INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--- PAPER NO. 633
B.RAMAN
Now that David Coleman Headley of the ChIcago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has pleaded guilty to the charges against him regarding the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist strikes and the planned attempt to attack the offices of a Danish paper, which published cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005, as part of a plea bargain with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it is settled that he will not be extradited to India and that India will not be allowed to interrogate to him.
2.As a result of the plea bargain, India no longer has any locus standi in the eyes of the US law in the case. All one can hope for is that the FBI will continue to share with India whatever additional information it gets from him till he is sentenced and starts his penalty. Till then, the FBI can continue interrogating him. One can reasonably expect that the FBI will share with India whatever additional details they get from him so long as those details do not implicate Pakistan. The FBI's first priority is to have the LET held accountable for the Mumbai strikes due to its emergence as a global jihadi organisation on par with Al Qaeda. Its second priority is to see that Pakistan is not held accountable and to conceal from India any information which links the State of Pakistan with Headley.
3. What next? What are the options before India? It has been a shrewd move on the part of the Home Ministry of the Government of India to have sought access to the former wife of Headley. According to media reports, she had also visited India----sometimes with him, sometimes separately. The information at her disposal will be relevant to the case. It is doubtful whether the FBI will respond positively to the request of the Govt. of India because of a fear that she might talk to the Indian interrogators about the role of Pakistan in the terrorist attack and the links of Headley with the Inter-Services I(ntelligence (ISI). If the FBI assists us to have access to his wife, it could help in diluting some of the doubts in the minds of large sections of the India public about its bona fides in the case. If the FBI drags its feet, one's suspicions regarding the FBI's attempt to protect the Pakistani State from the legal consequences of 26/11 will be strengthened.
4. There is one other important option available to India--- that is, to seek access to Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the co-conspirator against whom a separate case has been filed. He is equally knowledgeable about the 26/11 terrorist strikes.Whereas Headley was not in India immediately before the strikes, Rana was. According to the second report against Rana filed by the FBI in the court, he was in India in the third week of November, 2008. He flew from Mumbai to Dubai on a flight of the Emirates Airlines on November 21, 2008. He flew from Dubai to China by the same Airlines on November, 24, 2008, and from there returned to Chicago via Seoul on November 26, 2008, by the Asiana Airlines. Rana had admitted to the FBI that during his visit to Dubai from November 21 to 24, 2008, he met Maj. (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha who was in touch with Ilyas Kashmiri on behalf of Headley and that he came to know from Pasha about the impending terrorist attacks by the LET in Mumbai. It is clear from the papers filed by the FBI in the court that Rana personally knew Maj (retd) Abdur Rehman of the 313 Brigade and an unidentified office-bearer of the LET. It is also clear that Rana was fully aware at least on September 7, 2009, if not earlier, of the LET's plans for future attacks on four targets in India. The FBI has produced in court extracts from a clandestinely recorded conversation between Headley and Rana in a car regarding future attacks in India.
5.The interrogation of Rana by the Indian investigators is thus as important as the interrogation of Headley. Whereas Headley has no relatives in India, Rana reportedly has relatives in India through his wife's family. If India can have independent access to him, it can request his Indian relatives to persuade him to talk to us. Normally, certain constraints which operated in the case of Headley should not operate in the case of Rana. Firstly, Headley is an Americam citizen whereas Rana is a Canadian citizen resident in Chicago. Secondly, at least since 1998, Headley was an agent of the US, but there has been no information to indicate any links between Rana and the US intelligence. Fears of likely exposure of his links with the US intelligence should not operate.
6. India should now press the FBI for independent access to Rana. The FBI may respond in one of the following ways:
Agree to the access. This will restore the damaged Indian confidence in the bona fides of the FBI; or
Drag its feet by claiming that since an indictment has already been filed against him, a foreign investigation agency cannot be allowed to question him independently ;or
Ask the Canadian intelligence to object to the Indian request.
7. Whatever be the ultimate response of the FBI to our request to have access to Rana, our public and leaders will know to what extent the Obama Administration is sincere in its professed desire to co-operate with India in counter-terrorism. One notices the Obama Administration following exactly the same stance as the Bill Clinton Administration did after the serial explosions in Mumbai in March 1993--- namely, extend forensic co-operation to India and share intelligence about the perpetrators, but at the same time protect the State of Pakistan from the legal consequences of its involvement in terrorism in India.
8. Compare the feet-dragging by the Obama Administration with the refreshing attitude of the George Bush Administration after the terrorist attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008. It was reported that the Bush Administration took the initiative in sharing with India whatever intelligence it was able to gather about the role of the State of Pakistan in the attack. (19-3-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
HEADLEY & 26/11: US PLAYS DIRTY ON INDIA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.632
B.RAMAN
Ever since the case of David Coleman Headley broke out in October,2009, I have been repeatedly pointing out the following in my articles and TV interviews:
Headley was a quadruple agent, who was working for the USA's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba ( LET).
The FBI has already reached a plea bargain with him in order to avoid any formal production of evidence against him in the court which might result in details regarding his links with the US intelligence coming out.
The FBI would not extradite him to India and woulde not allow the Indian agencies to have access to him in order to prevent the Indian agencies from questioning him about his links with the US intelligence on the one side and with the Pakistani intelligence on the other.
2. Extracts from two articles on this subject written by me on December 12 and 16,2009, are annexed. What I have been writing and what I have been saying for the last five months has proved correct. The media has reported on the morning of March 18,2010, that Headley was going to plead guilty to some charges as part of a plea bargain process entered into by him with the FBI. What does it mean? Firstly, there will be no formal introduction of the evidence against him and no cross-examination. Secondly, the relatives of the 166 innocent persons killed in the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist strikes cannot seek the permission of the court to be represented by a lawyer to question him on the details of his involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. Thirdly, the details of his links with the US intelligence community will be covered up. Fourthly, the two Pakistani nationals living in Pakistan----Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade, who had threatened terrorist strikes in India during the major sports events of this year, and Maj. (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha of the Pakistan Army, who have been cited as co-accused in the FBI case against Headley because of their role as his handling officers, will escape prosecution.
3. Unless one is naive beyond redemption, it was clear from the beginning that the Obama Administration and its FBI were trying frantically to prevent the truth regarding Headley from coming out. I wrote on December 12,2009: "Senior officials of the White House and the FBI have been taking close and unusual interest in the investigation and prosecution. The Director of the FBI himself was reported to have visited Chicago before Headley was produced before the court. Many in India have analysed this as indicative of the close interest taken by President Obama in counter-terrorism co-operation with India. A more plausible explanation is that this is indicative of the concerns in the White House and the FBI that if the prosecution is not properly handled, the case could result in a bombshell if it emerges that one of the active conspirators of 26/11 was an agent of a US agency. This could lead to suits for heavy damages against the US Government from the relatives of the Americans, Israelis and other foreigners killed."
4. Headley will be protected. The FBI will be protected. The US administration will be protected. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will be protected. The Pakistani Government and its Army will be protected.
5. Only we poor Indians will remain unprotected because the Govt. of India headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh cannot protect us.
6. What naivete, Mr.Prime Minister! What naivete!( 18-3-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE I
( Extracts from my article of December 12,2009, titled "FBI Avoiding Focus on Headley’s Links With Narcotics Control Agency" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3545.html )
Sections of the US media have pointed out that the fact that the report filed against him by the FBI in the court on December 7 was called a Criminal Information Report and not an indictment indicates that the FBI has already reached a plea bargain deal with him under which as a quid pro quo for his admitting some charges when the trial formally commences next month, the FBI will not press other charges against him. His admitting some charges and the FBI dropping other charges will obviate the need for an elaborate trial with the introduction of detailed evidence.
This would prevent any deliberate or inadvertent disclosure by him of his work in the Af-Pak region for the DEA, which works in close co-operation with its Pakistani counterpart. The two have many joint operations.
It is very likely that the US will not allow his independent interrogation by Indian investigators and that it will not agree to his extradition to India as that might result in the Indian authorities coming to know not only of his contacts with Pakistani agencies, but also with the DEA.
Senior officials of the White House and the FBI have been taking close and unusual interest in the investigation and prosecution. The Director of the FBI himself was reported to have visited Chicago before Headley was produced before the court. Many in India have analysed this as indicative of the close interest taken by President Obama in counter-terrorism co-operation with India. A more plausible explanation is that this is indicative of the concerns in the White House and the FBI that if the prosecution is not properly handled, the case could result in a bombshell if it emerges that one of the active conspirators of 26/11 was an agent of a US agency. This could lead to suits for heavy damages against the US Government from the relatives of the Americans, Israelis and other foreigners killed.
ANNEXURE II
( Extracts from my article of December 16,2009, titled " "Headley: A Quadruple Agent" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3552.html )
By studying these extracts submitted by the FBI along with other FBI documents submitted by the FBI to the court and US media reports about Headley’s links with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),one can make the following assessment:
a. Headley was not a double agent, but a quadruple agent. He initially started working for the DEA around 1998. Even if one presumes that initially the FBI and the CIA were not aware of this, they should have become aware of this by 2004 when the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with a common charter and a common data-base was set up by the Bush Administration under the newly-created post of Director National Intelligence (DNI).
b. He started working for the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) sometime in 2005. It is not clear whether he joined the LET at his own instance or at the instance of the FBI or the CIA or both in order to penetrate it. He was already visiting Pakistan at the instance of the DEA since 1998. Since 2006, he started visiting India too. The DEA and the FBI would have been aware of his visits since every time a conscious agent of an agency travels abroad his passport is scrutinized by the controlling agency on his return. This is a security precaution followed by all intelligence agencies.
c. He started working for the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri towards the end of 2008 and agreed to visit Copenhagen to collect operational information for a possible terrorist attack. This was probably not at the instance of the FBI, which came to know accidentally of Headley volunteering himself to undertake a task in Copenhagen while monitoring the chat room of the old students of the Army Cadet School at Hasan Abdal. Both Headley and Rana studied in the school. The FBI put Headley under electronic surveillance after obtaining orders of a relevant court.
d. While doing the electronic surveillance to monitor his involvement in the Northern or Copenhagen or Micky Mouse project for the 313 Brigade, the FBI came across a series of E-mail intercepts in July and August, 2009, which showed that Headley had helped the LET in preparing itself for the 26/11 terrorist strikes and had agreed to help the LET in carrying out another terrorist strike in India for which he was to visit India. The FBI started monitoring the meetings and conversations of Headley and Rana and recorded their conversation of September 7, 2009, in a car which clearly indicated their involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strike.
e. The communications between Headley and his LET handler intercepted by the FBI in July and August also indicated that he was planning to visit India in October to prepare the ground for another terrorist strike. The FBI had two options---either allow him to go to India, alert the Indian intelligence and keep him under surveillance or arrest him before he left for Pakistan and India. If he had been allowed to go to India, watched there and arrested by the Indian intelligence, his past contacts with the US agencies and his role in 26/11 would have come to the notice of the Indian authorities. There is no evidence so far to show that till July 2009 the FBI was aware of his active role in 26/11. They were probably only aware of his frequent visits to Pakistan and India on behalf of the DEA operations. The FBI arrested him when he was about to leave for Pakistan and India on October 3.
B.RAMAN
Ever since the case of David Coleman Headley broke out in October,2009, I have been repeatedly pointing out the following in my articles and TV interviews:
Headley was a quadruple agent, who was working for the USA's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba ( LET).
The FBI has already reached a plea bargain with him in order to avoid any formal production of evidence against him in the court which might result in details regarding his links with the US intelligence coming out.
The FBI would not extradite him to India and woulde not allow the Indian agencies to have access to him in order to prevent the Indian agencies from questioning him about his links with the US intelligence on the one side and with the Pakistani intelligence on the other.
2. Extracts from two articles on this subject written by me on December 12 and 16,2009, are annexed. What I have been writing and what I have been saying for the last five months has proved correct. The media has reported on the morning of March 18,2010, that Headley was going to plead guilty to some charges as part of a plea bargain process entered into by him with the FBI. What does it mean? Firstly, there will be no formal introduction of the evidence against him and no cross-examination. Secondly, the relatives of the 166 innocent persons killed in the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist strikes cannot seek the permission of the court to be represented by a lawyer to question him on the details of his involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. Thirdly, the details of his links with the US intelligence community will be covered up. Fourthly, the two Pakistani nationals living in Pakistan----Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade, who had threatened terrorist strikes in India during the major sports events of this year, and Maj. (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha of the Pakistan Army, who have been cited as co-accused in the FBI case against Headley because of their role as his handling officers, will escape prosecution.
3. Unless one is naive beyond redemption, it was clear from the beginning that the Obama Administration and its FBI were trying frantically to prevent the truth regarding Headley from coming out. I wrote on December 12,2009: "Senior officials of the White House and the FBI have been taking close and unusual interest in the investigation and prosecution. The Director of the FBI himself was reported to have visited Chicago before Headley was produced before the court. Many in India have analysed this as indicative of the close interest taken by President Obama in counter-terrorism co-operation with India. A more plausible explanation is that this is indicative of the concerns in the White House and the FBI that if the prosecution is not properly handled, the case could result in a bombshell if it emerges that one of the active conspirators of 26/11 was an agent of a US agency. This could lead to suits for heavy damages against the US Government from the relatives of the Americans, Israelis and other foreigners killed."
4. Headley will be protected. The FBI will be protected. The US administration will be protected. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will be protected. The Pakistani Government and its Army will be protected.
5. Only we poor Indians will remain unprotected because the Govt. of India headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh cannot protect us.
6. What naivete, Mr.Prime Minister! What naivete!( 18-3-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE I
( Extracts from my article of December 12,2009, titled "FBI Avoiding Focus on Headley’s Links With Narcotics Control Agency" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3545.html )
Sections of the US media have pointed out that the fact that the report filed against him by the FBI in the court on December 7 was called a Criminal Information Report and not an indictment indicates that the FBI has already reached a plea bargain deal with him under which as a quid pro quo for his admitting some charges when the trial formally commences next month, the FBI will not press other charges against him. His admitting some charges and the FBI dropping other charges will obviate the need for an elaborate trial with the introduction of detailed evidence.
This would prevent any deliberate or inadvertent disclosure by him of his work in the Af-Pak region for the DEA, which works in close co-operation with its Pakistani counterpart. The two have many joint operations.
It is very likely that the US will not allow his independent interrogation by Indian investigators and that it will not agree to his extradition to India as that might result in the Indian authorities coming to know not only of his contacts with Pakistani agencies, but also with the DEA.
Senior officials of the White House and the FBI have been taking close and unusual interest in the investigation and prosecution. The Director of the FBI himself was reported to have visited Chicago before Headley was produced before the court. Many in India have analysed this as indicative of the close interest taken by President Obama in counter-terrorism co-operation with India. A more plausible explanation is that this is indicative of the concerns in the White House and the FBI that if the prosecution is not properly handled, the case could result in a bombshell if it emerges that one of the active conspirators of 26/11 was an agent of a US agency. This could lead to suits for heavy damages against the US Government from the relatives of the Americans, Israelis and other foreigners killed.
ANNEXURE II
( Extracts from my article of December 16,2009, titled " "Headley: A Quadruple Agent" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3552.html )
By studying these extracts submitted by the FBI along with other FBI documents submitted by the FBI to the court and US media reports about Headley’s links with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),one can make the following assessment:
a. Headley was not a double agent, but a quadruple agent. He initially started working for the DEA around 1998. Even if one presumes that initially the FBI and the CIA were not aware of this, they should have become aware of this by 2004 when the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with a common charter and a common data-base was set up by the Bush Administration under the newly-created post of Director National Intelligence (DNI).
b. He started working for the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) sometime in 2005. It is not clear whether he joined the LET at his own instance or at the instance of the FBI or the CIA or both in order to penetrate it. He was already visiting Pakistan at the instance of the DEA since 1998. Since 2006, he started visiting India too. The DEA and the FBI would have been aware of his visits since every time a conscious agent of an agency travels abroad his passport is scrutinized by the controlling agency on his return. This is a security precaution followed by all intelligence agencies.
c. He started working for the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri towards the end of 2008 and agreed to visit Copenhagen to collect operational information for a possible terrorist attack. This was probably not at the instance of the FBI, which came to know accidentally of Headley volunteering himself to undertake a task in Copenhagen while monitoring the chat room of the old students of the Army Cadet School at Hasan Abdal. Both Headley and Rana studied in the school. The FBI put Headley under electronic surveillance after obtaining orders of a relevant court.
d. While doing the electronic surveillance to monitor his involvement in the Northern or Copenhagen or Micky Mouse project for the 313 Brigade, the FBI came across a series of E-mail intercepts in July and August, 2009, which showed that Headley had helped the LET in preparing itself for the 26/11 terrorist strikes and had agreed to help the LET in carrying out another terrorist strike in India for which he was to visit India. The FBI started monitoring the meetings and conversations of Headley and Rana and recorded their conversation of September 7, 2009, in a car which clearly indicated their involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strike.
e. The communications between Headley and his LET handler intercepted by the FBI in July and August also indicated that he was planning to visit India in October to prepare the ground for another terrorist strike. The FBI had two options---either allow him to go to India, alert the Indian intelligence and keep him under surveillance or arrest him before he left for Pakistan and India. If he had been allowed to go to India, watched there and arrested by the Indian intelligence, his past contacts with the US agencies and his role in 26/11 would have come to the notice of the Indian authorities. There is no evidence so far to show that till July 2009 the FBI was aware of his active role in 26/11. They were probably only aware of his frequent visits to Pakistan and India on behalf of the DEA operations. The FBI arrested him when he was about to leave for Pakistan and India on October 3.
Monday, March 15, 2010
CONTINUING US SOFTNESS TOWARDS THE ISI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 631
B.RAMAN
According to counter-terrorism data for 2009 disseminated by Amir Mir, the Pakistani journalist, through his column in the "News" of March 13,2010, 28 personnel of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were killed by terrorists belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its Punjabi associates through suicide bombers during 2009. A study of the frequent targeted attacks on the ISI would indicate that all these attacks had taken place in the non-tribal areas----mainly in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar.
2. The targeted attacks on Pakistani Army officers by suicide bombers, which caused 102 fatalities during 2009, could be attributed to the Taliban anger over the commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007, in which a large number of Pashtun students, many of them girls, were killed, the subsequent military operations against the TTP and the intensification of the Drone ( pilotless plane) strikes by the US. Even though the Pakistani authorities have been criticising these strikes in public and projecting themselves as helpless in making the US stop them, the TTP and others in Pakistan believe that these strikes have the secret support of the Pakistan Army.
3. Apart from playing the usual role in the collection of intelligence before and during the Lal Masjid raid, the ISI did not play any noticeable role in the commando raid. There are no indicators of Talibani anger against the ISI for its role in the raid. Available intelligence indicates that the Talibani anger against the ISI is mainly because of what the TTP perceives as the ISI's co-operation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its counter-terrorism operations.
4.This co-operation is in the following forms:
Logistic support for the Drone strikes, which are largely operated by the CIA.
Collection of human intelligence for targeting. There has been a steady improvement in the quality and accuracy of the human intelligence available to the CIA and the US military forces deployed in Afghan territory. This improvement could not have been possible through the CIA's efforts alone. The TTP and its Punjabi associates suspect an increasing presence of the CIA in Pakistani territory for joint intelligence collection operations with the ISI.
5. The intensified US intelligence activity relating to Pakistan has resulted in an an increasing flow of intelligence not only about the TTP, but also about the Punjabi Taliban organisations, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). A perusal of the documents filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in a Chicago court against David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana of the Chicago cell of the LET gives an idea of the wealth of intelligence which the FBI has been able to collect regarding their links in Pakistan, including with at least one Army officer.
6. The increasing concerns in the US over the Al Qaeda-like growth of the LET and the threat posed by it not only to India, but also to the security of US nationals and to US interests are the result of the flow of intelligence to the US about the LET from its own sources. While India has reasons to be gratified by the new focus on the LET as equally dangerous as Al Qaeda, it has reasons to be dissatisfied over the continuing reluctance in US policy-making circles to act firmly against the ISI for its use of the LET against India.
7. If the LET has become as dangerous as Al Qaeda as was stated by some US experts before a Congressional hearing last week, it follows that the ISI, the LET's sponsor, has become as dangerous as Al Qaeda. The ISI-LET nexus has become an important factor in the persisting global jihadi threat. What should be of concern is that the global jihadi threat remains as high as before 9/11 with the LET making up for any loss in capabilities suffered by Al Qaeda.
8. This threat will remain high unless the ISI is made to act against the LET. This conclusion has not come out clearly in the Congressional hearing. While the US experts who testified in the Congressional hearing have not hesitated to call a spade a spade while drawing attention to the links between the ISI and the LET, they have not been forthright in calling for action against the ISI.
9. While the FBI has done a thorough job of the investigation into the activities of the Chicago cell of the LET from its side, it has not exercised sufficient pressure on the Pakistani agencies for thoroughly investigating the activities of the Pakistan-based handling officers of Headley and Rana. The FBI has done a lot to satisfy India that it has investigated the activities of the Chicago cell and its role in the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist strike thoroughly and shared the resulting information with the Indian agencies. At the same time, it has not done all that it should have in order to bring to book the Pakistan-based handling officers. Not even a case has been registered in Pakistan against them.
10. The co-operation of the ISI with the CIA in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the fact that the ISI has paid a heavy price for this co-operation have stood in the way of the US exercising pressure on Pakistan to act against the LET as firmly as it has against the TTP. The soft approach of the US towards the ISI with regard to its use of the LET against India continues. Unless India remonstrates strongly against this soft attitude, the Pakistani collusion with the LET will continue. ( 15-3-10)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
According to counter-terrorism data for 2009 disseminated by Amir Mir, the Pakistani journalist, through his column in the "News" of March 13,2010, 28 personnel of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were killed by terrorists belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its Punjabi associates through suicide bombers during 2009. A study of the frequent targeted attacks on the ISI would indicate that all these attacks had taken place in the non-tribal areas----mainly in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar.
2. The targeted attacks on Pakistani Army officers by suicide bombers, which caused 102 fatalities during 2009, could be attributed to the Taliban anger over the commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007, in which a large number of Pashtun students, many of them girls, were killed, the subsequent military operations against the TTP and the intensification of the Drone ( pilotless plane) strikes by the US. Even though the Pakistani authorities have been criticising these strikes in public and projecting themselves as helpless in making the US stop them, the TTP and others in Pakistan believe that these strikes have the secret support of the Pakistan Army.
3. Apart from playing the usual role in the collection of intelligence before and during the Lal Masjid raid, the ISI did not play any noticeable role in the commando raid. There are no indicators of Talibani anger against the ISI for its role in the raid. Available intelligence indicates that the Talibani anger against the ISI is mainly because of what the TTP perceives as the ISI's co-operation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its counter-terrorism operations.
4.This co-operation is in the following forms:
Logistic support for the Drone strikes, which are largely operated by the CIA.
Collection of human intelligence for targeting. There has been a steady improvement in the quality and accuracy of the human intelligence available to the CIA and the US military forces deployed in Afghan territory. This improvement could not have been possible through the CIA's efforts alone. The TTP and its Punjabi associates suspect an increasing presence of the CIA in Pakistani territory for joint intelligence collection operations with the ISI.
5. The intensified US intelligence activity relating to Pakistan has resulted in an an increasing flow of intelligence not only about the TTP, but also about the Punjabi Taliban organisations, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). A perusal of the documents filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in a Chicago court against David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana of the Chicago cell of the LET gives an idea of the wealth of intelligence which the FBI has been able to collect regarding their links in Pakistan, including with at least one Army officer.
6. The increasing concerns in the US over the Al Qaeda-like growth of the LET and the threat posed by it not only to India, but also to the security of US nationals and to US interests are the result of the flow of intelligence to the US about the LET from its own sources. While India has reasons to be gratified by the new focus on the LET as equally dangerous as Al Qaeda, it has reasons to be dissatisfied over the continuing reluctance in US policy-making circles to act firmly against the ISI for its use of the LET against India.
7. If the LET has become as dangerous as Al Qaeda as was stated by some US experts before a Congressional hearing last week, it follows that the ISI, the LET's sponsor, has become as dangerous as Al Qaeda. The ISI-LET nexus has become an important factor in the persisting global jihadi threat. What should be of concern is that the global jihadi threat remains as high as before 9/11 with the LET making up for any loss in capabilities suffered by Al Qaeda.
8. This threat will remain high unless the ISI is made to act against the LET. This conclusion has not come out clearly in the Congressional hearing. While the US experts who testified in the Congressional hearing have not hesitated to call a spade a spade while drawing attention to the links between the ISI and the LET, they have not been forthright in calling for action against the ISI.
9. While the FBI has done a thorough job of the investigation into the activities of the Chicago cell of the LET from its side, it has not exercised sufficient pressure on the Pakistani agencies for thoroughly investigating the activities of the Pakistan-based handling officers of Headley and Rana. The FBI has done a lot to satisfy India that it has investigated the activities of the Chicago cell and its role in the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist strike thoroughly and shared the resulting information with the Indian agencies. At the same time, it has not done all that it should have in order to bring to book the Pakistan-based handling officers. Not even a case has been registered in Pakistan against them.
10. The co-operation of the ISI with the CIA in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the fact that the ISI has paid a heavy price for this co-operation have stood in the way of the US exercising pressure on Pakistan to act against the LET as firmly as it has against the TTP. The soft approach of the US towards the ISI with regard to its use of the LET against India continues. Unless India remonstrates strongly against this soft attitude, the Pakistani collusion with the LET will continue. ( 15-3-10)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, March 13, 2010
PAKISTAN: THE MESSAGE OF THE MINGORA BLAST
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.630
B.RAMAN
Seventeen persons---- including two policemen and one soldier of the Pakistan Army--- were killed in a suicide attack at a checkpoint jointly manned by police and military personnel at Mingora, the principal town (capital) of the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) on March 13,2010.
2. Subsequently, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack and has warned that similar attacks would be launched if US Drone strikes continued in Waziristan. The suicide bomber was reported to have reached the scene of attack in a cycle rickshaw.
3.Such incidents illustrate the difficulty in eliminating terrorism even if the Army succeeds in establishing territorial control. During the last one year, the Pakistan Army and the para-military Frontier Corps have re-established territorial control over the disturbed Malakand Division of the NWFP, of which Swat is a part, and the South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agencies of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Despite this, acts of suicide and other terrorism continue to take place in the Pashtun belt with regular frequency.
4.Suicide terrorism can be eliminated only by weakening the motivating power of terrorist organisations and their leaders. The Drone strikes are necessary for sustained decapitation of the terrorist organisations, but they add to the flow of volunteers for suicide terrorism due to the anger caused by the strikes. The present high level of suicide terrorism---- about 95 since the beginning of 2009, an average of seven per month---- will continue so long as the Drone strikes continue at their present high level, but that is not an argument for reviewing the present policy of intensified Drone strikes---as argued by some US analysts.
5. The Drone strikes must be kept up till the terrorist leadership is decimated beyond replacement and the terrorist organisations are weakened beyond repair. If the Drone strikes are discontinued or reduced, the resulting pause would be exploited by the leadership of these organisations to re-build themselves as the Afghan Taliban did in 2004 and 2005. The present high level of suicide and other terrorism is a price which Pakistan and the US should be prepared to pay tactically for a strategic victory over terrorism. The present high level of terrorism could continue in the Pashtun belt at least for another 18 months if not longer. Better territorial control would not mean better control over terrorism as a phenomenon.
6. A battle against a disrupting phenomenon such as terrorism---suicide or otherwise--- takes a long time to succeed. We had ourselves seen this in our Punjab at the height of Khalistani terrorism. It flared up after the military operation in the Golden Temple of Amritsar in June 1984. It took us another 11 years to bring it under control even though the Khalistanis did not indulge in suicide terrorism and did not have access to the kind of weapons and explosive devices to which the jihadi terrorists of today are having access. (14-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Seventeen persons---- including two policemen and one soldier of the Pakistan Army--- were killed in a suicide attack at a checkpoint jointly manned by police and military personnel at Mingora, the principal town (capital) of the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) on March 13,2010.
2. Subsequently, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack and has warned that similar attacks would be launched if US Drone strikes continued in Waziristan. The suicide bomber was reported to have reached the scene of attack in a cycle rickshaw.
3.Such incidents illustrate the difficulty in eliminating terrorism even if the Army succeeds in establishing territorial control. During the last one year, the Pakistan Army and the para-military Frontier Corps have re-established territorial control over the disturbed Malakand Division of the NWFP, of which Swat is a part, and the South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agencies of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Despite this, acts of suicide and other terrorism continue to take place in the Pashtun belt with regular frequency.
4.Suicide terrorism can be eliminated only by weakening the motivating power of terrorist organisations and their leaders. The Drone strikes are necessary for sustained decapitation of the terrorist organisations, but they add to the flow of volunteers for suicide terrorism due to the anger caused by the strikes. The present high level of suicide terrorism---- about 95 since the beginning of 2009, an average of seven per month---- will continue so long as the Drone strikes continue at their present high level, but that is not an argument for reviewing the present policy of intensified Drone strikes---as argued by some US analysts.
5. The Drone strikes must be kept up till the terrorist leadership is decimated beyond replacement and the terrorist organisations are weakened beyond repair. If the Drone strikes are discontinued or reduced, the resulting pause would be exploited by the leadership of these organisations to re-build themselves as the Afghan Taliban did in 2004 and 2005. The present high level of suicide and other terrorism is a price which Pakistan and the US should be prepared to pay tactically for a strategic victory over terrorism. The present high level of terrorism could continue in the Pashtun belt at least for another 18 months if not longer. Better territorial control would not mean better control over terrorism as a phenomenon.
6. A battle against a disrupting phenomenon such as terrorism---suicide or otherwise--- takes a long time to succeed. We had ourselves seen this in our Punjab at the height of Khalistani terrorism. It flared up after the military operation in the Golden Temple of Amritsar in June 1984. It took us another 11 years to bring it under control even though the Khalistanis did not indulge in suicide terrorism and did not have access to the kind of weapons and explosive devices to which the jihadi terrorists of today are having access. (14-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, March 12, 2010
ANTI-ARMY ANGER REMAINS STRONG IN PAKISTAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--- PAPER NO. 629
B.RAMAN
The two suicide attacks against army vehicles in the Cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, which caused 45 fatalities, nine of them of military personnel, were followed by six low-intensity blasts in non-military areas which did not cause any fatalities. The Pashtun Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its Punjabi associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) are reported to have claimed responsibility for the two suicide blasts. No responsibility has been claimed for the subsequent low-intensity blasts.
2. The suicide blasts highlight the continuing capability of the TTP to operate in non-tribal areas with the help of its Punjabi associates despite the losses suffered by it in the Pashtun belt in recent weeks due to the effective missile strikes by US Drones (pilotless planes) against TTP hide-outs in North and South Waziristan.
3. The selection of the targets by the TTP and the LEJ for their three major strikes this week in Lahore reflects their continuing anger against the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is the police agency for counter-terrorism coming under the Ministry of the Interior, the police of Punjab, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Army. This anger, which came to the fore after the Army's commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007, has been kept alive by the USA's Drone strikes and by the Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These military operations are seen by the TTP and its Punjabi associates as undertaken under US pressure. The anti-US and the anti-Army anger are fanning each other.
4. The focus of the retaliatory attacks have been in the NWFP and the FATA, from where many of the Pashtun recruits of the Frontier Corps,
a para-military unit officered by the Army, come, and in Punjab from where the Punjabi soldiers of the Army come. By keeping up the attacks in Lahore and other places in Punjab, including Rawalpindi, and in the Pashtun belt, the TTP and its Punjabi associates are trying to create a divide between the Punjabi officer class and their Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers and thereby weaken their loyalty to the officers.
5. There have already been indications of some dilution of discipline and loyalty among the Pashtuns of the FC, but there are as yet no indications of a similar dilution among the Punjabi soldiers of the Army. The military leadership would be worried that if the jihadis keep up the pressure it could over a period of time have a negative impact on the Punjabi soldiers and this could affect the Army's capability against India.
6. The Army's concern is how to keep up the seeming co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban without letting it weaken its capability against India. It cannot discontinue its co-operation with the US which has kept the Pakistani economy afloat. The Pakistani State badly needs the cash flow from the US.By expanding their operations in Punjab, the TTP and its Punjabi associates are seeking to convey a message to the military leadership that its continued support to the US operations in the FATA and Afghanistan could weaken the loyalty of its Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers and dilute its capability against India.
7. The TTP, despite the availability of a large number of Pashtun suicide bombers, would not be effective in Punjab without the co-operation of Punjabi terrorist organisations, which provide local sanctuaries, logistics and recruits. There are principally five Punjabi terrorist organisations---the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the anti- Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Of these, the LET has not been affected by the anti-Army anger. It continues to maintain its loyalty to the Army. It follows a dual policy of co-operating with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban against the US and with the Pakistan Army against India. For reasons not clear, the HUM has not been very active in recent months.
8. The HUJI, the JEM and the LEJ have been whole-heartedly co-operating with the TTP in its anti-Army operations. Whereas the LET pays equal attention to the jihad against the US and India, the HUJI, the JEM, the LEJ and the TTP are for the moment paying greater attention to their jihad against the US and the Pakistani Army than to their jihad against India. They prefer to leave the responsibility for the jihad against India to the LET.
9. According to Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani journalist who writes for the "News" (March 13,2010), 1,217 persons were killed in 80 suicide bomber attacks during 2009. This was the higest figure of fatalities in a year since the Lal Masjid raid. Of the 1,217 fatalities, 863 were of civilians and the remaining 354 belonged to the security and law-enforcement agencies. Of them, 137 belonged to the police, 102 were Army officers and Jawans, 51 were FC personnel, 28 were staff members of the Inter-Services Intelligence, 22 belonged to the Khasadar Force, 12 belonged to the Pakistan Rangers and two others were employees of the Pakistan Navy. On an average, 72 civilians and 30 security and law-enforcement agencies’ personnel lost their lives every month in 2009 due to suicide bombings.
10. According to him, there has been a steep rise in fatalities due to suicide bombings between January 1 and March 12 this year as compared to the corresponding period of last year. There have been 321 fatalities in 15 suicide bombings till March 12 this year as against only 105 during the corresponding period last year.
11. He writes: "Authorities investigating the unending spate of suicide bombings are of the view most of these attacks have been carried out by the Punjabi Taliban belonging to four sectarian-cum-Jihadi groups which are working in tandem with the Pashtun-dominated Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. They believe several South Punjab-based members of the banned Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, who had taken part in the Afghan war, have now tied up with the TTP to carry out suicide attacks across Pakistan, especially targeting key military installations. South Punjab has grabbed the attention of Pakistani authorities over the past few months because of the involvement of the Taliban in a spate of Fidayeen-style suicide bombings, including the one targeting the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi on October 10, 2009."
12. What would be the impact of these attacks and the resulting fatalities on the morale of the Punjabi soldiers? It is likely that many of the civilians killed were the relatives of soldiers. The Army could come to the conclusion that the only way it could maintain the morale of its Punjabi soldiers is by intensifying its proxy war against India while pretending to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.One of the tempting options for the Army will be to wean the HUJI and the JEM away from the TTP by persuading them to join with the LET against India. If it succeeds, it could reduce the pressure on the Army.
13. The increase in anti- Pakistan Army terrorism in Punjab has to be closely monitored by India in order to assess its impact on Pakistan's proxy war against India. ( 13-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The two suicide attacks against army vehicles in the Cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, which caused 45 fatalities, nine of them of military personnel, were followed by six low-intensity blasts in non-military areas which did not cause any fatalities. The Pashtun Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its Punjabi associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) are reported to have claimed responsibility for the two suicide blasts. No responsibility has been claimed for the subsequent low-intensity blasts.
2. The suicide blasts highlight the continuing capability of the TTP to operate in non-tribal areas with the help of its Punjabi associates despite the losses suffered by it in the Pashtun belt in recent weeks due to the effective missile strikes by US Drones (pilotless planes) against TTP hide-outs in North and South Waziristan.
3. The selection of the targets by the TTP and the LEJ for their three major strikes this week in Lahore reflects their continuing anger against the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is the police agency for counter-terrorism coming under the Ministry of the Interior, the police of Punjab, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Army. This anger, which came to the fore after the Army's commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007, has been kept alive by the USA's Drone strikes and by the Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These military operations are seen by the TTP and its Punjabi associates as undertaken under US pressure. The anti-US and the anti-Army anger are fanning each other.
4. The focus of the retaliatory attacks have been in the NWFP and the FATA, from where many of the Pashtun recruits of the Frontier Corps,
a para-military unit officered by the Army, come, and in Punjab from where the Punjabi soldiers of the Army come. By keeping up the attacks in Lahore and other places in Punjab, including Rawalpindi, and in the Pashtun belt, the TTP and its Punjabi associates are trying to create a divide between the Punjabi officer class and their Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers and thereby weaken their loyalty to the officers.
5. There have already been indications of some dilution of discipline and loyalty among the Pashtuns of the FC, but there are as yet no indications of a similar dilution among the Punjabi soldiers of the Army. The military leadership would be worried that if the jihadis keep up the pressure it could over a period of time have a negative impact on the Punjabi soldiers and this could affect the Army's capability against India.
6. The Army's concern is how to keep up the seeming co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban without letting it weaken its capability against India. It cannot discontinue its co-operation with the US which has kept the Pakistani economy afloat. The Pakistani State badly needs the cash flow from the US.By expanding their operations in Punjab, the TTP and its Punjabi associates are seeking to convey a message to the military leadership that its continued support to the US operations in the FATA and Afghanistan could weaken the loyalty of its Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers and dilute its capability against India.
7. The TTP, despite the availability of a large number of Pashtun suicide bombers, would not be effective in Punjab without the co-operation of Punjabi terrorist organisations, which provide local sanctuaries, logistics and recruits. There are principally five Punjabi terrorist organisations---the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the anti- Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Of these, the LET has not been affected by the anti-Army anger. It continues to maintain its loyalty to the Army. It follows a dual policy of co-operating with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban against the US and with the Pakistan Army against India. For reasons not clear, the HUM has not been very active in recent months.
8. The HUJI, the JEM and the LEJ have been whole-heartedly co-operating with the TTP in its anti-Army operations. Whereas the LET pays equal attention to the jihad against the US and India, the HUJI, the JEM, the LEJ and the TTP are for the moment paying greater attention to their jihad against the US and the Pakistani Army than to their jihad against India. They prefer to leave the responsibility for the jihad against India to the LET.
9. According to Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani journalist who writes for the "News" (March 13,2010), 1,217 persons were killed in 80 suicide bomber attacks during 2009. This was the higest figure of fatalities in a year since the Lal Masjid raid. Of the 1,217 fatalities, 863 were of civilians and the remaining 354 belonged to the security and law-enforcement agencies. Of them, 137 belonged to the police, 102 were Army officers and Jawans, 51 were FC personnel, 28 were staff members of the Inter-Services Intelligence, 22 belonged to the Khasadar Force, 12 belonged to the Pakistan Rangers and two others were employees of the Pakistan Navy. On an average, 72 civilians and 30 security and law-enforcement agencies’ personnel lost their lives every month in 2009 due to suicide bombings.
10. According to him, there has been a steep rise in fatalities due to suicide bombings between January 1 and March 12 this year as compared to the corresponding period of last year. There have been 321 fatalities in 15 suicide bombings till March 12 this year as against only 105 during the corresponding period last year.
11. He writes: "Authorities investigating the unending spate of suicide bombings are of the view most of these attacks have been carried out by the Punjabi Taliban belonging to four sectarian-cum-Jihadi groups which are working in tandem with the Pashtun-dominated Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. They believe several South Punjab-based members of the banned Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, who had taken part in the Afghan war, have now tied up with the TTP to carry out suicide attacks across Pakistan, especially targeting key military installations. South Punjab has grabbed the attention of Pakistani authorities over the past few months because of the involvement of the Taliban in a spate of Fidayeen-style suicide bombings, including the one targeting the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi on October 10, 2009."
12. What would be the impact of these attacks and the resulting fatalities on the morale of the Punjabi soldiers? It is likely that many of the civilians killed were the relatives of soldiers. The Army could come to the conclusion that the only way it could maintain the morale of its Punjabi soldiers is by intensifying its proxy war against India while pretending to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.One of the tempting options for the Army will be to wean the HUJI and the JEM away from the TTP by persuading them to join with the LET against India. If it succeeds, it could reduce the pressure on the Army.
13. The increase in anti- Pakistan Army terrorism in Punjab has to be closely monitored by India in order to assess its impact on Pakistan's proxy war against India. ( 13-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
TALIBAN & LEJ SEND STRONG MESSAGE TO KAYANI & PASHA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR-- PAPER NO 628
B.RAMAN
In an apparent message to Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, and Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), two suicide bombers struck at military vehicles moving through the cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, killing at least 39 persons, six of them army personnel, and injuring 95 others.
2. While no claim of responsibility has so far been made, the needle of suspicion points at the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known, and its Punjabi terror associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Police sources in Lahore suspect that the attacks were in reprisal for the stepped-up Drone (pilotless plane) strikes by the US, the arrests of some Afghan Taliban leaders by the Pakistani authorities and the reported deaths since the beginning of this year of three important terrorist leaders due to the Drone attacks---- Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, whose death has so far been denied by the TTP,Qari Mohammad Zafar of the LEJ and Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET). While the still unadmitted ( by the TTP) death of Hakinullah was reported to have taken place in January, the other two deaths were reported to have taken place in February.
3. The TTP and other organisations associated with it such as the LEJ have been threatening the Government and its military-intelligence establishment with reprisal attacks if the Drone strikes and the military operations in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency are not called off and the army reinforcements sent there withdrawn.
4 The twin suicide attacks against military vehicles in Lahore took place two days after Gen.Kayani was reported to have given an extension of service to Pasha, who is due to retire later this month, and a few days before the expected arrival of Kayani and Pasha in Washington DC for talks with their US counterparts. One could expect more reprisal attacks on military targets in the coming days to step up pressure on the Army and the ISI to reverse the present policy of co-operation with the US. ( 12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In an apparent message to Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, and Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), two suicide bombers struck at military vehicles moving through the cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, killing at least 39 persons, six of them army personnel, and injuring 95 others.
2. While no claim of responsibility has so far been made, the needle of suspicion points at the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known, and its Punjabi terror associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Police sources in Lahore suspect that the attacks were in reprisal for the stepped-up Drone (pilotless plane) strikes by the US, the arrests of some Afghan Taliban leaders by the Pakistani authorities and the reported deaths since the beginning of this year of three important terrorist leaders due to the Drone attacks---- Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, whose death has so far been denied by the TTP,Qari Mohammad Zafar of the LEJ and Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET). While the still unadmitted ( by the TTP) death of Hakinullah was reported to have taken place in January, the other two deaths were reported to have taken place in February.
3. The TTP and other organisations associated with it such as the LEJ have been threatening the Government and its military-intelligence establishment with reprisal attacks if the Drone strikes and the military operations in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency are not called off and the army reinforcements sent there withdrawn.
4 The twin suicide attacks against military vehicles in Lahore took place two days after Gen.Kayani was reported to have given an extension of service to Pasha, who is due to retire later this month, and a few days before the expected arrival of Kayani and Pasha in Washington DC for talks with their US counterparts. One could expect more reprisal attacks on military targets in the coming days to step up pressure on the Army and the ISI to reverse the present policy of co-operation with the US. ( 12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA
B.RAMAN
Given below are my replies to a set of questions on the Maoist insurgency in India e-mailed to me by a journalist of a Brazilian online journal:
1 Who are the Maoists in India nowadays?
The Maoists are the cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), who are fighting against the State in the tribal areas of Central India-----mainly in Andhra Pradesh,Chattisgarh, Jharkand, Orissa and West Bengal.They also have some activity in Maharashtra and Bihar. It is essentially a movement of Maoist ideologues for the capture of political power through the barrel of the gun by exploiting the economic grievances of the poor tribals of central India.
2. How did they appear? Do they keep the same ideology from the Cold War?
It is a movement inspired by the ideology of Mao Zedong. They believe in Mao's tactics of capture of political power through a rural revolt of poor and exploited peasants and landless workers.Among the foreign ideological influences on them are those of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao, the Shining Path of Peru and the Maoists of Nepal. Even though the Chinese Communists discarded much of Maoist ideology after his death, his followers in India continue to follow them. They look upon the present leaders of China as revisionists.
3 What is the relation with the Communist Party?
They do not agree with the ideology of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other leftist parties which are against violence and which believe in acquiring political power by contesting in elections. The Maoists are fighting against the present Government of CPI (Marxist) in West Bengal which came to power through elections.
4 What are the main objectives of the group?
Capture of political power through a rural insurgency of the rural poor in order to work for the uplift of the poor people. It is essentially a movement of the rural poor and the backward tribals. It has no popular support in the urban areas and from the industrial workers.
5 Maoists and Naxalites are the same thing?
The Maoists' violent struggle originally started in the 1960s in a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. They used to be called Naxalites. They have now spread to other areas outside West Bengal and call themselves Maoists. Yes, the Naxalites and the Maoists are one and the same.
6 Can we compare them to radical Islamist groups?
One cannot. The jihadi terrorism is an urban movement. The Maoist movement is a rural insurgency. The jihadi terrorism is a religious movement against non-Muslims. The Maoist movement has nothing to do with religion. The Maoists don't believe in religion. The Maoist movement is a movement of the rural have-nots. The Maoists are Indian citizens. It is an indigenous insurgent movement. The jihadis are a mix of radicalised Muslims from India and Pakistan. They are trained in Pakistan by its Inter-Services Intelligence with the help of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The jihadi movement is a global movement. The Maoist movement is not.
7 Are the Maoists more dangerous than Al Qaeda? Why?
Al Qaeda is a terrorist organisation with a global political and religious agenda. The Maoists are an insurgent organisation with a purely Indian and social class agenda. Al Qaeda believes in indiscriminate killing of civilians. The Maoists believe in targeted killing of civilians. Apart from the security forces, the Maoists kill only those civilians whom they look upon as class enemies such as landlords and forest contractors. Al Qaeda has till now not posed a threat to India's internal security because it has practically no support in the Indian Muslim community. The Maoists pose a serious threat to India's internal security because they have considerable support from the rural poor in the tribal areas of Central India.
8 From where does their philosophy come from?
Already answered above
9 Do the Maoists have support from sectors or regions in India?
Already answered above
10 Why and how the Government have to deal with them?
The Government has to follow a two-pronged policy. It has to undertake a crash programme for the economic and social development of the poor tribals in Central India and take legal action against landlords and forest contractors and government officials exploiting and harassing the poor tribals. At the same time, it has to take action against the armed cadres of the Maoists and their leaders. It should not succumb to violence. It should show a caring attitude to the poor tribals.
11 In which extension this support makes more difficult the operations of the authorities?
The operations of the authorities are rendered difficult by the failure of the Government to modernise rural policing, poor road communications in the rural areas, and the lack of co-operation from the people of the areas who have sympathy for the Maoists.
12 How does the modus operandi work? Is it similar to the Al Qaeda’s one?
It has nothing to do with Al Qaeda. It is a rural insurgent movement which has to be dealt with using a mix of techniques----better rural policing, better attention to the grievances and problems of the rural poor, crash development of the rural areas, and strengthening the capability of the security forces to collect intelligece from the rural areas and prevent the Maoists from moving in large groups and attacking the security forces.The Maoists don't use improvised explosive devices. They use land mines. They often use weapons captured from the security forces. The Maoist modus operandi is more like the modus operandi used by the communist insurgents of Malaya, Thailand and Burma in the 1950s and the 1960s.
13 To deny the existence of a group or just combat could lead to a reinforcement of Maoists?
Question not clear
14 The strategies to fight against them are the same that they use with Al Qaeda?
Already answered above.
15 Can the Maoists make a major attack as Mumbai in 2008?
The Maoists have made many major attacks on the security forces, overran their posts, and captured large quantities of arms and ammunition. But they did not receive the kind of attention the LET received in Mumbai on 26/11 because they operate in rural areas and not in urban areas. They operate far away from the TV cameras. They don't attack iconic targets. They attack class targets in rural areas.
16 Are there links with terrorists groups in others countries?
They have ideological ties of solidarity with Maoists in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines. They don't have operational links.
17 Is there any peace agreement between the Government and the Maoists? What can we expect in a closer future?
There is no peace agreement. The Government is prepared to hold talks with them on their grievances if they give up the use of violence for achieving political and economic objectives and surrender their arms and ammunition. They are not prepared to. The Maoists pose a typical dilemma to Govt. policy-makers----security vs development. Without security, there can be no development.Without development, there can be no security.How to harmonise the requirements of security and development?.No answer to this question has been found so far.(12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Given below are my replies to a set of questions on the Maoist insurgency in India e-mailed to me by a journalist of a Brazilian online journal:
1 Who are the Maoists in India nowadays?
The Maoists are the cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), who are fighting against the State in the tribal areas of Central India-----mainly in Andhra Pradesh,Chattisgarh, Jharkand, Orissa and West Bengal.They also have some activity in Maharashtra and Bihar. It is essentially a movement of Maoist ideologues for the capture of political power through the barrel of the gun by exploiting the economic grievances of the poor tribals of central India.
2. How did they appear? Do they keep the same ideology from the Cold War?
It is a movement inspired by the ideology of Mao Zedong. They believe in Mao's tactics of capture of political power through a rural revolt of poor and exploited peasants and landless workers.Among the foreign ideological influences on them are those of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao, the Shining Path of Peru and the Maoists of Nepal. Even though the Chinese Communists discarded much of Maoist ideology after his death, his followers in India continue to follow them. They look upon the present leaders of China as revisionists.
3 What is the relation with the Communist Party?
They do not agree with the ideology of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other leftist parties which are against violence and which believe in acquiring political power by contesting in elections. The Maoists are fighting against the present Government of CPI (Marxist) in West Bengal which came to power through elections.
4 What are the main objectives of the group?
Capture of political power through a rural insurgency of the rural poor in order to work for the uplift of the poor people. It is essentially a movement of the rural poor and the backward tribals. It has no popular support in the urban areas and from the industrial workers.
5 Maoists and Naxalites are the same thing?
The Maoists' violent struggle originally started in the 1960s in a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. They used to be called Naxalites. They have now spread to other areas outside West Bengal and call themselves Maoists. Yes, the Naxalites and the Maoists are one and the same.
6 Can we compare them to radical Islamist groups?
One cannot. The jihadi terrorism is an urban movement. The Maoist movement is a rural insurgency. The jihadi terrorism is a religious movement against non-Muslims. The Maoist movement has nothing to do with religion. The Maoists don't believe in religion. The Maoist movement is a movement of the rural have-nots. The Maoists are Indian citizens. It is an indigenous insurgent movement. The jihadis are a mix of radicalised Muslims from India and Pakistan. They are trained in Pakistan by its Inter-Services Intelligence with the help of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The jihadi movement is a global movement. The Maoist movement is not.
7 Are the Maoists more dangerous than Al Qaeda? Why?
Al Qaeda is a terrorist organisation with a global political and religious agenda. The Maoists are an insurgent organisation with a purely Indian and social class agenda. Al Qaeda believes in indiscriminate killing of civilians. The Maoists believe in targeted killing of civilians. Apart from the security forces, the Maoists kill only those civilians whom they look upon as class enemies such as landlords and forest contractors. Al Qaeda has till now not posed a threat to India's internal security because it has practically no support in the Indian Muslim community. The Maoists pose a serious threat to India's internal security because they have considerable support from the rural poor in the tribal areas of Central India.
8 From where does their philosophy come from?
Already answered above
9 Do the Maoists have support from sectors or regions in India?
Already answered above
10 Why and how the Government have to deal with them?
The Government has to follow a two-pronged policy. It has to undertake a crash programme for the economic and social development of the poor tribals in Central India and take legal action against landlords and forest contractors and government officials exploiting and harassing the poor tribals. At the same time, it has to take action against the armed cadres of the Maoists and their leaders. It should not succumb to violence. It should show a caring attitude to the poor tribals.
11 In which extension this support makes more difficult the operations of the authorities?
The operations of the authorities are rendered difficult by the failure of the Government to modernise rural policing, poor road communications in the rural areas, and the lack of co-operation from the people of the areas who have sympathy for the Maoists.
12 How does the modus operandi work? Is it similar to the Al Qaeda’s one?
It has nothing to do with Al Qaeda. It is a rural insurgent movement which has to be dealt with using a mix of techniques----better rural policing, better attention to the grievances and problems of the rural poor, crash development of the rural areas, and strengthening the capability of the security forces to collect intelligece from the rural areas and prevent the Maoists from moving in large groups and attacking the security forces.The Maoists don't use improvised explosive devices. They use land mines. They often use weapons captured from the security forces. The Maoist modus operandi is more like the modus operandi used by the communist insurgents of Malaya, Thailand and Burma in the 1950s and the 1960s.
13 To deny the existence of a group or just combat could lead to a reinforcement of Maoists?
Question not clear
14 The strategies to fight against them are the same that they use with Al Qaeda?
Already answered above.
15 Can the Maoists make a major attack as Mumbai in 2008?
The Maoists have made many major attacks on the security forces, overran their posts, and captured large quantities of arms and ammunition. But they did not receive the kind of attention the LET received in Mumbai on 26/11 because they operate in rural areas and not in urban areas. They operate far away from the TV cameras. They don't attack iconic targets. They attack class targets in rural areas.
16 Are there links with terrorists groups in others countries?
They have ideological ties of solidarity with Maoists in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines. They don't have operational links.
17 Is there any peace agreement between the Government and the Maoists? What can we expect in a closer future?
There is no peace agreement. The Government is prepared to hold talks with them on their grievances if they give up the use of violence for achieving political and economic objectives and surrender their arms and ammunition. They are not prepared to. The Maoists pose a typical dilemma to Govt. policy-makers----security vs development. Without security, there can be no development.Without development, there can be no security.How to harmonise the requirements of security and development?.No answer to this question has been found so far.(12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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