ANOTHER SELF-IMMOLATION BY A TIBETAN MONK IN SICHUAN

B.RAMAN


Reportedly angered by the Chinese curbs on the celebration of the birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama last month, Tsewang Norbu, a 29-year-old Tibetan Buddhist monk from the Nyitso monastery in the Dawu town of the Sichuan Province of China, has committed self-immolation on August 15,2011.


2. China’s official Xinhua news agency has confirmed the incident, saying “It was unclear why he had burnt himself.”


3. Reliable reports from Tibetan sources in the Sichuan province say that he committed self-immolation after shouting slogans condemning the suppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese and praising His Holiness.


4.According to the Tibetan sources, he committed self-immolation outside a building housing local Government offices. Subsequent reports say that the Chinese security forces have surrounded the monastery and have been demanding that the monks in the monastery should hand over his dead body to the police for investigation and that the monks have been refusing to do so. This would indicate that before the Police could intervene, the other monks had probably managed to take the remains of the monk inside the monastery.


5. This is the second incident of self-immolation by a Tibetan Buddhist monk reported from the Sichuan province this year. In March last, a monk of the Kirti monastery committed self-immolation to protest against the Chinese rule. His self-immolation led to a long confrontation between the Chinese security forces and the inmates of the monastery. The security forces accused some of the monks of visiting prostitutes or inviting prostitutes inside the monastery. About 300 of the monks have since been kept in a military-run detention centre where they are subjected to “re-education” classes.


6. The Chinese authorities have repeatedly rejected the appeals of international human rights organisations for permission to visit the detention centre to enquire about the welfare of the detained monks. ( 16-8-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

CHINA IS CHANGING

B.RAMAN


Recent events in the port city of Dalian in north-east China where public protests forced the local Government to accept a demand for closing down a chemical plant following an accident and for re-locating it elsewhere show a new style of political management. This new style is marked by sensitivity to public opinion and a willingness to respond to reasonable public pressure instead of trying to suppress it as used to be done in the past.


2. The plant produces paraxylene (PX), a petrochemical used for the production of polyester film and fabrics. Last week, huge waves caused by a storm breached a dike built to protect the plant from floodwaters. Residents were concerned that a flood could damage the plant and cause it to release toxic chemicals.


3.Details of the breach and the dangers that could be posed to the environment of the city and the lives of its residents by any damage to the plant were disseminated by many netizens through Weibo, a Chinese microblog service similar to the Twitter. This led to a large number of residents ---about 12,000 according to one estimate--- demonstrating in the streets and outside the local municipal office on August 14, demanding that the plant should be immediately shut down and re-located elsewhere.


4. Instead of seeking to suppress the demonstration as they would have normally done, the local authorities accepted the public demand for shutting down the plant to prevent any damage and eventually re-locating it elsewhere. Initially, the authorities did try to prevent the dissemination of the information about the breach and the call for demonstrations through Weibo, but subsequently gave up the attempt.


5. In a refreshing departure from past practices, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency itself disseminated details of the breach and the demonstrations in an apparent attempt to prevent the circulation of exaggerated rumours. There was a greater transparency in the coverage of the incident and the public demonstrations and a greater willingness on the part of the authorities to accept the reasonableness of the public expression of concern and to respond to it.


6. Commenting on the way the local authorities dealt with the incident, the Party-controlled “Global Times” wrote as follows on August 15:


“The Dalian incident indicates social progress, as it shows the public has more opportunities to be heard. In Dalian, their opinion was treated with respect. But it is worth mentioning that while there are more channels for individuals and groups to express their opinions, it is essential that a distinction be made for rational opinion. There should also be channels for other voices to prevent a single opinion from being regarded as the mainstream.


“The incident showed that the demands of the public are taken seriously by the Chinese government. The pace of information disclosure and releasing of the official statement may not have been quick enough, but the adjustments that the government made were swift. Both the public and the government have begun adapting both their language and actions to a more democratic time.


“It should not be simply seen as a victory of a "protest." In fact, in China, reasonable public appeals will eventually be accepted by the government. New technological tools, such as Weibo, have strengthened communication between the public and the government. Protest, as a means of expressing opinions, will not likely become the main way Chinese people will make their voices heard.


“China's reform is being advanced by various minor incidents, and this reform has, in turn, created more room for understanding and tolerance.


“What the Dalian incident has shown is China's adaptability and problem-solving capability, not the risk that it may flounder over an emergency.”


7. In a report on the increasing role of microblogs in mobilising public opinion in China disseminated on August 14, the Xinhua said:


“ A decade ago, the most favoured medium for Chinese people to air their complaints was perhaps through the state-owned China Central Television network.



“However, the Internet has superseded television as the most popular means for the airing of discontent, with microblogs leading the charge.


“Microblogs came to prominence in China just two years ago, but have exploded in popularity. Sina Weibo, one of the country's most popular microblog providers, has allowed the country's citizens to supervise - and criticize - China's government in ways that were never thought possible before.


“In comparison to microblogs, traditional media entities face technical and systematic restrictions in their efforts to observe and supervise the government. The Internet and its vast number of microbloggers are now able to make up for this deficiency, according to Zhan Jiang, a professor of journalism at the Beijing Foreign Studies University.


“Microblogs make it easy for people to speak their thoughts in real-time, essentially making their public voices louder, according to Professor Zhan.


“Sina Weibo was launched in August 2009. Since then, it has attracted more than 140 million registered users, with the number expected to exceed 200 million by the end of this year, according to the company.


“Microblogging services enjoyed "explosive growth" in the first six months of this year, with the number of registered microblog users surging by 208.9 per cent to reach 195 million, according to the China Internet Network Information Center.


“A 2010 report quoted by the Beijing-based newspaper International Herald Leader said that more than one-fifth of the 50 most-discussed public events in 2010 were first reported on by microbloggers.


“Traditional media outlets have blind spots in performing their role as "society's watchdog." However, microblogs have allowed ordinary citizens to fill in these gaps.


“The general offices of the State Council, or China's Cabinet, and the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee have issued a circular stating that information on major emergencies and items of public concern, such as government efforts and the results of official investigations, should be released to the public in an "objective and timely manner."


“The People's Daily, the CPC's flagship newspaper, has urged officials to answer questions from Internet users in a timely and accurate fashion and to brush up on their online communication skills in a recent article titled "How to Speak in the Microblog Era."


“The article encouraged officials to address public concerns through online platforms and not to shy away from answering thorny questions. "Online performance reflects an official's all-around capability."


8.While adapting themselves to the role of netizens as watchdogs and supervisors of the performance of the Government, the Chinese authorities have at the same time noted with concern the role played by social media networks in facilitating anti-Government mobilisation in Egypt and in helping those who violated law and order during the recent riots in the UK in exchanging information with each other in matters such as the deployment of the police.


9. The fear that the mushrooming of the netizen community and the emergence of a new wired civil society may result in a dilution of the control of the Communist Party and its leadership role and lead to political destabilisation is palpable. How to use the microblogs in the interest of public welfare and better governance without letting them become detrimental to political stability and public order is a question that has been engaging the attention of the authorities. They still do not have a satisfactory answer to this.


10. Political and social activism by netizens is slowly changing China in ways unanticipated even a couple of years ago and could pave the way for a greater democracy through the Net instead of through the ballot box. ( 15-8-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com and Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

ANNA HAZARE'S PROTEST AGAINST CORRUPTION

B.RAMAN

The announced plans of Anna Hazare, the social activist, to go on a fast unto death from August 15 in support of the demand of the anti-corruption movement headed by him for a stronger Jan Lok Pal Bill than the one introduced by the Government in the Parliament pose an executive and moral dilemma to the Government of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh.


2. The executive dilemma arises from the fact that an attempt to commit a suicide for whatever purpose is a criminal offence under the Indian Penal Code and the Government is legally bound to act against the threatened fast, if necessary by arresting Anna Hazare either before or during his fast in order to save his life and to prevent a public disorder. The executive dilemma is enhanced by the danger that the act of saving his life might be interpreted as a violation of his right to protest and might lead to an even greater public disorder.


3. The moral dilemma arises from the fact that a fast unto death as a form of protest has been an accepted weapon since the days of Mahatma Gandhi. He used the threat of fast unto death on some occasions against the British rulers because he was left with no other way of expressing his protest over the failure of the British to concede his demands. It was a unique non-violent weapon used by Mahatma Gandhi under unique circumstances when India was under foreign rulers and did not have a democratic set-up which permitted dissenters to adopt various forms of ventilating grievances in a democratic manner without resorting to the ultimate weapon of a fast unto death.


4.Anna Hazare and his followers have been carrying on their protest in an independent and democratic India where various forms of democratic mobilisation and advocacy are available to them. They have been making use of these forms in order to educate the public on their demands and to bring moral pressure on the Government to accept the legitimacy of their demands. If the Government has not accepted the legitimacy of some of their demands, it is because it thinks that it will not be in the national interest to accept them and that those demands could be counter-productive.


5. A democratically-elected Government has the right to decide what is workable and what is not and what is in the national interest and what is not. If one is not in agreement with the views of the Government, one has the right to continue with the campaign of mobilisation and advocacy in the hope that the Government might be made to relent in its stand.


6. But one does not have the right to intimidate the Government into conceding one’s demands by threatening to use a weapon which might have been morally justifiable under the then existing circumstances during the British rule, but is no longer so under an independent and democratic dispensation. The Government has a legal obligation to prevent any attempt to commit a suicide and this obligation cannot be diluted because of the moral force of the demands of Anna Hazare and his followers for stronger action against corruption. Even a morally justifiable demand cannot be sought to be achieved through legally impermissible means.


7. Under our Constitution and our laws, every citizen has a right to protest, but not by adopting any means. While protesting, the existing laws have to be observed and any attempt at seeming intimidation avoided. The Government has to exercise its legal responsibility by preventing Anna Hazare from carrying out his threat to die through fasting. Whether that obligation should be exercised by arresting him before he starts his fast or by allowing him to fast for some time to satisfy his conscience and then arrest him is a matter for the Government to decide on the basis of its judgement regarding likely dangers to public order under different options.


8. It has to be admitted that there is considerable public support for Anna Hazare’s proposed fast because large sections of the public are not convinced of the sincerity of the Government’s proclaimed determination to end corruption. The executive responsibility of the Government to maintain law and order has not been matched by an exercise of its moral responsibility to convince the public of the sincerity of its determination to end corruption.


9.It is important for the Prime Minister even at this last moment to address the public on the issue of corruption through the electronic media and through a press conference devoted exclusively to public concerns over corruption.


10. An over-focus on the executive dimensions of the problem while neglecting the moral dimensions of it will maintain and exacerbate the existing tensions on this issue. ( 14-8-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

AFGHAN TALIBAN CARRIES OUT A CATASTROPHIC STRIKE AGAINST US NAVY SEALS

B.RAMAN


Seven officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US and an officer of the Jordanian Intelligence related to the royal family of Jordan were killed in a suicide attack launched on December 30, 2009, by Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a 36-year-old Al Qaeda sympathiser from Zarqa, Jordan, in the Khost area of Afghanistan.


2. It was seen as a joint operation by the followers of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former head of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the Pakistani Taliban followers of the late Baitullah Mehsud to jointly avenge the death of Zarqawi in Iraq and Baitullah in South Waziristan. They blamed the CIA for the death of their leaders.


3.In an operation reminiscent of the catastrophic Khost attack on the CIA by Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban has managed to carry out a catastrophic attack on a US helicopter on August 5,2011, carrying 30 US troops including 22 Navy SEALS, belonging to the same unit which had killed Osama bin Laden in a raid at Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 2 ---killing all of them. It is the largest fatality in a single incident ever suffered by the US during its military operations in Afghanistan launched in 2001 and the largest fatality ever suffered in a single incident by the Joint Special Operations Command, which controls the operations of the Navy SEALS since the JSOC was set up. Seven Afghan troops and an interpreter also died in the incident.


4. Latest reports indicate that the catastrophic incident, which has been greeted with shock and disbelief by the JSOC and the Navy SEALS, was the outcome of a trap successfully laid by the Afghan Taliban, which has claimed responsibility for bringing down the helicopter.


5. Afghan authorities seem to suspect that the attack was in retaliation for the successful raid by the Navy SEALS on the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 2, which resulted in his death, but the Taliban itself in its claim of responsibility, has not so far projected the attack as in retaliation for the death of OBL. It was not even clear whether the Taliban was aware of the presence of Navy SEALS from the same unit that killed OBL in the copter that it brought down


6. The Agence France Presse (AFP) has reported as follows on the trap:


“ The Taliban lured US forces into an elaborate trap to shoot down their helicopter, killing 30 American troops in the deadliest such incident of the war, an Afghan official said on August 8.


“A total of 38 people -- 30 US troops, many of them special forces, plus seven Afghan commandos and an interpreter -- were killed when their Chinook came down during an anti-Taliban operation late Friday ( August 5).


“The crash marked the biggest single loss of life for American and NATO forces since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban in late 2001, shortly after the September 11 attacks.



“The senior government official told AFP on condition of anonymity that a Taliban commander, Qari Tahir, lured US forces to the scene by tipping them off that a Taliban meeting was taking place.


“He also said four Pakistanis helped Tahir carry out the strike.


"Now it's confirmed that the helicopter was shot down and it was a trap that was set by a Taliban commander," said the official, citing intelligence gathered from the area.


"The Taliban knew which route the helicopter would take," he added.


"That's the only route, so they took position on either side of the valley on mountains and as the helicopter approached, they attacked it with rockets and other modern weapons. It was brought down by multiple shots.


“The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity as he was not authorised to discuss the issue, also said President Hamid Karzai's US-backed government "thinks this was a retaliation attack for the killing of Osama bin Laden."


“The Taliban themselves did not make such an assertion on claiming responsibility for the attack, which took place in the Taliban-infested Sayd Abad district of Wardak province, just southwest of Kabul.


“US media has reported that the dead included members of the Navy's SEAL Team Six, the secretive unit behind the daring raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan in May.


“US administration sources interviewed by AFP said the casualties did not include anyone who took part in the bin Laden raid on May 2.”


7.The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said in a statement that the CH-47 Chinook helicopter was fired on "by an insurgent rocket-propelled grenade while transporting the US service members and commandos to the scene of an ongoing engagement."


8.According to the statement, the operation had begun when ISAF troops searching for a Taliban leader in the Tangi Valley, surrounded by rugged mountains in central Maidan Wardak province about 80 km (50 miles) southwest of Kabul, were fired on by insurgents.


9.Several of the insurgents were killed before assistance was requested. "As the insurgents continued to fire, the combined force on the ground requested additional forces to assist the operation," the ISAF statement said.


10."Those additional personnel were in-bound to the scene when the CH-47 carrying them crashed, killing all on board."


11.US media has quoted a spokesman of the Naval Special Warfare group as saying: “There’s no precedent for this. It’s the worst day in our history by a mile.” Of the 22 Naval Special Warfare members killed, 17 were SEALs and five were direct support personnel.


12.Since the US military action began in Afghanistan in October, 2001, this is the second time that the Taliban has brought down a US helicopter. In an earlier successful strike by it in the Kunar province on June 28,2005, eight SEALS and eight other military personnel were killed when their copter was brought down by the Taliban. Another three SEALs were killed during a firefight on the ground.


13. An estimated 383 foreign troops have been killed so far this year, almost 50 of them in the first week of August. The catastrophic attack underlines the undamaged capability of the Afghan Taliban to take the NATO forces by surprise and inflict heavy casualties on them and its determination to make the US withdrawal from Afghanistan a humiliating retreat and not a successful withdrawal. ( 9-8-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75)

INITIAL US MOVES TO PREVENT BEIJING IMPOSING ITS DALAI LAMA ON TIBETANS

B.RAMAN

The Chinese, who have already been annoyed by the meeting of President Barack Obama with His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the Map Room of the White House during His Holiness’ recent visit to the US, have reasons to be further irritated and concerned over the directive on July 20 by the US House Foreign Affairs Committee to the US Secretary of State that China should not be allowed to open any more Consulates in the US until Beijing allowed the US to open a Consulate in Lhasa.


2.The Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2012 passed by the Committee said: "The Secretary shall seek to establish a United States consulate in Lhasa, Tibet, to provide services to United States citizens traveling in Tibet and to monitor political, economic, and cultural developments in Tibet, including Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces and, until such consulate is established, shall not permit the establishment in the United States of any additional consulate of the People’s Republic of China".


3.There is reportedly a pending request from the Chinese Foreign Office for permission to open Chinese Consulates at Atlanta and Boston. Now, these two may not materialise unless and until Beijing allows the US to open a Consulate at Lhasa.


4.India should emulate the US and should not allow Beijing to open any more Consulates in India until it permits India to open a Consulate in Lhasa. We have a much stronger case than the US for a Consulate in Lhasa.


5.Non-Governmental supporters of His Holiness in the US have organised an exhibition in the US to educate the public about the Panchen Lama. They also intend to start a movement to ensure that the Chinese do not disregard the Tibetan traditions in imposing their own Dalai Lama on the Tibetan people when His Holiness is no more. The Chinese interference in the traditional religious practices of the Tibetans in order to impose their own Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama on the Tibetan people could become an important issue in the future interactions between Washington and Beijing relating to Tibet and His Holiness.


6.While passing the resolution on a US Consulate in Lhasa, the House Foreign Affairs Committee also expressed serious concerns over the increasing suppression of religious freedom in Tibet and directed representatives of the United States Government to call for a cessation of all interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China in the reincarnation system of Tibetan Buddhism during exchanges with officials of the Government of the People's Republic of China.


7.The Panchen Lama nominated by the Chinese authorities after arresting the Panchen Lama selected by the representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, was to tour in Tibet during July to attend functions held in Tibet to mark the 60th anniversary of the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. According to latest reports from Tibet, he did not undertake the tour which was deferred indefinitely without giving any reasons.


8.The Nepalese Police arrested on August 5,2011, Thinley Lama, the new volunteer coordinator of the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Kathmandu, after he had held a news conference in which he called for the protection of the human rights of the Tibetan refugees living in Nepal. There has been intense pressure on the Nepalese Government by Beijing to ban what is projected as the anti-China activities of the refugees. In the first week of July, the Nepalese Police, under pressure from the Chinese Embassy, tried to prevent the refugees from celebrating the birthday of His Holiness. Thinley Lama is a Nepal resident and acts as the representative of His Holiness in Nepal.


9. Human Rights groups have condemned the action of the Nepal Police in detaining Thinley Lama and appealed to the international community to intervene to stop the persecution of Tibetan refugees by the Nepalese authorities under pressure from Beijing.


10.They allege that the Chinese Embassy has been more aggressive in urging Nepal to take action against Tibetan refugees since last month when a new Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, assumed office. China says there are no Tibetan “refugees,” but only illegal immigrants.


11. It has been reported that as a quid pro quo for curbs on the activities of the refugees by the Nepalese authorities, Beijing has offered financial assistance for the development of the tourist infrastructure in Nepal, including for the development of the infrastructure at Lumbini, the birth place of Buddha.


12. In the meanwhile, reliable reports from Tibet say that the Chinese authorities refrained from taking any action against about 5000 Tibetan monks, who defied the orders of the authorities and held a meeting at Lithang Gonchen in the Sichuan Province from July 15 to 24, for discussions to promote Tibetan cultural values and national unity. Initially, the Chinese authorities tried to prevent the meeting, but when the monks expressed their determination to go ahead with it, they did not intervene.


13.All the proceedings were held in the Tibetan language and all the participants were required to dress typically like Tibetans. There were discussions not only on religious, social and cultural issues, but also on the need to preserve the Tibetan language and the unity of Tibetans living in Tibet’s traditional three provinces of U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo—all now occupied by China. The monastery of Lithang Gonchen, which hosted the meeting, had sent invitations to over 100 other monasteries—both in Kardze and in neighboring prefectures—to take part. About a half of them participated.


14.Representatives also came from the Kirti monastery, in Kardze, from where about 300 defiant monks were arrested and moved to re-education camps in March this year following an incident of self-immolation by a young monk to protest against the Chinese rule. The Chinese have continued to reject requests from international human rights organisations for permission to visit the detained monks of the Kirti monastery. ( 8-8-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

SITUATION IN XINJIANG -- MY TAKE

B.RAMAN



The Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) had a lively discussion on the situation in the Chinese-controlled province of Xinjiang on August 6,2011. The discussion was initiated by Shri D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies. The following is an elaboration of my interventions during the discussions that followed:


(1).There are two Uighur ethnic movements confronting the Chinese. The first is a pro-human rights, pro-democracy movement spearheaded by the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC), which adopts peaceful methods of advocacy like those of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and enjoys the political, material and moral support of the US and other Western countries. The second is the jihadi movement spearheaded by the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET), which has an ideology similar to that of Al Qaeda and is based in Pakistan. The WUC projects itself as a purely Xinjiang-centric ethnic rights movement. The IMET projects itself as a Central Asia-centric pan-Umma movement. The Chinese concerns are mainly over the threats which they perceive to the security of their peripheral regions, which are populated by non-Han ethnic groups, as a result of the activities of the WUC though peaceful on the one side and the IMET, which is violent, on the other.


( 2 ). After the recent incidents of violence in the interior areas of Xinjiang during July, there has been a plethora of over-assessments regarding the strength, capabilities and reach of the IMET and the likely impact of its activities on China’s relations with Pakistan. I estimate the total strength of the IMET at present as not more than 200. Their Islamic motivation and jihadi determination are high, but their capability for sustained and spectacular terrorist actions of the Taliban or Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) kind is low. They have not so far shown any evidence of having modern weapons or being well-versed in the use of modern explosive devices and other techniques. They are not yet technology savvy. I have not come across any confirmed instance of modern copy-cat terrorism---such as the use of mobile telephones as triggers for improvised explosive devices or use of ammonium nitrate as an explosive material or use of projectiles in IEDs to increase fatalities etc. Explosive control measures inside Xinjiang as well as on the border with its regional neighbours seem to be tight. The result: The IMET has been facing difficulty in acquiring modern explosives. There have been no confirmed instances of suicide terrorism, but many instances of suicidal terrorism (Fedayeen attacks).In the absence of modern techniques and modern material, the IMET has been adopting home-grown techniques such as stabbing, hijacking a motor vehicle and running it over its targeted victims, using poisoned needles to spread panic etc. It unsuccessfully attempted a sky jacking which was thwarted by alert Chinese sky marshals.


(3). Though the IMET has been active for over 10 years now, it has not been able to create an insurgency-like situation in Xinjiang. It started as a hit and run movement with no attempts at territorial control and it remains so today. Despite the ruthless measures taken by the Chinese to neutralise the members of the IMET, it has maintained a capability for sporadically taking the Chinese by surprise and killing innocent civilians and members of Chinese security forces. One could see without difficulty that the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, which controls the police and is responsible for internal security, has a poor capability for intelligence collection and analysis in Xinjiang. The widely-alienated Uighur community has not been co-operating with the Police. The Han community, which remains cut off from the Uighur community, cannot provide useful sources of information. Since the IMET still uses word of mouth communication and avoids or has no access to modern communication technologies, the flow of Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) seems to be as poor as HUMINT. What we have been seeing in Xinjiang is an on-again-off-again battle between pre-modern terrorism and pre-modern counter-terrorism.


(4). In the absence of the use of modern, community-friendly techniques by the Chinese security forces, the ethnic and religious alienation will continue to be strong and instances of sporadic acts of terrorism with the use of brutal methods by both sides would continue. The Chinese are hoping that the rapid economic development of Xinjiang to bring its economy on par with that of coastal China will gradually make the Uighur movement wither away with the depletion of local support for externally-based organisations. So long as the ethnic and Islamic grievances remain strong, this is unlikely.


(5).Chinese concerns over the inability of Pakistan to deal with the sanctuaries of the IMET in Pakistani territory remain strong, but they have avoided giving open expression to these concerns at the central level in Beijing. Their present policy is praising Pakistani action centrally in Beijing, but criticising it regionally in Xinjiang. Pakistan, despite its anxiety to help the Chinese, will not be able to deal effectively with the IMET sanctuaries unless it acts strongly against Al Qaeda-related sanctuaries in North Waziristan, where the IMET is also based. So far, the Pakistan army---either because of collusion or of lack of confidence--- has failed to act in North Waziristan in response to US pressure. Will it do so in response to Chinese pressure? It is unlikely because North Waziristan is an important rear base for the operations of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Afghanistan. Pakistan would not like this rear base to be weakened by undertaking a major counter-terrorism operation, which could result in acts of retaliation by Al Qaeda-related groups. Pakistan will continue to follow its present policy in North Waziristan of seeming to act, but refraining from acting---whether the pressure comes from the US or China. To keep the Chinese happy, the ISI will continue to act vigorously against the Uighurs in the rest of Pakistan, but not in North Waziristan. This will cause ephemeral, tactical strains in Pakistan’s relations with China without any strategic impact of an adverse nature. The Chinese will not allow their dissatisfaction over the inadequate Pakistani action affect their strategic relationship with Pakistan. To expect a US-Pakistan like denouement in the relations between Pakistan and China due to Chinese concerns over the IMET bases in Pakistan would be unrealistic.


(6). The chances of the Chinese acting on their own against the IMET sanctuaries in Pakistani territory are weak. They do not have the capability. Nor is it their policy till now to get involved in counter-terrorism operations in foreign territory. All that one can visualise is that the ISI, which has strongly resisted increasing US intelligence presence and activities in Pakistani territory, will allow the Chinese intelligence to increase its presence in Pakistani territory to give the Chinese an independent and enhanced capability for the collection of HUMINT and TECHINT from Pakistani territory. ( 7-8-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

SONIA GANDHI'S HEALTH

B.RAMAN


The news of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi’s medical treatment necessitating a surgery in a foreign country came as a surprise to the public at large in India. The news of her illness and departure for that country was kept a closely-guarded secret. The news was broken to the public by a spokesman of the Congress (I) on the morning of August 4,2011. The spokesman, after announcing her then impending surgery, also revealed that before her departure she had constituted a four-member group including Shri Rahul Gandhi to look after the party affairs during her absence on medical treatment which may last two to three weeks.


2. The successful performance of the surgery and her convalescing in an ICU was announced by the party spokesperson on August 5.While the party has not revealed where she underwent the surgery and what for, there has been speculation that she underwent the surgery in a well-known anti-cancer clinic of New York. If this speculation is correct, her hospitalisation is probably cancer-related, though not necessarily cancer as of now. If it is established that her illness was due to a cancer, her post-surgery recovery may last longer than two to three weeks. She would have the option of undergoing the post-surgery therapy in the US itself or in a hospital in India specialising in such therapy.


3. A debate has arisen about the secrecy surrounding her hospitalisation and about the need for respecting the privacy of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her right to be spared unnecessary and unhealthy speculation regarding the state of her health. No one can question the right of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family to privacy. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, whatever be the powers actually exercised by her as the leader of her party, does not hold any position in the Government of India. She, her family and party are, therefore, not required to reveal more than what they themselves consider necessary. It is not necessary for them to tell the public details of her ailment and treatment.


4. Different yard-sticks are followed all over the world---more in democracies than in authoritarian countries--- regarding the need for transparency about the health of those holding office in the Government. The past practice was to maintain secrecy even about the health of those in the Government. One would recall the allegations before the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1964 that his family, party and officials had kept the public in the dark about a stroke suffered by him for which, it was alleged, he was under secret treatment.


5. One would also recall the controversy in France in the 1980s over the family and entourage of Francois Mitterand, the then President, keeping the public in the dark about the fact, which subsequently proved to be correct, that he was under secret treatment for prostate cancer.


6. It has now been generally accepted all over the world that the public has a right to be kept informed about the health of Government leaders. When Dr.Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister, developed a serious cardiac problem and had to undergo a major surgery, the public was kept totally in the picture.


7. Since Mrs.Sonia Gandhi does not hold any office in the Government, she, her family and party are within their rights not to say more about her health than what they have already done. At the same time, in view of the considerable political power exercised by her ---despite her not holding any office in the Government--- there is bound to be considerable speculation in the public about the state of her health and its likely implications for her party----whether she and her party like it or not.


8. The only way of keeping such speculation under reasonable limits is by taking the initiative in being as transparent as possible even though they may not be under an obligation to be totally transparent. The greater the information available to the public, the less will be the unwarranted speculation.


9.The political class as a whole on both sides of the political spectrum has conducted itself in a very responsible manner. The political leaders have conveyed their good wishes for a speedy recovery to Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her family and avoided any remarks of a controversial nature. There has been no unwarranted speculation at the political level.


10. As Mrs.Sonia Gandhi’s hospitalisation and further treatment continue---- depending on the duration--- the speculation regarding the political implications of her health, which till now is confined to the general public, may spread not only to the political class, but also to policy-making circles in foreign countries. They would be interested in assessing the nature of her illness and its duration and its likely impact on inter-personal relationships in the Congress (I) and on the political situation in the country as a whole.


11. It is in the interest of the Congress (I) itself and of the country to ensure that such assessments are based on correct and adequate information. While the family of Mrs.Sonia Gandhi and her party have every right to privacy regarding her health, it will be an act of political wisdom that they take the initiative in making available to the public and the political class as much information as possible without violating her privacy. ( 5-8-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )