Sitakant Mahapatra of 1961 IAS batch,Orissa cadre
--------------------
He carried in his breast pocket,
when he went, many things.
From his mother,a packet
of sacred nirmalya rice,
a small,framed photo of Jagannath.
And from their garden, in a handbag,
eight half-ripe mangoes and ten pieces
of cheese-molasses rice-cakes his mother
had stayed up late making for him.
He kept also in his breast pocket,
two treasured pictures of Sumitra
long-haired and dreamy-eyed before
their marriage and of Sonali on his lap.
He took as well Sumitra's kiss,planted
stealthily as a lighting strike on his cheek,
and from inexperienced Sonali, after
much persuasion and a KitKat bribe.
a shy kiss too---both warm until he reached Kargil.
He carried countless sobs in his breast
and suppressed tears, till their faces
disappeared like stars in the distant sky.
He returned in a wooden box
covered with a Tricolour, eyes closed,
cheeks ice-cold, face pale as dried flowers.
This time he carried nothing, not
chocolates for Sonali, nor toys, nor clothes;
nor a sari for Sumitra, nor a shawl
or eye-glasses for his mother.
He returned empty-handed. Like a bird,
sinless, but struck by a lethal arrow, he
circled and in a plane plummeted
to the ground, to Sumitra and Sonali
on his birthday.
---Taken from the edited "Memoirs" of the 1961 batch of All-India and Central Services officers who completed 50 years since we joined the service in May-June,1961
Monday, October 31, 2011
Saturday, October 29, 2011
SAIGON 1975, KABUL 2012: WILL PAKISTAN BE ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY?
B.RAMAN
The situation in Kabul should pose increasing concerns not only to the US and Afghanistan, but also India. The steady weakening of the security situation in the Afghan capital a year before the US Presidential elections is reminiscent of the weakening of the security situation in Saigon, the Vietnamese capital, in 1974, which inexorably led to the capture of Saigon by the Vietcong and the hasty withdrawal under humiliating conditions of the US forces in 1975.
2. The steadily deteriorating situation in Kabul was once again highlighted by a suicide attack against a bus carrying International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel on October 29,2011, in which five US soldiers, eight American civilians, three Afghan civilians and one Canadian were killed. The attack, for which responsibility has been claimed by the Taliban, was carried out by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber. The incident has been described by local observers as one of the worst ground attacks against foreign troops in Kabul since 2001.
3. There were two other incidents the same day---- but away from Kabul. In the first reported from the South, three ISAF soldiers were reportedly killed by a man in Afghan army uniform. The gunman was ultimately killed.
4.In the second incident outside Kabul, a teenage girl carried out a suicide attack on a building of the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, in the eastern province of Kunar, killing herself and wounding several NDS personnel.
5.In September, there was a commando style attack on the US Embassy and the ISAF headquarters in Kabul which lasted 20 hours, causing many casualties in the area around---but not in the US Embassy itself. The US blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started a PSYWAR campaign against the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for allegedly using the Haqqani network for promoting Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan.
6. The war of words between the US and Pakistan and US threats of an aid cut-off if Pakistan did not sincerely act against the network have had no impact on the ground situation in Afghanistan as seen from the incidents of October 29 in Kabul and outside.
7. The latest incidents illustrate that while the US may be making headway in its counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda and its terrorism affiliates, it is badly stuck up in its counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban and the Haqqani network. The US pressure on Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network has come too late---- long after the Taliban and the Haqqani network succeeded in infiltrating into Afghan territory, and in establishing a wide network of sleeper cells, which are no longer dependent on the sanctuaries in the Pakistani territory for their sustenance and motivation.
8. Even in the unlikely event of Pakistan acting against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory, the presence of many well-motivated and well-trained sleeper cells inside Afghanistan would continue to come in the way of US attempts to reverse the ground situation.
9. The Pakistan Army already visualises tactical advantages and a likely strategic turning-point in the ground situation in Afghanistan. The tactical advantages arise from the success of the Taliban and the Haqqani network in establishing a network of sleeper cells inside Afghan territory. The strategic turning-point visualised by Pakistan would, in its calculation, arise from an increasing pressure in the months before the Presidential elections on President Barack Obama to find a way out for extricating the US out of Afghanistan without humiliation or a loss of face for the US.
10. The Pakistan Army feels that only it will be in a position to prevent a humiliating situation for the US for which Washington will have to pay a price in the form of coming to terms with the ground reality of a Pakistani presence and control in Afghanistan and a dilution of the Indian presence and influence. Easing of the US pressure on Pakistan to act against the anti-India jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) could be part of this price.
11. It would be unwise of India to view Pakistan as a cornered nation without any exits unless it acts against terrorism emanating from its territory. It is presently a cornered nation all right, but the deteriorating ground situation in Afghanistan and the ultimate US dependence on Pakistan to avoid a humiliating withdrawal could provide Pakistan with a feasible exit option.
12. India should undertake an exercise as to how much of its presence and influence in Afghanistan would be sustainable in the event of a weakening of the US position and how to sustain it. We should not extend and expand our direct and open presence and influence beyond realistic limits. A greater injection of realism into our Afghan policy is called for. (30-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The situation in Kabul should pose increasing concerns not only to the US and Afghanistan, but also India. The steady weakening of the security situation in the Afghan capital a year before the US Presidential elections is reminiscent of the weakening of the security situation in Saigon, the Vietnamese capital, in 1974, which inexorably led to the capture of Saigon by the Vietcong and the hasty withdrawal under humiliating conditions of the US forces in 1975.
2. The steadily deteriorating situation in Kabul was once again highlighted by a suicide attack against a bus carrying International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel on October 29,2011, in which five US soldiers, eight American civilians, three Afghan civilians and one Canadian were killed. The attack, for which responsibility has been claimed by the Taliban, was carried out by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber. The incident has been described by local observers as one of the worst ground attacks against foreign troops in Kabul since 2001.
3. There were two other incidents the same day---- but away from Kabul. In the first reported from the South, three ISAF soldiers were reportedly killed by a man in Afghan army uniform. The gunman was ultimately killed.
4.In the second incident outside Kabul, a teenage girl carried out a suicide attack on a building of the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, in the eastern province of Kunar, killing herself and wounding several NDS personnel.
5.In September, there was a commando style attack on the US Embassy and the ISAF headquarters in Kabul which lasted 20 hours, causing many casualties in the area around---but not in the US Embassy itself. The US blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started a PSYWAR campaign against the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for allegedly using the Haqqani network for promoting Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan.
6. The war of words between the US and Pakistan and US threats of an aid cut-off if Pakistan did not sincerely act against the network have had no impact on the ground situation in Afghanistan as seen from the incidents of October 29 in Kabul and outside.
7. The latest incidents illustrate that while the US may be making headway in its counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda and its terrorism affiliates, it is badly stuck up in its counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban and the Haqqani network. The US pressure on Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network has come too late---- long after the Taliban and the Haqqani network succeeded in infiltrating into Afghan territory, and in establishing a wide network of sleeper cells, which are no longer dependent on the sanctuaries in the Pakistani territory for their sustenance and motivation.
8. Even in the unlikely event of Pakistan acting against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory, the presence of many well-motivated and well-trained sleeper cells inside Afghanistan would continue to come in the way of US attempts to reverse the ground situation.
9. The Pakistan Army already visualises tactical advantages and a likely strategic turning-point in the ground situation in Afghanistan. The tactical advantages arise from the success of the Taliban and the Haqqani network in establishing a network of sleeper cells inside Afghan territory. The strategic turning-point visualised by Pakistan would, in its calculation, arise from an increasing pressure in the months before the Presidential elections on President Barack Obama to find a way out for extricating the US out of Afghanistan without humiliation or a loss of face for the US.
10. The Pakistan Army feels that only it will be in a position to prevent a humiliating situation for the US for which Washington will have to pay a price in the form of coming to terms with the ground reality of a Pakistani presence and control in Afghanistan and a dilution of the Indian presence and influence. Easing of the US pressure on Pakistan to act against the anti-India jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) could be part of this price.
11. It would be unwise of India to view Pakistan as a cornered nation without any exits unless it acts against terrorism emanating from its territory. It is presently a cornered nation all right, but the deteriorating ground situation in Afghanistan and the ultimate US dependence on Pakistan to avoid a humiliating withdrawal could provide Pakistan with a feasible exit option.
12. India should undertake an exercise as to how much of its presence and influence in Afghanistan would be sustainable in the event of a weakening of the US position and how to sustain it. We should not extend and expand our direct and open presence and influence beyond realistic limits. A greater injection of realism into our Afghan policy is called for. (30-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 28, 2011
POLITICAL DRUM-BEATS FROM PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
With the next elections to Pakistan’s National Assembly due in the beginning of 2013, Pakistani politics has started picking up momentum and sliding into the contentious and venomous mode.
2. In their attempt to mobilise party faithfuls and gather fresh pockets of support, Pakistani political leaders have been exploiting three main issues: the alleged corruption and incompetence of President Asif Ali Zardari, the alleged unreliability and opportunism of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), and the anti-US anger.
3. While Nawaz’s PML has made Zardari’s sins of commission and omission the target of its anger, Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaaf ( PTI) have been focussing for the present on the anti-US anger to rally support for their movement against the Government. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) headed by the UK-based Altaf Hussain has come out in support of Zardari and against Nawaz. Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has been carefully watching the campaign unfold without getting into a vigorous counter campaign. It is not worried by Imran Khan. Its main worry is Nawaz, but for the present it is content to let the MQM counter the PML (N) without the PPP itself getting into battle station.
4. On October 28,2011, the PML (N) held a huge anti-Zardari rally in Lahore (about 40,000), while Imran Khan’s PTI held an anti-US rally in Islamabad. No estimate of the support attracted by the PTI’s rally is available. The PTI is holding an anti-Government rally in Lahore on October 30 and the MQM an anti-PML (N) rally in Karachi the same day.
5. The PPP has no reasons to be concerned for the present. Its support base in rural Sindh remains strong. Despite its differences with the MQM over its inept handling of the bad law and order situation in Karachi, it has reasons to be gratified over the continuing opposition of the MQM to Nawaz Sharif.
6.The PPP and the PML (N) have retained their major bases of support in Punjab----with no evidence of any major attrition one way or the other. The anti-US anger is unlikely to be a major political issue either in Sindh or in Punjab.
7. The public fall-out of the anti-US anger is presently confined to the Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Imran Khan has been trying to exploit this anger by focussing his campaign on the inability of the Zardari Government to stop the US Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the FATA. It remains to be seen what effect Imran’s campaign has on the support base of the Awami National Party (ANP), which continues to be an ally of the PPP despite its unhappiness over the anti-Pashtun attacks---allegedly by the MQM cadres---in Karachi. Balochistan does not count for much in the budding campaign.
8. The war of words between the Pakistan Army, the Foreign Office and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the US political and military leaders on the other over the ISI’s alleged collusion with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan has not excited much public interest despite the high decibel projection of the war of words in the Indian and Pakistani print and electronic media. The public anger over the May 2 US raid in Abbottabad, which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, has subsided. OBL has already become passee and no tears are being shed over his death. Even the fundamentalist political parties such as the Jamat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) have not been able to create a street hysteria over the US raid.
9. The main issue angering the voters today is the deteriorating economic situation, which could get worse if the US threat to cut down---if not stop--- its assistance to Pakistan is carried out. Even though the political and military leadership has been trying to project a couldn’t care less attitude over threats of US aid cut-off, they know that neither China nor Saudi Arabia could compensate for what Pakistan would lose should the US carry out its threat. With the next elections about 18 months away, it would not be in the interest of any of the mainstream parties for the economic situation to deteriorate further.
10. While the political drum-beats are to be expected, no clear-cut answers are available to two questions: Will the opposition try for a premature election in 2012 and what would be the attitude of the Army in the event of the contentious political debate getting more venomous ?
11. The indications from reliable sources in Pakistan close to the Army are that the GHQ in Rawalpindi has no stomach for a direct political role similar to what it had pre-2008 and would prefer that the elections are held as scheduled. The Army’s present preoccupation is the war of words with the US.
12. According to these sources, both the military and political leaders in Pakistan are feeling uncomfortable with the continuing war of words and are searching for an honourable way out without seeming to betray the Haqqani network which has remained loyal to Islamabad and Rawalpindi. ( 29-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
With the next elections to Pakistan’s National Assembly due in the beginning of 2013, Pakistani politics has started picking up momentum and sliding into the contentious and venomous mode.
2. In their attempt to mobilise party faithfuls and gather fresh pockets of support, Pakistani political leaders have been exploiting three main issues: the alleged corruption and incompetence of President Asif Ali Zardari, the alleged unreliability and opportunism of Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), and the anti-US anger.
3. While Nawaz’s PML has made Zardari’s sins of commission and omission the target of its anger, Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaaf ( PTI) have been focussing for the present on the anti-US anger to rally support for their movement against the Government. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) headed by the UK-based Altaf Hussain has come out in support of Zardari and against Nawaz. Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has been carefully watching the campaign unfold without getting into a vigorous counter campaign. It is not worried by Imran Khan. Its main worry is Nawaz, but for the present it is content to let the MQM counter the PML (N) without the PPP itself getting into battle station.
4. On October 28,2011, the PML (N) held a huge anti-Zardari rally in Lahore (about 40,000), while Imran Khan’s PTI held an anti-US rally in Islamabad. No estimate of the support attracted by the PTI’s rally is available. The PTI is holding an anti-Government rally in Lahore on October 30 and the MQM an anti-PML (N) rally in Karachi the same day.
5. The PPP has no reasons to be concerned for the present. Its support base in rural Sindh remains strong. Despite its differences with the MQM over its inept handling of the bad law and order situation in Karachi, it has reasons to be gratified over the continuing opposition of the MQM to Nawaz Sharif.
6.The PPP and the PML (N) have retained their major bases of support in Punjab----with no evidence of any major attrition one way or the other. The anti-US anger is unlikely to be a major political issue either in Sindh or in Punjab.
7. The public fall-out of the anti-US anger is presently confined to the Pashtun belt in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa (KP) province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Imran Khan has been trying to exploit this anger by focussing his campaign on the inability of the Zardari Government to stop the US Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the FATA. It remains to be seen what effect Imran’s campaign has on the support base of the Awami National Party (ANP), which continues to be an ally of the PPP despite its unhappiness over the anti-Pashtun attacks---allegedly by the MQM cadres---in Karachi. Balochistan does not count for much in the budding campaign.
8. The war of words between the Pakistan Army, the Foreign Office and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the US political and military leaders on the other over the ISI’s alleged collusion with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan has not excited much public interest despite the high decibel projection of the war of words in the Indian and Pakistani print and electronic media. The public anger over the May 2 US raid in Abbottabad, which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, has subsided. OBL has already become passee and no tears are being shed over his death. Even the fundamentalist political parties such as the Jamat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) have not been able to create a street hysteria over the US raid.
9. The main issue angering the voters today is the deteriorating economic situation, which could get worse if the US threat to cut down---if not stop--- its assistance to Pakistan is carried out. Even though the political and military leadership has been trying to project a couldn’t care less attitude over threats of US aid cut-off, they know that neither China nor Saudi Arabia could compensate for what Pakistan would lose should the US carry out its threat. With the next elections about 18 months away, it would not be in the interest of any of the mainstream parties for the economic situation to deteriorate further.
10. While the political drum-beats are to be expected, no clear-cut answers are available to two questions: Will the opposition try for a premature election in 2012 and what would be the attitude of the Army in the event of the contentious political debate getting more venomous ?
11. The indications from reliable sources in Pakistan close to the Army are that the GHQ in Rawalpindi has no stomach for a direct political role similar to what it had pre-2008 and would prefer that the elections are held as scheduled. The Army’s present preoccupation is the war of words with the US.
12. According to these sources, both the military and political leaders in Pakistan are feeling uncomfortable with the continuing war of words and are searching for an honourable way out without seeming to betray the Haqqani network which has remained loyal to Islamabad and Rawalpindi. ( 29-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, October 27, 2011
CHINESE CONCERNS OVER SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS
B.RAMAN
The growing concerns of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the destabilising potential of social media networks were reflected during the meeting of the Party Central Committee held at Beijing from October 15 to 18, 2011, under the presidentship of Hu Jintao, Party General Secretary.
2. The special meeting of the Party CC, which was convened ostensibly to discuss and decide on the need for cultural reforms and on measures required to strengthen China’s soft power to enable it to keep pace with its economic power, was also devoted to discussing the concerns of the Party leadership over the difficulties being experienced in preventing the perceived misuse of microblogs to spread dissatisfaction among the people over the sins of commission and omission of the leadership.
3. While the Party and the Government continue to maintain a tight control over the print media, they have not been able to control the dissemination and discussion of information regarding the failings of the leadership in the microblogs. The free discussion by the netizens in microblogs has reduced the relevance of the controlled discussions in the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is the country’s Parliament.
4. The Government/Party vetted reports on the proceedings of the NPC and the Party Central Committee as disseminated by the print media enjoy less and less credibility and the reports and critiques as disseminated by the netizens through their microblogs are enjoying increasing credibility.
5. Recently, the Government and the Party miserably failed in their attempts to cover up the inadequacies which led to a major train accident. The truth was brought out by the netizens through their microblogs. There have been other similar instances where attempts of the State and the Party to cover up their failings and the inadequacies in policy formulation and implementation were thwarted by alert netizens and tweeple.
6. The magnitude of the problem faced by the State and the party could be guessed from the fact that the number of Chinese users registered on domestic microblog sites such as Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo reached 195 million by the end of June, a more than threefold increase since the end of 2010, according to the China Internet Network Information Center. That is, nearly about 20 per cent of China’s population---most of them youth--- are now able to discuss among themselves matters of the State and the Party and of public interest without the State being able to exercise any control over their access to information and their discussion on the information thus disseminated through the microblogs. It should be noted, however, that there is a huge difference between registered users and active users. It is estimated that only about one-third of the registered users actively and regularly use the microblogs. Even that number is large.
7. Official denials of what the Government describes as rumours are no longer accepted by the 500 million strong web civil society of netizens, of whom about 195 million constitute the community of tweeple. Recent official denials of tweets about the alleged crash of an Air Force plane during a test flight and regarding some budgetary proposals have been disbelieved by the netizens, who continue to insist in their tweets and posts on the correctness of their information.
8.The Chinese Tweeple, who are using the microblogs as a political weapon to hold the State and the Party accountable for their sins of omission and commission, do not have any motivated agenda to destabilise the Government and the Party and to bring an end to the one-party rule. Since the traditional media and State and party organs do not give them an opportunity to openly voice their grievances and criticisms, they are using the platform provided by the microblogs to do so without any intention of wanting to destabilise the country.
9.But the Government and the Party fear that a cumulative effect of their use of the microblogs could be to create pockets of alienation in the civil society and ultimately unite those alienated against the Government and the State.
10.The Chinese Government has been trying to counter the anti-establishment soft power of the tweeple at two levels. Firstly, by encouraging the party cells and the Government offices to follow a pro-active policy of making a better use of the social media networks---particularly the microblogs---- to disseminate the correct information and to counter rumours and misperceptions. It has been reported that about 60,000 party cells and government offices are already aggressively using the microblogs for this purpose.
11.Secondly, by exercising pressure on the owners of the social media networks to tighten censorship and control over the main search engine Baidu and the microblogs in order to filter and keep out what the Government projects as rumours and criticism with a potential for destabilisation . Such measures were not very successful in June when rumours regarding the alleged death of Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu as State President and Party General Secretary, spread through microblogs despite the counter-measures taken by the Ministry of Public Security.
12. It is in the light of such incidents and experiences that the Party CC discussed what further measures needed to be taken to eliminate the potential for destabilisation of the social media networks. It is reported that there are 15 such networks in China, of which four are most popular.
13. A statement issued at the end of the meeting, which was published on October 26, vowed to "strengthen guidance and administration of social Internet services and instant communications tools, and regulate the orderly dissemination of information." It also said the Government should "apply the law to sternly punish the dissemination of harmful information."
14. The statement called on China's conventional media (print, TV and radio ) to correctly guide public opinion, to emphasize positive propaganda, and to uphold stability and unity. At the same time, it added that the people should have the right to know what is going on, the right to participate in and monitor events, and the right to express themselves.
15.The State Internet Information Office said on October 26 that it had asked the police to prosecute those responsible for spreading a bogus tax policy announcement and rumours that a fighter jet had crashed, killing the pilot.
16."The Internet is a microphone that everyone can use, but it is not one that everyone can use well," the People's Daily, the Communist Party's official newspaper, said in an editorial. The official Xinhua news agency has reported that three people, including a website editor, had been punished for spreading rumours.
17.The growing community of netizens and tweeple have realised their power against the State and the Party and the Government is going to find it difficult now to deprive them of this power. Any attempt to do so through oppressive measures might itself set in motion a destabilising chain of events ultimately threatening the power of the State and the Party in a one-party State. ( 27-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The growing concerns of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the destabilising potential of social media networks were reflected during the meeting of the Party Central Committee held at Beijing from October 15 to 18, 2011, under the presidentship of Hu Jintao, Party General Secretary.
2. The special meeting of the Party CC, which was convened ostensibly to discuss and decide on the need for cultural reforms and on measures required to strengthen China’s soft power to enable it to keep pace with its economic power, was also devoted to discussing the concerns of the Party leadership over the difficulties being experienced in preventing the perceived misuse of microblogs to spread dissatisfaction among the people over the sins of commission and omission of the leadership.
3. While the Party and the Government continue to maintain a tight control over the print media, they have not been able to control the dissemination and discussion of information regarding the failings of the leadership in the microblogs. The free discussion by the netizens in microblogs has reduced the relevance of the controlled discussions in the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is the country’s Parliament.
4. The Government/Party vetted reports on the proceedings of the NPC and the Party Central Committee as disseminated by the print media enjoy less and less credibility and the reports and critiques as disseminated by the netizens through their microblogs are enjoying increasing credibility.
5. Recently, the Government and the Party miserably failed in their attempts to cover up the inadequacies which led to a major train accident. The truth was brought out by the netizens through their microblogs. There have been other similar instances where attempts of the State and the Party to cover up their failings and the inadequacies in policy formulation and implementation were thwarted by alert netizens and tweeple.
6. The magnitude of the problem faced by the State and the party could be guessed from the fact that the number of Chinese users registered on domestic microblog sites such as Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo reached 195 million by the end of June, a more than threefold increase since the end of 2010, according to the China Internet Network Information Center. That is, nearly about 20 per cent of China’s population---most of them youth--- are now able to discuss among themselves matters of the State and the Party and of public interest without the State being able to exercise any control over their access to information and their discussion on the information thus disseminated through the microblogs. It should be noted, however, that there is a huge difference between registered users and active users. It is estimated that only about one-third of the registered users actively and regularly use the microblogs. Even that number is large.
7. Official denials of what the Government describes as rumours are no longer accepted by the 500 million strong web civil society of netizens, of whom about 195 million constitute the community of tweeple. Recent official denials of tweets about the alleged crash of an Air Force plane during a test flight and regarding some budgetary proposals have been disbelieved by the netizens, who continue to insist in their tweets and posts on the correctness of their information.
8.The Chinese Tweeple, who are using the microblogs as a political weapon to hold the State and the Party accountable for their sins of omission and commission, do not have any motivated agenda to destabilise the Government and the Party and to bring an end to the one-party rule. Since the traditional media and State and party organs do not give them an opportunity to openly voice their grievances and criticisms, they are using the platform provided by the microblogs to do so without any intention of wanting to destabilise the country.
9.But the Government and the Party fear that a cumulative effect of their use of the microblogs could be to create pockets of alienation in the civil society and ultimately unite those alienated against the Government and the State.
10.The Chinese Government has been trying to counter the anti-establishment soft power of the tweeple at two levels. Firstly, by encouraging the party cells and the Government offices to follow a pro-active policy of making a better use of the social media networks---particularly the microblogs---- to disseminate the correct information and to counter rumours and misperceptions. It has been reported that about 60,000 party cells and government offices are already aggressively using the microblogs for this purpose.
11.Secondly, by exercising pressure on the owners of the social media networks to tighten censorship and control over the main search engine Baidu and the microblogs in order to filter and keep out what the Government projects as rumours and criticism with a potential for destabilisation . Such measures were not very successful in June when rumours regarding the alleged death of Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu as State President and Party General Secretary, spread through microblogs despite the counter-measures taken by the Ministry of Public Security.
12. It is in the light of such incidents and experiences that the Party CC discussed what further measures needed to be taken to eliminate the potential for destabilisation of the social media networks. It is reported that there are 15 such networks in China, of which four are most popular.
13. A statement issued at the end of the meeting, which was published on October 26, vowed to "strengthen guidance and administration of social Internet services and instant communications tools, and regulate the orderly dissemination of information." It also said the Government should "apply the law to sternly punish the dissemination of harmful information."
14. The statement called on China's conventional media (print, TV and radio ) to correctly guide public opinion, to emphasize positive propaganda, and to uphold stability and unity. At the same time, it added that the people should have the right to know what is going on, the right to participate in and monitor events, and the right to express themselves.
15.The State Internet Information Office said on October 26 that it had asked the police to prosecute those responsible for spreading a bogus tax policy announcement and rumours that a fighter jet had crashed, killing the pilot.
16."The Internet is a microphone that everyone can use, but it is not one that everyone can use well," the People's Daily, the Communist Party's official newspaper, said in an editorial. The official Xinhua news agency has reported that three people, including a website editor, had been punished for spreading rumours.
17.The growing community of netizens and tweeple have realised their power against the State and the Party and the Government is going to find it difficult now to deprive them of this power. Any attempt to do so through oppressive measures might itself set in motion a destabilising chain of events ultimately threatening the power of the State and the Party in a one-party State. ( 27-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
CHINA: TIBETAN-CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT SPREADS
B.RAMAN
The unrest in the Tibetan areas of China ---Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan--- continues in different forms. The unrest was triggered off in March last by unhappiness among the Tibetans of Sichuan over the continued suppression of their political, religious and ethnic rights by the Chinese authorities and over their attempts to punish anyone who proclaimed his or her loyalty to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
2.The unrest in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan has taken the form of a chain of self-immolations by young Tibetan monks of the large Kirti monastery. The Chinese authorities have not been able to stop these acts or attempted acts of self-immolation despite their removing a large number of monks of the monastery to a military detention camp euphemistically called a re-education centre and punishing those present at the time of the self-immolations on charges of abetment to suicide. They have also been forcing senior monks to come out with statements condemning self-immolations as unBuddhist and have launched a campaign against His Holiness for not condemning self-immolations.
3. Despite these suppressive measures, acts or attempted acts of self-immolation continue with nine so far. In the latest incident reported on October 17, 2011, a nun is reported to have committed self-immolation. This is the first instance of a self-immolation by a nun in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. Wamgmo, the 20-year-old nun, was from the Mamo or Dechen Choekorling Nunnery, which has about 350 nuns in Ngaba. Nuns from here had also participated in the March 2008 protest movement,
4. The same day, the Chinese police opened fire on a group of protesting Tibetans, injuring two of them. There were no fatalities. The shooting followed a protest the previous day in the Khekor township of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture. A group of seven Tibetans protested in front of the local police station and shouted slogans calling for freedom for Tibet, the return of His Holiness from exile and the release from jail of His Holiness the Panchen Lama, chosen by the Dalai Lama in accordance with Tibetan Buddhist traditions. The Chinese have jailed him and the Communist Party of China has nominated its own Panchen Lama who has not been accepted by the Tibetans.
5.The self-immolations in Sichuan have been accompanied by protests and commercial strikes by Tibetans in the towns and villages to which those committing self-immolation belonged. The Tibetan community of Sichuan observed a day of fasting and protest on October 19 to express solidarity with the families of those who committed self-immolation. The acts of self-immolation have not so far spread to other Tibetan areas outside Sichuan.
6. However, a Tibetan-consciousness movement has been spreading right across the Tibetan belt. The objective of the movement is to enhance the consciousness of the Tibetans---particularly the youth--- about the distinct nature of the Tibetan culture as distinguished from the Han culture and to impress upon the youth the importance of preserving the Tibetan culture and maintaining their loyalty and devotion to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The monasteries have been in the forefront of this movement.
7. As part of this Tibetan-consciousness movement, Tibetans are being encouraged to dress in typical Tibetan style, speak among themselves only in the Tibetan language, eat only Tibetan food and participate in joint prayer meetings. Reports received from Tibet and other Tibetan areas say that thousands of Tibetans---many of them youth—are participating in the peaceful gatherings organised by this movement. The Chinese authorities have till now refrained from disrupting this movement lest it lead to any violence.
8. At the Sershul monastery in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province, more than 20,000 Tibetan monks and others gathered from Oct. 6-13 to take part in discussions on Tibetan-consciousness. In an earlier Tibetan-consciousness gathering from Oct. 2-5 at the Dzogchen monastery, also in Kardze, a senior religious leader spoke to more than 10,000 Tibetans on the Tibetan identity. Pledges to struggle for Tibetan freedom through non-violent means were taken
9.Similar gatherings were held in eight other places during September and October, including one gathering of about 1,400 monks in Nangchen in the Yulshul (in Chinese, Yushu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai province.
10. The absence of acts of self-immolation, protest meetings and commercial strikes in Tibet itself should not be misconstrued to mean that the struggle for Tibetan rights, which led to a mass flare-up in 2008, is showing signs of subsiding. It has taken a different form. The presence of thousands of Tibetans---particularly Tibetan youth--- in the Tibetan-consciousness gatherings in Tibet speaks of the continuing pride of the Tibetans in their Tibetan personality, culture and religious faith.
11. The Tibetan struggle for the protection and preservation of their self-identity and their loyalty and devotion to His Holiness remain as strong as ever. What should be encouraging is that a new generation Tibetan activists, different from those who were in the vanguard of the 2008 flare-up, has emerged and is now leading the Tibetan struggle. The new generation believes in a peaceful struggle. It feels that the violence of March 2008 played into the hands of the Chinese and enabled them to use brutal force to suppress the movement.( 25-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The unrest in the Tibetan areas of China ---Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan--- continues in different forms. The unrest was triggered off in March last by unhappiness among the Tibetans of Sichuan over the continued suppression of their political, religious and ethnic rights by the Chinese authorities and over their attempts to punish anyone who proclaimed his or her loyalty to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
2.The unrest in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan has taken the form of a chain of self-immolations by young Tibetan monks of the large Kirti monastery. The Chinese authorities have not been able to stop these acts or attempted acts of self-immolation despite their removing a large number of monks of the monastery to a military detention camp euphemistically called a re-education centre and punishing those present at the time of the self-immolations on charges of abetment to suicide. They have also been forcing senior monks to come out with statements condemning self-immolations as unBuddhist and have launched a campaign against His Holiness for not condemning self-immolations.
3. Despite these suppressive measures, acts or attempted acts of self-immolation continue with nine so far. In the latest incident reported on October 17, 2011, a nun is reported to have committed self-immolation. This is the first instance of a self-immolation by a nun in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. Wamgmo, the 20-year-old nun, was from the Mamo or Dechen Choekorling Nunnery, which has about 350 nuns in Ngaba. Nuns from here had also participated in the March 2008 protest movement,
4. The same day, the Chinese police opened fire on a group of protesting Tibetans, injuring two of them. There were no fatalities. The shooting followed a protest the previous day in the Khekor township of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture. A group of seven Tibetans protested in front of the local police station and shouted slogans calling for freedom for Tibet, the return of His Holiness from exile and the release from jail of His Holiness the Panchen Lama, chosen by the Dalai Lama in accordance with Tibetan Buddhist traditions. The Chinese have jailed him and the Communist Party of China has nominated its own Panchen Lama who has not been accepted by the Tibetans.
5.The self-immolations in Sichuan have been accompanied by protests and commercial strikes by Tibetans in the towns and villages to which those committing self-immolation belonged. The Tibetan community of Sichuan observed a day of fasting and protest on October 19 to express solidarity with the families of those who committed self-immolation. The acts of self-immolation have not so far spread to other Tibetan areas outside Sichuan.
6. However, a Tibetan-consciousness movement has been spreading right across the Tibetan belt. The objective of the movement is to enhance the consciousness of the Tibetans---particularly the youth--- about the distinct nature of the Tibetan culture as distinguished from the Han culture and to impress upon the youth the importance of preserving the Tibetan culture and maintaining their loyalty and devotion to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The monasteries have been in the forefront of this movement.
7. As part of this Tibetan-consciousness movement, Tibetans are being encouraged to dress in typical Tibetan style, speak among themselves only in the Tibetan language, eat only Tibetan food and participate in joint prayer meetings. Reports received from Tibet and other Tibetan areas say that thousands of Tibetans---many of them youth—are participating in the peaceful gatherings organised by this movement. The Chinese authorities have till now refrained from disrupting this movement lest it lead to any violence.
8. At the Sershul monastery in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province, more than 20,000 Tibetan monks and others gathered from Oct. 6-13 to take part in discussions on Tibetan-consciousness. In an earlier Tibetan-consciousness gathering from Oct. 2-5 at the Dzogchen monastery, also in Kardze, a senior religious leader spoke to more than 10,000 Tibetans on the Tibetan identity. Pledges to struggle for Tibetan freedom through non-violent means were taken
9.Similar gatherings were held in eight other places during September and October, including one gathering of about 1,400 monks in Nangchen in the Yulshul (in Chinese, Yushu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai province.
10. The absence of acts of self-immolation, protest meetings and commercial strikes in Tibet itself should not be misconstrued to mean that the struggle for Tibetan rights, which led to a mass flare-up in 2008, is showing signs of subsiding. It has taken a different form. The presence of thousands of Tibetans---particularly Tibetan youth--- in the Tibetan-consciousness gatherings in Tibet speaks of the continuing pride of the Tibetans in their Tibetan personality, culture and religious faith.
11. The Tibetan struggle for the protection and preservation of their self-identity and their loyalty and devotion to His Holiness remain as strong as ever. What should be encouraging is that a new generation Tibetan activists, different from those who were in the vanguard of the 2008 flare-up, has emerged and is now leading the Tibetan struggle. The new generation believes in a peaceful struggle. It feels that the violence of March 2008 played into the hands of the Chinese and enabled them to use brutal force to suppress the movement.( 25-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, October 23, 2011
CHOPPER RELEASE SPEAKS WELL OF GEN.KAYANI
B.RAMAN
On October 23,2011, an Indian military helicopter with four military personnel on board strayed into Pakistani air space in the Skardu region of Gilgit-Baltistan due to bad weather.
2. According to official accounts of the Pakistani Army, the occupants of the helicopter consisted of one Lt.Col, two Majors and a junior commissioned officer. On detecting the crossing of the helicopter into Pakistani air space, planes of the Pakistani Air Force took off and made it land in the Skardu area.
3. After questioning the occupants of the copter regarding the circumstances under which it crossed over into Pakistani air space, they were allowed to take off and return to the Kargil area of India the same day within a few hours.
4. According to official accounts emanating from New Delhi, the Armies of the two countries sorted out the incident in a professional and cordial manner by using the hotline that exists between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries.
5.Even though the incident was unintentional, the Pakistan Army could have played it up as having a sinister motive and detained the copter and its occupants ostensibly for long interrogation.
6. At a time when the Pakistani Army is under tremendous pressure from the US to mount operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, its Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS ), could have exploited the incident to mount a PSYWAR against India in order to project as if Pakistan continued to face a military threat from India.
7. The Pakistan Army resisted that temptation, treated the incident in the low-key in which it deserved to be treated, consciously avoided dramatizing it and let the chopper and its occupants fly back to India within a few hours.
8. This speaks highly of Gen.Kayani as a military professional. His positive and cool reflexes as reflected during the incident need to be noted, acknowledged and hailed by India. The way the Pakistani military and political leadership resisted the temptation to exploit the incident for ulterior purposes needs to be highlighted and praised.
9. We do not hesitate to criticise what we see as the negative traits and reflexes of the Pakistan Army in matters relating to India. In equal measure, we should not hesitate to highlight and hail the positive traits and reflexes of the Pakistani military leadership. The manner in which the Pakistani military leadership handled the incident is worthy of high praise.
10. One is reminded that during the crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001, Gen.Kayani was the Director-General of Military Operations in Rawalpindi. It was reported that the US was highly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis. He has shown a similar cool temperament on October 23.
11. Should the good vibrations generated by the Pakistani gesture remain an isolated act without follow-up? I don’t think so. This should be used as a starting point for setting up a more substantial military-military relationship between the armies of the two countries as a distrust-reducing measure. This is the time for us to consider inviting Gen.Kayani to visit India.
12. One should note too the commendable restraint shown by the media of the two countries in reporting on the incident. This augurs well for the future.( 24-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
On October 23,2011, an Indian military helicopter with four military personnel on board strayed into Pakistani air space in the Skardu region of Gilgit-Baltistan due to bad weather.
2. According to official accounts of the Pakistani Army, the occupants of the helicopter consisted of one Lt.Col, two Majors and a junior commissioned officer. On detecting the crossing of the helicopter into Pakistani air space, planes of the Pakistani Air Force took off and made it land in the Skardu area.
3. After questioning the occupants of the copter regarding the circumstances under which it crossed over into Pakistani air space, they were allowed to take off and return to the Kargil area of India the same day within a few hours.
4. According to official accounts emanating from New Delhi, the Armies of the two countries sorted out the incident in a professional and cordial manner by using the hotline that exists between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries.
5.Even though the incident was unintentional, the Pakistan Army could have played it up as having a sinister motive and detained the copter and its occupants ostensibly for long interrogation.
6. At a time when the Pakistani Army is under tremendous pressure from the US to mount operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, its Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS ), could have exploited the incident to mount a PSYWAR against India in order to project as if Pakistan continued to face a military threat from India.
7. The Pakistan Army resisted that temptation, treated the incident in the low-key in which it deserved to be treated, consciously avoided dramatizing it and let the chopper and its occupants fly back to India within a few hours.
8. This speaks highly of Gen.Kayani as a military professional. His positive and cool reflexes as reflected during the incident need to be noted, acknowledged and hailed by India. The way the Pakistani military and political leadership resisted the temptation to exploit the incident for ulterior purposes needs to be highlighted and praised.
9. We do not hesitate to criticise what we see as the negative traits and reflexes of the Pakistan Army in matters relating to India. In equal measure, we should not hesitate to highlight and hail the positive traits and reflexes of the Pakistani military leadership. The manner in which the Pakistani military leadership handled the incident is worthy of high praise.
10. One is reminded that during the crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001, Gen.Kayani was the Director-General of Military Operations in Rawalpindi. It was reported that the US was highly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis. He has shown a similar cool temperament on October 23.
11. Should the good vibrations generated by the Pakistani gesture remain an isolated act without follow-up? I don’t think so. This should be used as a starting point for setting up a more substantial military-military relationship between the armies of the two countries as a distrust-reducing measure. This is the time for us to consider inviting Gen.Kayani to visit India.
12. One should note too the commendable restraint shown by the media of the two countries in reporting on the incident. This augurs well for the future.( 24-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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