B.RAMAN
Can Pakistan unilaterally renounce US assistance in protest against the violation of its sovereignty by the US naval commandos who raided Osama bin Laden's house at Abbottabad on the night of May 1,2011, and killed him and as a mark of its indignation over the crescendo of US allegations and suspicions regarding a possible complicity of the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in facilitating OBL's stay at Abbottabad for nearly five years?
2. According to reliable sources in Pakistan, this is one of the options being considered by the political and military leadership to ward off public criticism over the perceived inaction of the political and military leaders in the face of the repeated violations of Pakistan's sovereignty by US Drone (pilotless) aircraft in the tribal belt in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and at Abbottabad by the naval commandos.
3. The violation of the sovereignty at Abbottabad has been particularly galling to officers at the lower and middle levels of the Armed Forces. The reputation till now enjoyed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in the eyes of these officers as a quiet strong man has been dented. Many of these officers no longer regard him as strong as they originally thought he was.
4.Concern over the damage suffered by the reputation of Kayani and other senior officers is behind Kayan's visits to many garrison towns after a Corps Commanders' conference in the GHQ in Rawalpindi last week to explain why the Abbottabad raid took the army by surprise.
5. According to these sources, many in the Corps Commanders conference voiced their disquiet over the failure of the civilian political leadership----particularly President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani--- to vigorously defend the Army and the ISI in the face of the attacks on their competence and professional integrity emanating from high levels of the US Administration, including Mr.Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who co-ordinated the commando raid.
6. The aggressive anti-US remarks of Gilani in the National Assembly on May 9 were prompted by the seething anger in the Army over the perceived hesitation in the civilian leadership in coming to the defence of the Army and the ISi. The cordiality that till now prevailed in the relationship between Prime Minister Gilani and Kayani is showing signs of being dissipated.
7. These sources feel that the danger of another coup being staged by a resentful army is remote because the Army is no longer confident of enjoying the support of the increasingly independent and fearless judiciary in legitimising any coup post-facto. At the same time, the Army's disillusionment with the leadership qualities of Zardari is showing signs of increasing and pressures are likely to increase for his exit. The salvos against Zardari and Gilani fired by Shah Mehmood Quereshi, former Foreign Minister, for their incompetent handling of the Abbottabad raid have been inspired by his Army backers.
8. These sources add that it is in this context that suggestions are being made for some dramatic action by the political and military leadership to salvage the reputation of the country. One such suggestion is for a unilateral renunciation of US assistance. Whether this option will be accepted and implemented or not will depend on the kind of support China is prepared to extend should Pakistan unilaterally renounce US assistance. To ascertain this will be the principal objective of Gilani's four-day visit to China from May 17. The fact that Gilani has not immediately dashed off to Beijing, but will be going only after a week would indicate a desire to avoid over-reaction in the heat of the moment. ( 11-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Monday, May 9, 2011
INDIAN MEDIA IN ISLAMABAD
B.RAMAN
Interested Indian observers should thank Sen.Rehman Malik, a fellow cop like me, who is Pakistan's Interior Minister, for facilitating the visit to Islamabad at this sensitive time in the history of Pakistan of two prominent and widely-respected journalists of the Indian electronic media---Barkha Dutt of NDTV and Suhasini Haider of CNN-IBN--- for reporting on the delicate situation there by asking the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi to issue them visas.
2. It has been reported that on the receipt of a Tweet from Barkha regarding the issue of a visa, he intervened immediately to ensure that Indian journalists based in New Delhi faced no difficulty in getting visas. Barkha and Suhasini were among the initial beneficiaries of his intervention.
3. This was a remarkable gesture by Senator Malik which has made me wonder how we in India would have conducted ourselves in a similar situation. If at the height of a national security situation in India, some reputed Pakistani journalists had tweeted Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seeking his intervention for a visa, would he have intervened? If some well-known Pakistani TV journalists had wanted to come to New Delhi to telecast debates on issues relating to India's relations with Pakistan and the US, would we have allowed them in the same way Pakistan's Interior Ministry--- without any apparent constraining intervention from the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence so far--- has allowed Barkha and Suhasini to report from Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad? Would we have allowed a Pakistani journalist like Hamid Mir or Ejaz Haider or Hanif Mohammad or any such personality to telecast a live talk show from New Delhi involving eminent opinion-makers in the brilliant way Barkha has been doing from Islamabad for the last three nights?
4. I have been closely following the despatches of Barkha and Suhasini and the live debates organised by Barkha from Islamabad for the last three nights. What has fascinated me is not only the rich contents of their despatches and debates, but also the freedom with which the two have apparently been allowed to report and discuss live from Islamabad.
5. Their despatches and debates are being watched not only by audiences in India, but also by audiences in Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities have till now not shown the least sign of nervousness that the reportage of Barkha and Suhasini could add to their difficulties in dealing with a very sensitive domestic situation.
6. This speaks very highly of the self-confidence of Senator Malik and his colleagues and their keenness not to do anything that might come in the way of reporting by the Indian journalists even if there be a potential risk of creating difficulties for the Pakistan Govt.
7. Thanks to the scintillating debates organised by Barkha----three so far--- and the crisp and well-analysed reporting of Suhasini, we in India have a better understanding of the storm signals from Pakistan --- in relation to domestic affairs as well as its relations with the US. Barkha and Suhasini need to be complimented in equal measure for maintaining a healthy balance and restraint in their reporting and for not letting themselves be influenced by "the Fix Pakistan" syndrome unfortunately seen in many other TV news channels.
8.Indo-Pakistan relations are generally characterised by petty-mindedness, suspicions and chicanerry on both sides. Senator Rehman Malik needs to be complimented for rising above such negative reflexes in facilitating the coverage of the situation in Pakistan by Barkha and Suhasini.
9. If we in India are fair and mentally generous, we ought to recognise the gesture of Senator Malik for what it is and reciprocate it in good measure from our side in the hope of paving the way for a turning point in the attitude of the two Governments towards each other's media. (10-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Strudies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Interested Indian observers should thank Sen.Rehman Malik, a fellow cop like me, who is Pakistan's Interior Minister, for facilitating the visit to Islamabad at this sensitive time in the history of Pakistan of two prominent and widely-respected journalists of the Indian electronic media---Barkha Dutt of NDTV and Suhasini Haider of CNN-IBN--- for reporting on the delicate situation there by asking the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi to issue them visas.
2. It has been reported that on the receipt of a Tweet from Barkha regarding the issue of a visa, he intervened immediately to ensure that Indian journalists based in New Delhi faced no difficulty in getting visas. Barkha and Suhasini were among the initial beneficiaries of his intervention.
3. This was a remarkable gesture by Senator Malik which has made me wonder how we in India would have conducted ourselves in a similar situation. If at the height of a national security situation in India, some reputed Pakistani journalists had tweeted Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seeking his intervention for a visa, would he have intervened? If some well-known Pakistani TV journalists had wanted to come to New Delhi to telecast debates on issues relating to India's relations with Pakistan and the US, would we have allowed them in the same way Pakistan's Interior Ministry--- without any apparent constraining intervention from the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence so far--- has allowed Barkha and Suhasini to report from Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad? Would we have allowed a Pakistani journalist like Hamid Mir or Ejaz Haider or Hanif Mohammad or any such personality to telecast a live talk show from New Delhi involving eminent opinion-makers in the brilliant way Barkha has been doing from Islamabad for the last three nights?
4. I have been closely following the despatches of Barkha and Suhasini and the live debates organised by Barkha from Islamabad for the last three nights. What has fascinated me is not only the rich contents of their despatches and debates, but also the freedom with which the two have apparently been allowed to report and discuss live from Islamabad.
5. Their despatches and debates are being watched not only by audiences in India, but also by audiences in Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities have till now not shown the least sign of nervousness that the reportage of Barkha and Suhasini could add to their difficulties in dealing with a very sensitive domestic situation.
6. This speaks very highly of the self-confidence of Senator Malik and his colleagues and their keenness not to do anything that might come in the way of reporting by the Indian journalists even if there be a potential risk of creating difficulties for the Pakistan Govt.
7. Thanks to the scintillating debates organised by Barkha----three so far--- and the crisp and well-analysed reporting of Suhasini, we in India have a better understanding of the storm signals from Pakistan --- in relation to domestic affairs as well as its relations with the US. Barkha and Suhasini need to be complimented in equal measure for maintaining a healthy balance and restraint in their reporting and for not letting themselves be influenced by "the Fix Pakistan" syndrome unfortunately seen in many other TV news channels.
8.Indo-Pakistan relations are generally characterised by petty-mindedness, suspicions and chicanerry on both sides. Senator Rehman Malik needs to be complimented for rising above such negative reflexes in facilitating the coverage of the situation in Pakistan by Barkha and Suhasini.
9. If we in India are fair and mentally generous, we ought to recognise the gesture of Senator Malik for what it is and reciprocate it in good measure from our side in the hope of paving the way for a turning point in the attitude of the two Governments towards each other's media. (10-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Strudies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
PAKISTAN AFTER OBL: QUO VADIS?
B.RAMAN
( Written at the request of the Editor, “Hindustan Times”, New Delhi )
A wave of skepticism and anger in Pakistan has greeted the clandestine raid by US naval commandoes into the place of residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, near Islamabad, on the night between May 1 and 2, which resulted in his death.
The skepticism has been over the claims made by both the US and Pakistan regarding the operation itself. Large sections of the Pakistani civil society believe that a chopper-borne hit and run raid of this nature could not have been carried out by the US Special Forces without the acquiescence, if not the covert collaboration, of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment.
Barring the technical break-down of a chopper which resulted in its being blown up, the entire operation lasting about two hours ---most of which was spent by the US raiding team either in the Pakistani air space or territory ---- was carried out with clock-like precision. It would be very difficult to attribute the total absence of any engagement between the US raiding party and the Pakistani security forces only to the remarkable capabilities of the US forces for a clandestine operation of this nature.
There ought to have been a Pakistani role ---even if that role was only one of pre-determined inaction till the Americans had killed OBL and left---- which ensured the success of the operation with a remarkable absence of engagement in the air or on the ground and a total lack of any collateral damage. That is what many not only in Pakistan, but also outside believe and this belief will remain strong whatever be the US claims and explanations.
There have been outbursts of public anger, but surprisingly not of rage. The first Friday prayers after the raid on May 6 surprisingly passed off without any serious incident of violence. The anger has been over the US violation of the Pakistani sovereignty and over the suspected Pakistani collaboration with the US for killing a pious Muslim, who is seen by many in the Islamic world not as a dreaded terrorist, but as a saviour and defender of Islam.
It would be difficult to assess for how long this skepticism and anger would last, but so long as it does, Pakistan would remain a vulnerable State---even more than in the past. Its internal security situation could further deteriorate due to a possible rise in acts of suicide terrorism directed against soft as well as hard targets. At a time when the anger caused by the Pakistani commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July 2007 was showing signs of subsiding, there is a danger of its being re-kindled by the US operation in Abbottabad.
Pakistan has been passing through a state of unstable equilibrium for some years now. This equilibrium could become even more unstable in the weeks and months to come as a consequence of the Abbottabad raid. How to prevent this unstable equilibrium from worsening further? That will be an important objective of the US policy towards Pakistan.
Pakistan’s strategic importance for the US will not diminish despite the elimination of OBL. Pakistani co-operation had served US interests well in the past---whether it was in relation to the cold war or the US rapprochement with China. It could serve US interests in the Islamic world equally well in the future. There cannot be a stable Afghanistan without a stable Pakistan and vice versa. The US interest in ensuring the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will remain as strong as ever. Pakistan will continue to be a key state in the fight against Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism.
It would be a miscalculation to think that US suspicions and anger over possible local support----official or unofficial or both--- to OBL in Pakistan could result in major changes in the US policy in the sub-continent to the detriment of Pakistan and benefit of India. While stepping up pressure on Pakistan for more sincerity and effectiveness in dealing with jihadi terrorism, the US will eschew any policies or actions which could prove detrimental to its interests in Pakistan.
Instead of hoping to be able to drive a wedge between the US and Pakistan by exploiting the cloud over the sanctuary enjoyed by OBL, India should examine how the OBL incident could be used as one more argument for convincing Pakistan of the need to give up the path of terrorism. These are traumatizing moments for Pakistan and its people. We should avoid any signs of glee. That would be unwise.
The problems faced by us in our relations with Pakistan due to its use of terrorism will continue. We should seek a solution to this problem through our own genius and in our own way through an appropriate mix of policy incentives and disincentives. We need a stand alone policy which will not depend on the US policy towards Pakistan for its success. (9-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinert Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
( Written at the request of the Editor, “Hindustan Times”, New Delhi )
A wave of skepticism and anger in Pakistan has greeted the clandestine raid by US naval commandoes into the place of residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, near Islamabad, on the night between May 1 and 2, which resulted in his death.
The skepticism has been over the claims made by both the US and Pakistan regarding the operation itself. Large sections of the Pakistani civil society believe that a chopper-borne hit and run raid of this nature could not have been carried out by the US Special Forces without the acquiescence, if not the covert collaboration, of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment.
Barring the technical break-down of a chopper which resulted in its being blown up, the entire operation lasting about two hours ---most of which was spent by the US raiding team either in the Pakistani air space or territory ---- was carried out with clock-like precision. It would be very difficult to attribute the total absence of any engagement between the US raiding party and the Pakistani security forces only to the remarkable capabilities of the US forces for a clandestine operation of this nature.
There ought to have been a Pakistani role ---even if that role was only one of pre-determined inaction till the Americans had killed OBL and left---- which ensured the success of the operation with a remarkable absence of engagement in the air or on the ground and a total lack of any collateral damage. That is what many not only in Pakistan, but also outside believe and this belief will remain strong whatever be the US claims and explanations.
There have been outbursts of public anger, but surprisingly not of rage. The first Friday prayers after the raid on May 6 surprisingly passed off without any serious incident of violence. The anger has been over the US violation of the Pakistani sovereignty and over the suspected Pakistani collaboration with the US for killing a pious Muslim, who is seen by many in the Islamic world not as a dreaded terrorist, but as a saviour and defender of Islam.
It would be difficult to assess for how long this skepticism and anger would last, but so long as it does, Pakistan would remain a vulnerable State---even more than in the past. Its internal security situation could further deteriorate due to a possible rise in acts of suicide terrorism directed against soft as well as hard targets. At a time when the anger caused by the Pakistani commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July 2007 was showing signs of subsiding, there is a danger of its being re-kindled by the US operation in Abbottabad.
Pakistan has been passing through a state of unstable equilibrium for some years now. This equilibrium could become even more unstable in the weeks and months to come as a consequence of the Abbottabad raid. How to prevent this unstable equilibrium from worsening further? That will be an important objective of the US policy towards Pakistan.
Pakistan’s strategic importance for the US will not diminish despite the elimination of OBL. Pakistani co-operation had served US interests well in the past---whether it was in relation to the cold war or the US rapprochement with China. It could serve US interests in the Islamic world equally well in the future. There cannot be a stable Afghanistan without a stable Pakistan and vice versa. The US interest in ensuring the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will remain as strong as ever. Pakistan will continue to be a key state in the fight against Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism.
It would be a miscalculation to think that US suspicions and anger over possible local support----official or unofficial or both--- to OBL in Pakistan could result in major changes in the US policy in the sub-continent to the detriment of Pakistan and benefit of India. While stepping up pressure on Pakistan for more sincerity and effectiveness in dealing with jihadi terrorism, the US will eschew any policies or actions which could prove detrimental to its interests in Pakistan.
Instead of hoping to be able to drive a wedge between the US and Pakistan by exploiting the cloud over the sanctuary enjoyed by OBL, India should examine how the OBL incident could be used as one more argument for convincing Pakistan of the need to give up the path of terrorism. These are traumatizing moments for Pakistan and its people. We should avoid any signs of glee. That would be unwise.
The problems faced by us in our relations with Pakistan due to its use of terrorism will continue. We should seek a solution to this problem through our own genius and in our own way through an appropriate mix of policy incentives and disincentives. We need a stand alone policy which will not depend on the US policy towards Pakistan for its success. (9-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinert Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
Saturday, May 7, 2011
WHO HEADED ISI WHEN OBL WAS LIVING IN ABBOTTABAD?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.717
B.RAMAN
Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the present Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen.Nadeem Taj, who retired recently, and Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who is on an year’s extension after having reached the age of superannuation on March 18,2011, have, in that order, headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the period between 2005 (month not known) and May 2,2011, when Osama bin Laden was reportedly living near the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Abbottabad, about 100 kms from Islamabad.
2.In October 2004, Gen.Pervez Musharraf appointed then Lt.Gen.Kayani as the DG of the ISI, in place of General Ehsan ul Haq, who was promoted as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Kayani led the ISI during a bleak period, with insurgencies in North-West Pakistan and Balochistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear proliferation scandal, and waves of suicide attacks throughout Pakistan emanating from the northwestern tribal belt. In his final days at the ISI, he also led the talks with Benazir Bhutto for a possible power sharing deal with Musharraf. In October 2007, after three years, he was replaced at the ISI by Lt Gen Nadeem Taj, who was previously the head of the PMA at Abbottabad. Kayani had the unique distinction of being the first DG of the ISI to be appointed as the COAS when he succeeded Musharraf in that capacity.
3. Kayani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the Baloch Regiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chose him as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two maintained their personal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
4. Kayani, who had done some training courses in the US, is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the US Armed Forces, but he really attracted the attention of the US' political and military leadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was the Director-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US was reportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
5.In September 2003, he was appointed Corps Commander of the X Corps at Rawalpindi. As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating the investigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi in December,2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsible for the attempts, Kayani also managed to establish the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had them arrested and court-martialled.
6.After his appointment as the DG of the ISI, he again impressed the US by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an Al Qaeda operative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrested in the tribal belt in 2005. He was immediately handed over to the US without properly interrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf.
7.Even though Kayani was projected as a highly successful DG of the ISI, facts spoke otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISI that the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Army practically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda spread its sanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
8.Kayani was succeeded as the DG of the ISI by Lt. Gen.Nadeem Taj, who was very close to Musharraf and at the same time known to be a virulently anti-India and anti-US chief of the ISI. It was during his tenure as the head of the ISI that the agency started using David Coleman Headley and Munawuur Hussain Rana, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for carrying out terrorist strikes in India. Many suspect that the plans for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were drawn up during his tenure as the DG,ISI.
9. Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG, ISI, on October 8, 2007, after his promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy, with the rank of Maj. Gen.
10. Taj , once Musharraf’s Military Secretary (MS), was associated with Musharraf through some of the regime’s most significant events. He was flying with Musharraf from Sri Lanka on October 12, 1999 when the coup was launched and was also in Musharraf’s car during the attempts to assassinate Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December 2003. From MS, he was appointed Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) and then moved on to become General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore before taking over as the head of the PMA at Abbottabad
11. Taj had a very short tenure of only 10 months as the DG of the ISI because of the USA’s suspicion that he was associated with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. He was reportedly as distrusted by the US as was Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, who headed the ISI when Mr.Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister between 1990 and 1993. Nasir had to be sacked by Nawaz Sharif under pressure from the Clinton Administration because of his suspected links with the Afghan Mujahideen.
12. Taj was removed from the ISI by Kayani allegedly under dual pressure from the US as well as China. The removal came in the wake of reports about US concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in the attempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, and over leakage of information shared by the US intelligence with the ISI to the Afghan Taliban. Then President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the last week of July ,2008, as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from the post of DG, ISI, Kayani took care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps, but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he did not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt. Kayani removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
13. The removal of Taj from the ISI also come in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during his week-long visit to China from September 21, 2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 29, 2008. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the Khyber Pakhtunkwa province. The TTP kidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP demanded the release of over 130 Taliban members in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.
14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, said as follows: " A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the two young engineers freed. He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander Abdullah Mahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. "The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't been resolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now, he said."
15.The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army abruptly announced on the night of September 29, 2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO), had been promoted as Lt. General and posted as the DG of the ISI in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj.
16. Lt. Gen. Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj.Gen. by Musharraf in January, 2003, had commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and had served as the Chief Instructor of the Command and Staff College. In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In October, 2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, to relieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in the UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also made by the office of the UN Secretary-General.
17. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley coming under the control of the Taliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operation against the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, who was in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January, 2008, Pasha announced that his troops had defeated the TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, which had withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. In August, 2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and asked Pasha to co-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two put up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps.
18.The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29, 2008, as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successes and setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continual operation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is a different ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha had a colourless record. That, despite this, he was posted as the DG, ISI, showed his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secret meeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US aircraft carrier, on August 26,2008, and not Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. It was speculated at that time that Taj did not accompany Kayani to the secret meeting with Mullen because the Americans did not want him.
19. Thus, in any enquiry regarding collusion between the ISI and OBL since 2005 which enabled OBL to live in Abbottabad, the main suspicion has to be on Nadeem Taj followed by Pasha and Kayani. Another person, whose contacts with Al Qaeda would call for a detailed enquiry is Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah, another officer highly trusted by Musharraf, who served as the Director of the Intelligence Bureau during this period.
20. When he was in the ISI, Shah used to be the handling officer of Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar, the Amir of the Taliban. After Musharraf seized power in October, 1999, he had him posted as the Home Secretary of Punjab. It was to him that Omar Sheikh, who orchestrated the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist, surrendered because Omar Sheikh knew him before and was confident that Ejaz Shah would see that he was not tortured.
21.After the murder of Pearl, there were many allegations regarding Shah's role. Musharraf tried to protect him by sending him as the Ambassador to Australia or Indonesia. Both the countries reportedly refused to accept him. Musharraf then made him the DG of the IB. As the DG of the IB, he saw to it that the death sentence against Omar Sheikh for his role in the Pearl case was not executed. The courts have been repeatedly postponing hearings on the appeal filed by Omar Sheikh against the death sentence. Before her return from political exile in October 2007, Benazir Bhutto had named him as one of the officers from whom a threat to her security could arise. (8-5-2011)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the present Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen.Nadeem Taj, who retired recently, and Lt.Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who is on an year’s extension after having reached the age of superannuation on March 18,2011, have, in that order, headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the period between 2005 (month not known) and May 2,2011, when Osama bin Laden was reportedly living near the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Abbottabad, about 100 kms from Islamabad.
2.In October 2004, Gen.Pervez Musharraf appointed then Lt.Gen.Kayani as the DG of the ISI, in place of General Ehsan ul Haq, who was promoted as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Kayani led the ISI during a bleak period, with insurgencies in North-West Pakistan and Balochistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear proliferation scandal, and waves of suicide attacks throughout Pakistan emanating from the northwestern tribal belt. In his final days at the ISI, he also led the talks with Benazir Bhutto for a possible power sharing deal with Musharraf. In October 2007, after three years, he was replaced at the ISI by Lt Gen Nadeem Taj, who was previously the head of the PMA at Abbottabad. Kayani had the unique distinction of being the first DG of the ISI to be appointed as the COAS when he succeeded Musharraf in that capacity.
3. Kayani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the Baloch Regiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chose him as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two maintained their personal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
4. Kayani, who had done some training courses in the US, is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the US Armed Forces, but he really attracted the attention of the US' political and military leadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was the Director-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US was reportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
5.In September 2003, he was appointed Corps Commander of the X Corps at Rawalpindi. As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating the investigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi in December,2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsible for the attempts, Kayani also managed to establish the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had them arrested and court-martialled.
6.After his appointment as the DG of the ISI, he again impressed the US by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an Al Qaeda operative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrested in the tribal belt in 2005. He was immediately handed over to the US without properly interrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf.
7.Even though Kayani was projected as a highly successful DG of the ISI, facts spoke otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISI that the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Army practically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda spread its sanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
8.Kayani was succeeded as the DG of the ISI by Lt. Gen.Nadeem Taj, who was very close to Musharraf and at the same time known to be a virulently anti-India and anti-US chief of the ISI. It was during his tenure as the head of the ISI that the agency started using David Coleman Headley and Munawuur Hussain Rana, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for carrying out terrorist strikes in India. Many suspect that the plans for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were drawn up during his tenure as the DG,ISI.
9. Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG, ISI, on October 8, 2007, after his promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy, with the rank of Maj. Gen.
10. Taj , once Musharraf’s Military Secretary (MS), was associated with Musharraf through some of the regime’s most significant events. He was flying with Musharraf from Sri Lanka on October 12, 1999 when the coup was launched and was also in Musharraf’s car during the attempts to assassinate Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December 2003. From MS, he was appointed Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) and then moved on to become General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore before taking over as the head of the PMA at Abbottabad
11. Taj had a very short tenure of only 10 months as the DG of the ISI because of the USA’s suspicion that he was associated with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. He was reportedly as distrusted by the US as was Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, who headed the ISI when Mr.Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister between 1990 and 1993. Nasir had to be sacked by Nawaz Sharif under pressure from the Clinton Administration because of his suspected links with the Afghan Mujahideen.
12. Taj was removed from the ISI by Kayani allegedly under dual pressure from the US as well as China. The removal came in the wake of reports about US concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in the attempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, and over leakage of information shared by the US intelligence with the ISI to the Afghan Taliban. Then President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the last week of July ,2008, as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from the post of DG, ISI, Kayani took care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps, but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he did not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt. Kayani removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
13. The removal of Taj from the ISI also come in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during his week-long visit to China from September 21, 2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 29, 2008. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the Khyber Pakhtunkwa province. The TTP kidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP demanded the release of over 130 Taliban members in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.
14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, said as follows: " A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the two young engineers freed. He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander Abdullah Mahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. "The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't been resolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now, he said."
15.The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army abruptly announced on the night of September 29, 2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO), had been promoted as Lt. General and posted as the DG of the ISI in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj.
16. Lt. Gen. Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj.Gen. by Musharraf in January, 2003, had commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and had served as the Chief Instructor of the Command and Staff College. In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In October, 2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, to relieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in the UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also made by the office of the UN Secretary-General.
17. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley coming under the control of the Taliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operation against the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, who was in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January, 2008, Pasha announced that his troops had defeated the TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, which had withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. In August, 2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and asked Pasha to co-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two put up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps.
18.The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29, 2008, as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successes and setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continual operation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is a different ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha had a colourless record. That, despite this, he was posted as the DG, ISI, showed his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secret meeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US aircraft carrier, on August 26,2008, and not Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. It was speculated at that time that Taj did not accompany Kayani to the secret meeting with Mullen because the Americans did not want him.
19. Thus, in any enquiry regarding collusion between the ISI and OBL since 2005 which enabled OBL to live in Abbottabad, the main suspicion has to be on Nadeem Taj followed by Pasha and Kayani. Another person, whose contacts with Al Qaeda would call for a detailed enquiry is Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah, another officer highly trusted by Musharraf, who served as the Director of the Intelligence Bureau during this period.
20. When he was in the ISI, Shah used to be the handling officer of Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar, the Amir of the Taliban. After Musharraf seized power in October, 1999, he had him posted as the Home Secretary of Punjab. It was to him that Omar Sheikh, who orchestrated the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist, surrendered because Omar Sheikh knew him before and was confident that Ejaz Shah would see that he was not tortured.
21.After the murder of Pearl, there were many allegations regarding Shah's role. Musharraf tried to protect him by sending him as the Ambassador to Australia or Indonesia. Both the countries reportedly refused to accept him. Musharraf then made him the DG of the IB. As the DG of the IB, he saw to it that the death sentence against Omar Sheikh for his role in the Pearl case was not executed. The courts have been repeatedly postponing hearings on the appeal filed by Omar Sheikh against the death sentence. Before her return from political exile in October 2007, Benazir Bhutto had named him as one of the officers from whom a threat to her security could arise. (8-5-2011)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WHERE IS ADAM GADAHN AN AMERICAN MUSLIM CLOSE TO OBL?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.716
B.RAMAN
Adam Gadahn alias Azzam al-Amriki, an American convert to Islam, headed As Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda .He used to produce the video and audio recordings of the periodic messages of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and have them sent to Al Jazeera for being disseminated. In his capacity as the producer of the video and audio recordings of OBL and Zawahiri, he had direct access to them.
2.In 2008, there was suspicion that he might be a mole of the CIA because he allegedly escaped a missile attack by a Drone (pilotless plane) of the CIA on a house in North Waziristan on January 29,2008. Fifteen persons were killed, but Madad Khan, the owner of the house, and Adam Gadahn, who was also allegedly present, were not among those killed. This gave rise to speculation that they might have been tipped off by the CIA about the impending missile attack to enable them to escape.
3. After this incident, Adam Gadahn disappeared from view for seven months. OBL and Zawahiri used to record their messages in Arabic. Gadahn used to provide the English translation and sub-titles. His translation and sub-titles used to have American spellings. During the period Gadahn was missing, the American spellings and expressions disappeared from the translations. No explanation was forthcoming either from Al Qaeda or from the CIA as to what happened to him. There was some speculation in the tribal areas of Pakistan that he had been taken by the Americans to Morocco for the treatment of injuries sustained by him during the missile attack.
4. Intriguingly, videos and audios purported to have been produced by Gadahn for Al Qaeda started circulating again from October 4,2008. There was no explanation as to where he was during the seven months when he was not disseminating video and audio recordings and someone else, who was apparently not an American, was doing it for Al Qaeda.
5. According to the BBC, to convince skeptics who refuse to believe that OBL was present in the Abbottabad house, which was raided by the helicopter-borne US Naval commandoes on May2, the Pentagon has released on May 7, five videos which were found in the house by the commandoes.The BBC has reported as follows on these videos: "The tapes show him watching himself on television, and preparing a video message addressed to the US. In the first video, filmed in October or November 2010, Bin Laden is shown wearing a white skullcap and white robes as he speaks to the camera in the style of previous video addresses by the al-Qaeda leader. There is no audio on the film, but Pentagon officials said it was a message to the United States. Three other clips appear to be rehearsals for the video message, says the BBC's Jonny Dymond in Washington. It is the first such film to emerge since al-Qaeda released a video address from Bin Laden in 2007, says our correspondent. In another of the videos, Bin Laden is shown watching a programme about himself on Arabic language television. He is shown sitting on the floor wrapped in what looks like a blanket or a coat, holding a remote control. As he watches TV he strokes his beard, which appears much greyer than it does in the propaganda video.In one scene, he watches a broadcast showing a picture of himself superimposed on a still image of the World Trade Center in flames after it was hit by hijacked planes. There is nothing in the videos to place Bin Laden in the compound where he was killed."
6.If the Pentagon claim that these videos were found in the Abbottabad house of OBL is correct, it is very likely that Gadahn used to visit the house to make the recordings before those were sent to Al Jazeera for telecast. Was Gadahn a mole of the CIA as suspected for some months by some, including me, and did he facilitate the operation of the naval commandoes to kill OBL? If this suspicion proves to be correct, the claim of the CIA that it was actually the surveillance of a Kuwaiti courier of Pakistani origin, which enabled the CIA to establish where OBL was living, might be a cock and bull story to protect Gadahn. The courier and his cousin brother were killed in the raid and would not be able to speak the truth now.
7. Only Gadahn can clarify the mystery. Where is he? Still with Al Qaeda? Or under the protection of the CIA back in the US? (8-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Adam Gadahn alias Azzam al-Amriki, an American convert to Islam, headed As Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda .He used to produce the video and audio recordings of the periodic messages of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and have them sent to Al Jazeera for being disseminated. In his capacity as the producer of the video and audio recordings of OBL and Zawahiri, he had direct access to them.
2.In 2008, there was suspicion that he might be a mole of the CIA because he allegedly escaped a missile attack by a Drone (pilotless plane) of the CIA on a house in North Waziristan on January 29,2008. Fifteen persons were killed, but Madad Khan, the owner of the house, and Adam Gadahn, who was also allegedly present, were not among those killed. This gave rise to speculation that they might have been tipped off by the CIA about the impending missile attack to enable them to escape.
3. After this incident, Adam Gadahn disappeared from view for seven months. OBL and Zawahiri used to record their messages in Arabic. Gadahn used to provide the English translation and sub-titles. His translation and sub-titles used to have American spellings. During the period Gadahn was missing, the American spellings and expressions disappeared from the translations. No explanation was forthcoming either from Al Qaeda or from the CIA as to what happened to him. There was some speculation in the tribal areas of Pakistan that he had been taken by the Americans to Morocco for the treatment of injuries sustained by him during the missile attack.
4. Intriguingly, videos and audios purported to have been produced by Gadahn for Al Qaeda started circulating again from October 4,2008. There was no explanation as to where he was during the seven months when he was not disseminating video and audio recordings and someone else, who was apparently not an American, was doing it for Al Qaeda.
5. According to the BBC, to convince skeptics who refuse to believe that OBL was present in the Abbottabad house, which was raided by the helicopter-borne US Naval commandoes on May2, the Pentagon has released on May 7, five videos which were found in the house by the commandoes.The BBC has reported as follows on these videos: "The tapes show him watching himself on television, and preparing a video message addressed to the US. In the first video, filmed in October or November 2010, Bin Laden is shown wearing a white skullcap and white robes as he speaks to the camera in the style of previous video addresses by the al-Qaeda leader. There is no audio on the film, but Pentagon officials said it was a message to the United States. Three other clips appear to be rehearsals for the video message, says the BBC's Jonny Dymond in Washington. It is the first such film to emerge since al-Qaeda released a video address from Bin Laden in 2007, says our correspondent. In another of the videos, Bin Laden is shown watching a programme about himself on Arabic language television. He is shown sitting on the floor wrapped in what looks like a blanket or a coat, holding a remote control. As he watches TV he strokes his beard, which appears much greyer than it does in the propaganda video.In one scene, he watches a broadcast showing a picture of himself superimposed on a still image of the World Trade Center in flames after it was hit by hijacked planes. There is nothing in the videos to place Bin Laden in the compound where he was killed."
6.If the Pentagon claim that these videos were found in the Abbottabad house of OBL is correct, it is very likely that Gadahn used to visit the house to make the recordings before those were sent to Al Jazeera for telecast. Was Gadahn a mole of the CIA as suspected for some months by some, including me, and did he facilitate the operation of the naval commandoes to kill OBL? If this suspicion proves to be correct, the claim of the CIA that it was actually the surveillance of a Kuwaiti courier of Pakistani origin, which enabled the CIA to establish where OBL was living, might be a cock and bull story to protect Gadahn. The courier and his cousin brother were killed in the raid and would not be able to speak the truth now.
7. Only Gadahn can clarify the mystery. Where is he? Still with Al Qaeda? Or under the protection of the CIA back in the US? (8-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, May 6, 2011
INDIA & PAKISTAN RELATIONS: Q & A
B.RAMAN
Should India continue with the peace process with Pakistan initiated when Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani visited Mohali in India on March 30,2011, to attend the semi-finals of the World Cup cricket match?
Answer: Yes. India should. There is no reason why India should allow its policy towards Pakistan to be affected by the Abbottabad raid on May 2 by the US Navy SEALS that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. The consequences of that raid are a matter to be sorted out by the US and Pakistan and should not have any bearing on India's relations with Pakistan. The peace process between India and Pakistan should continue so long as terrorist organisations based in Pakistan and supported by its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) refrain from indulging in any act of mass casualty terrorism in Indian territory.
Should India emulate the USA's Abbottabad raid?
A. The Abbottabad raid was an officially admitted clandestine operation by the US Special Forces belonging to its Navy, which carried out the raid under the leadership of Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was a raid carried out against the head of an international terrorist organisation, which has been responsible for a series of major acts of mass casualty terrorism directed not only against the US, but also against many other countries of the world. The US action in undertaking the raid despite its violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty, therefore, enjoyed considerable international support. Any operation by the Indian Special Forces in Pakistani territory against leaders of terrorist organisations operating against India would not enjoy similar support in the international community. Moreover, Pakistan would be forced by its public opinion to treat any officially admitted raid by the Indian Special Forces in its territory as an act of war and react accordingly. It could lead to a war between the two countries, which would not be in the interest of either.
Why should India be worried about what the rest of the world thinks?
A. If we take an action which is not deniable and which is officially admitted, we have to worry.
Does it mean India should never undertake an Abbottabad style raid in Pakistani territory by its Special Forces?
A. Not during times of peace when the two neighbours are engaged in the peace process. Such raids could, however, be justified in times of war. We should have the capability, but should not use it so long as peace, however unsatisfactory, prevails.
Then, how do you recommend the re-establishment of the covert action capability of our Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW)? You sound illogical.
A.One must understand some important differences between a clandestine operation by the Special Forces and a covert action by an intelligence agency. An operation by the Special Forces is carried out by specially trained units of your own armed forces in a clandestine manner. It is an act of unconventional warfare by conventional armed forces. It is kept clandestine till the operation is over, but often officially admitted after the operation. It is carried out with the help of your own nationals. A covert action by an intelligence agency in foreign territory has to be totally deniable and should not involve the participation on the ground in foreign territory of your own forces and/or nationals. You do not go into the foreign territory. You seek the assistance or co-operation of others who have legitimate reasons for being in foreign territory. A covert action can be undertaken anytime---in times of peace or war.
Every State having an adversarial relationship with another State should have three options at its disposal. The first option is talks to reduce the adversarial nature of the relationship. The second option is covert action by the intelligence agencies as a disincentive to make the adversary amenable to reason. The third option, which should be one of last resort, is war. Since India and Pakistan are nuclear powers war should not be lightly contemplated as an option . It should be contemplated only in extreme circumstances when national existence is in peril.
The problem which we face in our relations with Pakistan is that the option of deniable covert action by the intelligence agencies in Pakistani territory which we created for ourselves under Jawaharlal Nehru immediately after India became independent in 1947, was wound up in 1997 when Shri Inder Kumar Gujral was the Prime Minister. Neither Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee nor Dr.Manmohan Singh has been inclined to revive it. To revive it or not has to be a political decision.
There is no unanimity of opinion among senior intelligence officers as to whether it would be wise to revive it. I have heard of at least two recent heads of the R&AW, who were not convinced of the need for its revival. They reportedly felt that the R&AW should remain, as it is post-1997, a purely intelligence collection organisation, and should not get involved in covert action. There is a new generation of young intelligence officers which respects us old-timers, but does not agree with our views on the need to revive the covert action capability.
Then, why do you keep talking from time to time of the need to revive the covert action capability?
A. Because I do feel that in the absence of the intermediate option of a covert action capability, we are reduced to a position where we are either helpless spectators of Pakistan's use of terrorism against India or become advocates of an adventurous policy as we followed in 2002 which could have led to a war. There are two kinds of covert actions. The first is directed against the State of Pakistan. This has to be ruled out so long as we are satisfied with the peace talks with Pakistan. The second will be directed against the terrorists operating against India from Pakistani territory. This will be justified and necessary, My advice has always been: Re-create the capability, but use it only if the peace talks fail and Pakistan continues to evade our request and international pressure for action against the terrorist leaders operating against Indian citizens from its territory.This is a matter which needs to be examined quietly. (6-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Should India continue with the peace process with Pakistan initiated when Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani visited Mohali in India on March 30,2011, to attend the semi-finals of the World Cup cricket match?
Answer: Yes. India should. There is no reason why India should allow its policy towards Pakistan to be affected by the Abbottabad raid on May 2 by the US Navy SEALS that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. The consequences of that raid are a matter to be sorted out by the US and Pakistan and should not have any bearing on India's relations with Pakistan. The peace process between India and Pakistan should continue so long as terrorist organisations based in Pakistan and supported by its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) refrain from indulging in any act of mass casualty terrorism in Indian territory.
Should India emulate the USA's Abbottabad raid?
A. The Abbottabad raid was an officially admitted clandestine operation by the US Special Forces belonging to its Navy, which carried out the raid under the leadership of Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was a raid carried out against the head of an international terrorist organisation, which has been responsible for a series of major acts of mass casualty terrorism directed not only against the US, but also against many other countries of the world. The US action in undertaking the raid despite its violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty, therefore, enjoyed considerable international support. Any operation by the Indian Special Forces in Pakistani territory against leaders of terrorist organisations operating against India would not enjoy similar support in the international community. Moreover, Pakistan would be forced by its public opinion to treat any officially admitted raid by the Indian Special Forces in its territory as an act of war and react accordingly. It could lead to a war between the two countries, which would not be in the interest of either.
Why should India be worried about what the rest of the world thinks?
A. If we take an action which is not deniable and which is officially admitted, we have to worry.
Does it mean India should never undertake an Abbottabad style raid in Pakistani territory by its Special Forces?
A. Not during times of peace when the two neighbours are engaged in the peace process. Such raids could, however, be justified in times of war. We should have the capability, but should not use it so long as peace, however unsatisfactory, prevails.
Then, how do you recommend the re-establishment of the covert action capability of our Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW)? You sound illogical.
A.One must understand some important differences between a clandestine operation by the Special Forces and a covert action by an intelligence agency. An operation by the Special Forces is carried out by specially trained units of your own armed forces in a clandestine manner. It is an act of unconventional warfare by conventional armed forces. It is kept clandestine till the operation is over, but often officially admitted after the operation. It is carried out with the help of your own nationals. A covert action by an intelligence agency in foreign territory has to be totally deniable and should not involve the participation on the ground in foreign territory of your own forces and/or nationals. You do not go into the foreign territory. You seek the assistance or co-operation of others who have legitimate reasons for being in foreign territory. A covert action can be undertaken anytime---in times of peace or war.
Every State having an adversarial relationship with another State should have three options at its disposal. The first option is talks to reduce the adversarial nature of the relationship. The second option is covert action by the intelligence agencies as a disincentive to make the adversary amenable to reason. The third option, which should be one of last resort, is war. Since India and Pakistan are nuclear powers war should not be lightly contemplated as an option . It should be contemplated only in extreme circumstances when national existence is in peril.
The problem which we face in our relations with Pakistan is that the option of deniable covert action by the intelligence agencies in Pakistani territory which we created for ourselves under Jawaharlal Nehru immediately after India became independent in 1947, was wound up in 1997 when Shri Inder Kumar Gujral was the Prime Minister. Neither Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee nor Dr.Manmohan Singh has been inclined to revive it. To revive it or not has to be a political decision.
There is no unanimity of opinion among senior intelligence officers as to whether it would be wise to revive it. I have heard of at least two recent heads of the R&AW, who were not convinced of the need for its revival. They reportedly felt that the R&AW should remain, as it is post-1997, a purely intelligence collection organisation, and should not get involved in covert action. There is a new generation of young intelligence officers which respects us old-timers, but does not agree with our views on the need to revive the covert action capability.
Then, why do you keep talking from time to time of the need to revive the covert action capability?
A. Because I do feel that in the absence of the intermediate option of a covert action capability, we are reduced to a position where we are either helpless spectators of Pakistan's use of terrorism against India or become advocates of an adventurous policy as we followed in 2002 which could have led to a war. There are two kinds of covert actions. The first is directed against the State of Pakistan. This has to be ruled out so long as we are satisfied with the peace talks with Pakistan. The second will be directed against the terrorists operating against India from Pakistani territory. This will be justified and necessary, My advice has always been: Re-create the capability, but use it only if the peace talks fail and Pakistan continues to evade our request and international pressure for action against the terrorist leaders operating against Indian citizens from its territory.This is a matter which needs to be examined quietly. (6-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)