B.RAMAN
A few days ago, Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the Congress President, returned to New Delhi after a month-long stay abroad ---presumed to be in New York--- for medical treatment, which necessitated a surgery. According to party spokespersons, she has recovered well from her ailment and has started the process of resuming her normal political activities. We wish her well as she resumes her normal routine.
2. The nature of her ailment, which necessitated a surgery, has not been disclosed to the public, but it is widely believed that the treatment was for cancer in an undisclosed part of her body.
3.I am writing this article as a cancer patient myself, who has been under treatment for 22 months now for metastasised (widely spread before detected) cancer in the lower part of the abdomen. Before it was detected, the cancer had affected my prostate, the urinary bladder, a nearby bone and a lymph node. Fortunately, it has not caused me any pain so far. My body has been responding well to the treatment.
4. For a month after my cancer was detected in 2009, I was out of circulation, but, thereafter, even while undergoing the treatment, I have resumed my normal physical and intellectual activities. I have been writing as regularly as before, participating in seminars and TV discussions as frequently as before and travelling inside India as often as before. The quality of my life has not changed in any significant manner as a result of my cancer and the treatment.
5. What I have learnt during this period is that cancer is like any other physical ailment. It is not a tragedy. It is not the end of the world. It is not something to be ashamed of. One can fight cancer as one fights any other ailment and still lead an active and energetic life.
6. From the beginning, I have been very transparent about my cancer. I take the initiative in sharing not only with my friends and relatives, but also with my readers and the general public news of my treatment and the progress that I have been making in my fight against cancer. After every quarterly medical check-up, I myself post in my blog details of my condition as told to me by my doctor. I have written two articles on my fight against cancer, posted them in my blog and widely disseminated them through the Internet. I have seen to it that there is no unnecessary and undesirable mystery about my cancer. Mystery gives rise to avoidable speculation, which is not advisable for a public personage.
7. The cheerful manner in which I have been fighting it and voluntarily sharing the information with others has given me a certain pride in myself. I also like to think that it has enhanced the respect in which I am held by others.
8.The alleged secrecy surrounding the exact nature of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi’s ailment and the details of the progress in her treatment were discussed in some detail and with considerable sympathy by Ms.Nirmala Subramanian of “The Hindu” in an editorial page article earlier this week. She needs to be complimented for handling a personally and politically sensitive subject with considerable understanding and seriousness ---- while taking care not to hurt the feelings of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family members.
9. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family have a right to privacy in matters relating to her ailment and her medical treatment. Since she occupies an important position as the leader of a party which is leading the present coalition Government, the public too has a right to know as much as possible about her health. It is not obscene curiosity. It is a way of reassuring ourselves that Mrs.Sonia Gandhi has been responding well to the treatment and that her normal personal and political life will not be affected in any way by the treatment.
10. Till some years ago, all over the world, cancer was treated as something to be kept a secret. People diagnosed with cancer often used to disappear from public view and avoid contacts and sharing with other human beings. Now, the attitude to cancer has changed and continues to change.
11. Doctors and social activists discourage cancer patients from withdrawing into a shell. They encourage them to share freely with others the details of their ailment and the treatment and to continue to lead as active and as energetic a life as possible.
12. Cancer has to be fought and can be fought successfully without allowing your life-style to be affected significantly. In the fight against cancer, the psychological aspect is as important as the medicinal aspect. Fight, share and be active--- that is the message of today to all cancer patients.
13. In our country, many hospitals are encouraging cancer patients to develop the right mental attitude to strengthen their capability for handling the psychological dimension. A couple of days ago, a Chennai hospital had organised a get-together of cancer patients as part of such an exercise.
14.In our country, knowledge of cancer is still limited. As a result, many ---patients as well as their relatives---look upon cancer as a tragedy and as the beginning of the end of life. Doctors are trying to reassure people that it is not.
15. In the fight against cancer and in the campaign to spread awareness of the importance of will power and the right mental attitude to the ailment, Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, her children and party can play a very important role by fighting and sharing. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi is already on the way to becoming her usual active self after her return from the US.
16. She should not remain satisfied with merely resuming an active personal and political life. She should with gusto take over the leadership in public of the fight against cancer. She cannot do this effectively if she and those close to her continue to maintain secrecy about her ailment and the treatment. She must share the details with the public and contribute to the fight against cancer.
17. That’s what Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi would have done in similar circumstances. That’s what Mrs.Sonia Gandhi should do. As the opening shot of the exercise, she should let herself be interviewed on a good and responsible TV channel on her ailment and treatment . She should use this opportunity to convey to the public her determination to serve the people as before despite the ailment. ( 25-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, September 24, 2011
Friday, September 23, 2011
ANOTHER MASSACRE OF HAZARAS IN BALOCHISTAN BY PRO-AL QAEDA ELEMENTS
B.RAMAN
Twenty-six Shia pilgrims belonging to the Hazara community were dragged out of a bus in which they were travelling at Mastung in Balochistan on September 20,2011, lined up and shot dead by unidentified gunmen suspected to be belonging to the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which is close to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three others----of unknown sectarian or ethnic origin--- were killed subsequently. They were medical attendants who were in an ambulance which was rushing to the spot of the massacre.
2. The Hazaras have been the frequent targets of attacks in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan by anti-Shia groups----by the Taliban and the LeJ in particular. One would recall the massacre of the Hazaras in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September 1996 and allowed the LeJ to operate in Pakistan from sanctuaries in Afghan territory.
3. The Hazaras of Pakistan, who were suspected by Al Qaeda and the LeJ, of letting themselves be used by the US intelligence in its hunt for Osama bin Laden, subsequently became the targets of the LeJ. There have been many attacks on the Hazaras, who are to be found in large numbers in Balochistan.
4. Surprisingly, despite the suspected hostility of the Hazaras to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the LeJ, Osama bin Laden chose to have his hide-out in Abbottabad, where there is a sizable Hazara community. Ever since bin Laden was killed by the US Navy SEALS in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2, the LeJ has reportedly been suspecting that some members of the Hazara community of Abbottabad might have helped the US intelligence in tracking down bin Laden.
5. Since the death of bin Laden, there have been three attacks on the Hazaras in Balochistan by suspected cadres of the LeJ. There have been fears that the LeJ might attack the Hazaras of Abbottabad too----but this has not happened so far.
6. The Shias of Pakistan in general and the Hazaras of Balochistan in particular have been living in dread ever since the release on bail by a court in July of Malik Ishaq, the leader of the LeJ, who was under imprisonment since 1997 facing charges in over 40 cases of terrorism----many of them directed against the Shias and Iranians living and working in Pakistan. He was ordered to be released on grounds of weak evidence by the same judge (Justice Asif Saeed Khosa ), who was earlier a member of the Lahore High Court bench that had ordered the release of Hafiz Mohad Sayeed of the Lashkar-e-Toiba on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of which Hafiz is the Amir had any links with the LET, which was involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Justice Khosa is now in the Supreme Court.
7. Since his release, Ishaq has been touring in Punjab making venomous speeches against the Shias and justifying the LeJ’s attacks on the Shias as meant to protect the honour of the holy Prophet. In one of his speeches to his followers after his release from jail, he had said: “Prisons will not stop our mission. The LeJ is not a terrorist outfit. It was set up to ensure proper respect for the companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).Our struggle will continue.”
8.Fears that his hate speeches might lead to a fresh wave of attacks on the Shias of Punjab and Sindh have not materialised so far. However, there has been a surge in the attacks on the Hazaras of Balochistan. Some reports allege that the Mastung massacre was actually in retaliation for an unsuccessful attack on a gathering of Sunni followers of Ishaq in Alipur by suspected Shia elements.
9. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had used the services of Ishaq and three others to negotiate with a group of terrorists who had raided the GHQ at Rawalpindi in October ,2009, and taken hostage a number of officers. Among others whose services were used by the ISI were Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the chief of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, from which the LeJ was born following a split, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the Amir of the Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM) and Mufti Abdul Rauf, the younger brother of Maulana Masood Azhar the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad. They were flown in special aircraft from different places in Punjab to Rawalpindi to help the ISI in securing the release of the hostages.
10. Following the Mastung massacre of the Hazaras, the Punjab Government has placed Ishaq under house arrest for 10 days. ( 24-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Twenty-six Shia pilgrims belonging to the Hazara community were dragged out of a bus in which they were travelling at Mastung in Balochistan on September 20,2011, lined up and shot dead by unidentified gunmen suspected to be belonging to the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which is close to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three others----of unknown sectarian or ethnic origin--- were killed subsequently. They were medical attendants who were in an ambulance which was rushing to the spot of the massacre.
2. The Hazaras have been the frequent targets of attacks in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan by anti-Shia groups----by the Taliban and the LeJ in particular. One would recall the massacre of the Hazaras in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September 1996 and allowed the LeJ to operate in Pakistan from sanctuaries in Afghan territory.
3. The Hazaras of Pakistan, who were suspected by Al Qaeda and the LeJ, of letting themselves be used by the US intelligence in its hunt for Osama bin Laden, subsequently became the targets of the LeJ. There have been many attacks on the Hazaras, who are to be found in large numbers in Balochistan.
4. Surprisingly, despite the suspected hostility of the Hazaras to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the LeJ, Osama bin Laden chose to have his hide-out in Abbottabad, where there is a sizable Hazara community. Ever since bin Laden was killed by the US Navy SEALS in his Abbottabad hide-out on May 2, the LeJ has reportedly been suspecting that some members of the Hazara community of Abbottabad might have helped the US intelligence in tracking down bin Laden.
5. Since the death of bin Laden, there have been three attacks on the Hazaras in Balochistan by suspected cadres of the LeJ. There have been fears that the LeJ might attack the Hazaras of Abbottabad too----but this has not happened so far.
6. The Shias of Pakistan in general and the Hazaras of Balochistan in particular have been living in dread ever since the release on bail by a court in July of Malik Ishaq, the leader of the LeJ, who was under imprisonment since 1997 facing charges in over 40 cases of terrorism----many of them directed against the Shias and Iranians living and working in Pakistan. He was ordered to be released on grounds of weak evidence by the same judge (Justice Asif Saeed Khosa ), who was earlier a member of the Lahore High Court bench that had ordered the release of Hafiz Mohad Sayeed of the Lashkar-e-Toiba on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of which Hafiz is the Amir had any links with the LET, which was involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Justice Khosa is now in the Supreme Court.
7. Since his release, Ishaq has been touring in Punjab making venomous speeches against the Shias and justifying the LeJ’s attacks on the Shias as meant to protect the honour of the holy Prophet. In one of his speeches to his followers after his release from jail, he had said: “Prisons will not stop our mission. The LeJ is not a terrorist outfit. It was set up to ensure proper respect for the companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).Our struggle will continue.”
8.Fears that his hate speeches might lead to a fresh wave of attacks on the Shias of Punjab and Sindh have not materialised so far. However, there has been a surge in the attacks on the Hazaras of Balochistan. Some reports allege that the Mastung massacre was actually in retaliation for an unsuccessful attack on a gathering of Sunni followers of Ishaq in Alipur by suspected Shia elements.
9. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had used the services of Ishaq and three others to negotiate with a group of terrorists who had raided the GHQ at Rawalpindi in October ,2009, and taken hostage a number of officers. Among others whose services were used by the ISI were Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the chief of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, from which the LeJ was born following a split, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the Amir of the Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM) and Mufti Abdul Rauf, the younger brother of Maulana Masood Azhar the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad. They were flown in special aircraft from different places in Punjab to Rawalpindi to help the ISI in securing the release of the hostages.
10. Following the Mastung massacre of the Hazaras, the Punjab Government has placed Ishaq under house arrest for 10 days. ( 24-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, September 22, 2011
US FRETS & FUMES AGAINST PAKISTAN, BUT FINDS ITS OPTIONS LIMITED
B.RAMAN
The past few days have seen the US fretting and fuming against Pakistan for its use of the Haqqani network to make the US forces bleed in Afghanistan reach an unprecedented new high.
2.This has been due to the US intelligence concluding that the Haqqani network, backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was responsible for three recent terrorist strikes---two in Kabul directed against the hotel Inter-Continental (June) and the US Embassy ( September 13) and one (September 11 ) in the Wardak province against a NATO base in which many US troops were injured.
3.While the US agencies seem convinced of the ISI’s role in backing these attacks, they still do not have an answer to the question as to why the ISI has been doing this. What does Pakistan hope to gain not only by ignoring the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network, but even by facilitating the Haqqani network’s acts of terrorism directed against US troops and interests in Afghanistan.
4. The Pakistani defiance of the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network has an underlying mix of two motives---one strategic and the other tactical. The strategic motive is to make it clear to the US that the success of President Barack Obama’s plans for a thinning out of the US presence in Afghanistan well before next year’s Presidential elections would depend on the US accepting Pakistan’s strategic interests and presence in Afghanistan. The tactical motive is to give vent to its anger over the USA’s unilateral raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 last. The ISI cannot hit out at US interests in Pakistani territory. It is, therefore, doing so in Afghan territory.
5. In Pakistan’s calculation it holds two strong cards against the US which would continue to enable it to defy the US pressure to act. The strongest of these cards is the continuing US dependence on Pakistan for the transit of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory. The US attempts to develop alternate options through Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have not made the required headway that could enable the US to reduce its dependence on Pakistan significantly. The option to airlift the supplies directly to Afghanistan will be expensive and will result in a big surge in the cost of the US military operations in Afghanistan.
6. The other card which Pakistan thinks it holds is next year’s US presidential elections and Mr.Obama’s keenness to reduce the US involvement before the elections. Pakistan feels that this would rule out any undue escalation of US operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory. As the elections approach, Mr.Obama may not want to get involved in a new bloody phase of the US operations in Afghanistan---this time directed against the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory.
7. The US operations against the Haqqani network have till now been confined to the use of Drone (pilotless plane) strikes from the US bases in Afghanistan. The Drone strikes have been effective against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, but have been ineffective against the Haqqani network due to the poor flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the exact location of its bases in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the movements of its leaders and cadres. For reasons that are not clear to me, while the flow of HUMINT and TECHINT about Al Qaeda and its other affiliates to the US agencies has improved, they continue to grope in the dark about the Haqqani network. This is evident from their inability to prevent repeated attacks on US targets in Afghanistan and from the poor record of the Drone strikes against the Haqqani network.
8. The US has to remove from the Pakistani mind the impression that the US is pathetically dependent on the transit of logistic supplies for the NATO forces through Pakistani territory. This would be possible only by the US immediately starting an air bridge from its bases in the Gulf to Afghanistan to ferry by air the logistic supplies directly to the NATO bases. This has to be done whatever be the surge in the cost of the operation.
9. Once the US frees itself of its dependence on Pakistan, other options would be available such as declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism and stopping all aid and ground operations in the FATA to supplement the present Drone-dependent operations. ( 23-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The past few days have seen the US fretting and fuming against Pakistan for its use of the Haqqani network to make the US forces bleed in Afghanistan reach an unprecedented new high.
2.This has been due to the US intelligence concluding that the Haqqani network, backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was responsible for three recent terrorist strikes---two in Kabul directed against the hotel Inter-Continental (June) and the US Embassy ( September 13) and one (September 11 ) in the Wardak province against a NATO base in which many US troops were injured.
3.While the US agencies seem convinced of the ISI’s role in backing these attacks, they still do not have an answer to the question as to why the ISI has been doing this. What does Pakistan hope to gain not only by ignoring the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network, but even by facilitating the Haqqani network’s acts of terrorism directed against US troops and interests in Afghanistan.
4. The Pakistani defiance of the US pressure to act against the Haqqani network has an underlying mix of two motives---one strategic and the other tactical. The strategic motive is to make it clear to the US that the success of President Barack Obama’s plans for a thinning out of the US presence in Afghanistan well before next year’s Presidential elections would depend on the US accepting Pakistan’s strategic interests and presence in Afghanistan. The tactical motive is to give vent to its anger over the USA’s unilateral raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 last. The ISI cannot hit out at US interests in Pakistani territory. It is, therefore, doing so in Afghan territory.
5. In Pakistan’s calculation it holds two strong cards against the US which would continue to enable it to defy the US pressure to act. The strongest of these cards is the continuing US dependence on Pakistan for the transit of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory. The US attempts to develop alternate options through Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have not made the required headway that could enable the US to reduce its dependence on Pakistan significantly. The option to airlift the supplies directly to Afghanistan will be expensive and will result in a big surge in the cost of the US military operations in Afghanistan.
6. The other card which Pakistan thinks it holds is next year’s US presidential elections and Mr.Obama’s keenness to reduce the US involvement before the elections. Pakistan feels that this would rule out any undue escalation of US operations against the sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory. As the elections approach, Mr.Obama may not want to get involved in a new bloody phase of the US operations in Afghanistan---this time directed against the Haqqani network in Pakistani territory.
7. The US operations against the Haqqani network have till now been confined to the use of Drone (pilotless plane) strikes from the US bases in Afghanistan. The Drone strikes have been effective against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, but have been ineffective against the Haqqani network due to the poor flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the exact location of its bases in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the movements of its leaders and cadres. For reasons that are not clear to me, while the flow of HUMINT and TECHINT about Al Qaeda and its other affiliates to the US agencies has improved, they continue to grope in the dark about the Haqqani network. This is evident from their inability to prevent repeated attacks on US targets in Afghanistan and from the poor record of the Drone strikes against the Haqqani network.
8. The US has to remove from the Pakistani mind the impression that the US is pathetically dependent on the transit of logistic supplies for the NATO forces through Pakistani territory. This would be possible only by the US immediately starting an air bridge from its bases in the Gulf to Afghanistan to ferry by air the logistic supplies directly to the NATO bases. This has to be done whatever be the surge in the cost of the operation.
9. Once the US frees itself of its dependence on Pakistan, other options would be available such as declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism and stopping all aid and ground operations in the FATA to supplement the present Drone-dependent operations. ( 23-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
RABBANI’S ASSASSINATION : A WAKE-UP CALL FOR INDIA
B.RAMAN
The assassination on September 20,2011, of Burhanuddin Rabbani , a Tajik leader of Afghanistan, is of strategic significance to India.
2.Rabbani was the President of Afghanistan in the 1990s when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister ( 1993-96) of Pakistan. After the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September,1996, he became a prominent leader of the Tajik-dominant Northern Alliance motivated by the late Ahmed Shah Masood which played an active role in assisting the US post-9/11 in the defeat of the Taliban. It was Rabbani who, with Benazir’s concurrence, allowed Osama bin Laden to shift from Khartoum in the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan when the Sudan came under pressure from the US to act against bin Laden. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 it took bin Laden under its protection and shifted him to Kandahar where Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and its Shura were also based.
3. In the subsequent fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped the Taliban while a triumvirate consisting of India, Russia and Iran supported the Northern Alliance. The success of Al Qaeda in having Masood assassinated through an Arab suicide bomber a day before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland could not dent the fighting capability of the Northern Alliance, which paved the way for the victory of the US forces, which defeated the Taliban and captured power in Afghanistan after freeing the country from the control of the Taliban.
4. Subsequently under pressure from Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who viewed the Northern Alliance as a pro-India and anti-Pakistan group, the Alliance and its leaders found themselves marginalised in the new dispensation in Kabul---with the blessings of the US.
5. The political rehabilitation of Rabbani by President Hamid Karzai and his appointment as the head of the High Peace Council to hold talks with the Taliban and wean it away from the military conflict which it had been waging from its sanctuaries in the Quetta area of Balochistan, set alarm bells ringing in Pakistan’s GHQ.
6.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, saw in it a possible prelude to the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force on the ground with the blessings of India in order to counter once again the Taliban and the ISI should they stage a come-back in Kabul after the US-led NATO forces thin out from Afghanistan as planned by President Barack Obama. The concern in the GHQ was enhanced when Rabbani visited New Delhi in July last to seek India’s support for the peace process. The GHQ saw in his visit a hidden objective---- to discuss with Indian leaders and officials the possible future scenarios should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul.
7. The assassination of Rabbani was a pre-emptive strike by unidentified elements----which could be the Taliban or the Haqqani network or Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe Islami or Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda--- to prevent the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force capable of standing up to the Taliban and its affiliates. It was a warning to Karzai against any future alliance with the Tajijks. It was meant to drive a wedge between the Pashtuns and the Tajijks. There is no other way of explaining the assassination.
8. The explanation advanced by some analysts that the assassination was meant to derail the peace process and indicated the presence of elements in the Taliban which are opposed to the peace talks, does not sound convincing. If the Taliban wanted to derail the peace process, all it had to do was to withdraw from the talks with Rabbani and his Council. It did not have to kill Rabbani. He was killed not because he posed a danger immediately, but because he was viewed by the Taliban and its affiliates as likely to pose a danger in the future should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul. His assassination could weaken the support of the Tajiks for Karzai and make Karzai even more vulnerable to pressure from the Taliban than he has been till now.
9. The assassination has strategic implications for India. It could weaken the Tajik leadership, which has been an objective ally of India. It could weaken Karzai with whom India has built up an excellent working relationship. In the uncertain period after the thinning out of the US presence starts, India would need strong allies in Afghanistan--- in all the communities. It is likely that in the months to come more of the leaders who are perceived by the Taliban and the ISI as well disposed to India might be eliminated one by one.
10. What options would be available to India? This is a question that needs to be discussed by New Delhi with those in Afghanistan with whom it has a close relationship as well as with the US. Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have been cultivating Pakistan and vice versa. It is doubtful whether Russia would be amenable to the kind of co-operation that India and Russia had developed after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in 1996. Iran is out of question now in view of the hostility of the US to the present Iranian regime.
11. Co-operation with the US is the only strategic option we have. The US is now as concerned as we are over Pakistani machinations in Afghanistan. It could be more amenable to feelers from India for joint moves by India and the US to prevent a return to power of the Taliban with the ISI’s backing. Till now, the US has been hesitant to let India play any major role in training and equipping the Afghan security forces due to a fear over its adverse fall-out in Pakistan. We should persuade the US to get rid of its hesitation and let India play a more important role in this regard. This is the first step that would be called for. Others have to be identified. India and the US should not hum and haw and wait till the events overtake them. ( 22-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: SORBONNE75 )
The assassination on September 20,2011, of Burhanuddin Rabbani , a Tajik leader of Afghanistan, is of strategic significance to India.
2.Rabbani was the President of Afghanistan in the 1990s when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister ( 1993-96) of Pakistan. After the Taliban captured power in Kabul in September,1996, he became a prominent leader of the Tajik-dominant Northern Alliance motivated by the late Ahmed Shah Masood which played an active role in assisting the US post-9/11 in the defeat of the Taliban. It was Rabbani who, with Benazir’s concurrence, allowed Osama bin Laden to shift from Khartoum in the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan when the Sudan came under pressure from the US to act against bin Laden. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 it took bin Laden under its protection and shifted him to Kandahar where Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and its Shura were also based.
3. In the subsequent fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped the Taliban while a triumvirate consisting of India, Russia and Iran supported the Northern Alliance. The success of Al Qaeda in having Masood assassinated through an Arab suicide bomber a day before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland could not dent the fighting capability of the Northern Alliance, which paved the way for the victory of the US forces, which defeated the Taliban and captured power in Afghanistan after freeing the country from the control of the Taliban.
4. Subsequently under pressure from Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who viewed the Northern Alliance as a pro-India and anti-Pakistan group, the Alliance and its leaders found themselves marginalised in the new dispensation in Kabul---with the blessings of the US.
5. The political rehabilitation of Rabbani by President Hamid Karzai and his appointment as the head of the High Peace Council to hold talks with the Taliban and wean it away from the military conflict which it had been waging from its sanctuaries in the Quetta area of Balochistan, set alarm bells ringing in Pakistan’s GHQ.
6.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, saw in it a possible prelude to the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force on the ground with the blessings of India in order to counter once again the Taliban and the ISI should they stage a come-back in Kabul after the US-led NATO forces thin out from Afghanistan as planned by President Barack Obama. The concern in the GHQ was enhanced when Rabbani visited New Delhi in July last to seek India’s support for the peace process. The GHQ saw in his visit a hidden objective---- to discuss with Indian leaders and officials the possible future scenarios should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul.
7. The assassination of Rabbani was a pre-emptive strike by unidentified elements----which could be the Taliban or the Haqqani network or Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe Islami or Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda--- to prevent the re-emergence of the Northern Alliance as a strong force capable of standing up to the Taliban and its affiliates. It was a warning to Karzai against any future alliance with the Tajijks. It was meant to drive a wedge between the Pashtuns and the Tajijks. There is no other way of explaining the assassination.
8. The explanation advanced by some analysts that the assassination was meant to derail the peace process and indicated the presence of elements in the Taliban which are opposed to the peace talks, does not sound convincing. If the Taliban wanted to derail the peace process, all it had to do was to withdraw from the talks with Rabbani and his Council. It did not have to kill Rabbani. He was killed not because he posed a danger immediately, but because he was viewed by the Taliban and its affiliates as likely to pose a danger in the future should the Taliban stage a come-back in Kabul. His assassination could weaken the support of the Tajiks for Karzai and make Karzai even more vulnerable to pressure from the Taliban than he has been till now.
9. The assassination has strategic implications for India. It could weaken the Tajik leadership, which has been an objective ally of India. It could weaken Karzai with whom India has built up an excellent working relationship. In the uncertain period after the thinning out of the US presence starts, India would need strong allies in Afghanistan--- in all the communities. It is likely that in the months to come more of the leaders who are perceived by the Taliban and the ISI as well disposed to India might be eliminated one by one.
10. What options would be available to India? This is a question that needs to be discussed by New Delhi with those in Afghanistan with whom it has a close relationship as well as with the US. Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have been cultivating Pakistan and vice versa. It is doubtful whether Russia would be amenable to the kind of co-operation that India and Russia had developed after the Taliban captured power in Kabul in 1996. Iran is out of question now in view of the hostility of the US to the present Iranian regime.
11. Co-operation with the US is the only strategic option we have. The US is now as concerned as we are over Pakistani machinations in Afghanistan. It could be more amenable to feelers from India for joint moves by India and the US to prevent a return to power of the Taliban with the ISI’s backing. Till now, the US has been hesitant to let India play any major role in training and equipping the Afghan security forces due to a fear over its adverse fall-out in Pakistan. We should persuade the US to get rid of its hesitation and let India play a more important role in this regard. This is the first step that would be called for. Others have to be identified. India and the US should not hum and haw and wait till the events overtake them. ( 22-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, September 21, 2011
THE INDIAN SUMMER
(Joe Dassin’s song of 1975)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQ9acTpB0ic
-----------------------
You know, I have never been as happy as I was that morning
We were walking along the beach a bit like this,
It was autumn, an autumn when weather was nice
A season that exists only in North America
Down there one calls it the Indian Summer
This one was simply ours
With your long blue dress you resembled a watercolor by Marie Laurence.
And I remember, I remember very well
What I told you that morning
A year, a century, an eternity ago.
I told you: We will be going, where you want to go, whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer.
Today I'm far away from that morning of autumn
But it's like I am still there
I'm thinking of you
Where are you?
Do I still exist for you?
I'm watching this wave that will never reach the sand
You see, I'm lying down on the sand
And I'm remembering the rising tide flowing in, the sun and happiness drifting away into the sea
An eternity, a century, a year ago
We will be going, where you want to go whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQ9acTpB0ic
-----------------------
You know, I have never been as happy as I was that morning
We were walking along the beach a bit like this,
It was autumn, an autumn when weather was nice
A season that exists only in North America
Down there one calls it the Indian Summer
This one was simply ours
With your long blue dress you resembled a watercolor by Marie Laurence.
And I remember, I remember very well
What I told you that morning
A year, a century, an eternity ago.
I told you: We will be going, where you want to go, whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer.
Today I'm far away from that morning of autumn
But it's like I am still there
I'm thinking of you
Where are you?
Do I still exist for you?
I'm watching this wave that will never reach the sand
You see, I'm lying down on the sand
And I'm remembering the rising tide flowing in, the sun and happiness drifting away into the sea
An eternity, a century, a year ago
We will be going, where you want to go whenever you want to
We will be loving each other still even when love will be dead
And all of life will be like the shades of the Indian Summer
Monday, September 19, 2011
SHRI ASHOK CHATURVEDI RAS---R.I.P.
B.RAMAN,CAMP NEW DELHI
I grieve over the death of Shri Ashok Chaturvedi, who headed the Research & Analysis Wing ( R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency, in his capacity as Secretary ( R ) during 2007-09, on the night of September 18,2011, in a Delhi hospital due to a multi-organ failure. He was 63----12 years younger than me.
2.Ashok and I had the privilege of belonging to the Indian Police Service Cadre (IPS) of Madhya Pradesh. He was from Uttar Pradesh and I from Tamil Nadu, but we both loved the State and had pleasant memories of our stay in the State.
3.Ashok joined the R&AW some years after I did. He twice served under me----- in the 1980s as an Assistant Director in the Division that dealt with Khalistani terrorism and again in the 1990s as a Deputy Director in the same Division. He was posted to a Western country which was a hotbed of Khalistani activities and developed a wide network of contacts through whom he collected valuable information on the activities of the Khalistani terrorists in the West. I had inspected his Station and recorded my kudos on his very good operational performance.
4.In any objective account on the role of the R&AW in the fight against Khalistani terrorism, the contribution of Ashok’s many successful operations should find prominent mention.
5.He became somewhat controversial as the head of the R&AW. Sections of our media repeatedly carried negative reports about him. I am not in a position to vouch for the correctness of those reports sine I had retired in August 1994----13 years before he became the chief. However, these negative reports did not affect my regard and affection for him.
6.Bye,Ashok.I still remember the wonderful time I spent with you and your family on a heavily-snowing evening in a far-away land. How amazed I was by the large circle of friends you had in that country. You remembered my love for France and, the next day, you drove me to a city where French of a different kind was spoken.
7. We were always kind to each other. I knew how attached you were to me. And you knew how attached I was to you. Those memories do matter as we leave this world one by one.
I grieve over the death of Shri Ashok Chaturvedi, who headed the Research & Analysis Wing ( R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency, in his capacity as Secretary ( R ) during 2007-09, on the night of September 18,2011, in a Delhi hospital due to a multi-organ failure. He was 63----12 years younger than me.
2.Ashok and I had the privilege of belonging to the Indian Police Service Cadre (IPS) of Madhya Pradesh. He was from Uttar Pradesh and I from Tamil Nadu, but we both loved the State and had pleasant memories of our stay in the State.
3.Ashok joined the R&AW some years after I did. He twice served under me----- in the 1980s as an Assistant Director in the Division that dealt with Khalistani terrorism and again in the 1990s as a Deputy Director in the same Division. He was posted to a Western country which was a hotbed of Khalistani activities and developed a wide network of contacts through whom he collected valuable information on the activities of the Khalistani terrorists in the West. I had inspected his Station and recorded my kudos on his very good operational performance.
4.In any objective account on the role of the R&AW in the fight against Khalistani terrorism, the contribution of Ashok’s many successful operations should find prominent mention.
5.He became somewhat controversial as the head of the R&AW. Sections of our media repeatedly carried negative reports about him. I am not in a position to vouch for the correctness of those reports sine I had retired in August 1994----13 years before he became the chief. However, these negative reports did not affect my regard and affection for him.
6.Bye,Ashok.I still remember the wonderful time I spent with you and your family on a heavily-snowing evening in a far-away land. How amazed I was by the large circle of friends you had in that country. You remembered my love for France and, the next day, you drove me to a city where French of a different kind was spoken.
7. We were always kind to each other. I knew how attached you were to me. And you knew how attached I was to you. Those memories do matter as we leave this world one by one.
Friday, September 16, 2011
SOUTH CHINA SEA : INDIA SHOULD AVOID RUSHING IN WHERE EVEN US EXERCISES CAUTION
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of September 2,2011, titled “INS Airavat Incident: What does it Portend?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4677.html )
China has reacted ---moderately through a spokesperson of its Foreign Office and somewhat virulently through the Party-controlled “Global Times”--- to reports that India has been considering an offer from Vietnam to award oil and gas exploration bids over two blocks in the South China Sea to India’s ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL). These blocks presently come under the de facto control of Vietnam, which also claims de jure sovereignty over the blocks under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
2. Vietnamese claims of de jure sovereignty have been rejected by China, but accepted by India as would be evident from the following reported comment of a spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India : “The Chinese had concerns but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and have conveyed this to the Chinese.”
3. The Chinese spokesperson, without referring to India by name, has stated as follows: “ China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute.”
4. The “Global Times” (September 16 ), which does not necessarily represent the views of the Chinese Government and reflects more the views of conservative sections in the Communist Party of China, has been less measured in its comments and has talked of the need to confront the Indian move more vigorously.
5. As I had pointed out in my article cited above, there are two issues involved in the so-called South China Sea dispute.The first is its status as international and not Chinese waters and the second is the conflicting claims of sovereignty made by China, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries in the region over the island territories found in the Sea.
6. The US has so far been following a policy of rejecting Chinese claims of sovereignty over the entire Sea while not getting involved in the various disputes over the claims of sovereignty over the island territories. Indian policy closely converged with that of the US. It rejected the Chinese projection of the Sea as a whole as Chinese waters. It took steps to develop its strategic relations with Vietnam. It asserted the rights of the ships of the Indian Navy to transit the South China Sea during their visits to Vietnamese ports without the need to inform China beforehand or ask for Chinese permission.
7. At the same time, India rightly observed a nuanced silence on the dispute over the island territories. Now, for the first time, India is seeking to take a position on the island territories under the de facto control of Vietnam by accepting Vietnamese claims of de jure sovereignty over them.
8. This is a position with inherent seeds of an undesirable military confrontation between India and China in the South China Sea itself and subsequently or simultaneously across the land borders between the two countries. India is still in the process of strengthening its military-related infrastructure near the Chinese border. In my assessment, it will take India from five to 10 years to bring its infrastructure on par with that of China in Tibet.
9.The reach and strength of the Indian Navy in the South China Sea is far behind that of the US. The US is in a position to engage China in a naval confrontation in the South China Sea, but it realises that such a confrontation could be counter-productive. That is why it has been observing a neutral stand on the island territories.
10. The implications of the reported Indian move to accept Vietnamese claims of sovereignty and to consider favourably the Vietnamese invitation to undertake oil and gas exploration do not appear to have been carefully considered by the Government of India. China has been opposing with determination repeated Vietnamese moves to undertake explorations for natural resources around the island territories under its de facto control. It is likely to oppose any move by the Indian company to undertake exploration in the area.
11. We have seen that Vietnam has not been able to counter effectively Chinese disruptions of its exploration activities. It will not be able to provide adequate protection to the Indian company. Will we be able to keep a permanent presence of the Indian Navy in the area to protect the operations of the Indian company? Will it be able to counter Chinese attempts to disrupt the operations of the Indian company?
12. The ultimate result may be a confrontation with China in the seas adjacent to the Chinese mainland which India cannot hope to win and an over-all deterioration in Sino-Indian relations at a time when India is not yet prepared for a full-blown confrontation with China.
13. Some analysts have projected the Indian move as a tit-for-tat response to Chinese troops moving into the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in an area over which India claims sovereignty.
14. The Gilgit-Baltistan area is legitimately ours. The Chinese have no business to be there. We have many options for countering them and for making their foray into the area prohibitively costly and bloody for them. Instead of identifying those options and undertaking them, we should not try to confront the Chinese in the South China Sea, which is not India’s cup of tea. ( 17-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
( To be read in continuation of my article of September 2,2011, titled “INS Airavat Incident: What does it Portend?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4677.html )
China has reacted ---moderately through a spokesperson of its Foreign Office and somewhat virulently through the Party-controlled “Global Times”--- to reports that India has been considering an offer from Vietnam to award oil and gas exploration bids over two blocks in the South China Sea to India’s ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL). These blocks presently come under the de facto control of Vietnam, which also claims de jure sovereignty over the blocks under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
2. Vietnamese claims of de jure sovereignty have been rejected by China, but accepted by India as would be evident from the following reported comment of a spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India : “The Chinese had concerns but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and have conveyed this to the Chinese.”
3. The Chinese spokesperson, without referring to India by name, has stated as follows: “ China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute.”
4. The “Global Times” (September 16 ), which does not necessarily represent the views of the Chinese Government and reflects more the views of conservative sections in the Communist Party of China, has been less measured in its comments and has talked of the need to confront the Indian move more vigorously.
5. As I had pointed out in my article cited above, there are two issues involved in the so-called South China Sea dispute.The first is its status as international and not Chinese waters and the second is the conflicting claims of sovereignty made by China, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries in the region over the island territories found in the Sea.
6. The US has so far been following a policy of rejecting Chinese claims of sovereignty over the entire Sea while not getting involved in the various disputes over the claims of sovereignty over the island territories. Indian policy closely converged with that of the US. It rejected the Chinese projection of the Sea as a whole as Chinese waters. It took steps to develop its strategic relations with Vietnam. It asserted the rights of the ships of the Indian Navy to transit the South China Sea during their visits to Vietnamese ports without the need to inform China beforehand or ask for Chinese permission.
7. At the same time, India rightly observed a nuanced silence on the dispute over the island territories. Now, for the first time, India is seeking to take a position on the island territories under the de facto control of Vietnam by accepting Vietnamese claims of de jure sovereignty over them.
8. This is a position with inherent seeds of an undesirable military confrontation between India and China in the South China Sea itself and subsequently or simultaneously across the land borders between the two countries. India is still in the process of strengthening its military-related infrastructure near the Chinese border. In my assessment, it will take India from five to 10 years to bring its infrastructure on par with that of China in Tibet.
9.The reach and strength of the Indian Navy in the South China Sea is far behind that of the US. The US is in a position to engage China in a naval confrontation in the South China Sea, but it realises that such a confrontation could be counter-productive. That is why it has been observing a neutral stand on the island territories.
10. The implications of the reported Indian move to accept Vietnamese claims of sovereignty and to consider favourably the Vietnamese invitation to undertake oil and gas exploration do not appear to have been carefully considered by the Government of India. China has been opposing with determination repeated Vietnamese moves to undertake explorations for natural resources around the island territories under its de facto control. It is likely to oppose any move by the Indian company to undertake exploration in the area.
11. We have seen that Vietnam has not been able to counter effectively Chinese disruptions of its exploration activities. It will not be able to provide adequate protection to the Indian company. Will we be able to keep a permanent presence of the Indian Navy in the area to protect the operations of the Indian company? Will it be able to counter Chinese attempts to disrupt the operations of the Indian company?
12. The ultimate result may be a confrontation with China in the seas adjacent to the Chinese mainland which India cannot hope to win and an over-all deterioration in Sino-Indian relations at a time when India is not yet prepared for a full-blown confrontation with China.
13. Some analysts have projected the Indian move as a tit-for-tat response to Chinese troops moving into the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in an area over which India claims sovereignty.
14. The Gilgit-Baltistan area is legitimately ours. The Chinese have no business to be there. We have many options for countering them and for making their foray into the area prohibitively costly and bloody for them. Instead of identifying those options and undertaking them, we should not try to confront the Chinese in the South China Sea, which is not India’s cup of tea. ( 17-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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