B.RAMAN
China is not Tunisia or Egypt.
2. That is the message that the Chinese political leadership headed by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is seeking to send across to its own people and the world as the Communist Party of China (CPC) began on July 1 a month-long celebration of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC.
3.It was not the celebration of a self-confident leadership reassured of the future political stability and economic prosperity of China and the continuing loyalty of the people to the party and their continued acceptance of its vanguard role.
4. It was the celebration of a nervous leadership all the time watching over its shoulders to see whether the undoubted economic prosperity achieved by China would be adequate to keep the people away from demands for political freedom.
5. The nervousness of the leadership would be evident from the fact that whereas the 90th anniversary of the CPC, which falls in 2011, is being celebrated with great fanfare, the more significant 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution, which marked the success of the revolt of the ruled over the rulers, is not being observed in a similar manner.
6. The silence of the leadership over the 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution has been noted by sections of China’s vast netizen community. In response to their curiosity as to why this relative silence over the 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolt against the ruled, one of the readers’ fora of the CPC-controlled “People’s Daily” has found itself forced to make a brief reference to this unexplained and ununderstood silence.
7. A posting in one of the fora of the “People’s Daily” on July 1 said: “There is another significant anniversary this year of a milestone on the way to this moment of economic power: the centenary of the 1911 revolution, which brought an end to the Qing dynasty and with it some 2,000 years of imperial tradition. Unlike the birthday of the party, however, it is being oddly underplayed. A century later the Communist party's rule has begun to resemble the system that 1911's accidental revolutionaries overthrew: a large and privileged bureaucracy, hereditary privileges in the ruling elite, a mass of toiling workers and farmers – and, finally, the embrace of Confucius, the man the revolutionaries rejected 100 years ago, as someone with a lot to say about hierarchical government. Confucian influence, however, remains. The official doctrine today is not class struggle but harmony.”
8. While the vanguard role of the CPC might have brought the country forward to take its place as an emerging global power and as an economic power house, politically it has taken the country back to 1911 with basic political freedoms denied to people in the interest of social harmony and continuing 10 per cent plus growth rate.
9. The revolt of 1911 against the imperial rulers has been described as an accidental revolution. Can there be another accidental revolution against the rulers of present-day China by people inspired by the accidental revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt?
10. That is the fear in the minds of the Chinese leaders as they observe with pomp and pageantry the 90th anniversary of the CPC. A forum of the “People’s Daily” of June 30 quoted Ben Simpfendorfer, the managing director of Silk Road Associates, as saying:: "Unlike leaders in many developing economies, China's leaders understand the importance of giving back to the population, rather than just taking. In short, China is no Tunisia." It added: “That's a conclusion shared by most academics inside the party and overseas and one that's likely to please the wealthy businessman who was touring Jinggangshan. He said he didn't want to see China tossed by the turmoil now sweeping the Arab world. It quoted a woman companion of the businessman as saying: “I don't care who the ruler is, so long as we live well."
11. Living well is more important than living with self-respect. The CPC has enabled the people to live well. Its achievements should not be jeopardised by any premature talk of political freedoms and individual liberties.
12. The focus is on the power of the economic machine created under the leadership of the CPC which has enabled a 10 per cent plus growth rate year after year for a decade. Any talk of the political future of the Chinese society is discouraged even though Prime Minister Wen continues referring to the need for political reforms as he was doing last year.
13. It is interesting to note the differences in nuances in the statements made in connection with the anniversary by President Hu and Prime Minister Wen. Inaugurating the celebrations on July 1, Hu said as stated by the official Xinhua news agency:
“The Communist Party of China (CPC), chosen by history and the people, has accomplished three major events since its formation 90 years ago.
“The first is that the CPC, relying on the people, completed the new-democratic revolution, winning national independence and liberation of the people.
“The second is that the CPC completed the socialist revolution and established the basic socialist system.
“The third is that the Party carried out a great new revolution of reform and opening up, creating, upholding, and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.
"These three major events reshaped the future and destiny of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation."
14. Talking in London, where he was on an official visit, on June 27, Wen said: “ The best way to eradicate corruption, unfair income distribution and other ills in China is to firmly advance political structural reform and build socialist democracy under the rule of law."
15. It was an inconvenient reminder to those who are talking as if a 10 per cent plus growth rate year after year should be the end all and be all of China’s existence. So long as this objective is met, China does not have to worry about the political aspirations of its people, they feel.
16. Wen’s seems to be still a voice in the wilderness harping again and again for over a year now on the need for political reforms to maintain political and social harmony. The Party has been allowing him to say whatever he wants to say, but there seems to be very few takers in the party hierarchy for his views.
17. The fears of March-April that a Jasmine Revolution with Chinese characteristics may sprout in China have dissipated, but nervousness is still there. It is palpable as the Chinese leadership and people celebrate the 90th anniversary of the CPC and play down the importance of the 1911 revolt of the people against the rulers. They keep looking over their shoulders even as they cheer thousands and thousands of men, women and children marching before their eyes singing revolutionary songs. ( 2-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, July 1, 2011
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
STRATEGIC REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT
B.RAMAN
Since India became independent in 1947, it has had four in-house and one inter-ministerial reviews on certain aspects of national security management.
2. The in-house reviews went into the deficiencies in national security management as noticed during the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the Mizo uprising of 1966 and the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The inter-ministerial review by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by the late K.Subramanyam in 1999 went into the operational deficiencies noticed during the Kargil military conflict in 1999.
3. Of the five reviews held since 1947, three were totally Pakistan-centric, one of 1962 was China-centric and one was terrorism-related. All the previous reviews were the result of perceptions of failures in national security management which led to specific situations having a detrimental impact on national security.
4. All of them were essentially post-mortems with restricted terms of reference. They did bring about significant modifications or additions to the national security architecture--- such as the creation of the Directorate-General of Security after the 1962 war to enhance our capabilities vis-à-vis China, the creation of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) after the 1965 war with Pakistan and the Mizo uprising, the creation of the National Security Council and its Secretariat, the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) after the Kargil conflict and the National Investigation Agency and the proposed national intelligence grid after the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
5.All the major recommendations which came out of these previous reviews were implemented except one relating to the creation of the Chief of the Defence Staff system, which was not implemented reportedly due to differences amongst the three wings of the Armed Forces over the need for it.
6. Thus, the previous reviews did make significant contributions to a revamping of our national security architecture. However, since the previous reviews were triggered by perceptions of specific failures or deficiencies, they focussed on identifying the reasons for those failures and deficiencies and making necessary changes to prevent a repetition of those failures or deficiencies.
7. Since independence, there has never been a comprehensive, proactive strategic review of our national security management system, which will be futuristic and all-encompassing and not a panic reaction to past failures. Such a futuristic review has to project over different time-frames the threats to national security that could be expected in the future in the short, medium and long-terms, examine whether we have the required capabilities to be able to meet those threats, Identify existing deficiencies in capabilities, recommend action to remove them and suggest a time-frame for removing them.
8. Any futuristic exercise has to go beyond classical or conventional perceptions of national security management and the national security architecture. Its objective should be not only to enable us anticipate and meet future threats, but also to make a benign projection of our power abroad. National security management under the new context of India’s expected emergence as a major power of the region and ultimately of the world would involve identification of not only likely threats to our national security in the classical sense, but also likely hindrances to our emergence as a major power and recommending action to prevent or remove those hindrances.
9. The Government of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh needs to be complimented for setting up a National Task Force headed by Shri Naresh Chandra to make a futuristic review of our national security management system and come out with appropriate recommendations. The Task Force, as constituted, has eminent persons who had occupied senior positions in the Armed Forces, the Intelligence Community and the Atomic Energy Commission, and also non-governmental experts.
10. Shri Naresh Chandra’s credentials for heading such a futuristic exercise are immense. He had served as the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary and ultimately retired as the Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India. He is thus familiar with the working of the Armed Forces and the intelligence community. He had served as the Indian Ambassador to the US at a difficult time and is thus not a stranger to the world of big power diplomacy. He had served and continues to serve in the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and was its convenor for some time. He is thus familiar with the deficiencies which have crept into the working of our national security management system since the Kargil review of 1999.
11. How useful is the futuristic exercise being attempted for the first time since 1947 would depend on the constitution of the Task Force, its Terms of Reference, its methods of work and concepts, and the co-operation that it is able to get from the serving national security managers of today. Unless one is able to convince the serving officers of today of the need for changes, reforms, new thinking and new concepts and ideas, even the best of Task Forces would fail to meet the objectives for which it was set up.
12. It is to be hoped that the Government would have carefully worked out the terms of reference of the Task Force. Its organisation, methods and concepts have to be decided by the Task Force itself. The Government would have and should have no role in the matter. The Task Force should devote the first month of its existence to a brain-storming with different sections of our national security management world in order to get its ideas and concepts right before plunging into the nuts and bolts of the exercise.
13. We tend to have an over-fascination for nuts and bolts and an allergy for concepts. The reports of such reviews ultimately turn out to be a plethora of nuts and bolts recommendations without a proper conceptual framework which could sustain our national security management system in the coming 10 years, if not longer. We should avoid this in carrying forward this important exercise. (30-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Since India became independent in 1947, it has had four in-house and one inter-ministerial reviews on certain aspects of national security management.
2. The in-house reviews went into the deficiencies in national security management as noticed during the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the Mizo uprising of 1966 and the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The inter-ministerial review by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by the late K.Subramanyam in 1999 went into the operational deficiencies noticed during the Kargil military conflict in 1999.
3. Of the five reviews held since 1947, three were totally Pakistan-centric, one of 1962 was China-centric and one was terrorism-related. All the previous reviews were the result of perceptions of failures in national security management which led to specific situations having a detrimental impact on national security.
4. All of them were essentially post-mortems with restricted terms of reference. They did bring about significant modifications or additions to the national security architecture--- such as the creation of the Directorate-General of Security after the 1962 war to enhance our capabilities vis-à-vis China, the creation of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) after the 1965 war with Pakistan and the Mizo uprising, the creation of the National Security Council and its Secretariat, the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) after the Kargil conflict and the National Investigation Agency and the proposed national intelligence grid after the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
5.All the major recommendations which came out of these previous reviews were implemented except one relating to the creation of the Chief of the Defence Staff system, which was not implemented reportedly due to differences amongst the three wings of the Armed Forces over the need for it.
6. Thus, the previous reviews did make significant contributions to a revamping of our national security architecture. However, since the previous reviews were triggered by perceptions of specific failures or deficiencies, they focussed on identifying the reasons for those failures and deficiencies and making necessary changes to prevent a repetition of those failures or deficiencies.
7. Since independence, there has never been a comprehensive, proactive strategic review of our national security management system, which will be futuristic and all-encompassing and not a panic reaction to past failures. Such a futuristic review has to project over different time-frames the threats to national security that could be expected in the future in the short, medium and long-terms, examine whether we have the required capabilities to be able to meet those threats, Identify existing deficiencies in capabilities, recommend action to remove them and suggest a time-frame for removing them.
8. Any futuristic exercise has to go beyond classical or conventional perceptions of national security management and the national security architecture. Its objective should be not only to enable us anticipate and meet future threats, but also to make a benign projection of our power abroad. National security management under the new context of India’s expected emergence as a major power of the region and ultimately of the world would involve identification of not only likely threats to our national security in the classical sense, but also likely hindrances to our emergence as a major power and recommending action to prevent or remove those hindrances.
9. The Government of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh needs to be complimented for setting up a National Task Force headed by Shri Naresh Chandra to make a futuristic review of our national security management system and come out with appropriate recommendations. The Task Force, as constituted, has eminent persons who had occupied senior positions in the Armed Forces, the Intelligence Community and the Atomic Energy Commission, and also non-governmental experts.
10. Shri Naresh Chandra’s credentials for heading such a futuristic exercise are immense. He had served as the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary and ultimately retired as the Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India. He is thus familiar with the working of the Armed Forces and the intelligence community. He had served as the Indian Ambassador to the US at a difficult time and is thus not a stranger to the world of big power diplomacy. He had served and continues to serve in the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and was its convenor for some time. He is thus familiar with the deficiencies which have crept into the working of our national security management system since the Kargil review of 1999.
11. How useful is the futuristic exercise being attempted for the first time since 1947 would depend on the constitution of the Task Force, its Terms of Reference, its methods of work and concepts, and the co-operation that it is able to get from the serving national security managers of today. Unless one is able to convince the serving officers of today of the need for changes, reforms, new thinking and new concepts and ideas, even the best of Task Forces would fail to meet the objectives for which it was set up.
12. It is to be hoped that the Government would have carefully worked out the terms of reference of the Task Force. Its organisation, methods and concepts have to be decided by the Task Force itself. The Government would have and should have no role in the matter. The Task Force should devote the first month of its existence to a brain-storming with different sections of our national security management world in order to get its ideas and concepts right before plunging into the nuts and bolts of the exercise.
13. We tend to have an over-fascination for nuts and bolts and an allergy for concepts. The reports of such reviews ultimately turn out to be a plethora of nuts and bolts recommendations without a proper conceptual framework which could sustain our national security management system in the coming 10 years, if not longer. We should avoid this in carrying forward this important exercise. (30-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
KABUL TERRORIST ATTACK ON HOTEL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 731
B.RAMAN
After a gap of three and a half years, Kabul saw another terrorist attack on an important hotel frequented by foreigners and local VIPs on the night of June 28,2011.
2. The previous attack had taken place on January 14, 2008, when a group of terrorists, believed to be from the Afghan Taliban, stormed the gymnasium of the most popular luxury hotel, the Serena, and killed eight persons, including an American, a Norwegian and a Philippino woman. A Norwegian delegation under Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre was staying in the hotel at the time of the attack. The Australian Embassy was functioning from the hotel.
3. The target of the latest attack was Hotel Intercontinental, which is not part of the international chain by the same name. A part of the hotel was undergoing renovation involving employment of labour. Police suspect that the terrorists might have taken advantage of this to circumvent access control and gain access to the hotel.
4. At the time of the attack, a wedding party was going on in the dining room of the hotel. A meeting of provincial Governors was to start at the hotel the next day.
5. A total of nine terrorists, carrying explosive devices and wielding hand-held weapons, participated in the attack. All of them died during the operation, which lasted about five hours. After the attack started, the security forces, who were wearing night-vision devices, switched off the power supply to the hotel. This gave the security forces an operational advantage over the terrorists.
6. The attack resembled the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, which involved, inter alia, attacks on two hotels, in two respects and differed in two other respects. The resemblances were regarding the selection of a hotel frequented by foreigners as a target and the use of a mix of modus operandi involving the use of explosive devices and hand-held weapons.
7. The important differences were that it was not a swarm tactics involving well orchestrated attacks on multiple targets located at different places by multiple teams of terrorists thereby forcing the security forces to scatter their resources. It was a single target attack by a single team of terrorists. Moreover, whereas in Mumbai, there was a conscious attempt to take hostages in order to prolong the exchange of fire with the security forces, there was no such attempt in the Kabul attack.
8. Since 9/11, there have been terrorist attacks on international hotels and places of entertainment visited by tourists at some places--- twice each in Bali and Jakarta, and once each in Mombasa, Sharm-el-Sheikh, Islamabad and Mumbai. Hotels and places of entertainment for foreign tourists become favoured targets of terrorist groups because of the international publicity the attacks provide and the impact on the tourist economy.
9. Disruption of the tourist economy does not appear to have been the main motive of the Kabul attack of June 28. The objectives seem to have been to demonstrate the continuing capability of the terrorists to penetrate security barriers in Kabul and the weaknesses of the Afghan security forces and to call into question US claims of making progress in the counter-insurgency operations against the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. While the Afghan Taliban has made an as yet unsubstantiated claim for the attack, the possibility of the involvement of the Haqqani network has not been ruled out by the authorities.
10. The available details of the attack are as follows: According to Afghan security officials, the attack was initiated by two suicide bombers. One of them blew himself up at the front of the hotel and the other on the second floor. Three attackers managed to reach the roof of the hotel. They were killed by a NATO helicopter. One of the attackers took shelter in a room. After an exchange of fire with the security forces, he blew himself up. As he did so, two policemen and a Spanish guest of the hotel, a commercial pilot, were killed. The details relating to the killing of the other three terrorists are not available. A total of 11 civilians and two policemen were killed in the attack.
11. The attack once again highlighted the difficulties faced by security forces and private security companies in providing effective physical security in hotels. Excessive deployment of armed security personnel might deter foreign tourists from staying in the hotel. Inadequate security could make the hotel a tempting target for the terrorists. ( 29-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
After a gap of three and a half years, Kabul saw another terrorist attack on an important hotel frequented by foreigners and local VIPs on the night of June 28,2011.
2. The previous attack had taken place on January 14, 2008, when a group of terrorists, believed to be from the Afghan Taliban, stormed the gymnasium of the most popular luxury hotel, the Serena, and killed eight persons, including an American, a Norwegian and a Philippino woman. A Norwegian delegation under Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre was staying in the hotel at the time of the attack. The Australian Embassy was functioning from the hotel.
3. The target of the latest attack was Hotel Intercontinental, which is not part of the international chain by the same name. A part of the hotel was undergoing renovation involving employment of labour. Police suspect that the terrorists might have taken advantage of this to circumvent access control and gain access to the hotel.
4. At the time of the attack, a wedding party was going on in the dining room of the hotel. A meeting of provincial Governors was to start at the hotel the next day.
5. A total of nine terrorists, carrying explosive devices and wielding hand-held weapons, participated in the attack. All of them died during the operation, which lasted about five hours. After the attack started, the security forces, who were wearing night-vision devices, switched off the power supply to the hotel. This gave the security forces an operational advantage over the terrorists.
6. The attack resembled the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, which involved, inter alia, attacks on two hotels, in two respects and differed in two other respects. The resemblances were regarding the selection of a hotel frequented by foreigners as a target and the use of a mix of modus operandi involving the use of explosive devices and hand-held weapons.
7. The important differences were that it was not a swarm tactics involving well orchestrated attacks on multiple targets located at different places by multiple teams of terrorists thereby forcing the security forces to scatter their resources. It was a single target attack by a single team of terrorists. Moreover, whereas in Mumbai, there was a conscious attempt to take hostages in order to prolong the exchange of fire with the security forces, there was no such attempt in the Kabul attack.
8. Since 9/11, there have been terrorist attacks on international hotels and places of entertainment visited by tourists at some places--- twice each in Bali and Jakarta, and once each in Mombasa, Sharm-el-Sheikh, Islamabad and Mumbai. Hotels and places of entertainment for foreign tourists become favoured targets of terrorist groups because of the international publicity the attacks provide and the impact on the tourist economy.
9. Disruption of the tourist economy does not appear to have been the main motive of the Kabul attack of June 28. The objectives seem to have been to demonstrate the continuing capability of the terrorists to penetrate security barriers in Kabul and the weaknesses of the Afghan security forces and to call into question US claims of making progress in the counter-insurgency operations against the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. While the Afghan Taliban has made an as yet unsubstantiated claim for the attack, the possibility of the involvement of the Haqqani network has not been ruled out by the authorities.
10. The available details of the attack are as follows: According to Afghan security officials, the attack was initiated by two suicide bombers. One of them blew himself up at the front of the hotel and the other on the second floor. Three attackers managed to reach the roof of the hotel. They were killed by a NATO helicopter. One of the attackers took shelter in a room. After an exchange of fire with the security forces, he blew himself up. As he did so, two policemen and a Spanish guest of the hotel, a commercial pilot, were killed. The details relating to the killing of the other three terrorists are not available. A total of 11 civilians and two policemen were killed in the attack.
11. The attack once again highlighted the difficulties faced by security forces and private security companies in providing effective physical security in hotels. Excessive deployment of armed security personnel might deter foreign tourists from staying in the hotel. Inadequate security could make the hotel a tempting target for the terrorists. ( 29-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
MY THOUGHTS ON PMO'S MEDIA STRATEGY
B.RAMAN
It has been reported that the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, will be interacting with a small group of senior journalists from the print media on June 29,2011, to explain and discuss various aspects of the policies of his Government which have caused concern in the public mind. It has also been reported that this is the beginning of an exercise to address criticism of the total lack of communication between him and his personal advisers on the one side and the media world on the other.
2.The Government headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh is one of the most anonymous Governments the country has had since it became independent in 1947. We hardly know who are the experts on whose advice in various matters he relies for policy-making. We have very little idea of Who’s Who in the Prime Minister’s office. We hardly have an opportunity of mingling with the Prime Minister. He is a phantom Prime Minister.
3.We cannot afford to go on like this. Things have to change. We need urgent reforms first and foremost in the way the Prime Minister and his office function. Let there be an open debate about it. Let the Prime Minister encourage the debate. Let him shed the image of a phantom and come out talking, arguing, bantering, smiling and laughing. One is never too old for this.
4. We have a media world of uncontrollable plurality and diversity--- the national media, the regional media, the English media, the Hindi media, the media of the regional languages, the ethnic media and so on. The organisation and methods which work in the US and other Western democracies are unlikely to work in India. We need a media strategy based on modern thinking, modern technologies and modern organisation and methods----but in Indian and not Western colours.
5.We do not presently have a media strategy group in the PMO which understands the rapidly evolving media world and is able to keep pace with it, even if it is not able to keep ahead of it. In 2011---as it was in 1947--- the Prime Minister of this country, which projects itself as an emerging power, continues to rely on a media advisor, who is either from the print media or from the Central Information Service of the Government of India.
6. At a time when the print media has been overtaken in its innovative, projection and connectivity skills by the electronic media and the new media of the cyber world, it is generally a senior journalist from the print media --- who made his or her name as a pro-PM columnist--- who continues to advise the Prime Minister on his media strategies. All those chosen for this job till now tended to be over-protective of the Prime Minister. Instead of encouraging the Prime Minister to venture out and interact with various sections of the media, they tended to keep him on leash discouraging him from such interaction. The only few occasions when the media is able to interact with the Prime Minister and his close advisers freely and frankly are when they meet him on board his aircraft during his foreign travels. They do not get such opportunities when he is in India.
7.More than 60 years after our independence, we have not been able to develop a PMO Press Corps similar to the White House Press Corps consisting of journalists who have spent their lifetime studying how the Prime Minister and his office function and how they make policies.
8. Our inability to develop a PMO Press Corps is partly due to the financial constraints faced by our media. They cannot afford to have journalists focussing only on the Prime Minister and his office. It cannot be a full-time job as the White House coverage is in the US.
9. Another reason is that the PMO itself does not provide opportunities for the journalists to develop a PMO expertise by creating opportunities for them to interact frequently with the PM and his close advisers.
10. This has to change. There is a need for a larger media advisory cum strategy group in the PMO consisting of representatives from different media disciplines, technologies and age groups. Looking at India and the world only through the eyes of the print media has to change. In projecting the Prime Minister’s personality and policies, the role of the electronic media has become more important than that of the print media. People assess our Prime Minister no longer merely by what they read of him in the print media, but in an increasing measure by what they see of him on the TV. The new media of the cyber world is bidding fair to catch up with the electronic media. A media strategy largely influenced by minds from the print media is becoming increasingly inadequate and even obsolete.
11. The setting-up of such a group headed by a media-savvy strategist is the urgent need of the hour. Once such a group is set up and starts functioning as it should, other details will automatically fall in their place. (29-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
It has been reported that the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, will be interacting with a small group of senior journalists from the print media on June 29,2011, to explain and discuss various aspects of the policies of his Government which have caused concern in the public mind. It has also been reported that this is the beginning of an exercise to address criticism of the total lack of communication between him and his personal advisers on the one side and the media world on the other.
2.The Government headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh is one of the most anonymous Governments the country has had since it became independent in 1947. We hardly know who are the experts on whose advice in various matters he relies for policy-making. We have very little idea of Who’s Who in the Prime Minister’s office. We hardly have an opportunity of mingling with the Prime Minister. He is a phantom Prime Minister.
3.We cannot afford to go on like this. Things have to change. We need urgent reforms first and foremost in the way the Prime Minister and his office function. Let there be an open debate about it. Let the Prime Minister encourage the debate. Let him shed the image of a phantom and come out talking, arguing, bantering, smiling and laughing. One is never too old for this.
4. We have a media world of uncontrollable plurality and diversity--- the national media, the regional media, the English media, the Hindi media, the media of the regional languages, the ethnic media and so on. The organisation and methods which work in the US and other Western democracies are unlikely to work in India. We need a media strategy based on modern thinking, modern technologies and modern organisation and methods----but in Indian and not Western colours.
5.We do not presently have a media strategy group in the PMO which understands the rapidly evolving media world and is able to keep pace with it, even if it is not able to keep ahead of it. In 2011---as it was in 1947--- the Prime Minister of this country, which projects itself as an emerging power, continues to rely on a media advisor, who is either from the print media or from the Central Information Service of the Government of India.
6. At a time when the print media has been overtaken in its innovative, projection and connectivity skills by the electronic media and the new media of the cyber world, it is generally a senior journalist from the print media --- who made his or her name as a pro-PM columnist--- who continues to advise the Prime Minister on his media strategies. All those chosen for this job till now tended to be over-protective of the Prime Minister. Instead of encouraging the Prime Minister to venture out and interact with various sections of the media, they tended to keep him on leash discouraging him from such interaction. The only few occasions when the media is able to interact with the Prime Minister and his close advisers freely and frankly are when they meet him on board his aircraft during his foreign travels. They do not get such opportunities when he is in India.
7.More than 60 years after our independence, we have not been able to develop a PMO Press Corps similar to the White House Press Corps consisting of journalists who have spent their lifetime studying how the Prime Minister and his office function and how they make policies.
8. Our inability to develop a PMO Press Corps is partly due to the financial constraints faced by our media. They cannot afford to have journalists focussing only on the Prime Minister and his office. It cannot be a full-time job as the White House coverage is in the US.
9. Another reason is that the PMO itself does not provide opportunities for the journalists to develop a PMO expertise by creating opportunities for them to interact frequently with the PM and his close advisers.
10. This has to change. There is a need for a larger media advisory cum strategy group in the PMO consisting of representatives from different media disciplines, technologies and age groups. Looking at India and the world only through the eyes of the print media has to change. In projecting the Prime Minister’s personality and policies, the role of the electronic media has become more important than that of the print media. People assess our Prime Minister no longer merely by what they read of him in the print media, but in an increasing measure by what they see of him on the TV. The new media of the cyber world is bidding fair to catch up with the electronic media. A media strategy largely influenced by minds from the print media is becoming increasingly inadequate and even obsolete.
11. The setting-up of such a group headed by a media-savvy strategist is the urgent need of the hour. Once such a group is set up and starts functioning as it should, other details will automatically fall in their place. (29-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, June 27, 2011
MR.PRIME MINISTER: TIME TO THUMP THE TABLE
B.RAMAN
Mr.Prime Minister,
The time to thump the table has come.
The time to say: Here I am. Here I will be. The Prime Minister of India.
The time to tell the people of India: I have received your message. I understand your anguish over the state of India. I share your concerns over corruption. I realise that it has become the single dominating issue governing the thought process of the nation. Of what use eight plus growth rate, of what use my unblemished reputation as a man of integrity, if I am perceived by large sections of the people as heading a Government of the corrupt, by the corrupt and for the corrupt. I am determined to see that your anguish is mitigated and that your concerns are addressed in the short time that is still left for me to serve as the Prime Minister of this great nation. If I cannot do that due to circumstances beyond my control, I will quit without a moment’s hesitation. Heavens won’t fall if I cease to be the Prime Minister of India. I would rather be an ordinary citizen of this great country than be its effete Prime Minister unable to do what he wants to do, unable to do what he ought to do.
The time to tell your colleagues in your Cabinet: I am the Prime Minister so long as I sit in this chair. I shall remain the Prime Minister. I will be heard. I will be respected. I will be obeyed. My instructions will be adhered to. Those not willing to do so, better quit the Cabinet. If they don’t, I would not hesitate to drop them from the Cabinet.
The time to tell Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the President of the Congress (I): I may have been nominated by you to sit in this chair. So long as I sit in this chair, I am the Prime Minister of India and not you. All governmental authority will flow from me and not from you. My voice and my authority will count --- and count decisively—in all policy matters affecting national interests. My first obligation as the Prime Minister is to the people of India. I will listen to their voice and let that voice have its due role in influencing policy-making. There cannot be two centres of authority. The country cannot afford to have a Prime Minister who is seen by the people as no Prime Minister. Hereafter, I will either be the effective Prime Minister of India or you look for someone else with whom you feel comfortable and who will carry out your wishes. If I quit, the worst that can happen to me is that I will be reduced to a non-person as it happened to Narasimha Rao. So be it. I will rather go down in history as a non-person, but who was respected by his people rather than as a Prime Minister who was laughed at by his people.
The time to tell your colleagues in the Congress (I):Better stop your campaign to weaken my authority as the Prime Minister of India and to project Rahul Gandhi as born to be the Prime Minister of India. I do not see my job only as to keep the chair warm for Rahul Gandhi. I see my job as meant to address the needs and concerns of the people of India. So long as I sit in this chair, I will do what the people of this country expect me to do in the interest of the nation and not what you expect me to do in the interest of Rahul Gandhi. If you are not prepared to accept this, advise Mrs.Sonia Gandhi to nominate another Prime Minister.
Mr.Prime Minister,
The time to assert yourself has come.
The time to put all your detractors in your Cabinet and your party in their place has come.
The time to protect the integrity and honour of the institution of the Prime Minister of India has come.
The nation looks up to you to act boldly and to lead the people of India instead of being perceived merely as driftwood.
Act, Mr. Prime Minister, act. The people of this country will be behind you.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Mr.Prime Minister,
The time to thump the table has come.
The time to say: Here I am. Here I will be. The Prime Minister of India.
The time to tell the people of India: I have received your message. I understand your anguish over the state of India. I share your concerns over corruption. I realise that it has become the single dominating issue governing the thought process of the nation. Of what use eight plus growth rate, of what use my unblemished reputation as a man of integrity, if I am perceived by large sections of the people as heading a Government of the corrupt, by the corrupt and for the corrupt. I am determined to see that your anguish is mitigated and that your concerns are addressed in the short time that is still left for me to serve as the Prime Minister of this great nation. If I cannot do that due to circumstances beyond my control, I will quit without a moment’s hesitation. Heavens won’t fall if I cease to be the Prime Minister of India. I would rather be an ordinary citizen of this great country than be its effete Prime Minister unable to do what he wants to do, unable to do what he ought to do.
The time to tell your colleagues in your Cabinet: I am the Prime Minister so long as I sit in this chair. I shall remain the Prime Minister. I will be heard. I will be respected. I will be obeyed. My instructions will be adhered to. Those not willing to do so, better quit the Cabinet. If they don’t, I would not hesitate to drop them from the Cabinet.
The time to tell Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the President of the Congress (I): I may have been nominated by you to sit in this chair. So long as I sit in this chair, I am the Prime Minister of India and not you. All governmental authority will flow from me and not from you. My voice and my authority will count --- and count decisively—in all policy matters affecting national interests. My first obligation as the Prime Minister is to the people of India. I will listen to their voice and let that voice have its due role in influencing policy-making. There cannot be two centres of authority. The country cannot afford to have a Prime Minister who is seen by the people as no Prime Minister. Hereafter, I will either be the effective Prime Minister of India or you look for someone else with whom you feel comfortable and who will carry out your wishes. If I quit, the worst that can happen to me is that I will be reduced to a non-person as it happened to Narasimha Rao. So be it. I will rather go down in history as a non-person, but who was respected by his people rather than as a Prime Minister who was laughed at by his people.
The time to tell your colleagues in the Congress (I):Better stop your campaign to weaken my authority as the Prime Minister of India and to project Rahul Gandhi as born to be the Prime Minister of India. I do not see my job only as to keep the chair warm for Rahul Gandhi. I see my job as meant to address the needs and concerns of the people of India. So long as I sit in this chair, I will do what the people of this country expect me to do in the interest of the nation and not what you expect me to do in the interest of Rahul Gandhi. If you are not prepared to accept this, advise Mrs.Sonia Gandhi to nominate another Prime Minister.
Mr.Prime Minister,
The time to assert yourself has come.
The time to put all your detractors in your Cabinet and your party in their place has come.
The time to protect the integrity and honour of the institution of the Prime Minister of India has come.
The nation looks up to you to act boldly and to lead the people of India instead of being perceived merely as driftwood.
Act, Mr. Prime Minister, act. The people of this country will be behind you.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
INTROSPECTION IN PAKISTAN: WILL IT ENDURE?
B.RAMAN
The anger and humiliation caused in Pakistan by the unilateral raid by US naval commandos on the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011, and by the inability of the Pakistani Army and Air Force to prevent the raid have had two significant effects.
2.The first is widespread questioning by different sections of public and military opinion of the advisability of the present level of co-operation with the US and other NATO countries in counter-terrorism and the increasing dependence on the US for military and economic assistance.
3.While the state of Pakistan is not in a position to reduce its dependence on the US for assistance, an exercise is already on to curtail the present level of co-operation in counter-terrorism. As part of this exercise, there has been a reduction in the presence of intelligence officers and trainers from the US and other NATO countries based in Pakistan. The US and the UK have been told that Pakistan no longer requires training assistance for its security forces engaged in counter-terrorism duties and asked to withdraw the bulk of their trainers from Pakistani territory.
4. Only two aspects of the bilateral co-operation between Pakistan and the US have remained untouched till now. The first relates to the permission given by the Pakistani authorities for the unloading of logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan at the Karachi port and their road movement to Afghanistan by trucks. The second relates to the informal acceptance by the Pakistani authorities of the operations of the US Drone (pilotless plane ) strikes on suspected terrorist infrastructure in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).Recently, the US has stepped up its Drone strikes on suspected hide-outs of the Haqqani Network in the Kurram area of the FATA without facing any objection from the military leadership.
5.Simultaneously with the exercise to re-fashion Pakistan’s relations with the US, one could also discern initial signs of an introspection over the advisability of the present policy of unrelenting hostility to India. Some have started arguing that it is this hostility to India encouraged and promoted by the military leadership that has been leading to a high level of dependence on the US. It is, therefore, argued that if Pakistan wants to reduce its strategic dependence on the US, it has to have a new look at its present policies towards India.
6.In an article carried by the “Dawn” of Karachi on June 20,2011, Adnan Rehmat a journalist, analyst and media development specialist, who heads an NGO called Intermedia, argued for a new look India policy in the following words: “Misplaced bravado does not make pride and there’s no shame in desiring peace with someone we’ve painted as an enemy. The only way the delusional mindset that ill-serves Pakistan will be righted is when the national security doctrine puts the people, not the military establishment, at the center of Pakistan’s raison d ‘etre. We have tried India as an enemy and it has cost us dearly. It’s time to try India as a friend because the cost of being a friend is far, far less than the cost of being an enemy.”
7. More than the article itself, what has been a pleasant surprise is the large number of favourable readers’ endorsement that it has been receiving. The article has already received 162 feed-backs from the readers ---many of them positive.
8. The mood of less suspicion towards India which one notices could be attributed not only to the realisation that the past policy of hostility to India has proved counter-productive and increased Pakistan’s dependence on the US, but also to the improvement in the ground situation in Balochistan. The Baloch freedom-struggle is showing signs of losing steam. The number of attacks on Punjabi settlers working in Balochistan has declined. There is less disruption of the gas supply to industrial units in Punjab and Sindh from Balochistan.
9. The weakening of the Baloch freedom struggle is partly due to infighting among Baloch nationalist leaders and partly due to the ruthless suppression by the Army. India never had any role in encouraging the separatist movement in Balochistan. Despite this, the Pakistani authorities had convinced themselves that the Baloch freedom struggle could not have achieved the successes that it had without clandestine Indian support.
10. The splits in the movement and its consequent weakening have come as a pleasant surprise to the Pakistani authorities. This seems to be having a benign effect on their perception of India vis-à-vis Balochistan.
11. The attempt to look at India less negatively as a result of these developments is presently confined to sections of the civil society and to the non-governmental world. One does not as yet see signs of it in the Armed Forces, but the civilian bureaucracy shows signs of keeping its traditional anti-India reflexes in check. The ambiance of declining negativism towards each other noticed during the just concluded talks between Smt.Nirupama Rao, India’s Foreign Secretary, and Mr.Salman Bashir, her Pakistani counterpart, at Islamabad, is a sign of hope. Will it endure and gather strength? (27-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently. Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The anger and humiliation caused in Pakistan by the unilateral raid by US naval commandos on the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011, and by the inability of the Pakistani Army and Air Force to prevent the raid have had two significant effects.
2.The first is widespread questioning by different sections of public and military opinion of the advisability of the present level of co-operation with the US and other NATO countries in counter-terrorism and the increasing dependence on the US for military and economic assistance.
3.While the state of Pakistan is not in a position to reduce its dependence on the US for assistance, an exercise is already on to curtail the present level of co-operation in counter-terrorism. As part of this exercise, there has been a reduction in the presence of intelligence officers and trainers from the US and other NATO countries based in Pakistan. The US and the UK have been told that Pakistan no longer requires training assistance for its security forces engaged in counter-terrorism duties and asked to withdraw the bulk of their trainers from Pakistani territory.
4. Only two aspects of the bilateral co-operation between Pakistan and the US have remained untouched till now. The first relates to the permission given by the Pakistani authorities for the unloading of logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan at the Karachi port and their road movement to Afghanistan by trucks. The second relates to the informal acceptance by the Pakistani authorities of the operations of the US Drone (pilotless plane ) strikes on suspected terrorist infrastructure in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).Recently, the US has stepped up its Drone strikes on suspected hide-outs of the Haqqani Network in the Kurram area of the FATA without facing any objection from the military leadership.
5.Simultaneously with the exercise to re-fashion Pakistan’s relations with the US, one could also discern initial signs of an introspection over the advisability of the present policy of unrelenting hostility to India. Some have started arguing that it is this hostility to India encouraged and promoted by the military leadership that has been leading to a high level of dependence on the US. It is, therefore, argued that if Pakistan wants to reduce its strategic dependence on the US, it has to have a new look at its present policies towards India.
6.In an article carried by the “Dawn” of Karachi on June 20,2011, Adnan Rehmat a journalist, analyst and media development specialist, who heads an NGO called Intermedia, argued for a new look India policy in the following words: “Misplaced bravado does not make pride and there’s no shame in desiring peace with someone we’ve painted as an enemy. The only way the delusional mindset that ill-serves Pakistan will be righted is when the national security doctrine puts the people, not the military establishment, at the center of Pakistan’s raison d ‘etre. We have tried India as an enemy and it has cost us dearly. It’s time to try India as a friend because the cost of being a friend is far, far less than the cost of being an enemy.”
7. More than the article itself, what has been a pleasant surprise is the large number of favourable readers’ endorsement that it has been receiving. The article has already received 162 feed-backs from the readers ---many of them positive.
8. The mood of less suspicion towards India which one notices could be attributed not only to the realisation that the past policy of hostility to India has proved counter-productive and increased Pakistan’s dependence on the US, but also to the improvement in the ground situation in Balochistan. The Baloch freedom-struggle is showing signs of losing steam. The number of attacks on Punjabi settlers working in Balochistan has declined. There is less disruption of the gas supply to industrial units in Punjab and Sindh from Balochistan.
9. The weakening of the Baloch freedom struggle is partly due to infighting among Baloch nationalist leaders and partly due to the ruthless suppression by the Army. India never had any role in encouraging the separatist movement in Balochistan. Despite this, the Pakistani authorities had convinced themselves that the Baloch freedom struggle could not have achieved the successes that it had without clandestine Indian support.
10. The splits in the movement and its consequent weakening have come as a pleasant surprise to the Pakistani authorities. This seems to be having a benign effect on their perception of India vis-à-vis Balochistan.
11. The attempt to look at India less negatively as a result of these developments is presently confined to sections of the civil society and to the non-governmental world. One does not as yet see signs of it in the Armed Forces, but the civilian bureaucracy shows signs of keeping its traditional anti-India reflexes in check. The ambiance of declining negativism towards each other noticed during the just concluded talks between Smt.Nirupama Rao, India’s Foreign Secretary, and Mr.Salman Bashir, her Pakistani counterpart, at Islamabad, is a sign of hope. Will it endure and gather strength? (27-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently. Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, June 26, 2011
SAMJAUTA EXPRESS: UNWARRANTED LINKAGE
B.RAMAN
The five acts of reprisal terrorism carried out by some angry members of the Hindu community against their Muslim fellow-citizens since 2006 need to be strongly condemned and those responsible arrested and prosecuted.
2. We owe the strong action against the guilty to ourselves and to the relatives of the targeted Muslims.
3. These deplorable acts were the outcome of anger among some members of the Hindu community over what they perceived as the ineffective response of the Government of India towards jihadi terrorism directed against our soft targets. These jihadi attacks were being orchestrated and co-ordinated by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
4. All of us were angry over these acts and over the perceived failure of the Government to deal with them effectively. International law and UN resolutions on State-sponsored terrorism gave us the right to retaliate not only against the Pakistan-based organisations which were carrying out these strikes, but also against the State of Pakistan, which was repeatedly sponsoring such acts.
5. But the Government of India lacked the will to retaliate and the competence to stop the recurring terrorist strikes. It is under these circumstances that some members of the Hindu community decided to act on their own and retaliate.
6.Initially, they attacked our own fellow Muslim citizens and then the Pakistani nationals visiting their relatives in India when they allegedly carried out an explosion on board the Samjauta Express train in February 2007.
7. The history of terrorism has instances of such acts of reprisal by individual citizens dissatisfied with the official counter-terrorism response. We had seen it in Northern Ireland when some angry members of the Protestant community took the law into their own hands against their Catholic fellow-citizens.
8. Fortunately, better sense has prevailed and such reprisal attacks by individual members of the Hindu community against fellow-Muslims have stopped. The Government’s focus now should be on getting these five incidents investigated and prosecuted professionally.
9. There are two disturbing aspects to the follow-up action by the Government of India. The first is the seeming lack of a professional investigation, which has remained superficial and politically directed without any satisfactory evidence against organisations such as the RSS. To blame the RSS just because some of those arrested had an association with it would be as unfair as it would be to blame the Army just because some of those arrested were serving in the Army.
10.One has an impression that the investigation is being used as a political stick to beat the RSS with. The objective has become not the successful prosecution of the suspects, but the discrediting of the RSS. This would prove counter-productive.
11. The second disturbing aspect is our allowing Pakistan to project a linkage between the ISI-sponsored 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the explosion in the Samjauta Express. Our over-anxiety to show extra sensitivity to Pakistan’s psychological pressure on the Samjauta Express incident is unwarranted. This over-anxiety was evident in the way our National Investigation Agency (NIA) hastened with the filing of the charge-sheet against the Hindus arrested on the eve of the talks between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries in Islamabad.
12. Our investigation into the Samjauta Express incident is a stand-alone case unrelated to 26/11 in any manner. The Hindus who allegedly carried out the explosion were not sponsored by the Indian State. They had no ideological agenda. To see a moral and legal equivalence between what happened on board the Samjauta Express in February 2007 and what happened in Mumbai for almost three days in November,2008 is a total distortion of the facts relating to Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a weapon against India.
13. Pakistan wants to project the terrorism sponsored by it against India since 1981 as part of an action-reaction syndrome. We are walking into that trap by relaxing the pressure on Pakistan to arrest and prosecute successfully all those involved in the 26/11 strikes and by succumbing to Pakistani pressure on the Samjauta Express incident. (27-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
The five acts of reprisal terrorism carried out by some angry members of the Hindu community against their Muslim fellow-citizens since 2006 need to be strongly condemned and those responsible arrested and prosecuted.
2. We owe the strong action against the guilty to ourselves and to the relatives of the targeted Muslims.
3. These deplorable acts were the outcome of anger among some members of the Hindu community over what they perceived as the ineffective response of the Government of India towards jihadi terrorism directed against our soft targets. These jihadi attacks were being orchestrated and co-ordinated by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
4. All of us were angry over these acts and over the perceived failure of the Government to deal with them effectively. International law and UN resolutions on State-sponsored terrorism gave us the right to retaliate not only against the Pakistan-based organisations which were carrying out these strikes, but also against the State of Pakistan, which was repeatedly sponsoring such acts.
5. But the Government of India lacked the will to retaliate and the competence to stop the recurring terrorist strikes. It is under these circumstances that some members of the Hindu community decided to act on their own and retaliate.
6.Initially, they attacked our own fellow Muslim citizens and then the Pakistani nationals visiting their relatives in India when they allegedly carried out an explosion on board the Samjauta Express train in February 2007.
7. The history of terrorism has instances of such acts of reprisal by individual citizens dissatisfied with the official counter-terrorism response. We had seen it in Northern Ireland when some angry members of the Protestant community took the law into their own hands against their Catholic fellow-citizens.
8. Fortunately, better sense has prevailed and such reprisal attacks by individual members of the Hindu community against fellow-Muslims have stopped. The Government’s focus now should be on getting these five incidents investigated and prosecuted professionally.
9. There are two disturbing aspects to the follow-up action by the Government of India. The first is the seeming lack of a professional investigation, which has remained superficial and politically directed without any satisfactory evidence against organisations such as the RSS. To blame the RSS just because some of those arrested had an association with it would be as unfair as it would be to blame the Army just because some of those arrested were serving in the Army.
10.One has an impression that the investigation is being used as a political stick to beat the RSS with. The objective has become not the successful prosecution of the suspects, but the discrediting of the RSS. This would prove counter-productive.
11. The second disturbing aspect is our allowing Pakistan to project a linkage between the ISI-sponsored 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the explosion in the Samjauta Express. Our over-anxiety to show extra sensitivity to Pakistan’s psychological pressure on the Samjauta Express incident is unwarranted. This over-anxiety was evident in the way our National Investigation Agency (NIA) hastened with the filing of the charge-sheet against the Hindus arrested on the eve of the talks between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries in Islamabad.
12. Our investigation into the Samjauta Express incident is a stand-alone case unrelated to 26/11 in any manner. The Hindus who allegedly carried out the explosion were not sponsored by the Indian State. They had no ideological agenda. To see a moral and legal equivalence between what happened on board the Samjauta Express in February 2007 and what happened in Mumbai for almost three days in November,2008 is a total distortion of the facts relating to Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a weapon against India.
13. Pakistan wants to project the terrorism sponsored by it against India since 1981 as part of an action-reaction syndrome. We are walking into that trap by relaxing the pressure on Pakistan to arrest and prosecute successfully all those involved in the 26/11 strikes and by succumbing to Pakistani pressure on the Samjauta Express incident. (27-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
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