B.RAMAN
The visit of Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India's Foreign Secretary, to Islamabad on June 24,2010, for preparatory talks with Mr.Salman Bashir, Pakistani Foreign Secretary, could not have gone better than it did. Those, who had seen the bad vibrations which marred the atmosphere during Mr.Bashir's visit to New Delhi in February last for the first meeting with her, would have been taken by surprise by the good vibrations which were to the fore during her entire stay in Islamabad and her official discussions with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary and courtesy call on Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister.
2. During Mr.Bashir's visit to New Delhi in February, the two Foreign Secretaries could not even agree on a joint press conference. They held separate press conferences----Mrs.Rao in the Indian Foreign Office and Mr.Bashir in the Pakistani Chancery. They projected two different versions of what transpired during their discussions. Mrs.Rao's version was balanced and devoid of polemics. Mr. Bashir's was polemical. He was even sarcastic regarding India's concerns over terrorism and couldn't resist ridiculing India's case for action against Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).He insisted on India accepting a so-called road map, which Pakistan had given for resuming the dialogue process. India saw no merit in the so-called road map.
3.Within four months, one saw on the TV the two Foreign Secretaries addressing a joint press conference and projecting cordial images of themselves----- persons of reason looking for ways of narrowing the divide between the two countries instead of aggravating it as was done in February. One could be certain that this change for the better would have been preceded by intense back channel discussions and informal interactions to prevent a repeat of what happened in February. A choreography as impressive as what one saw could not have been spontaneous or the product of the goodwill of the moment. It had been prepared beforehand.
4.Mrs.Rao's emphasis was still on terrorism----but terrorism in general, but not terrorism in specific emanating from territory under the control of Pakistan and used by the State of Pakistan against India in an attempt to force a change of the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir. When Mr.Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister, the emphasis was not on any terrorism, but on terrorism of Pakistani origin emanating from territory under the control of Pakistan and sponsored by the State of Pakistan. This emphasis found mention in the formulation accepted by Gen.Pervez Musharraf during his talks with Mr.Vajpayee at Islamabad in January 2004.
5. Since taking over as the Prime Minister in 2004, Dr.Manmohan Singh had been veering away from this formulation, slowly but steadily and this process was taken one step further during the just-concluded meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries. Will India's apparent gesture to Pakistan, which spares Islamabad the dilemma of having to cut off the links of the State with the LET and other like-minded Punjabi Taliban organisations, help in India's 30-year fight against terrorism sponsored by the state of Pakistan---- initially in Punjab, then in J&K and subsequently in the rest of India?
6. Dr.Manmohan Singh seems to be hopeful and even confident that it will. If it does, one may see a turn for the better in the bilateral relations. If it does not, it will not only add to the prevailing public distrust of Pakistan, but could even discredit Dr.Manmohan Singh and embarrass his party.
7. There are two questions involved in matters relating to terrorism. Should India continue to link the question of a resumption of the dialogue to Pakistan satisfying Indian expectations even before the talks begin? Our past policy of linkage, justified till now, has started yielding diminishing returns with no fresh ideas coming up. One can, therefore, justify the delinking of the terrorism issue from the question of a resumption of the dialogue. But Dr.Manmohan Singh has gone one step further by delinking the terrorism issue from the issue of the Pakistani sponsorship of it and from the progress on the ground during the process of the dialogue. What we have agreed to is a "comprehensive, sustained and substantial dialogue" irrespective of the progress on the question of Pakistani action in discarding terrorism.
8. Mr.Bashir's emphasis was strill on the dialogue process in general and the Kashmir issue in particular. He seemed inclined to give up expressions such as "a comprehensive dialogue", a "road-map" etc with which India seemed to be uncomfortable. Pakistan is still determined to achieve its objectives ( terrorism plus more river waters) relating to J&K -----through talks if possible and through terrorism, if necessary.
9. We have to keep the dialogue going. We have to continue the exercise for reducing distrust. At the same time, we have to ensure that our national interests are not jeopardised as a result of unwarranted concessions to Pakistan The talks can create an enduring partnership between the two countries only if they lead to a total Pakistani break with the use of terrorism as a State weapon and with a change in Pakistani focus from territory-related issues to questions having a bearing on the mutual economic and other interests of the people of the two countries.
10. How to conduct the dialogue in such a manner as to promote these objectives? That is the question which needs to be examined lucidly before our Foreign Minister goes to Islamabad on July 15 to meet his Pakistani counterpart in the next stage of the dialogue process. Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, who arrived in Islamabad on June 25 for the SAARC Home Ministers’ meeting and bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, has kept a laser sharp focus on the terrorism issue even while welcoming the dialogue process. (26-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventytone2@gmail.com )
Friday, June 25, 2010
MORE ON CHINESE ALERT IN XINJIANG
B.RAMAN
According to reliable sources in the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan, the authorities in some of the towns of the Xinjiang province have made it mandatory for all religious sermons to be approved in advance by the local officials of the Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal intelligence and security. Prior permission of the Ministry is also required for holding any religious gathering. Members of the Communist Party of China have been banned from attending religious congregations.
2.Earlier, a directive issued by the Religious Affairs Department of Shayar county in the Aksu Prefecture of the Xinjinag province in April had stated as follows: " All religious groups must register with the village branch of the Religious Affairs Department, allow monthly inspections of religious sites and special meetings by authorities, and obtain prior approval of the content of any religious services. Before village members gather for worship, the Religious Affairs Department must review the content of the texts in question. An information officer for religious activities will verify the content of the texts and must be advised of the specific situation in which the texts will be used in worship."
3.According to the same sources in the Uighur diaspora of Pakistan, due to pressure from the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan's Ministry of the Interior has ordered the closure of the Omer Uighur Language School in Rawalpindi. The Chinese authorities have accused the school of having links with the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC). The Chinese Embassy has advised the members of the Uighur diaspora in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad area that in future they should send their children to a school at Rawalpindi set up earlier this year by the Chinese Embassy.
4. In July 2007, the Chinese authorities had exercised pressure on the Government of Gen.Pervez Musharraf to organise a commando raid into the Lal Masjid and its two madrasas in the Islamabad area following the kidnapping of some Chinese employees of beauty parlours by the students of the madrasas. It was anger over this raid which led to the formation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the wave of terrorist strikes by the TTP and other jihadi organisations. There were also attacks on some Chinese working in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa province and Balochistan.
5. In the past, the Chinese Embassy was insisting on action only against Uighurs in Pakistan suspected of supporting the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET), an associate of Al Qaeda.Now, they are insisting on action against Uighur supporters of the WUC too.
6.The Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced on June 24 that the third joint counter-terrorism exercise between the Chinese and Pakistani Armies will be held at Qingtongxia in northwest China's Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region from July 1 to 11. The first exercise was held in 2004, in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 soldiers from both countries participated. The second exercise was held in 2006 in the Abbottabad area of Pakistan. About 400 soldiers from both sides participated. The third exercise was to have been held in China in 2008, but was postponed for unexplained reasons. According to the Uighur sources, the authorities of the two countries were probably concerned that a joint exercise in the wake of the anger over the Chinese role in the Lal Masjid raid could lead to fresh attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
7.Though no joint exercise has been held since 2006, the close co-operation in counter-terrorism continues at two levels---between the two armies and between the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, had visited China in 2009 and again earlier this year to discuss counter-terrorism co-operation, including exchange of intelligence. China is reported to have pledged assistance amounting to more than US $ 300 million to enable Pakistan strengthen its counter-terrorism capacity.
8.The "Los Angeles Times" reported on May 25,2009, that the Obama Administration had appealed to China to provide training and even military equipment to help Pakistan counter a growing militant threat and that Mr.Richard C Holbrooke, the administration’s special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, had visited Beijing in this connection for talks with the Chinese authorities. According to unconfirmed reports, Abdul Haq Turkestani, the Amir of the IMET, was reported to have been killed in a US Drone (pilotless plane) strike in the North Waziristan area in February last. During his visit to China earlier this year, Mr.Rehman Malik claimed that this information was correct, but neither the US nor the IMET nor the Chinese have confirmed his reported death so far.
9. In December last, a mixed group of 20 Muslim and Christian Uighurs, helped by a Macau-based Christian organisation, had managed to reach Phnom-Penh in Cambodia from Xinjiang and sought political asylum from the local office of the UN High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR). Before the UNHCR office could intervene, the Cambodian authorities had them arrested and deported to China. Three Muslim members of this group have since been projected by the Chinese authorities as terrorists, who were members of the IMET.
10.Mr.Wu Heping, a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, told a press conference at Beijing on June 24 that the authorities of the Ministry had arrested a group of over 10 Uighurs belonging to the IMET. The details of the arrested persons given at the press conference indicated that the terrorist cell which the Chinese claimed to have broken up included three Muslim members of the group which had sought political asylum from the UNHCR office in Phnom-Penh in December 2009. It is not known what happened to the other 17 handed over by the Cambodian authorities.
11. Two persons were killed in an explosion in an oil storage tank in the Midong area of Urumqi on June 22,2010. According to the local authorities, the explosion took place when some welding work was going on. However, they have stated that it has not yet been established whether the welding caused the explosion. ( 25-6-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
According to reliable sources in the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan, the authorities in some of the towns of the Xinjiang province have made it mandatory for all religious sermons to be approved in advance by the local officials of the Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal intelligence and security. Prior permission of the Ministry is also required for holding any religious gathering. Members of the Communist Party of China have been banned from attending religious congregations.
2.Earlier, a directive issued by the Religious Affairs Department of Shayar county in the Aksu Prefecture of the Xinjinag province in April had stated as follows: " All religious groups must register with the village branch of the Religious Affairs Department, allow monthly inspections of religious sites and special meetings by authorities, and obtain prior approval of the content of any religious services. Before village members gather for worship, the Religious Affairs Department must review the content of the texts in question. An information officer for religious activities will verify the content of the texts and must be advised of the specific situation in which the texts will be used in worship."
3.According to the same sources in the Uighur diaspora of Pakistan, due to pressure from the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan's Ministry of the Interior has ordered the closure of the Omer Uighur Language School in Rawalpindi. The Chinese authorities have accused the school of having links with the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC). The Chinese Embassy has advised the members of the Uighur diaspora in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad area that in future they should send their children to a school at Rawalpindi set up earlier this year by the Chinese Embassy.
4. In July 2007, the Chinese authorities had exercised pressure on the Government of Gen.Pervez Musharraf to organise a commando raid into the Lal Masjid and its two madrasas in the Islamabad area following the kidnapping of some Chinese employees of beauty parlours by the students of the madrasas. It was anger over this raid which led to the formation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the wave of terrorist strikes by the TTP and other jihadi organisations. There were also attacks on some Chinese working in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa province and Balochistan.
5. In the past, the Chinese Embassy was insisting on action only against Uighurs in Pakistan suspected of supporting the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET), an associate of Al Qaeda.Now, they are insisting on action against Uighur supporters of the WUC too.
6.The Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced on June 24 that the third joint counter-terrorism exercise between the Chinese and Pakistani Armies will be held at Qingtongxia in northwest China's Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region from July 1 to 11. The first exercise was held in 2004, in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 soldiers from both countries participated. The second exercise was held in 2006 in the Abbottabad area of Pakistan. About 400 soldiers from both sides participated. The third exercise was to have been held in China in 2008, but was postponed for unexplained reasons. According to the Uighur sources, the authorities of the two countries were probably concerned that a joint exercise in the wake of the anger over the Chinese role in the Lal Masjid raid could lead to fresh attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
7.Though no joint exercise has been held since 2006, the close co-operation in counter-terrorism continues at two levels---between the two armies and between the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, had visited China in 2009 and again earlier this year to discuss counter-terrorism co-operation, including exchange of intelligence. China is reported to have pledged assistance amounting to more than US $ 300 million to enable Pakistan strengthen its counter-terrorism capacity.
8.The "Los Angeles Times" reported on May 25,2009, that the Obama Administration had appealed to China to provide training and even military equipment to help Pakistan counter a growing militant threat and that Mr.Richard C Holbrooke, the administration’s special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, had visited Beijing in this connection for talks with the Chinese authorities. According to unconfirmed reports, Abdul Haq Turkestani, the Amir of the IMET, was reported to have been killed in a US Drone (pilotless plane) strike in the North Waziristan area in February last. During his visit to China earlier this year, Mr.Rehman Malik claimed that this information was correct, but neither the US nor the IMET nor the Chinese have confirmed his reported death so far.
9. In December last, a mixed group of 20 Muslim and Christian Uighurs, helped by a Macau-based Christian organisation, had managed to reach Phnom-Penh in Cambodia from Xinjiang and sought political asylum from the local office of the UN High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR). Before the UNHCR office could intervene, the Cambodian authorities had them arrested and deported to China. Three Muslim members of this group have since been projected by the Chinese authorities as terrorists, who were members of the IMET.
10.Mr.Wu Heping, a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, told a press conference at Beijing on June 24 that the authorities of the Ministry had arrested a group of over 10 Uighurs belonging to the IMET. The details of the arrested persons given at the press conference indicated that the terrorist cell which the Chinese claimed to have broken up included three Muslim members of the group which had sought political asylum from the UNHCR office in Phnom-Penh in December 2009. It is not known what happened to the other 17 handed over by the Cambodian authorities.
11. Two persons were killed in an explosion in an oil storage tank in the Midong area of Urumqi on June 22,2010. According to the local authorities, the explosion took place when some welding work was going on. However, they have stated that it has not yet been established whether the welding caused the explosion. ( 25-6-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
WILL PETRAEUS SUCCEED WHERE McCHRYSTAL FAILED?
B.RAMAN
(To be read in continuation of my article of September 27,2009, at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3433.html titled "Obama's Af-Pak Troika Fails To Deliver" )
Gen.Stanley McChrystal, the US and NATO Commander in Afghanistan, arrived in Kabul in the early months of the Obama Administration with the roar of a tiger. He disappeared like the tail of a snake on June 23,2010, when President Barack Obama fired him and replaced him as the US and NATO commander in Kabul by Gen.David Petraeus, the present head of the US Central Command.
2. President Barack Obama had been justifiably angered by the irreverent remarks of Gen.McChrystal and some of his aides during a series of discussions with a journalist of the "Rolling Stone" magazine. An article carried by the magazine in its latest issue based on their irreverent remarks caused considerable embarrassment in the Pentagon and the White House. The dismissal of the General was an inevitable outcome.
3. Even before the sacked General landed himself in an inexcusable position due to his irreverence amounting to insubordination, the halo with which he had taken over command of the NATO forces in Afghanistan last year had disappeared because of his failure to come out with a strategy which could enable the NATO forces to prevail over the Taliban. Ever since the General took over in Kabul last year, the operations of the Afghan Taliban, from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, had increased in daring and success. Mr.Obama's hopes of the beginning of an exit with grace from Afghanistan from the middle of 2011 are in the process of being belied due to the failure of Gen.McChrystal to work out an effective strategy against the Taliban and its Pakistani mentors.
4. What worked for the General during his previous posting in Iraq----his skills in special operations and his ability to divide and prevail over Al Qaeda and its ex- Baathist allies from the disbanded army of Saddam Hussein---- did not work in Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan is a united force, which has successfully resisted US-inspired attempts to create a split between the so-called Good and Bad Taliban. In Iraq, Al Qaeda with its volunteers from outside---mainly from Saudi Arabia---- was in the forefront of the battles. It was easy to create a divide between the outsiders in Al Qaeda and the native Iraqis, who hated the Saudis of Al Qaeda as much as they hated the Americans. They were prepared to temporarily swallow their dislike of the Americans and collaborate with them against the outsiders of Al Qaeda.
5. In Afghanistan, the native Pashtuns of the Taliban have been in the forefront of the battles against the NATO forces. The role of the outsiders of Al Qaeda in the battles waged by the Taliban against the NATO forces has been minimal. Conditions for a successful divide and prevail strategy did not exist in Afghanistan and do not exist even today. Moreover, in Iraq, the role of Iran, despite its aversion to the US, was beneficial to the US operations against Al Qaeda and its associates. In Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan, while seemingly beneficial, has really been detrimental to the US war efforts.
6. In Afghanistan, a different mix was required----better conventional capabilities in Afghan territory, better covert capabilities in Pakistani territory to target the Taliban sanctuaries and rear bases and the political will to call Pakistan to order and to force it to stop playing its strategic games in Afghanistan. Instead of devising such a strategy, McChrystal followed a strategy largely based on illusions------- illusions of a coming split in the Taliban, illusions of a diminution of public support for the Taliban and illusions of Pakistani co-operation in dealing with the Taliban.
7. The illusions proved his undoing. His reported decision to postpone the much-trumpeted offensive against the Taliban in the Kandahar area scheduled for later this year spoke volumes of his failure to come to grips with the situation on the ground. A General minus the acquired-in-Iraq halo committed the sin of speaking disparagingly of his own political and professional superiors and has paid the price for it. His irreverence enabled Mr.Obama to rid himself of a General on the brink of battle failure on grounds of misconduct instead of on grounds of battle failure which could have reflected on Mr.Obama’s political and professional judgment.
8. It was easy to get rid of McChrystal. It is going to be difficult to turn the tide of the war in favour of the NATO. Gen.Petraeus, whom Mr.Obama has chosen for this purpose, had also acquired a halo in Iraq. The halo has become dimmer since he took over as the Commander of the Central Command. As the Commander, he has to share the responsibility for the set-backs in Afghanistan and for the failure to make headway against the Taliban.
9. As General Petraeus gets going in his new assignment, he has to tell himself repeatedly that Afghanistan is not Iraq, that the Pashtuns are not Iraqis or Saudis, that the Taliban is not Al Qaeda or Saddam’s ex-Baathists, that Pakistan is not Iran. He will have a new set of foes unlike any he had known and encountered in Iraq. In Sunni Pakistan ,he will have an Islamic State more devious and more dissimulating than a Shia Iran.
10. He will need a new strategy which will weld together the Pashtuns owing loyalty to President Hamid Karzai and the Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns loyal to the leaders of the old Northern Alliance. India understands the mindset of a Pakistani Sunni better than many other countries in the world. He will benefit by a share of the Indian wisdom. ( 24-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
(To be read in continuation of my article of September 27,2009, at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3433.html titled "Obama's Af-Pak Troika Fails To Deliver" )
Gen.Stanley McChrystal, the US and NATO Commander in Afghanistan, arrived in Kabul in the early months of the Obama Administration with the roar of a tiger. He disappeared like the tail of a snake on June 23,2010, when President Barack Obama fired him and replaced him as the US and NATO commander in Kabul by Gen.David Petraeus, the present head of the US Central Command.
2. President Barack Obama had been justifiably angered by the irreverent remarks of Gen.McChrystal and some of his aides during a series of discussions with a journalist of the "Rolling Stone" magazine. An article carried by the magazine in its latest issue based on their irreverent remarks caused considerable embarrassment in the Pentagon and the White House. The dismissal of the General was an inevitable outcome.
3. Even before the sacked General landed himself in an inexcusable position due to his irreverence amounting to insubordination, the halo with which he had taken over command of the NATO forces in Afghanistan last year had disappeared because of his failure to come out with a strategy which could enable the NATO forces to prevail over the Taliban. Ever since the General took over in Kabul last year, the operations of the Afghan Taliban, from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, had increased in daring and success. Mr.Obama's hopes of the beginning of an exit with grace from Afghanistan from the middle of 2011 are in the process of being belied due to the failure of Gen.McChrystal to work out an effective strategy against the Taliban and its Pakistani mentors.
4. What worked for the General during his previous posting in Iraq----his skills in special operations and his ability to divide and prevail over Al Qaeda and its ex- Baathist allies from the disbanded army of Saddam Hussein---- did not work in Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan is a united force, which has successfully resisted US-inspired attempts to create a split between the so-called Good and Bad Taliban. In Iraq, Al Qaeda with its volunteers from outside---mainly from Saudi Arabia---- was in the forefront of the battles. It was easy to create a divide between the outsiders in Al Qaeda and the native Iraqis, who hated the Saudis of Al Qaeda as much as they hated the Americans. They were prepared to temporarily swallow their dislike of the Americans and collaborate with them against the outsiders of Al Qaeda.
5. In Afghanistan, the native Pashtuns of the Taliban have been in the forefront of the battles against the NATO forces. The role of the outsiders of Al Qaeda in the battles waged by the Taliban against the NATO forces has been minimal. Conditions for a successful divide and prevail strategy did not exist in Afghanistan and do not exist even today. Moreover, in Iraq, the role of Iran, despite its aversion to the US, was beneficial to the US operations against Al Qaeda and its associates. In Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan, while seemingly beneficial, has really been detrimental to the US war efforts.
6. In Afghanistan, a different mix was required----better conventional capabilities in Afghan territory, better covert capabilities in Pakistani territory to target the Taliban sanctuaries and rear bases and the political will to call Pakistan to order and to force it to stop playing its strategic games in Afghanistan. Instead of devising such a strategy, McChrystal followed a strategy largely based on illusions------- illusions of a coming split in the Taliban, illusions of a diminution of public support for the Taliban and illusions of Pakistani co-operation in dealing with the Taliban.
7. The illusions proved his undoing. His reported decision to postpone the much-trumpeted offensive against the Taliban in the Kandahar area scheduled for later this year spoke volumes of his failure to come to grips with the situation on the ground. A General minus the acquired-in-Iraq halo committed the sin of speaking disparagingly of his own political and professional superiors and has paid the price for it. His irreverence enabled Mr.Obama to rid himself of a General on the brink of battle failure on grounds of misconduct instead of on grounds of battle failure which could have reflected on Mr.Obama’s political and professional judgment.
8. It was easy to get rid of McChrystal. It is going to be difficult to turn the tide of the war in favour of the NATO. Gen.Petraeus, whom Mr.Obama has chosen for this purpose, had also acquired a halo in Iraq. The halo has become dimmer since he took over as the Commander of the Central Command. As the Commander, he has to share the responsibility for the set-backs in Afghanistan and for the failure to make headway against the Taliban.
9. As General Petraeus gets going in his new assignment, he has to tell himself repeatedly that Afghanistan is not Iraq, that the Pashtuns are not Iraqis or Saudis, that the Taliban is not Al Qaeda or Saddam’s ex-Baathists, that Pakistan is not Iran. He will have a new set of foes unlike any he had known and encountered in Iraq. In Sunni Pakistan ,he will have an Islamic State more devious and more dissimulating than a Shia Iran.
10. He will need a new strategy which will weld together the Pashtuns owing loyalty to President Hamid Karzai and the Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns loyal to the leaders of the old Northern Alliance. India understands the mindset of a Pakistani Sunni better than many other countries in the world. He will benefit by a share of the Indian wisdom. ( 24-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
CHINA TO DE-EMPHASISE UIGHUR IDENTITY OF XINJIANG
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the first Xinjiang Work Conference, a joint conference of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, China’s cabinet, held at Beijing from May 17 to 19, 2010, to draft a blueprint for the region’s economic development until 2020, the Chinese authorities have embarked on a campaign in Xinjiang, which de-emphasises the Uighur ethnic identity of the province and highlights the Government's plans for its rapid economic development in order to bring it on par with other Chinese provinces.
2. The various documents and statements emanating from the conference, which was inaugurated by President Hu Jintao, underlined the plans of the Government for what was described as a leap-frog economic development of the province, but were silent on the Government's plans to protect the Uighur ethnic and Islamic religious identities of its Uighur population. However, subsequent comments by Chinese experts have indicated that the Government would follow a two-pronged policy based on rapid economic development and closer social integration in order to reduce Han-Uighur tensions which led to a serious outbreak of violence in July last year.
3.The "China Daily" of June 4,2010, quoted Prof.Qiang Shigong, Director of the Research Centre on the Rule of Law at Peking University, as saying as follows in an interview with a local journal called "South Wind Window", or "Nanfengchuang" after the Xinjiang Work conference:
"We need to adjust our Xinjiang policy according to the changes of social environment and approach the problem under the context of globalization.The economy’s development, although important, cannot create ethnic unity without the support of other polices, and on the contrary it may lead to social polarization and ethnic tensions because people of different ethnic backgrounds differ in their capability of adapting to the market. The ethnic integration in Xinjiang should not be understood as assimilation of non-Han Chinese. The Government should be sensitive to cultural diversities, and protect ethnic groups’ rights according to the law. "
4.He urged measures to weaken the identity of ethnic groups in policy-making, such as closing ethnic schools to promote more communication between different ethnic groups. He also said the promotion of Mandarin in ethnic regions could benefit local people in the current market economy environment. "To develop the economy and improve people’s lives doesn’t mean only helping people out of poverty. Instead, their education level and competitive capabilities should be enhanced fundamentally.The Han Chinese should take responsibility for the integration, and Han people should make more sacrifice and contribution to the goal," Qiang said. In his view, as the Government sends officials from other regions to work in Xinjiang, it should also encourage officials in Xinjiang to work in other regions.
5.The Xinjiang authorities have launched a door-to-door campaign to explain the new policies of the Government for the economoic development of the province to the people on the eve of the forthcoming anniversary of last year's outbreak of violence. According to Mr.Li Yi, head of the publicity department of the regional office of the Communist Party of China,over 9,000 officials and scholars would explain the Government's policies in schools, government departments, communities, villages, families and mosques across Xinjiang.
6. The Chinese authorities mistakenly seem to think that the feelings of alienation in the Uighur community are only because of the economic disparities between the Uighurs and the Han settlers. They do not seem to realise that these are more due to the unhappiness of the Uighurs over the failure of the Government to respect their ethnic and religious rights. (23-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In the wake of the first Xinjiang Work Conference, a joint conference of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, China’s cabinet, held at Beijing from May 17 to 19, 2010, to draft a blueprint for the region’s economic development until 2020, the Chinese authorities have embarked on a campaign in Xinjiang, which de-emphasises the Uighur ethnic identity of the province and highlights the Government's plans for its rapid economic development in order to bring it on par with other Chinese provinces.
2. The various documents and statements emanating from the conference, which was inaugurated by President Hu Jintao, underlined the plans of the Government for what was described as a leap-frog economic development of the province, but were silent on the Government's plans to protect the Uighur ethnic and Islamic religious identities of its Uighur population. However, subsequent comments by Chinese experts have indicated that the Government would follow a two-pronged policy based on rapid economic development and closer social integration in order to reduce Han-Uighur tensions which led to a serious outbreak of violence in July last year.
3.The "China Daily" of June 4,2010, quoted Prof.Qiang Shigong, Director of the Research Centre on the Rule of Law at Peking University, as saying as follows in an interview with a local journal called "South Wind Window", or "Nanfengchuang" after the Xinjiang Work conference:
"We need to adjust our Xinjiang policy according to the changes of social environment and approach the problem under the context of globalization.The economy’s development, although important, cannot create ethnic unity without the support of other polices, and on the contrary it may lead to social polarization and ethnic tensions because people of different ethnic backgrounds differ in their capability of adapting to the market. The ethnic integration in Xinjiang should not be understood as assimilation of non-Han Chinese. The Government should be sensitive to cultural diversities, and protect ethnic groups’ rights according to the law. "
4.He urged measures to weaken the identity of ethnic groups in policy-making, such as closing ethnic schools to promote more communication between different ethnic groups. He also said the promotion of Mandarin in ethnic regions could benefit local people in the current market economy environment. "To develop the economy and improve people’s lives doesn’t mean only helping people out of poverty. Instead, their education level and competitive capabilities should be enhanced fundamentally.The Han Chinese should take responsibility for the integration, and Han people should make more sacrifice and contribution to the goal," Qiang said. In his view, as the Government sends officials from other regions to work in Xinjiang, it should also encourage officials in Xinjiang to work in other regions.
5.The Xinjiang authorities have launched a door-to-door campaign to explain the new policies of the Government for the economoic development of the province to the people on the eve of the forthcoming anniversary of last year's outbreak of violence. According to Mr.Li Yi, head of the publicity department of the regional office of the Communist Party of China,over 9,000 officials and scholars would explain the Government's policies in schools, government departments, communities, villages, families and mosques across Xinjiang.
6. The Chinese authorities mistakenly seem to think that the feelings of alienation in the Uighur community are only because of the economic disparities between the Uighurs and the Han settlers. They do not seem to realise that these are more due to the unhappiness of the Uighurs over the failure of the Government to respect their ethnic and religious rights. (23-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA TO GO AHEAD WITH NUCLEAR DEAL WITH PAKISTAN, SAYS CHINA DAILY
B.RAMAN
Under the heading "China may finance Pakistan reactors", the "China Daily" has reported as follows on June 23,2010::
China will likely go ahead with financing the construction of two nuclear reactors in Pakistan despite concerns from other countries, say Chinese experts.
China is expected to announce its plans to build the reactors in Punjab province at a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in New Zealand on Thursday. Meanwhile the United States, with heavy lobbying from India, is reportedly raising doubts over the legitimacy of the deal.
One of the concerns is that Pakistan, as well as India, did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore is technically not restricted from transferring the technology to a third party, posing a potential threat to the international community.
"This is not the first time China has helped Pakistan build nuclear reactors, and since it will be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deal is not going to have any problems," said Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Zhai said the US will not pressure China too much as it previously struck a deal with India. In 2008, the NSG - which represents the 46 countries that control the world's atomic trade - made an exemption allowing Washington to sell civil nuclear technology to New Delhi. Pakistan has stressed many times it wants the same recognition as India on civil nuclear usage.
"Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself, and the country's loss is greater than the US and the other 42 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after," said Zhai.
The US asked China to clarify the details of the deal last Wednesday, after intense urging from India, but stopped short of publicly opposing it. On Thursday ( My comment: Tuesday?) China said the reactors are for peaceful purposes, and will accept the IAEA's inspection. China joined the NSG in 2004 but has already built one reactor and started a second at Chashma, Punjab. The latest two reactors in the region will generate 650 megawatts each.
Although the deal is not likely to attract strong opposition, NSG members still do not want to see the transaction go forward, according to Mark Hibbs, nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Policy in Washington. However, Hibbs said the US-India deal set a precedent.
"There was no real agreement between the members about how to proceed," the Australian Radio quoted him as saying.
Fan Jishe, a scholar of US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that the nature of the Sino-Pakistani deal is different from that of the US-India deal.
"We do not need an exemption from the NSG, as requested by the US, since the deal was reached before we joined the group," Fan said.
Under the heading "China may finance Pakistan reactors", the "China Daily" has reported as follows on June 23,2010::
China will likely go ahead with financing the construction of two nuclear reactors in Pakistan despite concerns from other countries, say Chinese experts.
China is expected to announce its plans to build the reactors in Punjab province at a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in New Zealand on Thursday. Meanwhile the United States, with heavy lobbying from India, is reportedly raising doubts over the legitimacy of the deal.
One of the concerns is that Pakistan, as well as India, did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore is technically not restricted from transferring the technology to a third party, posing a potential threat to the international community.
"This is not the first time China has helped Pakistan build nuclear reactors, and since it will be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deal is not going to have any problems," said Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Zhai said the US will not pressure China too much as it previously struck a deal with India. In 2008, the NSG - which represents the 46 countries that control the world's atomic trade - made an exemption allowing Washington to sell civil nuclear technology to New Delhi. Pakistan has stressed many times it wants the same recognition as India on civil nuclear usage.
"Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself, and the country's loss is greater than the US and the other 42 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after," said Zhai.
The US asked China to clarify the details of the deal last Wednesday, after intense urging from India, but stopped short of publicly opposing it. On Thursday ( My comment: Tuesday?) China said the reactors are for peaceful purposes, and will accept the IAEA's inspection. China joined the NSG in 2004 but has already built one reactor and started a second at Chashma, Punjab. The latest two reactors in the region will generate 650 megawatts each.
Although the deal is not likely to attract strong opposition, NSG members still do not want to see the transaction go forward, according to Mark Hibbs, nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Policy in Washington. However, Hibbs said the US-India deal set a precedent.
"There was no real agreement between the members about how to proceed," the Australian Radio quoted him as saying.
Fan Jishe, a scholar of US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that the nature of the Sino-Pakistani deal is different from that of the US-India deal.
"We do not need an exemption from the NSG, as requested by the US, since the deal was reached before we joined the group," Fan said.
Monday, June 21, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: KEEPING THE FINGERS CROSSED
B.RAMAN
Between June 24 and July 15,one would be seeing three important bilateral interactions, not amounting to a resumption of the composite dialogue, between India and Pakistan.
2.On June 24, Mrs.Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, will be in Islamabad, for talks with her Pakistani counterpart. During her stay, she will be, inter alia, preparing the ground work for the visits to Islamabad of Mr. P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, and Mr. S.M.Krishna, the Foreign Minister, which are to follow.
3. Mr. Chidambaram, accompanied by a team of senior officials from his Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs, will be in Islamabad later this week to attend the meeting of the Home Ministers of SAARC under the chairmanship of Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and a trusted confidante of President Asif Ali Zardari. Closer co-operation in counter-terrorism and the improvement of traditions of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters by the member-countries, both of which are presently more an exception than the rule, will be on the top of the agenda for the SAARC conference.
4. Media reports indicate that smaller countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives are unhappy that the SAARC, in its preoccupation with issues raised by India and Pakistan, has not been paying adequate attention to other regional security issues which are of greater interest to them such as regional co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Being island countries, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have legitimate expectations that terrorism and law and order problems emanating from the sea and across the seas should receive greater attention than they have received in the past. This is an important subject. Its importance has been further enhanced by the Lashkar-e-Toiba's (LET) sea-borne attacks in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
5. Mr. Chidambaram will be utilising his stay in Islamabad for bilateral interactions with Mr.Malik and other important Pakistani leaders, including the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr.Shah Mahmood Qureshi. Comments emanating from different sources in Pakistan ----governmental as well as non-Governmental--- indicate that the Pakistani authorities are aware of the important position occupied by Mr.Chidambaram in the Cabinet of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the confidence reportedly reposed in him by Dr.Singh as well as Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I). As the Minister in charge of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the perceptions of the post-26/11 Pakistani mindset, attitudes and policies formed by him during his visit to Pakistan would have an important role in influencing a decision by India on "What next?"
6. There is, therefore, a discernible keenness in Islamabad to see that Mr.Chidambaram's bilateral innteractions proceed smoothly without any jarring note. Such a jarring note could come either in the form of a new act of terrorism by jihadi elements from Pakistan either in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir or on Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan, committed before, during or in the days following his visit. Even if there be no fresh act of terrorism, even highly provocative and instigatory anti-India statements during this period by jihadi leaders such as Prof.Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jammat-ud-Dawa, the political wing of the LET, could derail the exercise undertaken by Dr.Singh and Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister. for creating an atmosphere of trust in the bilateral relations as a prelude to a resumption of a comprehensive dialogue on various issues bedevilling the relations between the two countries.
7. Trust-building will be the main objective of the interactions of Mr.Krishna in Pakistan from July 15. The meeting between Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Malik the plans for which were drawn up long before the decision taken by the two Prime Ministers for a trust-building exercise in the margins of the SAARC summit in Thimpu, Bhutan, in April has acquired an added importance in the context of the visit of our Foreign Minister. How Mr. Chidambaram's visit proceeds would have an important bearing on the subsequent visit of Mr.Krishna.
8. If Mr.Chidambaram comes back with a feeling that the Pakistani political and military-cum-intelligence leadership continues to be as negative as ever in matters relating to counter-terrorism in general and counter-LET in particular, public and political pressures against any fresh diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan could increase thereby tying the hands of Mr.Krishna.
9. The Pakistani authorities are aware of this danger too and are hoping that the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna would not at least add to the current distrust, even if they don't result in winds of change and trust beginning to sweep across the sub-continent. Both Mr.Malik and Mr.Qureshi have been avoiding negative-seeming comments. One saw this during the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Tashkant, which was attended by Mr.Zardari and Mr.Krishna as observers. Mr.Malik had accompanied Mr.Zardari.
10. Both Pakistan and India find themselves prisoners of self-created formulations, which hamper the search for a way out of the current darkness of distrust.By making any progress in sorting out other issues a hostage to the Kashmir issue, Pakistan has denied itself any room for policy flexibility. India has created a similar dead-end for itself by making progress in other issues a hostage to the issue of sincere Pakistani action against the jihadi terrorists in general and the LET in particular.
11. Breaking these self-created prisons is not going to be easy. It will be time-consuming. It will require a long spell of incident-free relations. Within this reality, are there ways of taking measures which could create trust? That is the question to be addressed during the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna. Distrust between India and Pakistan has three components--- the distrust between the general bureaucracies of the two countries, the distrust between the security bureaucracies, including the Army and the intelligence community and the distrust between the political leaderships.
12. The distrust between the political leaderships will be easier to break, provided the distrust between the bureacracies can be reduced. But,there is a vicious circle to be broken. The distrust between the political leaderships cannot be reduced unless that between the bureaucracies is addressed. The distrust between the bureaucracies cannot be reduced in the absence of trust between the political leaderships.
13. This calls for a beginning in the establishment of a network of relationships at various levels---political and bureaucratic---between the two countries. We have established such a network with China despite the continuing border dispute and despite our continuing distrust of the People's Liberation Army of China. There has not even been an attempt to build such a network between India and Pakistan. Is it possible to build such a network? If so, how to go about it?What role the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Home Ministry of India can play in this exercise as the starting blocks? These are questions which should be discussed during the forthcoming interactions.
14. Our insistence on Pakistani action against the LET and Sayeed is legitimate and should be continued. But we shoulde not allow this to become an over-obsession which nullifies all ideas and intitiatives of a positive nature. Over-obsession with certain issues has become the bane of Indo-Pakistan relations. If the two countries, their leaderships and bureaucracies could rid themselves of these over-obsessions, they may realise that a strategic relationship for mutual benefit between the two countries is not such a stupid idea after all. ( 22-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Between June 24 and July 15,one would be seeing three important bilateral interactions, not amounting to a resumption of the composite dialogue, between India and Pakistan.
2.On June 24, Mrs.Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, will be in Islamabad, for talks with her Pakistani counterpart. During her stay, she will be, inter alia, preparing the ground work for the visits to Islamabad of Mr. P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, and Mr. S.M.Krishna, the Foreign Minister, which are to follow.
3. Mr. Chidambaram, accompanied by a team of senior officials from his Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs, will be in Islamabad later this week to attend the meeting of the Home Ministers of SAARC under the chairmanship of Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and a trusted confidante of President Asif Ali Zardari. Closer co-operation in counter-terrorism and the improvement of traditions of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters by the member-countries, both of which are presently more an exception than the rule, will be on the top of the agenda for the SAARC conference.
4. Media reports indicate that smaller countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives are unhappy that the SAARC, in its preoccupation with issues raised by India and Pakistan, has not been paying adequate attention to other regional security issues which are of greater interest to them such as regional co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Being island countries, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have legitimate expectations that terrorism and law and order problems emanating from the sea and across the seas should receive greater attention than they have received in the past. This is an important subject. Its importance has been further enhanced by the Lashkar-e-Toiba's (LET) sea-borne attacks in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
5. Mr. Chidambaram will be utilising his stay in Islamabad for bilateral interactions with Mr.Malik and other important Pakistani leaders, including the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr.Shah Mahmood Qureshi. Comments emanating from different sources in Pakistan ----governmental as well as non-Governmental--- indicate that the Pakistani authorities are aware of the important position occupied by Mr.Chidambaram in the Cabinet of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the confidence reportedly reposed in him by Dr.Singh as well as Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I). As the Minister in charge of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the perceptions of the post-26/11 Pakistani mindset, attitudes and policies formed by him during his visit to Pakistan would have an important role in influencing a decision by India on "What next?"
6. There is, therefore, a discernible keenness in Islamabad to see that Mr.Chidambaram's bilateral innteractions proceed smoothly without any jarring note. Such a jarring note could come either in the form of a new act of terrorism by jihadi elements from Pakistan either in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir or on Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan, committed before, during or in the days following his visit. Even if there be no fresh act of terrorism, even highly provocative and instigatory anti-India statements during this period by jihadi leaders such as Prof.Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jammat-ud-Dawa, the political wing of the LET, could derail the exercise undertaken by Dr.Singh and Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister. for creating an atmosphere of trust in the bilateral relations as a prelude to a resumption of a comprehensive dialogue on various issues bedevilling the relations between the two countries.
7. Trust-building will be the main objective of the interactions of Mr.Krishna in Pakistan from July 15. The meeting between Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Malik the plans for which were drawn up long before the decision taken by the two Prime Ministers for a trust-building exercise in the margins of the SAARC summit in Thimpu, Bhutan, in April has acquired an added importance in the context of the visit of our Foreign Minister. How Mr. Chidambaram's visit proceeds would have an important bearing on the subsequent visit of Mr.Krishna.
8. If Mr.Chidambaram comes back with a feeling that the Pakistani political and military-cum-intelligence leadership continues to be as negative as ever in matters relating to counter-terrorism in general and counter-LET in particular, public and political pressures against any fresh diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan could increase thereby tying the hands of Mr.Krishna.
9. The Pakistani authorities are aware of this danger too and are hoping that the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna would not at least add to the current distrust, even if they don't result in winds of change and trust beginning to sweep across the sub-continent. Both Mr.Malik and Mr.Qureshi have been avoiding negative-seeming comments. One saw this during the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Tashkant, which was attended by Mr.Zardari and Mr.Krishna as observers. Mr.Malik had accompanied Mr.Zardari.
10. Both Pakistan and India find themselves prisoners of self-created formulations, which hamper the search for a way out of the current darkness of distrust.By making any progress in sorting out other issues a hostage to the Kashmir issue, Pakistan has denied itself any room for policy flexibility. India has created a similar dead-end for itself by making progress in other issues a hostage to the issue of sincere Pakistani action against the jihadi terrorists in general and the LET in particular.
11. Breaking these self-created prisons is not going to be easy. It will be time-consuming. It will require a long spell of incident-free relations. Within this reality, are there ways of taking measures which could create trust? That is the question to be addressed during the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna. Distrust between India and Pakistan has three components--- the distrust between the general bureaucracies of the two countries, the distrust between the security bureaucracies, including the Army and the intelligence community and the distrust between the political leaderships.
12. The distrust between the political leaderships will be easier to break, provided the distrust between the bureacracies can be reduced. But,there is a vicious circle to be broken. The distrust between the political leaderships cannot be reduced unless that between the bureaucracies is addressed. The distrust between the bureaucracies cannot be reduced in the absence of trust between the political leaderships.
13. This calls for a beginning in the establishment of a network of relationships at various levels---political and bureaucratic---between the two countries. We have established such a network with China despite the continuing border dispute and despite our continuing distrust of the People's Liberation Army of China. There has not even been an attempt to build such a network between India and Pakistan. Is it possible to build such a network? If so, how to go about it?What role the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Home Ministry of India can play in this exercise as the starting blocks? These are questions which should be discussed during the forthcoming interactions.
14. Our insistence on Pakistani action against the LET and Sayeed is legitimate and should be continued. But we shoulde not allow this to become an over-obsession which nullifies all ideas and intitiatives of a positive nature. Over-obsession with certain issues has become the bane of Indo-Pakistan relations. If the two countries, their leaderships and bureaucracies could rid themselves of these over-obsessions, they may realise that a strategic relationship for mutual benefit between the two countries is not such a stupid idea after all. ( 22-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, June 20, 2010
CHINA DETERMINED TO ENSURE INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR BALANCE
B.RAMAN
The perceptions of an increasingly feel good atmosphere in the relations between India and China since the Copenhagen summit of last year should not divert attention from the ground reality, which continues to be marked by the Chinese leadership’s determination to strengthen the feeling of security of Pakistan vis-Ã -vis India, to maintain a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan and to counter the reported plans of the Indian Army to develop a capability for a two-front war with a counter Sino-Pakistani capability to pose a two-front threat to India.
2. The talk in India of an increasingly feel good atmosphere has been caused by the absence of seemingly hostile rhetoric in China’s pronouncements regarding India, the warmth extended to our President, Mrs.Pratibha Patil, during her recent visit to China to mark the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the balanced Chinese response to the restrictions sought to be imposed by India on the award of sensitive telecommunication contracts to Chinese companies. Chinese reactions to developments such as the reported approval of the Government of India to the Army’s proposal to raise two new mountain divisions, deployment of Air Force units to protect Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian debate over a possible two front doctrine have been relatively free of polemics.
3.This feel good atmosphere and the restrained language on both sides as contrasted with the rhetoric of last year need to be welcomed and ought to continue. At the same time, it will be unwise to let our focus move away from disturbing elements in China’s policy towards Pakistan and Islamabad’s expectations from China, which have become evident recently.
4. The first disturbing element is China’s continued assistance to Pakistan to expand its reprocessing capability, which will further add to its military nuclear capability. The second is its surprising decision after a four-year hesitation to respond positively to Pakistan’s repeated requests for two more nuclear power stations similar in design and capacity to Chashma I and Chashma II. Chashma I has already been commissioned. Chashma II is under construction.
5. The international community and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which China joined in 2004, could not object to Chashma I and II both of which were justified by China as already on-going projects when it joined the NSG and hence not subject to the ban on the supply of nuclear equipment and technologies to States which are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
6. Chinese attempts initiated in 2006 to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan under the same 1991 contract were objected to by the administration of Mr.George Bush . The US objections were taken note of by Beijing, which put in cold storage its proposal for giving two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan without abandoning it.
7.In a surprise decision earlier this year, China decided to take this proposal out of the cold storage and go ahead with it after informing the NSG----without seeking its formal approval--- at the plenary meeting of the NSG in New Zealand this week. The indications from Beijing are that the Chinese Government would go ahead with its move even if there be objections from the NSG. Whether the two additional nuclear power stations would be part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG or would have to be under a new contract which could be concluded only with an exemption granted by the NSG is a matter of interpretation. Beijing seems to be determined to stick to its interpretation that these are part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG.
8.Intriguing questions for Indian analysts are: What made the Chinese political leadership, which was receptive to the concerns and views of the Bush Administration on this issue, revive the proposal and go ahead with it even at the risk of misunderstanding with the Obama Administration? Was it pressure from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) not to let the balance of nuclear capabilities between India and Pakistan be upset in favour of India as a result of the Indo-US Civil nuclear co-operation agreement of 2005 and the subsequent lifting by the NSG of the restrictions on the sale of nuclear equipment and technology to India? Does the PLA view the continued maintenance of a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan as in China’s national interest?
9.It was Pakistan, which raised in 2006, when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power, the question of China maintaining the balance by supplying additional nuclear power stations to Pakistan if the US refused to extend to Pakistan the same consideration as it had extended to India. Now voices are being raised in Pakistan about the importance of Pakistan persuading China to lease out a nuclear-powered submarine to Pakistan to neutralize any advantage accruing to India by its reported efforts to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia. This idea has also figured in an article written by Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, a retired officer of the Pakistan Navy, under the title “Options For the Pakistan Navy” which had appeared in the summer issue of the US Naval War College Review available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc6209f2-7f01-4bb7-ac24-8c301c62f015/S-2--Options-for-the-Pakistan-Navy
10. There is no evidence to indicate that Pakistan has formally taken up such an idea with the Chinese, but one has to closely monitor any developments having a bearing on this.
11.Sino-Indian atmospherics are better than they were last year, but that does not mean any significant change in Chinese perceptions and strategy relating to India and Pakistan. The improvement of relations with India has not diminished in the Chinese eyes the importance of strengthening Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities against India.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled “US Nod for Chashma III & IV? “ available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3788.html . ( 21-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The perceptions of an increasingly feel good atmosphere in the relations between India and China since the Copenhagen summit of last year should not divert attention from the ground reality, which continues to be marked by the Chinese leadership’s determination to strengthen the feeling of security of Pakistan vis-Ã -vis India, to maintain a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan and to counter the reported plans of the Indian Army to develop a capability for a two-front war with a counter Sino-Pakistani capability to pose a two-front threat to India.
2. The talk in India of an increasingly feel good atmosphere has been caused by the absence of seemingly hostile rhetoric in China’s pronouncements regarding India, the warmth extended to our President, Mrs.Pratibha Patil, during her recent visit to China to mark the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the balanced Chinese response to the restrictions sought to be imposed by India on the award of sensitive telecommunication contracts to Chinese companies. Chinese reactions to developments such as the reported approval of the Government of India to the Army’s proposal to raise two new mountain divisions, deployment of Air Force units to protect Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian debate over a possible two front doctrine have been relatively free of polemics.
3.This feel good atmosphere and the restrained language on both sides as contrasted with the rhetoric of last year need to be welcomed and ought to continue. At the same time, it will be unwise to let our focus move away from disturbing elements in China’s policy towards Pakistan and Islamabad’s expectations from China, which have become evident recently.
4. The first disturbing element is China’s continued assistance to Pakistan to expand its reprocessing capability, which will further add to its military nuclear capability. The second is its surprising decision after a four-year hesitation to respond positively to Pakistan’s repeated requests for two more nuclear power stations similar in design and capacity to Chashma I and Chashma II. Chashma I has already been commissioned. Chashma II is under construction.
5. The international community and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which China joined in 2004, could not object to Chashma I and II both of which were justified by China as already on-going projects when it joined the NSG and hence not subject to the ban on the supply of nuclear equipment and technologies to States which are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
6. Chinese attempts initiated in 2006 to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan under the same 1991 contract were objected to by the administration of Mr.George Bush . The US objections were taken note of by Beijing, which put in cold storage its proposal for giving two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan without abandoning it.
7.In a surprise decision earlier this year, China decided to take this proposal out of the cold storage and go ahead with it after informing the NSG----without seeking its formal approval--- at the plenary meeting of the NSG in New Zealand this week. The indications from Beijing are that the Chinese Government would go ahead with its move even if there be objections from the NSG. Whether the two additional nuclear power stations would be part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG or would have to be under a new contract which could be concluded only with an exemption granted by the NSG is a matter of interpretation. Beijing seems to be determined to stick to its interpretation that these are part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG.
8.Intriguing questions for Indian analysts are: What made the Chinese political leadership, which was receptive to the concerns and views of the Bush Administration on this issue, revive the proposal and go ahead with it even at the risk of misunderstanding with the Obama Administration? Was it pressure from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) not to let the balance of nuclear capabilities between India and Pakistan be upset in favour of India as a result of the Indo-US Civil nuclear co-operation agreement of 2005 and the subsequent lifting by the NSG of the restrictions on the sale of nuclear equipment and technology to India? Does the PLA view the continued maintenance of a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan as in China’s national interest?
9.It was Pakistan, which raised in 2006, when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power, the question of China maintaining the balance by supplying additional nuclear power stations to Pakistan if the US refused to extend to Pakistan the same consideration as it had extended to India. Now voices are being raised in Pakistan about the importance of Pakistan persuading China to lease out a nuclear-powered submarine to Pakistan to neutralize any advantage accruing to India by its reported efforts to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia. This idea has also figured in an article written by Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, a retired officer of the Pakistan Navy, under the title “Options For the Pakistan Navy” which had appeared in the summer issue of the US Naval War College Review available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc6209f2-7f01-4bb7-ac24-8c301c62f015/S-2--Options-for-the-Pakistan-Navy
10. There is no evidence to indicate that Pakistan has formally taken up such an idea with the Chinese, but one has to closely monitor any developments having a bearing on this.
11.Sino-Indian atmospherics are better than they were last year, but that does not mean any significant change in Chinese perceptions and strategy relating to India and Pakistan. The improvement of relations with India has not diminished in the Chinese eyes the importance of strengthening Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities against India.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled “US Nod for Chashma III & IV? “ available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3788.html . ( 21-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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