B.RAMAN
The Communist Party of China (CPC) and its leaders headed by President Hu Jintao are less nervous about the likely impact of memories of past events on China’s Generation Next.
2 This has become evident from the observance of two important anniversaries in Beijing. The first was the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew one of the longest spells of autocratic rule in the world by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and ushered in a republican Government, which gave way 38 years later to the one-party rule of the CPC.
3.It was a genuine democratic revolution which began with an armed uprising on October 10,1911 in the central city of Wuchang, part of present-day Wuhan, resulting in the fall of the Qing dynasty the next year. Since the CPC came to power in 1949, there has been less and less recall of the democratic revolution by the CPC and Governmental leadership lest the autocratic rule of the CPC be challenged by the people by taking inspiration from the struggle against the autocratic rule of the Qing dynasty.
4. In the light of the concerns of the leadership over the dangers of commemorating an event that led to the end of a long spell of autocratic rule of one kind, different from the autocratic rule of the CPC, many analysts were closely watching to see whether the present leadership would have the political courage and confidence to commemorate the event.
5.The priority given by the leadership to the observance in June last of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC and the silence on the approaching 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution made it appear that the CPC leadership still did not have the courage and confidence to celebrate an event that might remind China’s GenNext that it has had other political role models in past history different from the models of the CPC.
6. It, therefore, came as a refreshing surprise that the CPC observed in public the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution at a function in Beijing on October 9 chaired by President Hu Jintao and attended, among others, by some of the past leaders of the CPC, including former President Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu, who had disappeared from the public view ( but not from the social media networks) since his participation in the function held in June to mark the 90th anniversary of the CPC. His absence since then had given rise to feverish Net speculation that he was seriously ill or even dead.
7. In his keynote address as reported by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency, President Hu Jintao described the 1911 Revolution as "a thoroughly modern, national and democratic revolution" which shook the world and ushered in unprecedented social changes in China. He praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, as "a great national hero, a great patriot and a great leader of the Chinese democratic revolution". Hu added that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be achieved by adhering to socialism with Chinese characteristics, with patriotism, and by upholding peace, development and cooperation. Hu said that the mainland and Taiwan should work together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and called for the peaceful reunification of China.
8. While celebrating the event and recalling the role of Sun Yat-sen in seeking to usher in democracy in China, the CPC leadership has sought to emphasise the continuity of the CPC rule by projecting the emergence of the CPC as a natural outcome of the 1911 Revolution and not a distortion of it.
9.Beijing-based dissident historian Shi Binhai has been quoted by Radio Free Asia, sponsored by the US State Department, as saying that Jiang's appearance at the function served as a reminder that the Communist Party's line on historical events, and on Taiwan, would remain unchanged.
10. Chinese political dissidents and human rights activists have alleged that while holding a strictly-controlled and CPC-sponsored celebration of the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese security agencies stepped up surveillance on suspected dissidents in the main cities of the country---particularly in Wuhan. They also closely monitored the Net due to apparent concerns that the GenNext might exploit the even to revive its attempts for a Jasmine Revolution in China for the restoration of the long-lost democracy.
11. Radio Free Asia has quoted veteran pro-democracy activist He Depu as saying as follows in Beijing: “It has been 100 years since the 1911 revolution, when they overthrew the Qing dynasty to build a democratic China. We have struggled all these years and we still haven't made that happen." Despite the strict surveillance of micro-blogs, some of them managed to post calls for a new democratic revolution in China.
12. The second important anniversary that has been observed not by the CPC or the Government, but by a group of non-Governmental and non-party activists is the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Gang of Four headed by the wife of Mao Zedong, which led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping with his policy of economic reforms.
13.The event held in Beijing on October 5,2011, was titled "Remembering the smashing of the Gang of Four, 35 Years On". It was reportedly organised by Hu Deping, son of late disgraced former Premier Hu Yaobang, whose funeral sparked the 1989 student movement. Participants included the son of Hua Guofeng, Mao's short-tenured designated successor, and the daughter of Li Xiannian, Hua's chief economic adviser.
14.Some of the participants allegedly called for a new Cultural Revolution to put an end to corruption and moral decay, but their call did not find majority support among the about 200 participants from the past. The majority view was that genuine democracy and the rule of law were the only ways of achieving these laudable objectives.
15. The observance of these two anniversaries---one on the initiative of the CPC itself and the other on that of some political remnants of the past without much political influence---- indicates a continuing confidence in the present leadership that it has the on-going debate on the need for political reforms to buttress the economic reforms firmly under control and that revival of memories of certain past events would not divert the debate in a direction not desired by the Party.
16. It also reflects the assessment of the present leadership that China’s GenNext, while increasingly articulate and active in the Net in discussing new political ideas and models, would not create instability. China’s GenNext has benefited from China’s economic progress and would not like this to be jeopardised by destabilising political ideas and movements. ( 11-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Asssociate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 10, 2011
Sunday, October 9, 2011
INDIA EXPANDS ITS STRATEGIC PRESENCE
B.RAMAN
Slowly, but steadily and unrelentingly, India has been expanding its strategic presence.
2. One dimension of this became evident during the recent visit of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to New Delhi on October 4 and 5,2011. The visit saw the signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan covering military as well as non-military aspects of the relationship.
3. The non-military aspects were open and well known to the international community even earlier. These included, inter alia, Indian assistance to Afghanistan in the development of its strategic infrastructure and in strengthening its democratic and non-radical foundation. A democratic and non-radical Afghanistan is in India’s strategic interest as it is in the strategic interest of many other countries.
4. Pakistan views a genuinely democratic and non-radical Afghanistan as not conducive to its interests. Hence, its strong opposition even to India’s non-military assistance to Afghanistan. It made out even India’s political and economic links with Afghanistan as designed to trap Pakistan in an India-Afghanistan nutcracker.
5.The staged Pakistani hysteria on this subject initially met with a sympathetic and understanding response from the West, but as the West’s understanding of the real nature of Pakistan and its role as a catalyst of radicalism increased---particularly in the wake of the Abbottabad raid of May 2 by the US Navy SEALS to kill Osama bin Laden--- the West has come to realise that a robust Indian presence in Afghanistan after the West thins out its presence is desirable and necessary. One hears less and less from the West past articulations of concerns regarding the impact of the Indian presence on the psyche of Pakistan.
6. The SPA seeks to expand the Indian role from the non-military to the military sphere with an active Indian involvement in the training of the Afghan National Security Forces. The details of this training----what will be the magnitude of it, where will it be carried out, in Indian or Afghan territory---- are still to be worked out, but a decision in principle has been taken to make firm commitments to Afghanistan in the military field too, just as India has made in the economic field in the past.
7.The second dimension of this became evident coincidentally in the recent decisions of the Government of India not to let itself be inhibited in expanding its strategic ties with Vietnam by fears of Chinese concerns over it. In the past, India’s strategic ties with Vietnam were restricted to expanding the political and economic presence in Vietnam’s land territory and laying the foundation for a strong military-military relationship without rubbing China on the wrong side in relation to the South China Sea and the island territories in it under Vietnam’s control and sovereignty, which are challenged by Beijing.
8. The recently reported decision of the Government of India to permit a Government-connected oil company to accept from Vietnam oil and gas exploration rights from Vietnam in respect of two blocks belonging to Vietnam, which are claimed by China as its territory, is an indication of a decision in New Delhi not to let itself be inhibited any longer in expanding the strategic relationship with Vietnam by staged Chinese dramatics over the South China Sea and the island territories.
9. These are very important decisions indicative of a well thought-out Indian strategy for an incremental increase in Indian activism in areas which are of interest and concern not only to India, but also to the US. Whether India has kept the US informed of its moves and sought its blessings or not, its moves will ultimately redound to helping the strategic interests of the US too in Afghanistan as well as in the South China Sea area. The open signs of Indian activism should also be welcome to the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea .
10. India has proclaimed subtly, but firmly that its continuing desire for friendly relations with Pakistan and China would not come in the way of its promoting its legitimate strategic role and interests in the Af-Pak and Sino-Vietnamese regions.
11. To embark on a policy of activism is easier than to keep the activism sustained. Sustaining it would require better intelligence and military capabilities. There is bound to be resistance from Pakistan and China to the Indian strategic activism and to the expansion of the Indian strategic presence to areas which they consider as coming under their sphere of influence. Do we have the required national capabilities to counter their resistance separately and jointly? If not, how to strengthen them quickly and what role the US can and should play in this regard are important questions, which should be addressed by the Task Force on National Security headed by Shri Naresh Chandra. ( 10-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Slowly, but steadily and unrelentingly, India has been expanding its strategic presence.
2. One dimension of this became evident during the recent visit of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to New Delhi on October 4 and 5,2011. The visit saw the signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan covering military as well as non-military aspects of the relationship.
3. The non-military aspects were open and well known to the international community even earlier. These included, inter alia, Indian assistance to Afghanistan in the development of its strategic infrastructure and in strengthening its democratic and non-radical foundation. A democratic and non-radical Afghanistan is in India’s strategic interest as it is in the strategic interest of many other countries.
4. Pakistan views a genuinely democratic and non-radical Afghanistan as not conducive to its interests. Hence, its strong opposition even to India’s non-military assistance to Afghanistan. It made out even India’s political and economic links with Afghanistan as designed to trap Pakistan in an India-Afghanistan nutcracker.
5.The staged Pakistani hysteria on this subject initially met with a sympathetic and understanding response from the West, but as the West’s understanding of the real nature of Pakistan and its role as a catalyst of radicalism increased---particularly in the wake of the Abbottabad raid of May 2 by the US Navy SEALS to kill Osama bin Laden--- the West has come to realise that a robust Indian presence in Afghanistan after the West thins out its presence is desirable and necessary. One hears less and less from the West past articulations of concerns regarding the impact of the Indian presence on the psyche of Pakistan.
6. The SPA seeks to expand the Indian role from the non-military to the military sphere with an active Indian involvement in the training of the Afghan National Security Forces. The details of this training----what will be the magnitude of it, where will it be carried out, in Indian or Afghan territory---- are still to be worked out, but a decision in principle has been taken to make firm commitments to Afghanistan in the military field too, just as India has made in the economic field in the past.
7.The second dimension of this became evident coincidentally in the recent decisions of the Government of India not to let itself be inhibited in expanding its strategic ties with Vietnam by fears of Chinese concerns over it. In the past, India’s strategic ties with Vietnam were restricted to expanding the political and economic presence in Vietnam’s land territory and laying the foundation for a strong military-military relationship without rubbing China on the wrong side in relation to the South China Sea and the island territories in it under Vietnam’s control and sovereignty, which are challenged by Beijing.
8. The recently reported decision of the Government of India to permit a Government-connected oil company to accept from Vietnam oil and gas exploration rights from Vietnam in respect of two blocks belonging to Vietnam, which are claimed by China as its territory, is an indication of a decision in New Delhi not to let itself be inhibited any longer in expanding the strategic relationship with Vietnam by staged Chinese dramatics over the South China Sea and the island territories.
9. These are very important decisions indicative of a well thought-out Indian strategy for an incremental increase in Indian activism in areas which are of interest and concern not only to India, but also to the US. Whether India has kept the US informed of its moves and sought its blessings or not, its moves will ultimately redound to helping the strategic interests of the US too in Afghanistan as well as in the South China Sea area. The open signs of Indian activism should also be welcome to the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea .
10. India has proclaimed subtly, but firmly that its continuing desire for friendly relations with Pakistan and China would not come in the way of its promoting its legitimate strategic role and interests in the Af-Pak and Sino-Vietnamese regions.
11. To embark on a policy of activism is easier than to keep the activism sustained. Sustaining it would require better intelligence and military capabilities. There is bound to be resistance from Pakistan and China to the Indian strategic activism and to the expansion of the Indian strategic presence to areas which they consider as coming under their sphere of influence. Do we have the required national capabilities to counter their resistance separately and jointly? If not, how to strengthen them quickly and what role the US can and should play in this regard are important questions, which should be addressed by the Task Force on National Security headed by Shri Naresh Chandra. ( 10-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, October 8, 2011
INDIA-PAKISTAN-UK
B.RAMAN
The following are my answers yo E-mailed questions on the above-mentioned subject received from a UK-based analyst:
1) In your view, what is Pakistan's goal in Afghanistan? Do they want their interests to be respected in any peace settlement or do they want their interests to be the settlement? What is the view of the Indian government, officially and unofficially?
PAKISTAN'S GOAL IN AFGHANISTAN IS A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE PROBLEMS FOR ISLAMABAD IN THE PASHTUN BELT, WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE SIDES WITH INDIA IN ANY INDO-PAKISTAN MILITARY CONFLICT, WHICH WOULD PROTECT PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND WHICH WOULD KEEP INDIA AT A DISTANCE.PAKISTAN REGARDS AFGHANISTAN AS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND WANTS A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WHICH WOULD KEEP AFGHANISTAN THAT WAY.
2) In your view, what are India's strategic objectives in Afghanistan? How does it differ from its stated policy, if at all?
INDIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE A MULTI-ETHNIC,PLURALISTIC,MODERN,DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD PLAY ITS DUE ROLE IN THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION WITHOUT COMING UNDER THE MALIGN INFLUENCE OF THE PAKISTANI ARMY AND ITS ISI AND WHICH WOULD REMAIN IMMUNISED FROM PAKISTAN'S JIHADI VIRUS.INDIA WOULD ALSO HAVE A KEY INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO A PREVENTION OF A RE-TALIBANISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE RETURN OF AL QAEDA TO ITS OLD SANCTUARIES IN THE AFGHAN TERRITORY.THE STATED POLICY AND THE GENUINE OBJECTIVES ARE IDENTICAL.
3) How do you rate the MI6-ISI intelligence relationship? What is the view of the Indian government? Is there a similarly strong relationship with RAW?
I DON'T KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.BASED ON OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION, MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ISI'S CO-OPERATION WITH THE MI-5 AND THE MI-6 HAS BEEN AS UNSATISFACTORY AS ITS CO-OPERATION WITH THE CIA AND THE FBI. WE SAW A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ISI FOOT-DRAGGING IN THE CASE OF RASHID RAUF, A MIRPURI FROM BIRMINGHAM WHO WAS WANTED IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN THE UK AND WHO HAD LINKS WITH THE JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD AND SUSPECTED LINKS WITH AL QAEDA.
4) Given David Cameron wants to build a "special relationship" with India, what would the UK need to do vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan to help build such a relationship?
BOTH INDIA AND THE UK HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PAKISTAN WINDS UP THE JIHADI TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS TERRITORY AND ACTS AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA AND THE JEM WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONALS AND INTERESTS OF INDIA AND THE UK. IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE RETURN OF THE TALIBAN TO POWER IN KABUL AND OF AL QAEDA TO ITS SANCTUARIES IN AFGHAN TERRITORY. INDIA AND THE UK SHOULD WORK JOINTLY FOR PROMOTING THESE COMMON INTERESTS.
5) What could India offer the UK to make such a relationship reciprocal? Could RAW fill the vacuum of an ISI break from MI6?
THE RELATIONSHIP IS PROGRESSING. THERE IS NOW A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN INDIAN TERRITORY. SIMILARLY, THERE IS A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF INDIA'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN AS SATISFACTORY AS INDIA WOULD HAVE WISHED BECAUSE THE UK IS NOT PREPARED TO USE THE STICK AGAINST PAKISTAN DESPITE ITS UNHAPPINESS OVER PAKISTAN'S FOOT-DRAGGING AGAINST TERRORISM ORIGINATING FROM ITS TERRITORY. THE CONVERGENCE OF INDIAN AND BRITISH INTERESTS IN RELATION TO PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO HAVE LIMITS. THIS COMES IN THE WAY OF A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND INDIA ON STRATEGIC ISSUES.
6) What is your view of Cameron's remarks last year about Pakistan "exporting terror"?
TOTALLY JUSTIFIED AND FACTUALLY CORRECT.
7) How do you rate the idea of a UK-India "special relationship"?
THE IDEA IS GOOD, BUT THE PROBLEM IS IN IMPLEMENTATION. ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, TO BE WORTHWHILE, HAS TO BE BASED ON A QUID PRO QUO. THERE IS NO QUID PRO QUO IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UK.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The following are my answers yo E-mailed questions on the above-mentioned subject received from a UK-based analyst:
1) In your view, what is Pakistan's goal in Afghanistan? Do they want their interests to be respected in any peace settlement or do they want their interests to be the settlement? What is the view of the Indian government, officially and unofficially?
PAKISTAN'S GOAL IN AFGHANISTAN IS A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE PROBLEMS FOR ISLAMABAD IN THE PASHTUN BELT, WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE SIDES WITH INDIA IN ANY INDO-PAKISTAN MILITARY CONFLICT, WHICH WOULD PROTECT PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND WHICH WOULD KEEP INDIA AT A DISTANCE.PAKISTAN REGARDS AFGHANISTAN AS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND WANTS A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WHICH WOULD KEEP AFGHANISTAN THAT WAY.
2) In your view, what are India's strategic objectives in Afghanistan? How does it differ from its stated policy, if at all?
INDIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE A MULTI-ETHNIC,PLURALISTIC,MODERN,DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD PLAY ITS DUE ROLE IN THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION WITHOUT COMING UNDER THE MALIGN INFLUENCE OF THE PAKISTANI ARMY AND ITS ISI AND WHICH WOULD REMAIN IMMUNISED FROM PAKISTAN'S JIHADI VIRUS.INDIA WOULD ALSO HAVE A KEY INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO A PREVENTION OF A RE-TALIBANISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE RETURN OF AL QAEDA TO ITS OLD SANCTUARIES IN THE AFGHAN TERRITORY.THE STATED POLICY AND THE GENUINE OBJECTIVES ARE IDENTICAL.
3) How do you rate the MI6-ISI intelligence relationship? What is the view of the Indian government? Is there a similarly strong relationship with RAW?
I DON'T KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.BASED ON OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION, MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ISI'S CO-OPERATION WITH THE MI-5 AND THE MI-6 HAS BEEN AS UNSATISFACTORY AS ITS CO-OPERATION WITH THE CIA AND THE FBI. WE SAW A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ISI FOOT-DRAGGING IN THE CASE OF RASHID RAUF, A MIRPURI FROM BIRMINGHAM WHO WAS WANTED IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN THE UK AND WHO HAD LINKS WITH THE JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD AND SUSPECTED LINKS WITH AL QAEDA.
4) Given David Cameron wants to build a "special relationship" with India, what would the UK need to do vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan to help build such a relationship?
BOTH INDIA AND THE UK HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PAKISTAN WINDS UP THE JIHADI TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS TERRITORY AND ACTS AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA AND THE JEM WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONALS AND INTERESTS OF INDIA AND THE UK. IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE RETURN OF THE TALIBAN TO POWER IN KABUL AND OF AL QAEDA TO ITS SANCTUARIES IN AFGHAN TERRITORY. INDIA AND THE UK SHOULD WORK JOINTLY FOR PROMOTING THESE COMMON INTERESTS.
5) What could India offer the UK to make such a relationship reciprocal? Could RAW fill the vacuum of an ISI break from MI6?
THE RELATIONSHIP IS PROGRESSING. THERE IS NOW A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN INDIAN TERRITORY. SIMILARLY, THERE IS A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF INDIA'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN AS SATISFACTORY AS INDIA WOULD HAVE WISHED BECAUSE THE UK IS NOT PREPARED TO USE THE STICK AGAINST PAKISTAN DESPITE ITS UNHAPPINESS OVER PAKISTAN'S FOOT-DRAGGING AGAINST TERRORISM ORIGINATING FROM ITS TERRITORY. THE CONVERGENCE OF INDIAN AND BRITISH INTERESTS IN RELATION TO PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO HAVE LIMITS. THIS COMES IN THE WAY OF A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND INDIA ON STRATEGIC ISSUES.
6) What is your view of Cameron's remarks last year about Pakistan "exporting terror"?
TOTALLY JUSTIFIED AND FACTUALLY CORRECT.
7) How do you rate the idea of a UK-India "special relationship"?
THE IDEA IS GOOD, BUT THE PROBLEM IS IN IMPLEMENTATION. ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, TO BE WORTHWHILE, HAS TO BE BASED ON A QUID PRO QUO. THERE IS NO QUID PRO QUO IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UK.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 7, 2011
INDIA-PAKISTAN-US
These are my answers in reply to E-mailed questions received from the Islamabad correspondent of a well-known US weekly:
What is India's role in the war on terror?
Exchange of intelligence, knowledge,experience and capabilities and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the US..
- India has been the victim of several terror attacks recently. What is your opinion on New Delhi's approach to combating terrorist attacks? Do you think there is untapped potential for exchanging information between India and Pakistan on how to deal with terrorist actions?
Since much of the jihadi threat in India is from Pakistan-based organisations working under the control of the ISI, there is no scope for exchange of intelligence or mutual legal assistance between India and Pakistan.Terrorism is one of the weapons in Pakistan's anti-India arsenal. It is not going to help India in blunting that weapon. Having said this, I have been arguing in my interviews and writings that there must be some kind of institutional interface between the ISI and the R&AW to reduce the present high level of distrust between the two. This could come about only over a longer period and not in the short-term, but this should be an important objective of both.
-
With an increasing presence in Afghanistan, what role do you think India could play in Kabul following the U.S. withdrawal?
By helping in the economic development and in the spread of modern education in Afghanistan and by assisting Afghanistan in strengthening the capabilities of its armed forces, India could contribute to preventing the re-Talibanisation of the Afghan State and society and the return of Al Qaeda to its sanctuaries in Afghan territory after the US and other NATO forces thin out.
-
Do you believe the Haqqani network is still based in Pakistan or have they moved to Afghanistan, as claimed in recent interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani?
My assessment is that the Haqqani network no longer operates from North Waziristan. It now operates from the Kurram agency of Pakistan.The cadres and the training camps are in the Kurram Agency, but the leaders, who are high-value targets for US Drones, are spread out across Pakistan in order to escape Drone attacks.The cadres carry out hit and withdraw raids into Afghanistan.
-
What role could India play if conditions between Pakistan and the U.S. continue to deteriorate?
The US will never strategically co-operate with India against Pakistan. While the CIA and the Pentagon are not averse to ideas of limited Indo-US co-operation in dealing with threats originating from Pakistan, the State Department has always been cautious in endorsing such ideas. I had seen this vividly while I was in service and I continue to see this in my retirement.The only role India can play is to keep nudging the US to act more strongly against Pakistan without unrealistic hopes that the US wil,in fact, do so.When the US talks of strategic co-operation with India, it has China in mind and not Pakistan.
-
In interviews, Pakistan Army leaders have said they still consider India to be their biggest threat. Do you think India feels the same about Pakistan?
India can any day deal with Pakistan and put it in its place.What India is worried is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis.Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to view this axis with the same concern as India does.The developing China-Pakistan axis is the real axis of evil.
- Despite its efforts in the war on terror, Pakistan still has a substantial terrorist problem. Can peace be achieved between India and Pakistan while suspected terrorists still reside here?
There is unlikely to be a normal good-neighbours relationship between India and Pakistan in the short and medium terms.Pakistani complexes relating to India will come in the way. That doesn't mean the two countries should not try for a more benign and less malign relationship. There is a need for a common vision.The leaders of the two countries should meet more frequently to get to know and like each other and work painstakingly and without undue illusions towards such a common vision.
-
Following Al Qaeda, what terrorist group is the biggest threat to stability in South Asia, in your opinion.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the two Talibans in that order.I do not consider the Haqqani network as a separate terrorist organisation. It is a wing of the Afghan Taliban, but with some autonomy in its operations.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
What is India's role in the war on terror?
Exchange of intelligence, knowledge,experience and capabilities and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the US..
- India has been the victim of several terror attacks recently. What is your opinion on New Delhi's approach to combating terrorist attacks? Do you think there is untapped potential for exchanging information between India and Pakistan on how to deal with terrorist actions?
Since much of the jihadi threat in India is from Pakistan-based organisations working under the control of the ISI, there is no scope for exchange of intelligence or mutual legal assistance between India and Pakistan.Terrorism is one of the weapons in Pakistan's anti-India arsenal. It is not going to help India in blunting that weapon. Having said this, I have been arguing in my interviews and writings that there must be some kind of institutional interface between the ISI and the R&AW to reduce the present high level of distrust between the two. This could come about only over a longer period and not in the short-term, but this should be an important objective of both.
-
With an increasing presence in Afghanistan, what role do you think India could play in Kabul following the U.S. withdrawal?
By helping in the economic development and in the spread of modern education in Afghanistan and by assisting Afghanistan in strengthening the capabilities of its armed forces, India could contribute to preventing the re-Talibanisation of the Afghan State and society and the return of Al Qaeda to its sanctuaries in Afghan territory after the US and other NATO forces thin out.
-
Do you believe the Haqqani network is still based in Pakistan or have they moved to Afghanistan, as claimed in recent interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani?
My assessment is that the Haqqani network no longer operates from North Waziristan. It now operates from the Kurram agency of Pakistan.The cadres and the training camps are in the Kurram Agency, but the leaders, who are high-value targets for US Drones, are spread out across Pakistan in order to escape Drone attacks.The cadres carry out hit and withdraw raids into Afghanistan.
-
What role could India play if conditions between Pakistan and the U.S. continue to deteriorate?
The US will never strategically co-operate with India against Pakistan. While the CIA and the Pentagon are not averse to ideas of limited Indo-US co-operation in dealing with threats originating from Pakistan, the State Department has always been cautious in endorsing such ideas. I had seen this vividly while I was in service and I continue to see this in my retirement.The only role India can play is to keep nudging the US to act more strongly against Pakistan without unrealistic hopes that the US wil,in fact, do so.When the US talks of strategic co-operation with India, it has China in mind and not Pakistan.
-
In interviews, Pakistan Army leaders have said they still consider India to be their biggest threat. Do you think India feels the same about Pakistan?
India can any day deal with Pakistan and put it in its place.What India is worried is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis.Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to view this axis with the same concern as India does.The developing China-Pakistan axis is the real axis of evil.
- Despite its efforts in the war on terror, Pakistan still has a substantial terrorist problem. Can peace be achieved between India and Pakistan while suspected terrorists still reside here?
There is unlikely to be a normal good-neighbours relationship between India and Pakistan in the short and medium terms.Pakistani complexes relating to India will come in the way. That doesn't mean the two countries should not try for a more benign and less malign relationship. There is a need for a common vision.The leaders of the two countries should meet more frequently to get to know and like each other and work painstakingly and without undue illusions towards such a common vision.
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Following Al Qaeda, what terrorist group is the biggest threat to stability in South Asia, in your opinion.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the two Talibans in that order.I do not consider the Haqqani network as a separate terrorist organisation. It is a wing of the Afghan Taliban, but with some autonomy in its operations.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
Thursday, October 6, 2011
ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH EXTREMISM
B.RAMAN
( Based on salient points of my intervention during a panel discussion on the subject organised by the US Consulate-General in Hyderabad and the TV 5 news channel on October 5,2011. The other members of the panel were : Professor Javeed Alam, former chairperson of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, Dr. Syed Mazher Hussain, founder of COVA (Confederation of Voluntary Associations) – a network of about 800 organizations working on communal harmony and community empowerment issues in the states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir and peace in the sub-continent covering India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and Ms. Jameela Nishat, founder and manager of the NGO Shaheen, which works with disadvantaged Muslim and dalit populations. )
Extremism has two dimensions---- as a threat to law and order and internal security and as a phenomenon with political, religious, social, economic, psychological and other aspects. Both dimensions need to be tackled simultaneously.
2.Anger is a common cause of all types of extremism---whether religious, sectarian, ethnic, political or economic. Anger identification and mitigation has to form an important part of all strategies to deal with extremism.
3.A study of the published literature of all extremist movements in India would indicate that the anger which triggered the resort to violence by some members of the community was often caused by three perceptions of exploitation, injustice and unfairness of the system to the affected community. Unless these three perceptions and the resulting anger are tackled, any strategy to deal with extremism would remain incomplete and only partially effective.
4.The conventional wisdom that economic development and attention to factors such as eradication of unemployment would defeat extremism is not tenable. Young people are in the driving seat of most extremist movements. They organised the extremist movement and keep it alive. They rarely speak of social and economic grievances such as unemployment, reservations for minorities etc. They invariably speak of exploitation, injustice and unfairness in the system directed against the community to which they belong. Members of the civil society are collateral victims of their anger, but their anger is directed not against the civil society, but against the State and the Government.
5. One finds a growing divide between the youth and the elder sections of the people in each community and between the youth and the policy-makers constituting the administration in the nation as a whole. Neither elder members of the community from which extremism has arisen nor the Government have been able to address the phenomenon of the alienation of sections of the youth, which drives them to take to violence.
6. While votaries of extremism have been able to mobilise sections of the youth in support of resort to extremist methods, the State and the political parties have not been able to mobilise law-abiding sections of the youth in support of the strategy to deal with extremism. This creates an unfortunate and untrue image of a clash between the State and the youth as a whole of the affected community.
7. The police is the most visible part of the State and the administration. It has to play an important role in dealing with extremism not only as a threat, but also as a phenomenon. The better the interactions and the relations between the police and the community, the more effective will be any strategy to deal with extremism. Unfortunate perceptions/image of the police as uncaring, unjust and oppressive aggravate extremism.
8.Any community-focussed strategy to deal with extremism should, therefore, have the following core components:
(a).Continuous and well-sustained interactions between the State/administration and the affected community in order to identify the incipient signs of the emergence of anger in a community and take timely action to deal with them before they turn into extremist violence and in dealing with the threat and the phenomenon if the anger results in an extremist movement despite the best efforts of the State to prevent it. Such interactions have to be a two-way street. The community should be encouraged to go to the State and the administration with its grievances and the State and the administration should go to the community in order to ascertain its grievances and feel its pulse of anger. Very often, the community and its members do not go to the State due to a feeling that it is indifferent and unresponsive to their grievances. The greater the responsiveness of the State the more will be the readiness of the community to go to the State with its grievances.
(b). Improve interactions between the police and the affected community and take steps to improve the image of the police in the community. This again has to be a two-way street.
( c ).Take action to address the wrong perceptions of the youth and wean it away from resort to violence. For this, the State has to seek the co-operation of the elder members of the community. (7-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
( Based on salient points of my intervention during a panel discussion on the subject organised by the US Consulate-General in Hyderabad and the TV 5 news channel on October 5,2011. The other members of the panel were : Professor Javeed Alam, former chairperson of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, Dr. Syed Mazher Hussain, founder of COVA (Confederation of Voluntary Associations) – a network of about 800 organizations working on communal harmony and community empowerment issues in the states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir and peace in the sub-continent covering India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and Ms. Jameela Nishat, founder and manager of the NGO Shaheen, which works with disadvantaged Muslim and dalit populations. )
Extremism has two dimensions---- as a threat to law and order and internal security and as a phenomenon with political, religious, social, economic, psychological and other aspects. Both dimensions need to be tackled simultaneously.
2.Anger is a common cause of all types of extremism---whether religious, sectarian, ethnic, political or economic. Anger identification and mitigation has to form an important part of all strategies to deal with extremism.
3.A study of the published literature of all extremist movements in India would indicate that the anger which triggered the resort to violence by some members of the community was often caused by three perceptions of exploitation, injustice and unfairness of the system to the affected community. Unless these three perceptions and the resulting anger are tackled, any strategy to deal with extremism would remain incomplete and only partially effective.
4.The conventional wisdom that economic development and attention to factors such as eradication of unemployment would defeat extremism is not tenable. Young people are in the driving seat of most extremist movements. They organised the extremist movement and keep it alive. They rarely speak of social and economic grievances such as unemployment, reservations for minorities etc. They invariably speak of exploitation, injustice and unfairness in the system directed against the community to which they belong. Members of the civil society are collateral victims of their anger, but their anger is directed not against the civil society, but against the State and the Government.
5. One finds a growing divide between the youth and the elder sections of the people in each community and between the youth and the policy-makers constituting the administration in the nation as a whole. Neither elder members of the community from which extremism has arisen nor the Government have been able to address the phenomenon of the alienation of sections of the youth, which drives them to take to violence.
6. While votaries of extremism have been able to mobilise sections of the youth in support of resort to extremist methods, the State and the political parties have not been able to mobilise law-abiding sections of the youth in support of the strategy to deal with extremism. This creates an unfortunate and untrue image of a clash between the State and the youth as a whole of the affected community.
7. The police is the most visible part of the State and the administration. It has to play an important role in dealing with extremism not only as a threat, but also as a phenomenon. The better the interactions and the relations between the police and the community, the more effective will be any strategy to deal with extremism. Unfortunate perceptions/image of the police as uncaring, unjust and oppressive aggravate extremism.
8.Any community-focussed strategy to deal with extremism should, therefore, have the following core components:
(a).Continuous and well-sustained interactions between the State/administration and the affected community in order to identify the incipient signs of the emergence of anger in a community and take timely action to deal with them before they turn into extremist violence and in dealing with the threat and the phenomenon if the anger results in an extremist movement despite the best efforts of the State to prevent it. Such interactions have to be a two-way street. The community should be encouraged to go to the State and the administration with its grievances and the State and the administration should go to the community in order to ascertain its grievances and feel its pulse of anger. Very often, the community and its members do not go to the State due to a feeling that it is indifferent and unresponsive to their grievances. The greater the responsiveness of the State the more will be the readiness of the community to go to the State with its grievances.
(b). Improve interactions between the police and the affected community and take steps to improve the image of the police in the community. This again has to be a two-way street.
( c ).Take action to address the wrong perceptions of the youth and wean it away from resort to violence. For this, the State has to seek the co-operation of the elder members of the community. (7-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 3, 2011
CHINA’S GUANTANAMO BAY: TIBETAN MONKS CONTINUE TO PROTEST
B.RAMAN
Tibetan monks continue to protest against the detention in a military camp of a large number of monks from the Kirti monastery in the Sichuan province of China ever since the self-immolation in March last of a young monk of the monastery in support of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and in condemnation of the repressive Chinese rule in the Tibetan areas.
2. The monks have been detained in a military camp that has been compared by the Tibetans to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba started by the US post-9/11 for detaining Al Qaeda suspects. The Chinese have described the centre as a re-education camp and have repeatedly rejected pleas from international human rights organisations for permission to visit the camp.
3. The Chinese have also imposed humiliating restrictions on the observance of religious practices in the Kirti monastery by those who have not been arrested and detained in the camp.
4. Reports from Tibetan sources indicate that in recent days there have been two more instances of self-immolation and one instance of attempted self-immolation by young monks belonging to the monastery in protest against the camp and in support of His Holiness.
5.The latest instance took place on October 3,2011, when Kalsang Wangchuk, an 18-year-old monk from the Kirti monastery in the mountainous Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba) prefecture, set fire to himself near a vegetable market in the Ngaba town. He was reportedly carrying a photograph of His Holiness.
6.The police and the fire-brigade intervened and put out the flames. The local people have alleged that after putting out the fire, the police beat him up and forcibly dispersed a large number of people who had gathered in the area to protest against his being beaten up. It is not known what happened to him subsequently.
7. The attempted self-immolation of October 3 came in the wake of another anti-Chinese protest during the week-end in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the same province after a photo of His Holiness and a huge Tibetan flag were removed by the police from a building and thrown into the street.
8.On September 26, two young monks below 20 years of age belonging to the same monastery --- Lobsang Kalsang and Lobsang Konchog --- self-immolated before the police intervened. It has been reported that Lobsang Kalsang is the brother of Phuntsog, a 21-year-old monk also from the Kirti monastery who died after setting himself on fire in March, which led to the subsequent wave of protests. There was another incident of self-immolation in August.
9.The Chinese police have started arresting and prosecuting on a charge of abetment to suicide friends and associates of monks committing self-immolation and by-standers who do not intervene to prevent incidents of self-immolation. Despite this, protests through self-immolation continue.
10. Leaflets warning the Chinese of more attempts at self-immolation have been circulating in the area for the last few days.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.clom .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tibetan monks continue to protest against the detention in a military camp of a large number of monks from the Kirti monastery in the Sichuan province of China ever since the self-immolation in March last of a young monk of the monastery in support of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and in condemnation of the repressive Chinese rule in the Tibetan areas.
2. The monks have been detained in a military camp that has been compared by the Tibetans to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba started by the US post-9/11 for detaining Al Qaeda suspects. The Chinese have described the centre as a re-education camp and have repeatedly rejected pleas from international human rights organisations for permission to visit the camp.
3. The Chinese have also imposed humiliating restrictions on the observance of religious practices in the Kirti monastery by those who have not been arrested and detained in the camp.
4. Reports from Tibetan sources indicate that in recent days there have been two more instances of self-immolation and one instance of attempted self-immolation by young monks belonging to the monastery in protest against the camp and in support of His Holiness.
5.The latest instance took place on October 3,2011, when Kalsang Wangchuk, an 18-year-old monk from the Kirti monastery in the mountainous Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba) prefecture, set fire to himself near a vegetable market in the Ngaba town. He was reportedly carrying a photograph of His Holiness.
6.The police and the fire-brigade intervened and put out the flames. The local people have alleged that after putting out the fire, the police beat him up and forcibly dispersed a large number of people who had gathered in the area to protest against his being beaten up. It is not known what happened to him subsequently.
7. The attempted self-immolation of October 3 came in the wake of another anti-Chinese protest during the week-end in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the same province after a photo of His Holiness and a huge Tibetan flag were removed by the police from a building and thrown into the street.
8.On September 26, two young monks below 20 years of age belonging to the same monastery --- Lobsang Kalsang and Lobsang Konchog --- self-immolated before the police intervened. It has been reported that Lobsang Kalsang is the brother of Phuntsog, a 21-year-old monk also from the Kirti monastery who died after setting himself on fire in March, which led to the subsequent wave of protests. There was another incident of self-immolation in August.
9.The Chinese police have started arresting and prosecuting on a charge of abetment to suicide friends and associates of monks committing self-immolation and by-standers who do not intervene to prevent incidents of self-immolation. Despite this, protests through self-immolation continue.
10. Leaflets warning the Chinese of more attempts at self-immolation have been circulating in the area for the last few days.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.clom .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
BEIJING IRKED BY MYANMAR DECISION TO SUSPEND DAM CONSTRUCTION IN KACHIN STATE
B.RAMAN
The Government of Myanmar announced on September 30,2011, the suspension of its plans to build, with Chinese assistance, a massive dam on the Irrawaddy River in the Northern Kachin State.
2.The decision, which was in response to a public outcry over the controversial project in the Kachin State and from environmentalists, marked the first time a Government has re-visited plans for undertaking a project with Chinese assistance without worrying about any adverse reaction from China to the decision.
3. This is also the first time that the Government of President Thein Sein, which came to office in March last, has responded to public pressure and to representations from Mrs.Aung San Suu Kyi against a Chinese-aided project.
4. For some months, there have been similar pressure and protests from the people of the Arakan area against the award of contracts to Chinese oil and gas companies for the exploration of oil/gas in the Arakan area and for the construction of pipelines and a railway line from that area to Yunnan. The decision to suspend a major Chinese-aided project in the Kachin State in response to public pressure may be a shot in the arm to those opposing the Chinese projects in the Arakan area.
5. While announcing the decision to suspend the construction of the U.S. $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, President Thein Sein said in a message to the Parliament in the capital Naypyidaw:: "We have to respect the will of the people as our Government is elected by the people. We have a responsibility to solve the worries of the people so we will stop construction of the Myitsone Dam during our current government."
6. According to those opposing the project, it will mainly benefit the Chinese in Yunnan. They also say that the 3,600 megawatt Chinese-inspired project would submerge dozens of villages, displace more than 10,000 people, and destroy the area’s ecology.
7.Earlier this year, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) had terminated a 17-year ceasefire agreement with the Government in protest against the project and warned the Government that it would forcibly block the project undertaken by the China Power Investment Corp .
8. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, who vehemently opposed the project and has launched a signature campaign against it, and organisations of students and Buddhist monks have welcomed the decision of the Government.
9.Mrs.Suu Kyi has been quoted as saying: “It’s good to listen to the people’s voice. That’s what all governments should do.” Mrs. Suu Kyi had warned in a recent statement that fault lines in the vicinity of the dams and the sheer immensity of the reservoir raised the specter of "horrendous devastation in the event of an earthquake."
10. According to her, another danger was the "serious problem" from a weakened flow of the waters of the lrrawaddy—the intrusion of salt water into the delta. Aung Wah of the Kachin Social Network said the Government needed to do more to protect the Irrawaddy from ecological devastation. He added: “There are another six mega dams under construction or planned on the N’mai and Mali rivers which will export electricity to China and will have the same effect as the Myitsone dam.” He was referring to the two rivers that form the headwaters of the Irrawaddy.
11.The Burma Rivers Network, formed by groups representing the local communities, has called on the Government to immediately cancel the other six dams planned on the Irrawaddy source rivers, which, it said, “will have the same devastating impact on the country.”
12.It has urged the people of Myanmar to “demand an official declaration and pull-out of all personnel and equipment from the dam site by the project-holder, China Power Investment.”
13. The previous military Government had kept secret an environment assessment report, which had warned against the Chinese-inspired projects. The report has recently been leaked to the public by whistle-blowers in the Government. It warned: "The fragmentation of the Irrawaddy River by a series of dams will have serious social and environmental problems not only upstream of dams but also far downstream in the coastal area. There is no need for a huge dam such as the Myitsone to be constructed on the waterway.”
14. The Chinese Government, which has been taken by surprise by the decision of the Myanmar Government, has made no secret of its unhappiness. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said during the daily press briefing in Beijing: "The Myitsone hydropower plant is a China-Myanmar jointly invested project, which has gone through scientific feasibility studies and strict examinations by both sides. Relevant matters that have emerged during the implementation of the project should be properly settled through friendly consultations between the two sides. The Chinese Government always supports its enterprises to cooperate with foreign companies on a basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, and orders Chinese enterprises to strictly perform their duties and commitments according to laws and regulations of the countries where they work.”
15.The Myitsone hydropower project is a joint project of the China Power Investment Corp, and Myanmar's Ministry of Electric Power-1 and the local private Asia World Company. The construction, which was started in December 2009, was to be completed in 2019.
16. The decision of the present Myanmar Government, which consists largely of retired military officers, has political significance. It shows that the Government does not consider itself bound to implement the controversial decisions of the previous military dictatorship. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will use its influence in the Myanmar Army to have the decision reversed.
( 3-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Government of Myanmar announced on September 30,2011, the suspension of its plans to build, with Chinese assistance, a massive dam on the Irrawaddy River in the Northern Kachin State.
2.The decision, which was in response to a public outcry over the controversial project in the Kachin State and from environmentalists, marked the first time a Government has re-visited plans for undertaking a project with Chinese assistance without worrying about any adverse reaction from China to the decision.
3. This is also the first time that the Government of President Thein Sein, which came to office in March last, has responded to public pressure and to representations from Mrs.Aung San Suu Kyi against a Chinese-aided project.
4. For some months, there have been similar pressure and protests from the people of the Arakan area against the award of contracts to Chinese oil and gas companies for the exploration of oil/gas in the Arakan area and for the construction of pipelines and a railway line from that area to Yunnan. The decision to suspend a major Chinese-aided project in the Kachin State in response to public pressure may be a shot in the arm to those opposing the Chinese projects in the Arakan area.
5. While announcing the decision to suspend the construction of the U.S. $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, President Thein Sein said in a message to the Parliament in the capital Naypyidaw:: "We have to respect the will of the people as our Government is elected by the people. We have a responsibility to solve the worries of the people so we will stop construction of the Myitsone Dam during our current government."
6. According to those opposing the project, it will mainly benefit the Chinese in Yunnan. They also say that the 3,600 megawatt Chinese-inspired project would submerge dozens of villages, displace more than 10,000 people, and destroy the area’s ecology.
7.Earlier this year, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) had terminated a 17-year ceasefire agreement with the Government in protest against the project and warned the Government that it would forcibly block the project undertaken by the China Power Investment Corp .
8. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, who vehemently opposed the project and has launched a signature campaign against it, and organisations of students and Buddhist monks have welcomed the decision of the Government.
9.Mrs.Suu Kyi has been quoted as saying: “It’s good to listen to the people’s voice. That’s what all governments should do.” Mrs. Suu Kyi had warned in a recent statement that fault lines in the vicinity of the dams and the sheer immensity of the reservoir raised the specter of "horrendous devastation in the event of an earthquake."
10. According to her, another danger was the "serious problem" from a weakened flow of the waters of the lrrawaddy—the intrusion of salt water into the delta. Aung Wah of the Kachin Social Network said the Government needed to do more to protect the Irrawaddy from ecological devastation. He added: “There are another six mega dams under construction or planned on the N’mai and Mali rivers which will export electricity to China and will have the same effect as the Myitsone dam.” He was referring to the two rivers that form the headwaters of the Irrawaddy.
11.The Burma Rivers Network, formed by groups representing the local communities, has called on the Government to immediately cancel the other six dams planned on the Irrawaddy source rivers, which, it said, “will have the same devastating impact on the country.”
12.It has urged the people of Myanmar to “demand an official declaration and pull-out of all personnel and equipment from the dam site by the project-holder, China Power Investment.”
13. The previous military Government had kept secret an environment assessment report, which had warned against the Chinese-inspired projects. The report has recently been leaked to the public by whistle-blowers in the Government. It warned: "The fragmentation of the Irrawaddy River by a series of dams will have serious social and environmental problems not only upstream of dams but also far downstream in the coastal area. There is no need for a huge dam such as the Myitsone to be constructed on the waterway.”
14. The Chinese Government, which has been taken by surprise by the decision of the Myanmar Government, has made no secret of its unhappiness. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said during the daily press briefing in Beijing: "The Myitsone hydropower plant is a China-Myanmar jointly invested project, which has gone through scientific feasibility studies and strict examinations by both sides. Relevant matters that have emerged during the implementation of the project should be properly settled through friendly consultations between the two sides. The Chinese Government always supports its enterprises to cooperate with foreign companies on a basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, and orders Chinese enterprises to strictly perform their duties and commitments according to laws and regulations of the countries where they work.”
15.The Myitsone hydropower project is a joint project of the China Power Investment Corp, and Myanmar's Ministry of Electric Power-1 and the local private Asia World Company. The construction, which was started in December 2009, was to be completed in 2019.
16. The decision of the present Myanmar Government, which consists largely of retired military officers, has political significance. It shows that the Government does not consider itself bound to implement the controversial decisions of the previous military dictatorship. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will use its influence in the Myanmar Army to have the decision reversed.
( 3-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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