terrorism against Muslims for their role in jihadi terrorism.
8. The original charges of the ATS against the arrested Muslims and the subsequent charges of the CBI and the NIA against the arrested Hindus relied largely on uncorroborated confessions. There was no scientific investigation with painstaking collection of circumstantial and forensic evidence either by the State Police or by the central agencies.
9. As it always happens in such cases, those who confessed subsequently retracted . In the absence of substantial circumstantial and forensic evidence to back up the charges, the Malegaon case of 2006 has been hanging in mid-air. There has been no scientific forward movement in the investigation against either the arrested Muslims or Hindus. The result has been that neither the State Police nor the central investigation agencies have had the moral courage to admit that the investigations against the arrested Muslims by the State Police and against the arrested Hindus by the Central agencies have been very badly botched up and now there is no possibility of the truth being found out.
10. What we have against the Muslims arrested by the State Police and against the Hindus under investigation by the Central agencies is a series of allegations, insinuations and conjectures, but no legal evidence which will stand scrutiny in a court of law.
11. We have had the intriguing spectacle of the NIA not opposing bail applications from the nine Muslims originally arrested by the Maharashtra ATS, but at the same time refraining from ordering a closure of the investigation against them by submitting a Final Report in the case. The FR would have ended the investigation once and for all unless some fresh evidence was found, warranting a re-opening of the investigation. The Muslims released on bail would have been deemed innocent---neither accused nor suspects. By not opposing bail to them and at the same time, by not submitting a Final Report in the case, the NIA has kept them under the status of no longer accused, but still suspects. This doesn’t re-establish their honour in the eyes of the society.
12. In the case of the Hindus arrested in connection with some cases of reprisal terrorism, the facts and circumstances are exactly the same as in the case of the nine Muslims arrested in connection with the Malegaon 2006 blasts----that is, apart from the retracted confession of Swami Assemanand, there is hardly any circumstantial and forensic evidence against them. And yet they have been treated as suspects as well as accused. The mitigatory yardstick followed in the case of the Muslims has not been followed in the case of the Hindu suspects, one of whom is a religious lady. In the eyes of the Government of India, it is all right to be harsh with the Hindus, but not with the Muslims. Deplorable double standards adopted in the case of the two communities.
13. The result of the blatantly differential handling of Muslims and Hindus in the application of the same laws of criminal procedure would be to add to their anger against each other and against the Government. We will be playing into the hands of the jihadi terrorists and their Pakistani sponsors by aggravating the polarisation between the two communities and facilitating the Pakistani objective of creating a wedge between them.
14. The differential handling brings out clearly the political calculations of the Government in view of next year’s elections in Uttar Pradesh. Increasing the Muslim vote bank even at the risk of losing some Hindu votes has become the driving force of the investigation process. Seven of the Muslims will be out today and rejoin their families, but the Hindus will continue to languish in custody till the UP elections are over.
15. This is not the way to fight any terrorism---jihadi or Hindu reprisal. By politicising and communalising the investigation process, the Government will be further vitiating the relationship between the two communities and paving the way for more acts of terrorism in future. (16-11-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, November 12, 2011
INDIAN TV JOURNOS HAVE MORE TIME TO PROMOTE IMRAN KHAN THAN TO DRAW ATTENTION TO TRAGEDY OF BALOCHS
B.RAMAN
Indian TV journos have generally been very kind to Imran Khan, the cricketer turned politician of Pakistan. He has received more publicity from Indian TV journos than even from Pakistani journalists.
2. I have no personal objections to Indian TV journos having a soft corner for the glamorous Imran Khan. But, I do expect them to pay equal attention to those sections of Pakistani society, which have generally been well disposed towards India such as the Mohajirs of Karachi and the Balochs of Balochistan and their leaders. Their leaders are not as glamorous as Imran, but they are much more friendly to India than Imran.
3. How many times have you seen the Indian TV channels focussing on the tragedies being enacted in Karachi and Balochistan? How many times have you seen Indian TV journos focussing their spotlight on bleeding Balochistan? How many Mohajir and Baloch leaders have been interviewed by them?
4. While Indian TV journos have been enabling Imran to promote himself through the Indian TV, which is widely seen in Pakistan, as the next Prime Minister of Pakistan, at least some Pakistani journalists, whose heart and mind are in the right place, have drawn attention to the state of affairs in Balochistan, where the situation is reminiscent of that in the then East Pakistan before the war of Independence for Bangladesh broke out in 1971.
5.Baloch nationalists kidnapped by the Pakistan Army, tortured to death and their bodies thrown out in remote places, 10 Baloch journalists kidnapped and killed this year and no coverage of these incidents in the Pakistani TV media. Nor on the Indian TV. Only some sections of the Pakistani print media such as the “Daily Times” of Lahore and the “News” have been drawing attention to the colossal human tragedy in Balochistan.
6. One can understand the Pakistani TV channels not paying adequate attention to this tragedy due to fear of adverse reaction from the Pakistani Army. What is preventing the Indian TV channels from covering this tragedy? Is publicity for Imran Khan more important than spotlight on the human tragedy in Balochistan?
7. To create an awareness of the situation in Balochistan, which has been practically blacked out by the Indian TV channels, I am reproducing below an editorial of the “Daily Times” and an article written by an Assistant Editor of the “News”:
EDITORIAL OF THE “DAILY TIMES”
Killings in Balochistan continue
When people all over Pakistan will be celebrating Eid-ul-Azha ( on November 7 ), the people of Balochistan will be mourning their loved ones. The responsibility for this lies with the Pakistan military, its intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps (FC). The entire nation should be ashamed of the brutalities unleashed by the military against its own people in Balochistan. Javed Naseer Rind, a young journalist, was abducted in September and his tortured, bullet-riddled body was found the other day in the province. More than a dozen Baloch, including women, were killed last week in less than 24 hours during a military campaign in Balochistan; the same week when the FC was placed under the provincial government of Balochistan. The fifth military operation of our history is underway against the people of Balochistan but it seems that the rest of Pakistan remains oblivious to it. The apathy of the government and the nation is something that has further alienated the Baloch from the Pakistani state. Thus a new wave of separatism has found resonance in Balochistan. The lessons from 1971 have not been learnt.
The PPP-led government in Islamabad seems helpless before the Pakistan Army and its skewed policies. Even then there is no reason that the government cannot put pressure on the army and make a logical case against its brutalities. Promising development and aid will not serve its purpose unless and until the military is called back from Balochistan and the people of the province are empowered in letter and spirit. The Baloch insurgency started only to ask for their just rights but in order to quash their nationalism, the military under General Pervez Musharraf started using force. Even after the ouster of General Musharraf, the same policies are being carried out. When democracy returned to the country in 2008 after nine years of military rule, it was hoped that the civilian government would do away with a military dictator’s wrong policies. Instead, we have been disappointed with the way the ‘kill and dump’ policy is being carried out with impunity in Balochistan. Thousands of Baloch are still missing while hundreds of them have been slaughtered like animals by the army. Is this the way to deal with a demand for just rights?
The need of the hour is to settle this conflict through a political settlement. Military means cannot crush the honourable Baloch people. The government must talk to the Baloch leadership, both in the mountains and those who are in self-exile, and bring an end to the insurgency on a just basis. All the missing persons should be brought back to their homes safely. The military operation must be stopped at once. The Balochistan government is toothless and cannot do much to stop what is going on. The federal government must come to the rescue. If things keep on going the way they are, the federation will be in trouble. The government should not take this matter lightly. The Baloch deserve better from a democratically elected government. Cruelty is not the answer to anything. Peaceful means and political negotiations are key to bringing peace and prosperity in Balochistan. *
ARTICLE WRITTEN BY SAJID HUSSAIN, ASSISTANT EDITOR OF THE “NEWS” (November 12,2011)
Even if we buy the government’s claim that the number of missing persons in Balochistan has declined, it is only because many of them have lately been found dead. Since June 2010, more than 230 bodies of the previously missing persons have been dumped at abandoned places in the largest but the least populated province. According to the Balochistan Union of Journalists (BUJ), 10 journalists have been killed so far this year.
The missing persons issue and the so-called kill-and-dump spree in the province are as disturbing as the fact that Balochistan’s problem is almost altogether missing from the mainstream discourse. Any mention of Balochistan appears in speeches of politicians and the ranting of anchorpersons only when they intend to be politically correct.
The political parties have yet to include the Balochistan problem in their main agenda. The Jamaat-e- Islami (JI) has shown more concern for an individual, Dr Aafia Siddiqui, than a whole province. At a time when people in Balochistan are talking of separation from Pakistan, the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has concentrated its efforts on keeping the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) a part of the government. Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf has no time for Balochistan, or for any other thing, as it is out to save Pakistan. The MQM would desperately wait for another opportunity to flaunt its street power in defence of a Musharraf or a Zardari. Nawaz Sharif? Balochistan’s inconsequential electoral value does not guarantee premiership.
Ironically, our news-hungry media seems least impressed by Balochistan’s immense news value. Last month, Turbat city, the cultural hub of the province, remained shut for more than a week without a call for a strike from any of the political parties. Not important enough? OK. Only in Balochistan, the security forces take out rallies and sometimes, especially when their convoys meet roadside blasts, force the closure of shops. Of course, apart from these ‘human-interest stories’, Balochistan is home to more alarming news items, but who would want to become the 11th journalist to be killed this year? Is it not news itself that none of our mainstream newspapers and news channels has a full-fledged correspondent outside Quetta?
Unfortunately, only the security establishment has taken Balochistan seriously. In fact, too seriously. And that is where the real problem lies. In the absence of any check, as the rest of the country largely remains unmoved, the security forces have dealt single-handedly with the political unrest in the province. And that is the only way they deal with any issue. That is the army way. For a political solution, the political forces need to intervene and take the matter in their hands.
If they keep ignoring Balochistan, they may be missing it later. (12-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Indian TV journos have generally been very kind to Imran Khan, the cricketer turned politician of Pakistan. He has received more publicity from Indian TV journos than even from Pakistani journalists.
2. I have no personal objections to Indian TV journos having a soft corner for the glamorous Imran Khan. But, I do expect them to pay equal attention to those sections of Pakistani society, which have generally been well disposed towards India such as the Mohajirs of Karachi and the Balochs of Balochistan and their leaders. Their leaders are not as glamorous as Imran, but they are much more friendly to India than Imran.
3. How many times have you seen the Indian TV channels focussing on the tragedies being enacted in Karachi and Balochistan? How many times have you seen Indian TV journos focussing their spotlight on bleeding Balochistan? How many Mohajir and Baloch leaders have been interviewed by them?
4. While Indian TV journos have been enabling Imran to promote himself through the Indian TV, which is widely seen in Pakistan, as the next Prime Minister of Pakistan, at least some Pakistani journalists, whose heart and mind are in the right place, have drawn attention to the state of affairs in Balochistan, where the situation is reminiscent of that in the then East Pakistan before the war of Independence for Bangladesh broke out in 1971.
5.Baloch nationalists kidnapped by the Pakistan Army, tortured to death and their bodies thrown out in remote places, 10 Baloch journalists kidnapped and killed this year and no coverage of these incidents in the Pakistani TV media. Nor on the Indian TV. Only some sections of the Pakistani print media such as the “Daily Times” of Lahore and the “News” have been drawing attention to the colossal human tragedy in Balochistan.
6. One can understand the Pakistani TV channels not paying adequate attention to this tragedy due to fear of adverse reaction from the Pakistani Army. What is preventing the Indian TV channels from covering this tragedy? Is publicity for Imran Khan more important than spotlight on the human tragedy in Balochistan?
7. To create an awareness of the situation in Balochistan, which has been practically blacked out by the Indian TV channels, I am reproducing below an editorial of the “Daily Times” and an article written by an Assistant Editor of the “News”:
EDITORIAL OF THE “DAILY TIMES”
Killings in Balochistan continue
When people all over Pakistan will be celebrating Eid-ul-Azha ( on November 7 ), the people of Balochistan will be mourning their loved ones. The responsibility for this lies with the Pakistan military, its intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps (FC). The entire nation should be ashamed of the brutalities unleashed by the military against its own people in Balochistan. Javed Naseer Rind, a young journalist, was abducted in September and his tortured, bullet-riddled body was found the other day in the province. More than a dozen Baloch, including women, were killed last week in less than 24 hours during a military campaign in Balochistan; the same week when the FC was placed under the provincial government of Balochistan. The fifth military operation of our history is underway against the people of Balochistan but it seems that the rest of Pakistan remains oblivious to it. The apathy of the government and the nation is something that has further alienated the Baloch from the Pakistani state. Thus a new wave of separatism has found resonance in Balochistan. The lessons from 1971 have not been learnt.
The PPP-led government in Islamabad seems helpless before the Pakistan Army and its skewed policies. Even then there is no reason that the government cannot put pressure on the army and make a logical case against its brutalities. Promising development and aid will not serve its purpose unless and until the military is called back from Balochistan and the people of the province are empowered in letter and spirit. The Baloch insurgency started only to ask for their just rights but in order to quash their nationalism, the military under General Pervez Musharraf started using force. Even after the ouster of General Musharraf, the same policies are being carried out. When democracy returned to the country in 2008 after nine years of military rule, it was hoped that the civilian government would do away with a military dictator’s wrong policies. Instead, we have been disappointed with the way the ‘kill and dump’ policy is being carried out with impunity in Balochistan. Thousands of Baloch are still missing while hundreds of them have been slaughtered like animals by the army. Is this the way to deal with a demand for just rights?
The need of the hour is to settle this conflict through a political settlement. Military means cannot crush the honourable Baloch people. The government must talk to the Baloch leadership, both in the mountains and those who are in self-exile, and bring an end to the insurgency on a just basis. All the missing persons should be brought back to their homes safely. The military operation must be stopped at once. The Balochistan government is toothless and cannot do much to stop what is going on. The federal government must come to the rescue. If things keep on going the way they are, the federation will be in trouble. The government should not take this matter lightly. The Baloch deserve better from a democratically elected government. Cruelty is not the answer to anything. Peaceful means and political negotiations are key to bringing peace and prosperity in Balochistan. *
ARTICLE WRITTEN BY SAJID HUSSAIN, ASSISTANT EDITOR OF THE “NEWS” (November 12,2011)
Even if we buy the government’s claim that the number of missing persons in Balochistan has declined, it is only because many of them have lately been found dead. Since June 2010, more than 230 bodies of the previously missing persons have been dumped at abandoned places in the largest but the least populated province. According to the Balochistan Union of Journalists (BUJ), 10 journalists have been killed so far this year.
The missing persons issue and the so-called kill-and-dump spree in the province are as disturbing as the fact that Balochistan’s problem is almost altogether missing from the mainstream discourse. Any mention of Balochistan appears in speeches of politicians and the ranting of anchorpersons only when they intend to be politically correct.
The political parties have yet to include the Balochistan problem in their main agenda. The Jamaat-e- Islami (JI) has shown more concern for an individual, Dr Aafia Siddiqui, than a whole province. At a time when people in Balochistan are talking of separation from Pakistan, the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has concentrated its efforts on keeping the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) a part of the government. Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf has no time for Balochistan, or for any other thing, as it is out to save Pakistan. The MQM would desperately wait for another opportunity to flaunt its street power in defence of a Musharraf or a Zardari. Nawaz Sharif? Balochistan’s inconsequential electoral value does not guarantee premiership.
Ironically, our news-hungry media seems least impressed by Balochistan’s immense news value. Last month, Turbat city, the cultural hub of the province, remained shut for more than a week without a call for a strike from any of the political parties. Not important enough? OK. Only in Balochistan, the security forces take out rallies and sometimes, especially when their convoys meet roadside blasts, force the closure of shops. Of course, apart from these ‘human-interest stories’, Balochistan is home to more alarming news items, but who would want to become the 11th journalist to be killed this year? Is it not news itself that none of our mainstream newspapers and news channels has a full-fledged correspondent outside Quetta?
Unfortunately, only the security establishment has taken Balochistan seriously. In fact, too seriously. And that is where the real problem lies. In the absence of any check, as the rest of the country largely remains unmoved, the security forces have dealt single-handedly with the political unrest in the province. And that is the only way they deal with any issue. That is the army way. For a political solution, the political forces need to intervene and take the matter in their hands.
If they keep ignoring Balochistan, they may be missing it later. (12-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, November 11, 2011
AUNG SAN SUU KYI: CHANGE IN TACTICS OR COLOURS?
B.RAMAN
Slowly and steadily, the Army-propped civilian regime in Myanmar headed by President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy icon, are coming to terms with each other to avoid a confrontation and to pave the way for a Government, which would enjoy her support from outside, if not association, and thereby enjoy a greater credibility in the eyes of the people.
2. The Government has not imposed any restrictions on her travels outside Yangon. Despite this, she has been avoiding any travels, in an attempt not to create any embarrassing law and order situation for the Government. The change ---whether in her tactics or attitude to the Government--- figured in a question posed to her during her weekly radio interview on November 8,2011.Her reply was interesting.
3.She said: “ I would like to clarify that it is not true that I have made trips around the country whenever I was released from house arrest. In 1995 and in 2000, when I was released for the second time, I never made trips around the country, because of restrictions. Between 2002 and 2003, I did make trips around the country. But this time, since my trip to Pegu, although I have thought about making trips around the country I have been unable to do so because there is a lot of work to be done in Rangoon. Plans have already been made for the NLD to distribute rice to the flood victims as much as possible. I think that it would be better to distribute rice in this manner than to spend money to travel across the country.”
4. Similarly, questions are being asked by sections of the people as to why she is not opposing the construction of the gas pipeline from the Arakan area to Yunnan in China. She had strongly opposed on environmental grounds the construction of a big hydel project by a Chinese company in the Kachin State. Her opposition combined with the opposition from the Kachin leaders and people forced the Government to suspend the project, leading to protests from Beijing.
5. The gas pipeline project too is being opposed by the local people on various grounds such as payment of inadequate compensation for the land acquired for the project , taking the gas away to China instead of utilising it for the benefit of the local people and environmental damage. Despite this, she has not been as active in opposing the gas pipeline project in the Arakan area as she was in opposing the hydel project in the Kachin State.
6.She was asked about it during her weekly radio interview of October 28. In another interesting reply, she said: “Although one cannot say that a nationwide boycott (of the pipeline project) could not happen, I don’t think it would be easy. But it is necessary for the whole country, including the government, to be aware of matters that are really giving trouble to the people. Only then will we be able to find solutions to such issues. However, while we are protecting the interests of the people, we must at the same time be aware of—and take care to maintain—good relations with our neighbouring countries.”
7. The gas pipeline being constructed is more important to the Chinese than the suspended hydel project. It is designed to carry not only gas found locally, but also gas brought from the Gulf by Chinese tankers in order to reduce the Chinese dependence on the Malacca Strait. Suu Kyi has been avoiding any opposition to the gas pipeline project lest it add to the difficulties already being faced by the Government in its relations with China after the suspension of the hydel project.
8. In carefully calibrated steps, she and the Government have been trying to pave the way for her election to the Parliament, which seems to be the present priority of both. An amendment to the law on political parties, endorsed by President Thein Sein on November 4, removed the condition that all parties must agree to "preserve" the country's 2008 constitution.
9.In a significant interview to the “Yangon Times”, Khin Aung Myint, the Speaker of the Parliament, who used to be the Director of Public Relations and PSYWAR in the Ministry of Defence, was quoted as saying: “I recognize the result of the 1990 election, which the NLD won with a vast majority of the votes. The results cannot be reversed and I have no intention to do so.”
10.On November 8, a spokesman of her party the National League For Democracy (NLD) announced after a meeting at her residence in Yangon that more than 100 senior members of the party would meet at Yangon on November 18 to decide whether, in view of the change introduced by the Government, the NLD should re-register itself as a political party. Though he did not say so, its re-registration would make it, including Suu Kyi, eligible to stand for election to the Parliament. The speculation is that there is already an unwritten understanding between her and the President that a bye-election would be held before the year-end in which she could be elected.
11. What one has been seeing is a recognition of the victory of her Party in the 1990 elections by the Government. In return, she has agreed not to question the validity of last year’s elections to the present Parliament under the supervision of the Army. The NLD has apparently agreed to end its boycott of the present Parliament and the Government has agreed to pave the way for the election of some NLD leaders, including Suu Kyi, to the Parliament.
12. What then: Will Suu Kyi and her party work from outside the Government or will they join the Government? An answer to this question is not yet available. She said in her November 8 radio interview: “If the people are active and enthusiastic, the government will also become active and the country will develop. If all of you are active in this manner, the road toward political change will be smooth, and our cooperation will be more effective.”
13. Co-operation and national reconciliation and not political confrontation seems to be her objective. As part of this, she is prepared not to create any more difficulties for the Government in Myanmar’s relations with China. It is clear that she does not want to support the movement of the people of the Arakan region against the Chinese gas pipeline to Yunnan and the construction of a modern port at Kyaukpu to transport gas brought by Chinese tankers from the Gulf to Yunnan. (12-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Slowly and steadily, the Army-propped civilian regime in Myanmar headed by President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy icon, are coming to terms with each other to avoid a confrontation and to pave the way for a Government, which would enjoy her support from outside, if not association, and thereby enjoy a greater credibility in the eyes of the people.
2. The Government has not imposed any restrictions on her travels outside Yangon. Despite this, she has been avoiding any travels, in an attempt not to create any embarrassing law and order situation for the Government. The change ---whether in her tactics or attitude to the Government--- figured in a question posed to her during her weekly radio interview on November 8,2011.Her reply was interesting.
3.She said: “ I would like to clarify that it is not true that I have made trips around the country whenever I was released from house arrest. In 1995 and in 2000, when I was released for the second time, I never made trips around the country, because of restrictions. Between 2002 and 2003, I did make trips around the country. But this time, since my trip to Pegu, although I have thought about making trips around the country I have been unable to do so because there is a lot of work to be done in Rangoon. Plans have already been made for the NLD to distribute rice to the flood victims as much as possible. I think that it would be better to distribute rice in this manner than to spend money to travel across the country.”
4. Similarly, questions are being asked by sections of the people as to why she is not opposing the construction of the gas pipeline from the Arakan area to Yunnan in China. She had strongly opposed on environmental grounds the construction of a big hydel project by a Chinese company in the Kachin State. Her opposition combined with the opposition from the Kachin leaders and people forced the Government to suspend the project, leading to protests from Beijing.
5. The gas pipeline project too is being opposed by the local people on various grounds such as payment of inadequate compensation for the land acquired for the project , taking the gas away to China instead of utilising it for the benefit of the local people and environmental damage. Despite this, she has not been as active in opposing the gas pipeline project in the Arakan area as she was in opposing the hydel project in the Kachin State.
6.She was asked about it during her weekly radio interview of October 28. In another interesting reply, she said: “Although one cannot say that a nationwide boycott (of the pipeline project) could not happen, I don’t think it would be easy. But it is necessary for the whole country, including the government, to be aware of matters that are really giving trouble to the people. Only then will we be able to find solutions to such issues. However, while we are protecting the interests of the people, we must at the same time be aware of—and take care to maintain—good relations with our neighbouring countries.”
7. The gas pipeline being constructed is more important to the Chinese than the suspended hydel project. It is designed to carry not only gas found locally, but also gas brought from the Gulf by Chinese tankers in order to reduce the Chinese dependence on the Malacca Strait. Suu Kyi has been avoiding any opposition to the gas pipeline project lest it add to the difficulties already being faced by the Government in its relations with China after the suspension of the hydel project.
8. In carefully calibrated steps, she and the Government have been trying to pave the way for her election to the Parliament, which seems to be the present priority of both. An amendment to the law on political parties, endorsed by President Thein Sein on November 4, removed the condition that all parties must agree to "preserve" the country's 2008 constitution.
9.In a significant interview to the “Yangon Times”, Khin Aung Myint, the Speaker of the Parliament, who used to be the Director of Public Relations and PSYWAR in the Ministry of Defence, was quoted as saying: “I recognize the result of the 1990 election, which the NLD won with a vast majority of the votes. The results cannot be reversed and I have no intention to do so.”
10.On November 8, a spokesman of her party the National League For Democracy (NLD) announced after a meeting at her residence in Yangon that more than 100 senior members of the party would meet at Yangon on November 18 to decide whether, in view of the change introduced by the Government, the NLD should re-register itself as a political party. Though he did not say so, its re-registration would make it, including Suu Kyi, eligible to stand for election to the Parliament. The speculation is that there is already an unwritten understanding between her and the President that a bye-election would be held before the year-end in which she could be elected.
11. What one has been seeing is a recognition of the victory of her Party in the 1990 elections by the Government. In return, she has agreed not to question the validity of last year’s elections to the present Parliament under the supervision of the Army. The NLD has apparently agreed to end its boycott of the present Parliament and the Government has agreed to pave the way for the election of some NLD leaders, including Suu Kyi, to the Parliament.
12. What then: Will Suu Kyi and her party work from outside the Government or will they join the Government? An answer to this question is not yet available. She said in her November 8 radio interview: “If the people are active and enthusiastic, the government will also become active and the country will develop. If all of you are active in this manner, the road toward political change will be smooth, and our cooperation will be more effective.”
13. Co-operation and national reconciliation and not political confrontation seems to be her objective. As part of this, she is prepared not to create any more difficulties for the Government in Myanmar’s relations with China. It is clear that she does not want to support the movement of the people of the Arakan region against the Chinese gas pipeline to Yunnan and the construction of a modern port at Kyaukpu to transport gas brought by Chinese tankers from the Gulf to Yunnan. (12-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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