B.RAMAN
I have received the following comments on my article "If Israel Attacks Iran" from a well-placed and well-informed reader:
It appears that Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain [monarchy], Kuwait, Oman are lobbying for an IDF (Israeli Defence Force) strike. [since they appear to have failed to persuade the US and Europeans to strike against Iran's nuclear program.]
What role Saudi Arabia might play in a strike on Iran, even if they deny their role?
According to several military analysts, Iran lacks the ability to disrupt the port of Hormuz. As a practical matter, how can they do it?
Iran's air defense capability is extremely limited. And their fighter aircraft lack functional avionics and electronics. Iran lacks accurate long range rockets. Their primary ability to strike at Israel is Hezbollah. But would Hezbollah risk a war with most Lebanese to help Khamenei? Both Khamenei and Nasrallah are focusing their limited resources on helping Assad survive. [Assad is apparently using Hezbollah Arab fighters inside Syria against the Syrian resistance.]
Their priority is to help Assad survive. This will be more important to them than retaliating for an Israeli strike [or a joint Israeli, Saudi strike.]
You seem to think the US and Europeans won't support a military strike on Iran. Before the attempted assasination of the Saudi ambassador inside the US, you were 100% right. But the failed assasination has changed things. There is now serious talk about military action in Europe and the US, which the Sunni Arab countries are exploiting with their powerful lobbies.
More than 80% of Sunni Arabs have a negative view of Iran in recent Arab public opinion polls. This is the highest negative rating ever recorded. Much of this is because of the role of IRGC in helping Assad against the Syrian resistance. This increases the odds of a military strike against Iran.
Monday, November 7, 2011
IF ISRAEL ATTACKS IRAN
B.RAMAN
Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities? If so, how will it go about it? What will be the consequences?
2. A PSYWAR has been mounted from Israel regarding the strong likelihood and imminence of an attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna report ---as it is widely expected to---- that Iran has repaired the damages suffered by the computer network of its enrichment complex as a result of a virus (Stuxnet) allegedly planted by the Israeli intelligence and has resumed its enrichment operations full steam with the objective of acquiring weapons grade enrichment capability.
3. Such a report would mean that Israel’s sabotage operations to paralyse the enrichment facilities on which it was relying as an alternative to direct military strikes have failed to produce the desired results leaving it with no other option but direct military strikes to destroy the enrichment facilities that Iran has built up.
4. Should Israel undertake a military strike and if so, when? This question is being debated now in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles. It is apparent that any Israeli military strike may have to be unilateral because the West----including the US--- are not prepared to support a military strike. They feel that paralysing sanctions should be given an opportunity to force Iran to see reason and make Iran give up its plans for achieving a capability for weapons grade enrichment.
5. Israel’s faith in sanctions and sabotage as options to neutralise Iran’s capabilities has weakened and there is growing conviction in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles that the time for a direct military strike against Iran has arrived. If Israel does not act before November-end, the onset of winter and the heavy cloud cover during winter may make precise missile strikes difficult.
6. Political and diplomatic pressure from the US and other Western countries is unlikely to have any impact on Israeli decision-making which will be influenced purely by the assessment of the military and the intelligence agencies regarding the likelihood of success of a military operation.
7. Success means success in destroying Iran’s enrichment capabilities and success in destroying Iran’s capability for retaliation against Israel. When Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor under construction with French assistance in June,1981, the dangers of a retaliatory strike by Iraq against Israel were not a worrisome factor in the planning. It was known that Iraq did not have such a capability.
8. Iran has a strong retaliatory capability against Israel in the form of its missiles. Its Air Force is facing problems due to the reported unserviceability of many of its planes because of the sanctions. It, therefore, plans to rely on its missiles for a retaliatory strike on Israel. The Israeli forces will, therefore, have to either destroy the Iranian retaliatory capability in advance before attacking the nuclear facilities or attack the two simultaneously.
9. The final decision on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will depend on the confidence of the Israeli military and intelligence leadership that it can destroy Iran’s retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike.
10. While serving officers of the Israeli intelligence seem to be confident that a neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability will be doable, some retired officers of the Israeli intelligence such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, have expressed misgivings on this. They have advised the Government against any adventurist impulses.
11. If Israel succeeds in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Teheran will have two options----- block the Strait of Hormuz thereby creating serious dislocations in oil supply or undertake a long-term sabotage operation directed against the West without affecting the oil supply.
12. Blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact not only on the global economy, but also on Iran’s own economy at a time when its economy is already facing serious difficulties due to the economic sanctions. Success of a long-term sabotage operation will be doubtful since Iran is unlikely to enjoy the ground solidarity of the Sunni world. The Sunni countries are as worried as Israel over Iran’s nuclear aspirations. They will condemn Israeli military strikes, but will not do anything in support of Iran beyond that.
13. In view of what has been stated above,if Israel succeeds in neutralising Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Iran may decide that it has no other option but to gulp it and keep sulking---- as Saddam Hussein did post-1981.
14. If an Israeli military strike is successful, the consequences for the region and the global economy may not be serious. If it is not successful, the consequences could be far-reaching. (7-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities? If so, how will it go about it? What will be the consequences?
2. A PSYWAR has been mounted from Israel regarding the strong likelihood and imminence of an attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna report ---as it is widely expected to---- that Iran has repaired the damages suffered by the computer network of its enrichment complex as a result of a virus (Stuxnet) allegedly planted by the Israeli intelligence and has resumed its enrichment operations full steam with the objective of acquiring weapons grade enrichment capability.
3. Such a report would mean that Israel’s sabotage operations to paralyse the enrichment facilities on which it was relying as an alternative to direct military strikes have failed to produce the desired results leaving it with no other option but direct military strikes to destroy the enrichment facilities that Iran has built up.
4. Should Israel undertake a military strike and if so, when? This question is being debated now in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles. It is apparent that any Israeli military strike may have to be unilateral because the West----including the US--- are not prepared to support a military strike. They feel that paralysing sanctions should be given an opportunity to force Iran to see reason and make Iran give up its plans for achieving a capability for weapons grade enrichment.
5. Israel’s faith in sanctions and sabotage as options to neutralise Iran’s capabilities has weakened and there is growing conviction in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles that the time for a direct military strike against Iran has arrived. If Israel does not act before November-end, the onset of winter and the heavy cloud cover during winter may make precise missile strikes difficult.
6. Political and diplomatic pressure from the US and other Western countries is unlikely to have any impact on Israeli decision-making which will be influenced purely by the assessment of the military and the intelligence agencies regarding the likelihood of success of a military operation.
7. Success means success in destroying Iran’s enrichment capabilities and success in destroying Iran’s capability for retaliation against Israel. When Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor under construction with French assistance in June,1981, the dangers of a retaliatory strike by Iraq against Israel were not a worrisome factor in the planning. It was known that Iraq did not have such a capability.
8. Iran has a strong retaliatory capability against Israel in the form of its missiles. Its Air Force is facing problems due to the reported unserviceability of many of its planes because of the sanctions. It, therefore, plans to rely on its missiles for a retaliatory strike on Israel. The Israeli forces will, therefore, have to either destroy the Iranian retaliatory capability in advance before attacking the nuclear facilities or attack the two simultaneously.
9. The final decision on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will depend on the confidence of the Israeli military and intelligence leadership that it can destroy Iran’s retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike.
10. While serving officers of the Israeli intelligence seem to be confident that a neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability will be doable, some retired officers of the Israeli intelligence such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, have expressed misgivings on this. They have advised the Government against any adventurist impulses.
11. If Israel succeeds in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Teheran will have two options----- block the Strait of Hormuz thereby creating serious dislocations in oil supply or undertake a long-term sabotage operation directed against the West without affecting the oil supply.
12. Blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact not only on the global economy, but also on Iran’s own economy at a time when its economy is already facing serious difficulties due to the economic sanctions. Success of a long-term sabotage operation will be doubtful since Iran is unlikely to enjoy the ground solidarity of the Sunni world. The Sunni countries are as worried as Israel over Iran’s nuclear aspirations. They will condemn Israeli military strikes, but will not do anything in support of Iran beyond that.
13. In view of what has been stated above,if Israel succeeds in neutralising Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Iran may decide that it has no other option but to gulp it and keep sulking---- as Saddam Hussein did post-1981.
14. If an Israeli military strike is successful, the consequences for the region and the global economy may not be serious. If it is not successful, the consequences could be far-reaching. (7-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
TIBETAN UNREST SHOWS SIGNS OF SPREADING FROM SICHUAN TO TIBET
B.RAMAN
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: "Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay , the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.” ( 2-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: "Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay , the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.” ( 2-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 31, 2011
MY TAKE ON SHRI KATJU’S CRITICISM OF OUR TV CHANNELS
B.RAMAN
In an interview to Karan Thapar, TV journalist, former Chief Justice Markandey Katju, who presently heads the Press Council, has repeated his strong criticism of our media in general and of the TV media in particular. The text of the interview is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/197593/media-deliberately-dividing-people-pci-chief.html .
2.Some of his criticism seems to have been over-stated. The TV media has also to make both ends meet. Our TV channels are not charitable or philanthropic or non-profit organisations. Unless they make profit, they can’t provide professional services. Unless they have a steadily rising community of viewers, they can’t make profit. How to attract viewer interest is an important question that has to influence their policy-making. If growing sections of viewers prefer non-serious coverage such as of events in the film world, for example, can they ignore their preferences? They can’t.
3. A compromise has to be made if they have to survive----between the professional and the non-professional, between the serious and the non-serious, between the profound and the frivolous. If our TV channels are dishing out to us a mix of all this as a result of the professional compromise which they have to constantly make in the interest of survival, we cannot make over-righteous criticism of their performance as Shri Katju seems to have done.
4. The focus has to be not on the seemingly frivolous part of their coverage---one doesn’t have to watch it if one doesn’t like it--- but on the serious part of it. There has to be parameters to ensure that the serious part is governed by professional considerations without any non-professional agenda. An exercise to draw up a list of such parameters has not received the attention it deserves so far even though there has been a mushrooming of our private TV news channels since the first Gulf war of 1991.
5.In drawing up such parameters one has to go into questions such as: Are different view-points given adequate coverage? Is there favouritism in the selection of panels? Do commercial considerations influence the composition of the panels and the airing of different points of view? Is there a discreet black-listing of inconvenient moulders of public opinion either by the owners of the channels or their anchors? Is there a mechanism by which the criticisms, protests and grievances of the viewers are given serious attention and a response is given to them?
6. Who will lay down such parameters in the interest of professional excellence and public good? The Press Council can’t do it now since it has no powers or responsibility in respect of the TV world. The owners of the TV channels have shown no interest in such an exercise. Since the beginning of this year, I have been strongly voicing a demand through the Twitter world for an ombudsman in our TV news channels similar to what “The Hindu” has.
7. “The Hindu’s” ombudsman is not a paragon of professional virtues, but the creation of it by the paper at least showed that it was aware of the need to pay attention to the views of the readers regarding how the paper was run. One does not find a similar awareness among the owners of our TV channels and their anchors.
8. The prima donna culture and mindset that have permeated into our community of news anchors have made them totally impervious to the need to pay attention to the views and complaints of the viewers. They couldn’t care less about your criticisms or honest opinions. When you criticise, the reply that comes is “use the remote”.
9. The world of our TV news channels is becoming a copy-cat version of our film world. It is this aspect that should be causing concern and needs the attention of the decreasing number of serious-minded professionals still in the TV world.
10.There is one other aspect to which I had drawn attention earlier after the successful hunger-strike of Anna Hazare. That is the failure of our Doordarshan and All-India Radio to evolve into a public broadcasting service of professional excellence that would provide a serious alternative to the kichdi dished out by our private channels. The stunted evolution of the DD and the AIR is due to the continuing political stranglehold on them. This has to be broken. Only public pressure can do it. ( 1-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
In an interview to Karan Thapar, TV journalist, former Chief Justice Markandey Katju, who presently heads the Press Council, has repeated his strong criticism of our media in general and of the TV media in particular. The text of the interview is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/197593/media-deliberately-dividing-people-pci-chief.html .
2.Some of his criticism seems to have been over-stated. The TV media has also to make both ends meet. Our TV channels are not charitable or philanthropic or non-profit organisations. Unless they make profit, they can’t provide professional services. Unless they have a steadily rising community of viewers, they can’t make profit. How to attract viewer interest is an important question that has to influence their policy-making. If growing sections of viewers prefer non-serious coverage such as of events in the film world, for example, can they ignore their preferences? They can’t.
3. A compromise has to be made if they have to survive----between the professional and the non-professional, between the serious and the non-serious, between the profound and the frivolous. If our TV channels are dishing out to us a mix of all this as a result of the professional compromise which they have to constantly make in the interest of survival, we cannot make over-righteous criticism of their performance as Shri Katju seems to have done.
4. The focus has to be not on the seemingly frivolous part of their coverage---one doesn’t have to watch it if one doesn’t like it--- but on the serious part of it. There has to be parameters to ensure that the serious part is governed by professional considerations without any non-professional agenda. An exercise to draw up a list of such parameters has not received the attention it deserves so far even though there has been a mushrooming of our private TV news channels since the first Gulf war of 1991.
5.In drawing up such parameters one has to go into questions such as: Are different view-points given adequate coverage? Is there favouritism in the selection of panels? Do commercial considerations influence the composition of the panels and the airing of different points of view? Is there a discreet black-listing of inconvenient moulders of public opinion either by the owners of the channels or their anchors? Is there a mechanism by which the criticisms, protests and grievances of the viewers are given serious attention and a response is given to them?
6. Who will lay down such parameters in the interest of professional excellence and public good? The Press Council can’t do it now since it has no powers or responsibility in respect of the TV world. The owners of the TV channels have shown no interest in such an exercise. Since the beginning of this year, I have been strongly voicing a demand through the Twitter world for an ombudsman in our TV news channels similar to what “The Hindu” has.
7. “The Hindu’s” ombudsman is not a paragon of professional virtues, but the creation of it by the paper at least showed that it was aware of the need to pay attention to the views of the readers regarding how the paper was run. One does not find a similar awareness among the owners of our TV channels and their anchors.
8. The prima donna culture and mindset that have permeated into our community of news anchors have made them totally impervious to the need to pay attention to the views and complaints of the viewers. They couldn’t care less about your criticisms or honest opinions. When you criticise, the reply that comes is “use the remote”.
9. The world of our TV news channels is becoming a copy-cat version of our film world. It is this aspect that should be causing concern and needs the attention of the decreasing number of serious-minded professionals still in the TV world.
10.There is one other aspect to which I had drawn attention earlier after the successful hunger-strike of Anna Hazare. That is the failure of our Doordarshan and All-India Radio to evolve into a public broadcasting service of professional excellence that would provide a serious alternative to the kichdi dished out by our private channels. The stunted evolution of the DD and the AIR is due to the continuing political stranglehold on them. This has to be broken. Only public pressure can do it. ( 1-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
KARGIL-RETURNED
Sitakant Mahapatra of 1961 IAS batch,Orissa cadre
--------------------
He carried in his breast pocket,
when he went, many things.
From his mother,a packet
of sacred nirmalya rice,
a small,framed photo of Jagannath.
And from their garden, in a handbag,
eight half-ripe mangoes and ten pieces
of cheese-molasses rice-cakes his mother
had stayed up late making for him.
He kept also in his breast pocket,
two treasured pictures of Sumitra
long-haired and dreamy-eyed before
their marriage and of Sonali on his lap.
He took as well Sumitra's kiss,planted
stealthily as a lighting strike on his cheek,
and from inexperienced Sonali, after
much persuasion and a KitKat bribe.
a shy kiss too---both warm until he reached Kargil.
He carried countless sobs in his breast
and suppressed tears, till their faces
disappeared like stars in the distant sky.
He returned in a wooden box
covered with a Tricolour, eyes closed,
cheeks ice-cold, face pale as dried flowers.
This time he carried nothing, not
chocolates for Sonali, nor toys, nor clothes;
nor a sari for Sumitra, nor a shawl
or eye-glasses for his mother.
He returned empty-handed. Like a bird,
sinless, but struck by a lethal arrow, he
circled and in a plane plummeted
to the ground, to Sumitra and Sonali
on his birthday.
---Taken from the edited "Memoirs" of the 1961 batch of All-India and Central Services officers who completed 50 years since we joined the service in May-June,1961
--------------------
He carried in his breast pocket,
when he went, many things.
From his mother,a packet
of sacred nirmalya rice,
a small,framed photo of Jagannath.
And from their garden, in a handbag,
eight half-ripe mangoes and ten pieces
of cheese-molasses rice-cakes his mother
had stayed up late making for him.
He kept also in his breast pocket,
two treasured pictures of Sumitra
long-haired and dreamy-eyed before
their marriage and of Sonali on his lap.
He took as well Sumitra's kiss,planted
stealthily as a lighting strike on his cheek,
and from inexperienced Sonali, after
much persuasion and a KitKat bribe.
a shy kiss too---both warm until he reached Kargil.
He carried countless sobs in his breast
and suppressed tears, till their faces
disappeared like stars in the distant sky.
He returned in a wooden box
covered with a Tricolour, eyes closed,
cheeks ice-cold, face pale as dried flowers.
This time he carried nothing, not
chocolates for Sonali, nor toys, nor clothes;
nor a sari for Sumitra, nor a shawl
or eye-glasses for his mother.
He returned empty-handed. Like a bird,
sinless, but struck by a lethal arrow, he
circled and in a plane plummeted
to the ground, to Sumitra and Sonali
on his birthday.
---Taken from the edited "Memoirs" of the 1961 batch of All-India and Central Services officers who completed 50 years since we joined the service in May-June,1961
Saturday, October 29, 2011
SAIGON 1975, KABUL 2012: WILL PAKISTAN BE ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY?
B.RAMAN
The situation in Kabul should pose increasing concerns not only to the US and Afghanistan, but also India. The steady weakening of the security situation in the Afghan capital a year before the US Presidential elections is reminiscent of the weakening of the security situation in Saigon, the Vietnamese capital, in 1974, which inexorably led to the capture of Saigon by the Vietcong and the hasty withdrawal under humiliating conditions of the US forces in 1975.
2. The steadily deteriorating situation in Kabul was once again highlighted by a suicide attack against a bus carrying International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel on October 29,2011, in which five US soldiers, eight American civilians, three Afghan civilians and one Canadian were killed. The attack, for which responsibility has been claimed by the Taliban, was carried out by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber. The incident has been described by local observers as one of the worst ground attacks against foreign troops in Kabul since 2001.
3. There were two other incidents the same day---- but away from Kabul. In the first reported from the South, three ISAF soldiers were reportedly killed by a man in Afghan army uniform. The gunman was ultimately killed.
4.In the second incident outside Kabul, a teenage girl carried out a suicide attack on a building of the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, in the eastern province of Kunar, killing herself and wounding several NDS personnel.
5.In September, there was a commando style attack on the US Embassy and the ISAF headquarters in Kabul which lasted 20 hours, causing many casualties in the area around---but not in the US Embassy itself. The US blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started a PSYWAR campaign against the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for allegedly using the Haqqani network for promoting Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan.
6. The war of words between the US and Pakistan and US threats of an aid cut-off if Pakistan did not sincerely act against the network have had no impact on the ground situation in Afghanistan as seen from the incidents of October 29 in Kabul and outside.
7. The latest incidents illustrate that while the US may be making headway in its counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda and its terrorism affiliates, it is badly stuck up in its counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban and the Haqqani network. The US pressure on Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network has come too late---- long after the Taliban and the Haqqani network succeeded in infiltrating into Afghan territory, and in establishing a wide network of sleeper cells, which are no longer dependent on the sanctuaries in the Pakistani territory for their sustenance and motivation.
8. Even in the unlikely event of Pakistan acting against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory, the presence of many well-motivated and well-trained sleeper cells inside Afghanistan would continue to come in the way of US attempts to reverse the ground situation.
9. The Pakistan Army already visualises tactical advantages and a likely strategic turning-point in the ground situation in Afghanistan. The tactical advantages arise from the success of the Taliban and the Haqqani network in establishing a network of sleeper cells inside Afghan territory. The strategic turning-point visualised by Pakistan would, in its calculation, arise from an increasing pressure in the months before the Presidential elections on President Barack Obama to find a way out for extricating the US out of Afghanistan without humiliation or a loss of face for the US.
10. The Pakistan Army feels that only it will be in a position to prevent a humiliating situation for the US for which Washington will have to pay a price in the form of coming to terms with the ground reality of a Pakistani presence and control in Afghanistan and a dilution of the Indian presence and influence. Easing of the US pressure on Pakistan to act against the anti-India jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) could be part of this price.
11. It would be unwise of India to view Pakistan as a cornered nation without any exits unless it acts against terrorism emanating from its territory. It is presently a cornered nation all right, but the deteriorating ground situation in Afghanistan and the ultimate US dependence on Pakistan to avoid a humiliating withdrawal could provide Pakistan with a feasible exit option.
12. India should undertake an exercise as to how much of its presence and influence in Afghanistan would be sustainable in the event of a weakening of the US position and how to sustain it. We should not extend and expand our direct and open presence and influence beyond realistic limits. A greater injection of realism into our Afghan policy is called for. (30-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The situation in Kabul should pose increasing concerns not only to the US and Afghanistan, but also India. The steady weakening of the security situation in the Afghan capital a year before the US Presidential elections is reminiscent of the weakening of the security situation in Saigon, the Vietnamese capital, in 1974, which inexorably led to the capture of Saigon by the Vietcong and the hasty withdrawal under humiliating conditions of the US forces in 1975.
2. The steadily deteriorating situation in Kabul was once again highlighted by a suicide attack against a bus carrying International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel on October 29,2011, in which five US soldiers, eight American civilians, three Afghan civilians and one Canadian were killed. The attack, for which responsibility has been claimed by the Taliban, was carried out by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber. The incident has been described by local observers as one of the worst ground attacks against foreign troops in Kabul since 2001.
3. There were two other incidents the same day---- but away from Kabul. In the first reported from the South, three ISAF soldiers were reportedly killed by a man in Afghan army uniform. The gunman was ultimately killed.
4.In the second incident outside Kabul, a teenage girl carried out a suicide attack on a building of the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, in the eastern province of Kunar, killing herself and wounding several NDS personnel.
5.In September, there was a commando style attack on the US Embassy and the ISAF headquarters in Kabul which lasted 20 hours, causing many casualties in the area around---but not in the US Embassy itself. The US blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started a PSYWAR campaign against the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for allegedly using the Haqqani network for promoting Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan.
6. The war of words between the US and Pakistan and US threats of an aid cut-off if Pakistan did not sincerely act against the network have had no impact on the ground situation in Afghanistan as seen from the incidents of October 29 in Kabul and outside.
7. The latest incidents illustrate that while the US may be making headway in its counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda and its terrorism affiliates, it is badly stuck up in its counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban and the Haqqani network. The US pressure on Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network has come too late---- long after the Taliban and the Haqqani network succeeded in infiltrating into Afghan territory, and in establishing a wide network of sleeper cells, which are no longer dependent on the sanctuaries in the Pakistani territory for their sustenance and motivation.
8. Even in the unlikely event of Pakistan acting against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory, the presence of many well-motivated and well-trained sleeper cells inside Afghanistan would continue to come in the way of US attempts to reverse the ground situation.
9. The Pakistan Army already visualises tactical advantages and a likely strategic turning-point in the ground situation in Afghanistan. The tactical advantages arise from the success of the Taliban and the Haqqani network in establishing a network of sleeper cells inside Afghan territory. The strategic turning-point visualised by Pakistan would, in its calculation, arise from an increasing pressure in the months before the Presidential elections on President Barack Obama to find a way out for extricating the US out of Afghanistan without humiliation or a loss of face for the US.
10. The Pakistan Army feels that only it will be in a position to prevent a humiliating situation for the US for which Washington will have to pay a price in the form of coming to terms with the ground reality of a Pakistani presence and control in Afghanistan and a dilution of the Indian presence and influence. Easing of the US pressure on Pakistan to act against the anti-India jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) could be part of this price.
11. It would be unwise of India to view Pakistan as a cornered nation without any exits unless it acts against terrorism emanating from its territory. It is presently a cornered nation all right, but the deteriorating ground situation in Afghanistan and the ultimate US dependence on Pakistan to avoid a humiliating withdrawal could provide Pakistan with a feasible exit option.
12. India should undertake an exercise as to how much of its presence and influence in Afghanistan would be sustainable in the event of a weakening of the US position and how to sustain it. We should not extend and expand our direct and open presence and influence beyond realistic limits. A greater injection of realism into our Afghan policy is called for. (30-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 28, 2011
POLITICAL DRUM-BEATS FROM PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
With the next elections to Pakistan’s National Assembly due in the beginning of 2013, Pakistani politics has started picking up momentum and sliding into the contentious and venomous mode.
2. In their attempt to mobilise party faithfuls and gather fresh pockets of support, Pakistani political leaders have been exploiting three main issues: the alleged corruption and incompetence of President Asif Ali Zardari, the alleged unreliability and opportunism of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), and the anti-US anger.
3. While Nawaz’s PML has made Zardari’s sins of commission and omission the target of its anger, Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaaf ( PTI) have been focussing for the present on the anti-US anger to rally support for their movement against the Government. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) headed by the UK-based Altaf Hussain has come out in support of Zardari and against Nawaz. Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has been carefully watching the campaign unfold without getting into a vigorous counter campaign. It is not worried by Imran Khan. Its main worry is Nawaz, but for the present it is content to let the MQM counter the PML (N) without the PPP itself getting into battle station.
4. On October 28,2011, the PML (N) held a huge anti-Zardari rally in Lahore (about 40,000), while Imran Khan’s PTI held an anti-US rally in Islamabad. No estimate of the support attracted by the PTI’s rally is available. The PTI is holding an anti-Government rally in Lahore on October 30 and the MQM an anti-PML (N) rally in Karachi the same day.
5. The PPP has no reasons to be concerned for the present. Its support base in rural Sindh remains strong. Despite its differences with the MQM over its inept handling of the bad law and order situation in Karachi, it has reasons to be gratified over the continuing opposition of the MQM to Nawaz Sharif.
6.The PPP and the PML (N) have retained their major bases of support in Punjab----with no evidence of any major attrition one way or the other. The anti-US anger is unlikely to be a major political issue either in Sindh or in Punjab.
7. The public fall-out of the anti-US anger is presently confined to the Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Imran Khan has been trying to exploit this anger by focussing his campaign on the inability of the Zardari Government to stop the US Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the FATA. It remains to be seen what effect Imran’s campaign has on the support base of the Awami National Party (ANP), which continues to be an ally of the PPP despite its unhappiness over the anti-Pashtun attacks---allegedly by the MQM cadres---in Karachi. Balochistan does not count for much in the budding campaign.
8. The war of words between the Pakistan Army, the Foreign Office and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the US political and military leaders on the other over the ISI’s alleged collusion with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan has not excited much public interest despite the high decibel projection of the war of words in the Indian and Pakistani print and electronic media. The public anger over the May 2 US raid in Abbottabad, which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, has subsided. OBL has already become passee and no tears are being shed over his death. Even the fundamentalist political parties such as the Jamat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) have not been able to create a street hysteria over the US raid.
9. The main issue angering the voters today is the deteriorating economic situation, which could get worse if the US threat to cut down---if not stop--- its assistance to Pakistan is carried out. Even though the political and military leadership has been trying to project a couldn’t care less attitude over threats of US aid cut-off, they know that neither China nor Saudi Arabia could compensate for what Pakistan would lose should the US carry out its threat. With the next elections about 18 months away, it would not be in the interest of any of the mainstream parties for the economic situation to deteriorate further.
10. While the political drum-beats are to be expected, no clear-cut answers are available to two questions: Will the opposition try for a premature election in 2012 and what would be the attitude of the Army in the event of the contentious political debate getting more venomous ?
11. The indications from reliable sources in Pakistan close to the Army are that the GHQ in Rawalpindi has no stomach for a direct political role similar to what it had pre-2008 and would prefer that the elections are held as scheduled. The Army’s present preoccupation is the war of words with the US.
12. According to these sources, both the military and political leaders in Pakistan are feeling uncomfortable with the continuing war of words and are searching for an honourable way out without seeming to betray the Haqqani network which has remained loyal to Islamabad and Rawalpindi. ( 29-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
With the next elections to Pakistan’s National Assembly due in the beginning of 2013, Pakistani politics has started picking up momentum and sliding into the contentious and venomous mode.
2. In their attempt to mobilise party faithfuls and gather fresh pockets of support, Pakistani political leaders have been exploiting three main issues: the alleged corruption and incompetence of President Asif Ali Zardari, the alleged unreliability and opportunism of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), and the anti-US anger.
3. While Nawaz’s PML has made Zardari’s sins of commission and omission the target of its anger, Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaaf ( PTI) have been focussing for the present on the anti-US anger to rally support for their movement against the Government. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) headed by the UK-based Altaf Hussain has come out in support of Zardari and against Nawaz. Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has been carefully watching the campaign unfold without getting into a vigorous counter campaign. It is not worried by Imran Khan. Its main worry is Nawaz, but for the present it is content to let the MQM counter the PML (N) without the PPP itself getting into battle station.
4. On October 28,2011, the PML (N) held a huge anti-Zardari rally in Lahore (about 40,000), while Imran Khan’s PTI held an anti-US rally in Islamabad. No estimate of the support attracted by the PTI’s rally is available. The PTI is holding an anti-Government rally in Lahore on October 30 and the MQM an anti-PML (N) rally in Karachi the same day.
5. The PPP has no reasons to be concerned for the present. Its support base in rural Sindh remains strong. Despite its differences with the MQM over its inept handling of the bad law and order situation in Karachi, it has reasons to be gratified over the continuing opposition of the MQM to Nawaz Sharif.
6.The PPP and the PML (N) have retained their major bases of support in Punjab----with no evidence of any major attrition one way or the other. The anti-US anger is unlikely to be a major political issue either in Sindh or in Punjab.
7. The public fall-out of the anti-US anger is presently confined to the Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Imran Khan has been trying to exploit this anger by focussing his campaign on the inability of the Zardari Government to stop the US Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the FATA. It remains to be seen what effect Imran’s campaign has on the support base of the Awami National Party (ANP), which continues to be an ally of the PPP despite its unhappiness over the anti-Pashtun attacks---allegedly by the MQM cadres---in Karachi. Balochistan does not count for much in the budding campaign.
8. The war of words between the Pakistan Army, the Foreign Office and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the US political and military leaders on the other over the ISI’s alleged collusion with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan has not excited much public interest despite the high decibel projection of the war of words in the Indian and Pakistani print and electronic media. The public anger over the May 2 US raid in Abbottabad, which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, has subsided. OBL has already become passee and no tears are being shed over his death. Even the fundamentalist political parties such as the Jamat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) have not been able to create a street hysteria over the US raid.
9. The main issue angering the voters today is the deteriorating economic situation, which could get worse if the US threat to cut down---if not stop--- its assistance to Pakistan is carried out. Even though the political and military leadership has been trying to project a couldn’t care less attitude over threats of US aid cut-off, they know that neither China nor Saudi Arabia could compensate for what Pakistan would lose should the US carry out its threat. With the next elections about 18 months away, it would not be in the interest of any of the mainstream parties for the economic situation to deteriorate further.
10. While the political drum-beats are to be expected, no clear-cut answers are available to two questions: Will the opposition try for a premature election in 2012 and what would be the attitude of the Army in the event of the contentious political debate getting more venomous ?
11. The indications from reliable sources in Pakistan close to the Army are that the GHQ in Rawalpindi has no stomach for a direct political role similar to what it had pre-2008 and would prefer that the elections are held as scheduled. The Army’s present preoccupation is the war of words with the US.
12. According to these sources, both the military and political leaders in Pakistan are feeling uncomfortable with the continuing war of words and are searching for an honourable way out without seeming to betray the Haqqani network which has remained loyal to Islamabad and Rawalpindi. ( 29-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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