INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 651
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the front organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and other Pakistani jihadi organizations associated with Al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been organizing protest demonstrations in different cities of Pakistan to condemn an attempt by an user of “Facebook” to organise an "Everyone Draw Mohammed Day" competition to promote "freedom of expression". His attempt was allegedly inspired by an American woman cartoonist.
2. According to the Agence France Presse (AFP),Molly Norris, the American cartoonist whose work inspired the controversial page, condemned the Facebook spin-off and apologised to Muslims. She allegedly drew a cartoon in April to protest against the cancellation of an episode of popular show "South Park". Norris satirically proposed May 20 as an "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day." An "Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" page quickly turned up on Facebook, but Norris, writing on her website, said she had nothing to do with it. "The vitriol this 'day' has brought out of people who only want to draw obscene images, is offensive to Muslims who did nothing to endanger our right to expression in the first place," she said. "I apologise to people of Muslim faith and ask that this 'day' be called off," she said
3.The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) has banned access to Facebook, YouTube and more than 450 links to "derogatory" Internet material in view of what it called "growing sacrilegious content". Sweden said it has closed its embassy in Islamabad for more than two weeks due to the security situation. An Al Qaeda front organisation has reportedly offered US $ 100,000 to anyone who kills Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who has angered many Muslims by drawing what they regard a highly blasphemous caricature of the Prophet.
4.In view of the interest taken by the LET and other Al Qaeda associates to exploit this issue to whip up anger in Pakistan, one has to be watchful to the possibility of LET elements in India including members of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) indulging in similar provocative acts in India. It is an emotional issue which can be easily exploited to create similar anger in sections of the Indian Muislim community.
5. In this connection, reference is invited to my earlier article of April 3,2010, titled “Was Jihad Jane A Recruit of LET?” annexed below for easy reference. (22-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
WAS JIHAD JANE A RECRUIT OF LASHKAR-E-TOIBA? International Terrorism Monitor- Paper N0. 638 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3745.html
By B.Raman
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was “desperate to do something somehow to help” suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission “till I achieve it or die trying,” according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html
Saturday, May 22, 2010
OBAMA DROPS INTELLIGENCE CZAR
B.RAMAN
The decision of President Barack Obama to drop retired Admiral Dennis Blair, his Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has led to his resignation from the post with effect from May 28,2010. He has chosen to resign instead of waiting for the President to name his successor after being informed by Mr.Obama of his decision to replace him. His announcement that he was quitting came on May 21,2010, three days after the Senate Intelligence Committee had come out with a report specifying 14 intelligence failures relating to the unsuccessful attempt by a Nigerian student trained by Al Qaeda in Yemen to blow up a US flight from Amsterdam as it was about to land in Detroit on December 25,2009. The list of 14 failures named by the Committee is annexed.
2. Ever since the Christmas Day incident, there were indications that Admiral Blair had lost the confidence of Mr.Obama. His role as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community of 16 agencies, as the supervisor of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and as the driving force behind efforts to improve the collection of human and technical intelligence relating to terrorism came under a cloud. There were reports that Mr.Obama had started dealing directly with other officials like the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mr.Leon Panetta, and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser Mr.John Brennan. Media reports had alleged that Mr.Obama had sidelined Admiral Blair without removing him from his post.
3. The exit of Admiral Blair was, therefore, not a surprise, but it was interesting that Mr.Obama took five months to decide to replace him even though it became evident after the Christmas Day incident that the DNI had not been able to perform effectively the tasks of co-ordination and joint action for which he was handpicked by Mr.Obama in January 2009.
4. Mr.Obama’s decision to replace Admiral Blair has come at a time when Mr.Obama has failed to make headway with his policies in Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea and has been unable to make Pakistan act vigorously against Al Qaeda and the Talibans, which continue to target the US homeland. While the ground situation in Afghanistan continues to be bad, that in Iraq has started deteriorating with renewed Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. He has been unable to make Iran and North Korea reverse their nuclear policy. North Korea’s action in sinking a South Korean naval ship killing many South Korean naval personnel is a challenge not only to South Korea, but also to the US presence and leadership in the Pacific area. There has been an erosion of US leadership in the East as well as the West Asian regions and the problem states of the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan no longer have a fear of the US.
5. The replacement of Admiral Blair in the wake of the nervousness caused in the US by the failed attempt of Faisal Shahzad, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, to cause an incendiary explosion in the Times Square, New York, on May 1 would help in diverting public attention away from the gaps in Mr.Obama’s own leadership by focusing on the gaps in the leadership qualities of Admiral Blair, which have enabled foreign-based terrorists----whether Al Qaeda or the Tehrik-a-Taliban Pakistan--- to revive their attacks against the US, whether in the Khost area of Afghanistan where they killed seven CIA officers in the last week of December last or in the US homeland where two surprise attacks planned in stealth failed not because of the capabilities of the US intelligence, but thanks to the alertness of the public.
6. The post of DNI was created in 2004 to coordinate the work of the US intelligence community and to supervise that of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This was one of the recommendations of the National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. Admiral Blair was the third incumbent of the post. The previous two under Mr.George Bush were Mr. John Negroponte and Mr. John McConell. One had expected that the fact that the DNI works directly under the President and draws his status and authority from him would enable him to perform the role of intelligence co-ordinator effectively. But the expectations were belied.
7. Admiral Blair, like his two predecessors, was able to co-ordinate effectively only the budgetary part of the work----that is, having the total intelligence budget approved by the Congress and deciding on the allocations of individual agencies. He was unable to co-ordinate effectively the operational part of his work---- that is, setting the intelligence collection tasks for different agencies and getting the intelligence collected by different agencies integrated in a single stream, analysed, assessed and followed up. A DNI can perform the operational co-ordination effectively only if the heads of the agencies keep him in the picture regarding their important operations and share with him all important intelligence at every stage of their processing.
8. None of the three DNIs since the post was created in 2004 was able to make the chiefs of individual agencies share with him all that needed to be shared. There was no common understanding of what needed to be shared. The chief of every agency decided this according to his own whims and fancies. Neither Mr.Bush nor Mr.Obama was able to call the heads of individual agencies to order. The US intelligence community lacked the culture of joint action similar to what one finds in the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism in the Armed Forces. Instead of creating and heading an integrated intelligence staff, the DNIs were functioning in an ad hoc non-integrated manner.
9. The National Commission wanted the creation of the NCTC under the leadership of the DNI to ensure the integration of the entire intelligence process relating to terrorism-----collection, collation, analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The terrorist attempts on Christmas Day and on May 1 showed weaknesses in the integration process six years after the post of DNI and the NCTC were created.
10.The exit of Admiral Blair will not remove the deficiencies unless and until the entire counter-terrorism mechanism is overhauled and made to function in an integrated manner. There are lessons for India too because one has the impression that after his visit to the US earlier this year, Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seems to have come back with some admiration for the NCTC and has been trying to create a similar set-up in India. It is necessary to study what went wrong with it in the US so that we can ensure that similar weaknesses do not creep into our system.
11. What makes the difference between a good intelligence community and a bad one is not the number of its staff, its gadgetry and budgets alone, but its culture of joint action. If this culture is missing, thousands of intelligence personnel and billions of dollars alone will not win the fight against terrorism. None of the three DNIs who have held office since 2004 has succeeded in creating this culture. (22-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
LIST OF 14 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES CITED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE DOTS
The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14 intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit on Christmas Day :
— The State Department should have revoked Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa based on information available to the department.
— Abdulmutallab wasn't placed on any of the terrorist watchlists because the standards were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats.
— Key intelligence reports weren't reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.
— A CIA division at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.
— The CIA didn't disseminate key reports until after the attempted attack.
— A name search by the CIA Counterterrorism Center was too limited and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts at the CIA Counterterrorism Center didn't connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab, focusing instead on Yemen -based threats from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .
— Because her computer was wrongly configured, an FBI counterterrorism analyst couldn't access all the relevant reports even though they were in the FBI's system.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence wasn't properly organized to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.
— The National Security Agency didn't take all available actions that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab and didn't disseminate all relevant reporting.
— The NSA didn't select Abdulmutallab for watchlists based on information that only partly identified him.
— Intelligence analysts were focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula rather than on potential threats to the U.S.
The decision of President Barack Obama to drop retired Admiral Dennis Blair, his Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has led to his resignation from the post with effect from May 28,2010. He has chosen to resign instead of waiting for the President to name his successor after being informed by Mr.Obama of his decision to replace him. His announcement that he was quitting came on May 21,2010, three days after the Senate Intelligence Committee had come out with a report specifying 14 intelligence failures relating to the unsuccessful attempt by a Nigerian student trained by Al Qaeda in Yemen to blow up a US flight from Amsterdam as it was about to land in Detroit on December 25,2009. The list of 14 failures named by the Committee is annexed.
2. Ever since the Christmas Day incident, there were indications that Admiral Blair had lost the confidence of Mr.Obama. His role as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community of 16 agencies, as the supervisor of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and as the driving force behind efforts to improve the collection of human and technical intelligence relating to terrorism came under a cloud. There were reports that Mr.Obama had started dealing directly with other officials like the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mr.Leon Panetta, and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser Mr.John Brennan. Media reports had alleged that Mr.Obama had sidelined Admiral Blair without removing him from his post.
3. The exit of Admiral Blair was, therefore, not a surprise, but it was interesting that Mr.Obama took five months to decide to replace him even though it became evident after the Christmas Day incident that the DNI had not been able to perform effectively the tasks of co-ordination and joint action for which he was handpicked by Mr.Obama in January 2009.
4. Mr.Obama’s decision to replace Admiral Blair has come at a time when Mr.Obama has failed to make headway with his policies in Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea and has been unable to make Pakistan act vigorously against Al Qaeda and the Talibans, which continue to target the US homeland. While the ground situation in Afghanistan continues to be bad, that in Iraq has started deteriorating with renewed Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. He has been unable to make Iran and North Korea reverse their nuclear policy. North Korea’s action in sinking a South Korean naval ship killing many South Korean naval personnel is a challenge not only to South Korea, but also to the US presence and leadership in the Pacific area. There has been an erosion of US leadership in the East as well as the West Asian regions and the problem states of the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan no longer have a fear of the US.
5. The replacement of Admiral Blair in the wake of the nervousness caused in the US by the failed attempt of Faisal Shahzad, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, to cause an incendiary explosion in the Times Square, New York, on May 1 would help in diverting public attention away from the gaps in Mr.Obama’s own leadership by focusing on the gaps in the leadership qualities of Admiral Blair, which have enabled foreign-based terrorists----whether Al Qaeda or the Tehrik-a-Taliban Pakistan--- to revive their attacks against the US, whether in the Khost area of Afghanistan where they killed seven CIA officers in the last week of December last or in the US homeland where two surprise attacks planned in stealth failed not because of the capabilities of the US intelligence, but thanks to the alertness of the public.
6. The post of DNI was created in 2004 to coordinate the work of the US intelligence community and to supervise that of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This was one of the recommendations of the National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. Admiral Blair was the third incumbent of the post. The previous two under Mr.George Bush were Mr. John Negroponte and Mr. John McConell. One had expected that the fact that the DNI works directly under the President and draws his status and authority from him would enable him to perform the role of intelligence co-ordinator effectively. But the expectations were belied.
7. Admiral Blair, like his two predecessors, was able to co-ordinate effectively only the budgetary part of the work----that is, having the total intelligence budget approved by the Congress and deciding on the allocations of individual agencies. He was unable to co-ordinate effectively the operational part of his work---- that is, setting the intelligence collection tasks for different agencies and getting the intelligence collected by different agencies integrated in a single stream, analysed, assessed and followed up. A DNI can perform the operational co-ordination effectively only if the heads of the agencies keep him in the picture regarding their important operations and share with him all important intelligence at every stage of their processing.
8. None of the three DNIs since the post was created in 2004 was able to make the chiefs of individual agencies share with him all that needed to be shared. There was no common understanding of what needed to be shared. The chief of every agency decided this according to his own whims and fancies. Neither Mr.Bush nor Mr.Obama was able to call the heads of individual agencies to order. The US intelligence community lacked the culture of joint action similar to what one finds in the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism in the Armed Forces. Instead of creating and heading an integrated intelligence staff, the DNIs were functioning in an ad hoc non-integrated manner.
9. The National Commission wanted the creation of the NCTC under the leadership of the DNI to ensure the integration of the entire intelligence process relating to terrorism-----collection, collation, analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The terrorist attempts on Christmas Day and on May 1 showed weaknesses in the integration process six years after the post of DNI and the NCTC were created.
10.The exit of Admiral Blair will not remove the deficiencies unless and until the entire counter-terrorism mechanism is overhauled and made to function in an integrated manner. There are lessons for India too because one has the impression that after his visit to the US earlier this year, Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, seems to have come back with some admiration for the NCTC and has been trying to create a similar set-up in India. It is necessary to study what went wrong with it in the US so that we can ensure that similar weaknesses do not creep into our system.
11. What makes the difference between a good intelligence community and a bad one is not the number of its staff, its gadgetry and budgets alone, but its culture of joint action. If this culture is missing, thousands of intelligence personnel and billions of dollars alone will not win the fight against terrorism. None of the three DNIs who have held office since 2004 has succeeded in creating this culture. (22-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
LIST OF 14 INTELLIGENCE FAILURES CITED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE DOTS
The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14 intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit on Christmas Day :
— The State Department should have revoked Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa based on information available to the department.
— Abdulmutallab wasn't placed on any of the terrorist watchlists because the standards were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats.
— Key intelligence reports weren't reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.
— A CIA division at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.
— The CIA didn't disseminate key reports until after the attempted attack.
— A name search by the CIA Counterterrorism Center was too limited and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts at the CIA Counterterrorism Center didn't connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab, focusing instead on Yemen -based threats from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .
— Because her computer was wrongly configured, an FBI counterterrorism analyst couldn't access all the relevant reports even though they were in the FBI's system.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence wasn't properly organized to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.
— The National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.
— The National Security Agency didn't take all available actions that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.
— Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab and didn't disseminate all relevant reporting.
— The NSA didn't select Abdulmutallab for watchlists based on information that only partly identified him.
— Intelligence analysts were focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula rather than on potential threats to the U.S.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
US: ADDRESSING INTELLIGENCE GAPS IN PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
Gen.James Jones, the National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, and Mr.Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reached Pakistan from Washington DC on May 18,2010, for talks with President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Miniater Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani, Gen.Asfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and senior intelligence officials of Pakistan. They are also to hold discussions with US intelligence officials based in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
2. While the visit has been projected by the Pakistani authorities as one of the periodic consultations on intelligence-sharing and liaison between the two countries, it is reliably learnt from Pakistani sources that the visit has been sparked by US concerns over serious gaps in intelligence coverage, which made possible a successful suicide bomber attack through a Jordanian double agent on a group of seven CIA officers based in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, and the attempt of Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, to make an incendiary attack in the Times Square of New York on the evening of May 1, 2010. Shahzad had almost completed the task which he had been given by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) during his training in the North Waziristan area. The Times Square escaped a major disaster partly due to the malfunctioning of the incendiary car bomb left by Shahzad and partly due to the alertness of a T-Shirt vendor, who had alerted a policeman after noticing smoke coming out of the car.
3. The TTP headed by Hakimullah Mehsud had been involved in the successful strike against the CIA officers in the Khost area and in the failed attempt in the Times Square. In both cases, US intelligence was badly caught napping. Human intelligence (HUMINT) has always been a weak point for the US despite the recent improvement which has made possible some successful Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on terrorist suspects in the two Waziristans, but the technical intelligence coverage of the US was of a high order. It was the better TECHINT coverage by the National Security Agency (NSA) which led to the arrests of many Al Qaeda operatives in the Af-Pak region since the US forces went into action in Afghanistan in October,2001.
4.Both HUMINT and TECHINT agencies of the US failed to detect the preparations of the TTP for the Khost attack and the attempt in the Times Square. According to the Pakistani sources, the NSA failed to pick up any intercept even remotely connected to the two incidents in Khost and New York. Faisal had been frequently visiting Pakistan and was in Pakistan for about five months the last time during which he underwent training and went back to the US to launch the attack. Neither the HUMINT agencies nor the NSA picked up any piece of intelligence related to his being groomed by the TTP for the Times Square attack. The US immigration too failed to notice anything worrisome about his frequent travels to Pakistan despite the financial difficulties faced by him.
5. How to address these serious gaps in intelligence coverage? One way is by the US strengthening its intelligence presence in Pakistan for which a request is to be made to the Pakistani authorities by the visiting officials. They are unlikely to reject this request. A more difficult proposition is to make the Pakistani intelligence agencies improve their intelligence coverage not only in the tribal belt, but also in Karachi and other cities. A nagging question without answer is whether the Pakistani intelligence had noticed the suspicious activities of Faisal, but refrained from alerting their US counterparts.
6. One could understand the poor intelligence coverage of the Pakistani agencies in North Waziristan, but their coverage ought to be better in Karachi, where Faisal initially met elements in the Jaish-e-Mohammad and took their help for going to the TTP camp in North Waziristan. Jihadi elements in Karachi seem to have played an important role in assisting Faisal in obtaining money for his attempted attack and in contacting the TTP just as jihadi elements of Karachi had played an important role in assisting Richard Reid, the thwarted shoe bomber, in 2001. It was to identify the Karachi elements that Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", went to Karachi from Mumbai, where he was based, in the beginning of 2002 and paid with his life.
7. Under US prodding, the Gilani Government has strengthened the intelligence collection role of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the Pakistani Ministry of the Interior, and restored the leadership role of the police officers in the IB. The IB does not have much of a capability in the tribal belt where one has to depend on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but one would have expected the IB’s coverage to have been better in Karachi through the local police, but even the IB seems to have missed the contacts of Faisal with the JEM elements in Karachi before he went to Peshawar and from there to Noth Waziristan. (19-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary, (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Gen.James Jones, the National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, and Mr.Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reached Pakistan from Washington DC on May 18,2010, for talks with President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Miniater Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani, Gen.Asfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and senior intelligence officials of Pakistan. They are also to hold discussions with US intelligence officials based in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
2. While the visit has been projected by the Pakistani authorities as one of the periodic consultations on intelligence-sharing and liaison between the two countries, it is reliably learnt from Pakistani sources that the visit has been sparked by US concerns over serious gaps in intelligence coverage, which made possible a successful suicide bomber attack through a Jordanian double agent on a group of seven CIA officers based in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, and the attempt of Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, to make an incendiary attack in the Times Square of New York on the evening of May 1, 2010. Shahzad had almost completed the task which he had been given by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) during his training in the North Waziristan area. The Times Square escaped a major disaster partly due to the malfunctioning of the incendiary car bomb left by Shahzad and partly due to the alertness of a T-Shirt vendor, who had alerted a policeman after noticing smoke coming out of the car.
3. The TTP headed by Hakimullah Mehsud had been involved in the successful strike against the CIA officers in the Khost area and in the failed attempt in the Times Square. In both cases, US intelligence was badly caught napping. Human intelligence (HUMINT) has always been a weak point for the US despite the recent improvement which has made possible some successful Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on terrorist suspects in the two Waziristans, but the technical intelligence coverage of the US was of a high order. It was the better TECHINT coverage by the National Security Agency (NSA) which led to the arrests of many Al Qaeda operatives in the Af-Pak region since the US forces went into action in Afghanistan in October,2001.
4.Both HUMINT and TECHINT agencies of the US failed to detect the preparations of the TTP for the Khost attack and the attempt in the Times Square. According to the Pakistani sources, the NSA failed to pick up any intercept even remotely connected to the two incidents in Khost and New York. Faisal had been frequently visiting Pakistan and was in Pakistan for about five months the last time during which he underwent training and went back to the US to launch the attack. Neither the HUMINT agencies nor the NSA picked up any piece of intelligence related to his being groomed by the TTP for the Times Square attack. The US immigration too failed to notice anything worrisome about his frequent travels to Pakistan despite the financial difficulties faced by him.
5. How to address these serious gaps in intelligence coverage? One way is by the US strengthening its intelligence presence in Pakistan for which a request is to be made to the Pakistani authorities by the visiting officials. They are unlikely to reject this request. A more difficult proposition is to make the Pakistani intelligence agencies improve their intelligence coverage not only in the tribal belt, but also in Karachi and other cities. A nagging question without answer is whether the Pakistani intelligence had noticed the suspicious activities of Faisal, but refrained from alerting their US counterparts.
6. One could understand the poor intelligence coverage of the Pakistani agencies in North Waziristan, but their coverage ought to be better in Karachi, where Faisal initially met elements in the Jaish-e-Mohammad and took their help for going to the TTP camp in North Waziristan. Jihadi elements in Karachi seem to have played an important role in assisting Faisal in obtaining money for his attempted attack and in contacting the TTP just as jihadi elements of Karachi had played an important role in assisting Richard Reid, the thwarted shoe bomber, in 2001. It was to identify the Karachi elements that Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", went to Karachi from Mumbai, where he was based, in the beginning of 2002 and paid with his life.
7. Under US prodding, the Gilani Government has strengthened the intelligence collection role of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the Pakistani Ministry of the Interior, and restored the leadership role of the police officers in the IB. The IB does not have much of a capability in the tribal belt where one has to depend on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but one would have expected the IB’s coverage to have been better in Karachi through the local police, but even the IB seems to have missed the contacts of Faisal with the JEM elements in Karachi before he went to Peshawar and from there to Noth Waziristan. (19-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary, (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, May 17, 2010
NEED TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTIVE SECURITY IN CHATTISGARH
B.RAMAN
About thirty innocent civilians and 20 other civilians serving as Special Police Officers (SPOs) are reported to have been killed on May 17,2010, when a group of Maoists (Naxals) blew up a rural public transport bus in the Dantewada District of the Chattisgarh State. The bus was reportedly blown up with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) using gelatin sticks. It was going fromSukma to Dantewada.
2.On April 6, 2010, 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and one District Police member were killed in a Maoist ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in Dantewada. On May 8, seven CRPF members were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle in the Bijapur district. The Maoists also killed six villagers, including a sarpanch (village chief) , near Teregaon in the Rajnandgaon district on May 16 and threw their bodies outside their villages.
3. These incidents coming in quick succession within a period of six weeks indicate a weak protective security strategy in the Chattisgarh State, which needs urgent attention. The ghastly mass casualty attack of May 17 on a public transport bus has revived calls for a selective use of air strikes in the Dantewada area, which has a thick jungle cover. Even if the Government authorises limited air strikes, they would not have an immediate impact in the terrain in the Dantewada area, which favours insurgents and poses problems in providing effective protective security to the civilians.
4. There is a danger that in retaliation for the air strikes the Maoists would step up their attacks on civilians and, if they are successful, it would further damage the credibility of the security forces in the eyes of the public. The immediate step required is the strengthening pf protective security measures in the Chattisgarh State in general and in the Dantewada area in particular. The State's determination and ability to protect the civilians has to be demonstrated first before we embark on extreme measures such as air strikes. We should avoid over-reaction in panic and rhetoric which distorts our response.
5.SPOs are not regular police officers on the permanent pay rolls of the State. They are civilians too, who come forward to assist the Police, in the performance of certain essential police tasks while continuing in their normal professions. They are given free food when they function as SPOs and a token payment.SPOs are useful in rural areas. They played a useful role in the counter-terrorism operations against the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab. They were often the targets of attack by the terrorists in order to punish villagers who volunteer to assist the police. Immediately after the death of Sukhdev Singh Babbar, the then leader of the Babbar Khalsa, in an encounter with the Punjab Police in August,1992, terrorists of the Babbar Khalsa attacked and killed in their villages not only a number of SPOs, but also their family members.
6. The targeted attack on the bus carrying about 20 SPOs and other civilians by the Maoists on May 17 was meant to punish the civilians who were helping the police as SPOs and to intimidate the public into not helping the police in any manner. The travel of such a large group of SPOs in a bus carrying civilians was unwise. The Maoists apparently knew this and decided to kill them with an IED even at the risk of killing a number of other civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. It was not an opportunistic planting of an IED after noticing the SPOs in the bus. It was an attack planned in advance after coming to know that such a large number of SPOs would be travelling by this bus.
7.The incident of April 6 exposed a certain casualness in the counter-insurgency approach of the local security forces and the latest attack on the bus shows disturbingly that this casualness continues unrectified six weeks after the earlier incident.
8. The Maoists should have known that their attempt to kill the SPOs by blowing a rural public transport bus could result in the deaths of a large number of civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. The fact that despite this they undertook this attack shows that the Maoists, in their strategy, have reached a stage where they are indifferent to the impat of their actions on the general public. They are prepared to face the risk of temporary spells of public aversion in order to achieve their objective of demoralising and discrediting the police. Will this be an isolated attack involving mass civilian fatalities, or is it going to become a trend?
9.Public transport attracts terrorists and insurgents----- urban transport in the case of the jihadis and rural transport in remote areas in the case of insurgents. Attacks on rural public transport are more difficult to prevent and it is more difficult to protect the travelling public in the rural areas than in urban areas. In the urban areas, attacks on public transport result in much larger casualties than in rural areas as we saw in Mumbai in July,2006, but the psychological impact on the public is the same---- whether in urban or rural areas.
10. In their attempts to discredit the Government of India's counter-insurgency strategy, the Maoists are focussing on Chattisgarh----Dantewada in particular.While there is a need for a pan-Indian strategy to deal with the Maoists under the leadership and co-ordination of the Government of India, a special strategy to protect the people of Chattisgarh and to neutralise Maoist activities in the Chattisgarh area has to be worked out based on a larger surge of better equipped, better motivated and better informed security forces to help the local police. The special strategy for Chattisgarh cannot wait till a pan-Indian strategy is worked out. ( 18-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
About thirty innocent civilians and 20 other civilians serving as Special Police Officers (SPOs) are reported to have been killed on May 17,2010, when a group of Maoists (Naxals) blew up a rural public transport bus in the Dantewada District of the Chattisgarh State. The bus was reportedly blown up with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) using gelatin sticks. It was going fromSukma to Dantewada.
2.On April 6, 2010, 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and one District Police member were killed in a Maoist ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in Dantewada. On May 8, seven CRPF members were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle in the Bijapur district. The Maoists also killed six villagers, including a sarpanch (village chief) , near Teregaon in the Rajnandgaon district on May 16 and threw their bodies outside their villages.
3. These incidents coming in quick succession within a period of six weeks indicate a weak protective security strategy in the Chattisgarh State, which needs urgent attention. The ghastly mass casualty attack of May 17 on a public transport bus has revived calls for a selective use of air strikes in the Dantewada area, which has a thick jungle cover. Even if the Government authorises limited air strikes, they would not have an immediate impact in the terrain in the Dantewada area, which favours insurgents and poses problems in providing effective protective security to the civilians.
4. There is a danger that in retaliation for the air strikes the Maoists would step up their attacks on civilians and, if they are successful, it would further damage the credibility of the security forces in the eyes of the public. The immediate step required is the strengthening pf protective security measures in the Chattisgarh State in general and in the Dantewada area in particular. The State's determination and ability to protect the civilians has to be demonstrated first before we embark on extreme measures such as air strikes. We should avoid over-reaction in panic and rhetoric which distorts our response.
5.SPOs are not regular police officers on the permanent pay rolls of the State. They are civilians too, who come forward to assist the Police, in the performance of certain essential police tasks while continuing in their normal professions. They are given free food when they function as SPOs and a token payment.SPOs are useful in rural areas. They played a useful role in the counter-terrorism operations against the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab. They were often the targets of attack by the terrorists in order to punish villagers who volunteer to assist the police. Immediately after the death of Sukhdev Singh Babbar, the then leader of the Babbar Khalsa, in an encounter with the Punjab Police in August,1992, terrorists of the Babbar Khalsa attacked and killed in their villages not only a number of SPOs, but also their family members.
6. The targeted attack on the bus carrying about 20 SPOs and other civilians by the Maoists on May 17 was meant to punish the civilians who were helping the police as SPOs and to intimidate the public into not helping the police in any manner. The travel of such a large group of SPOs in a bus carrying civilians was unwise. The Maoists apparently knew this and decided to kill them with an IED even at the risk of killing a number of other civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. It was not an opportunistic planting of an IED after noticing the SPOs in the bus. It was an attack planned in advance after coming to know that such a large number of SPOs would be travelling by this bus.
7.The incident of April 6 exposed a certain casualness in the counter-insurgency approach of the local security forces and the latest attack on the bus shows disturbingly that this casualness continues unrectified six weeks after the earlier incident.
8. The Maoists should have known that their attempt to kill the SPOs by blowing a rural public transport bus could result in the deaths of a large number of civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. The fact that despite this they undertook this attack shows that the Maoists, in their strategy, have reached a stage where they are indifferent to the impat of their actions on the general public. They are prepared to face the risk of temporary spells of public aversion in order to achieve their objective of demoralising and discrediting the police. Will this be an isolated attack involving mass civilian fatalities, or is it going to become a trend?
9.Public transport attracts terrorists and insurgents----- urban transport in the case of the jihadis and rural transport in remote areas in the case of insurgents. Attacks on rural public transport are more difficult to prevent and it is more difficult to protect the travelling public in the rural areas than in urban areas. In the urban areas, attacks on public transport result in much larger casualties than in rural areas as we saw in Mumbai in July,2006, but the psychological impact on the public is the same---- whether in urban or rural areas.
10. In their attempts to discredit the Government of India's counter-insurgency strategy, the Maoists are focussing on Chattisgarh----Dantewada in particular.While there is a need for a pan-Indian strategy to deal with the Maoists under the leadership and co-ordination of the Government of India, a special strategy to protect the people of Chattisgarh and to neutralise Maoist activities in the Chattisgarh area has to be worked out based on a larger surge of better equipped, better motivated and better informed security forces to help the local police. The special strategy for Chattisgarh cannot wait till a pan-Indian strategy is worked out. ( 18-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, May 16, 2010
MALDIVES TO RE-SETTLE TWO TERRORISM SUSPECTS FROM GUANTANAMO BAY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.650
B.RAMAN
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
2.Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
3. The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
* Opposition to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, to New York for trial.
* Some of the suspects from Afghanistan and Yemen, who were released and re-settled in their country because there was no evidence against them to warrant a trial, took to terrorism after their release due to their anger against their alleged ill-treatment in the detention centre by the US. There is a danger that many others, who were arrested by the US authorities on mere suspicion without any evidence of their involvement in terrorism might similarly take to terrorism after their release due to their anger against the US. Yemenis, Pakistanis and Afghans constitute a bulk of such suspects in the detention centre.
* Difficulty in finding countries which would accept those whom the US did not want to send to their home country such as the Uighur suspects. China has been demanding that the Uighurs should be handed over to it for trial. Human rights organizations have been opposing this due to fears that they might be sentenced to death and executed by the Chinese authorities. While willing host- countries have been found to re-settle some of the Uighurs, others are without a willing host-country and hence continue to be at Guantanamo Bay.
4. Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
5. Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
6. The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
7. If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
8. It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
9. The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19. ( 17-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently , Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
2.Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
3. The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
* Opposition to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, to New York for trial.
* Some of the suspects from Afghanistan and Yemen, who were released and re-settled in their country because there was no evidence against them to warrant a trial, took to terrorism after their release due to their anger against their alleged ill-treatment in the detention centre by the US. There is a danger that many others, who were arrested by the US authorities on mere suspicion without any evidence of their involvement in terrorism might similarly take to terrorism after their release due to their anger against the US. Yemenis, Pakistanis and Afghans constitute a bulk of such suspects in the detention centre.
* Difficulty in finding countries which would accept those whom the US did not want to send to their home country such as the Uighur suspects. China has been demanding that the Uighurs should be handed over to it for trial. Human rights organizations have been opposing this due to fears that they might be sentenced to death and executed by the Chinese authorities. While willing host- countries have been found to re-settle some of the Uighurs, others are without a willing host-country and hence continue to be at Guantanamo Bay.
4. Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
5. Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
6. The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
7. If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
8. It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
9. The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19. ( 17-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently , Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
IS COPY-CAT OF MUMBAI 26/11 POSSIBLE IN INDONESIA?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.649
B.RAMAN
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August,2010.
2. This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
3. On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
4. While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
5. While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
6. There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
7. The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August,2010.
2. This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
3. On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
4. While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
5. While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
6. There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
7. The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, May 15, 2010
INDIAN DEPENDENCE ON CHINESE EQUIPMENT & TECHNOLOGY
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Railways is reportedly facing a crisis because of the unserviceability of 32 of the 69 locomotives bought from a Chinese company. It has been alleged that the Railways were forced to buy these locomotives by President Asif Ali Zardari and his advisers even though expert opinion in the Railways was against buying locomotives from a Chinese company, which turned out to be sub-standard. It has been reported that to keep the Railways going, they are thinking of ordering 75 new locomotives from non-Chinese sources. The text of a report on this subject carried by "The News" of Pakistan on May 15,2010, is attached.
2. This has an important lesson for India, which has been developing a dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in key sectors of the economy such as electricity production and mobile telephone networks. Procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from Chinese companies by Indian private companies on which there were no major restrictions till last year, has now been slowed down following concerns reportedly voiced by the Indian intelligence agencies over the security implications of a growing dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in this sensitive sector. It has been reported that the Government has not cleared any proposal for fresh procurement during the last four months and has undertaken a study of the concerns voiced by the intelligence agencies. In the meanwhile, pressure has been mounted on the Government to reverese its curbs by the Chinese authorities through their Embassy in New Delhi and by officials of the Chinese companies.
3. A point made by the Chinese companies is that while India has suspended the procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from China on security grounds, it continues to import similar equipment and technology from Western countries. The question posed by them is:If similar Western equipment and technology do not pose a security threat, why should Chinese equipment and technology pose a threat? An insinuation made is that the real reason for the suspension of the procurement from China is not secuity, but concealed commercial motives to favour Western companies.
4. Even if what the Chinese companies say is correct, the Government's caution in buying similar equipment and technology from China, even at much lower prices, is understandable because China is still perceived in India as a possible adversary. India and China had fought a war in 1962 and one should factor into our decision-making the possibility that there could be another military conflict if the border dispute is not satisfactoily settled.When the intelligence agencies talk of the security implications, they keep in view not only the circumstances of today, but also what could happen in future if the bilateral relations deteriorate.
5. While the Chinese and their supporters in India are unhappy over the curbs imposed by India on security grounds, they tend to play down the fact that the Chinese themselves had imposed similar restrictions on security grounds on Indian information technology companies in China. Mr.Zhu Rongji, the former Chinese Prime Minister, had allowed Indian IT companies to open branches in Shanghai. But for many years, they were not allowed to have a presence in Beijing. Chinese Governmental and non-Governmental entities were secretly advised not to give any contracts to the Indian companies. The Indian companies survived in Shanghai with the contracts won by them from the local offices of Western multinationals. Only now the Chinese have allowed Indian IT companies to have a presence in Beijing and other cities and permitted some of their banks to award contracts to the Indian companies. Even now, will the Chinese authorities allow Indian IT companies to operate in Tibet and Xinjiang?
6. While security is and ought to be an important consideration in the case of telecommunication equipment, serviceability of the equipment and assured future supplies of spare parts should be equally important considerations in sectors relating to key segments of our economy such as power production. The Pakistan Railways developed an unhealthy dependence on Chinese equipment and it is now threatened with serious dislocation despite the excellent state-to-state relations between the two countries.
7. We have been developing a dependence on the Chinese for our thermal power stations because the Chinese power equipment like their telecommunication equipment is much cheaper as compared to Western and Japanese equipment and the Chinese have a reputation of completing their projects in time. Other important considerations such as the quality and serviceability of the equipment and the guarantee of future supplies of spare parts are not given the attention they deserve.
8. Before deciding to order any equipment and technolgy from the West, an important question considered by us is: What are the chances of the Western Governments suspending the supply of spare parts in future to exercise political pressure on India? The US had not hesitated to use this weapon on some occasions in the past. If tomorrow there is a military conflict between India and Pakistan and the Chinese authorities, to help out Pakistan, suspend the supply of spare parts for our power projects set up with their assistance, what will happen to our power production and the economy as a whole?
9. Are such questions carefully considered before allowing the procurement of Chinese equipment and tchnology? One has the impression that in our keenness to improve bilateral trade with China, which is racing towards the annual target of US $ 60 billion with China being the main benficiary with a big trade surplus in its favour, we are not paying attention to important questions such as what I have explained above.Let us by all means allow a free hand in India to Chinese manufacturers of consumer goods, but in respect of other goods of a sensitive nature which could affect our national security or future economic stability, we have to be more careful.
10.Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good. Security and guarantee of future supplies should be important considerations in the case of Western companies too, but certain risks which we can afford to take in the case of Western companies, we cannot in the case of Chinese companies. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
FROM " THE NEWS" OF MAY 15,2010
Chinese suppliers fail to deliver
By Ahmad Noorani
ISLAMABAD: The shortage of locomotives in the Pakistan Railways has reached such a crisis stage that an emergency plan to procure 150 engines from reliable international suppliers has been put together as the Chinese suppliers have failed to deliver, senior officials of Railways told The News.
General Manager Railways Shahid Ahmad on Thursday night confirmed to The News that the top Railways management had finally decided to drop the idea of acquiring 75 locomotives from the Chinese company as 32 previously supplied engines out of 69 have been scrapped after they became unserviceable.
The 75 locomotives were ordered from China after President Zardari himself intervened and forced the Railways to oblige the Chinese suppliers despite large-scale opposition within the Railways Ministry. Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had gone on record against the Chinese suppliers but he was given a shut-up call.
The GM Railways disclosed that already an advertisement to purchase 150 locomotives has been published internationally and now the Railways will ensure that no substandard locomotives are procured.
Sources say the Chinese supplier has also refused to honour the warranty on these 32 locomotives as they are rotting in Railways sheds in Karachi and Lahore. Purchase of 69 sub-standard locomotives from China by spending billions of rupees was one of the initial mega corruption scandals against General Pervez Musharraf and his team.
However, vested interests succeeded to even get the present government fall in line and to award the contract of another 75 locomotives from the same Chinese company. “12 locomotives of 2,000 HP and 20 locomotives of 3,000 HP, all under warranty, have now been totally scrapped. There is no way that these could be used and a great loss has been inflicted on the national exchequer,” GM Shahid said.
He added: “The total cost of these locomotives has proved to be very high as these outdated engines have a very high maintenance cost. Whenever we want to change a very important device in the engine, a turbo super charger, it become out of order within two to three months because of inferior quality of the engine and causes unbearable loss to the locomotive itself.”
The senior Railways official revealed that 15 per cent advance amount has already been paid to the Chinese company and now a letter has been sent to them seeking a reply within 14 days regarding complete breakdown of the 32 locomotives costing Pakistan billions of rupees.
He said after receiving the reply of this letter proceedings to get back 15 per cent advance amount would be initiated. He said the Pakistan Railways needs sturdy and tough diesel engines as it runs services on long routes from Karachi to Peshawar which also include hilly areas.
The GM said the Pakistan Railways is in dire need of the engines otherwise the whole railway system was going to collapse. The Pakistan Railways procured 69 locomotives from China in 2001 which were technically approved by the then management of Pakistan Railways in spite of excessive axle load. These locomotives did not perform very well and had developed lot of major faults that caused huge revenue losses. The cracking of underframe of more than 9 locomotives of 3,000 HP in 2005 is one example.
The Railways officials say in spite of this bad performance the previous Railways administration committed serious violations of tender conditions, PPRA Rules and international competitive bidding procedures and awarded the contract of another 75 locomotives to China. The recommendations of technical committee were ignored wherein they had disqualified the Chinese proposal thrice due to non-compliance of relevant clauses.
The Pakistan Railways is reportedly facing a crisis because of the unserviceability of 32 of the 69 locomotives bought from a Chinese company. It has been alleged that the Railways were forced to buy these locomotives by President Asif Ali Zardari and his advisers even though expert opinion in the Railways was against buying locomotives from a Chinese company, which turned out to be sub-standard. It has been reported that to keep the Railways going, they are thinking of ordering 75 new locomotives from non-Chinese sources. The text of a report on this subject carried by "The News" of Pakistan on May 15,2010, is attached.
2. This has an important lesson for India, which has been developing a dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in key sectors of the economy such as electricity production and mobile telephone networks. Procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from Chinese companies by Indian private companies on which there were no major restrictions till last year, has now been slowed down following concerns reportedly voiced by the Indian intelligence agencies over the security implications of a growing dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in this sensitive sector. It has been reported that the Government has not cleared any proposal for fresh procurement during the last four months and has undertaken a study of the concerns voiced by the intelligence agencies. In the meanwhile, pressure has been mounted on the Government to reverese its curbs by the Chinese authorities through their Embassy in New Delhi and by officials of the Chinese companies.
3. A point made by the Chinese companies is that while India has suspended the procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from China on security grounds, it continues to import similar equipment and technology from Western countries. The question posed by them is:If similar Western equipment and technology do not pose a security threat, why should Chinese equipment and technology pose a threat? An insinuation made is that the real reason for the suspension of the procurement from China is not secuity, but concealed commercial motives to favour Western companies.
4. Even if what the Chinese companies say is correct, the Government's caution in buying similar equipment and technology from China, even at much lower prices, is understandable because China is still perceived in India as a possible adversary. India and China had fought a war in 1962 and one should factor into our decision-making the possibility that there could be another military conflict if the border dispute is not satisfactoily settled.When the intelligence agencies talk of the security implications, they keep in view not only the circumstances of today, but also what could happen in future if the bilateral relations deteriorate.
5. While the Chinese and their supporters in India are unhappy over the curbs imposed by India on security grounds, they tend to play down the fact that the Chinese themselves had imposed similar restrictions on security grounds on Indian information technology companies in China. Mr.Zhu Rongji, the former Chinese Prime Minister, had allowed Indian IT companies to open branches in Shanghai. But for many years, they were not allowed to have a presence in Beijing. Chinese Governmental and non-Governmental entities were secretly advised not to give any contracts to the Indian companies. The Indian companies survived in Shanghai with the contracts won by them from the local offices of Western multinationals. Only now the Chinese have allowed Indian IT companies to have a presence in Beijing and other cities and permitted some of their banks to award contracts to the Indian companies. Even now, will the Chinese authorities allow Indian IT companies to operate in Tibet and Xinjiang?
6. While security is and ought to be an important consideration in the case of telecommunication equipment, serviceability of the equipment and assured future supplies of spare parts should be equally important considerations in sectors relating to key segments of our economy such as power production. The Pakistan Railways developed an unhealthy dependence on Chinese equipment and it is now threatened with serious dislocation despite the excellent state-to-state relations between the two countries.
7. We have been developing a dependence on the Chinese for our thermal power stations because the Chinese power equipment like their telecommunication equipment is much cheaper as compared to Western and Japanese equipment and the Chinese have a reputation of completing their projects in time. Other important considerations such as the quality and serviceability of the equipment and the guarantee of future supplies of spare parts are not given the attention they deserve.
8. Before deciding to order any equipment and technolgy from the West, an important question considered by us is: What are the chances of the Western Governments suspending the supply of spare parts in future to exercise political pressure on India? The US had not hesitated to use this weapon on some occasions in the past. If tomorrow there is a military conflict between India and Pakistan and the Chinese authorities, to help out Pakistan, suspend the supply of spare parts for our power projects set up with their assistance, what will happen to our power production and the economy as a whole?
9. Are such questions carefully considered before allowing the procurement of Chinese equipment and tchnology? One has the impression that in our keenness to improve bilateral trade with China, which is racing towards the annual target of US $ 60 billion with China being the main benficiary with a big trade surplus in its favour, we are not paying attention to important questions such as what I have explained above.Let us by all means allow a free hand in India to Chinese manufacturers of consumer goods, but in respect of other goods of a sensitive nature which could affect our national security or future economic stability, we have to be more careful.
10.Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good. Security and guarantee of future supplies should be important considerations in the case of Western companies too, but certain risks which we can afford to take in the case of Western companies, we cannot in the case of Chinese companies. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
FROM " THE NEWS" OF MAY 15,2010
Chinese suppliers fail to deliver
By Ahmad Noorani
ISLAMABAD: The shortage of locomotives in the Pakistan Railways has reached such a crisis stage that an emergency plan to procure 150 engines from reliable international suppliers has been put together as the Chinese suppliers have failed to deliver, senior officials of Railways told The News.
General Manager Railways Shahid Ahmad on Thursday night confirmed to The News that the top Railways management had finally decided to drop the idea of acquiring 75 locomotives from the Chinese company as 32 previously supplied engines out of 69 have been scrapped after they became unserviceable.
The 75 locomotives were ordered from China after President Zardari himself intervened and forced the Railways to oblige the Chinese suppliers despite large-scale opposition within the Railways Ministry. Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had gone on record against the Chinese suppliers but he was given a shut-up call.
The GM Railways disclosed that already an advertisement to purchase 150 locomotives has been published internationally and now the Railways will ensure that no substandard locomotives are procured.
Sources say the Chinese supplier has also refused to honour the warranty on these 32 locomotives as they are rotting in Railways sheds in Karachi and Lahore. Purchase of 69 sub-standard locomotives from China by spending billions of rupees was one of the initial mega corruption scandals against General Pervez Musharraf and his team.
However, vested interests succeeded to even get the present government fall in line and to award the contract of another 75 locomotives from the same Chinese company. “12 locomotives of 2,000 HP and 20 locomotives of 3,000 HP, all under warranty, have now been totally scrapped. There is no way that these could be used and a great loss has been inflicted on the national exchequer,” GM Shahid said.
He added: “The total cost of these locomotives has proved to be very high as these outdated engines have a very high maintenance cost. Whenever we want to change a very important device in the engine, a turbo super charger, it become out of order within two to three months because of inferior quality of the engine and causes unbearable loss to the locomotive itself.”
The senior Railways official revealed that 15 per cent advance amount has already been paid to the Chinese company and now a letter has been sent to them seeking a reply within 14 days regarding complete breakdown of the 32 locomotives costing Pakistan billions of rupees.
He said after receiving the reply of this letter proceedings to get back 15 per cent advance amount would be initiated. He said the Pakistan Railways needs sturdy and tough diesel engines as it runs services on long routes from Karachi to Peshawar which also include hilly areas.
The GM said the Pakistan Railways is in dire need of the engines otherwise the whole railway system was going to collapse. The Pakistan Railways procured 69 locomotives from China in 2001 which were technically approved by the then management of Pakistan Railways in spite of excessive axle load. These locomotives did not perform very well and had developed lot of major faults that caused huge revenue losses. The cracking of underframe of more than 9 locomotives of 3,000 HP in 2005 is one example.
The Railways officials say in spite of this bad performance the previous Railways administration committed serious violations of tender conditions, PPRA Rules and international competitive bidding procedures and awarded the contract of another 75 locomotives to China. The recommendations of technical committee were ignored wherein they had disqualified the Chinese proposal thrice due to non-compliance of relevant clauses.
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