B.RAMAN
There are two Indias.
The dazzling India which we see every day on our TV channels, in the spins of our political leaders and in the writings of our so-called strategic analysts. This is the India which, according to them, is moving rapidly forward to take up its position as a world power, which is courted by the other nations of the world.
But there is another India which we rarely see or write about. This is the India of grinding poverty---- a victim of social exploitation of the worst kind, where the inhabitants---mainly tribals--- are treated like chattels and domestic animals by the upper caste political leaders, landlords and forest contractors.
We rarely see India of negative images because it has been sought to be pushed under the carpet by the dazzling India, which feels embarrassed to admit to the world that such an India exists 63 years after independence.
It is this India kept pushed under the carpet, which has managed to struggle its way out from under the carpet and is hitting out with ferocity at all its perceived exploiters---- whether in the Government or in the society.
It is this India coming out from under the carpet, which is flocking to the banners of the Maoist ideologues and taking to arms against the Government and its social exploiters. For it, the Government is not of the people, by the people and for the people, but of the exploiters, by the exploiters and for the exploiters.
Unless we have the moral courage to admit this harsh reality we are going to see more and more incidents of utter savagery as we saw on April 6,2010, in the Dantewada district of Chattisgarh where a group of Maoists ---estimated at between 300 and 1000--- ambushed and butchered about 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), who had gone into the jungles for counter-insurgency operations.
This is not the first incident of butchery of the security forces in the history of our counter-insurgency operations. This will not be the last unless and until we realize that counter-insurgency is not only about putting down violence against the State and Society, but also about making resort to violence unnecessary by addressing the problems and grievances of the tribals.
It would be very easy to dismiss the Maoist insurgency as the political manipulation of illiterate or semi-literate tribals by Maoist ideologues from cities to achieve political power through the barrel of the gun. Yes, there is an element of cynical political manipulation of the tribals by many city-bred Maoist ideologues.
But the claim of political manipulation alone cannot explain how hundreds and hundreds of tribals are flocking to the banners of the Maoists. Intense anger over the failures of successive Governments to recognize and address their problems are driving them to heed the calls of the ideologues to massacre their perceived class enemies.
Unless and until we have a two-pronged approach to the problem---better counter-insurgency to put down violence and better governance and administration to remove the expoitation of the tribals by the non-tribals and improve their quality of life, blood will continue to flow in the jungles and roads of the tribal homelands in Central India.
Tribal India had always posed law and order problems. The tribal homelands in the North-East did so when Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi were Prime Ministers. They put down the Chinese and Pakistani supported tribal insurgency in the North-East with a firm hand. At the same time, they interacted vigorously with the tribal people and addressed their problems in an attempt to wean them away from violence. Nehru started a special service called the Indian Frontier Administration Service (IFAS) and inducted the best officers from other services into it to improve governance in the tribal areas not only in the North-East, but also in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. They were always ready for a dialogue with the tribal leaders---even with those who had taken to arms against the State.
They addressed poverty and social injustice not only in the tribal areas, but also in the rest of the country. Indira Gandhi used to start her day every day by mingling with poor and exploited people outside her residence and listening to their tales of woe. Her shoulders were always available to the poor and exploited to rest their head on and cry.
After Rajiv Gandhi, we have had a succession of Prime Ministers without a human touch in governance and administration in the tribal areas. They tend to look upon the tribal revolt in Central India as purely a problem of law and order, but not also as a problem with human dimensions.
The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is rarely seen or heard. He hardly ever mingles with the poor and downtrodden in the tribal belt of Central India. He deals with the tribal belt of Central India in the same way as the Pakistani leaders deal with the tribals of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)---- as mainly a problem to be tackled by the security forces as if the political class has no responsibility for leadership.
There is hardly a medium and long-term strategy --- with a judicious mix of the law and order and hearts and minds dimensions. All new ideas on counter-insurgency coming up are about how to make the security forces more effective. It is important for them to be effective . But it is equally---if not more---important for the political leadership to be seen by the tribals as caring and sensitive to their anger and bitterness towards their exploiters.
The time has come for the Prime Minister to take up in his hands the responsibility for working out a comprehensive political, operational and human strategy for dealing with the problems of the tribal homelands in Central India
If we continue to dither as we are doing now, Mao Zedong may have his last laugh in India. (7-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
INDIA'S BLACK DAY IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Maoist rebels kill 75 Indian police
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/06/maoist-rebels-kill-indian-soldiers
Victims ambushed at dawn in thick forest in Chhattisgarh
Jason Burke, South Asia correspondent
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 April 2010 11.52 BST
Article history
Maoist rebels exercise at a base in the Abujh Marh forests, Chattisgarh, in 2007. Photograph: Mustafa Quraishi/AP
At least 75 paramilitary policemen were killed in a dawn ambush by Maoist rebels in thick forest in central India today. The loss was one of the worst in a single attack by the insurgents in many years and highlights the increasingly serious problem extremist leftwing violence poses to the country.
Several hundred fighters from the Communist party of India (Maoist) appeared to have used mines and small arms against a unit of 120 men from the central reserve police force.
The force was taking part in a months-long operation in the central state of Chhattisgarh aimed at re-establishing state authority in thousands of square miles of territory now under the sway of the insurgents. This year has seen a series of such attacks though the latest is by far the most ambitious and deadly.
"Something has gone very wrong," the Indian home minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, said. "They seem to have walked into a trap."
The Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has recently described the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat currently facing his country, described his shock.
B Raman, a former senior policeman and intelligence operative, said that it would "go down as a black day" in the history of India's counter-insurgency efforts. "It is a very serious incident. It shows above all the level of popular support the Maoists have in that area, especially if the strength of the ambush force was as high as is thought," Raman told the Guardian.
Although government officials, police and alleged "informers" are often among their targets, Maoists also regularly attack rail lines and factories. A statement from a captured Maoist leader released to media a few weeks ago revealed how the group extorts hundreds of millions of pounds from local companies every year.
The insurgents largely operate in remote areas where strategically important and precious resources such as bauxite, uranium, iron ore and diamonds are found. "The growing activities of Maoists are threatening iron ore mining," said Ashok Surana, head of a leading industrial body, Mini Steel Plant Association. They are also known as Naxalites, after Naxalbari, a village in the state of West Bengal where their movement was born in 1967 in a heady mix of rural protest and urban ideology.
A first wave of agitation was crushed in the early 1970s. Since then violence has mounted as the Maoists exploit resentment among very poor, marginalised rural communities which have not benefited from India's recent economic growth.
"There is a lot of exploitation, poverty, land loss and alienation," said Raman.
Maoists say they are fighting for the rights of "tribal" or adivasi communities. They are now present in nearly a third of India's 630 districts. The rebels carried out more than 1,000 attacks last year, killing more than 600 people.
GK Pillai, a senior interior ministry official, said last month that the campaign against the Maoists would take 10 years at least. He said the hardest fighting was still to come. Yesterday Pillai promised "much firmer action".
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/06/maoist-rebels-kill-indian-soldiers
Victims ambushed at dawn in thick forest in Chhattisgarh
Jason Burke, South Asia correspondent
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 April 2010 11.52 BST
Article history
Maoist rebels exercise at a base in the Abujh Marh forests, Chattisgarh, in 2007. Photograph: Mustafa Quraishi/AP
At least 75 paramilitary policemen were killed in a dawn ambush by Maoist rebels in thick forest in central India today. The loss was one of the worst in a single attack by the insurgents in many years and highlights the increasingly serious problem extremist leftwing violence poses to the country.
Several hundred fighters from the Communist party of India (Maoist) appeared to have used mines and small arms against a unit of 120 men from the central reserve police force.
The force was taking part in a months-long operation in the central state of Chhattisgarh aimed at re-establishing state authority in thousands of square miles of territory now under the sway of the insurgents. This year has seen a series of such attacks though the latest is by far the most ambitious and deadly.
"Something has gone very wrong," the Indian home minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, said. "They seem to have walked into a trap."
The Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has recently described the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat currently facing his country, described his shock.
B Raman, a former senior policeman and intelligence operative, said that it would "go down as a black day" in the history of India's counter-insurgency efforts. "It is a very serious incident. It shows above all the level of popular support the Maoists have in that area, especially if the strength of the ambush force was as high as is thought," Raman told the Guardian.
Although government officials, police and alleged "informers" are often among their targets, Maoists also regularly attack rail lines and factories. A statement from a captured Maoist leader released to media a few weeks ago revealed how the group extorts hundreds of millions of pounds from local companies every year.
The insurgents largely operate in remote areas where strategically important and precious resources such as bauxite, uranium, iron ore and diamonds are found. "The growing activities of Maoists are threatening iron ore mining," said Ashok Surana, head of a leading industrial body, Mini Steel Plant Association. They are also known as Naxalites, after Naxalbari, a village in the state of West Bengal where their movement was born in 1967 in a heady mix of rural protest and urban ideology.
A first wave of agitation was crushed in the early 1970s. Since then violence has mounted as the Maoists exploit resentment among very poor, marginalised rural communities which have not benefited from India's recent economic growth.
"There is a lot of exploitation, poverty, land loss and alienation," said Raman.
Maoists say they are fighting for the rights of "tribal" or adivasi communities. They are now present in nearly a third of India's 630 districts. The rebels carried out more than 1,000 attacks last year, killing more than 600 people.
GK Pillai, a senior interior ministry official, said last month that the campaign against the Maoists would take 10 years at least. He said the hardest fighting was still to come. Yesterday Pillai promised "much firmer action".
6/4: INDIA'S BLACK DAY IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY
B.RAMAN
6/4 will go down as a black day in the history of India's counter-insurgency just as 26/11 became a black day in the history of Indian counter-terrorism.
2. In a well-prepared and well-executed attack of unprecedented mobilisation, precision and savagery a large number of Maoists (Naxalites_) --- estimated by the local police to be about 1000 strong--- ambushed a combined party of over 80 members of the Central Resereve Police Force (CRPF) and the District Police returning from road security duty and managed to kill 72 members of the CRPF and one member of the District police force on April 6,2010. The Maoists had reportedly taken up position on a hill overlooking the route by which the party was returning after performing its task. It is not clear whether the route was a regular road or a motorable jungle track. The ambush took place in the thick Mukrana forests of Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.
3. The fact that the Maoists were able to mobilise such a large number of persons for the ambush would indicate that they had advance indication of the return of the CRPF party by that route. They might have had advance intelligence of the plans of the party or they might have assessed that the CRPF might be returning by this road after watching the CRPF men conduct search and destroy operations in the area for three days.
4. A rule of precaution in counter-insurgency operation is that you don't use the same route for going to an operational area and for returning from there. Often, this precaution is not followed by the security forces either due to carelessness or due to the fact that the security forces do not have much of a choice due to the poor development of roads in the jungle areas in which the Maoists operate.
5. One may recall an incident a couple of years ago when a large police party had gone by boat from Andhra Pradesh into Orissa . The Maoists had noticed them going and had correctly assessed that the AP police party would be returning by the same route. When they did, a large number of Maoists had taken up position on a raised feature overlooking the river and they literally mowed down over 50 members of the police party.
6. We had probably not learnt the right lessons from the river ambush and facilitated a deadly road ambush in thick forests by not following basic dos and donts of counter-insurgency. The CRPF and the District Police have to perform a thankless task for want of proper road and telecommunications networks in the Maoist-infected areas. While the Maoists are trained to treck long distances by foot, the security forces tend to be road and vehicles-bound. They become sitting ducks for the insurgents, who surprise them with explosives and landmines and then mow them down with hand-held weapons. The reflexes of the security forces tend to be weak as could be seen from the fact that there have been very few instances of an ambushed security forces patrol recovering from the ambush and retaliating against the Maoists. Ambushes always tend to be fatal for the security forces with very few instances of successful counter-ambushes by the security forces.
7. Continuing serious deficiencies in rural policing and in police-rural communities relationships have been coming in the way of village help for the police by way of preventive intelligence. Counter-intelligence in the rural areas to prevent the penetration of the security forces by the Maoists is also weak. The fact that only one member of the District Police was killed in the ambush of April 6 as against 72 members of the CRPF makes one suspect possible collusion between the Maoists and some members of the District Police. Since the Maoist and the District Police recruits are recruited from the same rural stock, possibilities of penetration of the new police recruits by the Maoists are high.
8. The time has come to think in terms of using helicopter patrols and spotter drones in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists in areas covered by thick jungles. An important question to be examined in this connection is how to prevent civilian casualties of villagers and residents of jungles and avoid environmental damage. (6-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
6/4 will go down as a black day in the history of India's counter-insurgency just as 26/11 became a black day in the history of Indian counter-terrorism.
2. In a well-prepared and well-executed attack of unprecedented mobilisation, precision and savagery a large number of Maoists (Naxalites_) --- estimated by the local police to be about 1000 strong--- ambushed a combined party of over 80 members of the Central Resereve Police Force (CRPF) and the District Police returning from road security duty and managed to kill 72 members of the CRPF and one member of the District police force on April 6,2010. The Maoists had reportedly taken up position on a hill overlooking the route by which the party was returning after performing its task. It is not clear whether the route was a regular road or a motorable jungle track. The ambush took place in the thick Mukrana forests of Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.
3. The fact that the Maoists were able to mobilise such a large number of persons for the ambush would indicate that they had advance indication of the return of the CRPF party by that route. They might have had advance intelligence of the plans of the party or they might have assessed that the CRPF might be returning by this road after watching the CRPF men conduct search and destroy operations in the area for three days.
4. A rule of precaution in counter-insurgency operation is that you don't use the same route for going to an operational area and for returning from there. Often, this precaution is not followed by the security forces either due to carelessness or due to the fact that the security forces do not have much of a choice due to the poor development of roads in the jungle areas in which the Maoists operate.
5. One may recall an incident a couple of years ago when a large police party had gone by boat from Andhra Pradesh into Orissa . The Maoists had noticed them going and had correctly assessed that the AP police party would be returning by the same route. When they did, a large number of Maoists had taken up position on a raised feature overlooking the river and they literally mowed down over 50 members of the police party.
6. We had probably not learnt the right lessons from the river ambush and facilitated a deadly road ambush in thick forests by not following basic dos and donts of counter-insurgency. The CRPF and the District Police have to perform a thankless task for want of proper road and telecommunications networks in the Maoist-infected areas. While the Maoists are trained to treck long distances by foot, the security forces tend to be road and vehicles-bound. They become sitting ducks for the insurgents, who surprise them with explosives and landmines and then mow them down with hand-held weapons. The reflexes of the security forces tend to be weak as could be seen from the fact that there have been very few instances of an ambushed security forces patrol recovering from the ambush and retaliating against the Maoists. Ambushes always tend to be fatal for the security forces with very few instances of successful counter-ambushes by the security forces.
7. Continuing serious deficiencies in rural policing and in police-rural communities relationships have been coming in the way of village help for the police by way of preventive intelligence. Counter-intelligence in the rural areas to prevent the penetration of the security forces by the Maoists is also weak. The fact that only one member of the District Police was killed in the ambush of April 6 as against 72 members of the CRPF makes one suspect possible collusion between the Maoists and some members of the District Police. Since the Maoist and the District Police recruits are recruited from the same rural stock, possibilities of penetration of the new police recruits by the Maoists are high.
8. The time has come to think in terms of using helicopter patrols and spotter drones in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists in areas covered by thick jungles. An important question to be examined in this connection is how to prevent civilian casualties of villagers and residents of jungles and avoid environmental damage. (6-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, April 5, 2010
THE AFGHANISATION OF PAKISTAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 639
B.RAMAN
The available details regarding the fedayeen (suicidal)-cum- suicide attack on the US Consulate in Peshawar, the capital of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, on April 5,2010, are still confusing.
2.However,certain aspects of the attack are clear: It was a single target swarm attack, meant to penetrate the US Consulate in a manner similar to the penetration of the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October last year. It was not a multiple-target attack similar to what one had seen in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and in Kabul subsequently. As in Mumbai and Kabul, it was a multiple modus operandi attack too involving the use of explosives and hand-held weapons As in Kabul, there was also a mix of the suicidal and the suicide techniques.In Mumbai, the suicidal technique was there, but not the suicide technique. As in Mumbai and Kabul, there was also a mix of the army-style commando attacks and conventional techniques, not requiring knowledge of military tactics.
3. As in Mumbai (10 terrorists), the number of terrorists involved was small. There are contradictory versions of the number, which varies between four and eight. As in GHQ, Rawalpindi, the terrorists managed to maintain the surprise element of the attack---- with the security guards becoming aware of their intentions and plans only after the terrorists reportedly used two car bombs against two security barriers outside the Consulate---one at a distance of about 40 metres and the other at a distance of 20 metres. At the first security barrier an armoured personnel carrier of the Frontier Corps was disabled through a car bomb. At least two suicide bombers were killed in the attempt to find their way across the two barriers. Thereafter, before they could approach the gate, which was damaged by the second vehicular explosion, the security detail of the Consulate consisting of the Frontier Corps personnel deployed by the NWFP Government and private security guards employed by the US Consulate retaliated effectively and killed the surviving terrorists wielding assault rifles and hand-grenades. The number of suicide terrorists killed seems to be between two and four and the number of commando-style attackers killed between four and six.
4. The reported fatalities are eight--- three members of the Frontier Corps, two security Guards of the US Consulate and three passers-by. It is not known whether the two security guards and the three passers-by were Pakistani or US nationals. The US Consulate is located in the Hospital Road which is closed to public vehicles. The terrorists managed to enter the road in police-like vehicles and move for some distance ---about 40 metres--- towards the Consulate before they were mowed down. Thus, the approach road security failed enabling the terrorists to move towards the gate of the Consulate. But, the physical security enhancements at and near the gate and the good reflexes of the Frontier Corps and Consulate security personnel manning the external perimeter security mowed down the terrorists before they could succeed in pentrating the Consulate.
5. The reports from Peshawar bring to mind the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament House on December 13,2001, in some respects. The attack on the Indian Parliament was a single-target, single-MO attack, but the terrorists, who employed the suicidal and not the suicide technique, evaded the approach road security by coming in vehicles resembling Government vehicles used for transporting members of Parliament and security personnel. While they breached the approach road security, they could not breach the external perimeter security due to the alertness and good reflexes of the security personnel guarding the outer perimeter.
6. In the case of the attack on the GHQ in Rawalpindi, the approach road security as well as the outer perimeter security failed enabling the terrorists to penetrate the premises. They could be mowed down only after they had gained entry into the GHQ campus, including the offices of the security staff.
7. The Peshawar attack illustrates two lessons in counter-terrorism, which are well-known but rarely followed: First, a well-trained and well-reflexed physical security can thwart a terrorist attack even if intelligence fails. Second, in a multi-layered physical security set-up, even if one layer fails, others can stop the terrorists. A multi-layered security set-up is a must for all sensitive establishments.
8. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Consulate. It has been threatening attacks on US nationals and interests ever since the reported ( but not yert confirmed) death of Hakimullah Mehsud in January last following a US Drone strike. Presuming its claim is correct, it has taken it three months to form the attack team and train them. American nationals and interests have been the targets of terrorist attacks in Pakistan right from the 1990s, but almost all the previous attacks involved explosives or hand-held weapons. This is the first time a US establishment in Pakistan has been the target of a military-style commando attack. Will the Taliban be able to mount a similar attack on the US Embassy in Islamabad or the US Consulate in Karachi? That is a question that must be worrying the US and Pakistani authorities.
9. Despite Pakistani claims----endorsed by a naiva Obama Administration---of successes in its counter-terrorism operations in the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division of the NWFP and in the South Waziristan and Bajaur Agencies of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA ), the Pashtun and the Punjabi Taliban remain as well-motivated, as resourceful, as innovative and as determined to kill as ever. They are feeling no shortage of suicide volunteers as seen from the Peshawar attack and the suicide attack (45 fatalities) the same day on a rally of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) in the Lower Dir District of the NWFP. Lower and Upper Dirs are the strongholds of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), founded by Maulana Fazlulla, who hails from the Dir area. The indications are that while the Lower Dir attack was carried out by the TNSM faction of the TTP, the Peshawar attack was carried out by the Mehsud faction from South Waziristan. It is difficult to say whether the two were co-ordinated by the same command and control./
10. If the Obama Administration does not wake up to the on-going Afghanisation of Pakistan with a rainbow coalition of terrorist groups having a free run, the ultimate humiliation of the Administration could come not from Afghanistan, but from Pakistan. ( 6-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Strudies, Chennai.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The available details regarding the fedayeen (suicidal)-cum- suicide attack on the US Consulate in Peshawar, the capital of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, on April 5,2010, are still confusing.
2.However,certain aspects of the attack are clear: It was a single target swarm attack, meant to penetrate the US Consulate in a manner similar to the penetration of the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October last year. It was not a multiple-target attack similar to what one had seen in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and in Kabul subsequently. As in Mumbai and Kabul, it was a multiple modus operandi attack too involving the use of explosives and hand-held weapons As in Kabul, there was also a mix of the suicidal and the suicide techniques.In Mumbai, the suicidal technique was there, but not the suicide technique. As in Mumbai and Kabul, there was also a mix of the army-style commando attacks and conventional techniques, not requiring knowledge of military tactics.
3. As in Mumbai (10 terrorists), the number of terrorists involved was small. There are contradictory versions of the number, which varies between four and eight. As in GHQ, Rawalpindi, the terrorists managed to maintain the surprise element of the attack---- with the security guards becoming aware of their intentions and plans only after the terrorists reportedly used two car bombs against two security barriers outside the Consulate---one at a distance of about 40 metres and the other at a distance of 20 metres. At the first security barrier an armoured personnel carrier of the Frontier Corps was disabled through a car bomb. At least two suicide bombers were killed in the attempt to find their way across the two barriers. Thereafter, before they could approach the gate, which was damaged by the second vehicular explosion, the security detail of the Consulate consisting of the Frontier Corps personnel deployed by the NWFP Government and private security guards employed by the US Consulate retaliated effectively and killed the surviving terrorists wielding assault rifles and hand-grenades. The number of suicide terrorists killed seems to be between two and four and the number of commando-style attackers killed between four and six.
4. The reported fatalities are eight--- three members of the Frontier Corps, two security Guards of the US Consulate and three passers-by. It is not known whether the two security guards and the three passers-by were Pakistani or US nationals. The US Consulate is located in the Hospital Road which is closed to public vehicles. The terrorists managed to enter the road in police-like vehicles and move for some distance ---about 40 metres--- towards the Consulate before they were mowed down. Thus, the approach road security failed enabling the terrorists to move towards the gate of the Consulate. But, the physical security enhancements at and near the gate and the good reflexes of the Frontier Corps and Consulate security personnel manning the external perimeter security mowed down the terrorists before they could succeed in pentrating the Consulate.
5. The reports from Peshawar bring to mind the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament House on December 13,2001, in some respects. The attack on the Indian Parliament was a single-target, single-MO attack, but the terrorists, who employed the suicidal and not the suicide technique, evaded the approach road security by coming in vehicles resembling Government vehicles used for transporting members of Parliament and security personnel. While they breached the approach road security, they could not breach the external perimeter security due to the alertness and good reflexes of the security personnel guarding the outer perimeter.
6. In the case of the attack on the GHQ in Rawalpindi, the approach road security as well as the outer perimeter security failed enabling the terrorists to penetrate the premises. They could be mowed down only after they had gained entry into the GHQ campus, including the offices of the security staff.
7. The Peshawar attack illustrates two lessons in counter-terrorism, which are well-known but rarely followed: First, a well-trained and well-reflexed physical security can thwart a terrorist attack even if intelligence fails. Second, in a multi-layered physical security set-up, even if one layer fails, others can stop the terrorists. A multi-layered security set-up is a must for all sensitive establishments.
8. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Consulate. It has been threatening attacks on US nationals and interests ever since the reported ( but not yert confirmed) death of Hakimullah Mehsud in January last following a US Drone strike. Presuming its claim is correct, it has taken it three months to form the attack team and train them. American nationals and interests have been the targets of terrorist attacks in Pakistan right from the 1990s, but almost all the previous attacks involved explosives or hand-held weapons. This is the first time a US establishment in Pakistan has been the target of a military-style commando attack. Will the Taliban be able to mount a similar attack on the US Embassy in Islamabad or the US Consulate in Karachi? That is a question that must be worrying the US and Pakistani authorities.
9. Despite Pakistani claims----endorsed by a naiva Obama Administration---of successes in its counter-terrorism operations in the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division of the NWFP and in the South Waziristan and Bajaur Agencies of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA ), the Pashtun and the Punjabi Taliban remain as well-motivated, as resourceful, as innovative and as determined to kill as ever. They are feeling no shortage of suicide volunteers as seen from the Peshawar attack and the suicide attack (45 fatalities) the same day on a rally of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) in the Lower Dir District of the NWFP. Lower and Upper Dirs are the strongholds of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), founded by Maulana Fazlulla, who hails from the Dir area. The indications are that while the Lower Dir attack was carried out by the TNSM faction of the TTP, the Peshawar attack was carried out by the Mehsud faction from South Waziristan. It is difficult to say whether the two were co-ordinated by the same command and control./
10. If the Obama Administration does not wake up to the on-going Afghanisation of Pakistan with a rainbow coalition of terrorist groups having a free run, the ultimate humiliation of the Administration could come not from Afghanistan, but from Pakistan. ( 6-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Strudies, Chennai.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, April 4, 2010
DEMOCRACY & THE ARMY IN PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
The two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament will be taking up for discussion on April 5,2010, the 18th Constitution Amendment Bill, as recommended by an all-party constitutional review committee. It has to be approved by a two-thirds majority by the two Houses and the provincial Assemblies before it comes into effect. Salient points of the Bill as extracted from the “Dawn” of April 3,2010, are annexed.
2. The Bill seeks to amend a number of provisions of the Constitution in order to remove or rectify various distortions in the 1973 Constitution, which was brought in by the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto when the was the Prime Minister till he was overthrown in 1977, arrested and got executed by Gen.Zia-ul-Haq. These amendments, in effect, will restore the powers of the Prime Minister as they were intended to be by Z.A.Bhutto under the 1973 Constitution and reverse the process of strengthening the position of the President at the expense of that of the Prime Minister by successive military dictators in order to impose their will on the civilian Prime Ministers whom they inducted into power in order to give a civilian façade to the military dictatorship.
3. A new article 90 in the Bill seeks to restore the authority of the Prime Minister by providing for the exercise of the executive authority of the federation “in the name of the president by the federal government consisting of the prime minister and federal ministers, which shall act through the prime minister, who shall be the chief executive of the federation”. Thus, all executive powers will be exercised by the Prime Minister in the name of the President. According to the amendment, the President would continue to be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but “the President shall, on advice of the Prime Minister” appoint the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three services chiefs. The President will not have any discretionary powers to decide who will head the Armed Forces.
4. How effective will be the exercise by the Prime Minister of the power to recommend who should head the Armed Forces would depend upon how willingly the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) goes along with the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif, as Prime Minister, had similar powers in 1999, but those powers could not protect him from the wrath of the Army in October,1999, when he advised the then President Mohammad Rafique Tarar to dismiss Gen.Pervez Musharraf as the COAS and appoint in his place Lt.Gen.Ziauddin, the then Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as the COAS. Tarar issued the orders when Musharraf had not yet returned to Pakistan after a visit to Sri Lanka. A group of Lts.General loyal to Musharraf and opposed to Ziauddin, an enginner, taking over as the COAS, refused to comply with the orders of the President issued on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. They dismissed and arrested both the Prime Minister and the ISI chief and paved the way for Musharraf to take over as the Chief Executive on his return to Karachi from Colombo. The judiciary endorsed their action under the so-called doctrine of necessity.
5. Thus, what has always determined the course of democracy in Pakistan is not what is written in the Constitution, but what the Army thought of the actions and decisions of the President and the Prime Minister. When it was unhappy with their actions and decisions, the Army has bulldozed its way into intervention to seize power irrespective of the Constitution. Constitutional provisions and laws have been allowed by the Army to operate only so long as they suited the Army.
6. Since the 1973 Constitution came into force, the Army has intervened twice directly and thrice indirectly. The direct interventions were in 1977 when Z.A.Bhutto was arrested, got tried and executed by Zia and in 1999 when Nawaz Sharif was arrested, tried and banished to Saudi Arabia by Musharraf.
7. The indirect interventions were in 1990 when the Army instigated the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dismiss Benazir Bhutto, in 1993 when the Army instigated Ghulam Ishaq Khan to have Nawz eased out and in 1996 when the Army instigated the then President Farooq Leghari to dismiss Benazir. Pakistan’s political leaders paved the way for the politicization of the Army by inciting it to act against their political opponents whom they were not able to confront politically. Thus, Nawaz incited the Army and the President to act against Benazir in 1990 and 1996 and Benazir incited them to have Nawaz eased out in 1993. The Pakistan Army might not have become politically as interventionist as it has been but for the country’s opportunistic politicians who had no qualms in encouraging the Army to intervene when it suited their partisan political interests.
8. The new Constitution Amendment Bill seeks to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to intervene in future directly or indirectly. To rule out direct military intervention, the Bill seeks to amend Article 6 of the Constitution to include suspension of the Constitution and putting it in abeyance among acts of high treason which no court shall validate. Zia and Musharraf were able to intervene directly, dismiss an elected Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly because there was no provision in the Constitution against it and a compliant judiciary validated their actions post-facto.
9. Theoretically, this cannot happen now and the Army cannot intervene directly. But, what would happen if an Army chief not only dismisses the Prime Minister and dissolves the National Assembly, but also suspends or abrogates the Constitution?
10. The Amendment seeks to rule out indirect intervention by the Army through the President by abolishing the powers of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly except when the Prime Minister loses the confidence of the National Assembly and no other person enjoys the confidence of the Assembly to form a new Government. The power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and to dissolve the National Assembly was introduced by Zia before he ordered elections in 1985 and inducted Mohammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister. He dismissed Junejo under this power and dissolved the National Assembly in 1988 due to differences with Junejo over the Afghan policy and the latter’s insistence on releasing to the public the report of the committee which had enquired into the explosions at the Ojehri camp of the Army in which the arms and ammunition, including Stinger missiles, given by the US to the ISI for issue to the Afghan Mujahideen were stored. The explosions took place when a US team was to inspect the stocks following allegations of misuse of the stocks by the ISI and diversion of some of the missiles to Iran.
11. The power to dismiss was retained by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Leghari, but Nawaz got it abolished when his party secured a two-thirds majority in the 1996 elections. Musharraf re-introduced it. He used to argue that the Army was forced to intervene directly in 1977 and 1999 because the Constitution did not provide any way of dealing with an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister, who managed to retain his support in the National Assembly. He strongly argued in favour of retaining the power of the President to dismiss an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister, but only on the recommendation of the National Security Council, which would be chaired by the President.
12. Now, this power is being sought to be abolished without providing a safety valve for action against an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister, who retains the confidence of the National Assembly. In other democracies, in similar situations, the pressure of political and public opinion acts as a safety valve. Only in the case of the arbitrary dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury by Musharraf did political and public opinion assert itself. Otherwise, Pakistan does not have a history of such assertion.
13. When the Army directly intervened and dismissed an arbitrary and unpopular Z.A.Bhutto in 1977 and an equally arbitrary and unpopular Nawaz in 1999, a helpless public opinion hailed the Army’s actions as deliverance The absence of a safety valve against an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister could again lead to the Army’s intervention in future with the support of the public. In Pakistan, the romanticisation of democratic traditions is confined to the elite. For the common man, the Army and the political class are equally evil. When caught between a looming military dictatorship and an arbitrary political ruler, they choose whoever can provide them immediate relief. Public memory in Pakistan and about Pakistan is short. We tend to forget how the people of Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) celebrated in 1977 when the Army threw out Z.A.Bhutto and how people all over Pakistan celebrated in 1999 when the Army threw out Nawaz and installed Musharraf as the ruler.
14. All lovers of democracy should welcome the Constitutional Amendment despite its imperfections. It would definitely strengthen the chances of the revival of democracy in Pakistan provided the political parties and the Army play the game according to the new rules. Even if one assumes that the political leaders have learnt their lessons and will now play the game according to the amended Constitution, will the Army do so? The Army thinks that it knows better than the political class what is good for the country. For the last 60 years or so, the Army has convinced itself that it has a legitimate political role to play---direct or indirect--- and is determined to play it should circumstances warrant it-----Constitution or no Constitution.
15. Look at Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the COAS. When he took over as the COAS, he said the Army’s place was in the barracks and withdrew all army officers exercising non-military functions. He has again come out of the barracks and has been playing an increasingly active and assertive role in decision-making----whether it be in respect of national security or foreign policy or relations with India. So long as the Army’s mindset that it is not only the defender of national security from external and internal threats, but also the guardian of the interests of the people persists, democracy in Pakistan will continue to be on the sufferance of the Army. The US cannot escape its share of the responsibility for the persistence of this mindset and for the repeated failures of democratic experiments in Pakistan. Kayani would not have acquired the kind of image that he has acquired without the blessings of the US. ( 4-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
SALIENT POINTS OF THE CONSTITUTION (18TH) AMENDMENT BILL ( as reported by the “Dawn” )
Here are the main features of the amendments.
Repeal the Legal Framework Order of 2002, along with its amendments, as having been issued without lawful authority, as well as the 17th Amendment of 2003 based on it.
Amend Article 1 to rename the NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Amend Article 6 to include suspension of the Constitution and putting it in abeyance among acts of high treason which no court will validate.
New article 10A to confer right to fair trial.
New article 19A to give every citizen the right to access to information in all matters of public importance.
Article 25A to make the state provide free and compulsory education to all children aged five to 16 years.
President to act on the prime minister’s advice to dissolve the National Assembly, set a date for the general election and appoint a caretaker government.
Repeal Article 58(2)B empowering the president to dissolve the National Assembly.
Amend Article 59 to increase Senate seats to 104 from the present 100 with one representing non-Muslim minorities from each province.
Amend Article 61 to increase working days of Senate in a parliamentary year to 110 from 90.
Amend Article 70 and omit Article 71 to do away with provisions for the constitution of a mediation committee in case of difference between the two houses on a bill and revert to calling a joint sitting of parliament in such an event.
Amend Article 89 to bar promulgation of an ordinance when either of the two houses is in session, rather than only the National Assembly, and restrict re-promulgation to only one time and that too in compliance with a resolution of either house.
New article 90 to substitute previous one to provide for exercise of the executive authority of the federation “in the name of the president by the federal government consisting of the prime minister and federal ministers, which shall act through the prime minister, who shall be the chief executive of the federation”. Abolish the concurrent legislative list and some subjects in the federal list 1 included in federal list.
Amend Article 92 to restrict the strength of the federal cabinet, after the next election, to 11 per cent of total members of parliament and of the provincial cabinets to 15 members or 11 per cent of an assembly, whichever is higher, and of advisers of the prime minister or chief minister to a maximum of five.
Amend Article 101 to provide for a provincial governor to be the resident and voter of the same province.
Amend Article 104 to provide for a speaker of a provincial assembly to be acting governor.
Amend Article 127 to increase working days of provincial assemblies to 100 days from 70 days.
Amend Articles 153 and 154 to provide for the Council of Common Interests to consist of the prime minister, provincial chief ministers and three members from the federal government to be nominated by the prime minister, have a permanent secretariat and meet at least once in 90 days.
Amend Article 157 to bind the federal government to consult a province’s government before deciding on the construction of a hydro-electric power station there.
Amend Article 160 to provide for the share of provinces in each NFC award not being less than given them in the previous award.
Amend Article 167 to authorise provinces to raise domestic and international loans or give guarantees on the security of the provincial consolidated fund within limits and conditions specified by the National Economic Council.
Amend Articles 168 and 171 to set auditor-general’s tenure at four years and to provide that the auditor-general’s reports will come to both houses of parliament.
Amend Article 175 to provide that, subject to existing commitments, mineral and oil and natural gas within a province or its adjacent territorial waters “shall vest jointly and equally in that province and the federal government”.
New article 175A to provide for the constitution of a seven-member judicial commission — for naming judges for appointment to superior courts to be confirmed by a parliamentary committee — consisting of the chief justice (chairman) and two senior-most judges of the Supreme court, a former chief justice or judge of the same court to be nominated by the chief justice, federal minister for law and justice, the attorney-general and a senior advocate of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Pakistan Bar Council for two years.
Amend Article 213 to provide for the prime minister to send, in consultation with the leader of opposition in the National Assembly, three names to a parliamentary committee for confirmation of one of them as the chief election commissioner and in case of difference, both of them to send separate lists.
Amend Article 232 to provide for declaration of emergency after a resolution passed by the assembly of that province and that if the president declares emergency “on his own”, the proclamation to be presented before both houses of parliament for approval within 10 days.
Amend Article 242 to provide for appointment of the chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission by the president on the advice of the prime minister and of the chairman of a provincial commission by the governor concerned on chief minister’s advice.
New article 243 to provide for appointment of chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee and chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force by the president on the advice of the prime minister.
The two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament will be taking up for discussion on April 5,2010, the 18th Constitution Amendment Bill, as recommended by an all-party constitutional review committee. It has to be approved by a two-thirds majority by the two Houses and the provincial Assemblies before it comes into effect. Salient points of the Bill as extracted from the “Dawn” of April 3,2010, are annexed.
2. The Bill seeks to amend a number of provisions of the Constitution in order to remove or rectify various distortions in the 1973 Constitution, which was brought in by the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto when the was the Prime Minister till he was overthrown in 1977, arrested and got executed by Gen.Zia-ul-Haq. These amendments, in effect, will restore the powers of the Prime Minister as they were intended to be by Z.A.Bhutto under the 1973 Constitution and reverse the process of strengthening the position of the President at the expense of that of the Prime Minister by successive military dictators in order to impose their will on the civilian Prime Ministers whom they inducted into power in order to give a civilian façade to the military dictatorship.
3. A new article 90 in the Bill seeks to restore the authority of the Prime Minister by providing for the exercise of the executive authority of the federation “in the name of the president by the federal government consisting of the prime minister and federal ministers, which shall act through the prime minister, who shall be the chief executive of the federation”. Thus, all executive powers will be exercised by the Prime Minister in the name of the President. According to the amendment, the President would continue to be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but “the President shall, on advice of the Prime Minister” appoint the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three services chiefs. The President will not have any discretionary powers to decide who will head the Armed Forces.
4. How effective will be the exercise by the Prime Minister of the power to recommend who should head the Armed Forces would depend upon how willingly the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) goes along with the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif, as Prime Minister, had similar powers in 1999, but those powers could not protect him from the wrath of the Army in October,1999, when he advised the then President Mohammad Rafique Tarar to dismiss Gen.Pervez Musharraf as the COAS and appoint in his place Lt.Gen.Ziauddin, the then Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as the COAS. Tarar issued the orders when Musharraf had not yet returned to Pakistan after a visit to Sri Lanka. A group of Lts.General loyal to Musharraf and opposed to Ziauddin, an enginner, taking over as the COAS, refused to comply with the orders of the President issued on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. They dismissed and arrested both the Prime Minister and the ISI chief and paved the way for Musharraf to take over as the Chief Executive on his return to Karachi from Colombo. The judiciary endorsed their action under the so-called doctrine of necessity.
5. Thus, what has always determined the course of democracy in Pakistan is not what is written in the Constitution, but what the Army thought of the actions and decisions of the President and the Prime Minister. When it was unhappy with their actions and decisions, the Army has bulldozed its way into intervention to seize power irrespective of the Constitution. Constitutional provisions and laws have been allowed by the Army to operate only so long as they suited the Army.
6. Since the 1973 Constitution came into force, the Army has intervened twice directly and thrice indirectly. The direct interventions were in 1977 when Z.A.Bhutto was arrested, got tried and executed by Zia and in 1999 when Nawaz Sharif was arrested, tried and banished to Saudi Arabia by Musharraf.
7. The indirect interventions were in 1990 when the Army instigated the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dismiss Benazir Bhutto, in 1993 when the Army instigated Ghulam Ishaq Khan to have Nawz eased out and in 1996 when the Army instigated the then President Farooq Leghari to dismiss Benazir. Pakistan’s political leaders paved the way for the politicization of the Army by inciting it to act against their political opponents whom they were not able to confront politically. Thus, Nawaz incited the Army and the President to act against Benazir in 1990 and 1996 and Benazir incited them to have Nawaz eased out in 1993. The Pakistan Army might not have become politically as interventionist as it has been but for the country’s opportunistic politicians who had no qualms in encouraging the Army to intervene when it suited their partisan political interests.
8. The new Constitution Amendment Bill seeks to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to intervene in future directly or indirectly. To rule out direct military intervention, the Bill seeks to amend Article 6 of the Constitution to include suspension of the Constitution and putting it in abeyance among acts of high treason which no court shall validate. Zia and Musharraf were able to intervene directly, dismiss an elected Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly because there was no provision in the Constitution against it and a compliant judiciary validated their actions post-facto.
9. Theoretically, this cannot happen now and the Army cannot intervene directly. But, what would happen if an Army chief not only dismisses the Prime Minister and dissolves the National Assembly, but also suspends or abrogates the Constitution?
10. The Amendment seeks to rule out indirect intervention by the Army through the President by abolishing the powers of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly except when the Prime Minister loses the confidence of the National Assembly and no other person enjoys the confidence of the Assembly to form a new Government. The power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and to dissolve the National Assembly was introduced by Zia before he ordered elections in 1985 and inducted Mohammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister. He dismissed Junejo under this power and dissolved the National Assembly in 1988 due to differences with Junejo over the Afghan policy and the latter’s insistence on releasing to the public the report of the committee which had enquired into the explosions at the Ojehri camp of the Army in which the arms and ammunition, including Stinger missiles, given by the US to the ISI for issue to the Afghan Mujahideen were stored. The explosions took place when a US team was to inspect the stocks following allegations of misuse of the stocks by the ISI and diversion of some of the missiles to Iran.
11. The power to dismiss was retained by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Leghari, but Nawaz got it abolished when his party secured a two-thirds majority in the 1996 elections. Musharraf re-introduced it. He used to argue that the Army was forced to intervene directly in 1977 and 1999 because the Constitution did not provide any way of dealing with an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister, who managed to retain his support in the National Assembly. He strongly argued in favour of retaining the power of the President to dismiss an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister, but only on the recommendation of the National Security Council, which would be chaired by the President.
12. Now, this power is being sought to be abolished without providing a safety valve for action against an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister, who retains the confidence of the National Assembly. In other democracies, in similar situations, the pressure of political and public opinion acts as a safety valve. Only in the case of the arbitrary dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury by Musharraf did political and public opinion assert itself. Otherwise, Pakistan does not have a history of such assertion.
13. When the Army directly intervened and dismissed an arbitrary and unpopular Z.A.Bhutto in 1977 and an equally arbitrary and unpopular Nawaz in 1999, a helpless public opinion hailed the Army’s actions as deliverance The absence of a safety valve against an arbitrary and unpopular Prime Minister could again lead to the Army’s intervention in future with the support of the public. In Pakistan, the romanticisation of democratic traditions is confined to the elite. For the common man, the Army and the political class are equally evil. When caught between a looming military dictatorship and an arbitrary political ruler, they choose whoever can provide them immediate relief. Public memory in Pakistan and about Pakistan is short. We tend to forget how the people of Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) celebrated in 1977 when the Army threw out Z.A.Bhutto and how people all over Pakistan celebrated in 1999 when the Army threw out Nawaz and installed Musharraf as the ruler.
14. All lovers of democracy should welcome the Constitutional Amendment despite its imperfections. It would definitely strengthen the chances of the revival of democracy in Pakistan provided the political parties and the Army play the game according to the new rules. Even if one assumes that the political leaders have learnt their lessons and will now play the game according to the amended Constitution, will the Army do so? The Army thinks that it knows better than the political class what is good for the country. For the last 60 years or so, the Army has convinced itself that it has a legitimate political role to play---direct or indirect--- and is determined to play it should circumstances warrant it-----Constitution or no Constitution.
15. Look at Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the COAS. When he took over as the COAS, he said the Army’s place was in the barracks and withdrew all army officers exercising non-military functions. He has again come out of the barracks and has been playing an increasingly active and assertive role in decision-making----whether it be in respect of national security or foreign policy or relations with India. So long as the Army’s mindset that it is not only the defender of national security from external and internal threats, but also the guardian of the interests of the people persists, democracy in Pakistan will continue to be on the sufferance of the Army. The US cannot escape its share of the responsibility for the persistence of this mindset and for the repeated failures of democratic experiments in Pakistan. Kayani would not have acquired the kind of image that he has acquired without the blessings of the US. ( 4-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
SALIENT POINTS OF THE CONSTITUTION (18TH) AMENDMENT BILL ( as reported by the “Dawn” )
Here are the main features of the amendments.
Repeal the Legal Framework Order of 2002, along with its amendments, as having been issued without lawful authority, as well as the 17th Amendment of 2003 based on it.
Amend Article 1 to rename the NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Amend Article 6 to include suspension of the Constitution and putting it in abeyance among acts of high treason which no court will validate.
New article 10A to confer right to fair trial.
New article 19A to give every citizen the right to access to information in all matters of public importance.
Article 25A to make the state provide free and compulsory education to all children aged five to 16 years.
President to act on the prime minister’s advice to dissolve the National Assembly, set a date for the general election and appoint a caretaker government.
Repeal Article 58(2)B empowering the president to dissolve the National Assembly.
Amend Article 59 to increase Senate seats to 104 from the present 100 with one representing non-Muslim minorities from each province.
Amend Article 61 to increase working days of Senate in a parliamentary year to 110 from 90.
Amend Article 70 and omit Article 71 to do away with provisions for the constitution of a mediation committee in case of difference between the two houses on a bill and revert to calling a joint sitting of parliament in such an event.
Amend Article 89 to bar promulgation of an ordinance when either of the two houses is in session, rather than only the National Assembly, and restrict re-promulgation to only one time and that too in compliance with a resolution of either house.
New article 90 to substitute previous one to provide for exercise of the executive authority of the federation “in the name of the president by the federal government consisting of the prime minister and federal ministers, which shall act through the prime minister, who shall be the chief executive of the federation”. Abolish the concurrent legislative list and some subjects in the federal list 1 included in federal list.
Amend Article 92 to restrict the strength of the federal cabinet, after the next election, to 11 per cent of total members of parliament and of the provincial cabinets to 15 members or 11 per cent of an assembly, whichever is higher, and of advisers of the prime minister or chief minister to a maximum of five.
Amend Article 101 to provide for a provincial governor to be the resident and voter of the same province.
Amend Article 104 to provide for a speaker of a provincial assembly to be acting governor.
Amend Article 127 to increase working days of provincial assemblies to 100 days from 70 days.
Amend Articles 153 and 154 to provide for the Council of Common Interests to consist of the prime minister, provincial chief ministers and three members from the federal government to be nominated by the prime minister, have a permanent secretariat and meet at least once in 90 days.
Amend Article 157 to bind the federal government to consult a province’s government before deciding on the construction of a hydro-electric power station there.
Amend Article 160 to provide for the share of provinces in each NFC award not being less than given them in the previous award.
Amend Article 167 to authorise provinces to raise domestic and international loans or give guarantees on the security of the provincial consolidated fund within limits and conditions specified by the National Economic Council.
Amend Articles 168 and 171 to set auditor-general’s tenure at four years and to provide that the auditor-general’s reports will come to both houses of parliament.
Amend Article 175 to provide that, subject to existing commitments, mineral and oil and natural gas within a province or its adjacent territorial waters “shall vest jointly and equally in that province and the federal government”.
New article 175A to provide for the constitution of a seven-member judicial commission — for naming judges for appointment to superior courts to be confirmed by a parliamentary committee — consisting of the chief justice (chairman) and two senior-most judges of the Supreme court, a former chief justice or judge of the same court to be nominated by the chief justice, federal minister for law and justice, the attorney-general and a senior advocate of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Pakistan Bar Council for two years.
Amend Article 213 to provide for the prime minister to send, in consultation with the leader of opposition in the National Assembly, three names to a parliamentary committee for confirmation of one of them as the chief election commissioner and in case of difference, both of them to send separate lists.
Amend Article 232 to provide for declaration of emergency after a resolution passed by the assembly of that province and that if the president declares emergency “on his own”, the proclamation to be presented before both houses of parliament for approval within 10 days.
Amend Article 242 to provide for appointment of the chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission by the president on the advice of the prime minister and of the chairman of a provincial commission by the governor concerned on chief minister’s advice.
New article 243 to provide for appointment of chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee and chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force by the president on the advice of the prime minister.
Saturday, April 3, 2010
INDIA: CAUGHT BETWEEN CHINA & THE DEEP SEA
B. RAMAN
On April 1,2010, India and China embarked on a six-month programme to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. S.M.Krishna, the Indian Foreign Minister, is visiting China for four days from April 5 to join the celebrations.
2. Forgotten---at least for the time being--- are the suspicions, distrust and harsh words of last year over the visits of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh to India’s Arunachal Pradesh State on the Chinese border in the North-East to campaign for local candidates in the elections and of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh at the invitation of the local people. China claims Arunachal Pradesh as its territory and calls it Southern Tibet. It wants India to hand over to China under the border negotiations under way without progress at least Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh.
3.The Chinese have a long memory. They have not forgotten that one of the old Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang and that the present His Holiness fled from Tibet into India in 1959 across the border in the Tawang area. They have made it clear that there will be no border agreement unless India transfers at least Tawang to China. That would mean the exodus of the Indian population from the territory handed over to China. No Indian Government, however popular, may be able to sell such a transfer favourable to the Chinese to the Indian Parliament and people.
4.2009 was full of alarming reports about the Chinese further strengthening their military infrastructure in Tibet and Chinese military patrols repeatedly intruding into Indian territory. Faced with opposition criticism of its perceived inaction against the growing trans-border assertiveness of China, the Government of India pressed ahead with an already ongoing programme for strengthening its military infrastructure in the Indian territory. India is many years behind China in developing its infrastructure in the border areas.
5.2009 also saw non-governmental Chinese analysts discussing in seemingly unofficial web sites and blogs the options available to China for teaching India a lesson should it become necessary. A repeat of the humiliating defeat of 1962 was one such option discussed. Taking advantage of the various separatist movements in India in an attempt to balkanize the country was another. An article on possible Indian balkanization by an unknown and insignificant Chinese analyst added to the already strong Indian suspicions of China.
6.China was active and assertive not only in the border areas. It has been equally so right around India’s periphery. Taking advantage of the suspicions and distrust of India in the other States of the South Asian region, China, which is not a South Asian power, has acquired a growing South Asian presence.
7.It continues to help Pakistan in further strengthening its nuclear and missile capabilities which are directed against India. After having completed the construction of the Gwadar commercial port on the Baloch coast, it has promised to develop it further into a modern naval base which would be available for use to the Chinese Navy too.
8.It won the gratitude of Sri Lanka by supplying it arms and ammunition to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and is embarked on the expansion of the Hambantota commercial port, which might one day be developed into a naval base. A grateful Sri Lanka has given a block for gas exploration to a Chinese company without inviting bids. India was given a block for exploration without bids and China was treated on par with India.
9.There are as many Chinese tourists visiting the Maldives as Indian and a Chinese bank has been allowed to operate in the Maldives to meet the foreign exchange needs of the Chinese tourists.
10.In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China in March, an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.
11.At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar have sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.
12.Sheikh Hasina also discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed.
13.In Nepal, China is looking for a road link to connect Nepalese roads with those in Tibet and for an extension of the railway line from Lhasa to Nepal.
14.Thus, the Chinese have been developing their infrastructure of potential military significance around India’s periphery. The Chinese think and plan long-term. Indian response is ad hoc. Just as New Delhi woke up late to the likely threats by land from the North, one realizes belatedly that the threats are from the South, East and West as well.
15.Whatever limited influence India has in South Asia is in danger of being eroded by the Chinese inroads. India is yet to work out a comprehensive response to it. All the sweet words of the 60th anniversary cannot hide this harsh reality. ( 3-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
On April 1,2010, India and China embarked on a six-month programme to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. S.M.Krishna, the Indian Foreign Minister, is visiting China for four days from April 5 to join the celebrations.
2. Forgotten---at least for the time being--- are the suspicions, distrust and harsh words of last year over the visits of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh to India’s Arunachal Pradesh State on the Chinese border in the North-East to campaign for local candidates in the elections and of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh at the invitation of the local people. China claims Arunachal Pradesh as its territory and calls it Southern Tibet. It wants India to hand over to China under the border negotiations under way without progress at least Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh.
3.The Chinese have a long memory. They have not forgotten that one of the old Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang and that the present His Holiness fled from Tibet into India in 1959 across the border in the Tawang area. They have made it clear that there will be no border agreement unless India transfers at least Tawang to China. That would mean the exodus of the Indian population from the territory handed over to China. No Indian Government, however popular, may be able to sell such a transfer favourable to the Chinese to the Indian Parliament and people.
4.2009 was full of alarming reports about the Chinese further strengthening their military infrastructure in Tibet and Chinese military patrols repeatedly intruding into Indian territory. Faced with opposition criticism of its perceived inaction against the growing trans-border assertiveness of China, the Government of India pressed ahead with an already ongoing programme for strengthening its military infrastructure in the Indian territory. India is many years behind China in developing its infrastructure in the border areas.
5.2009 also saw non-governmental Chinese analysts discussing in seemingly unofficial web sites and blogs the options available to China for teaching India a lesson should it become necessary. A repeat of the humiliating defeat of 1962 was one such option discussed. Taking advantage of the various separatist movements in India in an attempt to balkanize the country was another. An article on possible Indian balkanization by an unknown and insignificant Chinese analyst added to the already strong Indian suspicions of China.
6.China was active and assertive not only in the border areas. It has been equally so right around India’s periphery. Taking advantage of the suspicions and distrust of India in the other States of the South Asian region, China, which is not a South Asian power, has acquired a growing South Asian presence.
7.It continues to help Pakistan in further strengthening its nuclear and missile capabilities which are directed against India. After having completed the construction of the Gwadar commercial port on the Baloch coast, it has promised to develop it further into a modern naval base which would be available for use to the Chinese Navy too.
8.It won the gratitude of Sri Lanka by supplying it arms and ammunition to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and is embarked on the expansion of the Hambantota commercial port, which might one day be developed into a naval base. A grateful Sri Lanka has given a block for gas exploration to a Chinese company without inviting bids. India was given a block for exploration without bids and China was treated on par with India.
9.There are as many Chinese tourists visiting the Maldives as Indian and a Chinese bank has been allowed to operate in the Maldives to meet the foreign exchange needs of the Chinese tourists.
10.In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China in March, an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.
11.At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar have sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.
12.Sheikh Hasina also discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed.
13.In Nepal, China is looking for a road link to connect Nepalese roads with those in Tibet and for an extension of the railway line from Lhasa to Nepal.
14.Thus, the Chinese have been developing their infrastructure of potential military significance around India’s periphery. The Chinese think and plan long-term. Indian response is ad hoc. Just as New Delhi woke up late to the likely threats by land from the North, one realizes belatedly that the threats are from the South, East and West as well.
15.Whatever limited influence India has in South Asia is in danger of being eroded by the Chinese inroads. India is yet to work out a comprehensive response to it. All the sweet words of the 60th anniversary cannot hide this harsh reality. ( 3-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, April 2, 2010
WAS JIHAD JANE A RECRUIT OF LASHKAR-E-TOIBA?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 638
B.RAMAN
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was “desperate to do something somehow to help” suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission “till I achieve it or die trying,” according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html ( 3-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The case of Colleen La Rose also known as Jihad Jane and Fatima La Rose, who was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a fortnight after the arrest of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in October,2009, and indicted on March 4,2010, on a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn a cartoon of Prophet Mohammad in his paper, has not received in India the attention it deserves.
2. Colleen La Rose, a 46-year-old blonde from the Philadelphia area, where Headley used to live for some years before shifting to Chicago, had a troubled personal life. She was a volunteer for jihad who was recruited by an unidentified person in South Asia through the Internet and given the task of killing the Swedish cartoonist, just as Ilyas Kashmiri initially tasked Headley through the Internet to kill the Danish cartoonist, who had published cartoons of the Prophet in a Danish paper in 2005. Headley subsequently met Ilyas in North Waziristan. There is so far no indication that Jihad Jane had met her South Asian recruit to whom she got engaged without ever having met him.
3. Whoever initially recruited Headley and Jihad Jane seems to have done so for two reasons. Firstly, both of them had typical physical features of a White American. They did not look like Muslims and could , therefore, easily evade profiling. Headley looked a typical White despite his Pakistani origin. Jihad Jane is a typical White with no mixed blood. Secondly, both of them are US nationals with valid US passports with which they could travel easily without facing difficulties in obtaining visas and in going through immigration controls.
4. Both of them had been given double tasks. Headley was given the tasks of facilitating the operations of the LET in India and attacking the office of the Danish paper in Copenhagen with the help of sleeper cells in Europe to which Ilyas had given introduction. Headley had played an active role in helping the LET in carrying out the terrorist strikes in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008.Jihad Jane had the dual task of killing the Swedish cartoonist with the help of Ireland-based contacts in Europe and organising acts of terrorism in South Asia. In the evidence against her, the reference is to South Asia and not specifically to India.
5. The FBI has revealed the nationalities of her seven accomplices who were picked up in Ireland, but not their identifying particulars.Of the seven arrested in Ireland two are Algerians, two Libyans, a Palestinian, a Croatian, and an American woman married to one of the two arrested Algerians. The FBI documents available so far do not say anything about her South Asian fiancee. They are silent even about his nationality. He has been described as a man who claimed that he knew how to work with bombs and explosives.
6.In June 2008, Jihad Jane had posted a comment on YouTube saying she was “desperate to do something somehow to help” suffering Muslims. According to the FBI indictment, she appears to have been contacted by the jihadis thereafter. The indictment charges that she received a direct order to kill a Swedish resident. She traveled to Sweden and tracked the target with the intent of carrying out the murder. The FBI identified the target as cartoonist Lars Vilks.In an e-mail message to a co-conspirator, she wrote that she would pursue her mission “till I achieve it or die trying,” according to the indictment.The indictment accuses her of agreeing, in March 2009, to marry a co-conspirator from a South Asian country who was trying to obtain residency in Europe.He allegedly urged her to go to Sweden, find the Swedish man "and kill him". The indictment claims she tried to raise money over the internet, lure others to her cause, and lied to FBI investigators.
7. According to US media reports, she is also linked to an online organization Revolutionmuslim.com -- where she was a subscriber, again using the name Jihad Jane. The site is run by an American Muslim, who had made the following posting after she was indicted: "Sisters -- please consider sending her [LaRose] a message of support and hope and let's remind her she isn't alone. It's likely she's the only Muslimah there. As always, use discretion when writing, don't ask pointed questions, and of course don't say anything that could create problems for her or yourselves."
8.She has been accused not only of conspiring to murder the cartoonist, but also of allegedly trying to recruit women with Western passports to marry fellow violent jihadists and of raising money for terrorist causes.
9.The US Department of Justice has issued the following statement regarding her indictment:
"The indictment charges that LaRose (an American citizen born in 1963 who resides in Montgomery County, Pa.) and five unindicted co-conspirators (located in South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States) recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.
"The indictment further charges that LaRose and her unindicted co-conspirators used the Internet to establish relationships with one another and to communicate regarding their plans, which included martyring themselves, soliciting funds for terrorists, soliciting passports and avoiding travel restrictions (through the collection of passports and through marriage) in order to wage violent jihad. The indictment further charges that LaRose stole another individual’s U.S. passport and transferred or attempted to transfer it in an effort to facilitate an act of international terrorism.
"In addition, according to the indictment, LaRose received a direct order to kill a citizen and resident of Sweden, and to do so in a way that would frighten "the whole Kufar [non-believer] world." The indictment further charges that LaRose agreed to carry out her murder assignment, and that she and her co-conspirators discussed that her appearance and American citizenship would help her blend in while carrying out her plans. According to the indictment, LaRose traveled to Europe and tracked the intended target online in an effort to complete her task."
10.Available details regading the indictment do not identify the South Asian "with knowledge of bombs and explosives" with whom she fell in love through the Internet and who recruited her for acts of terrorism in Sweden and South Asia, but the available particulars of the modus operandi of recruiting and using non-Muslim looking Whites for terrorist strikes point the needle of suspicion at the LET.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 28,2010, titled "Female Headleys in Al Qaeda?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3631.html ( 3-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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