These are my answers in reply to E-mailed questions received from the Islamabad correspondent of a well-known US weekly:
What is India's role in the war on terror?
Exchange of intelligence, knowledge,experience and capabilities and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the US..
- India has been the victim of several terror attacks recently. What is your opinion on New Delhi's approach to combating terrorist attacks? Do you think there is untapped potential for exchanging information between India and Pakistan on how to deal with terrorist actions?
Since much of the jihadi threat in India is from Pakistan-based organisations working under the control of the ISI, there is no scope for exchange of intelligence or mutual legal assistance between India and Pakistan.Terrorism is one of the weapons in Pakistan's anti-India arsenal. It is not going to help India in blunting that weapon. Having said this, I have been arguing in my interviews and writings that there must be some kind of institutional interface between the ISI and the R&AW to reduce the present high level of distrust between the two. This could come about only over a longer period and not in the short-term, but this should be an important objective of both.
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With an increasing presence in Afghanistan, what role do you think India could play in Kabul following the U.S. withdrawal?
By helping in the economic development and in the spread of modern education in Afghanistan and by assisting Afghanistan in strengthening the capabilities of its armed forces, India could contribute to preventing the re-Talibanisation of the Afghan State and society and the return of Al Qaeda to its sanctuaries in Afghan territory after the US and other NATO forces thin out.
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Do you believe the Haqqani network is still based in Pakistan or have they moved to Afghanistan, as claimed in recent interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani?
My assessment is that the Haqqani network no longer operates from North Waziristan. It now operates from the Kurram agency of Pakistan.The cadres and the training camps are in the Kurram Agency, but the leaders, who are high-value targets for US Drones, are spread out across Pakistan in order to escape Drone attacks.The cadres carry out hit and withdraw raids into Afghanistan.
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What role could India play if conditions between Pakistan and the U.S. continue to deteriorate?
The US will never strategically co-operate with India against Pakistan. While the CIA and the Pentagon are not averse to ideas of limited Indo-US co-operation in dealing with threats originating from Pakistan, the State Department has always been cautious in endorsing such ideas. I had seen this vividly while I was in service and I continue to see this in my retirement.The only role India can play is to keep nudging the US to act more strongly against Pakistan without unrealistic hopes that the US wil,in fact, do so.When the US talks of strategic co-operation with India, it has China in mind and not Pakistan.
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In interviews, Pakistan Army leaders have said they still consider India to be their biggest threat. Do you think India feels the same about Pakistan?
India can any day deal with Pakistan and put it in its place.What India is worried is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis.Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to view this axis with the same concern as India does.The developing China-Pakistan axis is the real axis of evil.
- Despite its efforts in the war on terror, Pakistan still has a substantial terrorist problem. Can peace be achieved between India and Pakistan while suspected terrorists still reside here?
There is unlikely to be a normal good-neighbours relationship between India and Pakistan in the short and medium terms.Pakistani complexes relating to India will come in the way. That doesn't mean the two countries should not try for a more benign and less malign relationship. There is a need for a common vision.The leaders of the two countries should meet more frequently to get to know and like each other and work painstakingly and without undue illusions towards such a common vision.
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Following Al Qaeda, what terrorist group is the biggest threat to stability in South Asia, in your opinion.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the two Talibans in that order.I do not consider the Haqqani network as a separate terrorist organisation. It is a wing of the Afghan Taliban, but with some autonomy in its operations.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
Friday, October 7, 2011
Thursday, October 6, 2011
ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH EXTREMISM
B.RAMAN
( Based on salient points of my intervention during a panel discussion on the subject organised by the US Consulate-General in Hyderabad and the TV 5 news channel on October 5,2011. The other members of the panel were : Professor Javeed Alam, former chairperson of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, Dr. Syed Mazher Hussain, founder of COVA (Confederation of Voluntary Associations) – a network of about 800 organizations working on communal harmony and community empowerment issues in the states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir and peace in the sub-continent covering India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and Ms. Jameela Nishat, founder and manager of the NGO Shaheen, which works with disadvantaged Muslim and dalit populations. )
Extremism has two dimensions---- as a threat to law and order and internal security and as a phenomenon with political, religious, social, economic, psychological and other aspects. Both dimensions need to be tackled simultaneously.
2.Anger is a common cause of all types of extremism---whether religious, sectarian, ethnic, political or economic. Anger identification and mitigation has to form an important part of all strategies to deal with extremism.
3.A study of the published literature of all extremist movements in India would indicate that the anger which triggered the resort to violence by some members of the community was often caused by three perceptions of exploitation, injustice and unfairness of the system to the affected community. Unless these three perceptions and the resulting anger are tackled, any strategy to deal with extremism would remain incomplete and only partially effective.
4.The conventional wisdom that economic development and attention to factors such as eradication of unemployment would defeat extremism is not tenable. Young people are in the driving seat of most extremist movements. They organised the extremist movement and keep it alive. They rarely speak of social and economic grievances such as unemployment, reservations for minorities etc. They invariably speak of exploitation, injustice and unfairness in the system directed against the community to which they belong. Members of the civil society are collateral victims of their anger, but their anger is directed not against the civil society, but against the State and the Government.
5. One finds a growing divide between the youth and the elder sections of the people in each community and between the youth and the policy-makers constituting the administration in the nation as a whole. Neither elder members of the community from which extremism has arisen nor the Government have been able to address the phenomenon of the alienation of sections of the youth, which drives them to take to violence.
6. While votaries of extremism have been able to mobilise sections of the youth in support of resort to extremist methods, the State and the political parties have not been able to mobilise law-abiding sections of the youth in support of the strategy to deal with extremism. This creates an unfortunate and untrue image of a clash between the State and the youth as a whole of the affected community.
7. The police is the most visible part of the State and the administration. It has to play an important role in dealing with extremism not only as a threat, but also as a phenomenon. The better the interactions and the relations between the police and the community, the more effective will be any strategy to deal with extremism. Unfortunate perceptions/image of the police as uncaring, unjust and oppressive aggravate extremism.
8.Any community-focussed strategy to deal with extremism should, therefore, have the following core components:
(a).Continuous and well-sustained interactions between the State/administration and the affected community in order to identify the incipient signs of the emergence of anger in a community and take timely action to deal with them before they turn into extremist violence and in dealing with the threat and the phenomenon if the anger results in an extremist movement despite the best efforts of the State to prevent it. Such interactions have to be a two-way street. The community should be encouraged to go to the State and the administration with its grievances and the State and the administration should go to the community in order to ascertain its grievances and feel its pulse of anger. Very often, the community and its members do not go to the State due to a feeling that it is indifferent and unresponsive to their grievances. The greater the responsiveness of the State the more will be the readiness of the community to go to the State with its grievances.
(b). Improve interactions between the police and the affected community and take steps to improve the image of the police in the community. This again has to be a two-way street.
( c ).Take action to address the wrong perceptions of the youth and wean it away from resort to violence. For this, the State has to seek the co-operation of the elder members of the community. (7-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
( Based on salient points of my intervention during a panel discussion on the subject organised by the US Consulate-General in Hyderabad and the TV 5 news channel on October 5,2011. The other members of the panel were : Professor Javeed Alam, former chairperson of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, Dr. Syed Mazher Hussain, founder of COVA (Confederation of Voluntary Associations) – a network of about 800 organizations working on communal harmony and community empowerment issues in the states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir and peace in the sub-continent covering India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and Ms. Jameela Nishat, founder and manager of the NGO Shaheen, which works with disadvantaged Muslim and dalit populations. )
Extremism has two dimensions---- as a threat to law and order and internal security and as a phenomenon with political, religious, social, economic, psychological and other aspects. Both dimensions need to be tackled simultaneously.
2.Anger is a common cause of all types of extremism---whether religious, sectarian, ethnic, political or economic. Anger identification and mitigation has to form an important part of all strategies to deal with extremism.
3.A study of the published literature of all extremist movements in India would indicate that the anger which triggered the resort to violence by some members of the community was often caused by three perceptions of exploitation, injustice and unfairness of the system to the affected community. Unless these three perceptions and the resulting anger are tackled, any strategy to deal with extremism would remain incomplete and only partially effective.
4.The conventional wisdom that economic development and attention to factors such as eradication of unemployment would defeat extremism is not tenable. Young people are in the driving seat of most extremist movements. They organised the extremist movement and keep it alive. They rarely speak of social and economic grievances such as unemployment, reservations for minorities etc. They invariably speak of exploitation, injustice and unfairness in the system directed against the community to which they belong. Members of the civil society are collateral victims of their anger, but their anger is directed not against the civil society, but against the State and the Government.
5. One finds a growing divide between the youth and the elder sections of the people in each community and between the youth and the policy-makers constituting the administration in the nation as a whole. Neither elder members of the community from which extremism has arisen nor the Government have been able to address the phenomenon of the alienation of sections of the youth, which drives them to take to violence.
6. While votaries of extremism have been able to mobilise sections of the youth in support of resort to extremist methods, the State and the political parties have not been able to mobilise law-abiding sections of the youth in support of the strategy to deal with extremism. This creates an unfortunate and untrue image of a clash between the State and the youth as a whole of the affected community.
7. The police is the most visible part of the State and the administration. It has to play an important role in dealing with extremism not only as a threat, but also as a phenomenon. The better the interactions and the relations between the police and the community, the more effective will be any strategy to deal with extremism. Unfortunate perceptions/image of the police as uncaring, unjust and oppressive aggravate extremism.
8.Any community-focussed strategy to deal with extremism should, therefore, have the following core components:
(a).Continuous and well-sustained interactions between the State/administration and the affected community in order to identify the incipient signs of the emergence of anger in a community and take timely action to deal with them before they turn into extremist violence and in dealing with the threat and the phenomenon if the anger results in an extremist movement despite the best efforts of the State to prevent it. Such interactions have to be a two-way street. The community should be encouraged to go to the State and the administration with its grievances and the State and the administration should go to the community in order to ascertain its grievances and feel its pulse of anger. Very often, the community and its members do not go to the State due to a feeling that it is indifferent and unresponsive to their grievances. The greater the responsiveness of the State the more will be the readiness of the community to go to the State with its grievances.
(b). Improve interactions between the police and the affected community and take steps to improve the image of the police in the community. This again has to be a two-way street.
( c ).Take action to address the wrong perceptions of the youth and wean it away from resort to violence. For this, the State has to seek the co-operation of the elder members of the community. (7-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 3, 2011
CHINA’S GUANTANAMO BAY: TIBETAN MONKS CONTINUE TO PROTEST
B.RAMAN
Tibetan monks continue to protest against the detention in a military camp of a large number of monks from the Kirti monastery in the Sichuan province of China ever since the self-immolation in March last of a young monk of the monastery in support of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and in condemnation of the repressive Chinese rule in the Tibetan areas.
2. The monks have been detained in a military camp that has been compared by the Tibetans to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba started by the US post-9/11 for detaining Al Qaeda suspects. The Chinese have described the centre as a re-education camp and have repeatedly rejected pleas from international human rights organisations for permission to visit the camp.
3. The Chinese have also imposed humiliating restrictions on the observance of religious practices in the Kirti monastery by those who have not been arrested and detained in the camp.
4. Reports from Tibetan sources indicate that in recent days there have been two more instances of self-immolation and one instance of attempted self-immolation by young monks belonging to the monastery in protest against the camp and in support of His Holiness.
5.The latest instance took place on October 3,2011, when Kalsang Wangchuk, an 18-year-old monk from the Kirti monastery in the mountainous Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba) prefecture, set fire to himself near a vegetable market in the Ngaba town. He was reportedly carrying a photograph of His Holiness.
6.The police and the fire-brigade intervened and put out the flames. The local people have alleged that after putting out the fire, the police beat him up and forcibly dispersed a large number of people who had gathered in the area to protest against his being beaten up. It is not known what happened to him subsequently.
7. The attempted self-immolation of October 3 came in the wake of another anti-Chinese protest during the week-end in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the same province after a photo of His Holiness and a huge Tibetan flag were removed by the police from a building and thrown into the street.
8.On September 26, two young monks below 20 years of age belonging to the same monastery --- Lobsang Kalsang and Lobsang Konchog --- self-immolated before the police intervened. It has been reported that Lobsang Kalsang is the brother of Phuntsog, a 21-year-old monk also from the Kirti monastery who died after setting himself on fire in March, which led to the subsequent wave of protests. There was another incident of self-immolation in August.
9.The Chinese police have started arresting and prosecuting on a charge of abetment to suicide friends and associates of monks committing self-immolation and by-standers who do not intervene to prevent incidents of self-immolation. Despite this, protests through self-immolation continue.
10. Leaflets warning the Chinese of more attempts at self-immolation have been circulating in the area for the last few days.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.clom .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tibetan monks continue to protest against the detention in a military camp of a large number of monks from the Kirti monastery in the Sichuan province of China ever since the self-immolation in March last of a young monk of the monastery in support of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and in condemnation of the repressive Chinese rule in the Tibetan areas.
2. The monks have been detained in a military camp that has been compared by the Tibetans to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba started by the US post-9/11 for detaining Al Qaeda suspects. The Chinese have described the centre as a re-education camp and have repeatedly rejected pleas from international human rights organisations for permission to visit the camp.
3. The Chinese have also imposed humiliating restrictions on the observance of religious practices in the Kirti monastery by those who have not been arrested and detained in the camp.
4. Reports from Tibetan sources indicate that in recent days there have been two more instances of self-immolation and one instance of attempted self-immolation by young monks belonging to the monastery in protest against the camp and in support of His Holiness.
5.The latest instance took place on October 3,2011, when Kalsang Wangchuk, an 18-year-old monk from the Kirti monastery in the mountainous Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba) prefecture, set fire to himself near a vegetable market in the Ngaba town. He was reportedly carrying a photograph of His Holiness.
6.The police and the fire-brigade intervened and put out the flames. The local people have alleged that after putting out the fire, the police beat him up and forcibly dispersed a large number of people who had gathered in the area to protest against his being beaten up. It is not known what happened to him subsequently.
7. The attempted self-immolation of October 3 came in the wake of another anti-Chinese protest during the week-end in the Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the same province after a photo of His Holiness and a huge Tibetan flag were removed by the police from a building and thrown into the street.
8.On September 26, two young monks below 20 years of age belonging to the same monastery --- Lobsang Kalsang and Lobsang Konchog --- self-immolated before the police intervened. It has been reported that Lobsang Kalsang is the brother of Phuntsog, a 21-year-old monk also from the Kirti monastery who died after setting himself on fire in March, which led to the subsequent wave of protests. There was another incident of self-immolation in August.
9.The Chinese police have started arresting and prosecuting on a charge of abetment to suicide friends and associates of monks committing self-immolation and by-standers who do not intervene to prevent incidents of self-immolation. Despite this, protests through self-immolation continue.
10. Leaflets warning the Chinese of more attempts at self-immolation have been circulating in the area for the last few days.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.clom .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
BEIJING IRKED BY MYANMAR DECISION TO SUSPEND DAM CONSTRUCTION IN KACHIN STATE
B.RAMAN
The Government of Myanmar announced on September 30,2011, the suspension of its plans to build, with Chinese assistance, a massive dam on the Irrawaddy River in the Northern Kachin State.
2.The decision, which was in response to a public outcry over the controversial project in the Kachin State and from environmentalists, marked the first time a Government has re-visited plans for undertaking a project with Chinese assistance without worrying about any adverse reaction from China to the decision.
3. This is also the first time that the Government of President Thein Sein, which came to office in March last, has responded to public pressure and to representations from Mrs.Aung San Suu Kyi against a Chinese-aided project.
4. For some months, there have been similar pressure and protests from the people of the Arakan area against the award of contracts to Chinese oil and gas companies for the exploration of oil/gas in the Arakan area and for the construction of pipelines and a railway line from that area to Yunnan. The decision to suspend a major Chinese-aided project in the Kachin State in response to public pressure may be a shot in the arm to those opposing the Chinese projects in the Arakan area.
5. While announcing the decision to suspend the construction of the U.S. $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, President Thein Sein said in a message to the Parliament in the capital Naypyidaw:: "We have to respect the will of the people as our Government is elected by the people. We have a responsibility to solve the worries of the people so we will stop construction of the Myitsone Dam during our current government."
6. According to those opposing the project, it will mainly benefit the Chinese in Yunnan. They also say that the 3,600 megawatt Chinese-inspired project would submerge dozens of villages, displace more than 10,000 people, and destroy the area’s ecology.
7.Earlier this year, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) had terminated a 17-year ceasefire agreement with the Government in protest against the project and warned the Government that it would forcibly block the project undertaken by the China Power Investment Corp .
8. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, who vehemently opposed the project and has launched a signature campaign against it, and organisations of students and Buddhist monks have welcomed the decision of the Government.
9.Mrs.Suu Kyi has been quoted as saying: “It’s good to listen to the people’s voice. That’s what all governments should do.” Mrs. Suu Kyi had warned in a recent statement that fault lines in the vicinity of the dams and the sheer immensity of the reservoir raised the specter of "horrendous devastation in the event of an earthquake."
10. According to her, another danger was the "serious problem" from a weakened flow of the waters of the lrrawaddy—the intrusion of salt water into the delta. Aung Wah of the Kachin Social Network said the Government needed to do more to protect the Irrawaddy from ecological devastation. He added: “There are another six mega dams under construction or planned on the N’mai and Mali rivers which will export electricity to China and will have the same effect as the Myitsone dam.” He was referring to the two rivers that form the headwaters of the Irrawaddy.
11.The Burma Rivers Network, formed by groups representing the local communities, has called on the Government to immediately cancel the other six dams planned on the Irrawaddy source rivers, which, it said, “will have the same devastating impact on the country.”
12.It has urged the people of Myanmar to “demand an official declaration and pull-out of all personnel and equipment from the dam site by the project-holder, China Power Investment.”
13. The previous military Government had kept secret an environment assessment report, which had warned against the Chinese-inspired projects. The report has recently been leaked to the public by whistle-blowers in the Government. It warned: "The fragmentation of the Irrawaddy River by a series of dams will have serious social and environmental problems not only upstream of dams but also far downstream in the coastal area. There is no need for a huge dam such as the Myitsone to be constructed on the waterway.”
14. The Chinese Government, which has been taken by surprise by the decision of the Myanmar Government, has made no secret of its unhappiness. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said during the daily press briefing in Beijing: "The Myitsone hydropower plant is a China-Myanmar jointly invested project, which has gone through scientific feasibility studies and strict examinations by both sides. Relevant matters that have emerged during the implementation of the project should be properly settled through friendly consultations between the two sides. The Chinese Government always supports its enterprises to cooperate with foreign companies on a basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, and orders Chinese enterprises to strictly perform their duties and commitments according to laws and regulations of the countries where they work.”
15.The Myitsone hydropower project is a joint project of the China Power Investment Corp, and Myanmar's Ministry of Electric Power-1 and the local private Asia World Company. The construction, which was started in December 2009, was to be completed in 2019.
16. The decision of the present Myanmar Government, which consists largely of retired military officers, has political significance. It shows that the Government does not consider itself bound to implement the controversial decisions of the previous military dictatorship. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will use its influence in the Myanmar Army to have the decision reversed.
( 3-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Government of Myanmar announced on September 30,2011, the suspension of its plans to build, with Chinese assistance, a massive dam on the Irrawaddy River in the Northern Kachin State.
2.The decision, which was in response to a public outcry over the controversial project in the Kachin State and from environmentalists, marked the first time a Government has re-visited plans for undertaking a project with Chinese assistance without worrying about any adverse reaction from China to the decision.
3. This is also the first time that the Government of President Thein Sein, which came to office in March last, has responded to public pressure and to representations from Mrs.Aung San Suu Kyi against a Chinese-aided project.
4. For some months, there have been similar pressure and protests from the people of the Arakan area against the award of contracts to Chinese oil and gas companies for the exploration of oil/gas in the Arakan area and for the construction of pipelines and a railway line from that area to Yunnan. The decision to suspend a major Chinese-aided project in the Kachin State in response to public pressure may be a shot in the arm to those opposing the Chinese projects in the Arakan area.
5. While announcing the decision to suspend the construction of the U.S. $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, President Thein Sein said in a message to the Parliament in the capital Naypyidaw:: "We have to respect the will of the people as our Government is elected by the people. We have a responsibility to solve the worries of the people so we will stop construction of the Myitsone Dam during our current government."
6. According to those opposing the project, it will mainly benefit the Chinese in Yunnan. They also say that the 3,600 megawatt Chinese-inspired project would submerge dozens of villages, displace more than 10,000 people, and destroy the area’s ecology.
7.Earlier this year, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) had terminated a 17-year ceasefire agreement with the Government in protest against the project and warned the Government that it would forcibly block the project undertaken by the China Power Investment Corp .
8. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, who vehemently opposed the project and has launched a signature campaign against it, and organisations of students and Buddhist monks have welcomed the decision of the Government.
9.Mrs.Suu Kyi has been quoted as saying: “It’s good to listen to the people’s voice. That’s what all governments should do.” Mrs. Suu Kyi had warned in a recent statement that fault lines in the vicinity of the dams and the sheer immensity of the reservoir raised the specter of "horrendous devastation in the event of an earthquake."
10. According to her, another danger was the "serious problem" from a weakened flow of the waters of the lrrawaddy—the intrusion of salt water into the delta. Aung Wah of the Kachin Social Network said the Government needed to do more to protect the Irrawaddy from ecological devastation. He added: “There are another six mega dams under construction or planned on the N’mai and Mali rivers which will export electricity to China and will have the same effect as the Myitsone dam.” He was referring to the two rivers that form the headwaters of the Irrawaddy.
11.The Burma Rivers Network, formed by groups representing the local communities, has called on the Government to immediately cancel the other six dams planned on the Irrawaddy source rivers, which, it said, “will have the same devastating impact on the country.”
12.It has urged the people of Myanmar to “demand an official declaration and pull-out of all personnel and equipment from the dam site by the project-holder, China Power Investment.”
13. The previous military Government had kept secret an environment assessment report, which had warned against the Chinese-inspired projects. The report has recently been leaked to the public by whistle-blowers in the Government. It warned: "The fragmentation of the Irrawaddy River by a series of dams will have serious social and environmental problems not only upstream of dams but also far downstream in the coastal area. There is no need for a huge dam such as the Myitsone to be constructed on the waterway.”
14. The Chinese Government, which has been taken by surprise by the decision of the Myanmar Government, has made no secret of its unhappiness. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said during the daily press briefing in Beijing: "The Myitsone hydropower plant is a China-Myanmar jointly invested project, which has gone through scientific feasibility studies and strict examinations by both sides. Relevant matters that have emerged during the implementation of the project should be properly settled through friendly consultations between the two sides. The Chinese Government always supports its enterprises to cooperate with foreign companies on a basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, and orders Chinese enterprises to strictly perform their duties and commitments according to laws and regulations of the countries where they work.”
15.The Myitsone hydropower project is a joint project of the China Power Investment Corp, and Myanmar's Ministry of Electric Power-1 and the local private Asia World Company. The construction, which was started in December 2009, was to be completed in 2019.
16. The decision of the present Myanmar Government, which consists largely of retired military officers, has political significance. It shows that the Government does not consider itself bound to implement the controversial decisions of the previous military dictatorship. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will use its influence in the Myanmar Army to have the decision reversed.
( 3-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, October 1, 2011
CIA KEEPS UP ITS RUN OF SUCCESSES AGAINST AL QAEDA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR --PAPER NO 739
B.RAMAN
The USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has kept up its run of successes against Al Qaeda with the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni origin, and Samir Khan, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, in a Drone (pilotless plane) and a conventional air strike from a fighter aircraft on a convoy of three cars in which they were travelling in Yemen on September 30,2011.
2. Coming five months after the successful elimination of Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad hide-out in Pakistan on May 2, the elimination of Awlaki and Samir Khan speaks eloquently of the improvement in the capability of the CIA and other US intelligence agencies to track down high-value targets of Al Qaeda----whether in the Af-Pak region or in Yemen--- and eliminate them through precision strikes.
3. While the Abbottabad operation was carried out by the US intelligence and special forces without the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities due to suspicions of the complicity of the Pakistani Army and intelligence with Osama bin Laden, the strikes in Yemen that killed Awlaki seem to have been carried out with the knowledge of the Yemeni authorities.
4. This speaks well of the level of trust between the US and Yemeni intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies---the kind of trust that has been significantly absent in the relations between the agencies of the US and Pakistan.
5. It is not yet known whether the intelligence that led to the elimination of Awlaki and Samir Khan came from human or technical sources and what role the Saudi intelligence, which closely monitors the activities of Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), played in the operation.
6.Last year’s successful thwarting of an attempt in October by the AQAP to smuggle explosive devices concealed in printer cartridges to the US indicated that the intelligence probably came from human sources of the Saudi intelligence in the AQAP, which was originally formed by the merger of Al Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and which has many Saudi operatives.
7.Successful operations of the Saudi intelligence against Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in the past indicated a high level of penetration of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia by the Saudi intelligence. It is likely that some of these assets are still available to the Saudi intelligence after the merger of the Saudi Al Qaeda with that of Yemen.
8.Reports that Ibrahim Hasan al-Asiri, a Saudi, who was the explosive expert of Al Qaeda in the AQAP, was also in one of the cars and might have also been killed have not been confirmed so far. In fact, the Yemeni authorities have denied reports of the death of al-Asiri.
9. The strikes were made five miles from the town of Khashef in Yemen’s northern Jawf province, 87 miles east of the capital Sanaa.
10.If al-Asiri, a 29-year-old Yemen-based son of a retired soldier of the Saudi Army, had also been killed, it would have been a major blow to both the ideological-cum-motivational and operational wings of the AQAP. While the deaths of Awlaki and Samir Khan, who used to bring out “Inspire”, Al Qaeda’s online English journal, would be a severe blow to the ideological-cum-motivational wing of the AQAP, the survival of al-Asiri would ensure, at least for the time being, that the AQAP’s operational capabilities remain intact.
11. Born in New Mexico in the US in 1971, al-Awlaki was a U.S. citizen. His father Nasser al-Awlaki used to be the Agriculture Minister of Yemen. After completing his education in the US, Awlaki went back to Yemen from where he returned after some time to work as a religious cleric in the US.
12. Initially, he preached in a mosque of San Diego, where in 2000 he allegedly met two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. The FBI reportedly questioned him after 9/11, but found no evidence to justify his detention. The U.S. National Commission’s report on the 9/11 strikes said that Midhar and Hazmi “respected al-Awlaki as a religious figure and developed a close relationship with him.” They were aboard the plane that crashed into the Pentagon. He then preached at a mosque in Virginia.
13.In 2004 he travelled back to Yemen, where he taught at a university before he was arrested and imprisoned in 2006 on suspicion of having links with Al Qaeda. In December 2007 he was released after he repented.
14. The Obama Administration’s plans to neutralize the AQAP, with the co-operation of the Yemeni security authorities, took shape after reports emerged in November, 2009, that Major Nidal Malik Hasan of the US Army, who shot down a number of US soldiers in a military camp in Fort Hood in Texas, was in touch with Awlaki in Yemen through E-mail.
15.The US authorities did not categorise the massacre of fellow soldiers by Major Hasan as an act of terrorism, but Sen. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and others cited the connection between Hasan and Al-Awlaki as proof that the Fort Hood shooting was a terrorist attack. Their suspicions were strengthened by Al-Awlaki’s open approval of the act of Major Hasan.
16.Al Jazeera quoted al-Awlaki as saying in an interview: “My support to the operation was because the operation that brother Nidal carried out was a courageous one, and I endeavoured to explain my position regarding what happened because many Islamic organizations and preachers in the West condemned the operation.” While approving post-facto Major Hasan’s action, Awlaki refrained from saying anything which might have created a suspicion that he had prior knowledge of what the Major intended doing.
17.While continuing to treat Major Hasan’s act as not amounting to terrorism, the Obama Administration decided to act against the camps of the AQAP in Yemen. There were two major air raids in December 2009----supposedly by Yemeni planes, but actually by US aircraft------ which reportedly killed 30 members of the AQAP, but none of them was a high-value target. During the same month, the AQAP made an unsuccessful attempt to blow up a plane going to Detroit from Amsterdam through a Nigerian student allegedly motivated by Awlaki.
18.While the main wing of Al Qaeda based in Pakistan’s tribal areas continued to draw its recruits, volunteers and supporters from the Arabic-speaking residents of West Asia and North Africa, with little command of the English language, the AQAP, after Awlaki joined it, started drawing its adherents not only from the Arabic-speaking population of the region, but also from the community of Muslims in the English-speaking world who felt more comfortable with English than with Arabic.
19. It started an English web journal called “Inspire”, which was directed to the Muslims of the English-speaking world. It served the dual purpose of acting as the propaganda journal of the AQAP and on line training facility for enabling self-radicalised jihadis in the English-speaking world to acquire expertise in the use of weapons and explosives and techniques of waging a jihad without having to visit the training camps of the AQAP in Yemen.
20.The difficulties faced by self-radicalised Muslims of the English-speaking world due to their poor command of the Arabic language were sought to be removed through ideological and technical manuals and instructions in the English language.
21. The idea of propaganda, ideological indoctrination, motivation and self-acquired expertise through the medium of the English language was inspired by al- Awlaki, who felt as comfortable with the English language as he was with Arabic unlike Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders based in Pakistan and Yemen who felt more comfortable with Arabic than with English. Their poor command of English came in the way of their direct communication with their followers in the English-speaking world.
22.Under the guidance of Awlaki, the AQAP sought to capitalize on the interest of self-radicalised elements in the English-speaking world to take to jihad. After its failed attempt in October last year to smuggle explosive devices concealed in printer cartridges into the US, “Inspire” wrote that it had adopted a “strategy of a thousand cuts.” It explained this strategy in the following words: “To bring down America we do not need to strike big. In such an environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America worked so hard to erect.”
23.The strategy of a thousand cuts adopted by the AQAP against the US was reminiscent of a similar strategy used by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) against India. The objectives of the ISI's strategy were to discredit the Indian security agencies in the eyes of the Indian public, cause demoralisation, damage the Indian economy and drive a wedge between the Muslims and the non-Muslims in India.
24.The objectives of the AQAP were to create a fear psychosis in the US, make it over-react and spend an enormous amount on physical security thereby damaging the US economy. This was, in fact, not a new strategy of the AQ. Osama bin Laden had outlined this strategy in an audio message disseminated through Al Jazeera on November 2, 2004.
25. Awlaki thus gravitated to the Al Qaeda post-9/11 and motivated a new breed of English-speaking radicals. It had three Muslim radicals of American upbringing who played a major role in keeping anger focussed on the US and the rest of West. The first was Adam Gadahn, a white convert to Islam who sill operates from the Af-Pak region and handles Al Qaeda’s psywar set-up.The other two were Awlaki and Samir Khan.
26. The massive US retaliation in Afghanistan post-9/11 had triggered a debate in Al Qaeda about the wisdom of taking the jihad to the US homeland. Awlaki supported the need to take the jihad to the US homeland for final victory against the US.
27.Awlaki was an ideological and not an operational man--but after he arrived in Yemen and started guiding the AQAP, one noticed many changes. The AQAP tried to expand its area of operations from the Saudi-Yemeni-Somali region to the West, particularly the US. It started recruiting from among Muslims in the West---Arabs & non-Arabs-- who would have no difficulty in traveling in the West.
28.The new breed of Al Qaeda and its affiliates came largely from the US, the UK and Germany. It consisted of a small number of white converts to Islam and many from different Muslim diasporas. The identities of Al Qaeda’s pre-9/11 recruits were largely known to Western intelligence agencies. Their ability to travel and operate in the West was weakened. Al Qaeda’s breed of new recruits inspired by Awlaki tried to replace them and take over the responsibility for operations in the West.
29.The new breed was more comfortable in Western languages than the older recruits. It had not come to the adverse notice of the intelligence agencies. Many of them had valid passports with valid visas for travel in the West. They had mastered the Net and the social media networks, but their thinking was not as grand as that of the older recruits who conceived the idea of the 9/11 strikes and had them planned and executed.
30.The new recruits were more adept in the tactical than in the strategic. The new breed devised new tactics such as better ways of avoiding detection of IEDs, but the innovative sweep of the new breed was not as spectacular as that of the older one. Its operational thinking was more classic. It went back to older tactical ideas such blowing-up planes, letter-bombs etc. It repeatedly failed because the intelligence agencies are more adept now in detecting and thwarting conventional methods of terrorism. As a result, the new breed inspired and motivated by Awlaki has not succeeded in carrying out any major strike in the West. One has to see what impact Awlaki’s death has on the continuing flow of new volunteers/recruits to the AQAP.( 2-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
The USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has kept up its run of successes against Al Qaeda with the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni origin, and Samir Khan, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, in a Drone (pilotless plane) and a conventional air strike from a fighter aircraft on a convoy of three cars in which they were travelling in Yemen on September 30,2011.
2. Coming five months after the successful elimination of Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad hide-out in Pakistan on May 2, the elimination of Awlaki and Samir Khan speaks eloquently of the improvement in the capability of the CIA and other US intelligence agencies to track down high-value targets of Al Qaeda----whether in the Af-Pak region or in Yemen--- and eliminate them through precision strikes.
3. While the Abbottabad operation was carried out by the US intelligence and special forces without the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities due to suspicions of the complicity of the Pakistani Army and intelligence with Osama bin Laden, the strikes in Yemen that killed Awlaki seem to have been carried out with the knowledge of the Yemeni authorities.
4. This speaks well of the level of trust between the US and Yemeni intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies---the kind of trust that has been significantly absent in the relations between the agencies of the US and Pakistan.
5. It is not yet known whether the intelligence that led to the elimination of Awlaki and Samir Khan came from human or technical sources and what role the Saudi intelligence, which closely monitors the activities of Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), played in the operation.
6.Last year’s successful thwarting of an attempt in October by the AQAP to smuggle explosive devices concealed in printer cartridges to the US indicated that the intelligence probably came from human sources of the Saudi intelligence in the AQAP, which was originally formed by the merger of Al Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and which has many Saudi operatives.
7.Successful operations of the Saudi intelligence against Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in the past indicated a high level of penetration of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia by the Saudi intelligence. It is likely that some of these assets are still available to the Saudi intelligence after the merger of the Saudi Al Qaeda with that of Yemen.
8.Reports that Ibrahim Hasan al-Asiri, a Saudi, who was the explosive expert of Al Qaeda in the AQAP, was also in one of the cars and might have also been killed have not been confirmed so far. In fact, the Yemeni authorities have denied reports of the death of al-Asiri.
9. The strikes were made five miles from the town of Khashef in Yemen’s northern Jawf province, 87 miles east of the capital Sanaa.
10.If al-Asiri, a 29-year-old Yemen-based son of a retired soldier of the Saudi Army, had also been killed, it would have been a major blow to both the ideological-cum-motivational and operational wings of the AQAP. While the deaths of Awlaki and Samir Khan, who used to bring out “Inspire”, Al Qaeda’s online English journal, would be a severe blow to the ideological-cum-motivational wing of the AQAP, the survival of al-Asiri would ensure, at least for the time being, that the AQAP’s operational capabilities remain intact.
11. Born in New Mexico in the US in 1971, al-Awlaki was a U.S. citizen. His father Nasser al-Awlaki used to be the Agriculture Minister of Yemen. After completing his education in the US, Awlaki went back to Yemen from where he returned after some time to work as a religious cleric in the US.
12. Initially, he preached in a mosque of San Diego, where in 2000 he allegedly met two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. The FBI reportedly questioned him after 9/11, but found no evidence to justify his detention. The U.S. National Commission’s report on the 9/11 strikes said that Midhar and Hazmi “respected al-Awlaki as a religious figure and developed a close relationship with him.” They were aboard the plane that crashed into the Pentagon. He then preached at a mosque in Virginia.
13.In 2004 he travelled back to Yemen, where he taught at a university before he was arrested and imprisoned in 2006 on suspicion of having links with Al Qaeda. In December 2007 he was released after he repented.
14. The Obama Administration’s plans to neutralize the AQAP, with the co-operation of the Yemeni security authorities, took shape after reports emerged in November, 2009, that Major Nidal Malik Hasan of the US Army, who shot down a number of US soldiers in a military camp in Fort Hood in Texas, was in touch with Awlaki in Yemen through E-mail.
15.The US authorities did not categorise the massacre of fellow soldiers by Major Hasan as an act of terrorism, but Sen. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and others cited the connection between Hasan and Al-Awlaki as proof that the Fort Hood shooting was a terrorist attack. Their suspicions were strengthened by Al-Awlaki’s open approval of the act of Major Hasan.
16.Al Jazeera quoted al-Awlaki as saying in an interview: “My support to the operation was because the operation that brother Nidal carried out was a courageous one, and I endeavoured to explain my position regarding what happened because many Islamic organizations and preachers in the West condemned the operation.” While approving post-facto Major Hasan’s action, Awlaki refrained from saying anything which might have created a suspicion that he had prior knowledge of what the Major intended doing.
17.While continuing to treat Major Hasan’s act as not amounting to terrorism, the Obama Administration decided to act against the camps of the AQAP in Yemen. There were two major air raids in December 2009----supposedly by Yemeni planes, but actually by US aircraft------ which reportedly killed 30 members of the AQAP, but none of them was a high-value target. During the same month, the AQAP made an unsuccessful attempt to blow up a plane going to Detroit from Amsterdam through a Nigerian student allegedly motivated by Awlaki.
18.While the main wing of Al Qaeda based in Pakistan’s tribal areas continued to draw its recruits, volunteers and supporters from the Arabic-speaking residents of West Asia and North Africa, with little command of the English language, the AQAP, after Awlaki joined it, started drawing its adherents not only from the Arabic-speaking population of the region, but also from the community of Muslims in the English-speaking world who felt more comfortable with English than with Arabic.
19. It started an English web journal called “Inspire”, which was directed to the Muslims of the English-speaking world. It served the dual purpose of acting as the propaganda journal of the AQAP and on line training facility for enabling self-radicalised jihadis in the English-speaking world to acquire expertise in the use of weapons and explosives and techniques of waging a jihad without having to visit the training camps of the AQAP in Yemen.
20.The difficulties faced by self-radicalised Muslims of the English-speaking world due to their poor command of the Arabic language were sought to be removed through ideological and technical manuals and instructions in the English language.
21. The idea of propaganda, ideological indoctrination, motivation and self-acquired expertise through the medium of the English language was inspired by al- Awlaki, who felt as comfortable with the English language as he was with Arabic unlike Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders based in Pakistan and Yemen who felt more comfortable with Arabic than with English. Their poor command of English came in the way of their direct communication with their followers in the English-speaking world.
22.Under the guidance of Awlaki, the AQAP sought to capitalize on the interest of self-radicalised elements in the English-speaking world to take to jihad. After its failed attempt in October last year to smuggle explosive devices concealed in printer cartridges into the US, “Inspire” wrote that it had adopted a “strategy of a thousand cuts.” It explained this strategy in the following words: “To bring down America we do not need to strike big. In such an environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America worked so hard to erect.”
23.The strategy of a thousand cuts adopted by the AQAP against the US was reminiscent of a similar strategy used by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) against India. The objectives of the ISI's strategy were to discredit the Indian security agencies in the eyes of the Indian public, cause demoralisation, damage the Indian economy and drive a wedge between the Muslims and the non-Muslims in India.
24.The objectives of the AQAP were to create a fear psychosis in the US, make it over-react and spend an enormous amount on physical security thereby damaging the US economy. This was, in fact, not a new strategy of the AQ. Osama bin Laden had outlined this strategy in an audio message disseminated through Al Jazeera on November 2, 2004.
25. Awlaki thus gravitated to the Al Qaeda post-9/11 and motivated a new breed of English-speaking radicals. It had three Muslim radicals of American upbringing who played a major role in keeping anger focussed on the US and the rest of West. The first was Adam Gadahn, a white convert to Islam who sill operates from the Af-Pak region and handles Al Qaeda’s psywar set-up.The other two were Awlaki and Samir Khan.
26. The massive US retaliation in Afghanistan post-9/11 had triggered a debate in Al Qaeda about the wisdom of taking the jihad to the US homeland. Awlaki supported the need to take the jihad to the US homeland for final victory against the US.
27.Awlaki was an ideological and not an operational man--but after he arrived in Yemen and started guiding the AQAP, one noticed many changes. The AQAP tried to expand its area of operations from the Saudi-Yemeni-Somali region to the West, particularly the US. It started recruiting from among Muslims in the West---Arabs & non-Arabs-- who would have no difficulty in traveling in the West.
28.The new breed of Al Qaeda and its affiliates came largely from the US, the UK and Germany. It consisted of a small number of white converts to Islam and many from different Muslim diasporas. The identities of Al Qaeda’s pre-9/11 recruits were largely known to Western intelligence agencies. Their ability to travel and operate in the West was weakened. Al Qaeda’s breed of new recruits inspired by Awlaki tried to replace them and take over the responsibility for operations in the West.
29.The new breed was more comfortable in Western languages than the older recruits. It had not come to the adverse notice of the intelligence agencies. Many of them had valid passports with valid visas for travel in the West. They had mastered the Net and the social media networks, but their thinking was not as grand as that of the older recruits who conceived the idea of the 9/11 strikes and had them planned and executed.
30.The new recruits were more adept in the tactical than in the strategic. The new breed devised new tactics such as better ways of avoiding detection of IEDs, but the innovative sweep of the new breed was not as spectacular as that of the older one. Its operational thinking was more classic. It went back to older tactical ideas such blowing-up planes, letter-bombs etc. It repeatedly failed because the intelligence agencies are more adept now in detecting and thwarting conventional methods of terrorism. As a result, the new breed inspired and motivated by Awlaki has not succeeded in carrying out any major strike in the West. One has to see what impact Awlaki’s death has on the continuing flow of new volunteers/recruits to the AQAP.( 2-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, September 26, 2011
US-PAKISTAN TENSIONS: CHINA’S CAUTIOUS STANCE
B.RAMAN
The Chinese media have started informing the Chinese people of the tensions in Pakistan’s ties with the US without any editorial comment so far. There have been no comments from the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry either till now.
2. On September 27,2011, the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” carried a report of the State-owned Xinhua news agency datelined Islamabad stating that Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had gone to Saudi Arabia for talks with his Saudi counterparts.
3. The Xinhua despatch said that the decision to send Lt.Gen.Pasha to Saudi Arabia was taken on the recommendation of the Corps Commanders of the Pakistan Army, who met at Islamabad on September 25, “to brief Saudi leaders on the Pakistan-U.S. tension.”. However, the Pakistani military spokesman Maj Gen Ather Abbas denied that Lt.Gen.Pasha had gone to Saudi Arabia and insisted that Lt.Gen Pasha was in Islamabad.
4. The Xinhua report added: “Pakistan is likely to send envoys to other friendly countries in view of the tension with the U.S., sources said.”
5.The party-owned “Global Times” carried two reports of the AFP/Reuters news agencies relating, inter alia, to the unconnected visits of General James Mattis, the US CENTCOM Commander, and Mr.Meng Jianzhu, the Chinese Minister For Public Security, to Islamabad and the cancellation of the visit of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), to London.
6. While the Chinese media has so far restricted itself to reporting the arrival of the Chinese Public Security Minister in Islamabad, the Pakistani media has given more details of the visit.
7. Among those he has already met are President Asif Ali Zardari, Mr.Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister, Gen.Kayani and Gen. Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
8. It was reported that Mr.Jianzhu and Gen. Wynne discussed “the emerging geo-strategic situation of the region”. Mr.Jianzhu was quoted by a Pakistan Army statement as having praised “the role played by the armed forces of Pakistan in the fight against terror”.
9. Mr.Jianzhu was quoted by the Pakistani media as saying that China stood by Pakistan and reaffirming China’s support to Pakistan in the fight against militancy and for the promotion of regional peace and stability.
10.During his meeting with President Zardari on the night of September 26, officials of the two countries signed a number of agreements reportedly valued at US $ 250 million on economic and technical assistance, flood relief and rehabilitation of some damaged parts of the National Highways networks. Pakistani media reported that the Governor and the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan were among those present during the signing ceremony.
11.In reply to local journalists who asked whether the visit was connected to the tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US, Mr.Rehman Malik said: “Let’s not talk USA here. I am here with my friend from China. China is always there for us in the most difficult moments. China has supported Pakistan at every critical juncture of its history. We are grateful to it.”
12.Mr.Jianzhu told local journalists: “We are celebrating 2011 as year of friendship following the completion of 60 years of friendship of China and Pakistan. I have come to Pakistan to further beef up ties”.
13. Thus, both sides were anxious to avoid giving the impression that Mr.Jianzhu’s visit was connected to the tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US. According to reliable Pakistani sources, the visit had been arranged much before the eruption of the current tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US and was connected to the year-long observance of the 60th anniversary of the setting-up of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
14.Mr.Jianzhu is in charge of China’s Police and internal security and oversees co-operation in counter-terrorism with Pakistan---particularly against the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) operating from sanctuaries in North Waziristan.
15. China would be as much interested as the US in effective Pakistani action against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in North Waziristan because the sanctuaries of the IMET are also reportedly located in the same area.
16. While strongly supporting Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record as it did after the US raid to kill Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2 last, China would avoid giving the impression of taking sides with Pakistan in its dispute with the US on the question of action against the Haqqani network. China will have nothing to gain by justifying Pakistan’s inaction against the Haqqani network. While avoiding any adverse ( to Pakistan) public comments on this issue, China would nudge Pakistan into acting against all terrorist sanctuaries in North Waziristan--- whether of Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network or the IMET. (27-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
The Chinese media have started informing the Chinese people of the tensions in Pakistan’s ties with the US without any editorial comment so far. There have been no comments from the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry either till now.
2. On September 27,2011, the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” carried a report of the State-owned Xinhua news agency datelined Islamabad stating that Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had gone to Saudi Arabia for talks with his Saudi counterparts.
3. The Xinhua despatch said that the decision to send Lt.Gen.Pasha to Saudi Arabia was taken on the recommendation of the Corps Commanders of the Pakistan Army, who met at Islamabad on September 25, “to brief Saudi leaders on the Pakistan-U.S. tension.”. However, the Pakistani military spokesman Maj Gen Ather Abbas denied that Lt.Gen.Pasha had gone to Saudi Arabia and insisted that Lt.Gen Pasha was in Islamabad.
4. The Xinhua report added: “Pakistan is likely to send envoys to other friendly countries in view of the tension with the U.S., sources said.”
5.The party-owned “Global Times” carried two reports of the AFP/Reuters news agencies relating, inter alia, to the unconnected visits of General James Mattis, the US CENTCOM Commander, and Mr.Meng Jianzhu, the Chinese Minister For Public Security, to Islamabad and the cancellation of the visit of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), to London.
6. While the Chinese media has so far restricted itself to reporting the arrival of the Chinese Public Security Minister in Islamabad, the Pakistani media has given more details of the visit.
7. Among those he has already met are President Asif Ali Zardari, Mr.Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister, Gen.Kayani and Gen. Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
8. It was reported that Mr.Jianzhu and Gen. Wynne discussed “the emerging geo-strategic situation of the region”. Mr.Jianzhu was quoted by a Pakistan Army statement as having praised “the role played by the armed forces of Pakistan in the fight against terror”.
9. Mr.Jianzhu was quoted by the Pakistani media as saying that China stood by Pakistan and reaffirming China’s support to Pakistan in the fight against militancy and for the promotion of regional peace and stability.
10.During his meeting with President Zardari on the night of September 26, officials of the two countries signed a number of agreements reportedly valued at US $ 250 million on economic and technical assistance, flood relief and rehabilitation of some damaged parts of the National Highways networks. Pakistani media reported that the Governor and the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan were among those present during the signing ceremony.
11.In reply to local journalists who asked whether the visit was connected to the tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US, Mr.Rehman Malik said: “Let’s not talk USA here. I am here with my friend from China. China is always there for us in the most difficult moments. China has supported Pakistan at every critical juncture of its history. We are grateful to it.”
12.Mr.Jianzhu told local journalists: “We are celebrating 2011 as year of friendship following the completion of 60 years of friendship of China and Pakistan. I have come to Pakistan to further beef up ties”.
13. Thus, both sides were anxious to avoid giving the impression that Mr.Jianzhu’s visit was connected to the tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US. According to reliable Pakistani sources, the visit had been arranged much before the eruption of the current tensions in Pakistan’s relations with the US and was connected to the year-long observance of the 60th anniversary of the setting-up of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
14.Mr.Jianzhu is in charge of China’s Police and internal security and oversees co-operation in counter-terrorism with Pakistan---particularly against the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) operating from sanctuaries in North Waziristan.
15. China would be as much interested as the US in effective Pakistani action against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in North Waziristan because the sanctuaries of the IMET are also reportedly located in the same area.
16. While strongly supporting Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record as it did after the US raid to kill Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2 last, China would avoid giving the impression of taking sides with Pakistan in its dispute with the US on the question of action against the Haqqani network. China will have nothing to gain by justifying Pakistan’s inaction against the Haqqani network. While avoiding any adverse ( to Pakistan) public comments on this issue, China would nudge Pakistan into acting against all terrorist sanctuaries in North Waziristan--- whether of Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network or the IMET. (27-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
Sunday, September 25, 2011
US-PAKISTAN: SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY FACE-SAVING OPTION CONTINUES
B.RAMAN
The search for a mutually face-saving option in the dramatic turn of events in the relations between the US and Pakistan has continued over the week-end.
2.The dramatic turn came following the testimonies of Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr.Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on September 22,2011.
3. In his testimony, Admiral Mullen not only repeated--- in stronger language than in the past--- US accusations of links between the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the Haqqani network on the other, but also blamed the Haqqani network for three of the recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan---two in Kabul and one in the Wardak province. One of the attacks in Kabul was directed at the US Embassy and the Wardak attack was directed at a NATO base in which US troops are stationed.
4. The strongly-worded allegations about the ISI-aided (according to the US) Haqqani Network’s involvement in attacks on US personnel and interests in Afghanistan, gave rise to a brief debate in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the options available to the US in the light of the new accusations against the ISI and the Haqqani network.
5. When asked about it, Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think it would be helpful to describe what those options would look like and talk about what operational steps we may or may not take.”
6.Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, then asked Mr.Panetta: “Are Pakistani leaders aware of what options are open to us so that they’re not caught by any surprise if in fact we take steps against that network?”
7.Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think they would be surprised by the actions that we might or might not take.” In this connection, he referred to recent interactions at high levels with Pakistani officials.
8. What stood out in the Senate Armed Services Committee was the blunt allegations of Admiral Mullen against Pakistan and the more nuanced remarks of Mr.Panetta who indirectly admitted that weaknesses in physical security in Afghanistan had contributed to the successes of the Haqqani network.
9.According to agency reports of Mr.Panetta’s testimony, Mr. Panetta said the American military had a difficult job ahead and had to do better in preventing the insurgents from carrying out raids like the one on the Embassy. He added:“While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down — and down substantially in areas where we concentrated the surge — we must be more effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of insurgents to create perceptions of decreasing security.”
10. In this connection, it needs to be noted that Pakistan has been repeatedly saying that the successes of the Taliban as a whole and the Haqqani network in Afghanistan were due to weaknesses in the NATO’s counter-inurgency measures and that, instead of admitting this, the US was trying to shift the entire blame on to Pakistan.
11. A reference to possible US options also figured in the intervention of Senator John McCain, the senior Republican member of the committee, who described the Haqqani network’s attacks in Afghanistan as “the fundamental reality from which we must proceed in re-evaluating our policy towards Pakistan”. At the same time, he urged US lawmakers to recognise that abandoning Pakistan was not the answer. He added: “We tried that once. We cut off US assistance to Pakistan in the past and the problem got worse, not better. I say this with all humility, not recognising just yet what a better alternative approach would be.”
12. In his opening remarks, Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, also referred to the question of US options. He said: “I was glad to read a few days ago that Pakistan’s leaders have been personally informed that we are in fact going to… act more directly.”
13. The over-all impression from the discussions in the Senate Armed Services Committee was, firstly, that since there is now evidence of the role of the ISI-supported Haqqani network in direct attacks on US nationals and interests, the US has to act against the network in a robust manner if Pakistan does not act and, secondly, any action that the US takes should not have an enduring negative effect on the over-all relations between the US and Pakistan.
14. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s discussions have not yet been followed by a discussion by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by the more moderate Senator John Kerry, on the US options.
15. In the meanwhile, closely following the Senate Armed Services Committee’s debate, US CENTCOM commander General James N. Mattis visited Islamabad on September 24-25 and met, among others, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and General Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is not yet known whether he met any of the civilian leaders.
16.His discussions with Gen.Kayani and Gen.Wyne were followed by an unscheduled meeting of the Corps Commanders on September 25. The fact that after these meetings Gen.Kayani left for London as scheduled would indicate that in the assessment of the Pakistan Army no imminent new development is likely.
17.My sources in Pakistan project the discussions of the CENTCOM Commander as the possible beginning of a de-escalation exercise from both sides and of a search for a mutually face-saving option. The restrained language used by both sides during the visit of the CENTCOM Commander is significant. The Pakistani Army and the US Embassy issued separate statements on his visit and discussions.
18. The Pakistan Army statement on Gen Wynne’s meeting with Gen Mattis quoted the former as having spoken about “achieving enduring peace in the region… through mutual trust and cooperation”. It added that Gen Wynne expressed concern over the “negative statements emanating from (the) US” and “ stressed upon addressing the irritants in relationship which are a result of an extremely complex situation.”.
19.The US Embassy statement said: “The Generals had candid discussions about the current challenges in the US-Pakistan relationship. However, General Mattis also emphasised the vital role the Pakistan military plays in international security efforts to protect the Pakistani and Afghan people and the need for persistent engagement among the militaries of the US, Pakistan and other states in the region.”
20. It is interesting to note that the leaders of the civilian Government ---barring President Asif Ali Zardari--- have reacted much more strongly to Admiral Mullen’s allegations than the Pakistani military leadership. Gen.Kayani has restricted himself to describing Admiral Mullen’s allegations as “unfortunate and disturbing” and “not based on facts.” In an editorial, “Dawn” of Karachi has described the statements emanating from the Generals as “controlled reaction”.
21. As against this, statements emanating from the civilian leaders have been unbridled, indicating a nervousness on their part that absence of strong reactions could be misinterpreted by the Army as softness towards the US.
22. What action the Pakistan Army ultimately takes in response to the US pressure would depend not on the views of the civilian leaders, but on the assessment of the Corps Commanders. While details of the Corps Commanders’ meeting are not available, my sources say that the consensus was against unwise escalation of rhetoric.
23. “Dawn” itself ( September 26) has reported as follows on the Corps Commanders’ meeting: “A source privy to discussions at the conference revealed that de-escalation efforts were afoot. “Escalation is harmful. In the cost-benefit analysis there appears to be no benefit of a confrontation.” His claim was corroborated by another senior official. But there was nothing to suggest that the army had agreed to act against the Haqqani network under US pressure. The army is rather asking for developing strategic coherence and clarity about US goals in Afghanistan and thinks that operational differences would be addressed.”
24.There have been similar suspicions and distrust between the Armies and the intelligence agencies of the two countries in the past. The first was in 1993 when the Clinton Administration placed Pakistan on a list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism following suspicions that Gen.Javed Nasir, the then head of the ISI, had instigated the Afghan Mujahideen not to sell back to the CIA the unused Stinger missiles supplied by the CIA for use against the Soviet troops. The US removed Pakistan from this list after the Nawaz Sharif Government, then in power, removed Nasir and other officers named by the US from the ISI.
25. The second was after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US and before the launch of US military operations against the Taliban in October,2001. The US alleged that Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, the then head of the ISI, and Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff, were instigating the Taliban not to succumb to US pressure for action against Osama bin Laden. In response to US pressure, Gen.Musharraf shifted both of them from their key posts.
26. There is so far no indication that the US has been demanding action against Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, who is on extension after superannuation, and other ISI officers suspected by the US of colluding with the Haqqani network. Such a demand should not be ruled out.
27. The Obama Administration may not like to get involved in a messy ground operation in North Waziristan in the months before next year’s Presidential elections. It would prefer that Pakistan acts more robustly against the Haqqani network. This would involve a Swat Valley like ground operation in North Waziristan supported possibly by US air strikes from its bases in Afghanistan. Would Gen.Kayani be able to sell such an option to his Corps Commanders?
28. A concern in the minds of the Corps Commanders would be that any impression of a joint operation by Pakistan and the US could lead to desertions from the Pakistan Army, a phenomenon that has been absent till now. Past desertions were mainly from the Frontier Corps and other para-military forces. Desertions from the Army would be a serious development.
29. What the Corps Commanders would want in return for ground operations in North Waziristan is the US strengthening the air strike capability of the Pakistani military through the supply of Drones and related technology and more F-16 aircraft. If the US agrees to strengthen Pakistan’s offensive air strike capability, that would have implications for India.
30. It may be recalled that in 1999 when there was mounting pressure on the Nawaz Sharif Government for action against Arab members of Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries near the Afghan border in the Pakistani territory, Gen.Musharraf, then COAS, suggested shifting them to new sanctuaries in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If Gen.Kayani toys with a similar idea in respect of the Haqqani network, it could have implications for the internal security situation in Jammu & Kashmir.
31. How Pakistan reacts to the US pressure is a matter that should be closely monitored by India. It would be foolhardy to lull ourselves into complacency thinking that Pakistan is about to implode or unravel. It is unlikely to. (26-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The search for a mutually face-saving option in the dramatic turn of events in the relations between the US and Pakistan has continued over the week-end.
2.The dramatic turn came following the testimonies of Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr.Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on September 22,2011.
3. In his testimony, Admiral Mullen not only repeated--- in stronger language than in the past--- US accusations of links between the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the one side and the Haqqani network on the other, but also blamed the Haqqani network for three of the recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan---two in Kabul and one in the Wardak province. One of the attacks in Kabul was directed at the US Embassy and the Wardak attack was directed at a NATO base in which US troops are stationed.
4. The strongly-worded allegations about the ISI-aided (according to the US) Haqqani Network’s involvement in attacks on US personnel and interests in Afghanistan, gave rise to a brief debate in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the options available to the US in the light of the new accusations against the ISI and the Haqqani network.
5. When asked about it, Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think it would be helpful to describe what those options would look like and talk about what operational steps we may or may not take.”
6.Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, then asked Mr.Panetta: “Are Pakistani leaders aware of what options are open to us so that they’re not caught by any surprise if in fact we take steps against that network?”
7.Mr.Panetta replied as follows: “I don’t think they would be surprised by the actions that we might or might not take.” In this connection, he referred to recent interactions at high levels with Pakistani officials.
8. What stood out in the Senate Armed Services Committee was the blunt allegations of Admiral Mullen against Pakistan and the more nuanced remarks of Mr.Panetta who indirectly admitted that weaknesses in physical security in Afghanistan had contributed to the successes of the Haqqani network.
9.According to agency reports of Mr.Panetta’s testimony, Mr. Panetta said the American military had a difficult job ahead and had to do better in preventing the insurgents from carrying out raids like the one on the Embassy. He added:“While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down — and down substantially in areas where we concentrated the surge — we must be more effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of insurgents to create perceptions of decreasing security.”
10. In this connection, it needs to be noted that Pakistan has been repeatedly saying that the successes of the Taliban as a whole and the Haqqani network in Afghanistan were due to weaknesses in the NATO’s counter-inurgency measures and that, instead of admitting this, the US was trying to shift the entire blame on to Pakistan.
11. A reference to possible US options also figured in the intervention of Senator John McCain, the senior Republican member of the committee, who described the Haqqani network’s attacks in Afghanistan as “the fundamental reality from which we must proceed in re-evaluating our policy towards Pakistan”. At the same time, he urged US lawmakers to recognise that abandoning Pakistan was not the answer. He added: “We tried that once. We cut off US assistance to Pakistan in the past and the problem got worse, not better. I say this with all humility, not recognising just yet what a better alternative approach would be.”
12. In his opening remarks, Mr.Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Committee, also referred to the question of US options. He said: “I was glad to read a few days ago that Pakistan’s leaders have been personally informed that we are in fact going to… act more directly.”
13. The over-all impression from the discussions in the Senate Armed Services Committee was, firstly, that since there is now evidence of the role of the ISI-supported Haqqani network in direct attacks on US nationals and interests, the US has to act against the network in a robust manner if Pakistan does not act and, secondly, any action that the US takes should not have an enduring negative effect on the over-all relations between the US and Pakistan.
14. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s discussions have not yet been followed by a discussion by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by the more moderate Senator John Kerry, on the US options.
15. In the meanwhile, closely following the Senate Armed Services Committee’s debate, US CENTCOM commander General James N. Mattis visited Islamabad on September 24-25 and met, among others, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and General Khalid Shameem Wyne, Chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is not yet known whether he met any of the civilian leaders.
16.His discussions with Gen.Kayani and Gen.Wyne were followed by an unscheduled meeting of the Corps Commanders on September 25. The fact that after these meetings Gen.Kayani left for London as scheduled would indicate that in the assessment of the Pakistan Army no imminent new development is likely.
17.My sources in Pakistan project the discussions of the CENTCOM Commander as the possible beginning of a de-escalation exercise from both sides and of a search for a mutually face-saving option. The restrained language used by both sides during the visit of the CENTCOM Commander is significant. The Pakistani Army and the US Embassy issued separate statements on his visit and discussions.
18. The Pakistan Army statement on Gen Wynne’s meeting with Gen Mattis quoted the former as having spoken about “achieving enduring peace in the region… through mutual trust and cooperation”. It added that Gen Wynne expressed concern over the “negative statements emanating from (the) US” and “ stressed upon addressing the irritants in relationship which are a result of an extremely complex situation.”.
19.The US Embassy statement said: “The Generals had candid discussions about the current challenges in the US-Pakistan relationship. However, General Mattis also emphasised the vital role the Pakistan military plays in international security efforts to protect the Pakistani and Afghan people and the need for persistent engagement among the militaries of the US, Pakistan and other states in the region.”
20. It is interesting to note that the leaders of the civilian Government ---barring President Asif Ali Zardari--- have reacted much more strongly to Admiral Mullen’s allegations than the Pakistani military leadership. Gen.Kayani has restricted himself to describing Admiral Mullen’s allegations as “unfortunate and disturbing” and “not based on facts.” In an editorial, “Dawn” of Karachi has described the statements emanating from the Generals as “controlled reaction”.
21. As against this, statements emanating from the civilian leaders have been unbridled, indicating a nervousness on their part that absence of strong reactions could be misinterpreted by the Army as softness towards the US.
22. What action the Pakistan Army ultimately takes in response to the US pressure would depend not on the views of the civilian leaders, but on the assessment of the Corps Commanders. While details of the Corps Commanders’ meeting are not available, my sources say that the consensus was against unwise escalation of rhetoric.
23. “Dawn” itself ( September 26) has reported as follows on the Corps Commanders’ meeting: “A source privy to discussions at the conference revealed that de-escalation efforts were afoot. “Escalation is harmful. In the cost-benefit analysis there appears to be no benefit of a confrontation.” His claim was corroborated by another senior official. But there was nothing to suggest that the army had agreed to act against the Haqqani network under US pressure. The army is rather asking for developing strategic coherence and clarity about US goals in Afghanistan and thinks that operational differences would be addressed.”
24.There have been similar suspicions and distrust between the Armies and the intelligence agencies of the two countries in the past. The first was in 1993 when the Clinton Administration placed Pakistan on a list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism following suspicions that Gen.Javed Nasir, the then head of the ISI, had instigated the Afghan Mujahideen not to sell back to the CIA the unused Stinger missiles supplied by the CIA for use against the Soviet troops. The US removed Pakistan from this list after the Nawaz Sharif Government, then in power, removed Nasir and other officers named by the US from the ISI.
25. The second was after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US and before the launch of US military operations against the Taliban in October,2001. The US alleged that Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, the then head of the ISI, and Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff, were instigating the Taliban not to succumb to US pressure for action against Osama bin Laden. In response to US pressure, Gen.Musharraf shifted both of them from their key posts.
26. There is so far no indication that the US has been demanding action against Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, who is on extension after superannuation, and other ISI officers suspected by the US of colluding with the Haqqani network. Such a demand should not be ruled out.
27. The Obama Administration may not like to get involved in a messy ground operation in North Waziristan in the months before next year’s Presidential elections. It would prefer that Pakistan acts more robustly against the Haqqani network. This would involve a Swat Valley like ground operation in North Waziristan supported possibly by US air strikes from its bases in Afghanistan. Would Gen.Kayani be able to sell such an option to his Corps Commanders?
28. A concern in the minds of the Corps Commanders would be that any impression of a joint operation by Pakistan and the US could lead to desertions from the Pakistan Army, a phenomenon that has been absent till now. Past desertions were mainly from the Frontier Corps and other para-military forces. Desertions from the Army would be a serious development.
29. What the Corps Commanders would want in return for ground operations in North Waziristan is the US strengthening the air strike capability of the Pakistani military through the supply of Drones and related technology and more F-16 aircraft. If the US agrees to strengthen Pakistan’s offensive air strike capability, that would have implications for India.
30. It may be recalled that in 1999 when there was mounting pressure on the Nawaz Sharif Government for action against Arab members of Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries near the Afghan border in the Pakistani territory, Gen.Musharraf, then COAS, suggested shifting them to new sanctuaries in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If Gen.Kayani toys with a similar idea in respect of the Haqqani network, it could have implications for the internal security situation in Jammu & Kashmir.
31. How Pakistan reacts to the US pressure is a matter that should be closely monitored by India. It would be foolhardy to lull ourselves into complacency thinking that Pakistan is about to implode or unravel. It is unlikely to. (26-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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