A mole in an Indian mission can do great damage
( http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/apr/27/a-mole-in-an-indian-mission-can-do-great-damage.htm )
April 27, 2010 16:26 IST
Madhuri Gupta, the indian diplomat arrested for spying in the Indian mission in Islamabad [ Images ], may not have access to sensitive information, but she has access to the high commission and could have planted transmitting devices and tapped phones, writes B Raman.
Madhuri Gupta, second secretary in the press and information wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, has been arrested on a charge of working for a foreign intelligence agency. She was called to New Delhi [ Images ] ostensibly on consultation duty in connection with the SAARC summit opening in Thimphu on April 29 and taken into custody after her arrival.
Apparently, she was not aware that she was under suspicion. If she was, she might not have come to New Delhi. Instead, she might have fled to some other country to escape arrest and interrogation as Major Rabinder Singh, an alleged mole of the Research & Analysis Wing, did in 2004.
It has been reported that Home Secretary G K Pillai, has confirmed her arrest. He has not given any other details. There are two possibilities -- she was either working for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence or for the intelligence agency of a Western country through its intelligence officer working under the cover of a diplomat in Pakistan. I would not rule out the second possibility. Western intelligence agencies, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, had in the past tried to recruit Indian diplomats posted in Indian missions abroad through blackmail or offer of money or offer of resident status in their country. Madhuri Gupta is reported to be an unmarried woman in her 40s.
The ISI normally uses money or blackmail for recruiting India [ Images ]n diplomats posted in Pakistan. In the 1980s, when Rajiv Gandhi [ Images ] was the prime minister, the ISI had allegedly recruited a senior Indian Armed Forces attache by trapping him with the help of an attractive woman in Karachi and then blackmailing him with her help. He was called back to India under some pretext and removed from the armed forces. He was not prosecuted.
If the allegations against her are correct, Gupta might have been recruited by the agency which was using her either as an information agent or as a service agent. An information agent consciously supplies intelligence to which he or she has access. A service agent facilitates an intelligence operation of the recruiting agency in various ways.
As a Second Secretary in the Press and Information Wing, Gupta might not have had much access to sensitive intelligence. But, as she was working in the high commission, she would have had access to various offices in the Indian High Commission for performing furtive tasks such as planting bugs in the offices of the high commissioner and other diplomats, attaching transmitting devices for transmitting the telephone conversations of the high commissioner and others to the officer who recruited her etc.
If she had been working as a service agent, she would have caused immeasurable damage by enabling the agency that recruited her to collect electronically a lot of sensitive intelligence. It would never be possible to quantify and assess the extent of damage caused by her. She herself would not know since she would be unaware what kind of intelligence had been going on to her controlling officer through the gadgets which she had planted in the Indian High Commission on his direction.
In the 1970s, a British woman had been recruited by the Indian Embassy in Paris to work as a telephone operator. She had helped the MI-6 (the British intelligence service) in clandestinely recording the telephone conversations of all Indian diplomats posted in Paris. She had caused considerable damage before she was detected and sacked.
B Raman
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Monday, April 26, 2010
CHINESE NAVY'S POWER PROJECTION
B.RAMAN
Since the beginning of last year, the Chinese Navy, which no longer makes a secret of its aspiration of becoming a Pacific naval power on par with the US, has been adopting a dual strategy. This strategy is marked by an open and increasing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas and by a defensive extension of its capabilities, areas of operation and naval networking into the Indian Ocean and the Gulf areas.
2. Its assertiveness in the South and East China Seas is marked by repeated reiteration of its territorial claims in the area and its determination to protect its rights to fisheries, minerals, and oil and gas in the areas claimed by it. It is also marked by the expression of its readiness to use its Navy to protect its rights.
3.On May 16,2009, China officially imposed a ban on summer fishing in the South China Sea. Rejecting a Vietnamese protest against the ban, which affected the livelihood of Vietnamese fishermen who enjoyed traditional fishing rights in the area, Qin Gang, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said on June 9,2009, that China had "indisputable" sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, including Xisha and Nansha islands, and their adjacent waters. "It's a regular and justified administrative measure of China to post a summer fishing ban within the South China Sea, with the aim of protecting the sustainability of marine life in this area," Qin said. Simultaneously, China deployed some patrol ships in the area to enforce the ban.
4. On January 5,2010, Jiang Yu, a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, said that China's sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, including the Xisha and Nansha islands, was indisputable. He was explaining an announcement by the State Council of a guideline on the development of tourism in the province of Hainan, which said that tourism would be promoted on the Xisha and some uninhabited islands.
5. On February 9,2010, the China National Offshore Oil Company Limited (CNOOC Ltd.) announced that its partner, Husky Oil China Limited, a subsidiary of Husky Energy Inc., has discovered a new deepwater gas field in the South China Sea. It said in a statement on its website that the LiuHua (LH) 29-1 field is the third deepwater gas discovery made in Block 29/26 of the Pearl River Mouth Basin in the eastern South China Sea, after other discoveries in 2006 and 2009. According to the Xinhua news agency, CNOOC Ltd. is the listed subsidiary of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China's largest offshore oil company.
6. On April 26,2010, China's fishery administration said it had started regular patrols of the South China Sea by sending two vessels to take over from two others which were escorting Chinese fishing boats in the area. Wu Zhuang, Director of Administration of Fishery and Fishing Harbor Supervision for the South China Sea under the Ministry of Agriculture, said :"China Yuzheng 301 and 302 take over from China Yuzheng 311 and 202, which have been patrolling the sea area of Nansha Islands since April 1." He added that the patrol ships were sent to escort Chinese fishing boats in the South China Sea and reinforce China's fishing rights in the waters around Nansha Islands. The two ships set sail from Sanya, a coastal city in the Hainan province .
7. Simultaneously with its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, the Chinese have also stepped up their assertiveness in the East China Sea where their claims and interests clash with those of Japan. The fact that Tokyo has now a government, which is well disposed towards China and attaches greater importance than was done by past Governments to strengthening Japan’s relations with China, has not come in the way of the new assertiveness in the East China Sea.
8. On February 23,2010, Qin Gang, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, was asked for China’s reaction to a news report that Japan would appeal to an international maritime court if China started using an East China Sea oil and gas field for gas production. He replied as follows: "China and Japan have a principled common understanding on the East China Sea issue. China upholds and maintains the common understanding. This position has never changed." Qin added that China hoped Japan could provide a more favorable environment to put the common understanding into practice. According to the principled common understanding, the Japanese side could participate in the cooperative development of the Chunxiao oil and gas field in accordance with relevant laws of China, but the cooperative development is different from "joint development”, he said.
9. On April 8,2010, China’s PLA Daily announced that the East Sea Fleet would conduct a “large-scale” military exercise in the East China Sea. Following this, the Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa announced on April 13 that 10 Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) vessels, including two submarines and eight warships, have sailed through international waters between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako, heading southeast into the Pacific Ocean, since April 10. It was reported that the Japanese had made enquiries about these movements from Beijing through diplomatic channels. Beijing pointed out the same day that similar drills had been carried out in in international waters in the past by the navies of other countries. It implied that if other Navies could carry out such exercises in international waters, so could China. Japanese sources interpreted the movements as “signaling an effort by Beijing to expand naval activities in international waters with the aim of preventing intervention by other naval forces.”
10. Japan complained to China on April 21 that a Chinese military helicopter flew close to a Japanese naval vessel, the second encounter of such nature to happen in a month. Japan's Defense Ministry said the helicopter was within 300 feet (90 meters) of the Japanese vessel and had circled it twice. The Japanese vessel was monitoring Chinese military activities. However, the Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada was quoted by the Kyodo news agency as saying that the Chinese vessel did not violate any international laws. After the first incident on April 8, the Japanese Foreign Ministry protested to China on April 12, saying the close flight was "a dangerous act from the view of naval safety," and requested China to look into the matter. The Ministry again protested after the second incident and received a reply that the Chinese Government will investigate. The Japanese Defense Ministry has said it believed that the Chinese actions may be a show of power, and added that Japan intends to strengthen its defense in the area. The “Mainichi”, the Japanese daily, quoted the Japanese Defence Ministry as saying that the Chinese Navy conducted military exercises from April 7 to 9 in the East China Sea. Chinese ships passed through international waters between the main Okinawan island and Miyako Island on April 10 at around 8 p.m., and on around April 13 sailed near the Okinotorishima Island, the southernmost part of Japan.
11. Briefing the media in Beijing on April 22, Huang Xueping, a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, defended Chinese naval exercises in the East China Sea and asserted that the movement of Chinese naval ships out in the East China Sea did not violate international laws and posed no threat to other countries. He added that it is routine practice for the army to have its drills in the high seas, and is also a practice done by other countries. He warned: "Countries concerned should not track down or disrupt the activities of Chinese military vessels engaged in normal defense exercises."
12.Instead of being defensive and low-profile about the presence and assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the South and East China Seas, the Government/Party controlled Chinese media have been openly asserting China’s readiness to protect its traditional rights and defend its territorial claims in the area through its modernized Navy. They project the increasing assertiveness as a message that a modern and powerful Chinese Navy has arrived on the Pacific scene as a force to be reckoned with.
13. In an interview to the “China Daily News” ( April 27), Jin Linbo, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, suggested that Tokyo should communicate with Beijing before taking any unilateral action, which may be "misinterpreted" by China. He added: "The increase in frequency and size of our military exercise is normal; it only shows that China's navy is getting stronger. As long as it does not breach any law, other countries should gradually get used to it."
14. ”The “ Global Times” , the English daily of the Party-owned “People’s Daily” group, wrote on April 27: “As strategic equilibrium is shifting in west Pacific Ocean, even the slightest change can be rough for one side to take. A regular military drill by Chinese naval ships in international waters early this month caused a fuss in Japan. The Japanese media was full of hot air over the incident and tried to attach blame to China's seemingly assertive behavior. Admitting the drill took place in international open water, the Japanese media still claimed it raised concern in Japan "since it did not happen before." A stronger navy is a result of China's growing economic strength and ongoing modernization of its military power. It is a strategic requirement of a big power, which must defend its interests to the best of its ability.As China is assuming more responsibilities in East Asia, there will be more frequent military exercises in international waters. Beefing up China's naval forces is also necessary given the US is shifting considerable strategic defensive strength in the west Pacific. Naturally, the transformation of the Chinese navy will bring changes to the strategic pattern in East Asia and the west Pacific Ocean that has lasted for the last five decades. But the trans-formation is positive. China does not hold an intention to challenge the US in the central Pacific or engage in a military clash with Japan in close waters, though it is willing to protect its core interests at any cost. The west Pacific region is critical to world peace and stability; ensuring both requires the involvement of all major countries in the area. Neither side has a monopoly over the future of the west Pacific. Both the US and Japan, along with many other world powers, have aggressively expanded their maritime capabilities, but they need to adjust their viewpoint when considering China's moves. The time when dominant powers enjoyed unshared "spheres of influence" around the world is over. The purpose of China's growing navy is to provide offshore defense and to protect trade routes and Chinese citizens around the globe. It is difficult to imagine China would rely on a maritime strategic system built by the US after World War II to protect its global interests today. A growing Chinese navy is a symbol of China's peaceful rise.
Many countries have acknowledged that a rising China does not pose a threat to the world. If they truly mean it, they should be able to understand a growing Chinese navy.”
15. The Chinese Navy is there to stay and grow and assert China’s claims and rights. That is the message loud and clear.
16. While thus taking an increasingly assertive line on the presence and activities of its Navy in South and East China Seas and West Pacific, Chine continues to maintain a low profile over the presence and activities of its naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and Gulf Regions. They are projected as having a defensive role in protecting Chinese merchant ships and energy supplies from attacks by pirates and others. Chinese analysts do not as yet talk of any Chinese strategic interest in power projection in the Indian Ocean area. ( 28-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Since the beginning of last year, the Chinese Navy, which no longer makes a secret of its aspiration of becoming a Pacific naval power on par with the US, has been adopting a dual strategy. This strategy is marked by an open and increasing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas and by a defensive extension of its capabilities, areas of operation and naval networking into the Indian Ocean and the Gulf areas.
2. Its assertiveness in the South and East China Seas is marked by repeated reiteration of its territorial claims in the area and its determination to protect its rights to fisheries, minerals, and oil and gas in the areas claimed by it. It is also marked by the expression of its readiness to use its Navy to protect its rights.
3.On May 16,2009, China officially imposed a ban on summer fishing in the South China Sea. Rejecting a Vietnamese protest against the ban, which affected the livelihood of Vietnamese fishermen who enjoyed traditional fishing rights in the area, Qin Gang, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said on June 9,2009, that China had "indisputable" sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, including Xisha and Nansha islands, and their adjacent waters. "It's a regular and justified administrative measure of China to post a summer fishing ban within the South China Sea, with the aim of protecting the sustainability of marine life in this area," Qin said. Simultaneously, China deployed some patrol ships in the area to enforce the ban.
4. On January 5,2010, Jiang Yu, a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, said that China's sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, including the Xisha and Nansha islands, was indisputable. He was explaining an announcement by the State Council of a guideline on the development of tourism in the province of Hainan, which said that tourism would be promoted on the Xisha and some uninhabited islands.
5. On February 9,2010, the China National Offshore Oil Company Limited (CNOOC Ltd.) announced that its partner, Husky Oil China Limited, a subsidiary of Husky Energy Inc., has discovered a new deepwater gas field in the South China Sea. It said in a statement on its website that the LiuHua (LH) 29-1 field is the third deepwater gas discovery made in Block 29/26 of the Pearl River Mouth Basin in the eastern South China Sea, after other discoveries in 2006 and 2009. According to the Xinhua news agency, CNOOC Ltd. is the listed subsidiary of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China's largest offshore oil company.
6. On April 26,2010, China's fishery administration said it had started regular patrols of the South China Sea by sending two vessels to take over from two others which were escorting Chinese fishing boats in the area. Wu Zhuang, Director of Administration of Fishery and Fishing Harbor Supervision for the South China Sea under the Ministry of Agriculture, said :"China Yuzheng 301 and 302 take over from China Yuzheng 311 and 202, which have been patrolling the sea area of Nansha Islands since April 1." He added that the patrol ships were sent to escort Chinese fishing boats in the South China Sea and reinforce China's fishing rights in the waters around Nansha Islands. The two ships set sail from Sanya, a coastal city in the Hainan province .
7. Simultaneously with its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, the Chinese have also stepped up their assertiveness in the East China Sea where their claims and interests clash with those of Japan. The fact that Tokyo has now a government, which is well disposed towards China and attaches greater importance than was done by past Governments to strengthening Japan’s relations with China, has not come in the way of the new assertiveness in the East China Sea.
8. On February 23,2010, Qin Gang, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, was asked for China’s reaction to a news report that Japan would appeal to an international maritime court if China started using an East China Sea oil and gas field for gas production. He replied as follows: "China and Japan have a principled common understanding on the East China Sea issue. China upholds and maintains the common understanding. This position has never changed." Qin added that China hoped Japan could provide a more favorable environment to put the common understanding into practice. According to the principled common understanding, the Japanese side could participate in the cooperative development of the Chunxiao oil and gas field in accordance with relevant laws of China, but the cooperative development is different from "joint development”, he said.
9. On April 8,2010, China’s PLA Daily announced that the East Sea Fleet would conduct a “large-scale” military exercise in the East China Sea. Following this, the Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa announced on April 13 that 10 Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) vessels, including two submarines and eight warships, have sailed through international waters between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako, heading southeast into the Pacific Ocean, since April 10. It was reported that the Japanese had made enquiries about these movements from Beijing through diplomatic channels. Beijing pointed out the same day that similar drills had been carried out in in international waters in the past by the navies of other countries. It implied that if other Navies could carry out such exercises in international waters, so could China. Japanese sources interpreted the movements as “signaling an effort by Beijing to expand naval activities in international waters with the aim of preventing intervention by other naval forces.”
10. Japan complained to China on April 21 that a Chinese military helicopter flew close to a Japanese naval vessel, the second encounter of such nature to happen in a month. Japan's Defense Ministry said the helicopter was within 300 feet (90 meters) of the Japanese vessel and had circled it twice. The Japanese vessel was monitoring Chinese military activities. However, the Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada was quoted by the Kyodo news agency as saying that the Chinese vessel did not violate any international laws. After the first incident on April 8, the Japanese Foreign Ministry protested to China on April 12, saying the close flight was "a dangerous act from the view of naval safety," and requested China to look into the matter. The Ministry again protested after the second incident and received a reply that the Chinese Government will investigate. The Japanese Defense Ministry has said it believed that the Chinese actions may be a show of power, and added that Japan intends to strengthen its defense in the area. The “Mainichi”, the Japanese daily, quoted the Japanese Defence Ministry as saying that the Chinese Navy conducted military exercises from April 7 to 9 in the East China Sea. Chinese ships passed through international waters between the main Okinawan island and Miyako Island on April 10 at around 8 p.m., and on around April 13 sailed near the Okinotorishima Island, the southernmost part of Japan.
11. Briefing the media in Beijing on April 22, Huang Xueping, a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, defended Chinese naval exercises in the East China Sea and asserted that the movement of Chinese naval ships out in the East China Sea did not violate international laws and posed no threat to other countries. He added that it is routine practice for the army to have its drills in the high seas, and is also a practice done by other countries. He warned: "Countries concerned should not track down or disrupt the activities of Chinese military vessels engaged in normal defense exercises."
12.Instead of being defensive and low-profile about the presence and assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the South and East China Seas, the Government/Party controlled Chinese media have been openly asserting China’s readiness to protect its traditional rights and defend its territorial claims in the area through its modernized Navy. They project the increasing assertiveness as a message that a modern and powerful Chinese Navy has arrived on the Pacific scene as a force to be reckoned with.
13. In an interview to the “China Daily News” ( April 27), Jin Linbo, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, suggested that Tokyo should communicate with Beijing before taking any unilateral action, which may be "misinterpreted" by China. He added: "The increase in frequency and size of our military exercise is normal; it only shows that China's navy is getting stronger. As long as it does not breach any law, other countries should gradually get used to it."
14. ”The “ Global Times” , the English daily of the Party-owned “People’s Daily” group, wrote on April 27: “As strategic equilibrium is shifting in west Pacific Ocean, even the slightest change can be rough for one side to take. A regular military drill by Chinese naval ships in international waters early this month caused a fuss in Japan. The Japanese media was full of hot air over the incident and tried to attach blame to China's seemingly assertive behavior. Admitting the drill took place in international open water, the Japanese media still claimed it raised concern in Japan "since it did not happen before." A stronger navy is a result of China's growing economic strength and ongoing modernization of its military power. It is a strategic requirement of a big power, which must defend its interests to the best of its ability.As China is assuming more responsibilities in East Asia, there will be more frequent military exercises in international waters. Beefing up China's naval forces is also necessary given the US is shifting considerable strategic defensive strength in the west Pacific. Naturally, the transformation of the Chinese navy will bring changes to the strategic pattern in East Asia and the west Pacific Ocean that has lasted for the last five decades. But the trans-formation is positive. China does not hold an intention to challenge the US in the central Pacific or engage in a military clash with Japan in close waters, though it is willing to protect its core interests at any cost. The west Pacific region is critical to world peace and stability; ensuring both requires the involvement of all major countries in the area. Neither side has a monopoly over the future of the west Pacific. Both the US and Japan, along with many other world powers, have aggressively expanded their maritime capabilities, but they need to adjust their viewpoint when considering China's moves. The time when dominant powers enjoyed unshared "spheres of influence" around the world is over. The purpose of China's growing navy is to provide offshore defense and to protect trade routes and Chinese citizens around the globe. It is difficult to imagine China would rely on a maritime strategic system built by the US after World War II to protect its global interests today. A growing Chinese navy is a symbol of China's peaceful rise.
Many countries have acknowledged that a rising China does not pose a threat to the world. If they truly mean it, they should be able to understand a growing Chinese navy.”
15. The Chinese Navy is there to stay and grow and assert China’s claims and rights. That is the message loud and clear.
16. While thus taking an increasingly assertive line on the presence and activities of its Navy in South and East China Seas and West Pacific, Chine continues to maintain a low profile over the presence and activities of its naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and Gulf Regions. They are projected as having a defensive role in protecting Chinese merchant ships and energy supplies from attacks by pirates and others. Chinese analysts do not as yet talk of any Chinese strategic interest in power projection in the Indian Ocean area. ( 28-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
NO MALAFIDE TAPPING
There was no malafide tapping, says security expert
http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/apr/26/there-was-no-malafide-tapping-says-expert.htm
Last updated on: April 26, 2010 11:19 IST
Tags: National Technical Research Organisation, Nitish Kumar, Outlook magazine, Bihar
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Amid the muddle over the Indian Premier League [ Images ], the Centre is feeling the heat after Outlook magazine carried a report saying that the National Technical Research Organisation has got telephone conversations of Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar and many other dignitaries tapped.
However, B Raman, former R&AW officer and rediff.com's columnist says, "While there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports carried by Outlook about the functioning of the NTRO and the genuineness of the intercepts of some telephone conversations of some political leaders, I have difficulty in accepting that these intercepts necessarily show that the NTRO has been tapping the telephone conversations of these political personalities."
Raman says, "Tapping is a process. When there is tapping, there will be a series of intercepts of the conversations involving the same person. When there is only an isolated message, it does not show malafide tapping. It only shows accidental interception of telephone conversations of political leaders cited by Outlook while doing a random communications intelligence sweep."
Raman's contention is that while tapping phones of people who are at national security risk, many other people's conversation also gets recorded and "this happens all the time while doing a random sweep".
A random sweep is not done manually. It is done by a machine which records every conversation within a certain radius when the machine is on.
However, Raman suggests, "From time to time, intelligence officers play back the recording of the intercepts. If they find that if any of the intercepts is of a political nature unrelated to national security and contains politically sensitive or compromising material, the careerists among intelligence officers may show it to political leaders to cut favour with them."
When intelligence agencies find that they do not have sensitive or compromising content in taped material they, normally, shred the conversations.
The security expert adds, "The so-called intercepts cited by the magazine do not have any sensitive or compromising material. My feeling is that these were intercepted accidentally during the course of a random search and the person to whom these were given for shredding has passed them on to the journalist."
http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/apr/26/there-was-no-malafide-tapping-says-expert.htm
Last updated on: April 26, 2010 11:19 IST
Tags: National Technical Research Organisation, Nitish Kumar, Outlook magazine, Bihar
Amid the muddle over the Indian Premier League [ Images ], the Centre is feeling the heat after Outlook magazine carried a report saying that the National Technical Research Organisation has got telephone conversations of Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar and many other dignitaries tapped.
However, B Raman, former R&AW officer and rediff.com's columnist says, "While there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports carried by Outlook about the functioning of the NTRO and the genuineness of the intercepts of some telephone conversations of some political leaders, I have difficulty in accepting that these intercepts necessarily show that the NTRO has been tapping the telephone conversations of these political personalities."
Raman says, "Tapping is a process. When there is tapping, there will be a series of intercepts of the conversations involving the same person. When there is only an isolated message, it does not show malafide tapping. It only shows accidental interception of telephone conversations of political leaders cited by Outlook while doing a random communications intelligence sweep."
Raman's contention is that while tapping phones of people who are at national security risk, many other people's conversation also gets recorded and "this happens all the time while doing a random sweep".
A random sweep is not done manually. It is done by a machine which records every conversation within a certain radius when the machine is on.
However, Raman suggests, "From time to time, intelligence officers play back the recording of the intercepts. If they find that if any of the intercepts is of a political nature unrelated to national security and contains politically sensitive or compromising material, the careerists among intelligence officers may show it to political leaders to cut favour with them."
When intelligence agencies find that they do not have sensitive or compromising content in taped material they, normally, shred the conversations.
The security expert adds, "The so-called intercepts cited by the magazine do not have any sensitive or compromising material. My feeling is that these were intercepted accidentally during the course of a random search and the person to whom these were given for shredding has passed them on to the journalist."
Saturday, April 24, 2010
RANDOM COMINT SWEEPS----USE & MISUSE
B.RAMAN
The advance of technology and the increasing dependence on technical intelligence (TECHINT) for the maintenance of internal security have given rise to new ethical questions to which no satisfactory answers have been found anywhere in the world.
2. Modern technology has strengthened the capability of the intelligence agencies for intelligence collection.At the same time, it has placed at the disposal of criminal and anti-national elements better means of evading detection of their activities. The public, the legislature and the judiciary have been reluctant to strenghten the capability of the agencies to neutralise the advantages thus secured by these elements.
3.One may cite one example of the kind of problems now faced by intelligence and investigative agencies operating internally. Public opinion understands the need for the agencies--internal and external---- to intercept the communications of the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies and the diplomatic missions of foreign countries not well disposed towards us and of their nationals, who might be operating against our national interest, either from foreign or our territory. But, problems arise when there is a need to intercept the communications of one's own citizens, who might be acting against national interest.
4. Laws in most democratic societies normally allow the collection of communications intelligence (COMINT) only on citizens already identified as possible threats to national security on the basis of specific intelligence recorded in writing. In some countries, the required authorisation is given by officials designated by law and in others by the Attorney-General or by a court.
5. A general principle followed universally is that such authorisation should be of specified duration and against a specified individual, residing at a specified address and using a specified telephone or fax number or E-mail address. In recent years, criminal and anti-national elements have started persuading third parties, who may or may not be aware of their background, to let them use their postal and E-mail addresses and telephone and fax numbers for communication purposes.The mushrooming of public telephone booths and cyber cafes has also facilitated the use of evasion techniques by such elements. Every time such a practice comes to mnotice, the agencies had to seek a fresh authorisation for intercepting the communications of the third parties, public telephone booths and cyber cafes, which takes time and consequently results in a break in the continuity of intelligence collection
6.Before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, the Clinton Administration tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Congress to modify the law in order to facilitate the authorisation of the interception of the communications of a named suspect, whatever be the telephone and fax number, postal and E-mail address, public telephone booths and cyber cafes used by him or her. Public and Congressional opinion and civil rights groups were unwilling to increase the clandestine interception powers of the agencies. After 9/11, this opposition has relented and one understands that the agencies have been given the additional powers they wanted.
7. The agencies also need a capability for detecting and identifying criminal and anti-national elements that might have escaped detection through human intelligence (HUMINT). This might call for random, but not indiscriminate monitoring of communications that could result in the interception of messages having a bearing on ordinary crime, terrorism, narcotics smuggling, espionage etc. However, public opinion and lawmakers in democratic societies oppose random sweeps of communications due to fears of their misuse for partisan political purposes and on grounds of violation of privacy.
8.Algerian terrorists carried out a series of explosions in France in the 1990s. They were using the Internet for communications. However, the London-based leader of one of the terrorist groups, who had difficulty in operating a computer, used a telephone to convey oral orders for an explosion. During a random sweep of telephone calls, a French agency stumbled upon this call and the police was thus able to arrest the group and prevent any further explosions. The agency's action in carrying out a random sweep of telephone calls was a clear violation of the law, but there was no public outcry against it because it saved the lives of dozens of innocent civilians.
9. The importance of random COMINT sweeps for detecting and neutralising the sleeper cells of terrorist organisations has been increasingly felt since 9/11. Due to the difficulties faced by HUMINT agencies in penetrating terrorist organisations, random sweeps help the agencies in detecting a hitherto unsuspected terrorist cell and neutralising it before it can organise an act of terrorism. There has been increasing pressure on Governments from intelligence agencies to let them use random sweeps for detecting sleeper cells.
10. Random sweeps may and often do result in the collection of intelligence regarding terrorist cells and their plans. But, they also collect a lot of other information of no value to the agencies and the police. Fears that some of such information could be misused by the political leadership for partisan purposes come in the way of law-makers legitimising random sweeps. George Bush wanted to give his agencies the additional powers needed for random sweeps, but the Congress thwarted it. There were allegations that in spite of this he used his discretionary powers to authorise random sweeps on a case by case basis to neutralise sleeper cells operating in the US Homeland.
11. It is learnt that it was one such random sweep that made the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) realise that Ilyas Kashmiri, the Pakistani close to Al Qaeda, was trying to use David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for mounting an attack on the office of the Danish newspaper in Copenhagen which had published some cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammad in 2005. The entire investigation started with the interception of an Internet remark by Headley expressing his anger against the cartoonist and calling for an attack on him
12. In India, which is next door to the world's epicentre of terrorism in Pakistan and which has a large number of sleeper cells of Pakistani and Indian jihadi organisations waiting to strike in different parts of the country, the importance of adequate technical capability to detect and neutralise them and adequate powers to use that capability cannot be overemphasised. At the same time, fears of misuse of such capability and the powers to use it are legitimate.
13. How to enable random COMINT sweeps by the agencies in select cases and how to prevent the misuse of the intercepts with no value for counter-terrorism gathered by the agencies for partisan political purposes are questions which have not received the attention they deserve. Post-9/11, there has been a mushrooming of TECHINT capabilities in all countries facing the threat of terrorism. At the same time, attempts have been made to introduce safeguards against misuse of the capabilities.
14.In India too, post 9/11, there has been a mushrooming of TECHINT capabilities in different agencies----- some coming under the Ministry of Home Affairs, some under the Prime Minister in the Cabinet Secretariat and some under the Defence Minister.No attempt has been made to ensure that these capabilities are used in a co-ordinated manner under a common supervisory mechanism to prevent their misuse. Should random sweeps be allowed? Under what circumstances and under whose authority? Should the Parliament have a say in evolving the safeguards against possible misuse just as the Parliaments in many other countries have? These questions need to be debated in open in the Parliament and across the media and appropriate decisions taken which could be used as yardsticks for public and political opinion to decide for itself that the newly-created capabilities are being used in national interest only.
15.The articles published by the "Outlook" on the functioning of the National Technical Research Organisation would hopefully be the starting point of the much-delayed and much-needed debate on this subject. Public debate on sensitive intelligence matters such as this----if carried on with balance and restraint--- will not be harmful to national security. It will make our fight against threats to national security more effective and elicit greater public support for the fight. ( 25-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The advance of technology and the increasing dependence on technical intelligence (TECHINT) for the maintenance of internal security have given rise to new ethical questions to which no satisfactory answers have been found anywhere in the world.
2. Modern technology has strengthened the capability of the intelligence agencies for intelligence collection.At the same time, it has placed at the disposal of criminal and anti-national elements better means of evading detection of their activities. The public, the legislature and the judiciary have been reluctant to strenghten the capability of the agencies to neutralise the advantages thus secured by these elements.
3.One may cite one example of the kind of problems now faced by intelligence and investigative agencies operating internally. Public opinion understands the need for the agencies--internal and external---- to intercept the communications of the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies and the diplomatic missions of foreign countries not well disposed towards us and of their nationals, who might be operating against our national interest, either from foreign or our territory. But, problems arise when there is a need to intercept the communications of one's own citizens, who might be acting against national interest.
4. Laws in most democratic societies normally allow the collection of communications intelligence (COMINT) only on citizens already identified as possible threats to national security on the basis of specific intelligence recorded in writing. In some countries, the required authorisation is given by officials designated by law and in others by the Attorney-General or by a court.
5. A general principle followed universally is that such authorisation should be of specified duration and against a specified individual, residing at a specified address and using a specified telephone or fax number or E-mail address. In recent years, criminal and anti-national elements have started persuading third parties, who may or may not be aware of their background, to let them use their postal and E-mail addresses and telephone and fax numbers for communication purposes.The mushrooming of public telephone booths and cyber cafes has also facilitated the use of evasion techniques by such elements. Every time such a practice comes to mnotice, the agencies had to seek a fresh authorisation for intercepting the communications of the third parties, public telephone booths and cyber cafes, which takes time and consequently results in a break in the continuity of intelligence collection
6.Before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, the Clinton Administration tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Congress to modify the law in order to facilitate the authorisation of the interception of the communications of a named suspect, whatever be the telephone and fax number, postal and E-mail address, public telephone booths and cyber cafes used by him or her. Public and Congressional opinion and civil rights groups were unwilling to increase the clandestine interception powers of the agencies. After 9/11, this opposition has relented and one understands that the agencies have been given the additional powers they wanted.
7. The agencies also need a capability for detecting and identifying criminal and anti-national elements that might have escaped detection through human intelligence (HUMINT). This might call for random, but not indiscriminate monitoring of communications that could result in the interception of messages having a bearing on ordinary crime, terrorism, narcotics smuggling, espionage etc. However, public opinion and lawmakers in democratic societies oppose random sweeps of communications due to fears of their misuse for partisan political purposes and on grounds of violation of privacy.
8.Algerian terrorists carried out a series of explosions in France in the 1990s. They were using the Internet for communications. However, the London-based leader of one of the terrorist groups, who had difficulty in operating a computer, used a telephone to convey oral orders for an explosion. During a random sweep of telephone calls, a French agency stumbled upon this call and the police was thus able to arrest the group and prevent any further explosions. The agency's action in carrying out a random sweep of telephone calls was a clear violation of the law, but there was no public outcry against it because it saved the lives of dozens of innocent civilians.
9. The importance of random COMINT sweeps for detecting and neutralising the sleeper cells of terrorist organisations has been increasingly felt since 9/11. Due to the difficulties faced by HUMINT agencies in penetrating terrorist organisations, random sweeps help the agencies in detecting a hitherto unsuspected terrorist cell and neutralising it before it can organise an act of terrorism. There has been increasing pressure on Governments from intelligence agencies to let them use random sweeps for detecting sleeper cells.
10. Random sweeps may and often do result in the collection of intelligence regarding terrorist cells and their plans. But, they also collect a lot of other information of no value to the agencies and the police. Fears that some of such information could be misused by the political leadership for partisan purposes come in the way of law-makers legitimising random sweeps. George Bush wanted to give his agencies the additional powers needed for random sweeps, but the Congress thwarted it. There were allegations that in spite of this he used his discretionary powers to authorise random sweeps on a case by case basis to neutralise sleeper cells operating in the US Homeland.
11. It is learnt that it was one such random sweep that made the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) realise that Ilyas Kashmiri, the Pakistani close to Al Qaeda, was trying to use David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for mounting an attack on the office of the Danish newspaper in Copenhagen which had published some cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammad in 2005. The entire investigation started with the interception of an Internet remark by Headley expressing his anger against the cartoonist and calling for an attack on him
12. In India, which is next door to the world's epicentre of terrorism in Pakistan and which has a large number of sleeper cells of Pakistani and Indian jihadi organisations waiting to strike in different parts of the country, the importance of adequate technical capability to detect and neutralise them and adequate powers to use that capability cannot be overemphasised. At the same time, fears of misuse of such capability and the powers to use it are legitimate.
13. How to enable random COMINT sweeps by the agencies in select cases and how to prevent the misuse of the intercepts with no value for counter-terrorism gathered by the agencies for partisan political purposes are questions which have not received the attention they deserve. Post-9/11, there has been a mushrooming of TECHINT capabilities in all countries facing the threat of terrorism. At the same time, attempts have been made to introduce safeguards against misuse of the capabilities.
14.In India too, post 9/11, there has been a mushrooming of TECHINT capabilities in different agencies----- some coming under the Ministry of Home Affairs, some under the Prime Minister in the Cabinet Secretariat and some under the Defence Minister.No attempt has been made to ensure that these capabilities are used in a co-ordinated manner under a common supervisory mechanism to prevent their misuse. Should random sweeps be allowed? Under what circumstances and under whose authority? Should the Parliament have a say in evolving the safeguards against possible misuse just as the Parliaments in many other countries have? These questions need to be debated in open in the Parliament and across the media and appropriate decisions taken which could be used as yardsticks for public and political opinion to decide for itself that the newly-created capabilities are being used in national interest only.
15.The articles published by the "Outlook" on the functioning of the National Technical Research Organisation would hopefully be the starting point of the much-delayed and much-needed debate on this subject. Public debate on sensitive intelligence matters such as this----if carried on with balance and restraint--- will not be harmful to national security. It will make our fight against threats to national security more effective and elicit greater public support for the fight. ( 25-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
HU’S PROTÉGÉ SHIFTED FROM XINJIANG
B.RAMAN
A large number of Han residents of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, had demonstrated from September 2 to 4,2009, to protest against the failure of the local authorities to stop the wave of mysterious attacks with hypodermic syringe needles since August 17,2009. These demonstrations led to two important changes in the local party and Government.
2. On September 5,2009, the regional committee of the Communist Party of China for the Xinjiang Autonomous Region replaced Li Zhi, who was the Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, by Zhu Hailun, who was the Secretary of the Regional Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the entire province. Simultaneously, the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the province, which is the provincial legislature, replaced Liu Yaohua, who was the Director of the Public Security Department of the province, by Zhu Changjie, who was the party chief in the Aksu Prefecture of the province. The Public Security Department of the province, which works under the Ministry of Public Security of the central Government in Beijing, is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security. The police also comes under its supervision.
3.Commenting on these changes, I had stated as follows in my article of September 5,2009, titled “Two Heads Roll In Xinjiang” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3395.html : “Some interesting points about these two changes need to be underlined. Firstly, the two decisions have been projected as taken at the provincial level, but the instructions for the changes must have come from Beijing. Secondly, while the change at the party level has been restricted to the municipality of Urumqi, the change at the governmental level has affected the head of the Public Security Department for the entire province. There has been no announcement regarding the head of the Public Security Department in the Urumqi municipality. Any decision regarding him has apparently been left to the new provincial chief. It is also interesting to note that Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, has not so far been affected. He is the provincial head of the party continuously since 1994 and is considered very close to President Hu Jintao. During the demonstrations, most of the slogans were against him. Large sections of the Hans of Urumqi blame him for the failure of the police to protect them, but he can be removed only by the central party Politburo or its Standing Committee in Beijing. It would be interesting to see whether he too is removed by the Politburo or whether he is protected from any humiliation by President Hu Jintao. If he is removed, that could be an indication that Hu's position in the party has been weakened by the developments in Xinjiang. If he manages to stay on despite his alleged mishandling of the situation, that could be an indication that Hu's position remains strong.”
4. The Communist Party of China announced on April 24,2010, that Wang Lequan has been transferred from his post and posted as Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He has been replaced by Zhang Chunxian as the Party chief of the Xinjiang Region. Zhang, 57, is a native of Yuzhou city in Central China’s Henan Province. Before his transfer to Xinjiang, he was working as the Secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee from December 2005. Zhang, who joined the party in 1973, had served previously in the Ministry of Machinery, the Ministry of Supervision and the China National Packaging and Food Machinery Corporation, and subsequently as the Assistant Governor of Yunnan Province before going to Hunan in 2005.
5. The announcement of the changes in the party leadership of the Xinjiang region was made by the Party a day after the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party had held a meeting at Beijing to review the situation in the Xinjiang Region. A Xinhua news agency dispatch on the meeting said: “The meeting, presided over by President Hu Jintao, stressed that economic and social development in Xinjiang be pushed forward in a sound and speedy manner, placing priority on guaranteeing and improving people's livelihoods so all ethnic groups in the region can live a more prosperous and happier life.”
6. The fact that Wang had managed to continue as the head of the party in the Xinjiang Region for nearly eight months after the incidents of September,2009, would indicate that Hu managed to resist pressure from the public and party for his immediate removal from the Xinjiang Region. The Xinhua report on the Political Bureau meeting did not refer to the changes in the leadership. A separate announcement regarding this was made on April 24, but the announcement did indicate that the changes came after the meeting of the Political Bureau.
7. In January last, the Chinese Party had convened a Tibetan Work Forum ( the fifth since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Tibet ) chaired by President Hu to discuss Tibet-related policies. It was after that Forum that the Chinese decided to resume their dialogue with the representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and toned down their demonisation of His Holiness. It was stated at that time that a similar Work Forum ( the first on Xinjiang) would be organized. It is not clear whether the Politbureau meeting of April 23 was, in fact, the proposed Work Forum or was a prelude to that.
8. During his 16 years as the Xinjiang Party chief, Wang concentrated on developing the oil industry of the Region and encouraged the settlement of a large number of Hans from other parts of China to work in the oil industry. He incurred the anger of the Uighurs by introducing the teaching of the Chinese language in the primary schools and by banning the local Government servants from having beards, wearing headscarves and observing the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. His failure to anticipate and deal effectively with the Uighur disturbances in July last and the subsequent needle attacks on the Hans in August incurred the wrath of the Hans too. He found himself criticized by both the communities. It was the strong support of Hu that enabled him to continue till now despite widespread perceptions of his mishandling of the situation.
9. It would be interesting to see whether the new party chief would be authorized by the Party Central Committee to introduce any changes in the policies towards the Uighurs and their West-based leaders such as Mrs. Rebiya Kadeer, the President of the World Uighur Congress, who have been in the forefront of the campaign against the violation of the ethnic rights of the Uighurs by the Chinese authorities. Will there be a toning down of the demonisation of the ethnic rights movement? Will the Chinese relax the curbs on the religious rights of the Muslims too? ( 24-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
A large number of Han residents of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, had demonstrated from September 2 to 4,2009, to protest against the failure of the local authorities to stop the wave of mysterious attacks with hypodermic syringe needles since August 17,2009. These demonstrations led to two important changes in the local party and Government.
2. On September 5,2009, the regional committee of the Communist Party of China for the Xinjiang Autonomous Region replaced Li Zhi, who was the Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, by Zhu Hailun, who was the Secretary of the Regional Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the entire province. Simultaneously, the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the province, which is the provincial legislature, replaced Liu Yaohua, who was the Director of the Public Security Department of the province, by Zhu Changjie, who was the party chief in the Aksu Prefecture of the province. The Public Security Department of the province, which works under the Ministry of Public Security of the central Government in Beijing, is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security. The police also comes under its supervision.
3.Commenting on these changes, I had stated as follows in my article of September 5,2009, titled “Two Heads Roll In Xinjiang” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3395.html : “Some interesting points about these two changes need to be underlined. Firstly, the two decisions have been projected as taken at the provincial level, but the instructions for the changes must have come from Beijing. Secondly, while the change at the party level has been restricted to the municipality of Urumqi, the change at the governmental level has affected the head of the Public Security Department for the entire province. There has been no announcement regarding the head of the Public Security Department in the Urumqi municipality. Any decision regarding him has apparently been left to the new provincial chief. It is also interesting to note that Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, has not so far been affected. He is the provincial head of the party continuously since 1994 and is considered very close to President Hu Jintao. During the demonstrations, most of the slogans were against him. Large sections of the Hans of Urumqi blame him for the failure of the police to protect them, but he can be removed only by the central party Politburo or its Standing Committee in Beijing. It would be interesting to see whether he too is removed by the Politburo or whether he is protected from any humiliation by President Hu Jintao. If he is removed, that could be an indication that Hu's position in the party has been weakened by the developments in Xinjiang. If he manages to stay on despite his alleged mishandling of the situation, that could be an indication that Hu's position remains strong.”
4. The Communist Party of China announced on April 24,2010, that Wang Lequan has been transferred from his post and posted as Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He has been replaced by Zhang Chunxian as the Party chief of the Xinjiang Region. Zhang, 57, is a native of Yuzhou city in Central China’s Henan Province. Before his transfer to Xinjiang, he was working as the Secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee from December 2005. Zhang, who joined the party in 1973, had served previously in the Ministry of Machinery, the Ministry of Supervision and the China National Packaging and Food Machinery Corporation, and subsequently as the Assistant Governor of Yunnan Province before going to Hunan in 2005.
5. The announcement of the changes in the party leadership of the Xinjiang region was made by the Party a day after the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party had held a meeting at Beijing to review the situation in the Xinjiang Region. A Xinhua news agency dispatch on the meeting said: “The meeting, presided over by President Hu Jintao, stressed that economic and social development in Xinjiang be pushed forward in a sound and speedy manner, placing priority on guaranteeing and improving people's livelihoods so all ethnic groups in the region can live a more prosperous and happier life.”
6. The fact that Wang had managed to continue as the head of the party in the Xinjiang Region for nearly eight months after the incidents of September,2009, would indicate that Hu managed to resist pressure from the public and party for his immediate removal from the Xinjiang Region. The Xinhua report on the Political Bureau meeting did not refer to the changes in the leadership. A separate announcement regarding this was made on April 24, but the announcement did indicate that the changes came after the meeting of the Political Bureau.
7. In January last, the Chinese Party had convened a Tibetan Work Forum ( the fifth since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Tibet ) chaired by President Hu to discuss Tibet-related policies. It was after that Forum that the Chinese decided to resume their dialogue with the representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and toned down their demonisation of His Holiness. It was stated at that time that a similar Work Forum ( the first on Xinjiang) would be organized. It is not clear whether the Politbureau meeting of April 23 was, in fact, the proposed Work Forum or was a prelude to that.
8. During his 16 years as the Xinjiang Party chief, Wang concentrated on developing the oil industry of the Region and encouraged the settlement of a large number of Hans from other parts of China to work in the oil industry. He incurred the anger of the Uighurs by introducing the teaching of the Chinese language in the primary schools and by banning the local Government servants from having beards, wearing headscarves and observing the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. His failure to anticipate and deal effectively with the Uighur disturbances in July last and the subsequent needle attacks on the Hans in August incurred the wrath of the Hans too. He found himself criticized by both the communities. It was the strong support of Hu that enabled him to continue till now despite widespread perceptions of his mishandling of the situation.
9. It would be interesting to see whether the new party chief would be authorized by the Party Central Committee to introduce any changes in the policies towards the Uighurs and their West-based leaders such as Mrs. Rebiya Kadeer, the President of the World Uighur Congress, who have been in the forefront of the campaign against the violation of the ethnic rights of the Uighurs by the Chinese authorities. Will there be a toning down of the demonisation of the ethnic rights movement? Will the Chinese relax the curbs on the religious rights of the Muslims too? ( 24-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, April 22, 2010
CHINESE CURBS ON QUAKE RELIEF BY MONKS
B.RAMAN
Worried over nearly 10,000 Buddhist monks and nuns from the Tibet Autonomous Region, Sichuan and other neighboiuring areas rushing to the quake-hit Yushu area in the Western Qinghai province to organise rescue and relief work independently of the Government and the Chinese Red Cross, the Ministry of Public Security in the Qinghai province has imposed restrictions on rescue and relief work by monks and nuns. Under these restrictions, all those who had gone to the quake-hit area from outside the Yushu region have been ordered to go back to their areas. All monasteries have been told that only monks and nuns belonging to monasteries located in the Yushu area can participate in the rescue and relief work. Others have been banned from participating.
2. Initially, the Chinese did not try to prevent monks and nuns from the neighbouring areas from going to Yushu to organise rescue and relief work. According to reliable sources from the Yushu area, the Chinese became nervous and imposed the curbs when a monk publicly refused to shake hands with President Hu Jintao and hundreds of monks and nuns took out a candle light procession to pay homage to those killed. The police were taken aback when the processionists shouted slogans that His Holiness the Dalai Lama should be allowed to visit his home province to console his people in distress. It has been reported that the Chinese are also worried over the campaign mounted by Tibetan exiles in Western countries to demand that their host Governments should exercise pressure on Beijing to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas. ( 22-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China STudies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Worried over nearly 10,000 Buddhist monks and nuns from the Tibet Autonomous Region, Sichuan and other neighboiuring areas rushing to the quake-hit Yushu area in the Western Qinghai province to organise rescue and relief work independently of the Government and the Chinese Red Cross, the Ministry of Public Security in the Qinghai province has imposed restrictions on rescue and relief work by monks and nuns. Under these restrictions, all those who had gone to the quake-hit area from outside the Yushu region have been ordered to go back to their areas. All monasteries have been told that only monks and nuns belonging to monasteries located in the Yushu area can participate in the rescue and relief work. Others have been banned from participating.
2. Initially, the Chinese did not try to prevent monks and nuns from the neighbouring areas from going to Yushu to organise rescue and relief work. According to reliable sources from the Yushu area, the Chinese became nervous and imposed the curbs when a monk publicly refused to shake hands with President Hu Jintao and hundreds of monks and nuns took out a candle light procession to pay homage to those killed. The police were taken aback when the processionists shouted slogans that His Holiness the Dalai Lama should be allowed to visit his home province to console his people in distress. It has been reported that the Chinese are also worried over the campaign mounted by Tibetan exiles in Western countries to demand that their host Governments should exercise pressure on Beijing to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas. ( 22-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China STudies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
COUNTER-TERRORISM---SOME THOUGHTS
B.RAMAN
( Observations made by me while addressing a National Seminar on "Fight Against Terrorism" organised by the Mumbai Police at Mumbai on April 21,2010. The keynote address on the state of terrorism was delivered by Shri M.K. Narayanan, Governor of West Bengal. Other speakers were Dr.Anil Kakodkar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Dr.Raghunath Mashelkar, former Director-General,, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Shri G.Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan )
Two expressions often used by counter-terrorism analysts since the attempt to blow up the New York World Trade Centre in February,1993, are "acts of mass casualty terrorism" and "acts of catastrophic terrorism". These expressions have been defined by different experts in different manner. One of the definitions is based on the number of casualties inflicted by the terrorists. Under this definition, an act of catastrophic terrorism involves fatalities of more than 1000 and an act of mass casualty terrorism involves fatalities of more than 100. 9/11 in the US Homeland was an act of catastrophic terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in March,1993, July,2006 and November,2008, were acts of mass casualty terrorism.
2. While other cities in the world have also suffered acts of high casualty terrorism, Mumbai and Beirut have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists. The acts of terrorism in Bali, Madrid and London did not involve orchestration by a foreign State. The acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai involved orchestration by the State of Pakistan.
3. In his inaugural address, Shri D.Sivanandhan, Commissioner of Police, had analysed comprehensively the reasons for the repeated attacks in Mumbai. There is one reason not mentioned by him, which needs to be underlined---- namely the advantage of anonymity offered to a terrorist by a huge city like Mumbai. Anonymity tends to protect the terrorists from detection by the police.
4. What the Mumbai Police is confronted with is not just terrorism , but terrorism sponsored repeatedly against the residents of Mumbai by the State of Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. One should, therefore, talk of the "fight against State-sponsored Terrorism" and not just "Fight against Terrorism". If there was no orchestration by the State of Pakistan, the Mumbai Police would have been able to deal with the threat effectively. They have been facing difficulty because of the foreign sponsorship of terrorism.
5. Thus, counter-terrorism in Mumbai has two aspects--- action against terrorism and the terrorist organisations, which is the responsibility of the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra, and action against Pakistan, which is repeatedly sponsoring the terrorism. This is the responsibility of the Government of India. Unless the Government of India acts effectively against Pakistan for sponsoring acts of mass casualty terrorism against the residents of Mumbai, it will be unfair to blame the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra alone for not dealing with terrorism effectively.
6. If there is another act of mass casualty terrorism, there is a strong possibility that it will again be in Mumbai. The Mumbai Police should prepare themselves to face it. They have already taken various measures for revamping the counter-terrorism machinery in Mumbai. Strengthening the machinery alone is not adequate. It is equally important to strengthen the co-operation between the police and the community. The Security and Intelligence Committee of the British House of Commons, which went into deficiencies which led to the successful terrorist strikes in London in July,2005, pointed out that no counter-terrorism machinery however competent and no counter-terrorism doctrine however well thought-out, can deal effectively with terrorism unless there is effective police-community co-operation in counter-terrorism.
7. That the role of the community is important has to be realised by the police as well as the community and the two should work in tandem. After the London blasts, many new ideas have been introduced by the London Police for improving police-community co-operation against terrorism. I would like to underline in particular the appointment of counter-terrorism coordinators in important police stations to interact continuously with the public and the private business sector and the initiative taken by the business sector for sharing the additional expenses incurred by the police for promoting police-public co-operation against terrorism. Some of these ideas should be studied by the urban police in India and those considered worthy of emulation should be adapted to our needs.
8. The series of National Seminars on the "Fight Against Terrorism" being organised by the Mumbai Police in different parts of the city is a welcome and important exercise for promoting police-community co-operation against terrorism. This co-operation should be on a day-to-day basis instead of only at times of seminars like this. How to make police-community cooperation part of the counter-terrorism doctrine? That is an important question which should be addressed jointly by the leaders of the police and the community and an appropriate mechanism found. The Mumbai Police should move in this direction and give a lead to the other urban police of India.
9. In counter-terrorism, the quality of the leadership exercised by the political class is as important as the quality of the leadership exercised by the police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies. While addressing a seminar in New Delhi in 2001, Shri Narayanan pointed out that while the Punjab Police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies played an excellent role in bringing Khalistani terrorism under control, they might not have succeeded the way they did but for the equally commendable political leadership and co-operation in dealing with the menace. In dealing with Khalistani terrorism, the political and the professional classes were on the same page. Had this not been so, we might not have succeeded the way we did. In dealing with the state-sponsored jihadi terrorism too, we must try to ensure that the political and professional classes act in tandem and that the required political leadership is forthcoming. Without high-quality political leadership, the police alone, however brilliant and however well-endowed, cannot succeed.
10. In India, we tend to be defeatist. We keep criticising ourselves and our police all the time. We are given to chest-beating about our so-called failures. We tend to forget that our track record against terrorism and insurgencies is not bad at all. We have had success stories in Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. We are not doing too badly in Jammu & Kashmir and in the fight against jihadi terrorism in other parts of India. Our record against the Maoist insurgency has been above average in Andhra Pradesh and poor in other States affected by it. The terrorists and insurgents have had some spectacular tactical successes to their credit--- the explosion on board the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985, the three acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai and the Dantewada massacre of 76 policemen by the Maoists etc. But since India became independent in 1947, the terrorists and insurgents have not scored any notable strategic success. Strategically, the Indian State and its security set-up have ultimately prevailed despite the tactical set-backs. They never allowed fatigue to set in. Fatigue ultimately set in the ranks of the terrorists and insurgents and not in the ranks of the State. We have never conceded the illegitimate strategic demands of the terrorists and insurgents even though we might have conceded their tactical demands on occasions as happened at Kandahar in December, 1999. This is a unique record of which we ought to be proud of.
11. Let us by all means criticise our police, our intelligence agencies, other security agencies and the political class. They have much to answer for. But let us take care not to allow over-criticism to create defeatism. That is what Pakistan and its terrorist organisations want. We should not play into their hands. An ideal State would not allow the phenomenon of terrorism or insurgency to appear in its midst. But once it appears it takes a long time for the police and other security agencies to deal with it. A study of terrorism and insurgencies around the world would indicate that it takes around 15 to 20 years to deal with the menace. In India too, we have taken the same time. Once through our sins of commission and omission, we are faced with terrorism or insurgency, we need a lot of patience to deal with the menace. Impatience will prove counter-productive. It could make the police and other security forces over-react, thereby aggravating the problem.
12. There are copybook methods of dealing with acts of terrorism such as hijacking, blowing up aircraft, use of improvised explosive devices in public places etc, but there is no copybook method of dealing with terrorism and insurgencies. Our counter-terrorism techniques have to be nuanced and adapted individually to dealing with different kinds of terrorism and insurgencies. The techniques that we use against the jihadis we cannot use against the Maoists. The ruthlessness that we show towards Pakistanis we cannot show towards our own people. While dealing with our own people who have taken to terrorism and insurgencies, the rhetoric has to be non-provocative and non-escalatory and action has to be firm, but balanced.
13. International or global or trans-national terrorism of the jihadi variety cannot be countered effectively without international co-operation. There has been an improvement in international co-operation since 9/11, but this co-operation is still hampered by subjective and strategic factors. India has been a victim of this half-hearted co-operation. There is greater readiness on the part of the US and other countries of the West to co-operate with India against terrorism, but ifs and buts come in when it is a question of cooperation against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. This half-hearted co-operation will continue and we must learn to live with it. Ultimately, our strategic success against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will depend on our own capacity, our own determination and our own will to act. No international co-operation can be a substitute for the national will and determination to act.
14. Victim activism is weak in India. We saw in the US after 9/11 and we have seen among the Jewish people for years, the results which victim activism can achieve. If only we had victim activism in India similar to what one sees in the US and Israel, the relatives of the victims of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai would have rallied in protest against the plea bargain entered into by the FBI with David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba who was an important co-conspirator in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The total lack of protest from the relatives of those killed speaks poorly of the dormant state of victim activism in India.
15. Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, has to be commended for his determined efforts to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery after taking over as the Home Minister, but one is disturbed by what appears to be his uncritical admiration of American ideas, American systemic innovations and American-style rhetoric. By all means let us learn from the good practices of countries such as the US and Israel. But let us not blindly ape them. Our country is different. Our people are different. Our sensitivities are different. Uncritical admiration for American systems and approaches to counter-terrorism can prove counter-productive. ( 21-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Observations made by me while addressing a National Seminar on "Fight Against Terrorism" organised by the Mumbai Police at Mumbai on April 21,2010. The keynote address on the state of terrorism was delivered by Shri M.K. Narayanan, Governor of West Bengal. Other speakers were Dr.Anil Kakodkar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Dr.Raghunath Mashelkar, former Director-General,, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Shri G.Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan )
Two expressions often used by counter-terrorism analysts since the attempt to blow up the New York World Trade Centre in February,1993, are "acts of mass casualty terrorism" and "acts of catastrophic terrorism". These expressions have been defined by different experts in different manner. One of the definitions is based on the number of casualties inflicted by the terrorists. Under this definition, an act of catastrophic terrorism involves fatalities of more than 1000 and an act of mass casualty terrorism involves fatalities of more than 100. 9/11 in the US Homeland was an act of catastrophic terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in March,1993, July,2006 and November,2008, were acts of mass casualty terrorism.
2. While other cities in the world have also suffered acts of high casualty terrorism, Mumbai and Beirut have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists. The acts of terrorism in Bali, Madrid and London did not involve orchestration by a foreign State. The acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai involved orchestration by the State of Pakistan.
3. In his inaugural address, Shri D.Sivanandhan, Commissioner of Police, had analysed comprehensively the reasons for the repeated attacks in Mumbai. There is one reason not mentioned by him, which needs to be underlined---- namely the advantage of anonymity offered to a terrorist by a huge city like Mumbai. Anonymity tends to protect the terrorists from detection by the police.
4. What the Mumbai Police is confronted with is not just terrorism , but terrorism sponsored repeatedly against the residents of Mumbai by the State of Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. One should, therefore, talk of the "fight against State-sponsored Terrorism" and not just "Fight against Terrorism". If there was no orchestration by the State of Pakistan, the Mumbai Police would have been able to deal with the threat effectively. They have been facing difficulty because of the foreign sponsorship of terrorism.
5. Thus, counter-terrorism in Mumbai has two aspects--- action against terrorism and the terrorist organisations, which is the responsibility of the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra, and action against Pakistan, which is repeatedly sponsoring the terrorism. This is the responsibility of the Government of India. Unless the Government of India acts effectively against Pakistan for sponsoring acts of mass casualty terrorism against the residents of Mumbai, it will be unfair to blame the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra alone for not dealing with terrorism effectively.
6. If there is another act of mass casualty terrorism, there is a strong possibility that it will again be in Mumbai. The Mumbai Police should prepare themselves to face it. They have already taken various measures for revamping the counter-terrorism machinery in Mumbai. Strengthening the machinery alone is not adequate. It is equally important to strengthen the co-operation between the police and the community. The Security and Intelligence Committee of the British House of Commons, which went into deficiencies which led to the successful terrorist strikes in London in July,2005, pointed out that no counter-terrorism machinery however competent and no counter-terrorism doctrine however well thought-out, can deal effectively with terrorism unless there is effective police-community co-operation in counter-terrorism.
7. That the role of the community is important has to be realised by the police as well as the community and the two should work in tandem. After the London blasts, many new ideas have been introduced by the London Police for improving police-community co-operation against terrorism. I would like to underline in particular the appointment of counter-terrorism coordinators in important police stations to interact continuously with the public and the private business sector and the initiative taken by the business sector for sharing the additional expenses incurred by the police for promoting police-public co-operation against terrorism. Some of these ideas should be studied by the urban police in India and those considered worthy of emulation should be adapted to our needs.
8. The series of National Seminars on the "Fight Against Terrorism" being organised by the Mumbai Police in different parts of the city is a welcome and important exercise for promoting police-community co-operation against terrorism. This co-operation should be on a day-to-day basis instead of only at times of seminars like this. How to make police-community cooperation part of the counter-terrorism doctrine? That is an important question which should be addressed jointly by the leaders of the police and the community and an appropriate mechanism found. The Mumbai Police should move in this direction and give a lead to the other urban police of India.
9. In counter-terrorism, the quality of the leadership exercised by the political class is as important as the quality of the leadership exercised by the police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies. While addressing a seminar in New Delhi in 2001, Shri Narayanan pointed out that while the Punjab Police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies played an excellent role in bringing Khalistani terrorism under control, they might not have succeeded the way they did but for the equally commendable political leadership and co-operation in dealing with the menace. In dealing with Khalistani terrorism, the political and the professional classes were on the same page. Had this not been so, we might not have succeeded the way we did. In dealing with the state-sponsored jihadi terrorism too, we must try to ensure that the political and professional classes act in tandem and that the required political leadership is forthcoming. Without high-quality political leadership, the police alone, however brilliant and however well-endowed, cannot succeed.
10. In India, we tend to be defeatist. We keep criticising ourselves and our police all the time. We are given to chest-beating about our so-called failures. We tend to forget that our track record against terrorism and insurgencies is not bad at all. We have had success stories in Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. We are not doing too badly in Jammu & Kashmir and in the fight against jihadi terrorism in other parts of India. Our record against the Maoist insurgency has been above average in Andhra Pradesh and poor in other States affected by it. The terrorists and insurgents have had some spectacular tactical successes to their credit--- the explosion on board the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985, the three acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai and the Dantewada massacre of 76 policemen by the Maoists etc. But since India became independent in 1947, the terrorists and insurgents have not scored any notable strategic success. Strategically, the Indian State and its security set-up have ultimately prevailed despite the tactical set-backs. They never allowed fatigue to set in. Fatigue ultimately set in the ranks of the terrorists and insurgents and not in the ranks of the State. We have never conceded the illegitimate strategic demands of the terrorists and insurgents even though we might have conceded their tactical demands on occasions as happened at Kandahar in December, 1999. This is a unique record of which we ought to be proud of.
11. Let us by all means criticise our police, our intelligence agencies, other security agencies and the political class. They have much to answer for. But let us take care not to allow over-criticism to create defeatism. That is what Pakistan and its terrorist organisations want. We should not play into their hands. An ideal State would not allow the phenomenon of terrorism or insurgency to appear in its midst. But once it appears it takes a long time for the police and other security agencies to deal with it. A study of terrorism and insurgencies around the world would indicate that it takes around 15 to 20 years to deal with the menace. In India too, we have taken the same time. Once through our sins of commission and omission, we are faced with terrorism or insurgency, we need a lot of patience to deal with the menace. Impatience will prove counter-productive. It could make the police and other security forces over-react, thereby aggravating the problem.
12. There are copybook methods of dealing with acts of terrorism such as hijacking, blowing up aircraft, use of improvised explosive devices in public places etc, but there is no copybook method of dealing with terrorism and insurgencies. Our counter-terrorism techniques have to be nuanced and adapted individually to dealing with different kinds of terrorism and insurgencies. The techniques that we use against the jihadis we cannot use against the Maoists. The ruthlessness that we show towards Pakistanis we cannot show towards our own people. While dealing with our own people who have taken to terrorism and insurgencies, the rhetoric has to be non-provocative and non-escalatory and action has to be firm, but balanced.
13. International or global or trans-national terrorism of the jihadi variety cannot be countered effectively without international co-operation. There has been an improvement in international co-operation since 9/11, but this co-operation is still hampered by subjective and strategic factors. India has been a victim of this half-hearted co-operation. There is greater readiness on the part of the US and other countries of the West to co-operate with India against terrorism, but ifs and buts come in when it is a question of cooperation against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. This half-hearted co-operation will continue and we must learn to live with it. Ultimately, our strategic success against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will depend on our own capacity, our own determination and our own will to act. No international co-operation can be a substitute for the national will and determination to act.
14. Victim activism is weak in India. We saw in the US after 9/11 and we have seen among the Jewish people for years, the results which victim activism can achieve. If only we had victim activism in India similar to what one sees in the US and Israel, the relatives of the victims of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai would have rallied in protest against the plea bargain entered into by the FBI with David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba who was an important co-conspirator in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The total lack of protest from the relatives of those killed speaks poorly of the dormant state of victim activism in India.
15. Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, has to be commended for his determined efforts to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery after taking over as the Home Minister, but one is disturbed by what appears to be his uncritical admiration of American ideas, American systemic innovations and American-style rhetoric. By all means let us learn from the good practices of countries such as the US and Israel. But let us not blindly ape them. Our country is different. Our people are different. Our sensitivities are different. Uncritical admiration for American systems and approaches to counter-terrorism can prove counter-productive. ( 21-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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